THREE METAPHORS OF LEARNING
Models of Innovative Knowledge Communities and Three
Metaphors of Learning
Sami Paavola, Lasse Lipponen, and Kai Hakkarainen
University of Helsinki
Review of Educational Research, Winter 2004, Vol. 74, No. 4, pp. 557-576.
The authors analyze and compare three models of innovative knowledge communities:
Nonaka and Takeuchi’s model of knowledge-creation, Engeström’s model of
expansive learning, and Bereiter’s model of knowledge building. Despite basic
differences, these models have pertinent features in common: Most fundamentally,
they emphasize dynamic processes for transforming prevailing knowledge and
practices. Beyond characterizing learning as knowledge acquisition (the acquisition
metaphor) and as participation in a social community (the participation metaphor),
the authors of this article distinguish a third aspect: learning (and intelligent activity
in general) as knowledge creation (the knowledge-creation metaphor). This approach
focuses on investigating mediated processes of knowledge creation that have become
especially important in a knowledge society.
KEYWORDS: expansive learning, innovative knowledge community, knowledge
building, knowledge creation, metaphors of learning.
In her article “On Two Metaphors for Learning and the Dangers of Choosing
Just One,” Anna Sfard (1998) proposed that there are two main ways of thinking
about the genesis of new knowledge, namely, the acquisition and participation
metaphors. Behind these two metaphors is the debate between cognitive and situated
(or “situative”) perspectives on learning and human activity (see Anderson, Reder, &
Simon, 1996, 1997; Greeno, 1997). The acquisition metaphor, roughly speaking,
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relies on a “folk theory” of mind and learning. It is in accordance with the commonly
held view that people’s behavior is determined, and can be accounted for, by their
beliefs and desires. In this view, the mind is a kind of container of knowledge, and
learning is a process that fills the container, implanting knowledge there. Hence
knowledge is understood as a property or capacity of an individual mind, in which
learning is a matter of construction, acquisition, and outcomes, which are realized in
the process of transfer (that is, the process of using and applying knowledge in new
situations). This view emphasizes computational models of mind and knowledge,
aiming to simulate the way that the individual mind operates with knowledge.
In contrast, adherents of the participation metaphor examine learning as a
process of participation in various cultural practices and shared learning activities. In
this view, the focus is on activities (“knowing”) more than on outcomes or products
(“knowledge”). Knowledge does not exist either in a world of its own or in individual
minds, but is an aspect of participation in cultural practices (Brown {558}, Collins, &
Duguid, 1989; Lave, 1988; Lave & Wenger, 1991). Cognition and knowing are
distributed over both individuals and their environments, and learning is “situated” in
these relations and networks of distributed activities of participation. The argument is
that knowledge and knowing cannot be separated from situations where they are used
or where they take place. In the participation metaphor, learning is a matter of
participation in practices and actions (Anderson, Reder, & Simon, 1997; Greeno,
1997), “enculturation” (Brown, Collins, & Duguid, 1989), or “legitimate peripheral
participation” (Lave & Wenger, 1991). In this framework, terms such as acquisition
and accumulation are supplemented, or in some cases replaced, by concepts such as
discourse, interaction, activity, and participation.
In the history of the learning sciences (and “cognitive science”), the
acquisition approach has been the prominent one. However, in the recent years, the
participation metaphor has attracted considerable attention. From her analysis, Sfard
(1998) concluded that both perspectives are needed; they are not simply rivals but
also complement each other. Anderson and his colleagues (2000) arrive at the same
conclusion. They point out that both the cognitive and the situative perspective are
needed, and more research should be pursued on both fronts (see also Cobb &
Bowers, 1999; Greeno & Middle School Mathematics Through Applications Project
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Group, 1998). This “consensus” approach appears to be a way of avoiding a drastic
conflict between the two approaches. Combining the two may be problematic,
however.
In this article, we analyze three influential models of innovative knowledge
communities: (a) Ikujiro Nonaka and Hirotaka Takeuchi’s model of knowledge
creation; (b) Yrjö Engeström’s model of expansive learning; and (b) Carl Bereiter’s
model of knowledge building. Despite some basic differences in their backgrounds
and presuppositions, these models have surprising similarities. However, we do not
argue that they are similar, but rather that they have important commonalities. More
important, we propose that the commonalities contradict the distinctions commonly
asserted between the two approaches and that, in fact, both are variants of a third
approach: the knowledge-creation model of learning (Paavola, Lipponen, &
Hakkarainen, 2002; Hakkarainen, Palonen, Paavola, & Lehtinen, 2004). We maintain
that there is room—and a need—for a third main metaphor of learning, whose
characteristics can be illuminated by analyzing all three models as powerful
representatives of this metaphor. The knowledge-creation model strongly emphasizes
the aspect of collective knowledge creation for developing shared objects of activity,
an aspect that has not been the focus of the other two models. Other elements also
differentiate the knowledge-creation approach. However, it shares common aspects
with both the acquisition approach and the participation approach, and is thus a
promising way of softening the contrast between those two perspectives.
Three Models of Innovative Knowledge Communities
All three of the models discussed so far represent attempts to determine how
innovative communities are and should be organized to facilitate advancement of
practices and knowledge creation. We refer to them as “models of innovative
knowledge communities.” Nonaka and Takeuchi’s model focuses on knowledge
management and organization in firms to enable them to operate innovatively.
Engeström’s model is strongly rooted in the tradition of cultural-historical activity
theory; it seeks not only to analyze but also to change the learning and working {559}
practices of organizations. Bereiter’s theory of knowledge building is a new way of
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understanding education, on the basis of criticism of the folk theory of mind and
knowledge. At the outset, these models appear to have little in common. They were
developed for very different purposes, representing very different methodological
traditions and theoretical foundations. The present comparison does not capture all of
their aspects. However, even a general analysis of the shared elements of these
models reveals important aspects of innovative knowledge communities and
knowledge creation.
Nonaka and Takeuchi’s Model of Knowledge Creation
In their book The Knowledge-Creating Company, Ikujiro Nonaka and
Hirotaka Takeuchi (1995) presented a model of innovation processes, central to which
is an epistemological distinction between two kinds of knowledge, tacit and explicit.
