18.01.2013

Take-Home Final

HIST 561 – an Introduction to Indian history

Instructor: Prof. Dr. Suraiya Faroqhi

Fall-Semester 2012/13

Istanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi

Discussed topic:

Military technology in medieval India, in case of “war elephants”

by

Fehmi Ardalı

111671010

1

1-“military technology” as a definition with a compact and basic summary of weapons used on battlefields

2-“military tactics” as a definition

3-the role of “military technology” in “winning battles” and bydetermining the “military tactics”!?

4-historical background of “medieval India” in form of chronological summary and basic info about Mughal dynasty

5-the army of the Indian Moghuls: its weaponry, organization, administration and some of typical Indian tactics in a battle

6-the place of the elephants in the Moghul army

7-the effect of gunpowder on the “elephant strategy”

a- Swivel gun as animal transported gunb- Artilleryc- Rocket technology and volley gun

8-firearms

8- the role of the elephants during sieges

9- River crossings and pontoon bridges

10- Logistics

11-Conclusion

12-Appendices

2

In my term-paper I tried to summarize the huge content of my issue. After defining the vital terms shortly, I tried to make a description of the Mughal army.

Because of the page limitation of the term-paper I had to choose one of the main sections which was vital and typical forthe warfare in the Indian subcontinent.

I have chosen “war elephants” because they influenced the warfare in many aspects and were used in many parts of Indian-warfare.

-“military technology” as a definition with a compact and basicsummary of weapons used on battlefields

Military technology is the combination of equipment, vehicles, structures and communication systems, used in warfare.

Depending on the historical background and geographies, in which they are used, there would be a list with more than hundreds of items.

Just a summary of the common and well known types are:

-firearms: hand carried weapon that fires either a single or multiple projectiles (bullet) using gas

-artillery: large calibre weapons firing shells over great distances

-Melee weapons: the term "melee" generally means man-to-man or

3

hand-to-hand combat. Well known examples are swords, knives, axes, mace

-Long range weapons: Weapons to make it possible, to fight the enemy from a distance, like bows, slingers, lance, javelin, spear

-Siege weaponry, like catapult, trebuchet, ballista, battering rams

-“military tactics” as a definition

Field-Marshal Montgomery said: “strategy is the art of the conduct of war; tactics are the art of fighting.”

Strategy and tactics are closely related, they even exist on the same process.

Both deal with distance, time and force but strategy in large scale and time, while tactics are in small scale and time.

In current military thought, there are three planning levels.

The first one with the largest scale of planning is the strategy.

During a war there are operations of armies, in size of army corps.

This intermediate level of “military strategy” converts strategy into military campaigns, which is called as “the operational level”.

On this level the general staff plans how to move, which corps with formations of which units.

The main issues in this phase of strategy are the movement and disposition of forces; like where to move the corps, what kind of operational strategies to execute, defensive or offensive, etc.

4

The military tactics were basically related how to manoeuvre units during combat depending on terrain due to the goal of thebattle.

-the role of “military technology” in “winning battles” and by determining the “military tactics”!?

War is a chaotic system, which is very complex with almost endless variables.

But after analysing numbers of historical conflicts, the military historians decided that some factors are more important than others for the final decision of battles and in long term a “war”.

As mentioned above “grand/national military strategy” dictates the progress of a war in planning the operational movements, but leadership, training, moral, and most importantly, the technological level of weapons define how battles are fought.

The geography and climate, as well as the economic and social level of the society define the type of weapons used by warriors.

In addition to all above, the military technology is one of themost important aspects that dictates which weapons to be used.

The only difference is that in the contrary to all above mentioned aspects, like geography or climate, that are unchangeable or not influenceable; the military technology can be changed, transferred or adopted.

İn this presentation we focus us on the weapons, which were mainly used by the Mughal army and specially developed in Indian societies, not only Mughals, but also natives of Indian subcontinent.

Of course, sudden changes in economic circumstances and especially unexpected and fast technological developments influence the military technology and would immediately be

5

reflected in changes to military tactics.

Through using the conventional weapons with innovative ideas, new and more effective weapons can be made.

As long as only one side of the fighting armies in a battle owes the weapon with technological superiority, in this case this weapon could be decisive, but the advantage of better technology is of no more value than training, cohesion, strategy, or geography.

-historical background of “medieval India” in form of chronological summary and basic info about Mughal dynasty

Nicholas Spykman’s thought, “Geography is the most important factor in foreign policy because it is the most permanent.” is in my opinion the best description for the importance of “geography” in world history and in our case in warfare.1

İn a war, during operational movement of armies or on a battle every aspect could be changed or manipulated, but not the physical geographic features.

