Microbial risk governance: challenges and opportunities in fresh water management in Canada

Microbial Risk Governance: Challenges and Opportunities in Freshwater Management in Canada

Gemma Dunn Corresponding Author: [email protected] Leila Harris, Karen Bakker

This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in Canadian Water Resources Journal on June 29, 2015, available online: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/07011784.2015.1043648

Citation: Dunn, G., Harris, L. and K. Bakker (2015) Microbial Risk Governance: Challenges and Opportunities in Canada. Canadian Water Resources Journal 40(3): 273-249. DOI: 10.1080/07011784.2015.1043648

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INSTITUTE FOR RESOURCES, ENVIRONMENT AND SUSTAINABILITY UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Abstract ............................................................................................................................ 1 Résumé ............................................................................................................................ 2 Introduction ...................................................................................................................... 3 Methods ........................................................................................................................... 6

Case study selection .................................................................................................... 6 Interviews...................................................................................................................... 7

Results and Discussion .................................................................................................. 10 Mapping institutional complexity ................................................................................. 10 Regulatory complexity ................................................................................................ 11 Coordination of agency roles and responsibilities ...................................................... 11 Stronger regulatory cohesion/integrated legislative framework .................................. 12 Communication, cooperation and collaboration ......................................................... 14

Conclusions .................................................................................................................... 17 Acknowledgements ........................................................................................................ 19 References ..................................................................................................................... 20

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ABSTRACT This paper analyzes the barriers and opportunities that decentralized water governance regimes pose to effective microbial risk assessment and management for drinking and recreational water quality. The paper presents a case study of Canada (a country whose approach to water governance is among the most decentralized in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD]) evaluating microbial governance approaches in British Columbia and Ontario. The analysis is timely for two reasons: (1) relatively little research has been conducted on microbial risk assessment and management from a governance perspective; the literature focuses largely on technical and methodological approaches (such as Quantitative Microbial Risk Assessment [QMRA] or Water Safety Plans); (2) 15 years post Walkerton, little research has examined the implementation of source water protection as a strategy to reduce microbial risk in recreational and drinking water in the context of decentralized water governance. A range of issues are considered, including how decentralized governance might enable or constrain microbial risk assessment and management practices, and how the relationships between decentralized and multi-level governance actors might further deepen the complexity of watershed management, particularly source water protection. The analysis indicates that decentralized water governance in Ontario and BC may contribute to difficulties in effectuating source water protection and other features of a multi-barrier approach. The most significant challenges, as identified by practitioners, relate to the fragmentation of land and water jurisdiction, regulation, institutions and mandates, particularly a lack of coordination (both regulatory and institutional) and limited clarity on roles and responsibilities. Building on this analysis, the paper suggests more effort is required to support proactive institutional arrangements, including: inter- and intra-agency communication across levels of government; master planning and other initiatives to move towards integrated policy development; flexible, responsive policy environments; a governance culture that fosters leadership and collaboration; and holistic problem framing and mobilization of interdisciplinary knowledge.

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RÉSUMÉ Ce papier analyse les obstacles et les opportunités que les régimes de gouvernance décentralisée de l’eau posent dans l’évaluation et la gestion effective du risque de contamination microbienne de l’eau potable et de plaisance. Cet article se base sur l’étude de cas du Canada, pays dont la gouvernance de l’eau est parmi les plus décentralisées des pays membres de l’Organisation de Coopération et de Développement Économiques (OCDE), évaluant ainsi les approches de gouvernance microbienne en Colombie Britannique et en Ontario. Cette analyse est utile pour deux raisons : (1) relativement peu de recherches ont été effectuées sur l’évaluation et la gestion des risques de contamination microbienne, d’une perspective de gouvernance. En effet, la littérature met généralement l’accent sur les approches techniques et méthodologiques, telles que Quantitative Microbial Risk Assessment (QMRA) ou encore Water Safety Plans; (2) 15 ans après l’incident de Walkerton, peu de recherches ont examiné l’implémentation d’une protection des sources d’eau, en tant que stratégie visant à réduire les risques de contamination microbienne de l’eau potable et de plaisance, et ce dans le cadre de gouvernance décentralisée de l’eau. Dans ce cadre, une série de questions est prise en considération, comprenant: comment la gouvernance décentralisée pourrait-elle permettre ou limiter les pratiques d’évaluation et de gestion des risques de contamination microbienne; et comment les relations entre les acteurs de la gouvernance décentralisée et ceux de la gouvernance à plusieurs niveaux pourraient-elles approfondir la complexité de la gestion des bassins versants, et particulièrement la protection des sources d’eau? Cette analyse indique que la gouvernance décentralisée de l’eau en Ontario et en Colombie Britannique pourrait contribuer aux difficultés de l’établissement d’une protection efficace des sources d’eau et des autres caractéristiques d’une approche multi-barrières. Les défis les plus importants, tels qu’identifiés par les praticiens, se rapportent à la fragmentation de la juridiction, la régulation, les institutions et les mandats des terres et de l’eau, et particulièrement au manque de coordination (à la fois réglementaire et institutionnel) et à la faible clarification des rôles et des responsabilités. Cette analyse suggère la nécessité de plus d’effort afin de soutenir les arrangements institutionnels proactifs, y compris: la communication inter- et intra-agences entre les différents niveaux du gouvernement, la planification de base et autres initiatives visant à s’orienter vers l’élaboration de politiques intégrées, vers des politiques environnementales souples et réactives, vers une culture de gouvernance qui favorise le leadership et la collaboration ainsi que vers la limitation de problèmes holistiques et la mobilisation des connaissances interdisciplinaires.

