Might did not make right Bush Doctrine in Mideast ended up in tatters

Beijing Foreign Language StudiesUniversity

Might Did not Make Right —Bush Doctrine in the Mideast Ended

up in Tatters

Term Paper for American Foreign Policy in the

Post-war Years

Might Did Not Make Right—Bush Doctrine in the Mideast Ended up in Tatters

Student Name: 杨杨杨

Student ID: 13011074

Date: December, 2013

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Abstract

The “Bush Doctrine”, which asserted that the United

States should preemptively attack states that harbored

terrorists and act unilaterally if necessary, was

launched with power in the Mideast but ended in tatters.

On every issue that Bush administration prioritized—

promoting Arab-Israeli peace, liberating Lebanon from

Syrian and Iranian influence, stabilizing Iraq and

containing Iran—American’s foes grew stronger and its

allies fell weaker. The United States failed to achieve

its objectives in the realms of counter-terrorism,

democracy promotion and nuclear proliferation. The main

reason for its failure was that the Bush administration

relied too much on military force and too little on

diplomacy. In this paper, I firstly give a brief


description of the Bush Doctrine; secondly make a review

of Bush policy in the Mideast; last I make an analysis of

the reasons for Bush policy’s failure in the Mideast.

Key words: the “Bush Doctrine”; Mideast; Failure;

Military Force

摘摘

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Contents


1.The “Bush Doctrine”

The “Bush Doctrine”, though rarely used by members of

the Bush administration, revealed everything about George

W. Bush’s foreign policy. The September 11, 2001, attacks

on the United States put the “war on terrorism” atop of

the Bush agenda, and in the months after, Bush’s foreign

policy took on an aggressive tone, particularly towards

Mideast. The phrase the “Bush Doctrine” after 9/11

particularly described the policy that the United States

had the right to secure itself against countries that

harbor or give aid to terrorists.

1.1 The Four Planks of the “Bush Doctrine”

In the year after September 11, 2001, the Bush

administration put together the elements of a more far-

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reaching foreign policy doctrine based on pre-emptive

military strikes, unilateralism and prevention of the

emergence of rivals to the United States, which was

manifested in the Bush Doctrine. The main principles of

the Bush Doctrine were delineated in the National Security

Strategy of the United States 1:

The security environment confronting the United States

today is radically different from what we have faced

before. Yet the first duty of the United States Government

remains what it always has been: to protect the American

people and American interests. It is an enduring American

principle that this duty obligates the government to

anticipate and counter threats, using all elements of

national power, before the threats can do grave damage.

The greater the threat, the greater is the risk of

inaction – and the more compelling the case for taking

anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if

uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the

enemy’s attack. There are few greater threats than a

terrorist attack with WMD.

1 The National Security Strategy of the United States was first published in 2002 and thenrevised in 2006. It is available online at the White House website: <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html>

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To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our

adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act

preemptively in exercising our inherent right of self-

defense. The United States will not resort to force in all

cases to preempt emerging threats. Our preference is that

nonmilitary actions succeed. And no country should ever

use preemption as a pretext for aggression.

1.1.1 Preemption

The Bush Doctrine asserted that the United States

should preemptively attack a real or potential adversary

before it became a substantial threat in the future.

Accordingly, the Bush administration adopted a policy of

preventive war, which held that the United States should

depose regimes that represented a potential threat to the

security of the United Sates, even if that threat was not

immediate.

1.1.2 Unilateralism

Unilateralism granted the United States the right to

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act unilaterally if they thought necessary. Consequently,

the United Stated isolated itself more and more from

international law, which was evident when Bush told the

U.N. Security Council that the United States was going to

invade Iraq, with or without the council’s approval.

Ironically, this was in stark contrast with Bush’s

initial foreign policy, when he preached that they should

learn humility in dealing with other nations. In fact,

Bush was pushing the United States to a more obvious and

unabashed hegemony.

1.1.3 Military Primacy

In the Bush Doctrine, military strength has

fundamental role in the fight with terrorists and

American must do what is necessary to ensure their

nation’s security. Deeply influenced by neoconservatives,

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Bush laid emphasis on power and the necessity to resort

to military force to achieve its goals, which was

actually one of the main reasons why Mideast people

turned against him.

