"Merkel, Putin, and the Lessons of History" (National Interest, March 25, 2014)

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Germany doesn't see Putin as Hitler. It sees Russia through the eyes of Willy Brandt. Merkel, Putin and the Lessons of History Klaus Larres, Peter Eltsov March 25, 2014 On March 18, the Crimean peninsula became part of the Russian Federation. So far Russian President Putin has shrugged off global protests about his flagrant violation of international law. He has decided to simply ignore the warnings of leaders such as President Obama and Germany’s Chancellor Angela Merkel. Greeted by thousands of people on Red Square in Moscow, Putin said “Crimea and Sevastopol are returning to ... their home shores, to their home port, to Russia”. Many foreign-policy experts in the United States and elsewhere are pronouncing that negotiations and engagement with the other side don’t work and are useless. Putin needs to be stopped immediately and punished. The imposition of severe sanctions on Russia and individual senior office-holders in the Kremlin, it is argued, is the least the US and ! Tweet " " Share Share + $ $ Share Share % &

Transcript of "Merkel, Putin, and the Lessons of History" (National Interest, March 25, 2014)

Germany doesn't see Putin as Hitler. It sees Russia through the eyes of Willy Brandt.

Merkel, Putin and the Lessons ofHistory

Klaus Larres, Peter Eltsov

March 25, 2014

On March 18, the Crimeanpeninsula became part of theRussian Federation. So far RussianPresident Putin has shrugged offglobal protests about his flagrantviolation of international law. Hehas decided to simply ignore thewarnings of leaders such asPresident Obama and Germany’sChancellor Angela Merkel. Greetedby thousands of people on Red

Square in Moscow, Putin said “Crimea and Sevastopol are returning to ... their homeshores, to their home port, to Russia”.

Many foreign-policy experts in the United States and elsewhere are pronouncing thatnegotiations and engagement with the other side don’t work and are useless. Putin needsto be stopped immediately and punished. The imposition of severe sanctions on Russiaand individual senior office-holders in the Kremlin, it is argued, is the least the US and

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the EU should do to force Putin and his clique to see reason and respect internationallaws and norms. Putin has to give in, is the mantra heard everywhere in Washington, DC,but much less so in Angela Merkel’s Germany.

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In the U.S. it is not only foreign policy hawk John McCain but Secretary of State JohnKerry and even the President himself who resort to this sort of demonstration ofmanliness and verbal muscle. French President Hollande, hugely unpopular in his owncountry, and the British in the form of Foreign Secretary Hague and beleaguered PrimeMinister Cameron are not far behind. While Moscow points to the Western-supportedseparation of Kosovo from the Serb Republic in early 2008, which continues to be deeplyresented in Russia, to explain the legitimacy of its takeover of Crimea. But many in theWestern world feel reminded of an entirely different historical parallel.

Hitler's occupation and annexation of the Czechoslovakian Sudetenland with its manyethnic Germans in October 1938 appears to have certain similarities with the Russianannexation of Crimea. By early 1938, German propaganda had been claiming that theCzechs were committing atrocities against the 3 million Sudeten Germans (about 23.5percent of the population). Nazi Germany threatened to protect them by military means.Hitler told the British Prime Minister that beyond Sudetenland he had "no further

territorial ambitions in Europe." The attempted appeasement of Hitler by means ofBritish and French agreement to the handover of the Sudetenland to Nazi Germanyencouraged Hitler’s belief that he could also get away with the invasion of Poland theyear after. That invasion, of course, instead unleashed the Second World War.

Yet, comparing Putin to Hitler in this way is as misguided as talking about a new ColdWar. Among the major EU countries, it is only in Germany that a somewhat moremeasured and more carefully balanced response to Putin's unacceptable behavior isheard. Chancellor Angela Merkel, recently elected to her third term in office, has begunto condemn Putin's annexation of Crimea in somewhat more outspoken terms during thelast week or so. Still, she and her experienced foreign minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier,a leading member of Merkel's Social-Democratic coalition partner, are among those whourge engagement and negotiations and are reluctant to agree on imposing too many EUsanctions on Russia.

