Mediating Structures and the Military: The Case of Religious Soldiers

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Armed Forces & Society

DOI: 10.1177/0095327X07308629 2008; 34; 615 originally published online Oct 8, 2007; Armed Forces & SocietyElisheva Rosman-Stollman

Mediating Structures and the Military: The Case of Religious Soldiers

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Author’s Note: This article develops part of my doctoral dissertation. I thank my advisor, Professor StuartA. Cohen of Bar-Ilan University, and Professor Kemal Kirisci of Bogazinçi University for his commentson the section pertaining to the Turkish military. I also thank the anonymous referees of Armed Forces &Society and the editor for their helpful comments.

Armed Forces & SocietyVolume 34 Number 4

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Seminar on Armed Forces andSociety. All rights reserved.

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Mediating Structures and the Military

The Case of Religious Soldiers

Elisheva Rosman-StollmanBar Ilan UniversityAshkelon Academic College

Very few armed forces consciously relate to the religious component of soldiers’identities. Like religions, the military system demands individuals to conform to rulesand schedules. Should military and religious obligations clash, soldiers are forcedto choose. When modern armed forces relate to religious elements in their members’identities, how do they do so? What are the conditions most conducive to a militaryrelating to the religious component of its soldiers’ identities? This article posits a frame-work for the analysis of both questions, employing the concept of mediating structuresto illustrate the mechanisms whereby militaries and religions accommodate each otherand Luckham’s typology of boundaries (integral, permeable, fragmented) to identifythe conditions that are most—and least—hospitable to mediation. This framework isillustrated by references to institutional and individual relations between religion andarmed forces in Iran, Israel, Turkey, the United States, and India.

Keywords: religion; military; mediating structure; civil–military boundaries

Despite modern predictions of religion’s imminent demise, it continues to affectnumerous spheres of public and private life all over the world. Civil–military

relations are no exception. The potential for conflict between militaries and religionsis simply stated: All religions demand adherence to a set of doctrinal beliefs thatcompeting frameworks of authority, such as the military, might consider threatening.Some religions, such as Judaism, Islam, and Sikhism, further emphasize the need forthe observance of a detailed set of commandments that cover numerous details ofeveryday life (dress, diet, times for prayer). These are not easily accommodated by amilitary structure. The military system demands that individuals conform to its rulesand schedule. It requires its members to dress identically in uniform and perform


616 Armed Forces & Society

certain tasks in unison.1 Obviously, military and religious obligations can potentiallyclash. This forces soldier–believers to choose between their loyalties. On the otherhand, Western, democratic societies supposedly respect the beliefs of individuals andbelieve in upholding individual rights to certain freedoms, including that of religion.

Notwithstanding these difficulties, religiously observant persons serve in militariesall over the world. In light of this, the purpose of this article is to understand howmodern armed forces relate to the religious aspects of their members. After examiningthe treatment of religious soldiers, the article will present a framework for the analysisof the ways in which modern militaries relate to the religious element and of theconditions most conducive to their doing so.

Mediating Structures as a Possible Solution

This analysis can benefit by utilizing the concept of “mediating structures,” firstapplied to the study of promotion of civil society by Berger and Neuhaus. Accordingto their definition, such structures stand “between the individual in his private life andthe large institutions of public life.”2 They transmit messages both from the largerstructures to individuals (top-down messages) and from their members to the largerstructures of public life. Thus, a mediating structure is a smaller “community” that isable to voice its members’ needs and demands to the larger structures in a clearer way.According to Berger and Neuhaus, the understanding of these messages is improvedwhen articulated through the mediators. The conveying of messages also legitimizesthe larger structures and helps avoid coercion.

For example, a teachers union can mediate between individuals (teachers in acertain school) and their school board, the city education council, and the educationdepartment or office in their greater government. The union voices the demands ofits members and makes their complaints known to the government. Conversely, thestaff of the same school understand general government policy through its impact onthem and discussing this impact with their peers and their union. In other words,mediating structures help people understand greater structures by articulating policyimplications on their small community and also assist larger structures of governmentin understanding and addressing demands voiced by individuals.

Since religious individuals are essentially caught between their obligations towardtheir faith and obligations toward the military in which they serve, it follows that theytoo could benefit from such an arrangement. A mediating structure could shieldindividuals from pressure exerted by both the military and religious systems and diffuseconflict by voicing concerns and needs of religious soldiers in an organized fashion.It could allow the greater structures to respond to a consolidated group request ratherthan trying to accommodate spontaneous individual concerns. In addition, the adminis-tration of these mediating structures can try to oppose policy that might harm theindividuals they comprise. The religious establishment and the military also stand to


gain stability and cooperation and avoid conflict with each other when such a mech-anism is employed.

What type of armed force can create a mediating structure that facilitates accom-modation for religious soldiers? What determines the ability to create mediatingstructures between religious establishments and a given military?

Much will depend on whether enlistment is voluntary or compulsory. A religioussoldier entering a volunteer-based force by choice is presumably aware of the restric-tions a military framework imposes on religious individuals and is willing to adjustto them. This presumption would largely relieve the military of responsibility formaking provisions for potential conflicts. In contrast, a military that drafts religiousconscripts cannot ignore these difficulties. Recruits in these cases do not necessarilywish to serve in the military. Even if they do, they usually still want to observe thecommandments of their religion while in uniform, including those commandmentsthat clash with military life. A military system that comprehends this obligation mightbe more open to creating a mediating structure for the benefit of religious soldiersand—by ameliorating conflict with these soldiers—for its own benefit as well.

The presence or absence of conscription, however, is often a reflection of a morebasic relationship between the armed forces and society at large. Hence, to discoverwhether and when militaries might be willing to tolerate the existence of mediatinginstitutions, it seems necessary to examine the nature of what Luckham long agotermed the “boundaries” between them. Especially useful, in this context, is histypology of possible boundary situations, which runs along a scale extending fromcomplete fusion (“permeable boundaries”), through boundaries that are nonexistentin some respects but clearly defined in others (“fragmented boundaries”), to sharp anddistinctive boundaries between the civil and military spheres (“integral boundaries”).3

Boundaries between the military and the civil spheres in a given society influencethe possibility of creating a framework that is allowed to work freely to mediatebetween parties. Just as one is in need of the proper documentation to cross an inter-national border, mediating structures must possess the required authority to cross theboundaries between civil and military systems. As the case studies below demonstrate,when boundaries are integral or permeable, it is difficult to create mediating structuresthat are able to resolve conflict between the military and the religious establishment.Fragmented boundaries, however, create opportunities for mediation.

Case Studies

This article examines five separate military forces during the twentieth and twenty-first centuries and uses them as case studies. Through these multiple case studies, we willbe able to examine how militaries treat religious persons within them. Naturally, casestudies that represent ideal types for the purpose of this study do not exist.4 In addition,not all combinations of variables exist in practice and therefore cannot be tested.

Rosman-Stollman / Religious Soldiers 617


As Figure 1 shows, the case studies were chosen to represent both conscription-based and volunteer forces and all three types of Luckham’s civil–military boundaries.In addition, since we are focusing on the status of religious soldiers, case studiesrepresent militaries with a clearly defined religion, with no clearly defined religion,and with proclaimed secular tendencies.

The Iranian armed forces will serve as example of a conscription-based force inwhich civil–military boundaries are permeable. In addition, the Iranian military hasa clearly defined religion: Shiite Islam. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) also has adefined religion (Judaism). It is also a conscription-based military. However, the civil–military boundaries are fragmented. The U.S. military, which has no defined religionand promotes a separation of church and state, will serve as a case study for a volunteerarmed force with clearly defined (integral) civil–military boundaries. For an exampleof a proclaimed secular force, the Turkish armed forces were chosen. Turkey’s mili-tary is conscription based, with a volunteer officer corps, and its civil–military bound-aries are also integral. The Indian military is undefined religiously but is a de factoHindu force. It is a volunteer-based military, and civil–military boundaries in this caseare also integral. At first glance, it seems that the U.S. and Indian militaries have iden-tical characteristics (see Figure 1). However, as demonstrated below, they differ intheir treatment of religious soldiers and in their general attitude toward the majorityreligion (Christianity and Hinduism, respectively).