1.1.4 The Spread of Democracy

The Bush administration adopted a policy of spreading

democracy around the world, especially in the Mideast, as

a strategy for combating terrorism. In Bush’s own words,

it was to “advance liberty and hope as an alternative to

the enemy’s ideology of repression and fear” (2010). Bush

held that the United States should actively support

democratic governments around the world, especially in

the Mideast and depose regimes that harbor or support

terrorists.

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1.2 Criticism on the Bush Doctrine

The Bush Doctrine was subject to controversy and

incurred massive criticism. In 2008, polls showed that

there was more anti-Americanism than before the Bush

administration formed the Bush Doctrine. This increase,

if not solely caused by the Bush Doctrine, was at least

partially a result of implementing it.

Some politic critics, being suspicious of the

increasing willingness of the United States to use

military force unilaterally, accused the Bush

administration of foreign interventionism. Robert W.

Tucker and David C. Hendrickson opposed the Bush Doctrine

by arguing that it reflects a turn away from

international law, and marks the end of American

legitimacy in foreign affairs (2004). Joseph G. Peschek

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wrote that the United States under the guide of the Bush

Doctrine was acting as an “unabashed imperial power” and

the war on terrorism “have served to distract attention

from the domestic vulnerabilities of the Bush

administration” (2004).

Some commentators are suspicious of the Bush

Doctrine’s principle to promote democracy by arguing that

instead of supporting genuine democratic regimes driven

by local people, the Bush administration supported US-

friendly regimes installed by diplomats acting on behalf

of the United States. This is manifested in the way that

the United Sates acted in Afghanistan, where

parliamentary democracy was downplayed by the US. The

election of Karzai, the president of Afghanistan, had

been manipulated on the parts of the U.S. government.

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Kilhartkar and Ingalls called Karzai a U.S. ally (2007).

2.The Bush Doctrine in the Mideast

After 9/11, the Bush administration took an aggressive

stance toward the Mideast and exercised the main

principles of the Bush Doctrine there. The Bush

administration hewed to a neoconservative strategy in the

Mideast that sought to fundamentally reshape the region

through power and wars.

2.1 The War in Afghanistan

After 9/11, Bush denounced “war on terrorism” and the

US led a NATO invasion of Afghanistan, to dismantle the

al-Qaeda terrorist organization and to remove the Taliban

government from power. Bush demanded the Taliban to hand

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over Osama bin Laden and expel the al-Qaeda network which

was supporting the Taliban in its war with the Afghan

Northern Alliance. The Taliban recommended bin Laden to

leave the country and declined to extradite him.

Accordingly, the US launched Operation Enduring Freedom

with the UK and later joined by Germany and other western

allies, to attack the Taliban and al-Qaeda in conjunction

with the Northern Alliance.The U.S. and allies drove the

Taliban from power and gradually built new military bases

near major cities across the country.

In December 2001, the U.N. Security Council

established the International Security Assistance Force

(ISAF) to oversee security in the country and train the

Afghan National Security Forces. Although NATO members

provided the core of the force, only a portion of U.S.

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forces operated under NATO command. The majority remained

under direct American command.

The United States and its allies sought to help the

Afghans develop new specialties, such as civil order

brigades, counternarcotics, border surveillance, and

bring democracy to the Afghans. In the beginning, it

looked like a good war. The U.S. and its allies drove the

Taliban and al-Qaeda out, and helped place Hamid Karzai

in charge, hoping he would pacify Afghanistan. But

gradually the U.S. acted more like an occupying power,

which generated an insurgency.

International human rights organizations began to

criticize the U.S. for detaining alleged Taliban and al-

Qaeda combatant and refusing to grant these detainees

their rights as prisoners of war. Others alleged that

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numerous captured Taliban fighters possessed no link to

either al-Qaeda or the Taliban. Instead, these fighers

were misfortunately forced to join the Taliban military

during the American invasion. According to Human Rights

Watch, as of January 2004, “the public still [did] not

know who the detainees are, what they [had] allegedly

done, and whether and when they will be charged with

crimes or released. There [had] been no hearings to

determine the legal status of detainees and no judicial

review—in short, no legal process at all”.