The German political establishment is hesitant about the idea of punishing Putin publiclyand expecting him to humiliatingly call it quits and resort to the status-quo ante inCrimea. This much more measured approach has confirmed Merkel as probably the mostthoughtful head of government in the entire EU. The leading position she obtainedduring the Euro crisis (largely due to her skillful political approach and Germany'ssuccessful economic performance) is being confirmed during the current crisis.

There are three main reasons for Merkel's more sober and, on the whole, moreconstructive approach to dealing with Putin. These reasons have very little to do withGermany's dependency on Russian natural resources (35 percent of all of Germany's gasand oil imports come from Russia) and the long-standing existence of deep Russian andGerman trade relations. 31 percent of all EU exports to Russia are from Germany, andthere are over six thousand German companies registered in Russia. Although thesefactors may have helped to develop an alternative approach to dealing with Putin, themain reasons for the German 'Sonderweg' toward Putin's Kremlin go much deeper. Thereasons mostly can be found in both Merkel's personally cautious and culturally sensitive

political approach and Germany's since 1949 traditionally un-militaristic civilian powerapproach to international relations.

1. Merkel is a very cautious and unemotional person. At least in public, she is not proneto excited outbursts and the flaunting of her ego. She detested, for instance, the male-chauvinistic behavior of both former Italian Prime Minister Berlusconi, with his high-testosterone style, and former French President Sarkozy who never was happy if he couldnot be regarded as the most important person in any room he happened to be in. Bycontrast, Merkel's leadership style is characterized by a rejection of pomp andcircumstance and knee-jerk decisions. Not least, it seems, the 'ego' factor is almost totallyabsent in her way of leading. She tends to resort to a frequently somewhat slow andcontemplative approach to decision making, relying largely on a small circle of trustedadvisers and gatekeepers in the Chancellery in Berlin. This makes her come across asenigmatic at times, but on the whole it appears she has a superior leadership style, onewhich is not unduly influenced by the drama of the moment and self-importance, but bylong-term considerations and careful reflection. Not surprisingly Merkel's upbringing asa research scientist in the former communist East Germany (she was thirty-five when theWall came down) has deeply influenced her. In the GDR it was unwise to stick out toomuch and flaunt one's personal abilities. She also always had to be aware of stateinformers listening in to private conversations. This not only led to her outrage when shefound out recently about the NSA listening in to her private cell phone conversations, butfrom an early age it has implanted a certain natural carefulness and suspicion in herpersonality.

2. Merkel's and Foreign Minister Steinmeier's historical reference points are not theappeasement of Hitler, the Suez crisis, the Kosovo war or America's Iraq invasion. Theirpoint of reference goes back to the era of détente and West German Ostpolitik of the1970s pursued by Social Democratic chancellor Willy Brandt. The "policy of small steps"and "change through rapprochement," as Brandt's confidante Egon Bahr called it, didindeed lead to a wholesale change of West Germany's (and the West's) policy toward the

Soviet Union and the eastern bloc. More importantly, it profoundly changed Moscow'sway of dealing with the West. After some initial hesitation, Brandt's approach wassupported by the Nixon administration's policy of superpower détente with both Moscowand Beijing. It led to trade and disarmament treaties, cultural and educationalinterchanges and enabled an increasing number of people from the Warsaw bloccountries to travel to the West. To cut a long story short, over time it undermined theideological hold of the Soviet Union over its people. Ostpolitik and détente, thus,indirectly contributed significantly to German and European unification in 1989/90. It isno wonder that one of the authors of superpower détente, Henry Kissinger, in a recentessay, proposed a very measured—but by no means soft—approach to Putin's illegalaction in Ukraine. This is also Merkel's approach. She saw and personally felt the positiveconsequences of Brandt's Ostpolitik from the other side of the Iron Curtain. She knowsthat a blustering approach which threatens consequences in the form of sanctions andthe refusal of visas is unlikely to impress Moscow. The imposition of yet more red lines inthe sand and calls for the humiliating punishment of Putin will not resolve this seriouscrisis either. This approach never worked with the Soviet dictators during the Cold War,even though they did not have solid domestic support. It is unlikely to work with Putineither, who rightly or wrongly does enjoy the nationalistic favor of many of his subjects,both in the Russian Federation and in Crimea itself.