This makes it the first vital element which should be mentionedin every academic research.

For that reason a basic description of the geography of the Indian subcontinent is important.

The north-western frontier of the Indian subcontinent was open to invasion from Afghanistan.

India was only vulnerable to nomads from one direction - it wasprotected against invasion from other directions by the Himalayas and the sea.

North-western India is quite dry and forms a natural extension of the steppes and deserts. Those regions in the centre and

1 Nicholas John Spykman, The Geography of the peace, 3. ed (Hamden, Connecticut,U.S.A: Archon books, 1969).pp.41

6

northwest are not actual desert, but they do not compare to Mongolia or the Ukraine, especially for horse breed.

The Deccan Plateau is protected by the coastal mountains from the summer monsoon.

Much of the population was concentrated on the peripheries, whether in the Ganges River valley in the northeast or along the coasts.

The native nomads of India lived and moved within closely circumscribed areas and were associated with fixed settlements.(See Appendix: A)

Chronol ogical summary and basic info about Mughal dynasty:

The name “Mughal” was derived from the Persian word for Mongol.

The Mughal dynasty was direct descendant of Genghis Khan through Chagatai Khan and Timur.

The beginning of the Mongol attacks into India was marked in 1221.

Before the Mongols arrived north India, the Muslim dynasty of the Delhi sultanate, the so-called, slave dynasty, by assassination of the Afghan ruler, Muhammad of Ghur, ruled since 1206.

1221: the first appearance of the Mongols in India

till 1307: several Mongol invasions, until Alaadin Khalji had beaten them and marked the end of Mongol attacks

1389: Timur invaded India

1414 -1451: Sayyid dynasty

1451 – 1526 Loddi dynasty

7

İn the early 1500s the first Mongol tribes invaded northern India from Afghanistan.

Babur was forced by the Uzbeks from Samarqand in 1512.

After several attempts he conquered Kabul, but realized the difficulties of ruling the city and the environment due to the geographical circumstances and the characteristics of the Afghan tribes.

He marched into the north-western India and defeated the last Delhi sultan in 1526, İbrahim Loddi in the battle of Panipat.

This was the end of the Delhi sultanate and foundation of Mughal Empire.

After the death of Babur in 1530 the Mughals lost the control of India, but during the reign of his grandchild Akbar (1542 – 1605), their power in India was secured.

İn the late 17th and early 18th centuries, they controlled mostof the Indian subcontinent.

From Bengal in the east to Balochistan in the west, from Kashmir in the north to the Kaveri basin in the south.

Its population at the height of their power has been estimated as between 110 and 150 million and the controlled territory of more than 3.2 million square kilometres.

-the army of the Indian Moghuls: its weaponry, organization, administration and some of typical Indian tactics in a battle

The age of Turkish rule in India can be divided into two periods, the Afghan period from the 1200s to the 1500s and the Mughal period from the 1500s to the 1800s.

The key factor of the Mughal military success was the mounted archers.

The “composite bow” of the horse archers, is made from horn, wood, and sinew laminated together.

8

The nomad society living on large grassland areas used their bows for hunting. They used both hands for the bow and arrow, which made them perfect horse riders.

İn a battle those archers avoided close combat, were able to shot approx. 15 arrows in a minute attacking the enemy from allsides.

The relation between the “composite bow” and “war elephants” was based actually on “killing each other”.

When the Mughals began to conquer the Indian sub-continent theyfought against armies, whose ranks were full with war elephants.

The war-elephant on a battlefield could be used only as a “shock -weapon”, during a mass attack in close-combat.

On the contrary the horse archer with the composite bow was theideal long-range weapon, with speed and high-level fire rate, which massacred the elephants without armour before they even reach the enemy lines.

Babur’s answer against armoured elephants was, to combine the artillery with “Wagenburg” tactic and matchlock men.

But the horse archers on the flanks and as reserve were indispensable. The professional archers were able to shoot eventhe riders of the elephants.2

The defenders without any long range weapons were not able to respond and all these conditions caused not only casualties, but also drop morale and disorder the defence line.

İt was common that the attack was ended with the surrender of the enemy or if they were mounted with their escape.

Horses, especially the warhorses of the nomad armies were not belonging to common animal species of the Indian sub-continent.