Explicit knowledge is knowledge that is easy to articulate and express formally and in
clear terms. Tacit knowledge, which is more important in creating innovations, is
“personal knowledge embedded in individual experience and involves intangible
factors such as personal belief, perspective, and the value system” (viii). Another
fundamental point in this model is an “ontological” framework of four levels of
“entities” that operate in knowledge creation: the individual, group, organizational,
and inter-organizational levels. According to Nonaka and Takeuchi, knowledge is
created and transformed in an ascending process, or spiral, from the individual level
to the group and organizational levels, and finally between organizations.
The dynamics of this model arise from the interaction between tacit
knowledge and explicit knowledge. A “knowledge spiral” is grounded in four
complementary types of knowledge conversion: (a) from tacit knowledge to tacit
knowledge, labeled socialization; (b) from tacit to explicit knowledge, called
externalization; (c) from explicit to explicit knowledge, or combination; and (d) from
explicit to tacit knowledge, or internalization. The knowledge creation spiral starts
from socialization, sharing tacit knowledge and experiences at the group level. In this
phase, a close interaction and collaboration within a group is needed. The aim of the
socialization process is to create common understanding and trust within the group.
The next phase, externalization, is the central one in knowledge creation. In this
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phase, tacit knowledge is explicated and conceptualized by means of metaphors,
analogies, and concepts. In Nonaka and Takeuchi’s model, the basic source of
innovation is tacit knowledge, which needs to be explicated in order to be transformed
into knowledge that is useful at the levels of the group and the whole organization. At
the combination stage, units of already-existing explicit knowledge are combined and
exchanged. Finally, to have real effects in an organization, the explicit knowledge of
the group or organization must be internalized by individuals and transformed into
tacit knowledge and into action through “learning by doing.” After internalization, a
new round of the knowledge spiral will begin.
Nonaka and Takeuchi provide various examples of the importance of
externalization of tacit knowledge for innovation in Japanese firms. Personal hunches
must be convertible to explicit knowledge and shared with others to be fruitful.
Nonaka and Takeuchi describe, for example, the development of a new type of urban
car by Honda. Characteristic of this process were slogans and phrases (such as
“Theory of Automobile Evolution”) that were a form of explication of the personal
hunches of various people. From considering how automobiles (taken as living
beings) {560} would evolve emerged the concept of “Tall Boy” (a car that grows
higher without becoming otherwise bigger) that provided a background for modern
city cars. The slogans operated as ideals for the whole group of developers (Nonaka &
Takeuchi, 1995, pp. 11–12). In another example given by Nonaka and Takeuchi, an
essential aspect of developing the automatic home bread-making machine was
explication of the tacit knowledge of master bakers. The engineers and developers
alone did not have success in constructing a machine that could bake tasty bread. To
learn the skill of making bread, they apprenticed to a famous master baker. An
important element of this process occurred when one of the developers was able to
explicate a crucial aspect of baker’s kneading skill. After this explication, the
knowledge could be built into the construction of the machine, although the effort was
time consuming. The point is that explication of tacit knowledge was of crucial
importance in the genesis of the innovation (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995, pp. 63–64,
95–123).
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Engeström’s Model of Expansive Learning
Yrjö Engeström (1999b) has studied and developed innovative learning cycles
in work teams by using Cultural-Historical Activity Theory (CHAT) and the theory of
expansive learning to provide the framework for his analysis. The central tenet of
CHAT is that human beings do not live in a vacuum but are embedded in their
sociocultural context, and that their behavior cannot be understood independently of
that context (Engeström, 1987; see also Engeström, Miettinen, & Punamäki, 1999).
The basic unit of analysis in CHAT is human activity, which is mediated through the
conceptual and material cultural artifacts people use. Engeström’s model of expansive
learning in work teams is based on a learning cycle with seven stages in its ideal form
(Engeström, 1999b, pp. 383–384; cf. Engeström, 1987, pp. 188–191, 321–336). First,
individual participants question and criticize certain existing practices. Second, they
analyze the situation; that is, they analyze the historical causes and empirical inner
relations of the activity system in question. Third, the participants engage in modeling
a new solution to the problematic situation. Fourth, they examine the new model by
experimenting to determine whether it works and what potentialities and limitations it
has. Fifth, they implement the new model to explore practical action and applications.
Sixth, they reflect on and evaluate the process. Finally, they engage in consolidating
the new practice in its new form. Through this expansive cycle, in which the
participants focus on reconceptualizing their own activity system in relation to their
shared objects of activity, both the objects and the existing scripts are
reconceptualized; the activity system is transformed; and new motives and objects for
the activity system are created. This sequential model should be understood as an
ideal or heuristic tool for analyzing elements of expansive learning, because the
cycles of expansive learning do not necessarily follow any fixed order.
Engeström and his colleagues (Engeström, Engeström, & Kärkkäinen, 1995;
Ahonen, Engeström, & Virkkunen, 2000) have developed an intervention method,
called the “boundary-crossing laboratory or “change laboratory,” that is used in
several types of workplaces—for example, telecommunication companies, hospitals,
and schools. The intent of the boundary-crossing laboratory is to guide the members
of a workplace community to reflect on their mutual activities with the help of
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researchers. It is based on an ethnographic approach to observing and recording a
community’s everyday activities. Advancement of knowledge is fun{561}damentally
dependent on changes in tools, methods, and active practices. For example, Ahonen,
Engeström, and Virkkunen (2000) investigated a telephone company that faced the
challenge of transforming itself from a provincial monopoly, providing basic
telephone services, to one that would provide knowledge-intensive and competitive
GSM mobile connections and digital network services. The boundary-crossing
laboratory focuses on making the constraints of a community’s current activity system
visible to the participants and helping them to move beyond the constraints. The
interventions focus on identifying the developmental challenges of the organization’s
activity system, collectively constructing a vision of the organization’s future, and
implementing a series of practical changes. Toward this end, the researchers may
observe and videotape work activities and interview workers, administrators, and
managers.