3. Merkel is one of the few Western politicians who attempts quite genuinely to see theworld through the eyes of the Russian president. And putting yourself into the shoes ofyour opponent is a crucial but much neglected foreign-policy skill. Again, her upbringingin Soviet dominated East Germany and her deep immersion in Russian culture benefitsher. Merkel is a fluent Russian speaker. In fact as a schoolgirl she received one of theGDR's coveted prizes for being the best speaker of Russian in the entire country. Theprize consisted of a trip to Moscow. Naturally, her linguistic abilities have given her amuch greater understanding of Russian sensitivities than other Western politicians, whogenerally know little to nothing about Russian history and literature. Putin speaks fluentGerman, which he perfected during his stint as a KGB officer in Dresden in the 1980s.Merkel and Putin have repeatedly telephoned during the current crisis, though not much

progress seems to have been made. Merkel allegedly even told President Obama thatPutin had lost touch with reality and was living "in another world."

At times it seems that Merkel is right. The government-controlled TV channels in Russiaair the most vociferous anti-Western propaganda. Popular Russian TV anchor DmitryKiselyov, interpreted the Ukrainian Revolution as a plot by Sweden, Lithuania, andPoland to revenge Russia for their defeat in the battle of Poltava in 1709. Most recently,Kisilyov threatened the world by stating that Russia is “the only country in the worldrealistically capable of turning the United States into radioactive ash”. He said thisstanding in front of a large image of a mushroom cloud.

In a country where the public flow of information is strictly controlled, such rhetoricwould not have been tolerated without the highest approval. In an emotional address tothe Russian parliament on March 18, president Putin blamed the West for orchestratingwars, revolutions, and political chaos. The Arab spring, according to the Russianpresident, turned into the Arab winter, because people were forced into traditions whichthey were not used to. The Ukrainian Revolution, he said, was also sponsored by theWest and directed against Ukraine, Russia, and Eurasian integration. “In the case ofUkraine, our Western partners crossed the line,” said Putin.

The idea of Eurasian integration which is so dear to Putin is based on Eurasianism – aschool of thought which argues Russia is exceptional in its ability to connect East andWest in a unique imperial manner. Eurasianists also believe that Russia’s political systemis destined to be based on the principles of collectivity and the centralized state, asopposed to individualism and representative government. As Sergei Uvarov, the ministerof culture under Nicolas I, famously said, the founding pillars of the Russian state areorthodoxy, autocracy, and nationality – a thesis very similar to Putin’s.

Putin’s speech on March 18 during which he announced that Crimea had come home wasfilled with nostalgia about the Soviet Union. He said that it was unfortunate that theUSSR fell apart. Since then, there had been no political stability in the world. He alsoexpressed compassion for the Russians living in the new independent states: “Millions ofRussians went to sleep in one country and woke up abroad. In a matter of hours, they

became a minority in former Soviet republics”. Bashing the West, Putin askedrhetorically why what was “allowed for the Albanians in Kosovo is not allowed for theUkrainians, Russians, and Crimean Tatars in Crimea.” Putin concluded that the reasonwas that, for centuries, the West had been exercising a policy of containment towardsRussia – during Czarist and communist times and with regard to contemporary Russia.Putin still views the world and Russian history through a Cold War prism.

The frightening reality of the Ukrainian conflict is that competing and often mutuallyexclusive interpretations of the past predetermine politics and even military action. Justconsider Putin’s view of World War II. It infuriates Putin tremendously that WestUkrainians reiterate that the war was started by Nazi Germany in alliance with the SovietUnion. The Kremlin vehemently denies this interpretation. Soviet conquests in EasternEurope during the Second World War are presented by Putin’s spokespeople as anunfortunate historical necessity. Putin does not use the word ‘occupation’ with regard tothe former parts of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Putin’s minister of culture,Vladimir Medinsky, goes further, calling the conquest of the Baltic states and WestUkraine “the incorporation of their territories into the Soviet Union”. The German-Sovietmilitary parade in Brest-Litovsk that marked the division of Poland on September 22,1939, is presented by the same man as “the withdrawal of German troops under thesupervision of Soviet authorities”.

