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Contemporary Southeast Asia Vol. 34, No. 2 (2012), pp. 249–73 DOI:10.1355/cs34-2e©2012ISEAS ISSN0129-797Xprint/ISSN1793-284Xelectronic

Andrew Butcher is Director of Policy and Research at the Asia NewZealandFoundation,Wellington.

Students, Soldiers, Sports, Sheep and the Silver-Screen: New Zealand’s Soft Power in ASEAN and Southeast Asia1

andrew butcher

although new Zealand is a small state in the South Pacific, it has a great interest in the stability of Southeast asia, the safety of sea lanes which pass through it and the centrality of aSean in the regional security architecture. however, new Zealand has limited hard power capabilities: the country’s military expenditure is extremely modest and its population and GdP are dwarfed by aSean as a region and by some Southeast asian countries. what new Zealand potentially offers Southeast asia, however, is its soft power. this article identifies five of new Zealand’s soft power assets — students, soldiers, sports, sheep and the silver-screen — and critically examines whether these constitute sufficient resources for new Zealand to engage with Southeast asia adequately, and make a contribution to regional stability.

Keywords: NewZealand, softpower,ASEAN.

Joseph Nye defines soft power as “the ability to get what you wantthrough attraction rather than coercion or payment … [arising] fromtheattractivenessofacountry’sculture,politicalidealsandpolicies”.2InlistingthesocialindicesofAmerica’s“softpower”Nyenotes,inter alia, the following variables: immigration (specifically, the ability toattract immigrants), film and television, and foreign students.3 If wewere to apply those same indices to New Zealand — a country that

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is in almost no way comparable to the United States except that itis an English-speaking democracy — we would note the followingthree factors. First, New Zealand has one of the highest permanentinflows of migrants per capita among countries belonging to theOrganization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).4Second, the New Zealand rate of ten international students per 100personsaged20–24 in2008wassecondonly toAustraliaacross theOECD5 and, within the OECD, New Zealand is the eighth largestrecipient of international students overall.6 Third, New Zealand’sfilm industry isundergoing rapidgrowthand in2011grossedNZ$3billion (US$2.4 billion).7

New Zealand has numerous attributes which might enhanceits soft power efforts in Southeast Asia, but these attributes do notbecomesoftpowerqualitiesorassetsjustbyvirtueoftheirexistence.In an era in which both New Zealand’s military capabilities anddiplomatic presence are being reduced due to budget cuts, softpower becomes all the more important. And it becomes especiallyimportant in Southeast Asia. New Zealand’s economic securityis contingent on the safety of the sea lanes which pass throughSoutheast Asia, and strategically New Zealand relies on a stableregion and a strong ASEAN.

Thisarticle isconcernedwithboth SoutheastAsiaandASEAN.NewZealand’sbilateralrelationshipswithSoutheastAsiancountriespredateitsrelationshipwith(andtheexistenceof)ASEAN.Moreover,New Zealand’s relationships with Southeast Asian countries differfromonecountrytothenext(economically,militarilyandhistorically)and from its engagement with ASEAN as an institution. Both themultilateral/institutional engagement with ASEAN and the bilateralengagement with Southeast Asian countries are important in theirown right. Sometimes this engagement is distinct; other times NewZealandmayuseitsbilateralengagementtoinfluenceitsinstitutionalengagement with ASEAN.

Quantifyingsoftpowerisproblematic.Thenumberofinternationalviewers of the Rugby World Cup and foreign students, the valueof exported goods and services, the impact of the film industry alltell us something about the individual strengths of these particularsoft power assets, but they do not tell us their combined strengthor their long-term effects.

By contrast, quantifying hard power is relatively easier. Thisarticle begins by briefly noting New Zealand’s “small … but strong”hardpowercapabilities.GivenNewZealand’slimitedhardpower,softpower takes on added importance. Soft power can be aspirational,

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expressed inNewZealand’snational anthem;contextual, in relationto New Zealand’s nearest neighbour, Australia; perceived, by NewZealand’s allies in Asia; and cultural, through demographic shiftsand migration to and from Asia. Soft power can be important forparticularcontextsandthefocusinthisarticleisonSoutheastAsia.After a discussion of New Zealand’s engagement with SoutheastAsia, especially economic engagement, this author goes on to arguewhy Southeast Asia is important to New Zealand. The final sectiondiscusses five of the soft power assets that New Zealand possessesand utilizes in its soft power engagement with Southeast Asia,namely students (international education), soldiers (defence ties),sports, sheep (and what they signify in New Zealand’s narrative)and the silver screen (film-making).

Each of these five attributes will draw on different audiences.Sports and the silver screen contribute to a narrative about NewZealand that is aimedatwide appeal:not only rugbyplayerswatchrugby and not only fans of Tolkein watch Lord of the rings. Thosewho were educated in New Zealand under the Colombo Plan areof a certain (and older) generation. Their children’s views of NewZealand will be shaped very differently. Similarly, those who recallfondly New Zealand’s military engagement in Southeast Asia aremore likely to be older members of the elite. It matters less who is drawn to New Zealand’s multifaceted soft power and rathermore how it is used to best effect. The Colombo Plan might havegenerated good experiences of New Zealand for its students but cansoft power really have been said to be effective when one of thosestudents can say “[t]he New Zealand training was wonderful” andyetalso“[f]unninglyenough, Ihaven’tbeenbacktoNewZealand”?8Nostalgia shouldnot be confused for softpower.Yet there are othergraduates of the Colombo Plan, as there are others who watchrugby,thesilver-screen,visitNewZealandandrecognizeitsmilitarycontribution to Southeast Asia, who do respond with somethingmore than epithets and bouquets. Where those others are amongthe elite then New Zealand may find doors open where otherwisethey would be closed. Where those others are the mainstream thenNewZealandcanshapepublic, aswell aselite,opinionabout itselfand its place in the world.

However, data on how New Zealand’s soft power in Asia isreceived ishard tocomeby. Itdoesnot featureatall in theChicagoCouncil of Global Affairs 2008 Multinational Survey,9 or in the PewGlobal Attitudes Project. This might tell us, negatively, that New

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Zealand’s softpower is so soft it is barely felt; or thatNewZealandis so small it is hardly noticed, except by New Zealand’s neighbourAustralia which, according to polling by the Lowy Institute, likes itmuch more than it likes many other countries in Asia.10

Small … but Strong: New Zealand’s “Hard Power”

NewZealand’shardpower,atleastintheformofmilitarycapabilities,is very small indeed. This is illustrated best by the entry for NewZealandin the International Institute forStrategicStudies’2011the Military balance. Comparedtopagesandpagesofdataandnarrativefor most other countries, New Zealand is given just one page. In2011, New Zealand spent a mere $2.14 billion on defence.11 Thesole paragraph devoted to New Zealand’s armed forces has a whiffof “damned with faint praise”.