Following Yin’s recommendations regarding the structure of case studies,5 eachcase study will include a description of the treatment of religious soldiers within a


Figure 1Case Study Characteristics

Iran Israel Turkey India United

States

Conscription/

volunteer

Conscription Conscription Conscription/

volunteer

officer corps

Volunteer Volunteer

Civil–military

boundaries

Permeable Fragmented Integral Integral Integral

Defined

religion

Defined

Shii Muslim

Defined

Jewish

Defined

secular

Undefined

(de facto

Hindu)

Undefined


given military. To view each example within context, the discussion of each case studywill begin with a brief sketch of the military force in question, the status of religiousminorities, and the nature of civil–military boundaries according to Luckham’s typology.Once the context is established, we will survey the ability of soldier–believers topractice their faith within the armed force discussed. Because of the scope of thisarticle, it will focus in more detail on the treatment of members of the majority religion.Understanding religious accommodation—or “inaccommodation”—is the first step incomprehending how a given military treats religious soldiers within it. Our descrip-tion will focus on the ability of a religious soldier to practice religion in everydaymilitary life, the general attitude toward both the majority and minority religions, andthe existence of some form of mediation. It seems that when some form of mediationoccurs, treatment of religious soldiers is more favorable. However, the main variablethat determines the existence of a mediating structure is the nature of civil–militaryboundaries. These points will be illustrated in the following sections.

Since scholarship and the layman’s literature alike neglect the topic of religioussoldiers, the following descriptive sections are based on material published by andabout each of the forces depicted. When possible, interviews and personal corre-spondence with soldiers (past and present) and military officials were conducted tosupplement written sources. Interviews and correspondence sought to decipher howreligious soldiers are treated de facto in the ranks and whether or not military regula-tions supported religious practice. In addition, personal contact exposed emotionaldynamics involved. For example, reactions of Turkish military officials—interviewedseparately—to questions concerning religious conscripts illustrated the mixed feelingstoward Islam and Muslim practices in that military. Given that this topic is usuallymentioned only in passing in the existing literature, this method of research was theonly one suitable.

After individually examining each case study, investigating how religious soldiersare treated within each case, we will attempt to compare the five types. Such acomparison may allow us to ascertain the conditions conducive to the emergence ofsome form of mediation and the conditions that inhibit mediation.

The Iranian Armed Forces

Historical and practical context. Since the 1979 revolution, most research onIran’s military has concentrated on the military’s unconventional capabilities and itsrelations with the Revolutionary Guard and Basij units. Hence, information on themain body of the Iranian military is scarce.6 The Iranian armed forces are based oncompulsory service for males. Many of the recruits come from a rural–tribal (andtherefore traditional) background. Although most soldiers are Shiite Muslims, Iranis home to Sunni, Bahai, Christian, Jewish, and Zoroastrian minorities, who are notexempt from service.



Intensive Muslim indoctrination of the military began immediately after the 1979revolution, when religious clerics joined military units. At first, their task was to conveyAyatollah Khomeini’s messages to the soldiers. Once the government completedpurges and stabilized the armed forces, their new task was to ensure the political andideological loyalty of the troops,7 similarly to the function of commissars in the RedArmy.8 This automatically discourages the emergence of mediating structures since,as Berger and Neuhaus observe, a government using coercion has little need formediation.

Each unit of both the armed forces and the Revolutionary Guard are supervisedby a branch of the Ideological–Political Directorate (Modiriyate Aghidati va SiyasiArtesh). This arrangement is supposed to ensure the unit’s loyalty to the laws ofIslam and the republic. In the wake of the revolution, the Directorate was chargedwith restoring order and discipline in military units and convincing soldiers to “fightfor Islam.” The official reason for Directorate representation within units is to fulfillthe soldiers’ need for information about Islam.9 However, in practice, the Directoratealso influences promotion and other military-related matters.10

These points all indicate that, based on the criteria cited by Luckham, the bound-aries between the military and civilian systems in Iran are relatively permeable.The civilian system is able to “cross over” into the military system at will, and theexistence of paramilitary organizations—the Revolutionary Guard and Basij—contributes to this.11

Everyday treatment of religious soldiers. Article 144 of the Islamic RepublicConstitution states that members of the armed forces must be believers who observe(Muslim) religious commandments. The duty to obey one’s commanders is describedas a religious obligation.12 This illustrates attitudes toward religious soldiers. If thereare hardships in the Iranian military, observing Islamic Shiite Law does not seemto be one of them. Friday prayers are organized by a special office of the DefenseMinistry’s Department of Services and Public Relations. Officers are encouraged topray together.13 There is also an opportunity for Shiite religious study. Soldiers arerequired to take a four- to six-week ideological–political course, including the studyof classic Shiite Muslim texts.14 While not traditional, institutional Islamic studies(as in a religious college [madrasa]), within this framework soldiers interested instudying religious texts are able to do so to a certain extent.

It seems reasonable to assume that the food served in the Iranian armed forces issuitable for observant Muslim soldiers. It can also be assumed that observance of theRamadan fast is possible, if not required. On the other hand, based on their treatmentas civilians,15 it seems that religious minorities in Iran are not granted full freedomof religion during their military service. Likewise, it is unclear to what extent SunniMuslim soldiers are subject to religious pressure from the Shiite majority. Personalaccounts tell of regular harassment of soldiers belonging to both constitutionallyprotected minorities, such as Jews and Christians, and unrecognized minorities, such



as Bahai. Sunni Muslims or members of any other religious minorities are unable toserve as commissioned officers in the Iranian armed forces.16

The Iranian case: Conclusion. Given these characteristics, mediating structurescannot exist between the Iranian military and any aspect of civil society, includingreligious frameworks. The Iranian regime, which can be described as totalitarian, hasno need for mediating structures. As Berger and Neuhaus demonstrated, mediatingstructures also serve to legitimize the regime. Absent legitimization, a regime wouldhave to resort to coercion to impose its authority. Since there is a great deal of coercionin Iran (the Ideological–Political Directorate itself being a case in point), the creationof mediating structures would limit the regime’s power—a result the regime itself wouldoppose. Clearly, conditions in Iran are not conducive to mediating structures unlessthey serve as an agent of the state. This is the case with the Ideological–PoliticalDirectorate itself. Although it is not a true mediating institution, it does communicatemessages from the state to religious soldiers and is able to accommodate the needsof these soldiers, providing they are Shiite Muslims.

The Iranian model—a military that in no way threatens the religious framework—can be compared to communist and totalitarian armies (e.g., China, North Korea, andthe former Soviet Union) in which a defined political doctrine replaces religiousideology.

IDF

Historical and practical context. Luckham classified the Israeli case as one withfragmented boundaries.17 The IDF is based on conscription of eighteen-year-old Jewishmen and women. Deferment for religious reasons is possible, although conscientiousobjection on other grounds is not always accommodated.18 Of the religious and ethnicminorities in Israel, Druze, Bedouin, Samaritan, Christian, and Circassian men can befound in the ranks of the IDF.

The relationship between religion and the state in Israel has been the subject ofmuch scholarship. This relationship has evolved over the years, and, despite tension,religion is an acknowledged component of political life. With the exception of theultraorthodox segment of the population in Israel, most of the Jewish religious sectoris actively involved in secular Israeli society, holding jobs in both the public andprivate domains.19 Due to conscription and their acceptance of military service as apart of their civic duty, many religious soldiers (men and women) serve in the IDF,unless willing to commit to a life of study in a religious college (yeshiva). Indeed, mostmale and about one-third of female graduates of the Jewish religious state-sponsoredhigh school system serve in the IDF.