Bereiter’s Model of Knowledge Building
Carl Bereiter (2002) argued that the emergence of the knowledge society has
given rise to a view of knowledge as a thing that can be systematically produced and
shared among members of a community. In creating a theoretical and practical model
for future education, Scardamalia and Bereiter (1994) have proposed the concept of
knowledge building. Knowledge building refers to collective work for the
advancement and elaboration of conceptual artifacts (product plans, business
strategies, marketing plans, theories, ideas, and models), the entities of Karl Popper’s
World 3 (the world of cultural knowledge). Popper has emphasized that in addition to
physical and material reality (World 1) and the reality that concerns mental states
(World 2), there is a third realm (World 3), which includes conceptual entities such as
theories and ideas (Popper, 1972). World 3 is especially important for human beings
because they do not operate only in the physical and mental realms, but also
understand and develop objects belonging to the third realm. World 3 is dependent on
World 2 and World 1, but it is nevertheless rather autonomous. Bereiter criticizes
theories of learning that do not take into account World 3 and that therefore rely on
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the mind-as-container metaphor. In such theories, learning is viewed as an
accumulation of information ready-made for the human mind —the mind being
understood as a container or archive of knowledge.
An important aspect of Bereiter’s theory is to make a conceptual distinction
between learning, which operates in the realm of mental states (Popper’s World 2),
and knowledge building, which operates in the realm of theories and ideas (Popper’s
World 3). In modern enterprises, knowledge is considered to consist of objects or
conceptual artifacts that can be systematically produced and developed; in other
words, there is a process of knowledge building, not learning, in Bereiter’s sense. It
should be remarked that when we speak in this article about the knowledge-creation
metaphor of learning, we use the term “learning” quite broadly, to include what
Bereiter calls “knowledge building.” In any case, scientific research groups are
typically working with theories and models that may be understood as shared
knowledge objects rather than as representing mental states. Naturally, simple
learning (i.e. learning in Bereiter’s sense) does occur in the business world and in
scientific research, but it is not the main focus of these domains of activity. The
primary goal of members of an innovative expert community is not to learn something
(i.e., to change, or simply add to, their own mental states) but to solve problems,
originate new thoughts, and advance communal knowledge. In other words, their goal
is to {562} create new knowledge and add the value of conceptual artifacts. Bereiter
takes a pragmatic and naturalistic stance toward conceptual artifacts. Although they
are nonmaterial, we should consider them to be as real as the objects of World 1 (the
physical realm).
Bereiter’s knowledge-building approach has been used extensively in
educational institutions to guide students and teachers to engage in collaborative
efforts to develop their thoughts and ideas (Bereiter, 2002). Moreover, the model
provides conceptual foundations for research and development of groupware systems
(knowledge-building technology) deliberately designed to facilitate collaborative
work toward advancing shared knowledge artifacts (Scardamalia & Bereiter, 1994).
For instance, Ann Russell and her colleagues (see Russell, 2002) have analyzed an
interprofessional teams’ progress toward becoming a knowledge-building community
within a rehabilitation hospital. Traditionally, each profession engaged in its own
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training, whereas the present project guided them to engage in a knowledge-building
process as a multiprofessional team within their own work context. A collaborative
environment entitled Knowledge Forum (KF, see www.learn.motion.com) was used to
foster building of professional knowledge among the teams. The participants were
asked over 16-month period to use the KF environment to construct professional
learning portfolios to be read and commented on by their fellow professionals. These
learning portfolios turned out to provide a rich resource for advancement of the
participants’ professional community in ways that helped them to share their higher-
level reflections with each other. It is not a part of healthcare professionals’ culture to
engage in deliberate building of their knowledge and reflection of their practices.
Gradually, however, the participants took part in increasingly demanding discourses
in which they not only reported their own activities but also engaged in a genuine
multiprofessional process of building professional knowledge.
All the models presented above challenge common notions of what learning
and knowledge are. Table 1 provides a schematic representation of the key features of
the innovative communities as depicted in the three models.
Common Aspects of the Three Models of Innovative Communities
In spite of epistemological and ontological differences among the models of
Nonaka and Takeuchi, Engeström, and Bereiter, they have many features in common.
In the following paragraphs we present seven of their commonalities.
The Pursuit of Newness
All three models use the dynamics of knowledge creation and the pursuit of
newness as a focal starting point. Nonaka and Takeuchi point out that their focus is
“on knowledge creation, not on knowledge per se” (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995, p. 6).
This dynamic view of epistemology is the basis of their criticism of the “Western
epistemological tradition” (1995, p. 49), which, in their view, has emphasized
knowledge as such but has not provided sufficient means for analyzing how to create
new knowledge. Although their analysis of Western epistemology is rather crude (see
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especially 1995, pp. 21–27) and does not take into account new developments (e.g.,
chaos theory, LeCompte, 1994; self-organizing systems, Resnick, 1994;
connectionism, Dawson, 2004), it makes their own emphasis on {563}
TABLE 1
Three models of innovative knowledge communities
Nonaka & Takeuchi Engeström Bereiter
Type of processes
focused on
Emphasis on the
knowledge spiral,
based on tacit versus
explicit knowledge
Emphasis on material
object–oriented
activities and
practices
Emphasis on
knowledge building
with conceptual
artifacts
Source of
innovation
Transforming tacit
knowledge into
explicit knowledge
Overcoming
tensions,
disturbances, and
ambiguities through
expansive learning
Working
deliberately to
create and extend
knowledge objects
Scope of framework Ontological levels
(individual, group,
organizational, and
inter-organizational
Activity systems and
networks of activity
systems
Knowledge-
building
communities
knowledge creation very clear. Engeström’s model concentrates on expansive,
qualitative changes in activity systems (1987). He contrasts expansive learning with
“reactive” forms of learning, which presuppose a given context and a preset learning
task (1987, p. 2). According to Engeström, “[i]n important transformations of our
personal lives and organizational practices, we must learn new forms of activity
which are not yet there,” and in attempting to do so, standard theories of learning are
not enough (Engeström 2001, pp. 137–139). According to Bereiter (see Bereiter &
Scardamalia, 1993), creative expertise is the continuous effort of going beyond the
current level of accomplishment and working at the edge of one’s competence to
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adapt to the progressively changing requirements of the environment. In Bereiter’s
model, the conceptual artifacts of World 3 are not eternal verities or pure ideas, but
human constructions in constant process of actual or potential change and
improvement (2002, pp. 465–483). Bereiter distinguishes learning from knowledge
building by arguing that the main focus of experts is not only to improve their
individual understanding but to work for developing new culturally shared knowledge
objects. Activity theory makes a corresponding distinction by distinguishing between
“learning the given new” (i.e., transmitting culturally given knowledge to students, as
is typical in formal education) and “learning the societal new” (i.e., innovative
learning activity at workplaces that focuses on collaborative mastering of culturally
new practices and knowledge) (Sutter, 2002). It is no coincidence that in all these
models, innovative learning and knowledge advancement are characterized as cyclical
and iterative processes, which have several implications. Knowledge creation often
requires sustained periods of time and is not correctly described by traditional
narratives of heroic individuals making ingenious discoveries through sudden
moments of insight. Moreover, knowledge creation is not linear (Engeström, 1987, p.