2.2 Iraq Occupation

Different from the Afghan war which was an allied

military operation with the NATO, the U.S. invasion in

Iraq was carried out without the authorization of the

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United Nations Security Council.

Accusing the Iraqi government for having ties to

terrorist groups and developing weapons of mass

destruction (WMD), Bush had began publicly pressing Iraq

for regime change since early 2002. In March 2003, Bush

ultimately declared war on Iraq. Saddam Hussein was

deposed, but the cost was dear. Thousands of civilians

were killed during the invasion and by resistance

fighters. The death toll in Iraq was over 100,000 Iraqi

civilians and 400 U.S. soldiers.2

Throughout the course of the Iraq war, Bush was often

the target of harsh criticism, both in the U.S. and in

the rest of the world. Even governments of many countries

on the United Nations Security Council argued that the

2 Figures available on the website http://www.iraqbodycount.org/

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http://www.iraqbodycount.org/


war broke international law.

Questions about the credibility of the Bush

administration’s pre-war claims were raised. Bush and his

cabinet tried to find excuses to attack Iraq immediately

after 9/11, such as associating it with 9/11, claiming

that Saddam Hussein possessed WMD and Iraq posed an

imminent threat. But these accusations lacked evidence.

The U.S. found no credible evidence of a collaborative

relationship between pre-invasion Iraq and al-Qaeda or of

Iraqi involvement in the 9/11 attacks. Failing to find

WMD in Iraq led to greater criticism of the invasion of

Iraq.

The Iraq invasion might have hurt U.S. efforts to

combat terrorism, given the increase in car bombing,

hostage abductions and beheadings in Iraq as well as oil-

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rich Saudi Arabia. The U.S. heavily used military power

worsened the condition in Iraq. The Bush administration

argued that war with Iraq was necessary to eliminate

Saddam Hussein’s arsenal of WMD, to diminish the threat

of international terrorism, and to promote democracy in

Iraq and the region. Yet little hard evidence was offered

in support of the administrion’s claims about the dangers

of Iraq (Pfiffner, 2004).

2.3 Iran—Axis of Evil

After 9/11, the United States alleged that Iran had

associations with al-Qaeda terrorists. The 9/11

Commission Report stated that 8 to 10 of the hijackers on

9/11 passed through Iran and their travel was facilitated

by Iranian border guards (Zagorin and Klein, 2004).

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Detectors from Iran’s intelligence service testified that

Iranian officials had “foreknowledge of the 9/11

attacks”, but the extent of Iranian involvement has been

questioned due to major differences between the religious

ideologies of Iran and al-Qaeda (Weisner and Shane,

2011). After a further investigation into a possible

Iranian role in the 9/11 was called for, President Bush

reiterated that there was no direct connection between

Iran and the attacks of September 11.

Later in 2002, Bush labeled Iran, along with North

Korea and Iraq as an “Axis of Evil”, warning that the

proliferation of long-range missiles developed by these

three countries constituted terrorism and threatened the

United States. Since 2003, the U.S. had been flying

unmanned aerial vehicles, launched from Iraq, over Iran

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to obtain intelligence on Iran’s nuclear program, only to

get little new information.

Iranian nuclear program was a major foreign policy of

the Bush administration. Bush made clear that an Iranian

enrichment program was unacceptable and the United States

would not allow Iran to possess a nuclear weapon or the

means to create a nuclear weapon. The U.S. called Iran to

stop enriching uranium and imposed sanctions on Iran for

continuing to do so, and the sanctions were later

tightened.

In 2009, after Bush’s second presidency term, Iran’s

nuclear program continued relatively unfettered, meaning

that Bush’s goal of ending Iran’s enrichment was not

achieved.

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2.4 Peace in Palestine and Israel

Bush’s policy regarding the Palestinian-Israeli

conflict has two main features: avoiding too much

involvement and favoring Israel, the second one being the

real reason for the failure of U.S. policy in the

Palestinian-Israeli peace talk.