As described in earlier studies,20 the IDF employs military chaplains in the MilitaryRabbinate corps. Founded almost immediately after the establishment of the IDF



itself in 1948, the Military Rabbinate ensures that the IDF adheres to Jewish Law(halakha) in matters such as Sabbath observance, dietary restrictions (kashrut), andholiday and fast day observance. The military rabbi is also supposed to be consultedif military daily life conflicts with Jewish observances.

The most striking characteristic of the IDF’s accommodation of religious soldiersis a series of programs that enable young Jewish men and women to study in a religiouscollege (yeshiva, mekhina, or midrasha) before conscription and, depending on theprogram, during their actual military service. The IDF will allow potential soldiersto defer their service for up to two years once enrolled in a study program. During thistime, they dedicate themselves to religious study. This arrangement placates the religiousestablishment, which considers religious study to be a religious commandment, andensures its cooperation with the military framework. It allows religious soldiers toserve in the IDF with the endorsement of their religious and social community.21

Two of these programs—the men’s hesder program and the women’s garinprogram—allow participants to serve with other religious soldiers to minimize contactwith the secular military world. The officials of these programs also keep an eye onthe treatment of their students when in uniform. While this monitoring is not alwaysapparent, should students encounter a serious religion-related problem, their studyprogram will not hesitate to intervene on their behalf.22 The IDF is aware of thepossibility of intervention and maintains contact with the study programs throughvarious bureaucratic mechanisms.

All the above mechanisms ensure that the IDF will not unilaterally formulatepolicy concerning soldier–believers. These structures are able to protest when theyfeel religious standards are not being upheld and the religious observance of theirstudents is jeopardized. For example, when students belonging to the mekhinaprogram were supposed to participate in an evaluation process for the Navy togetherwith female soldiers, their rabbis complained. They informed Navy headquartersthat their students would no longer apply for this venue of service if basic standardsof tzniut (modesty) were not observed. The evaluation process was revised to accom-modate religious soldiers.23 While this sort of intervention is fairly rare, it proves thatstudy programs are able to voice the needs of their students and present their demandsto the IDF.

Conversely, the study programs also convey messages from the IDF to their studentsand, in general, promote military service. For example, during the period devoted tostudy, many programs attempt to prepare their students for military service. Someprograms go so far as to offer physical fitness classes and practice navigation skillsto enhance their students’ performance when conscripted. All programs instill intheir students a deep sense of commitment toward the IDF. Most of these young menand women are convinced that serving in the IDF is a religious commandment.24

As mentioned above, while the majority of soldiers are Jewish and the IDF itselfis defined as a Jewish armed force, non-Jewish minorities serve in its ranks. Althoughthere are no non-Jewish chaplains in the IDF, a military rabbi overseeing matters



pertaining to non-Jewish soldiers is reportedly in close contact with appropriatecivilian religious authorities and consults with them on a fairly regular basis.25

Everyday treatment of religious soldiers. The IDF prides itself on being a “people’sarmy,” meaning that in principle the entire civilian Jewish population served or isserving in its ranks. Although this is no longer as true as it was in the past, the ideaencourages the IDF to promote a religiously tolerant environment to enable religioussoldiers to serve within it. Military kitchens are supposed to uphold Jewish dietaryrestrictions (kashrut). Soldiers are allowed time for prayer, and no training activitiestake place on Saturday, the Jewish day of rest. During fast days, fasting soldiers areexempt from physical exertion.

In practice, these rules are not always strictly adhered to. For example, militarykitchens do not always observe kashrut, and rules of the Sabbath are at times brokenwithout a proper halakhic justification. However, officers and recruits alike are awareof the policy that Jewish halakha should be upheld whenever possible.

During the late 1990s, the IDF began integrating women into combat units. Asnoted above, this poses the most pressing problem today for religious soldiers whodo not wish to be in close physical proximity with women for halakhic reasons. In thismatter, as in others, the IDF makes tangible efforts to oblige soldiers, if not alwayssuccessfully.

Non-Jewish soldiers are also accommodated. During non-Jewish holidays and fastdays, soldiers of that religion are accommodated as much as possible. For example,as with Jewish fasts, Muslim soldiers are allowed to rest on base during Ramadanand avoid active physical training or active duty. Military meals must be scheduledto accommodate fasting soldiers and allow them to eat before and after the fast. Sincethe IDF conforms to Jewish dietary laws in all matters pertaining to meat (pork isforbidden, and meat is ritually slaughtered), Muslims are also able to eat in militarymess halls.

Non-Jewish soldiers are allowed to observe their own day of rest instead ofSaturday: Muslims may rest on Friday and Christians on Sunday. While military rabbisconduct military funerals for Jewish soldiers, non-Jewish military funerals areconducted by a civilian religious leader of the family’s choice.26

The Israeli case: Conclusion. Clearly, the IDF is tolerant of religion in general,although preference is given to Judaism. It seems that this tolerance is enhancedby the presence of both internal mediating structures (the Military Rabbinate) andexternal ones (religious study programs). Since these structures—especially the studyprograms—are able to intervene and protest if a certain standard of Jewish religiousobservance is not upheld, in most cases the IDF prefers to avoid confrontation andaccommodate religious practices. In addition, fearing religious soldiers will avoidbeing drafted for religious reasons, the IDF is willing to invest time and effort to ensurethey will continue to serve in its ranks.27



This case demonstrates the possibilities the fragmented nature of civil–militaryboundaries in Israel affords mediating structures. The IDF is willing to allow studyprograms to cross over into the military sphere and meddle in military affairs. They arenot military structures, and for all practical purposes they represent civilian interests.But once allowed into the military sphere, the IDF cannot control the actions of thesestructures. Conversely, these same structures bring military ideas and messagesinto the civilian sphere. As demonstrated, the study programs teach their students toobey the military system as part of their religious observance. This is a valuable assetto the IDF and encourages its cooperation with the mediating structures.

The fragmented boundaries and the structures that take advantage of them alleviatemilitary–religious tensions within the IDF. The fact that some form of cooperationexists allows both the IDF and the religious establishment in Israel to avoid outrightconfrontation and conflict. Religious soldiers are able to serve in the IDF and fulfilltheir civic duty without seriously compromising the practice of their faith.

The Israeli model—strong external–civilian and internal–military mediatingstructures—does not exist in other militaries. However, this model can be comparedto the Turkish model (see below) since both armed forces conscript graduates of areligious high school system and must contend with their wish to continue to observetheir religious practices.

The U.S. Military

Historical and practical context. The U.S. military became a volunteer force in1973. Luckham classified the borders between the civil and military systems in theUnited States as integral, and his classification is still relevant today.28 The U.S. armedforces, like other Western armies, addresses the needs of religious soldiers throughchaplains serving in all branches of the military (Army, Navy, and Air Force Officesof the Chief of Chaplains).29 Chaplains are certified by a particular religious denomi-nation and can conduct religious ceremonies only for soldiers of that denomination.30

The role of chaplain in the U.S. military has evolved over time. As early as theseventeenth century in colonial America, the chaplain’s role was to preserve thereligiosity of the troops. They were to promote moral behavior and discourage negativehabits such as drinking and gambling.31 This model is similar to that of the Iranianmilitary, as previously discussed.

Over the years, chaplains have been given additional duties. Today, chaplains areexpected to assist soldiers in obtaining the religious services they are entitled towithin the bounds of military law. Essentially, it is the chaplain’s duty to protect theright of all soldiers to religious freedom, whether they adhere to a certain faith or areatheists. Chaplains are also charged with meeting the religious and emotional needsof soldiers’ families and in many ways function as de facto psychologists and socialworkers.