214). It is more a process of ambiguity and “creative chaos” (Nonaka & Takeuchi,
1995, pp. 78–80), involving the sense of progress. Knowledge creation does not start
{564} from scratch but is a process of transforming and developing—sometimes in a
radical way—existing ideas and practices.
Mediating Elements to avoid Cartesian dualisms
All of these models, according to their proponents, stand in opposition to
mentalism and Cartesian dichotomies by bringing mediating elements to the process
of knowledge creation (although in Nonaka and Takeuchi’s model the role of
mediation is not so obvious). Nonaka and Takeuchi try to avoid the “Cartesian split”
between subject and object (a dichotomy that they view as common in Western
thought) by referring to the Japanese way of thinking. Japanese tradition does not
separate humanity and nature, body and mind, or self and other as sharply as the
Cartesian tradition has done (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995, pp. 20–32). It does not so
clearly separate knowledge and rationality from emotion, figurative speech, action,
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and so on; in the processes of innovation, these vague and even chaotic elements are
fuel for the emergence of something new. To avoid such dualisms, and in particular,
mentalism, Engeström emphasizes the element of thirdness (i.e., mediation) in
expansive learning (Engeström, 1987, pp. 221–222, 302–304). The concepts of
activity and dialectics operate as mediating factors, bringing dynamics to the model
(pp. 140, 310). Similarly, Bereiter opposes Cartesian dualisms between the material
realm (World 1) and the mental realm (World 2) by emphasizing the objects of World
3. In this sense, the objects of World 3 can be considered to be mediators between
mind and matter, although Bereiter himself does not emphasize such a role explicitly.
Questions and questioning also have an important mediating role in these
models. All of three models are intended to capture the dynamic processes of
innovative learning and knowledge advancement, where questioning and various
disturbances initiate cycles of innovation. In Bereiter’s model, questions and problems
of understanding are the moving force for progressive knowledge building (Bereiter
& Scardamalia, 1993, pp. 210–211). In Engeström’s model, questioning and criticism
of existing practices is the starting point of the expansive learning cycle (Engeström,
1999b, p. 383). Although Nonaka and Takeuchi do not emphasize conflicts or
questioning, those topics are involved in their model (1995, p. 13–14). We will return
to this issue.
Viewing Knowledge Creation As a Social Process
In all of the models, knowledge creation is fundamentally a social process.
The models appear to share a view that social interaction provides essential cognitive
resources for human cognitive accomplishment (Miyake, 1986; Hutchins, 1995;
Vygotsky, 1978). Understanding is seen as iterative in nature; that is, it emerges
through a series of attempts to explain and understand the processes and mechanisms
being investigated. In a shared problem-solving process, agents who have partial but
different information about the problem in question appear to improve their
understanding collectively through social interaction. Accordingly, new ideas and
innovations emerge between rather than within people. Each of the three models
provides a perspective of its own on epistemic communities and organizations. All
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share the idea that innovation or intelligence arises from systemic features of a whole
community or organization. Knowledge creation is not primarily a matter of creative
individuals, but instead requires fundamental reorganization of the {565} practices of
a whole community. Epistemological processes require supporting social processes,
and vice versa.
Emphasis on the Role of Individual Subjects in Knowledge Creation
Although in these models, innovation processes are fundamentally social,
individual activity also is emphasized—not that of individuals separately but of
individuals acting as a part of a stream of social activities. Nonaka and Takeuchi state
that new knowledge always starts with an individual (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995, pp.
13, 59). Thus, individuals’ hunches and tacit knowledge should be explicated for
communal and organizational use. In Engeström’s model, although the role of
communities, material things, and cultural history is emphasized, it is individual
subjects who question the existing practices and start the cycle of expansive learning
(Engeström, 1999b, p. 383; 1987, p. 322; 1999a; see also Engeström & Cole, 1997).
Similarly, although Bereiter’s approach builds on cognitive theories of expertise, he
stresses the individual’s efforts to solve knowledge problems and to develop an
increasingly complex relation to knowledge objects, along with fellow inquirers.
Going beyond Propositional and Conceptual Knowledge
All three models share the idea of going beyond pure propositional and
conceptual knowledge. While recognizing the importance of such knowledge, they
stress other types of knowledge as well. Without going into detail, a rough distinction
between three basic forms of knowledge is recapitulated here (see Bereiter &
Scardamalia, 1993, pp. 43–47): Declarative knowledge means “formal” or
propositional knowledge. Procedural knowledge or know-how means knowledge
embedded in skills and not guided by explicit rules or propositional knowledge;
rather, it is manifest in rule-like behavior that emerges from knowledgeable action
(see Bereiter, 2002). Lastly, hidden knowledge or tacit knowledge is based on
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impressions and a “sense” of things. This kind of distinction does not take into
account the variety of forms or formulations of knowledge, but it can be used to
identify a common point in these models of innovative learning. They all criticize the
traditional view of human cognition as a rule-based symbolic system that relies on
explicit propositional knowledge. An emphasis on propositional knowledge can lead,
for example, to the so-called “paralysis by analysis” syndrome (Nonaka & Takeuchi,
1995, p. 198). Connectionism (see Bechtel & Abrahamsen, 1991; Dawson, 2004) is a
conceptual foundation that Bereiter (1991) uses to search for an alternative to
traditional rule-based models of cognition. In Engeström’s model and in the cultural-
historical approach, knowledge is always embedded in practices, in contrast to the
mentalistic tradition of “knowledge in the head” (see, e.g., Engeström, 1999b, p. 397).