The Mughal army was importing them from several foreign countries, like Arabia, Persia, Somalia and Transoxania.2 Douglas E. Streusand, The formation of the Mughal Empire, 2nd ed (U.S.A.: Oxford University Press, 1996).,pp.56-7

9

Additional to the household troops of the emperor, who were fewthousand cavalry and musketeers, but a huge number of artilleryand war-elephants.

They were recruited from the same geographical regions from where the nobility came.

Their numbers rose from about 12,000 in the mid-sixteenth century to 100,000 and more in the late seventeenth.

Most of these came from Central Asia, Persia and Afghanistan.

Those men mounted on the best warhorses were the best-trained military men in “cavalry warfare of a nomad way” and they had no contact with the Indian society.

The entire Mughal army was under the command of a few hundred of such high-ranking “amirs”.

The warriors/mercenaries were actually recruited, as “war-bands”, led by their own “amir” or “commander”, often from their own homelands.

The Mughal emperors paid them in cash and gave to the amirs high ranks or “mansabs” in the Mughal military bureaucratic apparatus, in effect constituting the nobility.

The term is derived from Mansab, meaning 'rank'.

The mansabdars governed the empire and commanded its armies in the emperor's name.

Though they were usually aristocrats, they did not form a feudal aristocracy, for neither the offices nor the estates that supported them were not hereditary.

İn the Indian society there were castes like the Rajputs, who became a kind of “warlords” in the Mughal army. (The term derives from Sanskrit raja-putra, "son of a king")

10

These Hindu warrior classes of North India employed their own followers and played a secondary but an important role in Mughal warfare.

They carried only swords and short spears or lances into war, with light shields. They had a chivalric code of combat honour,which accepted close combat and refused long-range weapons.

The majority of the infantry men were chosen from the enormous man-power source of the Indian countryside.

Those Hindu soldiers were in the service of local rulers and landlords, or tribal militias these “peasant soldiers,” from the local society.

Mughal weapons greatly evolved during the ruling periods of Babur, Akbar, Aurangzeb and lastly Tipu Sultan.

Some Mughal rulers were very open for innovations, like Babur and Akbar. They followed and supported technological developments in other countries and imported the new weapons, with military instructors and in some cases specialised crews to India.

They adopted the new weapons and tactics of their enemies, likerocket technology from China and the use of elephants not only in the battlefield but also during sieges.

But the importance of “composite bow” remained a very long time.

Typical Indian tactics: 3

In the south of India it was the practice to make the first attack against the rear of an army.

The objective was the elephant of the opposite leader, and round it the fiercest of the battle raged.

3 Wikipedia. (n.d.). Retrieved January 12, 2013, from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mughal_Army. A lot of information’s on thisarticle were summarised from the book of Surinder Kumar Bhakari, Indian Warfare: An appraisal and tactics in early medieval period (New Delhi, İndia,: South Asia books, 1981)

11

As a rule, a battle in India was a series of isolated skirmishes, the contending bodies holding themselves at first at some distance from each other, and ending in close individual fighting.

Numbers always decided the day that the smaller force gave way before the larger force.

Treacherous desertion or half-hearted support was a frequent occurrence.

The most decisive point of a battle was, however, the death or disappearance of the leader. Many battles were lost by the event above referred to, the death or disappearance of the leader.

Single combat - Sometimes emperors of High rank officers challenged for single combat.

For example Akbar challenged his opponent, Daud Lodi, to a fight in single combat. It does not appear that any of these duels actually took place.

Challenges to single combat seem to have been not unusual between men of lower rank.

Defeat - There were no dispositions taken to cover its escape, no stratagems to mask its route, cover its baggage, gain an advance, lay an ambuscade, or mislead a pursuer.

Juhar - This well-known Hindu practice of killing women and children to prevent their falling into the enemy's hand. Sometimes Mughals also followed this.

-the role of war elephants

The elephant is the only animal which was used as a significantcombatant, systematically and on a large scale.

İt was very common and - if we may call “regional” – very typical, and the tactics on the battlefield were dictated by the war elephants.

12

Elephants were trained and guided by a special carer for combat. (See Appendix: B)

Their tactical use in combat was to charge the enemy for breaking their ranks.

İn ancient (actually until the medieval) times the battles werefought between armies in lines. To break the enemy line meant in many cases the victory, because it caused chaos and demoralized the enemy. Meanwhile the commander of the army lostcontrol and the majority of the army flee.

The trampling and terror-causing elephants were ideal for this purpose. (See Appendix: C)

There is uncertainty as to when elephant warfare first began. The earliest Indian Vedic hymns, the Rigveda, dating from the late 2nd and early 1st millennia BC, make reference to the use of elephants for warfare.