TheNewZealandDefenceForce (NZDF) is small,but itdrawsonastrongnationalmilitarytradition.NewZealandforceshavebeeninvolved in almost every conflict in which the country’s largerallieshavebeen involvedover the last century, and forces remaindeployedoverseas.Despitefundingshortfallsandcapabilitylossesincluding the withdrawal from service of jet combat aircraft adecadeago, theNZDF is characterisedbyhigh training standards,professionalism and morale. The November 2010 Defence WhitePaperpromisedtomaintainandenhanceexistingcapabilities,andtoprovidesomeadditionalelements(suchasshort-rangemaritimeair patrol). However, there were no promises of any significantincrease to the defence budget.12

In 2011, New Zealand military personnel were deployed in seventheatres (all of which, except Egypt, were under the banner of theUnitedNations):Afghanistan(188aspartoftheInternationalSecurityAssistanceForceandoneobserverwiththeUnitedNationsAssistanceMission in Afghanistan); Egypt (28 as part of the MultinationalForce and Observers, one training unit, one transport unit); Iraq(one observer as part of the United Nations Assistance Mission inIraq); the Middle East, which the Military balance notes separatelybut does not further define (seven observers as part of the UnitedNations Truce Supervision Organization); the Solomon Islands (fivepersonnel as part of Regional Assistance Mission to the SolomonIslands); South Sudan (one personnel and two observers as partof United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan); andTimor-Leste (80 personnel as part of the International StabilisationForce, one infantry company and one observer with the United

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Nations Integrated Missions in Timor-Leste).13 However, as can beseen, these troops were relatively modest in number.

Outsideofmilitaryexpenditure,hardpowertakesonotherforms:thesizeofacountry’spopulationandeconomy,itsnaturalresources,military expenditure, social stability,14 membership of internationalforums and organizations, the global profile of its political leaders,the historical role that a country has played, and so on. Countriesthathaveextensivehardpowerassetscanusethemtoapplycoercivemilitary pressure or as economic leverage.15 New Zealand, however,does not have the military power to threaten other countries norapply economic sanctions, with the possible exception of a smallcountry like Fiji. Indeed, almost by definition, New Zealand has touse soft power to achieve its ends: it is all it has at its disposal.Yet, as explained below, even New Zealand’s hard power, such asit is, may be best understood as a soft power tool.

EconomiclinksmayalsobeconsideredaspartofNewZealand’ssoft power engagement, though clearly they can also form animportantpartofhardpower.Thestrongesteconomiesintheworld,America and China, can use their economic strength as leverage inasserting their interests. However, New Zealand’s economy is byno measure one of the strongest in the world. It is not, and willnever be a member of the Group of 20, is heavily reliant upon itsexternal markets and is highly vulnerable to exogenous economicshocks. New Zealand holds virtually no economic leverage over itsmajor trading partners. Therefore, part of New Zealand’s tighteningand deepening web of relationships with Asia finds form in variousand interlinking free trade agreements (FTAs), including one withAustralia and ASEAN (the Australia and New Zealand Free TradeAgreement or AANZFTA).

AANZFTA has created a free trade area among the twelveeconomies of Australia, New Zealand and the ten ASEAN membersamounting to more than 600 million people with a combined GDPof US$2.7 trillion. Taken together ASEAN and Australia are NewZealand’s most significant trade partners. ASEAN is New Zealand’sfourth most important export destination (behind Australia, theEuropeanUnionandChina),withtwo-waytradeamountingtoUS$10.2billion. In the past five years New Zealand’s exports to ASEAN andAustralia combined have risen by 61 per cent (compared with 33per cent to the rest of the world). Two-way trade with ASEAN andAustralia combined in the past five years has increased by 38 percent and in the past ten years by 62 per cent.16

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New Zealand’s 4.3 million people virtually pales into insig-nificance compared to the 600 million inhabitants of ASEAN. Interms of GDP, New Zealand’s US$138 billion (estimate for 2010) ispaltry compared with ASEAN’s $1.5 trillion. New Zealand’s tradewith ASEAN represented only 0.3 per cent of total ASEAN tradeand its share of the inflow of foreign direct investment to ASEANwasamere0.1per cent.17 Itmaybe fairer to compareNewZealandwith individual countries of ASEAN, but even here New Zealanddoes not stand up well, its GDP exceeding only that of the lessdevelopedASEANcountries suchasCambodia,Laos,MyanmarandVietnam.18 The thinness of New Zealand’s economic engagementwith Southeast Asia is costly. Not only are there untapped marketsbut, strategically, there is a risk that should New Zealand’s heavyeconomic reliance on China run into troubled waters, it will nothave the depth of economic engagement in Southeast Asia requiredto ensure, let alone sustain, its economic growth and security.

By comparison with other countries, as we have seen, NewZealand’s relative GDP means that it is a small economy. But whataboutitssoftpowerappealasaadvancedcapitalistandindustrializedeconomy in its own right? One way we might consider the efficacyof this appeal would be to consider why people migrate to NewZealand.TheLongitudinalImmigrationSurvey:NewZealand(LISNZ)revealsthatthemainreasonsmigrantschooseNewZealandweretherelaxed pace of life or lifestyle (44 per cent), the climate or cleangreen environment (40 per cent) and to provide a better future fortheir children (39 per cent). None of the main reasons for migrantscomingtoNewZealandincludebecauseit isperceivedasawealthycountryorasaplacewheretheythemselvesmightbecomewealthy.19Indeed, it is the images of clean, green and relaxed lifestyle thatare reinforced by some of the soft power attributes noted later inthis article.

“Make Her Praises Heard Afar”

Whilesoftpowercannotbequantifiedinthesamewayashardpower— such as in warships, dollars, or GDP — we may neverthelesssuggest that because of New Zealand’s limited hard power, its softpowerbecomesallthemoreimportant.StephenHoadleyhassuggestedthat New Zealand’s exercise of soft power is expressed in verse inits national anthem [written in 1876]: “make our country good andgreat” and “make her praises heard afar”.20

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New Zealand’s praises would have to be heard far indeed. Aformer British colony, it is approximately 1,600 kilometres fromits nearest neighbour Australia, and has a population of only 4.3million. New Zealand is the 52nd largest economy in the world bynominalGDP,accordingtotheInternationalMonetaryFund,and,bythese measures, is in the company of modest powers such as theUkraine, Kazakhstan, Peru and Kuwait. Like other small countries,New Zealand has a big neighbour it can call on if its security isthreatened.Australiahastheeconomicweightandmilitarycapabilitiesthat New Zealand does not. Despite this very lop-sided asymmetry,economically,andineverysense,NewZealand’sclosestrelationshipis with Australia. Malcolm Cook has argued that no two othercountries in the world have such a close bilateral relationship.21

In an article which is concerned with New Zealand and itsrelationshipwithSoutheastAsiaitmayseemoddtomentionAustraliaat all. But, as Cook has argued, “Australia and New Zealand havelong stood together in theirpost-colonial aspirations for engagementwith (or, for some, more hopefully as part of) Asia”, through amultitude of formal initiatives and informal ties.22 This “standingtogether” is, Cook argues, also perceived externally to Australia andNew Zealand. He notes “many capitals to our [i.e. Australia andNew Zealand’s] north … naturally pair Australia and New Zealandtogether when they consider the two countries’ place in the Asia-Pacific region.”23 Likewise, however, “Australia and New Zealandalso often stand together in mutual consternation on the outsidelooking in on East Asian regional efforts.”24 While New Zealandand Australia can and do engage distinctly and sometimes competewith each other in Southeast Asia, they are not so discrete thatwe can treat one without considering the other. It is not that NewZealand’s soft power is defined, in this context, in opposition toAustralia’s hard power — that would be a simplistic, asymmetricalandunfairbinary.Butif,asCookargues,NewZealandandAustraliaare perceived by their northern neighbours more often togetherthan apart, then we need to treat New Zealand’s engagement in thecontext of Australia’s engagement too.