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INTRODUCTION The provision of safe drinking water, the protection of source waters, and ecosystem services are all pressing concerns (Davies and Mazumder 2003; Ivey et al. 2006; Pahl-Wostl 2009; Pahl-Wostl et al. 2010; World Health Organization [WHO] 2011; Huntjens et al. 2012). This paper examines one issue within this broader set of challenges: risks related to microbial contamination of recreational and drinking water. (Whilst the importance of other risks – including chemical or other contamination – related to water is recognized, these are beyond the scope of this study). Many researchers have observed that failure to provide safe drinking water is not (solely) a result of a lack of scientific understanding, but also due to institutional and organizational failures such as inadequate financial resources, weak standards, failure to implement or enforce standards, lack of skilled staff, rivalries among agencies and insufficient political will (see e.g. de Loë and Kruetzwiser 2005; Ivey et al. 2006; Plummer et al. 2011). These various factors are often referred to by the general term “governance” – the laws, rules, regulations, policies, practices and institutions related to the management of water. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), amongst others, has identified weak water governance as a core cause of the current water crises (Pahl-Wostl 2009; OECD 2011; Pahl-Wostl et al. 2012; Gupta et al. 2013).

Reforms to governance have thus been the focus of much attention in recent years. In this paper, a specific aspect of water quality – microbial risk – is examined in the context of decentralized water governance. Decentralization is defined here as the focus on lower levels of government for decision-making, often associated with “rescaling” – shifting decision-making authority and administrative responsibility from nation-state, provincial or other centralized scales to state, municipal or watershed scales. Decentralization, which has been increasingly emphasized in policy and academic literatures, is often promoted as key to increasing efficiency, and improving policy performance and the effectiveness of service delivery. Among other claims, some have argued that decentralized approaches mobilize local interest, increase citizen involvement and promote reciprocity and consensus in ways that are thought to be best suited to sustainable water management (Rogers and Hall 2003; Brandes and Kriwoken 2006; Swanson et al. 2010). In Canada, there remains a continuous tension between harmonization (centralization and selective standardization of laws, rules and norms) and decentralization/subsidiarity (the delegation of decision-making and policy implementation to lower scales). In such a large and varied country as Canada, decentralization of natural resource management has the potential to facilitate more appropriate local responses to biophysical conditions and changes (Swanson et al. 2010). However, critics argue that Canada’s pursuit of subsidiarity may be detrimental to water management in other ways (see e.g. Hill et al. 2008; Weibust 2009; Bakker and Cook 2011), contributing to urban–rural disparities (Hrudey 2011), regulatory disparities (Cook et al. 2013; Dunn et al. 2014a, 2014b), poor data collection and quality, and inadequate information sharing (Dunn and Bakker 2011). Another concern is that decentralization may occur without necessary and sufficient capacity; for example, local actors might lack the power, capacity or financial resources to fulfill expected mandates

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(Brown and Purcell 2005).

Learning from the Canadian context, this paper analyzes the types of barriers and opportunities that complex and decentralized governance landscapes afford for the specific issues of microbial risk in water governance. A range of concerns is considered, from whether local governance is likely to enable source water protection, to the relationships between decentralized and multi-level governance actors, as well as the complex requirements for watershed management (Patrick 2009; Plummer et al. 2011). In order to consider the implications of decentralized governance for microbial risk assessment and management, the analysis presents two case studies within Canada, a country whose approach to water governance is among the most decentralized of any OECD country (Harrison 1996; Saunders and Wenig 2007; Weibust 2009; Bakker and Cook 2011; Dunn et al. 2014b). In Canada, there are national guidelines for adoption of the multi-barrier approach; however, each province has its own way of dealing with microbial risk assessment and management, resulting in widely varied policies, regulatory requirements and management practices across the country (see Cook et al. 2013). Variation in microbial risk assessment and management frameworks is evident not only between provinces, but also within provinces, even within the same watershed and across water providers (Dunn et al. 2014b). Within a single watershed there are multiple stakeholders that engage (or, perhaps, “should” engage) in microbial risk assessment and management, including watershed/conservation authorities, water utilities and health authorities, each with differing goals and objectives (e.g. water quality for human health-related to drinking or recreation, or for ecosystem health). In short, Canada is an interesting case study to consider the context of decentralization as it relates to microbial risk governance. As such, the findings are likely of interest to those engaged in debates and trends towards decentralized water governance in other regions.

The analysis offered here is timely for two reasons. First, relatively little research has been conducted on microbial water-quality risk assessment and management from a governance perspective; the literature focuses largely on technical and methodological approaches (such as Quantitative Microbial Risk Assessment [QMRA] or Water Safety Plans - see e.g. Signor and Ashbolt 2006; Ashbolt et al. 2010; Schijven et al. 2011). Second – 15 years post Walkerton – relatively little research has examined the implementation of source-water protection as a strategy to reduce microbial risk in recreational and drinking water in the context of decentralized water governance. Focusing on the practitioner perspectives of day-to-day and on-the-ground challenges, this analysis details elements of the decentralized water governance landscape that pose considerable challenges with respect to the possibilities to implement source-water protection, and to engage in other assessment and management strategies that are likely key to reducing microbial risk for recreational and drinking water. Source-water protection is the first stage in the source-to-tap framework, often referred to as the multi-barrier approach. [The multi-barrier approach is comprised of six stages: source water protection; effective water treatment; secure water distribution system; water quality monitoring (at source, treatment plant and tap); operator training; and an emergency response procedure]. This proactive, preventative approach to recreational- and drinking-water quality is increasingly advocated in the academic literature as well as

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by the WHO (Dunn et al. 2014b).

