MANAGEMENT, TRANSIENCE AND SUBCONTRACTING: THE CASE OF THE CONSTRUCTION SITE

Journal of Managemen& Studies 25:6 November 1988 0022-2380 $3.50

MANAGEMENT, TRANSIENCE AND SUBCONTRACTING: T H E CASE OF T H E CONSTRUCTION SITE

A. D. BEARDSWORTH E. T . KEIL M . BRESNEN A. BRYMAN

Department of Social Sciences, Loughborough University

INTRODUCTION

This article takes as its central focus the set of constraints, tensions and ambiguities which cluster around the process of site management in the construction industry. This industry is of particular interest in that it provides a striking example of a productive process which relies heavily on subcontracting as a key organizational and commercial device.

The centrality of subcontracting, it will be argued, plus certain other crucial characteristic features of construction activity, produce a setting which appears to generate special problems for management, problems which invite further analysis. In order to cast light upon such issues the role of the site manager will be examined, a role which occupies a pivotal position in the construction process. Drawing upon interview data obtained from a sample of site managers, an attempt will be made to analyse the managerial and organizational demands made upon this occupational group. Additional qualitative material concerning the role of the site manager, obtained from interviews with contracts managers (who are responsible for overseeing a number of construction sites) will also be presented.

This task cannot be undertaken, however, without an initial outline of the significance of subcontracting in the historical development of managerial control over the labour process, and some discussion of the reasons for the presence of subcontracting in certain sectors of the contemporary economy. In addition, reference will also have to be made to some of the special features of construction work which arise out of specific technical, spatial and temporal constraints.

The argument, therefore, will need to proceed through historical, inter- organizational and organizational levels of analysis before settling at the level of the individual site manager.

Address for reprints: A. D. Beardsworth, Department of Social Sciences, Loughborough University, Loughborough, Leicestershire, LE11 3TU, UK.

604 A. D. BEARDSWORTH, E. T. KEIL, M. BRESNEN, A. BRYMAN

SUBCONTRACTING AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE MANAGERIAL CONTROL OF THE PRODUCTIVE PROCESS

The concept of a specific group termed management, and charged with the specialized function of the exercise of planning and control within work organizations is, of course, of relatively recent origin. In the case of such organizations, it is not to be assumed that the control of the workforce by management is simply a technical requirement of the production process. It can also be seen as an aspect of the wider network of social relations centred upon that process (Hyman, 1980,

The conventional image of the organization of work before industrialization is a very familiar one: production units are seen as having been relatively small, technology as essentially of a craft-based type, with quality or precision produced with relatively simple tools and with relatively large inputs of skill. Hence, craft workers, at least, would be seen as having enjoyed relatively high levels of autonomy and control over many aspects of the labour process. The social relationships between such workers and those directing productive activities would tend to be of a direct, face-to-face kind, and possibly supported by ties other than purely economic or contractual ones. Thus, the type of control exercised would be of a relatively straightforward and personal nature.[’]

At an early stage in the process of industrialization in Britain, for example, we can note the emerging importance of the so-called ‘putting out’ system. Under this system work tasks were subdivided (sometimes minutely) and raw materials or partly finished products were distributed to and collected from workers based in their own homes. The logic of breaking down work tasks into small components is clear, in that it tends to reduce skill levels and in turn to lower labour costs. In addition, as Marglin (1980) points out, the putting out system effectively reduced the worker’s control over the product, placing this more into the hands of the capitalist entrepreneur who acted as focal point and organizer. However, Marglin also notes that in these circumstances the worker retains a considerable degree of control over certain aspects of the labour process, for example, the specific way in which a given task is carried out, the pace of work and the level

In a sense, as Braveman (1974) has suggested, putting out (or, more generally, the use of subcontracting) represents a preference on the part of the entrepreneur for the purchase of labour already embodied in a product. In this way the entrepreneur avoids taking on responsibility for the supervision and motivation of the workforce. However, this strategy can have serious limitations, as Braverman indicates. Production may be slow and irregular, and the product itself may lack uniformity and be of unpredictable quality. What is more, the movement and processing of raw materials may be difficult to monitor, and such materials susceptible to pilferage and embezzlement. Thus, Marglin (1980, p. 245) quotes contemporary expressions of dismay at the indiscipline and laziness of the eighteenth century ‘labouring classes’, although he notes that what was seen as ‘laziness’ by the entrepreneur represented perfectly rational behaviour on the part of the worker, who might choose to consume more leisure (for example, when wages rose).

pp. 311-12).

of output.