Forexample,interlocutorsinTrackIItalksbetweenNewZealandand China, which this author participated in, raised the question ofwhetherNewZealandwasalsoexpectingtohostUSmilitarypersonnelin thewaythatAustraliadid, inDarwin.The(diminishing)daylightbetweenNewZealand’sandAustralia’s relationshipwith theUnitedStates is raised in Track II dialogues elsewhere too. New Zealandresponds that it is not an ally of the United States, certainly not

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in the way that Australia is, and therefore should be seen as apartfrom (not together with) Australia in Asia. Whether that argumentis sustainable is of another matter altogether.

New Zealand’s soft power is also recognized by its friendsand allies in Asia. As noted by Yoichiro Sato, Japan recognized“New Zealand’s contribution [to the] ratification and environmentalnorms to the cause of reducing global carbon dioxide emissions.”25Additionally, Sato argues that, depending on how New Zealanduses its soft power, it could be a “persuasive friend” playing aninfluential role in “the making of … international regimes” whichcan “discipline China’s military and economic behavior”.26 Here, atleast on Sato’s assessment, New Zealand has soft power assets thatJapan does not have and that New Zealand can use its soft powerfor Japan’s interests’ vis-à-vis China.

New Zealand’s soft power is also seen as an asset in ASEAN.Daljit Singh has noted that “with its assets of soft power and omni-directional foreign and trade policies, New Zealand has done wellto overcome its handicaps of a small population and geographicalremoteness from Asia”27 and that New Zealand’s strength in softpower belies its small size.28 “New Zealand’s soft power attributes[being multi-ethnic, having excellent governance, strong support ofglobalinstitutionsandtheinternationalruleoflaw,beingprincipledand trustworthy, and adopting a non-confrontational approach tosensitive issues and being a stable and mature democracy]”, Singhasserts, “are seen as clearly adding value to aSean and Southeast asia, like a breath of fresh air to a region still plagued by manysocial, economic and governance problems.”29 Soft power may beless tangible thanhardpower; itmaybemore“walkingsoftly” than“carrying a big stick” but to New Zealand’s regional allies it is aviable and important contribution by New Zealand in its dealingswith Asia.

CulturaltiesbetweenNewZealandandAsiaarealsodeepening.NewZealand’sethnicallyAsianpopulation,atninepercentin2006(the most recent census), is proportionally greater than its Pacificpopulation and is set to equal its indigenous Maori population by2026.30NewZealand’srapidlychangingpopulation—NewZealand’sAsian population was 3 per cent in 1996 and is projected to rise to16 per cent in 2026 — is a significant and important contributor toits soft power. Immigration from Asia to New Zealand grewexponentiallyfrom1986to2006,buthasslowedsincethen.31WithinNew Zealand’s Asian populations, there are a significant number ofChinese (from mainland China and across Southeast Asia), Koreans

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and Indians (historically from Fiji, though an increasing numberfrom India), as well as sizeable populations of Malaysians andFilipinos. For New Zealand, its Asian populations and their linksto their native countries may also be considered as an increasinglyimportant aspect of the country’s soft power. These people-to-people links are evident in various ways: in the 300,000-strongcrowd, of Asians and others, who turn out to celebrate the ChineseNewYearLanternFestivalinNewZealand’slargestcityofAuckland;in the role of New Zealanders in Asia (some of whom are NewZealanders of Asian origin) as aid-workers, teachers and business-people,32 and in the business links between Chinese migrantsto New Zealand and their suppliers, employers and customers inChina.33

The people-to-people links between Southeast Asia and NewZealand form an important part of its soft power engagement withthe region. Robert Didham has estimated that there are between8,000 to 12,000 New Zealanders in Southeast Asia, compared toapproximately 50,000 Australians. In 2006 there were nearly 60,000people born in Southeast Asian countries residing in New Zealandandabout tentimesthatnumber(600,000) inAustralia.Asrecordedin the 2006 census, the majority Southeast Asia-born populationswere from the Philippines (15,282) and Malaysia (14,457).34 DidhamgoesontonotethatthereisasignificantexchangeofpeoplebetweenSoutheast Asia and New Zealand, both those with or without NewZealand citizenship, and at an average net gain by Southeast Asiaof nearly 150 New Zealand-born New Zealand citizens per year.35

New Zealand’s Engagement with Southeast Asia

ThecombinedanddeepeningengagementofNewZealand’scultural,demographic and economic links with Asia provide a platform onwhich to assess New Zealand’s use of soft power in Asia. Thisarticle, however, adopts a narrower focus. The interest here is withNew Zealand’s soft power engagement with Southeast Asia, for thefollowingreasons:first,SoutheastAsiaisgeographicallyandhistoricallycloser to New Zealand than other parts of Asia; second, through itsactive and early participation in the Colombo Plan, New Zealandhelped educate some of Southeast Asia’s elite from the originalASEAN countries, particularly Malaysia, Thailand and Singapore;third,throughtheparticipationofNZDFpersonnelinSoutheastAsia:to Borneo, Singapore and the Philippines during the Second WorldWar; toconflicts inMalaya, through its responsibilitiesasamember

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of the Australia-New Zealand Malaya Area during the “Emergency”,to which New Zealand committed elements of all three services,includingthenewlyformedNewZealandSpecialAirService(SAS);36andreluctantlyandmodestly (in the formofabattalion),during theKonfrontasi ;37 and Vietnam during the Vietnam War (around 3,500New Zealand military personnel served in South Vietnam betweenJune1964andDecember1972);38 fourthbywelcomingrefugeesfromCambodia and Myanmar and large migrant populations from otherSoutheast Asian countries, New Zealand has become a home formany displaced Southeast Asians.

“A Need to be Unsentimental”: The Importance of Southeast Asia to New Zealand

New Zealand’s economic links with Southeast Asia are only part ofits engagement with the region. There are defence and aid ties toSoutheastAsia, andpolitical ties toASEAN, towhichNewZealandhas been a Dialogue Partner since 1975, and through ASEAN’ssubsidiary bodies, including the East Asia Summit (EAS), whichNew Zealand joined in 2005. New Zealand’s various soft powerattributes may be applied to anywhere in the world. So why doesNew Zealand’s soft power in Southeast Asia matter?

As the global centre of gravity shifts from the trans-Atlantic toAsia,NewZealandwillfacestarkchoicesbetweenitshistory(i.e.theUnitedKingdom)and itsgeography (theAsia-Pacific).Economically,New Zealand’s ties with Asia are becoming deeper and thicker, butperhapsalsounbalanced.ItsheavyeconomicrelianceonChina,totheextent that it is now New Zealand’s second largest trading partner,may seem to some observers as an inevitable consequence of theremarkable pulling power of the world’s second largest economy.But New Zealand has suffered once before in relying too heavilyon one market at the expense of others. When the United Kingdommoved its preferential treatment from New Zealand to Europe inthe 1970s, New Zealand’s economy went into shock. Strengtheningeconomic ties is good in and of itself but it also has a largerpurpose.39 Strategic, diplomatic, educational, aid and defence ties,alongside economic engagement, all reinforce each other. There aremuch more than mercantile reasons for New Zealand to strengthenits ties with ASEAN.