In the next section the methods are presented, including a justification of the case-study approach. The combined results and discussion section presents empirical findings from the two selected provinces. The paper concludes with the relevance of these findings for researchers and water managers, through a discussion of several focal themes of interest (specifically, through attention to the overarching theme of microbial risk and source-water protection in the context of decentralized water governance).

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METHODS The empirical research employed a case study approach using document analysis and semi-structured interviews to gather qualitative data (Yin 2003; Poteete et al. 2010; Marshall and Rossman 2011), both to understand the issues at play, and to consider the influence of context on the responses (Blaikie 2000).

The provinces of British Columbia (BC) and Ontario (ON) were chosen as the focus of this study due to their notably different governance environments. Following the Walkerton tragedy in 2000, and recommendations of the subsequent judicial inquiry, Ontario introduced a strong policy and legislation framework, which seeks to realize the multi-barrier approach including source water protection (O’Connor 2002; Plummer et al. 2010). By contrast, BC has yet to formally embrace the multi-barrier approach, and has a more voluntary and ad hoc approach to microbial risk management (Dunn et al., 2014b). The current water-governance framework in BC has been described as “bewildering and complex” with a “patchwork of authorities and responsibilities inherited from days when water was taken for granted, and other resources, such as timber, minerals, and fish, were the main concern” (Campbell 2004, 7). These divergent governance approaches have resulted in different legal mandates, jurisdictional boundaries and entities engaged in microbial risk management, in ways that are generally consistent with the fragmented landscape of water governance across the country (Bakker and Cook 2011). As such, these two provincial contexts provide a “natural laboratory” for comparative analysis: the two provinces have comparable legal and political frameworks and the same overarching federal conditions, but each province also offers a distinct approach toward microbial risk and drinking water governance (including different focus on component features such as Source Water Protection (SWP). This situation begs the question: what are the implications of these distinct governance contexts for microbial risk practices, including the multi-barrier approach and other best practices as described in the literature? What can be learned from these differences to forge a stronger appreciation of the specific opportunities and challenges for microbial risk governance in decentralized contexts such as Canada?

Three case study watersheds were selected from each case study province (six watersheds in total). Twenty-five interviews were conducted with a broad range of actors engaged in microbial risk management at different scales (municipal, provincial and federal). This multi-scalar research design was developed in recognition that scale is often an important factor in water governance, particularly for the consideration of power relations and inter-agency relationships (Swyngedouw et al. 2002; Robbins 2004; Patrick et al. 2008; Moss and Newig 2010).

Case study selection In each watershed, three types of agencies engaged in microbial risk management were identified (from source water, through treatment and delivery to customer): (1) watershed authorities, (2) water utilities and (3) health authorities. For utilities, medium (serving > 10,000) to large drinking water systems (serving > 90, 000) were selected (with similar characteristics where possible). All water utilities interviewed had

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experienced historical water quality or quantity challenges. Specific selection criteria included the type of: watershed (urban or mixed urban-rural); surface source water (areas served exclusively by groundwater sources were excluded); drinking-water treatment (e.g. chlorination, UV and/or filtration); water purveyor (e.g. municipal government, private utility).

Interviews Telephone interviews were conducted with personnel from watershed authorities, water utilities, health authorities and provincial agencies in both provinces, as well as with federal agency representatives with a role in microbial risk. People likely to be most familiar with the day-to-day microbial risk management practices of the selected agencies/entities (see Table 1) were targeted. The use of the semi-structured interviews with these individuals enabled open discussion with experienced practitioners that revealed nuances of microbial risk practices (Seidman 2005). Consideration of perspectives from water managers, regulators and policy makers together enabled key issues relating to microbial risk governance to be identified. Moreover, focusing on day-to-day practices provided valuable insights into on-the-ground issues and challenges that are not readily available in the literature. The 1-hour telephone interviews were recorded, transcribed and qualitatively analyzed using thematic codes based on the questions asked of participants, and sub-theme codes derived from the content of the discussions. Free and informed consent of the participants was obtained; the study protocol was approved by the University of British Columbia, Vancouver, Canada, Behavioral Research Ethics Board (H12-01626, July 2012).

Table 1. Case study selection

Agency type/scale Ontario British Columbia

Federal Agency

Health Canada Public Health Agency of Canada

Environment Canada Provincial Agency

Ontario Ministry of Environment Public Health Ontario

BC Ministry of Health BC Ministry of Environment

Water Utility

Toronto Kitchener-Waterloo Ottawa

Abbotsford Kelowna Victoria

Health Authority

Toronto Regional Health Authority Waterloo Health Authority Ottawa Public Health

Fraser Health Authority Interior Health Authority Vancouver Island Health Authority

Watershed Authority

Toronto Conservation Authority Grand River Conservation Authority Rideau Valley Conservation Authority

Fraser Valley Regional District Okanagan Basin Water Board Capital Regional District Watershed

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The institutional map (Table 2) was compiled through information gathered from government reports, agency websites, legislation and the interviews. The table was sent to the 22 municipal and provincial interviewees from BC and Ontario, who were asked to review and validate the information. Fourteen participants responded with detailed feedback, which was incorporated into the map. Table 2. Institutional mapping - Overview of key institutions and legislation connected to microbial water quality in BC and Ontario.