Tacit knowledge is an important aspect of innovative knowledge communities,
although its interpretation varies in the three models. For Nonaka and Takeuchi, tacit
knowledge includes the subjective insights, intuitions, hunches, and ideals that are the
crucial basis for innovative processes (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995, pp. 8–10).
Engeström has not explicitly emphasized tacit knowledge because in expansive
learning, more stress is placed on knowledge embedded in practices. However, he has
given credit to Nonaka and Takeuchi’s circle for identifying various modes of
knowledge and discussing transitions between tacit knowledge and {566} explicit
knowledge (Engeström, 1999b, p. 401). Tacit knowledge is also important in
Bereiter’s model of expertise. Skills and know-how manifest themselves in
performance, but tacit knowledge is much harder to recognize directly. However, this
difficulty does not mean that it is an insignificant form of knowledge—quite the
contrary. Bereiter and Scardamalia (1993, pp. 133–152; see also Bereiter, 2002)
argue, for example, that knowledge of “promisingness,” which is for them one form
of tacit knowledge, is an essential resource of creative experts. Having continuously
solved problems in their own area of expertise, creative experts have some sort of
sense about what is promising and how to make progress in their field. They deal with
uncertainty and embark on ventures and risky efforts as part of their innovative
processes.
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Recognizing Conceptualizations and Conceptual Artifacts as Important
Although these models of innovative learning criticize propositional and
conceptual knowledge when presented as the only form of knowledge, they
nevertheless emphasize the role of conceptualization and the role of making
knowledge explicit in innovative processes. According to Nonaka and Takeuchi, one
key process in innovation involves the externalization of tacit knowledge. In a similar
vein, an important phase in Engeström’s expansive learning cycle requires
constructing an explicit model that offers a new solution to the problem in question.
Even if the models constructed in the expansive cycle are rooted in material practices,
they often are also theoretical and symbolic in nature (see Wartofsky, 1979).
Bereiter’s model is based on the idea of conceptual artifacts and solving problems of
understanding. Thus, in Bereiter’s model, the goal is to develop, evaluate, and modify
conceptual artifacts collaboratively. An important aspect of these three models of
innovative learning is the “dialectical” interaction between different forms of
knowledge, and especially the process of creating conceptual knowledge and
conceptual models that can be used in subsequent activity.
Interaction Around and Through Shared Objects
Finally, all three models describe how to organize collaboration for
developing shared objects of activity in an innovative way. This commonality
connects the other six commonalities, discussed above, and is closely related to the
role of mediation in all three models. The shared objects are different in each case: In
Nonaka and Takeuchi’s model they are concrete products (such as cars or baking
machines); in Engeström’s they involve practices and activity systems; and in
Bereiter’s they are conceptual artifacts. But the overall structure of the process—the
organization of the interaction around these mediating objects or artifacts—is quite
similar in the three models. The interaction takes place through these objects, not just
between people. Neither individual initiative nor collective practices as such are
important; what is crucial is how they can be directed and organized toward
developing shared objects. The importance of conceptualization and “conceptual
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artifacts” in these models also is closely related to the fact that all three describe how
to direct collaborative efforts for developing shared objects of activity within long-
term processes. Through conceptualization, new ideas are formulated for communal
use and for subsequent development. {567}
Different After All?
In the previous pages, we have detailed how three models of innovative
knowledge communities are similar. Although we emphasized their commonalities,
we could have focused on differences, especially because the backgrounds of the
models appear at first to be so far apart. However, on closer examination, the
differences prove to be complementary rather than drastically in conflict.
Engeström, for example, has criticized Nonaka and Takeuchi for failing to
take into account the first two phases of the expansive cycle—questioning and
analyzing the situation—and thus neglecting the importance of controversies and
conflicts in knowledge creation (Engeström, 1999b, p. 380). As a consequence,
Engeström feels that Nonaka and Takeuchi take problems as given or as defined by
the management, without analyzing how they originate. However, questioning and
conflicts do have a role in Nonaka and Takeuchi’s model, although they are not so
strongly emphasized as in Engeström’s expansive cycle. Socialization in Nonaka and
Takeuchi’s model involves dialogue and discussion, and “[t]his dialogue can involve
considerable conflict and disagreement, but it is precisely such conflict that pushes
employees to question existing premises and to make sense of their experience in a
new way” (1995, p. 14). It appears that both of these aspects—on the one hand, the
creation of mutual trust and understanding by strong socialization, and on the other
hand, the opportunity and acceptance for criticism and questioning—are needed in
knowledge innovation. One reason for the difference between Engeström and Nonaka
and Takeuchi may be cultural. Engeström analyzed knowledge creation in Western
organizations, whereas Nonaka and Takeuchi worked mostly in Japanese
organizations. In Japanese culture, harmony and group thinking are more strongly
emphasized than in Western culture, where both individual differences and conflicts
are given more prominence (see Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995, pp. 31, 63).
THREE METAPHORS OF LEARNING
Bereiter (2002, pp. 174–185) has argued that Nonaka and Takeuchi’s model
falls short of its goals. According to Bereiter, this model does not adequately explain
creativity, knowledge work, collaborative knowledge building, or the role of
understanding. Yet this is not so much a criticism of Nonaka and Takeuchi’s model as
it is a list of shortcomings, from Bereiter’s point of view. A more radical argument by
Bereiter is that Nonaka and Takeuchi’s model is still rooted in mentalistic “folk
epistemology”: It is based on the externalization of tacit knowledge and appears to
rely on a mentalistic assumption that knowledge resides and is created in an
individual’s head. Bereiter feels that what is missing from this model is knowledge
“in the world” in the form of “conceptual artifacts,” along with the idea of knowledge
building in Popper’s World 3. But despite his criticism, Bereiter acknowledges that
Nonaka and Takeuchi’s model goes “pretty far” in dealing with knowledge creation
(Bereiter, 2002, pp. 175–176).