We may consider New Zealand’s relationship with SoutheastAsia as comprising three “s’”: soldiers, students and sentiment.New Zealand’s values are demonstrated through the various forms

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of its soft power. On “soldiers”, New Zealand contributed militarypersonneltoAsiaandeducatedsomeofSoutheastAsia’selite(inthecontextof thespectreofCommunism)becauseitheldcertainvalues— about democracy, freedom, the rule of law — to be important.Similarly, New Zealand trades with and encourages tourism fromAsian countries because these represent an important economicvalueofgrowthandprosperity.Ontheformerpoint,NewZealanderRobert Ayson argues that “[i]t is important for New Zealanders notto be shy about the democratic traditions which our own nationalexperience reflects. And we should not for a minute think thatan emphasis on democratic freedoms in foreign policy necessarilyseparates us from our friends and partners in Asia.”40 New Zealandshares democratic values with Japan, Korea, India and Indonesia,though “[t]heir respective variations on this theme [of democracy]are not always completely familiar to us.”41 On “students”, it is theCommonwealthbondthatdrewColomboPlanstudentstoNewZealandand unites the members of the Five Power Defence Arrangements(FPDA,i.e.Australia,Malaysia,NewZealand,SingaporeandtheUK)though neither Malaysia nor Singapore “are hardly poster childrenforthevaluesofawesternliberaldemocracy”.42But,on“sentiment”,Terence O’Brien has warned, “there is a need to be unsentimental.New Zealand is largely a petitioner with ASEAN.”43

ASEAN has deliberately given New Zealand a strategic foot-hold in the region, particularly through its membership of the EastAsia Summit (EAS). In the EAS, New Zealand can sit at the tablewith not only the ASEAN powers but the Great Powers as well.Only twoUSPresidents (Lyndon JohnsonandBillClinton), twoUSSecretaries of State (George Schultz and Hillary Clinton), and oneChinesePresident (Hu Jintao)haveevervisitedNewZealand.Allofthem visited only once, and in the case of Presidents Clinton andHu, their visits were primarily to attend the Asia-Pacific EconomicCooperation Leaders’ Summit in Auckland. ASEAN provides theinvitationcardforNewZealandtomeetthese,andother,leaders,andin a context that arguably is favourable to New Zealand’s interests,and more frequent than bilateral visits might allow.

Theseleaders’levelmeetingsareincreasinglyimportant.China’sgrowing economic influence provides it “with greater latitude toexpanditspoliticalinfluence”,includingin“shapingthedevelopmentof regionalarchitectureand, in theprocess, further[ing] its influence[in ASEAN]”.44 With respect to the regional security architecture,this finds form in China’s preference for the ASEAN Plus Three(APT, where China is one of three extra-regional powers and one of

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thirteenmembers)overEAS(whereChina’s influence isdiminished,numerically at least). These matters are not incidental for NewZealand.ThestabilityofASEANasaninstitution,SoutheastAsiaasa region, the freedomand safetyof its sea lanes, and the economiesof some of New Zealand’s largest trading partners, is crucial forNew Zealand’s national interests. In the EAS, New Zealand is aparticipant, has a voice and makes a contribution, which it wouldnot have, arguably, without either ASEAN centrality in any form ofregional architecture, or in the APT.

New Zealand’s use of its soft power matters because, to a largeextent, that isallNewZealandhas.Several thousandstudentscameto New Zealand under the Colombo Plan.45 It is New Zealand’s softpower, through these students especially, that have cultivated someof the political elite in some Southeast Asian countries, especiallyMalaysia, Thailand and Singapore.46 New Zealand was not the onlycountry to educate Southeast Asians or defend Southeast Asiancountries.YetNewZealandkept its troops inSingapore longer thaneither the Australians or the British, and retains military ties withboth Malaysia and Singapore through the FDPA (as, to be fair, doAustraliaandBritain). Ineducation, thesmall-sizeofNewZealand’spopulation at the time of the Colombo Plan meant that most NewZealand households had some contact with a Southeast Asianstudent.47 And that goodwill counts for a great deal. The numberof students who came to New Zealand under the Colombo Plan,or even as fee-paying foreign students at the same time, might bediminishing innumberand influence,butNewZealand’s reputationwill, for a time at least, outlast them.

Yet is soft power enough? Even if there is a desire for NewZealand to invest in more military hardware or to engage itsmilitary more often and in more places, such a desire is notrealistic given the economic and political climate in Wellington.Constrained economic circumstances require a suite of differenttools and responses. Conventional diplomacy, of course, plays animportant role. However, New Zealand’s formal diplomatic effortsare currently being severely culled through a cost-cutting exerciseand reorientation of its Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade. Butis soft power sufficient to “project” New Zealand’s voice? Does softpowerdeliverforNewZealand’snationalinterests?Doesitsufficientlydemonstrate a willingness to commit to the security of SoutheastAsia, the stability of ASEAN, and the delicate balance required toaccompany a rising China?

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New Zealand’s economic growth through its trade with Asia iscontingentupon the region remainingsafeandsecure.Without landbordersforitsexportstocross,NewZealandisheavilyreliantonthesafety of maritime trade routes. Freedom of navigation and sea lanesecurity are all immovable requirements for New Zealand’s nationalinterest. It is not drawing too long a bow to argue that whateverdisrupts that freedom of navigation, whether territorial disputes,piracy or maritime insecurity generally, threatens those interests.

Ian Storey has described Southeast Asia as “China’s economichinterland”48 and China’s expanding economic influence extendsto New Zealand as well. New Zealand, as with the countries andinstitutions of ASEAN, has to navigate the difficult terrain, andmake difficult choices, with respect to its “longstanding and closesecuritypartnerships”withAustralia,America,BritainandCanada,49alongside its growing economic relationship with China, now NewZealand’s second largest tradingpartner.The terrainonwhich thosechoices are made will include Southeast Asia.

In multiple ways, therefore, New Zealand will need to makedelicatechoicestobalanceChinese,ASEAN,AmericanandAustralianinterests. Bilateral relationships, however, are not that simple, nordetermined along one line only. New Zealand can and does, ofcourse, maintain multiple relationships at once. However, thesemultiple relationships do not run along parallel tracks or fit neatlyinto independent strategies of engagement for each relationship.Indeed,thesemultiplerelationshipsbecomeallthemorecomplexanddifficultwhen therearecompeting interestsandexpectations.Whendecreasing diplomatic resources meet increasingly complex issues— which is the situation New Zealand now faces — then the rolethat soft power can play becomes both important and necessary.

Track II diplomacy may be conceived as another form of softpower and on this New Zealand is strengthening its hand. Forexample, through the Asia New Zealand Foundation, which leadsNew Zealand’s Track II engagement with Asia, there are nowannual Track II dialogues with countries where New Zealand hashad limited influence, including Myanmar, and with establisheddialoguepartnersinAustralia,ASEAN,Vietnam,China,India,Japan,Korea andTaiwan.Track II dialogues expand the conversation, bothin content and in contributors. The role of other non-governmentorganizations, including in Track III, may also become increasinglyimportantasso-callednon-traditionalsecurityissuesbecomeimportantdomestically for Southeast Asian countries and for the region moregenerally.50Inotherwords,“softpower”isnottheexclusiveproperty

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of professional diplomats or defence personnel; its breadth extendsacross multiple tracks of engagement.

ForNewZealand’snationalinterestsandeconomicsustainabilityitiscrucialthatitbothmaintainanddevelopallformsofengagementwith Southeast Asia. To that end, this paper now considers, in turnand briefly, five soft power attributes that New Zealand may bringto its engagement with Southeast Asia: students, soldiers, sports,sheep and the silver screen.