ONTARIO BRITISH COLUMBIA Drinking Water Source Water Drinking Water Source Water

Key

Leg

isla

tion

&

Reg

ulat

ions

• ON Safe Drinking Water Act 2002

• Ontario Drinking Water Systems Reg. 170

• Ontario Health Protection and Promotion Act 1990

• ON Clean Water Act 2006

• Environmental Protection Act 1990

• Ontario Water Resource Act 1990

• Nutrient Management Act 2002

• BC Drinking Water Protection Act (BC DWPA) 2001

• BC Drinking Water Protection Regulation (BC DWPR) 2003

• Public Health Act 2008

• Water Act 1996 • Forest and Range

Practices Act 2002 • Environmental

Management Act 2003

• Land Act 1996

Key

Min

istr

ies • Ministry of Environment (large and small

municipal water systems, designated facilities)

• Ministry of Health and Long Term Care (private drinking water wells, small non-residential systems)

• Ministry of Health • Ministry of Forests,

Lands and Natural Resource Operations (private drinking water utilities) Ministry of Community, Sport and Cultural Development (MCSCD)

• Ministry of the Environment

Supe

rvis

ory

auth

ority

• Ministry of Environment

• 5 regional Health Authorities

• Office of the Provincial Health Officer

• No clear ministry responsible for source water protection. (Under BC Action Plan for Safe Drinking Water, responsibility for possible impacts from any land-use or activity rests with the respective governing agency).

Table 2. (Continued).

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ONTARIO BRITISH COLUMBIA Drinking Water Source Water Drinking Water Source Water

Supe

rvis

ory

auth

ority

• > 36 local Health Authorities

• Ontario’s Advisory Council on Drinking Water Quality and Testing Standards

• Drinking Water Management Division

• Medical Officer of Health (MOH)

• Source Protection Authority

• Regional Conservation Authorities

Mic

robi

al W

ater

Qua

lity

Dat

a C

olle

ctio

n &

Ass

essm

ent • Water systems

• Source Protection Committee (includes representatives from municipalities, farmers, industry and the general public).

• Drinking Water Inspectors (MOE) • Safe Drinking Water Branch (MOE) • Public Health Units/Inspectors (may

sample ‘source waters’ if used for recreation)

• Licensed Microbiology Labs

• Water systems subject to BC Drinking Water Protection legislation.

• Regional Health Authorities Medical Health Officers and Drinking Water Officer

• Approved Microbiology Labs

• Water Suppliers • (The Ministry of

Environment and Health Authorities may collect data)

Impl

emen

tatio

n R

isk

Ass

essm

ent &

M

anag

emen

t • Conservation Authorities & Source Protection Committee

• Municipalities (DWQMS) • Ministry of Environment • Local public health authorities (small

systems)

• Water suppliers may be required to undertake risk assessment by DWO

• Water suppliers (DWO may require risk assessment, which may include source water assessment)

• Water System Owners (rural areas)

Acc

ount

abili

ty &

Enf

orce

men

t

• Primarily Ministry of Environment • (Medical Officer of Health has

responsibility to administer Boil Water Advisories)

• Regional Health Authorities (Medical Health Officers & Public Health Officials)

• Water system owners

• Ministry of Environment and Ministry of Forests, Lands and Natural Resource Operations

• Health Authorities may have a role if there is a violation of the drinking water protection legislation.

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RESULTS AND DISCUSSION Practitioners emphasized a range of considerations important for microbial governance, and also barriers to SWP and other features of the multi-barrier approach. Among them, they emphasized an ongoing focus on treatment: “you know that you can probably treat any water coming – given enough money, you can probably treat anything to a drinkable state”. Practitioners consistently highlighted the ways that this focus on treatment contributes to a lack of attention to source water concerns: “on the health side of things people will focus on the pipe…they really don’t want to know about the source, because they can treat it…they don’t really address the cause. They address the symptom, right. Like, they treat to get to that point, but watershed management is probably a better way of going”.

Even as this continued reliance on treatment and end of pipe was highlighted as an ongoing barrier, practitioners nonetheless noted general agreement related to the importance of a multi-barrier approach: “I think everyone would agree [with the] multi-barrier approach, everyone agrees it’s better not to contaminate your source water than to pull out a contaminant afterwards.” However, as the interviews also made clear, significant barriers remain.

Practitioners also identified a number of features of the decentralized governance environment that impede movement towards source-water protection as a strategy to reduce microbial risk in recreational and drinking water. These include multiple regulations, agencies and stakeholders; limited coordination and clarity on roles and responsibilities of different agencies; lack of clarity in terms of what institution or regulatory requirement takes precedence; and barriers to the integration of water- and land-use activities (including difficulties prioritizing between land-use needs and conflicts). These considerations are detailed below as they relate to the ongoing challenges they represent towards the implementation of the multi-barrier approach, and allied efforts to reduce microbial risk in recreational and drinking water.