In general, it appears that individuals have a more central role in Nonaka and
Takeuchi’s model of knowledge creation than in Engeström’s or Bereiter’s. One could
say that in Nonaka and Takeuchi’s model, the individual cognitive agent appears to be
taken as given. Nonaka and Takeuchi talk about individuals who pursue processes of
innovation, but the actual individual and his or her knowledge remain, to a large
extent, unanalyzed. The idea of individual transformation through collective activity
is much stronger in Bereiter’s and Engeström’s model. However, {568} for Nonaka
and Takeuchi, knowledge is also produced collaboratively (not only in individual
minds), and the explication phase of knowledge to the group and organizational levels
is a focal part of the overall cycle of knowledge creation. Although there is no explicit
room for conceptual artifacts in Nonaka and Takeuchi’s model, the model appears to
be quite compatible with the general idea of Bereiter’s knowledge building. And
although Nonaka and Takeuchi emphasize the role of individuals, they also argue that
“Western epistemology” is too much focused on the individual (“Cartesian”) subject
and has largely abandoned the social interaction. They refer to the Japanese tradition
(and “organic” worldview) where self is embedded in collective action. Knowledge
conversion is, in a fundamental way, a social process and “not confined within an
individual” (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995, p. 61; see also pp. 31–32, 226). Thus, in all of
THREE METAPHORS OF LEARNING
these models of innovative knowledge communities, knowledge creation is a matter
of individual initiative embedded in fertile group and organizational activities.
At the outset, Bereiter’s and Engeström’s ideas appear to be totally opposed to
each other. From Engeström’s perspective, Bereiter’s emphasis on Popper’s World 3
and conceptual artifacts leads to an overly intellectualist or formal approach, in which
conceptions are separated from activities and social practices (Engeström, 1987, pp.
46–49; Engeström & Cole, 1997, pp. 306–307). From Bereiter’s perspective,
sociocultural approaches miss the idea of conceptual artifacts and therefore fail to
appreciate the importance of knowledge that is not clearly and immediately connected
to practices and situations (Bereiter, 2002, pp. 56–92, 465–483). But even here, the
difference may not be as radical as might appear at first. The basic processes
delineated in these models are very similar. Both models try to capture dynamic
processes of change and transformation and reject Cartesian dualism. Although
Bereiter emphasizes conceptual artifacts, their building does not rely only on
symbolic and propositional knowledge. In this sense, Bereiter’s World 3 is not an
isolated and self-sustained conceptual realm but has a history and a close connection
with cultural practices (pp. 466–467). And although Engeström emphasizes practices
and knowledge embedded in practices, he also allows a clear role for abstractions and
conceptual models (see e.g. Engeström, 1999b, pp. 382–384; also see
Wartofsky,1979). Engeström’s model connects with activity theory, which has its
basis in the Vygotskyan idea that both signs and tools (related to conceptual artifacts
and material practices, respectively) constitute the starting point for mediated human
action (Vygotsky, 1978; see Engeström, 1999a, pp. 23–25).
In summary, we acknowledge differences among the three models. Their
emphases are different, especially with respect to the fundamental target or object of
innovation, as noted earlier. In Nonaka and Takeuchi’s model, the focus is on
externalizing ideas and insights to communal use and for the production of innovative
products in firms. In Engeström’s model, the main focus is on expanding and
transforming activity systems and developing practices to solve disturbances and
contradictions. Bereiter emphasizes conceptual artifacts and how those objects of
World 3 are developed and transformed. We have shown, however, that in a
fundamental sense, the three models appear to be close to each other, similarly
THREE METAPHORS OF LEARNING
addressing questions about how innovative communities create new knowledge,
artifacts, and practices collaboratively, in mediated processes of activity. The central
aspect of collaborative knowledge advancement is to expand and transform ideas,
prac{569}tices, and material and conceptual artifacts. In this sense, the three models
complement rather than oppose each other.
Toward the Knowledge-Creation Approach to Learning
We began by identifying two main metaphors of learning: acquisition and
participation. We here maintain that our discussion of the models of innovative
knowledge communities creates a basis for a third main metaphor of learning, one that
concentrates on mediated processes of knowledge creation. The models that we have
reviewed emphasize that previous conceptions of learning have been inadequate for
dealing with innovative, expansive, or progressive aspects of knowledge advancement
in a profound way. Neither the acquisition approach nor the participation approach
has been sufficient, at least not in ideal typical form. The main focus of the
acquisition perspective has been on the acquisition of knowledge that is more or less
ready-made or on clear-cut developmental rules or phases, rather than on the creation
of something “expansively” new. The participation perspective typically has focused
on examining how knowledge and practices are passed from one generation to another
in traditional cultures or in cultures without substantial and deliberate changes or
cultural transformations (see, e.g., Lave & Wenger, 1991). The focus has been on how
newcomers become old-timers by participating in cultural practices, not on the radical
advancement of knowledge or practices.
More recently, the acquisition and participation approaches have been revised
to deal with innovation. But the shared claim in the models of innovative knowledge
communities is that to genuinely tackle the issues of knowledge creation, something
else is needed beyond what is provided in the acquisition or participation models. The
metaphors of learning are collections of various features related to major approaches
to learning. In this sense there are no clear-cut divisions between the metaphors;
rather, they overlap, because more concrete models of learning can combine their
features in different ways and degrees. The importance of these metaphors is that they
THREE METAPHORS OF LEARNING
present, in concise form, typical and important main alternatives for understanding
learning. Approaches belonging to the acquisition metaphor typically emphasize
individuals, processes happening in individuals’ minds, conceptual knowledge, and
clear-cut logical rules. To these features can be added innovativeness, such as in
models of inquiry where creative efforts of searching through conceptual spaces are
emphasized (e.g., Boden, 2004; Simon, 1977). In epistemology, these approaches are
closely related to attempts to develop the logic of discovery (e.g., Hanson, 1958).
Approaches belonging to the participation metaphor typically emphasize
communities, social practices, activities, and the situated nature of human cognition
and knowledge. This emphasis can also include progressive development of activities
(see, e.g., Brown & Duguid, 1999; Stewart, 1997).
What, then, are the emphases of the knowledge-creation approach, besides the
focus on creating and developing something new? Knowledge-creation models
conceptualize learning and knowledge advancement as collaborative processes for
developing shared objects of activity. Learning is not conceptualized through
processes occurring in individuals’ minds, or through processes of participation in
social practices. Learning is understood as a collaborative effort directed toward
developing some mediated artifacts, broadly defined as including knowledge, {570}
ideas, practices, and material or conceptual artifacts. The interaction among different
forms of knowledge or between knowledge and other activities is emphasized as a
requirement for this kind of innovativeness in learning and knowledge creation.
