TERM PAPER

STATES AND SOCIETIES IN MIDDLE EAST

MILITARY RULE IN POLITICS AND STATE-SOCIETY

RELATIONS IN MIDDLE EAST FROM THE 1980 ONWARDS

Abstract

The military role in state formation in Middle East appeared

during the 20th century, have big impacts on state-society

relations in Middle Eastern countries. In 1923, Turkey became

the first independent country in Middle East with “Independency

War” controlled by military elites. The state-building

processes of military orders continued in three waves which

took place in 1950s, 1960s and 1970s in countries such as

Egypt, Algeria, Syria and Iraq. After 1980, new military rules

in Middle Eastern societies appeared as military officials

conducted coup d`états either peacefully or coercively. During

1960s and 1970s; in the formative period, the military order

was analyzed positively due to their bureaucratic regimes

within the republican order such as in Egypt, Syria, Algeria,

Tunisia, Libya, and Yemen (Vatikiotis 1961, Halpern 1963, Abdel

Malek 1968, Haddad 1973, Khuri & Obermeyer 1974, Khuri 1982).

In contrast to the role of military in formative years of

Middle Eastern countries, post-1980 period was a time of

transformation of the military role in state-society relations

and the consolidation of their authoritarian regimes. Analysts

such as Lucien Pye, Manfred Halpern, and Edward Shils saw the

military as the ideal instrument to direct the

industrialization, institutionalization, and reform necessary

for a modern society, but the military is actually a key

variable for the stability of authoritarianism.1 Since the

2000s one might see that this consolidation has been crumbled

strongly by the Middle Eastern societies, which became popular

with the Arab Uprising. However, it is very crucial to

understand why the authoritarian military regimes in Middle

East started to collapse. Which reasons triggered the revolts

against the authoritarian governments? How the state-society

relations were formed within these military governments in

order to success regime stability lasting for many decades?

What are the general politics of these regimes since the 1980s?

What kind of power enabled the military regimes to run the

state, i.e. which means of production were they holding in

their hand? Another important question is what relations of

power the military officers were exercising among different

actors and which benefits these relations were providing? The

changes in global and regional dimensions are other questions

in order to explain the success of authoritarian regimes in

staying so many years in political affairs. The paper will

address the question of how the military system of power has

shifted (at least partly) to other actors including points of

view, mentioned above, with scientific knowledge and

contemporary empiric studies which will include Egypt and

Turkey as case studies for the topic.

Content

1. Historical Background of Military in Middle

East

2. New Social Contract

3. Civil-Military Relations

4. Political Challenges to Military

5. Case Study: EGYPT

6. Case Study: TURKEY

7. Conclusion

Historical Background of Military Rule

The military elites played a crucial role in building the

modern state and transforming the community into a modern

society. During the formative years the flow of change was

dominated strongly by military elites in countries such as

Turkey and Egypt. The military elites carried out the politics,

economy and ran the state institutions according to their

policies. The military rule during the formative years had both

an anti-imperialist and anti-landlord character.2 Especial,

during 1950s; in Egypt, Iraq, Syria and Iran nationalistic

politics heightened as the military elites; who were influenced

by nationalist ideas from Europe, refused political dependency

and economic exploitation of their countries. Moreover, modern

secular states were established by taking the religion under

state control and dismantle their existing power structures.

Especially in Egypt, the state controlled economy by owning the

means of production such as food production, household

appliances and television, defense industry, informatics,

automotive industry, market and shopping mall management,

construction, banking and finance, service industry, gas and

oil station and water marketing companies State Formation and

Development.3 However, the policies of the military elites were

diverging from each other according to their ideological

background, the unique history of the country and their stance

during the Cold-War years in the bipolar world. For example, in

Egypt a period of socialist transformation was experienced

during the Nasser regime whereas Turkey`s Kemalist regime aimed

a corporatist model of society to create a national economy,

one denying the existence of conflicting class interests.

(Caglar Keyder, 1987) Afterwards, in Turkey a liberal domestic

economy was performed during the Menderes government.4 Though

there are differences in terms of their practices, the military

became a dominant actor in certain countries in Middle East who

suppressed or deconstructed the old patronage structures and

created its own power relations in a modern state-society

system. The domain of military rule was not only constrained by

security, politics and economy but it also regulated

effectively the education, culture and religion in the society.

New Social Contract: Neoliberalism in the Middle East

The neo-liberal policies opened up a new era in globalization.