Indian elephants were the first ones, used as a combat weapon. But the most famous act, which made them well-known, was the crossing of the Alps in the Carthaginian army of Hannibal in 218 BC.

The fact that those were African elephants and none of the 37 elephants survived this journey, is mostly irrelevant.

The first confrontation of the European communities with war elephants happened at the Battle of Gaugamela in331 BC, where Alexander fought the Persian king Darius.

There were many examples in the history of especially Mediterranean region, but elephants used mostly as a combat weapon in South and Southeast Asia, where the existence of animals were great, the supplies were a lot and the terrain wasideal.

Another irrelevant fact is that all war elephants were male because of males' greater aggression.

But the main reason for using the female elephants for logistics is rather because a female elephant in battle will run from a male.

13

There were equipped with wooden towers, in which commonly archers took place for attacking the enemy from this advantagedposition.

Sometimes swords or spears were fastened on to their trunks.

For those who met the elephants in the battlefield for the first time, it was a shock.

Their mass, their cries, crumbling the ground and with the above mentioned weapons it was a perfect shock weapon.

But at the same time it was a two-edged sword.

They were afraid of fire and fine-tuned-loud music. The Romans used, pigs, carrying bunches of burning woods, Mongols fire-arrows, Vietnamese and Burma armies music, Timur flaming straw to the back of his camels to fight them.

Once they were confused and angered, it was almost impossible to control them, so they began to attack their own soldiers, even, elephants in the same army.

İt was a common issue, to begin the battle with an attack of elephants for causing a chaos in the main line of the enemy army and then kill the elephants by their own carers, who were “driving” them or let them to leave the battlefield.

With the dispersal of “cannon” was the use of the combat elephant on the battlefield finally ended at the end of the 19th century.

But their use by engineering and labour roles was common till the end of the W2.

14

-the effect of gunpowder on the “elephant strategy”

Artillery

Although Mongols learned cannon technology from the Chinese hundreds of years earlier, the use of artillery was not widespread in Central Asia.

But, Babur’s personal interest on “military technology” and theinternational relations with the Ottomans brought important advantages to the Mughal army.

He brought two Ottoman master gunners, Mustafa Rumî, (the Ottoman), Ali-Quli (I think,” kul”, meaning “servant”) and military tactics of the Ottoman army, which were unknown in this region.

İn his biography, Baburnâme, he described the battle tactics, combining the artillery with “Wagenburg” tactic and matchlock men, as usual horsemen on the flanks.4

Nowadays, historians disagree about the number of cannons he brought to India.

4 Paul K. Davis, 100 Decisive Battles: From Ancient Times to the Present, 2nd ed (U.S.A.: Oxford University Press, 2001).pp.81-85

15

But it’s sure, that the artillery played a "key role" in his success.

On the battlefields against elephant cavalry, (This term can beused for military tactics, described Indian military history!) marking the definitive end of the offensive use elephants in Indian warfare.5

On the other hand especially under Babur’s reign heavy artillery was an important part of the Mughal military.

As usual, the main problem was to transport them. On the Indiangeography with rugged passes and water crossings it was a very difficult and slow process.

For the transport of only one cannon several elephants and a lot of oxen were needed.

Swivel gun as animal transported gun

The light artillery was very widespread, as usual in many medieval empires, because they were easy and cheap to produce, the main metals for its production was easier to find and if necessary to import.

The typical light artillery for Indian sub-continent was the so-called Animal-transported swivel guns.

(See Appendix: C)

A swivel is a connection that allows the connected object, suchas a gun or chair, to rotate horizontally and/or vertically.

Due to their relatively small size, swivel guns were highly portable and could be transported on a camel or elephant.

They were often used also on the decks of small boats along therivers, which dominated some regions of Indian geography.

5 Jeremy Black, War and the World: Military power and the Fate of Continents (İstanbul: Dost Kitabevi yayınları, 2009).,pp.59

16

Rocket technology:

The rocket-technology was actually found approximately in the 13th century in China.

The first use of this technology as a weapon is controversial. İn the 13th century by Chinese against Mongols is the most accepted thesis.

But, the type of rockets used at that time, was actually, arrows with explosives attached.

During centuries the quantity and quality of the black powder was developed, so that bigger “rocket capsules” filled with black powder could be fired against enemy infantry.

The elephant’s fear of fire and loud noise combined with their dislike of smoke and its smell made the rockets one the vital weapons in a battle against war elephants.