The U.S. military also has a loose connection to various external religious organi-zations that support religious soldiers. The largest of these, the Jewish Welfare Board(JWB), was founded in 1917 and supports Jewish chaplains and lay leaders.32 However,it appears that despite this organization’s work, there is insufficient informationwithin the military about how to contact Jewish lay leaders, and there is little awarenessregarding the rights of religious Jewish soldiers in general.33

Conversely, special arrangements for Muslim soldiers began much later. The firstMuslim chaplain in the U.S. military was appointed only in 1994.34 The AmericanMuslim Armed Forces and Veterans Affairs Council (AMAF and VAC) describes itselfas “serving as a bridge between Muslims and the various branches of the military.”The council responds to Muslim soldiers who report alleged discrimination and bringsrequests by Muslims before the U.S. Defense Department.35

Everyday treatment of religious soldiers. American military regulations addressreligious freedom in an official document published in 1988, Department of DefenseDirective 1300.17.36 Generally, the directive favors granting religion-related requestswhen feasible. For example, article 3.2.7.3 specifically permits the wearing of a skull-cap for Jews when no other military headgear is worn.37 However, the U.S. militarydoes not involve itself in soldiers’ religious observances and confines itself to a degreeof accommodation—no more, no less. As mentioned above, followers of religionsgrounded in religious law, primarily Islam and Judaism, are in a more sensitive positionthan followers of other religions due to the more “practical” aspects of their faith thatdictate one’s daily behavior. Devoting resources to ordering kosher or halal food, orpermitting soldiers to refrain from physical activity while they are fasting, requiresfar more effort than granting requests allowing prayer for an additional denomination.Therefore, allowing observant members of law-based religions to serve in the militarycan be interpreted as willingness to accommodate various faiths.

American Muslim soldiers are allocated time to pray on Fridays and are not servedpork at meals. In addition, during Ramadan, Muslim soldiers are officially relievedof physical training and permitted to change their daily schedule to accommodate thetraditional evening meal.38 Nevertheless, some Muslim soldiers report being unableto pray five times a day, as required by their religion.39

Meals Ready to Eat that are compatible with Muslim and Jewish dietary laws areavailable. While such special arrangements undoubtedly help Jewish and Muslimsoldiers, problems still arise owing to the relatively small number of these soldiers inthe U.S. military.40 It seems that chaplains and support organizations cannot guaranteethat religious individuals will be able to practice their faith to the fullest extent in theU.S. armed forces. While they may attempt to mediate between a religious individualand the military system, they are relatively weak, and their influence is limited.

Some religious sects such as Quakers, Mennonites, and Jehovah’s Witnesses opposemilitary service. Since the abolition of the draft in the United States, there has beenno conflict between the two sides. It is interesting to note that, nevertheless, some



followers of these sects do serve in the U.S. military.41 The apparent explanation isthat soldiers join these sects during the course of their service but remain to completetheir tour of duty due to their military contracts. Soldiers who are Jehovah’s Witnessesare not allowed to refuse medical treatment, including blood transfusions, which theirreligion forbids.42 In other words, despite the right to maintain their faith, their decisionto serve in the military obliges these soldiers to make certain concessions.

U.S. headlines in recent years have drawn attention to cases of religious intolerancetoward soldiers. For example, in 2005, there was an instance of religious coercion ofnonevangelistic Christian soldiers at the Air Force Academy in Colorado Springs.Among other grievances, cadets complained they were pressured to attend religiousservices, and prayers were held before meals.43

The American case: Conclusion. The minimal influence of external institutions,such as the JWB, coupled with the existence of military chaplains, demonstrates theintegral nature of the boundaries between the civilian system and the military systemin the U.S. military: The only religious authority able to act within the military frame-work is an internal one (military chaplaincy). External structures cannot meddlewithin the military sphere, and the military system does not seek to influence religioussoldiers in any way.

Despite its willingness to accommodate religious soldiers, the U.S. military systemcan claim it is incapable of helping every soldier observe every religious commandment.Soldiers are aware of the situation prior to recruitment. Since it is a volunteer-basedmilitary, the U.S. armed forces can demand that soldiers make religious concessionswhen, in its view, religious observances obstruct their roles as soldiers. A Jehovah’sWitness, therefore, can be ordered to receive a blood transfusion.

On the other hand, most Americans consider themselves religious people,44 andthe U.S. military also tends to adopt a sympathetic view toward religious faith. It is thisapproach that allows for the presence of chaplains and lay leaders. The willingnessto somewhat accommodate religious soldiers indicates that religion and faith are notregarded as negative factors. It is quite clear, however, that religion is a privatematter, and while all are free to believe in whatever religion they choose, Americans(civilians and soldiers alike) are expected to yield to the reigning secular ethos andnot parade religious practices in the public domain.

The American model highlights the difference between mediating structuresand chaplains. Although chaplains can be considered “one-man” mediating structures,they belong to one of the parties involved—the military system. While the well-being of religious soldiers is the chaplains’ major concern, chaplains are officers inuniform and are expected to be officers first. Therefore, despite the degree of medi-ation that takes place through chaplains, religious individuals must manage to a largeextent on their own. Without knowledge of their rights and the military’s responsi-bilities toward them and a proactive stance on their own behalf, their needs will notbe met.



The American model parallels the situation in militaries of Western, democraticcountries, such as Australia, the United Kingdom, Canada, France, Germany, andNew Zealand. These militaries employ chaplains with similar functions to thosedescribed here.

The Turkish Military

Historical and practical context. The relationship among the government, themilitary, and Islam in Turkey is complicated, although it seems boundaries betweenthe military and civil systems are (in Luckham’s terms) integral.45 The Turkish militaryis involved in Turkish politics. Though usually discreet, occasionally this involvementbecomes overt, as during the military coups of 1960 and 1980. Turkish citizens takepride in their country’s secular lifestyle. However, in their private lives, many ofthem follow religious law to varying degrees.46 Most of Turkey’s citizens are Muslim,and Muslim tradition is an important element in its culture.47

The Turkish military is based on conscription for males, and no exemptions aregranted for reasons of religion or conscience. Members of the Kurdish, Alevi, Jewish,Christian, and Donmeh minorities are also required to serve. It is unclear how theseminorities are treated when in uniform. However, Alevis have been known to ask forpolitical asylum abroad due to their fear of persecution during military service.48

In Turkey, as in Iran and Israel, there are those who view military service itselfas a religious obligation. For example, a senior military source mentioned that theKoran states that fighters are exempt from prayer and the Ramadan fast because “itis more holy” to serve in the armed forces than to fast and pray.49

Everyday treatment of religious soldiers. Most Turkish soldiers come from ruralareas and traditional backgrounds. Accordingly, there are cultural–religious elementswithin the Turkish military, and attitudes toward Islam are not necessarily negative.For example, meals in military mess halls are preceded by a general blessing usingthe word Tanri, a Turkish and more secular equivalent of the Muslim Allah.50 Themilitary appears to accept the notion that religion can act as a unifying force. However,religion must be confined within certain boundaries.