This new era of globalization was mainly determined by the neo-

liberal policies, namely deregulation, privatization and

liberalization. In the MENA region; the period of etatism and

import substitution policies, bureaucratic expansion and

control over the national economy during 1960s and the early

1970s, was replaced by neo-liberal policies.5 The economic

crises in the early 1970s and the rising fuel prices generated

the failure of planned industrialization in Egypt.6 In 1974,

Anwar Sadat`s open door policy revealed the beginning of a wave

of economic liberalization in the region as the oil-lacking

countries like Jordon, Morocco, Syria and Turkey followed

economic liberalization policies. International organizations

like World Bank and IMF were eager to stimulate privatization

policies in the region. Thus, Structural Adjustment Programs

(SAPs) were created for the individual countries to make them

more market oriented. According to neo-liberal view, every

country could benefit from globalization and international

market by adopting market oriented structures. Moreover,

transitologists argued that liberalization of market forces

would result in political liberalization/ democracy by saying

that market forces would diminish the state`s authority as the

state`s economic power was shifted to the market forces.

Today, a significant number of analysts agree that the

transformation of Middle Eastern countries into the neo-liberal

globalization paradigm neither represents a democratization nor

is a preliminary to such a process. On the contrary, it has

actually configured and legitimated a restructuring of power

system that has left the authoritarian and patrimonial rule of

the Arab Regimes unchanged .7 In order to discover why

transition theory`s institutional and formal aspect of politics

fails to explain the situation in the Middle East, the

attention must be paid to the analysis of power relations in

each country.

The military was still in power during 1980s in Middle East,

where Saddam in Iraq, Mubarek in Egypt and Kenan Evren (the

head of 1980 coup d´etat) in Turkey could be given as examples.

The neo-liberal globalization period didn`t diminish the power

of authoritarian military rule inside the state entities, as it

is claimed by neo-liberals that “unstoppable forces unleashed

by globalization” such as civil society, market forces and

transnational actors would result in the “retreat of the

state”. The military rulers, who were at the top rankings of

bureaucracy, were formally driven out from economic sphere of

the state and the state was not anymore the redistributor of

wealth. The shift of capital from public sphere to private one

didn`t create an independent class, who would run the liberal

market. Rather, the privatization processes have represented

an opportunity for the ruling elites to reorganize and shift

patronage networks towards the private sector, without

undermining the power of the state as the ultimate source of

rent.8 Indeed, the private sector in Middle East is dependent

upon state connections for its own survival and thus be easily

manipulated by the regimes.

The neo-liberal globalization isn`t not a mere depoliticized

conception of reform, drawing a definite line between the realm

of economics and the realm of politics. Though neo-liberal

perspective considers that institutional reforms are technical

solutions to deal with globalization in Global South, there is

the agenda of creating secure free market environment.

International donors like World Bank and IMF promoted

Washington Consensus in 1980s and Post-Washington consensus in

1990s where they introduced prescriptive “good governance”

policy. From the neo-liberal point of view the institutional

reforms in authoritarian governments could be portrayed as a

step to democracy. These reforms included bolster trade and

investment integration within the region, reduction of tariff

and non-tariff barriers, and access to the service sector which

enabled the global capital to flourish freely. According to

Hanieh, they are not just economic policies but also represent

a particular political agenda that reveals the unassailable

link between aid and the fulfilment of neo-liberal reforms.9

Opening up the domestic economy to the foreign capital became a

source of bargaining power for the authoritarian regimes in

order to increase their resources. The political demands of

international donors like free and fair elections or give

democratic rights to citizens are just nominal, as the

institutions state apparatus have been gathered into the hands

of authoritarian military elites in the Middle East.

MILITARY-CIVIL RELATIONS DURING THE LAST THREE DECADES

In Middle Eastern countries like Turkey, Iraq, Syria or Egypt

the military placed itself as the dominant power structure

above the state apparatus which preserves still the continuity

today. Military formed a system of power in civil society by

interfering in political space, economic sphere and security

apparatus to absorb every possible confrontation to their

indestructible principles. Though the political regime was

democracy, the principles of military dominated every agenda of

political parties in Middle Eastern governments. The military

interfered in politics by staging coup d´états, arresting or

dismantling political parties which would threaten their system

of power within the state apparatus. As long as the government

shares the same norms and values with the military order, there

will be no inconsistency between the government and the

military.10 In other words, the military considers itself not in

service of the government, but in the service of its own norms

and values.11 The norms and values of the military apparatus in

Middle Eastern countries contain the protection of national

security against the internal and external threats. The

military places itself above the civil society and claim that

the civil society is incapable of preserving the interests of

the national state as the civil society is considered to

disregard the national interests and construct their own ones.