They had a lot of advantages. They were cheap and easy to produce. They could be used by anyone after a short training and in any terrain.

Their disadvantages were their low hit-rate and time-consuming preparation, not to forget, being useless under rain.

For a picture of one of the first examples, (See Appendix E.)

Volley gun:

A volley gun is a gun with several barrels for firing a number of shots, either simultaneously or in sequence.

İn compare to the modern machine guns they don’t have the automatic loading and –firing mechanism.

Those weapons were not decisive in long term history of medieval India, because they couldn’t be mass- produced and as usual the social and economic circumstances didn’t allow the wide-spread use.

17

But because of their technical design ( firing several projectiles in one shot) could be used effectively against elephants, which makes them worth to mention in my term-paper.

There is a picture of a Ottoman volley gun from early_16th_century in the Musee de l'Armee, Paris. (See Appendix: F)

-Firearms

Military historians agree that the mass-production and the use in great numbers of gunpowder weapons by disciplined and well-trained soldiers on the battlefield changed the course of warfare.

But how and when this development occurred varies from region to region.

Generally people know that its origins are in China and the efficient use and mass-production were realized in Europe.

Somehow everything in between is non-transparent and difficult to analyse.

There is an agreement through military historians that through Mongols the gunpowder weapon, cannon technology and their use quickly widespread in India.

Firearms arrived in India during the Afghan period and began tochange the conduct of warfare during the Mughal period.

İn the Sultanate of Delhi or some regional literary references the use of those weaponries were presented before the arrival of the Mongols, but not so widespread and in large quantities.

This fact makes us to think, that those technologies came through Himalayan or sea routes before the arrival of Mongols.

İn my opinion we may not forget that the civil and military life are two halves of an apple in a nomad society.

18

The military thinking and culture is a must for the survival ofnomad way of life.

Therefore, their leaders and the majority of their society are prone to adapt new weapons of their enemies and evolve them depending on the geographical and socio-economic conditions.

Those characteristics made Mongols the effective users of everyweapon nearly under all circumstances.

Regardless of their origin, knowledge and use of these weapons quickly spread.

New weaponry arrived Mughal empires in different ways.

One way was the sea route by European merchants or ex-soldiers,another by Ottoman and Persian military help or even by international traders.

The technicians tried to copy those new technologies of firearms productions with different success or failure results.

For example, it is typical for Indian military history of the Mughal period that the firearm production and use sucked by thematchlock.

With the technical and scientific developments in the military industry somewhere the Mughal Empire lost its ability to copy the “new weapons” and had stagnated.

But this was not the only reason for the preference of “matchlock” as the standard weapon in the Indian sub-continent.

İt was not enough to copy the weapon, because with the development of a new weapon, new drill and training methods must be mastered by the soldiers.

The average Indian soldier had no discipline and the Moghul warrior was not used to change “his way of war”.

After so many years of conquer and victory the Moghul ruling class were also not so much interested in new weaponry and technics and tactics.

19

As a result, stagnation occurred particularly in terms of standard weapons.

By the time of Akbar, over 35,000 musketeers existed in the Mughal military.

The question for my term-paper is the relation between the firearm and the war elephant.

Logically, one or even a lot of matchlocks were not enough powerful to kill a war elephant. İf we consider that the use ofwar elephants in a battle happened in a mass, then we can imagine that not the defenders but the attackers in the towers on the elephants could had been used the matchlock.

The unreliability, the long and complex loading-process of the matchlock couldn’t allow using the weapon against such a shock-attack.

Although the matchlock did not require any special training andcontinuous training from childhood like by the composite bow, exactly this kind of training made the composite bow such a deathly weapon even against the elephant riders.

-the role of the elephants during sieges

A military blockade of a city or fortress is called a siege.

The term derives from “sedere”, Latin for "to sit".

When an attacking army appears a city or fortress that cannot be easily taken by a coup de main (swift attack) or refuses to surrender, then a siege begins.

The aim is to conquer by attrition or an assault.

A speciality of siege weapons in India was using elephants to batter in the wooden gates of a fort. The gates were protectedwith some additional cover material so that it couldn’t be broken easily. As a countermeasure the gates were studded with iron spikes as a protection against elephants.

20

İf we analyse especially the architecture of the fortress - gates we can realize that those “elephant attacks” were one of the main fears of the defenders.

The architects found a lot of solutions for preventing the entrance of a fortress from those “live battering rams”.

The simple one was to build external and internal gates; both strengthened with two flanking towers and combined with additional walls, which formed a small fort at the entrance.