The treatment of religious officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs) in theTurkish military illustrates this point. An “overly” religious candidate for the officercorps or one who is active in religious organizations is likely to be rejected.51 In addition,graduates of the religious school network (Imam Hatip) are not accepted to militaryofficer academies and cannot serve as Turkish officers.52 The Turkish military alsoappears to keep tabs on the ideological leanings of its officers. An officer suspectedof adhering to a “problematic” ideology (religious or political) is dismissed. Between1995 and 2000, 745 officers and NCOs were dismissed by the Supreme Military Councilfor reasons related to their ideological beliefs.53 It appears that what differentiates



a “pious” religious officer from an “extremist” religious officer is public behavior:Actively opposing secular behavior or publicly espousing a form of theocracy aregrounds for dismissal. Soldiers dismissed from service for these reasons are noteligible for severance compensation or military pension. Moreover, they have verylittle chance of finding a job in the private sector.54

In recent years, officers and NCOs who were dismissed from the military forreligion-related reasons petitioned the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR).One such case involved a joint suit filed in 1998 by six soldiers (two officers and fourNCOs).55 The soldiers posited that the dismissals violated their right to freedom ofreligion and thought and were therefore unjustified.

In its final decision given in 2003, the court ruled that while the plaintiffs’ rightsto freedom of religion must be upheld, military law differs from civil law. When theplaintiffs chose a career in the military, they were aware of the military legal system,which differs from the civil system. Since the military viewed the plaintiffs’ commit-ment to their religious beliefs to be greater than their commitment to the military,it was not in the military’s interest to allow them to remain in their positions. Thedismissal of the plaintiffs was therefore upheld.56

Similar rulings by the ECHR indicate that this is how the Turkish military viewsthe situation. There is no justification for the continued military service of officerswho belong to religious sects and whose loyalty to the military is suspect, their mainloyalty being to religious entities. These may not be the true reasons for their dismissal,and the military may be overreacting to what it views as a religious threat.57 Nevertheless,such an environment is not hospitable to the creation of a mediating structure thatwould attempt to uphold rights of religious soldiers, even if only partially.

While officers suspected of religious extremism can be dismissed, the militarymust still contend with extremist or pious conscripts. Based on conversations andcorrespondence with Turkish military sources and former soldiers, it appears thatproblems arise. Soldiers are able to pray only during their free time, when prayer willnot interfere with military activity.58 Therefore, although prayer is not forbidden, itis impossible to pray five times a day, as required of observant Muslims. On Fridays,public prayers are held for interested soldiers.59 There are no military imams or chaplainsin the Turkish military.60

Meals served in the Turkish armed forces are considered halal (adhering to Muslimdietary laws).61 Pork is not part of the military menu, for cultural and religious reasons:“There is no pork in the army. Ninety-nine percent of Turks will not eat pork. . . .It is forbidden by our religion and not part of our tradition.”62

Unlike other armed forces described here, the Turkish military does not officiallygrant exemptions to fasting soldiers. Soldiers who choose to fast during the monthof Ramadan may do so as long as it does not affect their military duties. The onlyattempt to accommodate the fast is a change in the meal schedule during Ramadan:dinner is served at a time when all soldiers can break the fast together, and breakfastis served earlier than usual, before the official start of the fast.63 It appears that what



actually occurs in the field is largely determined by the particular commander ofeach unit. Some are more understanding toward fasting soldiers and will accommodatethem somewhat, while others ignore the implications of the fast completely.64

The Turkish case: Conclusion. Mandatory conscription dictates the presence ofreligious soldiers in the Turkish military, but integral boundaries prevent any sortof external religious body from assisting them. It appears that the greatest obstacle toobserving the commandments of Islam in uniform is psychological: the Turkishmilitary finds it difficult to accept the possibility that a soldier could be equallycommitted to a religious authority and a military authority. The rules of play are notentirely clear to individual soldiers, and it seems that the military can change thoserules at will. A religious soldier will always be suspected of dual loyalty, if notovert preference for a religious authority over the military one. Integral boundariesbetween the civilian and military spheres will not allow mediating institutions to existwithin the military. The already-present suspicions toward religious soldiers strengthenthis tendency and also prevent the creation of any kind of internal military religiousauthority.

The Indian Armed Forces

Historical and practical context. The modern Indian military has its roots in thecolonial Indian armed forces, and the boundaries between it and the civil system arealso termed integral by Luckham.65 The Indian military is volunteer based. Recruitsmust meet minimum physical requirements, pass a written exam, and attain requiredscores on high school matriculation exams.66 Military service in India is a key to socialmobility and can upgrade the social and economic standing of a soldier’s family.67

The Indian infantry includes homogeneous regiments (on the basis of ethnic orreligious–ethnic affiliation) and heterogeneous regiments, some of which containhomogeneous divisions or companies. While some homogeneous units were createdto appease groups within Indian society, most are a result of history. The British Rajpreferred to recruit soldiers in mainly ethnically and/or religiously homogeneousregiments—the Sikh Regiment and the Dogra Regiment, for example.68 Some of theseregiments still exist in the independent Indian military.

Social–ethnic–religious tension in India has spilled over into the military. Followingindependence and the division between India and Pakistan in 1947, the Indian armedforces began to question the allegiance of Muslim officers and soldiers, who wereseen as a possible fifth column. For example, Kashmir Muslims were categoricallyrejected from military service. Officially, underrepresentation of Muslims in themilitary in the twenty-first century is attributed to inefficiency in recruitment officesin Muslim regions and the low quality of Muslim education.69



In contrast to the underrepresentation of Muslims, Sikhs play a very prominent rolein the Indian military. Sikhs serve in two homogeneous regiments and in other homo-geneous military platoons and companies.70 In 2002, 20 percent of Indian officers wereSikhs,71 despite the fact that Sikh soldiers were involved in violent incidents, the mostfamous being the clash between the Indian military and Sikhs at the Golden Templeand the assassination of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi during the 1980s.

Everyday treatment of religious soldiers. While not recognized as chaplains,72

India employs the services of religious teachers who are given junior commissionedofficer rank. They are charged with leading prayers for interested soldiers. Religiousteachers “wear dress appropriate to the occasions and customary to their religions,”not uniforms.73

The Indian armed forces have no policy regarding special arrangements forreligious soldiers on holidays or fast days and deal with religious requests on a case-by-case basis.74 Muslim and Sikh soldiers are permitted to grow beards in the military.Sikhs may wear their religious head covering, a turban, and are provided with militaryturbans. Similarly, the dress uniforms of Naga soldiers resemble traditional Nagadress.75

The extent to which Muslim and Sikh soldiers are able to eat the meat served inIndian military mess halls is unclear. As noted, religious Muslim soldiers can eatonly halal meat. Meat-eating Sikh soldiers cannot eat meat slaughtered by membersof other religions (e.g., halal or kosher). Some Sikhs, like Hindus from certain castes,are strict vegetarians. Military food is not vegetarian.76 It is also not clear whethermilitary kitchens provide alternatives to beef for meat-eating Hindus or alternativesto pork for Muslims. Homogeneous units possibly solve some of these problems byfeeding fewer denominations from the same kitchen.

The Indian case: Conclusion. It appears that preference is given to the majorityreligion, Hinduism. Minorities have complained that when senior officers speak ofthe military’s values, they base their ideas solely on Hindu sources. Moreover, Hindusects (but not others) are permitted to distribute printed material and religious articlesto soldiers. In other words, the military has become a legitimate forum for (Hindu)religious activities.77

At one level, however, the ethnic–social–religious tradition of soldiers is takeninto account. Each infantry unit has its own battle cry, appropriate to the backgroundof its soldiers. For example, the battle cry of the two Sikh regiments appeals to onegod, while the battle cry of the Hindu Dogra regiment appeals to a Hindu goddess.78

The Indian model views homogeneous units as a privilege. According to thismodel, ethnic or ethnic–religious groups strive for homogeneous military units fortheir members. For Sikhs, serving in their own unit also allows them to wear uniformsthat conform to the demands of their religion. However, the primary motivation forcreating homogeneous units appears to be sociopolitical; it is a way of ensuring that



ethnic groups will not be posted in their home states and forced to act against theinterests of their communities.