The military officers were taught that they possess the

superior qualifications, are more disciplined and nationalist

and that they are more “loyal” to the nation state, than the

civil society is. The secular military order claimed also to be

the protector of democratic regimes. However, this claim is

contradictory. On the one hand the military officers were

endorsing democracy as the political regime and rejected any

military intervention in political affairs, on the other hand

they were approving the military intervention as legitimate

whenever their norms and values became threatened by the

different sections of civil society.

The exclusionist power structure of military elites between

state-society relations resumed within the neo-liberal

globalization paradigm but it engaged in a transformation

period. The transformation period is determined by changing

patterns in political, economic and security sector in state-

society relations. First of all, after the engagement of Arab

regimes with neo-liberal globalization the political strategies

changed in Middle East including Turkey. The political sector`s

general direction developed towards a strong elitism in and

privatization of political decisions where civil society was

excluded from decision making processes. Decisions were

increasingly restricted to circles and technocrats, often

through private or semi-private institutions and without

democratic oversight, where such oversight exists.7

Furthermore, a depoliticization and demobilization process of

the middle and lower social strata occurred as the neo-liberal

reforms constricted the state-society relations from

eliminating poverty and distribution of wealth to providing

security for its citizens. Besides the depoliticization of

middle and lower classes, the nationalist ideology also

diminished its significance. A possible explanation for this

decline is that the neo-liberal globalization increased the

variety of elites in Middle Eastern governments who had primary

interest in building their own constituencies fearing that

other fractions of elites will undermine their privileged

status in state apparatus. Client-seeking elites didn`t propose

political solutions to common problems of civil society like

unemployment or socio-economic inequality. The elites were

afraid that politicization of social conflicts could result in

their loss of relations of power originating from the public

and the private sector interactions. The only partial exception

could be given the trend of Islamist movements which will be

discussed in Political Challenges part of the paper. The

emergence of diversified actors in political sphere shouldn`t

be understood as a liberalization process as the different

renewed participatory policies for different elites have been

combined with repressive policies towards political actors

which constitute an autonomous or have a grassroots base. (e.g.

like Islamists.)7

The privatization process in Middle Eastern countries led not

only the sale of property from the public to private sector but

it also outsourced the former public services, like education,

transport and health, that often involves the creation of

hybrid public-private partnerships with little democratic

accountability. Liberalization process in economy occurred

only in sectors and areas of major interest to the strongest

states, corporations and individuals. Hence, foreign investment

and exchange has been liberalized, but, for example, migration

and trade in textiles products have not.7 In fact, economic

liberalization measures became an opportunity for the elites to

restructure external relations, like negotiating external rents

or reorienting international trade, and redistributing internal

sources by coopting new social groups and excluding others.

This attitude of governments has resulted in a shift in

patronage networks and the formation of new crony capitalists,

rather than creation of competitive markets. Crony capitalism,

where success in business in dependent upon close relationships

between governments and business men, in Middle Eastern

countries like Turkey, Egypt, Morocco and Jordan the military

elite favored their social neighborhood in distributing of

legal permits, government grants and special tax breaks. The

exclusionist economic policies of the military oriented

governments resulted in reactions in civil society. Social

strata, which rose from the governments` exclusionist policies

emerged within the global neo-liberal structure as the ISI

policy in the Middle was depleted and export-led economy

enabled different sections in society(opposing to military in

state apparatus) to accumulate capital within the regional and

global economy. For example, the Gülen Movement originated from

the withdrawal of direct control in economy of the state and

export oriented policies in Turkey. Albeit, the diminishing

power of the state in economy didn`t lessen the system of power

of the state itself.

In the “stronger” states like Morocco, Egypt or Saudi Arabia

public policies became more securitized and the torture and

physical intimidation of police forces happened in a daily

routine. A “securitization” process in the civil-military

relations developed in accordance with the restructuring of the

states` system of power and altering patterns in global (in)

security. The “securitization” of everyday state appeared as a

coercive mechanism which not only enabled the state apparatus

to have control over civil society but also granted

legitimization to the use of force against it. Although not in

all cases, in Middle Eastern countries where the state still

constituted its dominant system of power like in Morocco,

Turkey, Syria or Egypt; any community which contravened with

the existing power structure, was excluded from the sphere of

politics. The exclusionist and neo-patrimonial state apparatus

started to change during the last decade with the change of

global, regional, national and local dynamics.