In some cases, for reducing the effect of the attack to the main gate, both gates were built in an angle of 90 degree to each other.

On the other hand, in India siege of fortresses or cities rarely ended by a final assault which was called “storming”.

Because of the inefficiency of the artillery in those days, a breach on the wall was very rare.

That’s the reasons why only a few of sieges in Indian subcontinent ended in medieval times by “storming”.

But on the other hand, treachery within the walls was as frequent cause of surrender.

The developments on European continent in siege technology fromthe point of the defenders couldn’t be followed in India.

The new form of “fortress building” which was called, “Trace italienne” hadn’t been copied by any ruler of Indian sub-continent, because there was no need of it.

The fortresses on strategic locations had so gigantic towers and walls, which even the biggest cannons of early modern period couldn’t destroy them.6 234- 235

As an example, the Purana Qila fortress in Delphi build between1530-1545 had walls with a measure of 17 meters. (For a comparison or a better imagination İstanbul walls 7-8 meters.)

6 Geoffrey Parker, The Military Revolution: military innovation and the rise of the West, 1500 – 1800 (Cambridge: Cambridge University press, 1996)., pp.234-5

21

Because of this reason we may not overestimate the importance of elephants during a siege. Due to these facts we can imagine that the attack of the gates through the elephants was a commonissue during the siege of garrisons’ forts or small fortresses.

İt was reported that till the end of the 18th century the European powers were not able to conquer a fortress by cannon bombardment.

But, in my personal opinion this military “failure” depends also on the fact, that till the appearance of the British army (not the East India Company) none of the colonial forces invested too much money and manpower into the conquest of India.

Therefore the miners and sappers were the main weapons during asiege in India. Many Europeans were employed as sappers in the Mughal Army.

-River crossings and pontoon bridges:

Pontoon bridges are especially useful in wartime as river crossings.

Such bridges are usually temporary, and are sometimes destroyedafter crossing from hindering them to be used by the enemy forces.

İn case of long marches through regions with several rivers they had been carried. (See Appendix J)

İn medieval India, especially along the Ganges and İndus this practice was common.

Especially the bridge builders were experienced to build pontoon bridges which could carry even the elephants.

There are three basic facts about the Indian sub-continent and the Mughal Empire, when we try to understand the importance of building “technically good” pontoon bridges.

The Mughal Empire was a “mobile state”, the elephants were the primary baggage animals because of the natural conditions and

22

big regions of Indian sub-continent were dominated by the rivers. (See the map on the Appendix I )

İf we consider only those three basic facts we can easily imagine the importance of building pontoon bridges which shouldn’t collapse under the massive weight of the elephants and the relevance between elephants, their role in the daily administration of the Mughal Empire and pontoon bridges.

-Logistics and elephants:

The fact that the Mughal emperors spent much of their time moving around their lands, like a mobile government with an armed camp.

Without a good logistic system it couldn’t possible to build such a great empire and care for its survival.

There were many similarities, between the Mughal and Ottoman Empire, because both of them were based on a “nomad background”.

But the geographical and cultural differences in the Indian sub-continent created automatically some variations.

The baggage animals, like by Ottomans, were oxen, dromedaries, and of course elephants as the main carriers.

But due to the natural specialities and advantages of the sub-continent elephants were the main actor for every possible logistical work.

Not only for carrying the huge heavy artillery, which was vitalespecially during the early and late Mughal period during siegebattles, but also for construction, maintenance and developmentworks of road and building structures they were indispensable.

On the other hand, elephants carried two pieces of "elephant barrel" - artillery and two soldiers to fire them. The elephants served only to transport the weapons and their crew, however; they dismounted before firing. (See Appendix: D)

23

Conclusion:

As we realized, not only the technological developments but additional natural, economic and social circumstances defines the “type” of the weapon used in battles.

The weapons, the geographical environment and the military knowledge of the commanding class in the army define the tactics on the battlefield.

By the end of the 16th century the Mughal matchlock muskets were better made than most European firearms and they were manufacturing light and heavy cannon of brass and bronze.

But they failed to follow, import and copy the new military technologies.

They didn’t invest in science and technological education. The new tactics, based on the new weapons and technologies were unknown in the subcontinent.

The weapons were old fashioned, the army with less discipline and training.

The army’s fundamental structure depended on the warlords, who brought the mass of the soldiers.

When the empire began to lose its administrative, economic and military power, the decentralization created new rivals from the old allies.