In 2001, the United States vetoed a Security Council

resolution calling for a UN observer force to protect

Palestinians in the occupied territories and imposed for

conditions (Lynch, 2001):

No mention of Israeli settlements; no use of

the word “siege” to describe Israel’s actions in

the occupied territories; no reference to the

Fourth Geneva Convention regulating an occupying

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power’s conduct toward an occupied civilian

population; and no mention of the land-for peace

principle embodied in UN Resolution 242.

The above four U.S. “no mentions” clearly revealed

Bush’s bias toward Israel and its fundamental reluctance

to be involved in serious mediation of the conflict.

Bush’s assumption of the presidency in January 2001

coincided almost exactly with Ariel Sharon’s election as

prime minister of Israel a few weeks later. From the

outset, the Bush administration had almost

unquestioningly followed the course set by Sharon, except

for occasional mild remonstrations between them.

Bush’s bias against Palestine and favor for Israel had

long existed. He never received Arafat, the leader of

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Palestine, at the white house, despite hosting the

Israeli leader several times. Sharon’s portraying Arafat

as “Israel’s Usama bin Laden” after 9/11 added Bush’s

hostility toward the Palestinian leader. Later in 2002,

Bush called for the ouster of Arafat, which was largely

Sharon’s agenda. Bush even ordered U.S. diplomats never

to talk with Arafat again.

In September 2002, the Quartet, made up of the EU,

Russia, the UN and the US, had drafted the Road Map to

peace. Unhappy with the initial draft, the Bush

administration compelled the Quartet to accept a redraft

which accommodated Israel’s objections. It was not until

the late April 2003 that Bush finally officially launched

the Road Map. But the Road Map failed in the last,

because it was written ultimately in favor for Israel and

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Bush virtually did nothing to ensure Israel’s compliance

with the plan’s demands. The map allowed Israel to

continue colonizing the occupied territories while

prohibiting any Palestinian resistance. Apart from

exerting no pressure on Israel, the Bush administration

pushed hard on Palestine to implement the plan, including

choosing a new leadership, controlling violence by

militant Islamic organizations and so on. This led to

condemnation from Arafat, Arab and European governments.

Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak commented that Bush’s

policy had led to an “unprecedented hared” of Arabs for

the U.S. (Ewen and Goldenberg, 2004).

3.More Turmoil in the Mideast---What Went Wrong?

It seems impossible to credibly argue that the Bush

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administration achieved at addressing the problems in the

Mideast or advancing the United States national security.

In the realm of counterterrorism, the Bush Doctrine

failed: Although the United States did not suffer another

direct attack after 9/11, the terrorism situation

worsened as many other countries came under attack; in

the realm of democracy promotion, the Bush Doctrine

failed: the Iraqi democratization by military force did

not turn out effective and it was risky and costly; in

the realm of nuclear non-proliferation, the Bush Doctrine

failed: Iran’s nuclear program continues relatively

unfettered; in the realm of peace talk, the Bush Doctrine

failed: The Palestinian-Israel conflict still exists.

Scott Macleod in 2006 summarized five fatal mistakes

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of Bush’s Mideast policy:3

A. Bush ignored the Palestinians.

B. Bush invaded Iraq.

C. Bush misjudged Iran.

D. Bush hurt Israel.

E. Bush alienated Muslims

The situation in the Mideast did not become any better

than before the Bush administration set foot on the

region. The reason for the failure was the innate flaws

of Bush’s foreign policy---the Bush Doctrine in the

Mideast. It’s primacy on military force and its

peremptory unilateralism boomeranged on the United

Stated.

3 Macleod’s article is available online at the website http://content.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1563750,00.html

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http://content.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1563750,00.html


Take the Afghanistan war for example. Although the US

military attack on Afghanistan was understandable and

predictable, it was carried out with little concern for

diplomacy, multilateralism and international law. During

the invasion, there were a large number of civilian

casualties and human rights abuses.

The invasion in Iraq was even without the

authorization from the United Nations Security Council,

which revealed the absolute unilateralism of the Bush

administration. The invasion in Iraq also incurred harsh

criticism from both Arab countries and American allies in

the UN. How could such a war as caused indignation in

many countries win? Bush’s policy in the Mideast was an

obvious representation of unilateralism, military

warlordism and moral absolutism.