Mapping institutional complexity Unlike other provinces such as Manitoba and Saskatchewan, there is no single agency that has responsibility for all aspects of water in the provinces of BC or Ontario. The regulatory and institutional arrangements in both provinces are highly complex, with a myriad of statutes, regulations and agencies governing water resources. In BC, there are 13 government agencies with responsibilities relating to drinking water and source protection, and 29 statutes that deal with matters of relevance to drinking- and source-water protection (Fraser Basin Council 2005; British Columbia Inter-Agency Memorandum of Understanding 2006). In Ontario, there are 14 ministries engaged in water policy and 56 statutes related to land-use planning and water management (Cook 2011, 113). The institutional map (Table 2) illustrates the complex nature of current multi-level water governance arrangements in both provinces.

Whilst one interviewee saw the merit in having such a broad range of

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stakeholders involved, many interviewees described the multiplicity of agencies and departments as a significant challenge. As one health authority interviewee described, “nothing is easy. It’s really complicated, really involved.” Interviewees in both provinces described the current (decentralized) governance arrangements as problematic for source-water protection, both in terms of institutional arrangements and regarding regulatory approaches (see Table 2). Among these concerns, interviewees spoke of difficulties related to the fact that certain activities that could negatively impact water quality (e.g. land-use activities or sewer discharges) are administered/overseen by different agencies. In addition, interviewees spoke of contradictions and inconsistencies between different regulations, as described further below.

Regulatory complexity Whilst both provinces have decentralized governance arrangements in common, the institutional and regulatory arrangements related to microbial risk governance in each province are considerably different. In BC, provincial responsibility for microbial water quality is divided between the BC Ministry of Health (which develops guidelines and policies on treated drinking water) and the BC Ministry of Environment (which develops legislation related to source waters). In Ontario, regulation regarding microbial water quality is set by the Ministry of Environment, which oversees large municipal systems. The Ministry of Health and Long Term Care oversees small and private water systems. Accountability and enforcement in Ontario largely reside at the ministerial level, whereas in BC these responsibilities lie primarily with the five regional health authorities that implement legislation, regulation and province-wide policies, approve plans, and inspect and verify samples. Ontario has specific regulation for microbial risk assessment and management (under the Safe Drinking Water Act 2002 s.15 (1)), whilst BC has no such legislative imperative (Dunn et al., 2014b). BC’s discretionary approach means that a drinking water officer may require a system owner to undertake assessment, which may include source water assessment, if deemed necessary. Arguably, Ontario is viewed as having a stronger regulatory environment with clearer pathways of responsibility.

In BC, the situation is more complex and ad hoc: requirements may vary according to the discretion of a drinking water officer or others at one of five health authorities. The BC provincial government recognizes the importance of SWP, but again has a primarily voluntaristic approach, with limited legal grounding. Notably, the two largest metropolitan areas in BC, Greater Vancouver and Greater Victoria, which account for 60% of the province’s population, have fully protected mountainous watersheds. Ontario, by contrast, was the first Canadian province to introduce legislated semi-quantitative microbial risk assessment, and has pursued other elements of a source-to-tap framework (Dunn et al., 2014b). However, Ontario faces considerable challenges as, in essence, it is “retroactively” trying to protect source waters that are already compromised, given the impacts of existing and historical industrial, agricultural and (sub)urban activities.

Coordination of agency roles and responsibilities In both BC and Ontario, the control and oversight of land-use activities were found to concentrate at the provincial scale and are spread across multiple agencies. However,

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for water, the impacts of such activities are dealt with at the municipal scale, namely through water utilities and watershed authorities. Watershed authorities and water utilities (both in BC and in Ontario) tended to describe this disconnect that characterizes current decentralized governance arrangements as problematic in at least three ways, regarding: (1) lack of clear authority and leadership; (2) multi-level governance interactions between provincial agencies and other authorities that operate at municipal or other scales; and (3) lack of coordination of land- and water-related regulations and oversight, with considerable implications for protection of source waters (particularly as it is relevant to microbial contamination).

BC interviewees acknowledged that there is no clear ministry responsible for source-water protection; rather, multiple agencies have a role. One watershed authority interviewee observed, “when you start looking at risk and risk on the landscape, water transcends many departments and multiple agencies, and that is problematic.” As one watershed authority interviewee highlighted, “at the provincial level many of the land and water use issues are separated…it’s becoming more complicated and in some cases more confusing…. When it comes to source protection we definitely need to get our heads around basin water management…. The source protection question is a little bit more complicated”.

Under BC’s Action Plan for Safe Drinking Water, responsibility for possible impacts from any land use or activity (e.g. forestry or mining) rests with the respective governing agency (e.g. Ministry of Energy and Mines or the Ministry of Forests, Lands and Natural Resource Operations). Whilst the BC Ministry of Environment enforces the Water Act, they do so more to protect the environment and key habitat rather than from a drinking water source perspective. Specific to drinking water, Health Authorities may take legal action if there is a violation of the Drinking Water Protection Act, but do not oversee land uses, watersheds or groundwater. As such, there is a clear disconnect in the overarching governance approach wherein human and ecosystem health perspectives are separate goals and mandates, and land and water governance are also largely distinct, rather than integrally linked as might be required for a fully fledged multi-barrier framework. “[I]t’s…particularly fragmented on the source side of things…who exactly is responsible for the contamination that’s actually getting into the watershed, and to manage that? That’s spread across multiple layers both vertically and horizontally across those agencies, so within the federal, within the provincial, within the regional there are these different agencies that have some sort of direct responsibility. There needs to be more coordination”.