Students

JosephNyehasarguedthatacademicandculturalexchangesbetweentheSovietUnionand theUnitedStatesduring theColdWarplayeda significant role in enhancing America’s soft power.51 Along withdefence ties, New Zealand’s educational ties with the region are thelongestandhistoricallymost resonant inSoutheastAsia.Within theOECD, New Zealand is the eighth largest recipient of internationalstudents, though it has the highest per capita rate of internationalstudentsintheOECDat15internationalstudentsper1,000people.52Education is oneofNewZealand’s topfive export earners.Thevastmajority of overseas students in New Zealand (about 75 per cent)come from Asia.

Under the Colombo Plan, New Zealand first educated Asianstudents from India, Sri Lanka, South Korea, and in Southeast Asiafrom the former British territories (Malaya, Singapore, Sarawak,North Borneo), and Thailand,53 from the Plan’s inception in 1950(the first students arrived in New Zealand in 1951) until the 1980s,when the educational and training work became integrated intoNew Zealand’s bilateral aid programmes.54 The Colombo Plan wasa Commonwealth initiative under which Commonwealth countries(originallyAustralia,Britain,Canada,Ceylon[SriLanka],India,NewZealand and Pakistan)55 educated Asia’s elite as part of a broadersuiteofactivitiesdesignedtostemthetideofcommunismsweepingacross Southeast Asia:

[i]tsWesternfoundersweremotivatedtoadvanceAsiandevelopmentbyfactorsincludingthesuccessoftheMarshallPlaninrebuildingpostwarEurope,growingfearsthatAsiancountriesmightfallvictimonebyonetocommunism,andaconcerntobolsterelitesinnewlyindependent countries that many believed had been ill-preparedto go it alone. The Plan’s Asian founders, not unnaturally, wereconcerned to advance the social and economic development oftheir countrieswithin the context of anewgrouping inwhich all

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memberswouldhaveequalstatus. Initially thePlanwas intendedto last only a few years.”56

The Colombo Plan still exists today as an economic and socialdevelopment programme based in Sri Lanka.57

Educating Southeast Asian students under the Colombo Planhas been, for New Zealand, “the gift that keeps on giving”, as oneof New Zealand’s High Commissioners in the region put it to thisauthor.58 The deep reservoir of goodwill by those who studied inNew Zealand at that time, both as Colombo Plan students and,later, private fee-paying students, is a well that has not yet run dry.AnecdotallyNewZealandhadatonetime,amongitsgraduates,halfof the Malaysian cabinet.

It might be argued that the Colombo Plan is no longer relevantfor New Zealand and its soft power engagement in Southeast Asia.At one level that is true. Those who New Zealand educated duringthe period of the Colombo Plan are now mostly retired. But, theColombo Plan in New Zealand “came to stand, and in popular perception still stands, for a particular collection of attitudes andpractices in international education. … [A]nd a feeling that NewZealand … is benefiting short and long-term from the contacts thatare established … through the presence of Colombo Plan studentsin New Zealand.”59 The Colombo Plan students in New Zealandat this time “were objects of interest, sympathy and curiosity, notof resentment or fear”60 and the nostalgia associated with it inNew Zealand (even if not in other countries that hosted ColomboPlan students) is remarkable, given the first Colombo Plan studentarrived in New Zealand over sixty years ago. Today there is apowerful economic argument in New Zealand’s export educationindustry, which was not present in 1951, but it is these attitudesand perceptions that shape New Zealand’s soft power vision of itsexport education, whether that is based in reality any longer ornot. Indeed, the divergence between the nostalgia and the realitypresentsagreat risk to the long-termeffectivenessof thissoftpowertool for New Zealand.

Fee-paying students from Southeast Asia continue to study inNew Zealand, although not in as high numbers as they used to.In the past decade students from Southeast Asia in New Zealand’stertiary institutions have dropped from almost half to less thanten per cent of the Asian student body in the period 2003–05, butmore recently this rate has reversed slightly with every one in fiveAsian international tertiary students coming from Southeast Asiain 2008.61

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Outside of full-fee paying foreign students, New Zealandcontributes in other ways to education in Southeast Asia, notablythroughtheEnglishLanguageTeachingforOfficials(ELTO)programme,wherebyprogrammeofficialsfromthedevelopingnationsinASEANcometoNewZealandforabriefperiodtolearnEnglish.FundedfromNewZealand’s aidbudget, themotivations for theELTOprogrammeare both similar and different to the Colombo Plan: similar incultivating relationships with potential leaders, different in that itis not done in the hope of stemming the flow of communism.

Soldiers

Softpowercanalsocome inmilitarygarb,as ithasdoneonseveraloccasions in the last sixty years. It continues to find form in theFPDA and in New Zealand’s collaboration with Malaysian andSingaporean troops in Afghanistan; these provide tangible long-termeffects on goodwill on both sides.

NewZealandkept its troops for longer inSingapore thaneitherBritain or Australia and is still an active member of the FPDA. Ithas also had a long-term role in training military personnel fromASEAN countries. The FPDA may be more symbolic than strategicin that it serves more as a “comfort pillow”. However, symbolismcan be strategic too. The FDPA plays a small but important rolein New Zealand’s relationship with Southeast Asia and illustratesthe importance of retaining alliances with specific states besidesmaintaining political relations with a regional institution such asASEAN.TheFPDAalsoconnectsNewZealand’shistoricalengagementwiththeregionwithitscontemporaryconcerns,namelythestabilityof Southeast Asia as a region and the security of its trading routes.New Zealand’s 2010 defence white paper describes the FPDA as“NewZealand’smostsignificantoperationalsecuritylinktoSoutheastAsia … [which] will continue to provide a valuable anchor for thepresence of our defence assets in the region”.62 Regionally it hasbenefits too: the FPDA provides a forum for cooperation betweenMalaysia and Singapore, which might not otherwise happen.

Sports

Arguably New Zealand’s biggest brand is its rugby team, the AllBlacks, and sport in general is a central part of New Zealand’sidentity. Fitness in New Zealand, Charlotte Macdonald argues, wasand is about being “strong, beautiful and modern”.63 New Zealand

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hasagreatbeliefinteams:witnesstheoverwhelmingsupportfortheAll Blacks during the 2011 Rugby World Cup and how that playedinto a patriotic narrative about New Zealand “punching above itsweight” and showing itself off to the world.

Sportalsoplaysanincreasinglyimportantroleintheintegrationof immigrants in New Zealand. In New Zealand, table tennis andbadminton teams have seen an increase in players from Asia. Onetable tennis regional sports organization in Auckland notes that ofits registered players, 90 per cent are Asian, with the bulk fromChina and the rest from South Korea.64 Football (or soccer) in NewZealand has benefited from the arrival of Southeast Asians, whilecricket has benefited from Indian migrants.65 Sports, like religion,crossesethnicboundariesandnationalborders.TheAllBlackshaveplayed in Hong Kong and Japan, and New Zealand sports personshave competed at the Commonwealth Games in Kuala Lumpur.