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Might alone did not make right, however powerful that

might was. In fact, the Bush administration

underestimated the complexity of the Mideast issues and

overestimated its military power. Terrorism and nuclear

proliferation could not be eliminated solely by military

forces. Instead, it required diplomacy and negotiation.

The Bush administration, alas, did not intend to used

diplomacy and negotiation and barely had a strategy to

address the multifold issues in the Mideast.

4.Conclusion

In the first few month after George W. Bush took

office, foreign affairs never appeared to be the center

of his policy and if he showed any attitude toward

foreign policy, it would be humble and mild.

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Contrastingly, after 9/11, Bush put together the elements

of a far-from-humble and aggressive foreign policy

doctrine based on unilateralism, preemptive strikes and

prevention of the emergency of any possible rivals to US

supremacy. The Mideast became of the heart of the Bush

Doctrine and the Bush administration set foot on the area

and gradually lost his way and eventually got bogged

down.

Not having a clear strategy toward the intractable

issues in the Mideast, Bush relied most on military

forces, and because of its unilateralism and peremptory

actions, Bush sometimes found that he had to fight by

himself. Without reasonable diplomacy and negotiation and

relying heavily on its overestimated military forces, the

Bush administration failed almost every objective, as

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Osama bin Laden was not apprehended, new terrorists

groups emerged and got trained, nuclear proliferation was

exacerbated and Iraq became more unstable. Besides,

massive civilian casualties worsened American situation

in the Mideast. By the end of President Bush’s

presidency, he had left Barack Obama, the next President,

a much traumatized American image and a deeply wounded

Mideast.

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References

Bush, George W. (2010). Decision Points. New York: Crown.

Ewen, MacAskill and Suzanne Goldenberg. (2004). “Arab

Ally Snub Bush amid ‘Unprecedented Hatred’ for US”.

The Guardians. April 20.

Kolhatkar, Sonali and James Ingalls. (2006). Bleeding

Afghanistan: Washington, Warlords and the Propaganda

of Silence. New York: Seven Stories Press.

Lynch, Colum. (2001). “U.S. Vetoes U.N. Observer Force to

Protection Palestinians”. Washington Post. March 28.

Peschek Joseph G. (2004). The Bush Doctrine and U.S.

Hegemony: Continuity and Change. Hamline University.

Pfiffner, James P. (2004). “Did President Bush Mislead

the Country in His Arguments for War With Iraq?”

Presidential Studies Quarterly, 34:1, pp. 25-26.

Rachel S. Teylor. “International Law: War in Iraq”. World

Press.

http://www.worldpress.org/specials/iraq/ (accessed

12/10/2013)

Speulda, Nicole (2005). Documenting the Phenomenon of

Anti-Americanism. Princeton University: The Princeton

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Project on National Security.

Tucker, Robert W and David C. Hendrickson. (2004). “The

Sources of American Legitimacy”. Foreign Affairs:18-

32.

“United States: Guantanamo Two Years On”. (2004). Human

Rights Watch. January 9.

Weisner, Benjaming and Scott Shane. (2011). Court Filings

Assert Iran Had Link to 9/11 Attacks. The New York

Times. May 19.

Zagorin, Adam and Joe Klein. (2004.). “9/11 Commission

Finds Ties Between al-Qaeda and Iran”. Times. July 16.

杨杨杨（2010/2013 杨杨杨杨杨杨杨杨杨），《》（America’s Misadventures in the Middle

East），杨杨杨杨杨杨杨杨杨杨杨杨杨杨杨杨杨杨、。：。

杨杨杨杨杨，（2009 杨杨杨杨杨杨—），《 1967 杨杨杨杨杨杨杨杨杨杨杨杨杨》（Peace Process—American Diplomacy and

the Arab-Israeli Conflict since 1967），杨杨杨杨杨杨杨杨杨杨杨杨杨杨杨杨杨杨杨杨杨杨杨杨杨杨杨、、夏。：。

杨杨杨（2004 杨杨杨杨杨—杨杨杨杨杨杨杨杨杨杨杨杨杨杨杨），一。：。《》

杨杨杨（2006 杨杨杨杨杨杨杨杨杨杨杨杨杨杨杨杨杨杨杨杨杨），。：。《》

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Might did not make right Bush Doctrine in Mideast ended up in tatters

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