Our label for the third metaphor—the knowledge-creation metaphor of
learning—is not intended to suggest that only knowledge is created or developed in all
of these models. Rather, knowledge resembles other artifacts that are designed and
transformed. In Nonaka and Takeuchi’s model, concrete products are developed; in
Engeström’s model, the product is practices and activity systems; and in Bereiter’s
model, it is conceptual artifacts. Nevertheless, it can be argued that the shared objects
of activity are distinctively “knowledge-laden” or impregnated with knowledge. In
Nonaka and Takeuchi’s model, the interaction between tacit knowledge and explicit
knowledge is essential; in Engeström’s model, practices and activity systems are
informed by conceptualized models and reflection; and in Bereiter’s (2002) model,
conceptual artifacts are explicitly “knowledge objects.”
THREE METAPHORS OF LEARNING
The acquisition perspective emphasizes knowledge and also is closely
connected to the Western, Cartesian tradition that seeks certainty as a basis for
knowledge. From the participation perspective, this epistemological emphasis is too
strong; the participation perspective requires that more attention be paid to social and
cultural aspects of knowledge advancement. Knowledge work is not accomplished by
epistemological means alone, but by participating in cultural practices and by
becoming members of knowledge communities (see Packer & Goicoechea, 2000).
From the point of view of the knowledge-creation metaphor, this broader perspective
also is needed because it is important to understand those practices through which
innovative knowledge communities function. The knowledge-creation metaphor does
not, however, exclude epistemological processes; it holds that epistemology must be
analyzed anew. Accordingly, the focus is not on the certainty of knowledge but how
knowledge is used and how it is developed. The models of innovative knowledge
communities are important just because they analyze processes of knowledge creation
in a detailed and concrete way. Such analysis requires that both social and
epistemological perspectives be taken into account.
The models analyzed in this article are not the only representatives of the
knowledge-creation metaphor of learning, but they represent that metaphor in an
explicit manner. And the metaphor is not proposed as totally new. For example,
classical models and theories of education (e.g., those by Piaget, Vygotsky, and
Dewey) could be analyzed from the metaphorical point of view. Perhaps one element
that makes a model a “classic” is that it includes aspects from all metaphors analyzed
here, though with various emphases and depending on how the models are interpreted.
For example, if Vygotsky (1978) were classified according to the dualist division
between acquisition and participation perspectives, he would belong without doubt to
the participation approach. He emphasized activities and social interaction with the
surrounding culture as a starting point for the child’s development. But, as we have
interpreted it, Vygotsky’s idea that human activity is mediated by tools and signs is
one of the central bases for the knowledge-creation approach, especially if interpreted
through the theory of expansive learning (see Engeström 1987, 1999a). In the
knowledge-creation metaphor, the emphasis is not on the situatedness of cognition or
on social practices alone, but rather on progressive development of these practices and
THREE METAPHORS OF LEARNING
artifacts through mediated activities (see Engeström & Cole, 1997; cf. Brown,
Collins, & Duguid, 1989). Interestingly, Nonaka’s notion {571} of knowledge
conversation comes close to Vygotsky’s (1962) idea that everyday concepts develop
into scientific ones by gaining systematicity and conceptual clarity, and that scientific
concepts also develop into everyday concepts through use and application1 (see also
Engeström, 1999b, p. 398).
Even though the knowledge-creation metaphor has historical roots, the
present-day challenge of developing individual and collective competencies related to
knowledge creation in both educational and work settings is a novelty. This, at least,
is what the models of innovative knowledge communities emphasize. According to
Engeström, “learning and expansion are becoming integrated, forming a historically
new type of activity” (Engeström, 1987, p. 27). Bereiter states that instantiating
creative practices of working with knowledge, and constantly going beyond that
prevailing practices that formerly characterized mainly scientific communities, are
crucial in workplaces and should be essential also in schooling. These models of
innovative knowledge communities appear to provide valuable guidance for
restructuring school and work settings into innovative knowledge communities by
helping teachers, students, and people in various organizations to work deliberately
toward advancing their knowledge. They also help to guide the transformation of
practices and support people in reflecting on and transforming their communities.
This is a challenging task, as can be seen in situations where the models of innovative
knowledge communities have been used to guide schools as organizations, or schools
as teacher communities, in developing similar practices; these models have also been
used at the classroom level (Ahonen, Engeström, & Virkkunen, 2000; Bereiter, 2002;
Engeström, Engeström, & Kärkkäinen, 1995; Hargreaves, 1999; Scardamalia, 2002;
see also Paavola, Lipponen, & Hakkarainen, 2002; Hakkarainen, Palonen, Paavola, &
Lehtinen, 2004).
Activity theory appears to provide tools that help to address the larger
processes of social and cultural transformation in educational contexts. For example,
THREE METAPHORS OF LEARNING
Engeström and his colleagues (2002) have pursued a change-laboratory intervention
with teacher communities in a middle school. According to their analysis, there are
several factors that make pedagogical transformation of a school very difficult. They
include factors such as the social, spatial, and temporal structures embedded in
classroom-based studies and the teachers’ tradition of working as isolated individual
professionals. These fundamental constraints may make it very difficult for
participants to reflect jointly on their practices and to pursue transformations by
asking questions, constructing models and visions, and examining emerging, novel
pedagogical approaches in practice. The change laboratory focuses on making these
constraints visible to the participants and helping them to overcome the constraints.
The laboratory helps them to recognize developmental challenges to the activity
system of the school, collectively creating a vision of the school’s future and
implementing a series of practical changes.
David Hargreaves (1999) has talked about the “knowledge-creating school”
when applying Nonaka and Takeuchi’s theory to schools. He argues that, to answer
the challenges of the knowledge society, schools, and especially teachers and
headmasters, need to become creators of professional knowledge. This change entails
a conscious effort to articulate teachers’ professional experiences into shareable
knowledge within and between schools. To help students, too, develop the skills and
competencies needed for knowledge creation, teachers should have personal
experiences of creating professional knowledge. {572}
Bereiter and Scardamalia’s (1993) notion of schools as knowledge-building
communities addresses the challenges that both teachers and students are facing.