MANAGEMENT, TRANSIENCE AND SUBCONTRACTING 605

In addition, Pollard (1968) argues that the rapidly increasing scale and complexity of industrial and commercial activities as industrialization proceeded, went more and more beyond the organizational capacities of individual entrepreneurs, or even partnerships, located at the centre of networks of subcontracting or putting out. What was needed were techniques to ‘. . . manage large units within a competitive progressive environment and within a framework of economic motivation. . .’ (Pollard, 1968, p. 24). Thus Braverman, for example, sees subcontracting as an essentially transitional form, a situation where the entrepreneur had not yet assumed full control over the labour process, that is, had not yet assumed the role of management.

Interestingly, Littler (1982), while critical of Braverman’s analysis of the labour process, retains the notion that forms of work organization like subcontracting are characteristic of the initial phases of capitalist development. Similarly, Gordon, Edwards and Reich (1982, pp. 91-2) see such systems as ‘inside contracting’, where labour contractors worked within a particular company by hiring their own labourers in return for a premium on the contracted work, as symptomatic of what they term the ‘initial proletarianization of the workforce’ (a process which they locate between the early 1820s and the mid 1890s for the USA).

Authors like Littler (1982) and Gordon et al. (1982) devote a considerable amount of attention to the analysis of the development of forms of managerial control over the labour process, and see the looser relationships between employer and employee embodied in subcontracting as early forms which were eventually superseded. A similar perspective is adopted by Hill (1981) , and in earlier work Hobsbawm (1964) also characterized subcontract systems as features typical of the early stages of capitalism, referring to the phenomenon of ‘co-exploitation’ in which some members of what he termed the ‘labour aristocracy’ acted as co- employers of their workmates.

Bradley (1983), in reviewing the work of Littler and Gordon et al., is somewhat sceptical about the value of trying to compose categorizations of managerial control strategies in terms of a hypothesized historical progression. However, she also sees subcontracting as ‘. . . in the long term ambiguous for capital, leading in all cases to its eventual demise’ (Bradley, 1983, p. 505). This ambiguity, she suggests, arises out of the fact that in such circumstances employers must devolve a significant degree of control to agents who can themselves be seen as close to labour.

Pollard (1968, p. 34) suggests that the specialization already built into the putting out system provided the basis for the further concentration and intensification of productive processes by way of the factory system. In addition, Marglin (1980) stresses the point that the marshalling of the manufacturing workforce into factories cannot be seen solely as the result of technological factors (for example the need to concentrate increasingly large and complex machines). Indeed, he provides examples of factory organization without complex machinery (Marglin, 1980, pp. 238-9), and argues that the crucial importance of the factory system was that it enabled employers to extend the degree of supervision and discipline they could exercise over their workforce.[*] In the factory the worker’s control of the pace and processes of work was greatly reduced. Despite considerable resistance (e.g. in weaving), the putting out system had largely


disappeared by the mid-nineteenth century as the factory system gradually extended its coverage of manufacturing industry.

In this sense, the technological innovations associated with industrialization are seen as devices which, in a suitable organizational context, can greatly enhance the employer’s command of the labour process. Technical efficiency and reduced costs are not seen as the sole basis for such innovations. As Hill (1981) reminds us, choices made by management between various technological options will be influenced, to some extent, in the direction of those options which facilitate the extension of control.

Certainly, one of the best known and most radical forms of work re-organization in order to extend managerial control of the labour process is the approach termed ‘scientific management’ by its originator Frederick Taylor. Taylor’s principles are by now very familiar ones: work tasks are to be broken down into their simplest component elements, and these elements distributed among a relatively unskilled workforce (Taylor, 191 1). In addition, the actual manner in which these elements are to be performed is specified by management on the basis of the findings of work study techniques.

Braverman (1974, pp. 124-31) sees in Taylorism the ultimate expression of the idea of management as a function which concentrates in its own hands control of design, planning and work organization and co-ordination. The workforce itself is seen as having little involvement in such areas, experiencing for the most part a process of deskilling. Thus, as well as gathering the workforce into factories, dictating the pattern of hours worked and leisure consumed and enforcing close supervision, the prerogative of modern management is also seen as including the control of the productive process itself, in all its detail.