The fall began in distant regions and with the colonization progress of the European powers the end came rapidly.

Later emperors paid less attention to the technical aspects of artillery, allowing the Mughal Empire to gradually fall behind in weapon technology,

With every new technological advancement there is a corresponding change in training, cohesion, strategy, geography.

24

But there are an overwhelming number of factors and probabilities of which we cannot possible consolidate.

Wars are multifaceted organisms and are as complex as the humans that fight them.

Appendices:

Appendix A: Geographical map of Indian sub-continent

Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Indiahills.png

Appendix B: Emperor Akbar restrains an elephant

25

Berlin State Museum - Museum of Islamic Art / Moghul miniature,India, 1609-10

Appendix C: Swivel gun mounted on a camel

Source: http://www.gunhistoryIndia.com/2008/12/camel-26

cavalryman-on-camel-with-mounted.html

Appendix D: An original engraving from 1892 elephants carrying cannons

Source: http://www.etsy.com/listing/31258944/elephants-transporting-cannons-1892

Appendix E:

27

Drawing of an early Chinese soldier lighting a rocket

Source: http://history.msfc.nasa.gov/rocketry/03.html

Appendix F:

The largest wheeled cannon, “ Jaivana cannon” at the Jaigarh Fort, Jaipur, cast in 1720.

Source: http://www.gunhistoryIndia.com/2009/02/jaivana-worlds-largest-cannon.html

28

Appendix G:

Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Early_16th_century_Ottoman_volley_gun.jpg

Appendix H:

Anti-elephant spikes on the main gate

Source: http://notreallytravelling.com

Appendix I: Akbar's Adventures with the Elephant Hawa'i in 1561

29

across a collapsing bridge of boats over the river Jamuna, in Victoria and Albert Museum London

Appendix J:

30

Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:India_rivers_and_lakes_map.svg

31

Bibliography:

Abu L-Fazl, Akbar Nama of Abu-l-fazl, Low Price Publications, India,1989

Archer, I. Christon, Ferrig, John R., World history of warfare,University of Nebraska press, U.S.A., 2002, pp.172-183

Atul, Chandra Roy, A history of Mughal navy and naval warfare,

World Press, Calcutta, India, 1972

Aune, M. G., "Elephants, Englishmen and India: Early Modern travel Writing and the Pre-Colonial Movement", North Dakota State University , Early Modern Literary Studies, Vol.11/1, 2005

Babur, Baburnâme: Memoirs of Babur, Prince and Emperor, translated by John Leyden and William Erskine, revised by Lucas King, Oxford University Press, England, 1921

Barua, P., The State at War in South Asia, University of Nebraska Press, U.S.A., 2005, p.32 -50

Bhakari, Surinder Kumar, Indian Warfare: An appraisal and tactics in early medieval period, South Asia books, New Delhi, India,1981; (revision of the author's thesis (Ph.D.--Universityof Saugar, 1975) under title: Warfare in northern India between600-1200 A.D.)

Black, Jeremy, War and the World: military power and the fate of continents 1450 – 2000, New Haven and London, England, 1998

Black, Jeremy,(ed.), Great Military Leaders and their Campaigns, Thames & Hudson, England, 2008, p. 116 - 123

Burton-page, John, 'A study of fortification in the Indian subcontinent from the thirteenth to the eighteenth century A.D.', Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 23, 1960, pp. 516–22

32

Chase, Kenneth, Firearms: a global history to 1700, Cambridge University press, Cambridge, England, 2003, p. 1 - 27, 131 - 134, 205 – 210

Çeçen, Doç. Dr. Anıl, Türk devletleri, İnkılâp kitabevi, İstanbul, Turkey, 1986, p.253 – 282

Davis, Paul K., 100 Decisive Battles: From Ancient Times to thePresent, 2nd ed., Oxford University Press, U.S.A.,2001

Digby, Simon, War-horse and elephant in the Delhi Sultanate, Orient Monographs, Oxford, England, 1971

Eraly, Abraham, the Mughal world: Life in India’s last golden age, Penguin books, India, 2007

Encyclopaedia of İslam, 2nd edition, articles on Akbar, Babur, India, Hind, Leiden, 1960

Flint, Colin (ed.), The Geography of War and Peace, Oxford University Press, England, 2005

Gommans, Jos J. L., The Rise of the Indo-Afghan Empire, c. 1710-80, E. J. Brill, Leiden, Netherlands, 1995

Gommans, Jos J. L., Mughal warfare, Indian frontiers and high roads to empire, 1500 – 1700, Routledge, London, England, 2002