“Rugby diplomacy” was in action in New Zealand just priorto the start of the Rugby World Cup, when the Foreign Ministerhosted the Pacific Islands’ Forum. The wider potential diplomaticleverageofrugbyisreinforcedwhenonenotesthattheNewZealandForeign Minister is also responsible for the Rugby World Cup andthat during the Rugby World Cup, New Zealand diplomats werediverted from their usual consular tasks abroad to provide supportfor New Zealand’s hosting of the tournament. As this author notedat the time:

In a region [Asia] where military expenditure is increasing, NewZealand could do worse than use the RWC [Rugby World Cup]for its diplomatic efforts. And over the next six weeks and 42matches therewillbe those in the region lookingnotat the rugbyfields but rather at the symbolism: did New Zealand divert itsforeign affairs resources for logistical support only, or becauseit realises there’s a bigger game in town, longer than just a fewweeks, with much higher stakes, and that even if soft power isall New Zealand has got, it knows how to use it. … Diplomacyandrugbyare literallyhand-in-glovethisweek.This issoftpowerin its most “Kiwi” form66

Looking further back, new Zealand herald columnist Tapu Misa,describedhowrugby“hasnever justbeenagameforNewZealand”,andadds“[a]ndthoseofuswhomarchedagainstthe1981SpringbokTour [of New Zealand] (the final match was played at Eden Park30 years ago today) were in no doubt of rugby’s significance tonational identity and pride, here and in apartheid South Africa.”67

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Sheep

One of the most distinguishable “Kiwi” attributes of New Zealandis its sheeppopulation.NewZealandhas40.1millionsheep,whichamounts to 10 sheep per person68 and the New Zealand’s economicengineareitsprimaryindustries(i.e.agriculture,forestry,environmentand natural resources, biosecurity and animal welfare, food safety,fisheries).69Eachcountryhasparticularcharacteristicswithwhich itis associated abroad. These characteristics form part of a narrativeabout a country, or reinforce existing held views. For New Zealand,it may be argued that sheep could be read as a signifier for “cleanand green”, for “100% pure”, for “easy lifestyle”; recall the reasonsnotedearlierastowhymigrantschoosetoliveinNewZealand.Takethose attributes further and particular political positions come intoview, including New Zealand’s anti-nuclear stance or commitmentto addressingclimatechange, for example.ThenarrativeaboutNewZealand and its soft power thus becomes internally coherent andconsistent. This narrative then shapes expectations — recall furtherthe comments about New Zealand’s soft power vis-à-vis Japan andASEAN, noted earlier — and become somewhat self-fulfilling.

Sheeparemore than justasignifier: theycontribute inmultipleways to New Zealand’s economy, including through tourism.Genuinely, many visitors who come to New Zealand expect to seesheep. Tourism to New Zealand is increasing from across Asia. In2008, China overtook Japan to become New Zealand’s fourth largesttouristmarket70andisprojectedtoovertaketheBritishandAmericanmarkets in spending by mid-2012 and in tourist numbers by 2014.71Tourism is a central plank of New Zealand’s economic success, andincreasingly so as that success is tied to Asian markets.

AstheSoutheastAsianeconomiesgrow,sodoestheexpectationthat these economies will provide an increasing number of touriststo New Zealand. Concomitant with this is the ambition for greaterandbetterconnectivity;increasingdirectflightsfromNewZealandtoSoutheast Asia is one feature of this ambition (to that end, GarudaAirlines will resume direct flights from Jakarta to Auckland in late2012).There is potential traffic the other way as well. New Zealandis increasingly used as a gateway to and from Southeast Asia andLatin America. Of all these indices, tourism rests most on howNew Zealand projects itself to the world, but it also depends onexogenous factors outside New Zealand’s control. Budget airline AirAsia had a short-lived presence in New Zealand, but the combinedfactorsofthe2011Christchurchearthquake(coinciding,unfortunately,

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with Air Asia’s initial offerings in New Zealand), the airline’s owneconomic troubles, and the global economic crisis, meant that itdid not last.

“Connectivity”, to use the current vernacular, reinforces otheraspects of New Zealand’s soft power: it eases travel for migrants,students and tourists from Asia to New Zealand, and opens uproutes the other way for more New Zealanders to see, experienceanddobusiness inAsia.Sheepareanattraction for tourists toNewZealand; what they signify is an attraction for those who see NewZealand’s soft power as an important asset in Southeast Asia.

RobertAysonargues“Formanyyearswehavebeenencouragedto think first and foremost about New Zealand’s interests in aneven deeper economic interaction with Asia. … [T]hese materialinterests upon which a good part of New Zealand’s economicwellbeing appears to rest”,72 dominate New Zealand’s approach toAsia generally and say something about the value placed upon, andsought from, New Zealand’s bilateral and multilateral relationshipswithAsiancountries. Indeed,NewZealand’stourism,educationandfilm-making industries are set within an understanding of economicgrowth. The growth of tourists from Asia to New Zealand is notjust good for New Zealand’s tourism industry; it is good for NewZealand’seconomy. It isnot incidental therefore thatNewZealand’sPrime Minister is also the Minister for Tourism.

The Silver-Screen

Tourism is New Zealand’s largest export earner and generates 10per cent of the country’s GDP. Latterly, that has been reinforced bythe success of New Zealand’s film industry. The silver-screen is themostrecenttoolinNewZealand’ssoft-powerarmoury.FilmsbyNewZealand directors and filmed in New Zealand, including the Pianoandthe Lord of the rings trilogyhave reinforced the“clean,green”image of New Zealand and generated tourism campaigns of theirown. New Zealand projects itself, literally, onto the silver-screen.Film is not only used as a tourism tool in Asia and elsewhere intheworld.NewZealandalsohascollaborations in thefilmindustry,withSingaporeandSouthKorea,andanincreasingnumberofIndianfilms are being produced in New Zealand.

The economic significance of the film industry in New Zealandincreasedsignificantlyinthe1990sandreputedlygeneratedNZ$500million($394million)inforeignexchangeinthe1999–2000financialyear,whichwasadramaticincreasefromNZ$86million($68million)

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in 1995.73 The New Zealand screen industry recorded gross revenueofNZ$2.7billion($2.1billion)inthe2009financialyearmakingthevalue of this industry comparable to the forestry and logging andhorticulture sectors.74 This has increased. In 2011, the film industryhad gross revenue of NZ$3 billion ($2.4 billion).75

Recalling Nye’s recognition that the film industry is an aspectof soft power for the United States, we may conceive of the filmindustry in New Zealand in the same terms. The tourism effects ofthe Lord of the rings were more about tourists experiencing the“clean and green” New Zealand than visiting a filmset. In that way,the silver-screen, as with sheep, is an important signifier of a widernarrative about who New Zealand is and what it stands for.

Conclusion

The narrative New Zealand presents to the world about what itstands for — articulated through tourism campaigns, films, or theexperiences of students and soldiers and sports tournaments — isone that it uses to great effect. It positions New Zealand as a niceplace to visit and projects New Zealanders as people who “punchabove their weight” in what they contribute to the world.76

Thesevarioussoftpowerattributes—students, soldiers, sports,sheepandthesilver-screen—provideasuiteoftoolsatNewZealand’sdisposal, with which it can project its voice,77 advance its interests,and through which it can make its “praises heard afar”. Sometimes,however, this soft power can border on the sentimental and thenostalgic. Sentimentality is, however, no substitute for strategy.