In sum, the analysis indicates that decentralized governance makes source-water protection difficult to realize in practice, specifically given fragmentation of land and water jurisdiction, regulation and mandates. While decentralization does not rule out coordination, in these examples there is clearly a lack of cohesion (both regulatory and institutional) that serves as a key obstacle for effective microbial risk governance and full realization of a multi-barrier approach.

Stronger regulatory cohesion/integrated legislative framework In terms of broad source-to-tap approaches, Ontario is perceived to have a stronger legislative and regulatory framework. As one provincial interviewee described, “the

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approach in Ontario tends to be far more prescriptive and regulation-driven than it does in British Columbia.” For example, each watershed in Ontario is required to have a Source Protection Plan (developed by local source-protection committees) under the Clean Water Act (2006). These Source Protection Plans are to be implemented through collaboration with municipalities, conservation authorities, landowners and provincial ministries. However, interviewees still identified challenges with this approach; for example: “in practice, I think most or all jurisdictions don’t give the water regulator enough control over land use activity that they could force source water protection, if that is what is desired” (Ontario provincial interviewee). As well, it is clear that more extensive development (including agricultural land uses) around many metropolitan areas in Ontario means that source water protection, as a strategy to reduce microbial risk in recreational and drinking water, remains a goal that is often difficult to achieve in practical terms.

In comparison, legislated requirements for source protection in BC are narrower in scope. Instead, the province has taken a mostly voluntary approach, with few specified requirements. One provincial interviewee observed that “the BC model seems to move toward a far more minimalist approach to regulation.” In BC, both drinking water and source water protection plans can be applied to address source protection concerns for water supplies, but these are not mandated. One interviewee observed, “in practice I don’t believe these have been successfully implemented.” One provincial interviewee similarly suggested, “Well, there really isn’t — I mean, Drinking Water Protection Act (DWPA) and Drinking Water Protection Regulations, so — but again, those focus on the treatment of the water. There isn’t anything really on the protection of sources...”. More broadly, there is a key concern (particularly in BC) related to competing regulation: it is possible that one piece of legislation, which may have negative consequences for source-water quality, may take precedence over other legislation (such as other legal dispositions meant to prevent or remedy these potential negative consequences, a finding echoed in Patrick 2009). As one watershed interviewee explained, “[w]hen we look at governance, when we ask the question, which I think is an important one, what legislation trumps what? I think most people would be really surprised that the Mining Act actually trumps water health in many cases. Or that the Forestry Act has the ability to have practices on the landscape that would be deemed as increasing the risk to public health and biological contamination. The Range Act is almost silent on the protection for water quality”.

As this quote illustrates, issues relating to source-water quality are not well integrated into the broader legislative framework, particularly as legal instruments that guide practices (such as mining or forestry) may have the capacity to impinge on microbial water quality. This is not a feature of the decentralized governance landscape per se, but is arguably aggravated by a lack of an integrated approach (or single/lead agency mandate) that might force some of these tensions to be addressed head-on. This also highlights the need for a more holistic regulatory approach that would be comprehensive in defining or establishing a more balanced or at least more explicit jurisdictional hierarchy among regulatory instruments and institutional actors. While in many ways these concerns are clearly linked to the decentralized governance context, at the root of these concerns lie the competing demands for water and the fundamental

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challenge that decision-makers face in this regard: “on…the source-water protection side, you end up with competing land uses. And do we use this as a protected watershed, or do we use this for agricultural grazing? Do we use it for resource extraction? Whether it’s logging or minerals, and what is overall the best sort of societal benefit from this patch of ground? Which includes not just dirt, but water…that’s a really tough one…everyone recognizes that drinking water is important, but economic livelihood is also important. So do we take this water as our protected water supply, or do we allow cattle in it? Or do we…ban cattle anywhere in the watershed? Or do we restrict or regulate how cattle may be grazed in the watershed, to minimize or reduce risk, but not eliminate cattle related pathogen risk. Do we allow logging in this watershed? Because there is value in timber, and maybe if we don’t log, there’s more, hypothetically, forest fire risk, in which case the watershed would be even more compromised, or maybe not. How do you go about making those sorts of competing decisions or different choices? And how do you go about weighing the importance of water versus some other uses? And I mean, you can say water trumps all…that would be one policy decision. Or you can say it’s got to be decided locally on a case-by-case decision, right. Or you could say, well, resource extraction trumps all or agriculture trumps all…there are a whole bunch of different ways you can go about resolving that kind of conflict. But I would suggest that no matter how you try to couch it, there still is conflict or, you know, different land uses”.

The quotes above highlight a core theme: the longstanding tendency of focusing on technology, treatment and end-of-tap issues related to water quality and drinking water, rather than the causes of contamination in source waters – core outstanding challenges that remain difficult to address. Although this is not unique to decentralized governance contexts, these concerns and the inherent tensions that arise with multiple stakeholders and potential water users are particularly difficult to balance and manage in a decentralized and fragmented governance context such as that observable in Canada. This is especially the case when there is little coordination and clarity on roles and responsibilities of different agencies, or a lack of clarity with respect to implementation or enforcement of legislative requirements.