While religious teachers are not chaplains and are unable to mediate betweenreligious soldiers and greater structures of the religious and military establishments,homogeneous units are in a better position to voice the needs and demands of ethnicor religious groups. It seems, therefore, that homogenous units act, in some ways, asmediating structures. Two examples are the authorization for unique ethnic–religiousdress and the adoption of culturally based battle cries. It is also possible that theysolve complex religious dietary problems. By establishing a homogeneous unit andgranting it allowances, the military can signal that it understands the special needsof a certain group. The group, in turn, can voice the concerns of its members in themilitary through the homogeneous unit. On the other hand, not all ethnic and religiousgroups in India can expect to be allowed to maintain a homogeneous unit, and theMuslim minority is a case in point.

Points of Comparison and Discussion

The above findings are illustrated in Figure 2. When examining these findings, itseems that they supply a partial answer to the questions posed at the beginning of thisstudy: How do modern armed forces relate to the religious element in their members’identities, and when are they more inclined to do so?

When modern armed forces address the religious element in their members’identities, they do so either on a case-by-case basis or through some sort of mediatingmechanism. The nature of that mechanism is usually determined by the nature ofthe boundaries between the military and the religious frameworks in question and thetype of recruitment used by that specific military.

The Iranian case presents a model in which the military institution is subservientto the religious framework. This is partly because the boundaries are permeable. Thereis no need to mediate when one of the structures can dominate the other at will. TheIranian religious establishment is not interested in even a superficial partnership withthe military. The Directorate serves not to mediate but to spy and intimidate. An armedforce under constant surveillance by an ideological directorate may feel, justifiably,that it is unable to fulfill its role. The need to include religious entities in militarydecision making detracts from the military’s efficiency, training programs, and overallfunctioning.

On the other hand, when boundaries are fragmented—as in the Israeli case—mediating structures are able to participate in solving some of the aforementionedproblems. Being able to communicate with potential soldiers from the religiouscommunity in Israel through these structures enhances the messages the IDF wouldlike to send. Hearing messages from the IDF through the trusted source of a religiouslearning institution lends credibility to these messages and affords them a religious



aura. Communication also protects religious soldiers from inhospitable unilateralpolicy the military may choose to formulate. Nevertheless, one should note that medi-ating structures in Israel serve the Jewish religious community. Even when non-Jewishminorities are accommodated, their mechanisms are not as powerful.

The American, Indian, and Turkish cases are more complex. First, there is a clearseparation in these countries between the two frameworks of religion and the military.Even during Turkish military coups, boundaries were clearly detectable. In thesecases, mediation and the creation of mediating structures are possible, even if theydo not currently exist. However, when boundaries are integral, since external entities


Iran Israel Turkey India United

States

Conscription/

volunteer

Conscription Conscription Conscription/

volunteer

officer corps

Volunteer Volunteer

Civil–military

boundaries

Permeable Fragmented Integral Integral Integral

Defined

religion

Defined

Shii Muslim

Defined

Jewish

Defined

secular

Undefined (de

facto Hindu)

Undefined

Accommoda-

tion of

practices

and beliefs

Yes

(Shii Islam

only)

Yes

(minority and

majority

religions)

No, unless a

cultural/

national norm

Yes

(majority

and minority

religions)

When possible

(majority and

minority

religions)

Mediation Ideological–

Political

Directorate

(IDP)

Military

chaplains,

strong external

mediating

structures

No Homogenous

units

Military

chaplains,

weak external

meditating

structures

General

attitude toward

religion

Shii Islam

tolerated

Tolerance,

Judaism given

preference

Intolerance in

the public

sphere

Tolerance,

Hinduism

given

preference

Tolerance,

observance

expected to be

discreet

Figure 2Five Models of Religious Accommodation in the Military


cannot “cross over” into the military sphere due to the integrity of the boundaries,they are of little help in defusing military–religious tensions. Internal mediatingmechanisms such as military chaplains are able to deal with these tensions to a certainextent.

In countries with voluntary military service (e.g., the United States after 1973,India, and the Turkish officer corps), the military receives legitimization when settingrules of conduct that contradict religious principles (e.g., blood transfusions forJehovah’s Witnesses in the U.S. military or the Turkish military’s dismissal of officersand NCOs belonging to religious sects). The religious establishment cannot objectto such rules or appeal for change in a volunteer-based military. If and when themilitary makes certain “concessions” to accommodate individual soldiers for religiousreasons, these go beyond the letter of the law. By freely enlisting, individuals under-stand they will have to make compromises that favor the interests of the military,including religious compromises. Although at times the military decides that it is inits own interests to be flexible, it has no real obligation to be so.

When considering these points, it seems that Luckham’s typology of boundariesand the issue of conscription can predict when some form of mediation will or willnot occur. Permeable boundaries do not encourage mediating institutions. Fragmentedboundaries encourage the formation of external mediating structures that have thepotential to meddle in military matters. Integral boundaries rule out the possibility ofstrong external mediating mechanisms but will allow internal ones to a certain extent.

The second variable regarding volunteer versus conscription contributes to ourability to predict the creation of mediating structures to a lesser extent. A volunteer-based military can benefit from mediating structures but is under no real pressure tocreate them. A conscription-based military, where religious soldiers will undoubtedlyserve due to mandatory service, will probably benefit more noticeably from such anarrangement. That said, this variable highlights the fact that a conscription-basedmilitary is far more pressed to deal with soldier–believers than a volunteer force, evenif it chooses to ignore the issue.

Besides these two indicators, the case studies above illustrate there are a numberof additional factors to be considered. The Indian military is relatively considerateof the religious–cultural needs of soldiers from minority populations. In the Indiancase, the primary motivation for this consideration is an attempt to co-opt subgroupsin a highly heterogeneous population. Motivation to take religious sensibilities intoconsideration is not altruistic. Political interests and the desire of the Indian militaryto co-opt ethnic groups motivate concessions to certain groups in society. The pressuresfaced by the military—in this case from the political system, the soldiers, and theneeds of the military itself—cause it to be flexible. The political and social realities,then, compel the military to adopt this approach. These considerations are similar tothe Israeli case in which the wish to include all segments of society in the IDF compelsthe military to accommodate religious soldiers.



Still, the influence of tradition in the Indian military on the structure of homoge-neous units must not be underestimated. In this respect, the situation in the Indianmilitary is mostly a product of inertia after the Raj—the military traditions establishedduring that period persist. The Indian case therefore is a model grounded on self-interest resulting in an unintentional and relatively high level of tolerance for religiousand cultural needs of minorities.

The situation in the United States is also thought provoking. Religious frameworksin the United States do not completely relinquish their ability to influence the military.Even if mediation is conducted according to the dictates of the military (its willingnessto employ chaplains in an official capacity), it seems that religious institutions perceivethe existing possibilities for mediation as “workable” structures. The various religiousestablishments are the authorities that certify chaplains, thus creating a partnershipwith the military framework: the military will only accept a chaplain recognized bya particular denomination. So despite the integral boundaries between the two spheres,cooperation takes place and mediation occurs, if limited.

Some religious minorities succeed in employing additional, nonmilitary means tosupport chaplains and religious soldiers outside the scope of the military. Nevertheless,there are only few instances in which organizations, or even the on-site chaplains,are able to protect their soldiers from religious difficulties during active duty. It is upto the individual soldiers to care for their religious well-being. Soldiers unaware oftheir rights and reticent about demanding them will not be granted any.