This paper has focused on Southeast Asia and ASEAN as theforums in which New Zealand’s soft power may be viewed. Thesevarious soft power links to Southeast Asia are both historic — theColombo Plan, the various military contributions, the FPDA — andcontemporary, throughlinksintradeandtourism.NewZealandalsohas links to ASEAN — as a Dialogue Partner, a member of the EASand,withAustralia,partytotheAANZFTA.NewZealand’sengagementwith Southeast Asia and ASEAN is “both/and” not “either/or”;the bilateral relationships are as important as the multilateral andsometimes the distinction between the two is blurred. Furthermore,New Zealand’s soft power assets in Southeast Asia may also playa wider role: in contributing to a secure region, a stable ASEAN,and to issues of regional concern and security.

Hard power is easier to quantify than soft power, and NewZealand’smilitaryandeconomic“hardpower”is“small…butstrong”andmodest.Itisnotonlyasmalleconomywithlowmilitaryexpen-

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diture;itisalsoacountrythatisfavouredbyitsmigrantsbecauseofits clean, green, relaxed image. New Zealand’s soft power attributesreinforce this narrative. Some of New Zealand’s Asian neighboursrecognize elements of this soft power, though only Australia, seem-ingly, surveys its public to see whether this admiration for NewZealand extends beyond some of Asia’s elites. Indeed, it is theseelites who might have more reason to favour New Zealand’s softpower credentials, as they were the ones who were Colombo Planstudents,orstilladmireNewZealand’slongmilitarycontributionstothe region. And where the views of elites matter, and where thoseelites can thus turn these soft power credentials to tangible benefitto New Zealand, then that is all to New Zealand’s favour.

ButtheoutcomeofNewZealand’ssoftpower,whilenotincidental,is not central either. These various soft power tools provide acontext forNewZealand’sengagementwithSoutheastAsia.Withoutextensive military hardware or economic might, New Zealand reliesheavily on the views of its past and current graduates, its militarylinks, its self-portraits through tourism and film, and its economiclinks through trade. It both sings its own praises afar, and relies onothers to join in the chorus. Arguably, Southeast Asia and ASEANare more important to New Zealand than New Zealand is to them,but through students, soldiers, sports, sheep and the silver-screenNew Zealand seeks to show that it might be small and far awaybut that it still projects power, albeit softly.

NOTES1 An earlier version of this paper was presented as a seminar in Singapore on

24 October 2010 at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies where the authorwas a Visiting Fellow. The author is grateful for the feedback provided at thatseminarandforcommentsbyIanStorey,RichardGrantandthetwoanonymousreviewers on an earlier version of this paper.

2 Joseph Nye, Soft Power: the Means to Success in world Politics (New York:Public Affairs, 2004), p. x.

3 Ibid., p. 33.4 Department of Labour, Migration trends and Outlook 2010–2011 (Wellington:

DepartmentofLabour,2011),p.8,<http://www.dol.govt.nz/publications/research/migration-trends-1011/migration-trends-1011.pdf>.

5 Ibid., p. 12.6 Department of Labour, Life after Study: International Students’ Settlement

experiences in new Zealand (Wellington: Department of Labour, 2010), p. viii,<http://www.dol.govt.nz/publications/research/life-after-study/life-after-study.pdf>.

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270 andrew butcher

7 Statistics New Zealand, “Film Lights Up Screen Industry in 2011”, Mediarelease,2April2011,<http://www.stats.govt.nz/browse_for_stats/industry_sectors/film_and_television/ScreenIndustrySurvey_MR10-11.aspx>.

8 Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, the colombo Plan at 50 (Wellington:Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2001), p. 14.

9 Christopher Whitney and David Shambaugh, Soft Power in asia: results of a 2008 Multinational Survey of Public Opinion (Chicago:TheChicagoCouncilonGlobalAffairsandtheEastAsiaInstitute,2009),<http://www.thechicagocouncil.org/UserFiles/File/POS_Topline%20Reports/Asia%20Soft%20Power%202008/Soft%20Power%202008_full%20report.pdf>.

10 FergusHanson,the Lowy Institute Poll: australia and new Zealand in the world, Public Opinion and Foreign Policy (Sydney:TheLowyInstituteforInternationalPolicy,2012),p.3,<http://lowyinstitute.cachefly.net/files/lowy_poll_2012_web3.pdf>.

11 International Institute forStrategicStudies,the Military balance 2012 (London:International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2012), p. 270.

12 Ibid., p. 270.13 Ibid., p. 271.14 Nye, Soft Power, op. cit., p. 3.15 Ibid., p. 5.16 I am grateful to Vangelis Vitalis for providing these data.17 Singh, aSean’s Perspective of new Zealand’s Place in asia, op. cit., p. 6.18 Ibid. New Zealand also has a higher GDP than Brunei, but Brunei’s per-capita

GDP, which may be a more accurate reflection of economic strength, is higherthan all ASEAN countries except Singapore.

19 DepartmentofLabour,Motives and Processes of Migration (Wellington:Departmentof Labour, 2009), <http://dol.govt.nz/research/migration/lisnz/ff/DOL10705-19-LisNZ-FastFacts-4-Migration-Motives.pdf>.

20 Stephen Hoadley, “From Defence to Security: New Zealand’s Hard Power,Soft Power and Smart Power”, new Zealand International review 32, no. 5(September–October 2007): 18–21.

21 Malcolm Cook, Standing together in Single File: australia’s Views of new Zealand in asia (Wellington: Asia New Zealand Foundation, 2010), p. 4,<http://www.asianz.org.nz/sites/asianz.org.nz/files/AsiaNZ_Outlook_13_June.pdf>.

22 Ibid., p. 1.23 Ibid., p. 2.24 Ibid.25 Yoichiro Sato, Lining up a Persuasive Friend: Japan’s expectations of how

new Zealand can contribute to asian Security (Wellington: Asia New ZealandFoundation, 2011), p. 2, <http://www.asianz.org.nz/sites/asianz.org.nz/files/Asia_NZ_Outlook_16.pdf>.

26 Ibid., p. 1.

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27 Daljit Singh, aSean’s Perspective of new Zealand’s Place in asia (Wellington:AsiaNewZealandFoundation,2011),p.1,<http://www.asianz.org.nz/sites/asianz.org.nz/files/Outlook_Asean%27s_perspective_of_NZ%27s_place.pdf>.

28 Ibid., p. 6.29 Ibid., p. 17, my emphasis.30 Richard Bedford and Elsie Ho, asians in new Zealand: Implications of a

changing demography (Wellington:AsiaNewZealandFoundation,2008),p.11,<http://www.asianz.org.nz/sites/asianz.org.nz/files/AsiaNZ%20Outlook%207.pdf>.

31 Ibid., p. 11.32 Alan Gamlen, engaging asia: the role of the diaspora (Wellington: Asia New

Zealand Foundation, 2011), <http://www.asianz.org.nz/sites/asianz.org.nz/files/Asia%20NZ%20Outlook%2015.pdf>.

33 Paul Spoonley and Carina Meares, chinese businesses and the transformation of auckland (Wellington: Asia New Zealand Foundation, 2009), <http://www.asianz.org.nz/sites/asianz.org.nz/files/Asia%20NZ%20Chinese%20Businesses.pdf>.

34 Robert Didham, Intersections: Southeast asia and diaspora engagement (Wellington:AsiaNewZealandFoundation,2009),p.5,<http://www.asianz.org.nz/sites/asianz.org.nz/files/11490%20AsiaNZ%20Outlook%2011%20web2.pdf>.

35 ItisimportanttonotethatasNewZealandallowsdualcitizenship,somepeopletravelling between Southeast Asia and New Zealand may be using anotherpassportandthatothersmaybecitizensbyvirtueofbeingborninNewZealandregardless of their parents’ citizenship or residency status (as was the case forthose born in New Zealand prior to 1 January 2006).