Communication, cooperation and collaboration A number of issues noted by interviewees also highlighted intangible aspects related to the concerns noted above, including lack of communication, collaboration and trust – all frequently mentioned as impediments to the ability to effectively practice microbial risk assessment and management. In particular, the importance of communication between and within organizations was a common theme. Seven of the 18 municipal-level interviewees specifically identified the lack of communication as an impediment to effective cooperation and collaboration between agencies engaged in microbial risk. For instance, one watershed authority interviewee remarked, “[m]ostly in terms of the different provincial agencies…it seems like each one is an individual entity and they don’t communicate with each other so anything that you work with one agency on you have to repeat the same process with the other agency; there is no discussion between them”.

Again, this was a concern for practitioners responsible for protecting source

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water and ecosystem health as well as those responsible for drinking water treatment. As one interviewee described it, “[t]here seems to be a division between the source water people and the watershed practices and the people that treat the water. I think these groups could probably benefit from a closer relationship.”

Half of the municipal-level interviewees (in both BC and Ontario) noted that they were of the opinion that greater coordination is needed. Water utilities and watershed authorities described challenges occurring predominantly at the provincial level, largely due to the multiplicity of agencies and departments involved. In particular, they identified issues relating to: (1) roles and responsibilities being unclear; (2) poor communication (if any) between provincial agencies and departments (duplicating effort as well as creating frustration and confusion); and (3) lack of leadership (both provincially and federally). For the BC interviewees in particular, these issues were aggravated when also considering coordination at multiple scales, e.g. between municipalities, provincial authorities and so forth.

Even as there are clear associated costs (financially and also in terms of person hours), more regular meetings among these entities might enable more effective communication, sharing of information, strategizing and fostering of trust. One BC watershed interviewee mentioned that this was occurring in some cases, and was critical. “Having key decision-makers that get together monthly to talk about water management at the basin level is really the biggest attribute and asset that we have as we look at risk and risk management. The trust factor is critically important as well as the regularity. Also, it’s a very effective way to be able to communicate complex issues that are happening on the ground and have that go through a formalized process so that it also has a level of credibility”.

According to this interviewee, the existing collaboration allows broader perspectives to facilitate watershed solutions. As one federal interviewee also remarked, “it’s always better to work in collaboration with others. It makes it more complicated, but some of the best work that we’ve done has been in collaboration with [other agencies].” These respondents speak directly to the idea that “safe drinking water is better achieved by partnership and effective exchange of information” (Jalba et al. 2010, 56). For example, active and effective inter-agency relationships are imperative when dealing with a crisis event, and the quality of relationships determines the quality of the response in a crisis. Indeed, Jalba et al. (2010) argue that the severity of some of the major drinking-water incidents in the past were aggravated by the absence of constructive (and communicative) interagency relationships.

One (BC) provincial interviewee commented, “So in terms of drinking water, if we really wanted to do something about protecting source drinking water, I think the first step would be prioritizing it provincially and seeing where the limited resources needed to be directed.” A federal employee echoed the need for cohesion and alignment: “Unless there’s a mechanism – an explicit mechanism to bring everyone together and develop these sort of aligned programs and aligned initiatives, those efforts really only ever happen on an ad hoc basis, and it’s usually — it’s person driven.” As one provincial interviewee observed, “I think that direction has to come from the very top. But we can try individually and with our work groups and that. We try to make those relationships,

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and we do have some very good relationships with our colleagues…but I think to make some advances of a more substantial nature, I think we need buy-in and recognition from a higher level in government to provide that direction and maybe a few more resources towards that…. I think we need both levels of government to sit down together and say, look, this is an issue and let’s do something about it. And we can try, but when you start – the bottom-up is not very effective a lot of times on a bigger scale. We can have small wins. I can work with people [locally] on small watershed-level scales. But that doesn’t translate to a provincial – into a provincial model”.

One federal interviewee described the need for “a working group, let’s say, or some sort of a body that would set some national priorities for various agencies to work towards — in a cohesive manner.” Here we see a strong call for decision-making and priority-setting at more centralized levels (e.g. federal or provincial), perhaps especially important in a decentralized context.

While coordination and trust among multiple agencies is necessarily complex, and requires time and effort, it is possible that such an endeavor will be viewed as more appropriate and legitimate than a top-down or centralized solution where there has not been adequate engagement and deliberation with all relevant actors. As these results highlight, decentralized governance requires greater attention to maintaining coherence, and working together to coordinate responses to complex problems. The challenge is to achieve this coordination whilst preserving diversity. The importance of strong leadership, negotiation and clarity of rules and roles in water-governance regimes are themes present in the literature (Rogers and Hall 2003; Pahl-Wostl et al. 2010). A recent international water governance survey conducted by the OECD concluded that a “pervasive feature of water governance systems is the lack of a ‘master plan’ for assigning water-related tasks across ministries and levels of government,” amplifying siloed ministries, and generating weak regulatory frameworks and poor policy implementation (Gupta et al. 2013). The report states that cohesion, coordination and cooperation are imperative given the interdependency and interconnectedness of water, and the multiplicity of actors with overlapping responsibilities operating at multiple levels and varying scales (OECD 2011). In many ways, even if all of these features are not necessary elements of a decentralized water governance schema, our results point to the possibility that they are likely aggravated in such a context.