The misuse of historical arguments in politics can be highly dangerous. The Germansknow this better than most; after all they were forced to undergo a process of de-Nazification and re-education after the Second World War. While President Putin, in thetradition of many dictators, takes a personal part in the preparation of a standardizedtextbook on his country’s national history, Merkel knows that both the Nazis and the EastGerman communists rose to power by using and abusing history. Neither Karl Marx norFriedrich Engels personally served as revolutionaries; yet they defined a new conceptionof world history – historical materialism – which in turn laid the foundation for thecreation of communist regimes. A series of works by the linguist and archaeologist,Gustaf Kossina, who died just before Adolf Hitler came to power, laid the theoretical

grounds for the annexation of Poland and Czechoslovakia: Kossina argued that theselands were occupied by Germanic people since deep antiquity. The message that Putindelivered in his speech on March 18 was not much different from Kossina’s. Whilereconfirming that he has no plans to annex Eastern and Southern Ukraine, he said thatBolsheviks drew new borders without any consideration of ‘traditional ethnic boundaries’– a policy that has caused so many problems and wars in history. It is likewisefrightening, however, that some leaders of the Ukrainian revolution in Kiev positionthemselves as ultranationalists and anti-Semites.

After the end of the Cold War, Harvard professor Sam Huntington argued that the sourceof conflict in the modern world would be primarily cultural or civilizational. As theUkrainian conflict shows, Huntington did not have it quite right. Ideology continues to bea crucial source of conflict with competing interpretations of history playing a crucialrole.

One of the tasks Chancellor Merkel and the other Western leaders have is to overcomethis mental imprisonment of viewing the world in terms of old historical parallels.Merkel’s inclination to think in terms of engagement, negotiations and thereestablishment of constructive relations with Russia will be helpful. But how can thecurrent crisis be overcome? Perhaps it is time for a quid pro quo policy between Russiaand the West.

The Western world, after all, does not have much of a choice but to grudgingly andreluctantly accept the annexation of Crimea by Putin – despite its illegality. Perhaps theWest also ought to promise not to make Ukraine a member of NATO. In return Putinshould agree to formally recognize the independence of Kosovo, become constructivelyengaged in terminating the civil war in Syria and in resolving the Iranian nuclear-capacity crisis, sign an undertaking to fully respect Ukraine’s borders and not to supportany pro-Russian separatist tendencies in eastern Ukraine and elsewhere in the region. Onsuch a basis the reestablishment of constructive relations with Russia might be possible.In addition the U.S. and the EU, together with the IMF, should do their best to improveUkraine’s economy. Poland, which since 1990 has become a strong economic power,

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might serve as a model here. An economically flourishing Ukraine, after all, woulddecisively diminish any overly pro-Russian tendencies in eastern and southern Ukraine.

Angela Merkel might be the right person to convince the Russian president to enter intosuch a quid pro quo deal. One thing is clear: there is no point in leaving Russia isolatedfor any length of time and to embark on yet another prolonged period of tension withsuch a big and important country. "Change through rapprochement" appears to be a goodrecipe for finding a way out of the current crisis. This is not appeasement, butconstructive engagement to resolve the crisis. International isolation, punishment andhumiliation of Russia, by contrast, is unlikely to improve matters. Let us learn the rightlessons from history this time round.

Klaus Larres is the Richard M Krasno Distinguished Professor in History &International Affairs at the University of North Carolina in Chapel Hill and a SeniorFellow at the Center for Transatlantic Relations at Johns Hopkins University/SAIS inWashington, DC.

Peter Eltsov, a Washington based political analyst, has conducted research in Russia,Ukraine, the Caucasus, South and Central Asia, and the Middle East. He taught andconducted research at Harvard, Free University in Berlin, the Library of Congress andWellesley College.

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