“Political Challenges to Military “System of Power”: Political

Islam

First of all, one might to think about what political Islam is.

Political Islam is referred by conceptual plurality like

radical Islam, militant Islam, extremist Islam, revolutionary

Islam and fundamentalist Islam. This diversity points both to

the many aspects believed to characterize political Islam, as

well as to the problem of finding an appropriate term. The

shortest (and most encompassing) definition of political Islam

is that it denotes “Islam used to a political end”.12 There is

an illegitimate extension of the Islamic tradition, outside of

the properly religious domain it has historically occupied.13

Though Political Islam has many aspects in the history as this

paper examines the period after 1980, the changes in political

dynamics in Middle East will be also constrained to this

period. First of all, the Iranian revolution in 1979, 9/11

attacks in 2001 and lastly the Arab Uprising since 2010 has

changed many regional dynamics in Middle East. Every event in

Middle East has constituted diversified results in the region,

but they built a common consequence in terms of increasing the

power of political Islam in the region. Not only regional, but

also global events in the world politics has also resulted in

the rise of Islam. 9/11 attacks were a determinant in the rise

of political Islam, as it put the secular states in a weaker

position whereas Islamist movements emerged as an alternative

to the unsuccessful authoritarian secular governments.

The important question, one might wonder here is that how

Islamist movements gained a popular support from the civil

society in secular states. The explanation can be separated

into two dimensions. The former dimension, which is the

political one, can be explained by the failure of Pan-Arabism

as regional wars and conflicts prevented such a union and every

state was acting individually with other states according to

the self-interests; sometimes against the interest of all Arab

nations in the region. (Gulf War, 1990) The latter dimension

can be explained in the socio-economic paradigm within the

statist and structural perspective. After the neo-liberal

restructuring of the world economy took place, individual

states restructured themselves by reproducing their authority

and creating their neo-patrimonial system of power. The

increasing gap between the rich and the poor in civil society

was not disturbing the “retreated” state. The withdrawing of

the state from welfare created a power vacuum which resulted in

filling this gap with Islamic charities. The care of the civil

society by Islamic charities with “social service” policy

increased the grassroots mobilization within the network of

political Islam. The social service of Islamic charities

created an informal network of system of power between the

Islamic entities and civil society without including the state

apparatus.14

However, the Islamic charities were avoiding take part in any

of the demonstrations in Egypt, Morocco or Tunisia until the

Arab Uprisings started. Fearing that the “securitized” state

would dismantle or destruct their system of power, Islamic

organizations didn`t participated actively in politics. An

example can be given for the post-modern coup in Turkey held on

28 February 1997 against the Welfare Party of Erbakan. When

the Arab Uprisings started, the political Islam soared

drastically where Justice and Development Party in Morocco, the

Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt or the Islamic Action Front in

Jordan show up actively with a reformist political wing.

The economic resources of these Islamic movements are very

important to understand how they crashed the military system of

power in state apparatus which will be revealed in case studies

with empiric data.

CASE STUDY: EGYPT

The Lotus Revolution in Egypt on 25 January 2011 revealed the

major contradiction against the Egyptian President Hosni

Mubarak of the Egyptian society with the diverse movement of

demonstrations, marches, plaza occupations, riots, non-violent

civil resistance, acts of civil disobedience and labor strikes

which followed a popular uprising Millions of protesters from a

variety of socio-economic and religious backgrounds demanded.

The grievances of the legal and political issues including

police brutality, state of emergency laws,15 lack of free

elections and freedom of speech, corruption,16 and economic

issues including high unemployment, food price inflation 17 and

low wages. On 10 February, Hosni Mubarak resigned from the

presidency. Indeed, the key dramatis personae in the crucial

events of January-February were the military and the Ministry

of the Interior, organized Islamists and especially the Muslim

Brotherhood, and young political activists networked through

social media. 18 On 24 June 2012 Muslim Brotherhood candidate

Mohamed Morsi is declared winner of Egypt's first free

presidential election since the ouster of Hosni Mubarak by

Egypt’s electoral commission and is the first Islamist elected

to be head of an Arab state. However, Morsi`s reluctance upon

alienating the army and the liberals, accompanied by asserting

authority over the rule of law and judiciary, and the failure

to capitalize popular goodwill resulted in the loss of support

in the society. 19 On 3 July 2013, Morsi was ousted from the

Egyptian coup d’état following the Egyptian protests against

his authoritarian rule.