In the case of conscription, the relationship between the military and the religiousindividual is completely different, an example being the Turkish system. Uprootingrecruits from their normal lives by enforcing a compulsory service law requires themilitary institution to attend to their needs, including their religious needs. In Turkey,these needs are addressed minimally and on an individual basis only. Religiouselements that are considered cultural in nature apply to the entire armed forces.“External” ritualistic behavior, such as praying or fasting, is allowed to some extent,but never at the expense of the military duties of the soldier. Such behavior on thepart of the military system is problematic. It creates tension in religious soldiers, whohave no choice but to enlist due to conscription, between their religious and militarycommitments. Since Turkey drafts graduates of Imam Hatip schools, it obviouslymust contend with pious Muslim recruits, to say nothing of other minorities. A medi-ating structure could prove helpful in such a situation, and Israel is a case in point.But the attitude in Turkey toward overt religious behavior influences the military’sviews on creation of such structures and draws attention to the differences betweenits armed forces and the situation in the IDF.

The analysis above demonstrates that the criteria of boundaries and conscriptionare not the only ones indicative of what form of mediating mechanism will or willnot be created. It seems that when observing the relationship between the militaryand religion, it is helpful to also examine the history of a specific military and itsgeneral attitude toward religion. This also affects the ability of mediating mechanisms



of any sort to survive. Yet these additional indicators are relatively secondary: ifboundaries are not conducive to mediation, it matters little if the military views religionin a favorable light, as the case of Iran proves.

Interestingly, the above findings agree with Fox and Sandler’s observation thatthe extent to which a state is democratic has no clear influence on attitudes towardethnic–religious minorities.79 While one might assume the more liberal a democracyis the more accommodation it will offer religious minorities in its armed forces, thisdoes not seem to be the case. As they posit, separation of church and state does notguarantee tolerance or accommodation. Both India and the United States are classifiedby Fox and Sandler as democracies. However, as this study shows, the level of religiousaccommodation in the military differs between these two democracies.80

The relationship between religion and the military has yet to be extensivelyresearched. Using the parameters suggested here may assist in further typology andresearch in this field. As religion does not show signs of turning into a relic of thepast, using mediating structures may be increasingly detrimental when attempting toachieve equilibrium between a functioning, government-serving military and freedomof religion for its soldiers.

Notes

1. Ervin Goffman, Asylums: Essays on the Social Situation of Mental Patients and Other Inmates(New York: Doubleday, 1961), chap. 1.

2. Peter L. Berger and Richard John Neuhaus, To Empower People: From State to Civil Society,ed. Michael Novak, 2nd ed. (Washington, DC: AEI Press, 1996), 158.

3. A. R. Luckham, “A Comparative Typology of Civil–Military Relations,” Government and Opposition6, 1 (1971): 5–35.

4. Robert K. Yin, Case Study Research: Design and Methods, 2nd ed. (London: Sage, 1994), 48.5. Ibid., 32–53.6. An example of this dearth of information can be seen in a relatively recent RAND report on Iran’s

security policy. Most of the written sources used in the report to portray the current state of the Iranianarmed forces were written in the 1980s and early 1990s. The majority of the report is based on interviews,as the authors explain. See Daniel Byman, Shahram Chubin, Anoushiravan Ehteshami, and Jerrold D. Green,Iran’s Security Policy in the Post-Revolutionary Era (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2001), 4.

7. Gregory F. Rose, “The Post Revolutionary Purge of Iran’s Armed Forces: A Revisionist Assessment,”Iranian Studies 17, 2–3 (Spring–Summer 1984): 154–55.

8. On the role of Soviet commissars and their relationships with military commanders, the problemof dual loyalty (military and ideological), see Timothy J. Colton, Commissars, Commanders, and CivilianAuthority: The Structure of Soviet Military Politics (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1979):58–68, 70–74. The subject is worthy of future comparative research. Some initial comparisons were madein Kenneth Katzman, The Warriors of Islam: Iran’s Revolutionary Guard (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1993).

9. Sepher Zabih, The Iranian Military in Revolution and War (New York: Routledge, 1988),144–45, 156.

10. Byman et al., Iran’s Security Policy, 25.11. Nader Entessar, “The Military and Politics in the Islamic Republic of Iran,” in Post-Revolutionary

Iran, ed. Hooshang Amirahmadi and Manoucher Parvin (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1988), 56–74.12. As quoted in Zabih, Iranian Military, 136–37.



13. Byman et al., Iran’s Security Policy, 25.14. Zabih, Iranian Military, 147–48.15. See, for example, Nazila Ghanea-Hercock, Ethnic And Religious Groups in the Islamic Republic

of Iran: Paper Submitted to the UN Working Group on Minorities, 9th Session, http://www.ohchr.org/english/issues/minorities/docs/WP2.doc and Hussein D. Hassan, Iran: Ethnic and Religious Minorities, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL34021.pdf.

16. For one such personal account, see Mohammad R. Jahan-Parvar, “I Don’t Know, Therefore It DoesNot Exist!” http://www.iranian.com/BTW/2006/April/Minorities/index.html.

17. Luckham, “Comparative Typology,” 24. For a more detailed discussion of Luckham’s typologyregarding the Israeli case, see Moshe Lissak, “The Civilian Components of the Israeli Defense Doctrine”[in Hebrew], Iyunim beTkumat Israel 1 (1991): 191–210.

18. See, for example, Israeli Supreme Court Case 2383/04, Miloh v. Minister of Defense [in Hebrew];Israeli Supreme Court Case 1380/02, Ben-Artzi v. Minister of Defense [in Hebrew].

19. For the purposes of this article, unless stated otherwise, Jewish religious soldiers addressed originatefrom the Religious-Zionism social group, as opposed to the ultraorthodox segment. Most ultraorthodoxJews do not serve in the Israel Defense Forces, and though the issue of their conscription is interesting, itis beyond the scope of this article.

20. Stuart A. Cohen, The Scroll or the Sword? Dilemmas of Religion and Military Service in Israel(Amsterdam: Harwood, 1997).

21. Because of the scope of this article, the above description is rather oversimplified. For example,the religious establishment does not wholeheartedly endorse women’s conscription. For a more in-depthdiscussion, see Cohen, “The Hesder Yeshivot in Israel: A Church-State Military Arrangement,” Journal ofChurch and State 35, 1 (Winter 1993): 113–30; Cohen, “From Integration to Segregation: The Role ofReligion in the Israel Defense Force,” Armed Forces & Society 25, 3 (Spring 1999), 393–94; and ElishevaRosman-Stollman, “Religion and the Military as Greedy Frameworks: Religious Zionism and the IsraelDefense Forces” [in Hebrew] (PhD diss., Bar Ilan Univ., 2005).

22. But the degree of intervention may vary between programs.23. Netty C. Gross, “A Hilltop Coming-of-Age,” Jerusalem Report (December 2, 2002): 40.24. For a more comprehensive explanation of this idea, see Cohen, The Scroll or the Sword? and

Rosman-Stollman, “Religion and the Military.”25. Interview with Rabbi Menachem Edri, Head of Information Division and Minority Chaplain,

Military Rabbinate of the Israel Defense Forces, March 12, 2006.26. Chief of Staff Order 34.0310, Religious Accommodation for Soldiers of Non-Jewish Minorities

[in Hebrew] (March 2006).27. Interview with Major General Yiftach Ron-Tal, Head of Ground Forces Command, May 2, 2003

and interview with Brigadier General Elazar Stern, Head of the Education Corps, June 23, 2003.28. Luckham, “Comparative Typology,” 22.29. See the official Web site of the U.S. Office of the Chief of Chaplains at http://www.chapnet

.army.mil.30. Israel Drazin and Cecil B. Currey, For God and Country: The History of a Constitutional Challenge

to the Army Chaplaincy (Hoboken, NJ: KTAV, 1995), 13–14.31. Ibid., 4–6, 8; Albert Isaac Slomovitz, The Fighting Rabbis (New York: New York University

Press, 1999), 4.32. Jewish Welfare Board Web site, http://www.jcca.org/JWB.33. Neil Block, The Current State of Jewish Lay Leadership, http://www.jewsingreen.com.34. E. A. S. Bokhari, “Religious Orientation of Muslim Soldiers in the United States Armed Forces,”

Defence Journal (June 1999), http://defencejournal.com/jun99/orientation.htm.35. American Muslim Armed Forces and Veterans Affairs Council Web site, http://www.amafandvac

.org; also see http://www.4law.co.il/Lea275z300.htm.36. Department of Defense Directive (DODD) Number 1300/17, February 3, 1988. Certified current

November 21, 2003.