Gommans, Jos J. L., & Kolff, Dirk H. A., Warfare and Weaponry in South Asia 1000 – 1800, Oxford in India readings: Themes in Indian history, , Oxford University Press, England, 2001

Grant, R.G., Warrior: A Visual History of the Fighting Man, DK ADULT, 2010, p. 124-128

Habib, İrfan (edited by), Akbar and his India, Oxford India paperbacks, India, 1997, p. 33 -54

Habib, İrfan, Technology in medieval India c. 650 – 1750, Tulika books, New Delhi, India, p. 85 -119

Habib, İrfan, An atlas of the Mughal empire, Oxford University Press, U.S.A., 1982

33

Hodgson , Marshall G. S. , The venture of Islam: Conscience andhistory in a world civilization, volume three, the gunpowder empires and modern times, University of Chicago press, U.S.A., 1974

Iqtidar, Alam Khan, Gunpowder and Firearms: Warfare in MedievalIndia, Oxford University press, New Delhi, India, 2004

Irvine, William, The army of the Indian Moghuls: its organization and administration, Luzac & Co., London, England, 1903, p.113 - 159

Jackson, Peter, The Delhi Sultanate, a political and military history, Cambridge University press, Cambridge, England, 1999

Kinard J., Artillery: An Illustrated History of Its Impact, ABC-CLIO, 2007, p. 95-96

Kolff, Dirk H., & A., Naukar, Rajput and sepoy: the ethno history of the military labour market in Hindustan, 1450 – 1850, Cambridge University press, Cambridge, England, 1990

(Ph.D. thesis under title: an armed peasantry and its allies: Rajput tradition and state formation, 1450 – 1850, in Leiden University, 1983)

Makhdoomee, M.A., Mechanical Artillery in medieval India, Journal of Indian history, Vol. XV, 1936, p. 139 -195

McNeill, William H., The age of gunpowder empires 1450 – 1800, American Historical Association, Washington, DC, U.S.A., 1989

Mukhia, Harbans, The Mughals of India, Blackwell publishing, England, 2004

Nicolle, David, Mughal India 1504-1761, Osprey military publishing, Men at arm series vol. 263, London, England, 1993

Nicolle, David, Medieval Siege weapons Vol. 2, Byzantium, İslamic world and India AD 476 – 1526, Osprey military publishing , New Vanguard Vol. 69, London, England, 2003

Nossov, Konstantin S., Indian castles, 1206 – 1526, the rise

34

and fall of Delhi Sultanate, Osprey military publishing , Fortress series Vol.51, London, England, 2006

Nossov, Konstantin S., War Elephants, Osprey military publishing , New Vanguard Vol. 69, London, England, 2012

Parker, Geoffrey, The Military Revolution: military innovation and the rise of the West, 1500 – 1800, Cambridge University press, Cambridge, 1996

Pant, Gayatri Nath, Mughal weapons in Babur-nâmâ, Agam Kala Prakashan, Delhi, India, 1989

Pant, Gayatri Nath, Studies in Indian weapons and warfare, ArmyEducational Stores, New Delhi, India, 1970

Pearson, M. N., The Portuguese in India , the New Cambridge History of India,Vol.1, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge,1987

Rajshree Shukla, & Abdul Sabahuddin, The Mughal Strategy of War, Global Vision Publishing House, Delhi, 2003

Richards, John F., The Mughal Empire, Cambridge University press, Cambridge, 1993

Roy, Kaushik, Military Synthesis in South Asia: Armies, Warfare, and Indian Society, c. 1740-1849, the Journal of Military History, Vol. 69, No. 3 (Jul., 2005), pp. 651-690

Singh Harjeet, Cannons Versus Elephants The Battles Of Panipat,Pentagon Press, India, 2011

Nicholas John Spykman, The Geography of the peace, (originallypublished by Harcourt, Brace & World, 1944), Archon books, Hamden, Connecticut, U.S.A., 1969

Singh, Jagjit, Maj. General, Artillery: the battle-winning arm,Lancer publishers and Distributors, New Delhi, India, 2006, pp.11 - 36

Streusand Douglas E., Islamic Gunpowder Empires: Ottomans, Safavids and Mughals, Westview Press, Colorado, U.S.A., 2011

35

Streusand Douglas E., the formation of the Mughal Empire, Oxford University press, U.S.A., 1996

Wink, Andrè, Makers of Muslim world: Akbar, Oneworld publications, Oxford, England, 2009, p.23 – 28, p. 66 - 68

36