The main legitimacy of Freedom and Justice Party (established

by Muslim Brotherhood) that it represents the real Egyptians

and not the city dwellers and the liberal upper class, but the

millions who live in slums, small towns and villages,

struggling to make a living and adhering to a basically

conservative Muslim lifestyle vanished as the government came

to nothing with the socio-economic and political demands of

civil society and insisted on to consolidate its system of

power and eradicate the “fulul” of the Mubarak-regime.

In international affairs, Morsi obtained support at first. The

British foreign minister David Cameron was the first person who

visited him and Morsi made his first visit to Saudi Arabia with

the desire of developing relations. Moreover, he supported the

intervention to Syria on behalf of the opposition groups

against Bashar Al Assad. He also sent a friendly diplomatic

letter to Shimon Peres in the case of Palestine issue

contrasting to the Mubarak`s hostility to Israel. By easing the

tensions with Israel and improving relations with Gulf

Countries, Morsi gained US support for him.

In Egypt, the defeat of Mubarak didn`t come from the private

sector. The “Whales of the Nile”, who were supposed to

represent the independent business class, were unable to swim

away from becoming vulnerable objects of the desire of the

military, security services, officers of both, and the

Islamists. (Springborg, p.248) Business men were discredited

from civil society, as being the cronies of the Mubarak

government. For example, the Egyptian Businessmen`s Association

and AmCham were led by cronies tied to the regime, such as

Shafiq Gabr, the perennial AmCham president closely linked to

the military. (Springborg, p.257) The private universities

emerged from the 1990s were funded by businessmen, but

investors ensured that individuals trusted by the deep state

were placed in prominent positions.20 On the contrary, the crony

business men participated in the physical resistance in the

protests in the so-called battle of the camels in 2 February,

in which thugs on camels and horses, allegedly hired by Murtada

Mansur, a Giza businessmen, sought unsuccessfully to turn the

tide in Tahrir Square. (Springborg, p.246) One might imply that

Morsi also didn`t want to change the crony business in Egypt,

as he wanted to create its own system of power against the

military order in state apparatus. Equally, the political

intention to approach the Gulf Countries could be also

considered as a willingness to establish a rentier state of the

GCC variety as the financial support of Muslim Brotherhood and

other Islamist political actors are strongly connected to the

GCC countries. However, the population/hydrocarbon wealth ratio

is too low for establishing a classic rentier state like those

of GCC countries.21

The revolution in Egypt didn`t also emerged from the opposition

political parties as they were inactive and suppressed under

the masonic-oligarchic regime of Mubarak. The NGOs weren`t

constituting an initiating role in Egyptian revolution neither,

because the NGOs which encouraged reformist transformation into

a democratic civil society with a narrowed and managerial point

of view denying the dynamic view of civil society, which

include civil disobedience and grassroots mobilization.

22 The revolution of 25 January 2011 in Egypt, which occurred

with the grassroots mobilization of the civil society, was

firstly represented by the Muslim Brotherhood in political

sphere. However, the Egyptian society wasn`t satisfied with

Morsi as the society continued to demand the actualization of

the socio-economic civil rights and a liberalization in

politics and media.

CASE STUDY: TURKEY

In Turkey the active and permanent political Islam started with

AKP (Justice and Development Party) which won Turkey's 15th

general election, which was held on November 3, 2002 following

the collapse of the DSP-MHP-ANAP coalition led by Bülent

Ecevit. The AKP-government revealed itself as a promising

political party by asserting to eliminate the corruptions by

coalition-led governments and removing the economic stagnation

appeared dramatic with the devaluation crisis of Turkish Lira

between the year 2001 and 2002.

AKP portrays itself as a pro-Western and pro-American party in

the Turkish political spectrum that advocates a liberal market

economy including Turkish membership in the European Union.23

Some authors suggested also that AKP is a conservative democrat

party, who defends change, reform and transformation in favor

of democracy, human rights and rule of law against Kemalist

state elites. 24 In a speech in 2005, Erdogan rejected the

labels such as Islamic Party or Muslim-democrats and implied

that the party was just a conservative democrat one.25 The

removal of six zero from Turkish Lira, the constitutional

referendums held in 2007 and 2010(which enabled also to judge

the military juntas of 1980 coup d’état), the opening of

European Court of Human Rights for individual citizens, the

Peace-opening Process with Kurdish people and the permission

for the Women students to enter the universities with headscarf

were constituting the reformist side of AKP government.