Bereiter (2002) argued that prevailing educational practices do not provide students
with an opportunity to engage in intentional efforts of knowledge advancement.
Together with their colleagues, the authors carried out a series of design experiments
for facilitating collaborative building of knowledge at school (Scardamalia &
Bereiter, 1994, 1999). Because of the knowledge limitations of young students, they
usually are not in a position to create knowledge in a demanding sense. Yet there is
still a wide variety of opportunities for students to understand and explain the issues
that they are dealing with, as well as to transform their prevailing social practices and
ways of operating within a culture that supports working with knowledge
THREE METAPHORS OF LEARNING
(Hakkarainen, 2003, 2004; Hakkarainen & Sintonen, 2002). Even if the product that
emerges from students’ efforts lacks wider cultural value as an innovation, it is most
important for students to engage in knowledge-creating inquiry and to develop a
corresponding identity—that is, to consider themselves to be not only consumers but
also creators of knowledge. They may create knowledge for their local community,
and they certainly can create knowledge in relation to their own initial position as
learners. These kinds of considerations make evident the value of restructuring
educational practices in accordance with knowledge-creation models.
Conclusions
The issues that we have raised in our discussion of the knowledge-creation
metaphor resemble in some ways those articulated in the debates about constructivism
in its several forms. For this reason, we offer some clarifying remarks. It may be
argued that the most widely used metaphor for learning today is “construction”—
based on the constructivist view that knowledge and social practices are constructed
by learners. The main reason that we have not used that metaphor here is that
constructivism has many versions and interpretations (see, e.g., Steffe & Gale, 1995;
Phillips, 1997). The term, by itself, has become rather meaningless unless further
qualified. Constructivism can, for instance, refer to an enhanced version of the
acquisition metaphor of learning if the emphasis is on the basic Kantian idea that
knowledge cannot be acquired directly but must be accessed through inborn schemes
or the like. Yet constructivism can also have affinities with the participation metaphor
of learning if the idea is that social and cultural practices are primarily constructed.
We share with constructivists an interest in understanding the creative aspects
of human cognition. The knowledge-creation metaphor, arguably, is also a form of
constructivism in the sense that it emphasizes the creation of something new in the
process of learning. The problem with a “constructivist” stance in psychology and
education is that it often does not involve specific analyses of “constructive”
processes, particularly with respect to innovation. As a consequence, the
understanding of these processes has not become more specific during the past two
decades. We think that the metaphors and models of innovative knowledge
THREE METAPHORS OF LEARNING
communities that are discussed here can raise similar issues, so that the discussion
concerning constructivism may be furthered. In addition, we believe that we have
provided a more detailed analysis of knowledge-creation processes, particularly with
respect to innovation at the individual and communal levels. {573}
For the most part, we have analyzed the models on a quite general level. A
more specific analysis would have brought their differences more to the fore. Yet we
believe that a general analysis is fruitful. The central function of delineating general
metaphors of learning is to shed light on the basic, alternative starting points for
understanding learning and human activity. Speaking very generally, the acquisition
perspective focuses on knowledge and knowledge structures in learning and processes
of learning within individuals’ minds. The participation perspective emphasizes the
meaning of social practices and activities as bases for learning. And the knowledge-
creation perspective focuses on analyzing the processes whereby new knowledge and
new mediating objects of activity are collaboratively created, whether in schools or at
work.
In contemporary society, human work increasingly is constituted by creation
of knowledge artifacts. Most people are required to develop competencies that allow
them to work productively at levels of knowledge that formerly characterized only a
small elite of intellectuals. Rather than relying on pure mentation, educational
institutions could teach young students to deliberately use and construct artifacts for
expanding their intellectual resources. The knowledge society is not reflected in
citizen’s lives merely through work; our entire everyday environment also is
undergoing similar changes. Ensuring our development and well-being outside work
requires us to develop the advanced skills of a knowledge society. As a consequence,
there is an increasing need, in almost every area of life, to understand theoretically
and practically how new knowledge, mediating artifacts, and practices are created.
Thus it may be argued that conceptually well-founded approaches to knowledge-
creation are needed to help people make the epistemological and ontological shifts
required to participate productively in an advanced knowledge society. We believe
that the models of innovative knowledge communities and knowledge creation take
the challenge seriously and can help us to understand and cope with the fundamental
changes in our society.
THREE METAPHORS OF LEARNING
Notes
The first author was supported by a grant from the Finnish Cultural
Foundation. We would like to thank Hal White, the editors, and the anonymous
reviewers of Review of Educational Research for valuable comments, as well as for
editorial help on this article.
This article is a revised and developed version of Paavola, Lipponen, and
Hakkarainen, 2002. Sami Paavola and Kai Hakkarainen constructed the preliminary
version of the manuscript. Lasse Lipponen helped to improve the article and
strengthen its argumentation. The final version was constructed by all of us together.
Many of the core ideas have been extensively articulated in Hakkarainen, Palonen,
Paavola, and Lehtinen, 2004.1 We owe this remark to the reviewers of this journal.
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Authors
SAMI PAAVOLA is a researcher at the Centre for Research on Networked Learning and
Knowledge Building, Department of Psychology, University of Helsinki, P.O.
Box 9 (Siltavuorenpenger 20 D), SF-00014 Helsinki, Finland; e-mail
[email protected]. Philosophy is his main field of research. His program
focuses on models and theories of discovery, inquiry, and learning.
Correspondence regarding this article can be addressed to him.
LASSE LIPPONEN is a senior lecturer in the Department of Psychology, and the
Department of Applied Educational Science. He can be contacted at the
Department of Psychology, University of Helsinki, P.O. Box 9
THREE METAPHORS OF LEARNING
(Siltavuorenpenger 20 D), SF-00014 Helsinki, Finland;
[email protected]. His research focuses on collaborative and
technology-mediated practices of learning and working.
KAI HAKKARAINEN is the Director of the Centre for Research on Networked
Learning and Knowledge Building, Department of Psychology, University of
Helsinki, P.O. Box 9 (Siltavuorenpenger 20 D), SF-00014 Helsinki, Finland;
e-mail [email protected]. His research includes investigating how
collaborative technology may be used to facilitate in-depth learning and
promote the creation, sharing, and management of knowledge in education and
workplaces.
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