36 For further detail on New Zealand’s full contribution to the Emergency, seeMark Rolls, “Growing Apart: New Zealand and Malaysia”, in Southeast asia and new Zealand: a history of regional and bilateral relations, edited byAnthony Smith (Wellington: Victoria University of Wellington Press, 2005), p.212.

37 For details on New Zealand’s contribution during the Konfrontasi, see Rolls,“Growing Apart”, op. cit., pp. 216–18.

38 NewZealandand theVietnamWar,new Zealand history Online, <http://www.nzhistory.net.nz/war/vietnam-war> .

39 RobertAyson, “Australia-NewZealand”, inaustralia as a asia-Pacific regional Power: Friendship in Flux?,editedbyBrendanTaylor (Oxford:Routledge,2007),p. 129.

40 Robert Ayson, “Interests, Values and New Zealand’s Engagement with Asia”,Inaugural Professorial Lecture, Victoria University of Wellington, 19 July 2011,<http://www.victoria.ac.nz/css/docs/Current%20Work/2011/Inaugural%20Lecture%2019.07.11.pdf>, p. 5.

41 Ibid.42 Ibid., p. 6.43 Terence O’Brien, new Zealand and aSean: current and Future Outlook

(Wellington:InstituteofPolicyStudies,VictoriaUniversityofWellington,1995),p. 6.

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44 Ian Storey, Southeast asia and the rise of china: the Search for Security (Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2011), p. 64.

45 The precise number is unknown because the records are lost.46 See Nicholas Tarling, International Students in new Zealand: the Making of

Policy Since 1950 (Auckland: New Zealand Asia Institute, 2004); Ministry ofForeign Affairs and Trade, the colombo Plan at 50 (Wellington: Ministry ofForeign Affairs and Trade, 2001).

47 See Tarling, International Students in new Zealand, op. cit.48 Storey, Southeast asia and the rise of china, op. cit. p. 5.49 Ministry of Defence, new Zealand defence white Paper (Wellington: Ministry

ofDefence,2010),p.18,<http://www.defence.govt.nz/pdfs/defence-review-2009-defence-white-paper-final.pdf>.

50 See Amitav Acharya, constructing a Security community in Southeast asia: aSean and the Problem of regional Order, 2nd ed. (New York: Routledge,2009), pp. 273–75.

51 Joseph Nye, “Soft Power and Higher Education”, 2005, p. 12, <http://net.educause.edu/ir/library/pdf/FFP0502S.pdf>.

52 Department of Labour, Life after Study, op. cit., p. viii.53 Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, the colombo Plan at 50, op. cit.,

pp. 9–10.54 HelenClark,“Foreword”,inMinistryofForeignAffairsandTrade,the colombo

Plan at 50, op. cit., p. 1.55 Subsequently the Plan expanded to include Southeast Asia in its focus and

membership grew to include, in 1951 South Vietnam (the unified Vietnamwithdrew in 1978), Cambodia, Laos, the United States; in 1952, Burma andNepal; in 1953, Indonesia; in 1954, Japan, the Philippines and Thailand; in1957, Malaya; in 1962, South Korea and Bhutan; in 1963, Afghanistan andthe Maldives; in 1966, Iran and Singapore; in 1972, Fiji; in 1973, Papua NewGuinea; and in 1998, Mongolia. See Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, the colombo Plan at 50, p. 5.

56 Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, the colombo Plan at 50, op. cit., p. 5.57 Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, the colombo Plan at 50, op. cit., p. 5.58 Interview with New Zealand’s High Commissioner to Malaysia, His Excellency

David Pine, Kuala Lumpur, September 2011.59 Tarling, International Students, op. cit., p. 9, my emphasis.60 Ibid., p. 13.61 Didham, Intersections: Southeast asia and diaspora engagement, op. cit.,

p. 10.62 Ministry of Defence, defence white Paper 2010, op. cit., p. 30.63 CharlotteMacdonald,Strong, beautiful and Modern: national Fitness in britain,

new Zealand, australia and canada (Wellington:BridgetWilliamsBooks,2011),p. 10.

64 Paul Spoonley and Catherine Taiapa, Sport and cultural diversity: responding to the Sports and Leisure needs of Immigrants and ethnic Minorities in

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auckland: a report for the auckland regional Physical activity and Sport Strategy (Auckland: Massey University, 2009), p. 27.

65 Ibid., p. 28.66 Andrew Butcher, “Rugby Diplomacy”, the Interpreter: the weblog of the Lowy

Institute for International Policy,9September2011,<http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2011/09/09/Rugby-diplomacy.aspx>.

67 Tapu Misa, “Rugby — a sport with power to ignite and unite”, new Zealand herald, 12 September 2011, <http://www.nzherald.co.nz/opinion/news/article.cfm?c_id=466&objectid=10751077>.

68 StatisticsNewZealand,“Myth8:NewZealandhas3millionpeopleand60millionsheep”, 7 May 2007, <http://population.govt.nz/myth-busters/myth-8.aspx>.

69 For more see the website of New Zealand’s newly formed Ministry of PrimaryIndustries <www.mpi.govt.nz>.

70 Tourism New Zealand, “China: Market Overview”, 2011, <http://www.tourismnewzealand.com/markets-and-stats/north-asia/china/>.

71 MinistryofEconomicDevelopment, “ChineseTouristsMoreValuable thanUSAandUKOverNextFiveYears”(Wellington:MinistryofEconomicDevelopment,2011),<http://www.med.govt.nz/sectors-industries/tourism/news/chinese-tourists-more-valuable-than-usa-and-uk-over-next-five-years>.

72 Robert Ayson, “Interests, Values and New Zealand’s Engagement with Asia”,Inaugural Professorial Lecture, Victoria University of Wellington, 19 July 2011,<http://www.victoria.ac.nz/css/docs/Current%20Work/2011/Inaugural%20Lecture%2019.07.11.pdf>, p. 2.

73 W.GlenCroy,the Lord of the rings, new Zealand and tourism: Image building with Film, Department of Management Working Paper Series, 10/04, MonashUniversity, 2004, <http://www.linkbc.ca/torc/downs1/LordoftheRingsReport.pdf>.

74 The New Zealand Treasury, new Zealand economic and Financial Overview 2010 (Wellington: The Treasury, 2010), p. 27, <http://www.treasury.govt.nz/economy/overview/2010/>.

75 Statistics New Zealand, “Screen Industry Survey 2010/11 Media Release”, 2April2012,<http://www.stats.govt.nz/browse_for_stats/industry_sectors/film_and_television/ScreenIndustrySurvey_MR10-11.aspx>.

76 Malcolm Cook in Standing together, op. cit., p. 5 notes that this phrase“punching above its weight” is not unique to New Zealand. In Australia it is“the most hackneyed and oft-used expression … to describe our foreign policyand our broader engagement with the world.”

77 CSCAP New Zealand, “Projecting Our Voice — Major Power Relationships inAsia, the Responses of Regional Organisations and the Implications for NewZealand: The Report of a Study by CSCAP-New Zealand” (Wellington: Centrefor Strategic Studies, Victoria University of Wellington, 2011), <http://www.victoria.ac.nz/css/docs/CSCAP%20national%20study/CSCAP%20National%20Study%20Sep%202011.pdf>.

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