Nonetheless, the intervention of the state into the private

spaces of civil society, like the possibility to abolish the

abortion and the prohibition of alcohol selling after 10 p.m. ,

the overuse of police force and arrogant attitude of Erdogan in

Gezi Park demonstrations in 2013 and lastly the corruption

scandal in 17 December 2013 and the tapes of Erdogan and his

son about his illegal property reveal that AKP government is

neither reformist nor an anti-corruption government.

In order to understand how AKP was able to transform the system

of power of the former military ruled state apparatus after it

won the elections in 2002, one might look at the changes since

the 1980 coup d’état in terms of the attitude of the military

elites to the Islamic entities and the political-economic

changes in Turkey. First of all, during the Cold-War era,

Turkey`s civil society engaged in division; on the one hand the

leftist groups and the right-wing group on the other during

1970s. After military coup d’état materialized in 1980, the

military regime permitted a tacit tolerance towards the Islamic

entities in order to use the religion as a tool to dissolve the

leftist intention in civil society. Moreover, the rising of the

Kurdish issue necessitated a wane in nationalistic ideas in

order to stabilize civil society. Özal, the head of ANAP which

run the government between 1983 and 1989 and later became the

president, had an Islamic inclined politics for example. The

state apparatus eased the restrictions towards the Qur`an

schools, building of new mosques and Islamic research centers.

The tacit tolerance towards Özal and his party was limited by

military regimes in accordance with the empowerment and

assertiveness of Özal in national and regional politics. For

example, Özal`s determination to participate in Gulf War

besides the US and hence assert an expansionist and active

policy in Middle East was strongly opposed by the military.

(Gürbey, p.258) During the instable coalition years, Erbakan

with Welfare Party won the elections in a coalition government

in 1996. However, the military forced him to resignation from

the prime minister position in 28 February 1997 which is today

considered as a post-modern coup d’état. The authoritarian

military system of power granted certain degree of freedom in

political sphere to Islamic parties and it retook the freedom

when they turned into a threatening power. Nonetheless, this

authoritarian order shifted to the side of Islamic entities,

when the government AKP successfully separated military from

politics with the Ergenekon trial and consolidated itself in

state institutions by restructuring them with the support of

Gulen Cemaat. The economic changes in Turkey were similar to

the Egypt and other countries within the neo-liberal paradigm

as privatization, deregulation and liberalization were the main

policies of governments; especially with Özal and Erdogan

governments. However, the Green Capital is generating the main

factor in the empowerment of the political Islam in Turkey. The

green capital is used to refer to the Islamic companies which

intensified after the 28 February process. Some examples can be

given Ülker, Bim, Ihlas and Kombassan. Not only the companies,

but also a banking system has been constituted for the Islamic

companies to accumulate more capital like Bank Avrasya, Al-

Baraka or Kuveyt-Türk. The Islamic Banking system doesn`t

working on an interest based system as the interest is

abolished in Islamic beliefs and thus it attracts the “mümin”

to choose an Islamic Bank. Today`s president Gül worked as a

specialist at the Islamic Development Bank in Jeddah, Saudi

Arabia between 1983 and 1991. From 1980 onwards, the trade

volume between Turkey and Gulf countries heightened. The AKP

government, unlike his preceding ones, achieved to create an

Islamic capital which was powerful enough to fight with the

military ruled capital in Turkey. Twenty years ago, Turks

discussed the influence of the "deep state," the shadowy

network of generals, intelligence officials, and—among

conspiracy theorists—organized crime bosses. Today, in private

conversations in teahouses and in the National Assembly, many

Turkish officials discuss green money and AKP financial opacity

as the new threat. Under apparent Saudi influence, such changes

will likely further erode Turkish secularism. 26

CONCLUSION

This paper aimed to answer the question of how the secular

military orders` system of power in Middle East shifted towards

the political Islam and was challenged by political Islam by

giving a historical background and explaining the neo-liberal

globalization dimension behind the shift of power in state-

society relations in Middle East. This paper helps to

understand the Arab Spring by trying to characterize the old

structures within state-society relations in Middle East and to

explain the changes after the adaptation of neo-liberal

policies. The case studies reveal both the commonalities and

differences during the process of shift of the power from

military order to the excluded Islamic part of civil society.

However, it is also important to mention that the structural

changes appeared not only within the systemic failure of state-

society relations but also due to the international financial

crisis, revolution in the communication and international

events which affected the time and space dimensions of the

changes in Middle East.

As Anderson points out, no class in history immediately

comprehends the logic of its own historical situation, in

epochs of transition: a long period of disorientation and

confusion may be necessary for it to learn the necessary rules

of its own sovereignty. (Anderson 1980, p.55)

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