37. This directive was the result of a Supreme Court petition by an Jewish American soldier regardinghis right to wear a skullcap in the U.S. Air Force. See Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986),http://caselaw.lp. findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?court=us&vol=475&invol=503.

38. “Islam in the US Armed Forces,” Renaissance (February 1999), http://www.renaissance.com.pk.39. Isle Muslims in Military Service Keep Faithful to their Religion, http://www.amafandvac.org and cf.

Serving Allah and America Muslims in the Military Strive to Reconcile Religion, http://www.amafandvac.org.40. See accounts of problems encountered by Jewish soldiers trying to keep kosher while in uniform

as depicted in the Jews in Green forum, http://www.jewsingreen.com/forums/viewtopic.php?t=9. No similaraccounts were found for Muslim soldiers or soldiers of other religions.

41. In 2002, there were a total 507 Jehovah’s Witnesses and 163 Quakers serving in all branches ofthe U.S. military. See tables of official statistics of the U.S. military at http://www.wfial.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=artGeneral.article_6.

42. See an official U.S. military document on medical treatment for Jehovah’s Witnesses at http://www.watchtowerinformationservice.org/milblood.htm.

43. The accusations are detailed in Americans United for the Separation of Church and State, Report ofAmericans United for Separation of Church and State on Religious Coercion and Endorsement of Religiona the United States Air Force Academy, http://www.au.org.

44. See, for example, the 2001 study showing 81 percent of adult Americans identify with a specificreligion. Barry A. Kosmin and Egon Mayer, American Religious Identification Survey (New York: CityUniversity of New York, 2001), http://www.gc.cuny.edu/faculty/research_briefs/aris/aris_index.htm.

45. Luckham, “Comparative Typology,” 28. Luckham notes that the distinction in Turkey betweenthe civilian and military systems forces officers to choose between military and political careers. Ibid.,note 64.

46. Gareth Jenkins, Context and Circumstance: The Turkish Military and Politics, IISS Adelphi Paper337 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2001), 59–60.

47. M. Hakan Yavuz, Islamic Political Identity in Turkey (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2003),21–23 and Ali Carkoglu and Binnaz Toprak, Religion, Society and Politics in Turkey, 2000 (Istanbul,Turkey: TESEV, 2000), English summary, 3, http://www.tesev.org.tr/eng/project/TESEV_search.pdf.

48. See, for example, Asylum Seekers from Turkey: The Dangers They Face—Report of a Mission toTurkey 4-12 October 2000 (London: Asylum Aid, February 2001), 42–48, http://www.asylumaid.org.uk/Publications/turkey%20report.pdf.

49. Interview with A., senior Turkish military source, Tel-Aviv, November 9, 2004. In the same vein,interview with B., Turkish military source, Jerusalem, November 14, 2004.

50. K. (former Turkish soldier), personal correspondence, November 10, 2004. The complete blessingis Tanrimiz hamdolsun, milletimiz var olsun, afiyet olsun (May our God be praised, may our nation existand bon appétit). I thank Ozgul Erdemli for her help with this translation.

51. Jenkins, Context and Circumstance, 23.52. Only graduates of science or military high schools may apply to the officer corps. This policy has

persisted despite attempts by religious parties to abolish it. Yüksel Sezgin, “Can the Israeli Status QuoModel Help Post-February 28 Turkey Solve Its Problems?” Turkish Studies 4, 3 (Autumn 2003): 63–64.

53. Jenkins, Context and Circumstance, 26, 28–29.54. Ibid., 28–29.55. Third Section, Partial Decision as to the Admissibility of Application no. 45824/99 by Ziya Çelikates

and Others against Turkey, http://www.echr.coe.int/ and Third Section, Final Decision as to the Admissibilityof Application no. 45824/99 by Sedat Sen and Others against Turkey, http://www.echr.coe.int/.

56. Ibid.57. As Jenkins speculates. Jenkins, Context and Circumstance, 28–29.58. Interview with A., senior Turkish military source, November 9, 2004.59. Interview with B., Turkish military source, November 14, 2004.60. Interview with A., senior Turkish military source, November 9, 2004.



61. Interview with B., Turkish military source, November 14, 2004. The source mentioned that heworked in the division responsible for supplying food to the Turkish army for many years and that all ofthe meat is purchased from one well-known supplier.

62. Interview with A., senior Turkish military source, November 9, 2004.63. Ibid.64. For example, a former soldier recalled an instance when, during Ramadan, his unit was punished

by being forced to sit in the sun. A soldier who was fasting and suffered considerably was not allowed tomove to the shade. K., personal correspondence, November 10, 2004.

65. Luckham, “Comparative Typology,” 29–30.66. The official Indian Army site, Careers: Requirements http://joinindianarmy.nic.in/otherranks.htm

and Additional Directorate General Recruiting and Publicity, http://indianarmy.nic.in/rtg.doc, see chap.31 and Appendix A.

67. G. Jacobs, “India’s Army,” Asian Defence Journal 9 (September 1985): 16.68. Omar Khalidi, “Ethnic Group Recruitment in the Indian Army: The Contrasting Cases of Sikhs,

Muslims, Gurkhas and Others,” Pacific Affairs 74, 4 (Winter 2001–2002): 540.69. Ibid., 532–35, 544.70. Samina Ahmed, “Civil–Military Relations in India,” Regional Studies 10, 3 (Summer 1992): 29.71. Khalidi, “Ethnic Group Recruitment,” 536.72. When specifically asked if the Indian military employs the services of chaplains of some sort, the

Indian Defense attaché in Israel responded, “No. There are only volunteers or civilians. No official duties areassigned for this purpose.” Indian defense attaché in Tel Aviv, Israel, personal correspondence, June 6, 2005.

73. Official Indian military document, Additional Directorate General Recruiting and Publicity,http://indianarmy.nic.in/rtg.doc, see chap. 30.

74. Indian defense attaché in Tel Aviv, Israel, personal correspondence, June 6, 2005.75. See photos in Pushpindar Singh, “The Indian Army Today: Colour and Firepower,” Asian Defence

Journal 4 (April 1987): 5, 10.76. Indian defense attaché in Israel, personal correspondence, June 6, 2005.77. Khalidi, “Ethnic Group Recruitment,” 546.78. For the battle cries of all regiments, see the unofficial Web site of the Indian military, http://www

.bharat-rakshak.com/LAND-FORCES/Army/Reg-Inf.html.79. Jonathan Fox and Shmuel Sandler, “Regime Types and Discrimination against Ethnoreligious

Minorities: A Cross-Sectional Analysis of the Autocracy-Democracy Continuum,” Political Studies 51(2003): 469–89. However, it is important to note that Fox and Sandler examine only ethnic and ethno-religious minorities, not religious minorities who are not ethnically different from the majority in a givenstate. See http://www.politicalstudies.org/PDF/appendix_51_3.pdf.

80. Again, this may stem from the fact that Fox and Sandler do not examine religious minorities whoare not ethnically different. Ibid.

Elisheva Rosman-Stollman teaches at Bar Ilan University and Ashkelon Academic College in Israel. Shehas published articles in Iyunim beTkumat Israel and Middle Eastern Studies. Address for correspondence:Elisheva Rosman-Stollman, P. O. Box 1555, Efrat, Israel; e-mail: [email protected].



Mediating Structures and the Military: The Case of Religious Soldiers

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