Our research with practitioners working in both BC and Ontario (as two provinces with decentralized, albeit distinct, water-governance landscapes) finds evidence for a range of concerns as highlighted, including a lack of vertical integration between different levels of government in both study contexts. With respect to the broader literature on microbial risk and water governance in Canada, our findings echo elements of a number of earlier studies (see for example de Loë and Kruetzwiser et al. 2005; Ivey et al. 2006; Ferreyra et al. 2008; Patrick et al. 2008; Patrick 2009; Plummer et al. 2011). Overall, the clear suggestion is that 15 years post Walkerton, a number of key operational challenges remain.

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CONCLUSIONS Decentralization of governance is frequently advocated as a positive strategy for natural-resources management, particularly moving towards more watershed- and ecosystem-scale management. This is thought to enable decision-making at scales where local conditions can be highlighted, where feedback loops are tightest and where quicker, more responsive approaches might be possible (particularly as compared with top-down or remote governance). Often promoted, decentralization remains challenging to implement successfully in practice (Swanson and Bhadwal 2009). This work adds to the understanding of the many challenges associated with implementation of source-water protection strategies and other features of microbial risk governance. In particular, we highlight ways that the decentralized water-governance context (both in Canada in general and in our study provinces in particular) potentially accentuates key barriers in the microbial risk governance realm. The most significant challenges, as identified by practitioners, relate to the fragmentation of land and water jurisdiction, and of regulation and mandates, which impede efforts to move towards source-water protection as a strategy to reduce microbial risk in recreational and drinking water. It is increasingly understood that land use and water quality are inextricably linked; the protection of source waters as a strategy to reduce microbial risk in recreational and drinking water is critically dependent on the integration of land-use planning and watershed management (Peckenham et al. 2005; Plummer et al. 2011). However, in practice, these issues are often addressed in singular and isolated ways (including problem framing, compartmentalization of infrastructure, institutional organization and mandates, regulatory and governance approaches).

Based on this case study, and observations with respect to the current situation of decentralized and fragmented governance in both provinces (see Table 2), it remains the case that (regardless of the specific strategy) stronger efforts are needed to coordinate water policy (Pahl-Wostl 2002; Jalba et al. 2010; van de Meene et al. 2011). While decentralization does not rule out coordination, these case study examples highlight that the lack of cohesion and coordination (both institutional and regulatory) in multi-level governance contexts continues to impede capacity to mitigate microbial risks to water quality or to fully operationalize the multi-barrier approach. Decentralization could be more effective if:

(1) A coordinating framework or “master plan” was put in place to cohesively tie the disparate efforts together (including risk assessment, or sharing of data and expertise; OECD 2011; Gupta et al. 2013; OECD 2011). This should include clear planning and reporting to ensure broad management goals are being met (Swanson and Bhadwal 2009);

(2) Policy development were to move from a piecemeal to an integrated approach – particularly to be better able to link human and ecosystem health perspectives (for water supply, as well as wastewater, stormwater and land-use planning; Jacobs and Pulwarty 2003; Pahl-Wostl 2009; Wong and Brown 2009; Bakker 2012; Pahl-Wostl et al. 2012; Gupta et al. 2013);

(3) Institutional rules and relationships were reshaped with an eye to systemic

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incentives to ensure that water challenges are addressed proactively (Dovers 2001; Ison 2010);

(4) Stronger support and direction from senior authorities were made available to guide or incentivize these processes. To this last point, although decentralization means delegation of authority, the authors concur with other commentators who suggest that centralized or senior government still has a crucial role to play (Swanson and Bhadwal 2009); finally,

(5) Increased financial resources and staffing investments are made towards this end, particularly to enable more contact, communication and trust building across key entities (Plummer et al. 2011). In terms of where the investments may be needed, stronger attention to communication, cohesion, coordination and integration could help to address some of these challenges to better build on experiences, learn across sectors, issues and jurisdictions, and to better identify workable solutions.

Trust and capacity building are also crucial elements, which will only be supported by more frequent communication across governments, and similar proactive arrangements (within, between and outside of agencies, including the public (Dunn et al. 2014b). All of these elements would likely go a long way towards enabling a governance culture that fosters leadership and collaboration, integrating policy development in a policy environment that is flexible and responsive to challenges, and holistic problem framing and mobilization of interdisciplinary knowledge (van de Meene et al. 2011).

While there are no easy answers to challenges of better integrating land- and water-use planning, or implementing source-water protection and other features of a multi-barrier approach, some recognition of these specific challenges, and more focused effort to respond to them, will offer at least a partial response. Doing so is a necessary but insufficient step to shift directions towards a more comprehensive approach to microbial risk, and indeed water governance more generally. Fostering improved understanding, and discussion of these issues in Canada, is also likely to be instructive for other contexts, particularly those that are currently moving towards more decentralized water governance approaches. For these instances, our evidence can serve as a cautionary tale of the types of challenges that are likely to be particular acute, to consider key investments that must be made, to more adequately ensure water quality for human and ecosystem needs.

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This article is a product of a 4-year (2011–2015) research project “Applied metagenomics of the watershed microbiome”. The authors would like to thank Genome BC and Genome Canada for financially supporting this research. We would like to thank all of the individuals who participated in the research interviews for their valuable time and input. The authors would also like to acknowledge the help and support of the other research team members, particularly Natalie Prystajecky, Ida Ngueng Feze, Judy Isaac-Renton, Christina Cook, Zamayla Chan, Maggie Low and Judy Chang. For more information about this project, please visit www.watersheddiscovery.ca.

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Microbial risk governance: challenges and opportunities in fresh water management in Canada

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