Braverman’s view of Taylorism as a pervasive, if currently unacknowledged, element in modern management is a highly controversial one. Of course, Braverman’s position has been subjected to a considerable amount of criticism, with its alleged idealization of craft work, and its neglect of phenomena like workforce resistance, and of the processes whereby the legitimation of managerial control is created and maintained (Thompson, 1983, pp. 95-100). In addition, Braverman appears to pay relatively little attention to the crucial issue of the ways in which management may seek to motivate its workforce.[3]

Significantly, however, Braverman does admit that deskilling and the extension of managerial control are likely to occur very unevenly, varying considerably from industry to industry, and in some instances having a very limited applic- ability. Indeed Pollard argues that devices like subcontracting cannot be seen simply as a stage in the evolution of industrialism, a stage eventually superseded by more ‘advanced’ forms. Rather he argues that subcontracting and related practices may remain significant options in some circumstances (Pollard, 1968, pp. 38-9, p. 47). Certainly, such forms persisted until relatively recently in such industries as coal mining (Goffee, 1981; Taylor, 1960) and the ports (Wilson, 1972), and still occur widely in areas like publishing (Powell, 1985, pp. 9-10), cleaning services (Bernstein, 1986), and construction (Leopold and Leonard, 1983).

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SUBCONTRACTING IN THE CONTEMPORARY ECONOMY

Clearly, the continuing presence of subcontracting as a key organizational form in a number of areas of economic activity demands some explanation. Certainly one crucial factor is the degree of flexibility in response to uncertainty this form permits in many different types of work organization.

Friedman (1977, pp. 118-29) points out the flexibility provided by subcontracting in a sector like the car industry, and Faulkner and Anderson (1987) have suggested that the use of short-term contractual arrangements in the Hollywood film industry may provide the flexibility to reduce risk and enhance profits. Indeed, it has been suggested that there has recently been a more general trend back towards the use of subcontracting. For example, Morris (1984) discusses an instance of the increased use of subcontractors by the British Steel Corporation, where some individuals previously employed directly by the Corporation were subsequently hired by subcontracting firms on a short-term basis. In addition, Clutterbuck (1985) provides examples of firms which have shed employees and re-hired them as independent contractors. In fact Atkinson (1985) has argued that under pressure from recession firms may have sought to enhance their flexibility by loosening their contractual bonds with their employees. This may be achieved through the use of short-term contracts, temporary workers and ‘teleworking‘, as well as through subcontracting.

Atkinson’s description of the workforce of the ‘flexible’ firm includes the following categories:

(1). Core workers: full time, permanent ‘career’ employees, who receive high inputs of training from the firm, plus job security, and who in return accept a high degree of functional flexibility.

(2). First peripheral group: full-time workers, but having ‘jobs’ rather than ‘careers’, undertaking non firm-specific work, and exhibiting relatively high rates of turnover.

(3). Second peripheral group: including part-timers, temporaries, workers on short-term contracts, etc.

(4). External groups: subcontractors, self-employed jobbers, etc. By dividing its workforce in this way, and increasing the use of categories (3) and

(4), for example, the firm is seen by Atkinson as enhancing its functional, numerical and financial flexibility. However, there are, of course, disadvantages to this strategy: the problems of co-ordinating and monitoring the quality of inputs from external sources like subcontractors, and the problems involved in supervising and motivating workers whose relationship with the firm is insecure or merely temporary, and who therefore lack a sense of identification with it (Atkinson, 1984).

An additional perspective on the logic of subcontracting is provided by analyses of the use of hierarchical or market mechanisms of control based upon the transaction cost approach put forward by Williamson (1975; see also Ouchi, 1979,1980). According to this approach, the decision as to whether to produce a product or service intern- ally (hierarchical form of control) or to contract out for its supply (market form of control) is influenced by the transaction costs that are involved. These costs are seen as determined by the degree of uncertainty and complexity inherent in the transaction, coupled with the effects of market conditions. A crucial element of such conditions is the likelihood of opportunistic motives being pursued by potential suppliers (Ouchi, 1980, p. 133). In conditions in which low levels ofuncertainty and


complexity occur, and in which the level of opportunism among suppliers is also perceived as low, transaction costs will be lower and hence the market mechanism preferred. The perspective suffers somewhat from the fact that it ignores the broader strategic decision-making context, and the importance of historical developments in the organization of work. However, it does enable an analysis of the interchangeability of internal (hierarchical) and market mechanisms of transaction and control - or what Butler and Carney (1983) describe as the ‘make-buy decision’ - based upon specific technological and market characteristics. Eccles (1981a, 1981b), who employs this perspective in an analysis of construction organization, uses the generic label of ‘quasifirm’ - analogous to Williamson’s (1975) ‘inside contracting system’ - to refer to the preferred mode of organization for construction work. He links this to the intensive technology employed in construction, and the consequent need for flexibility, coupled with the technical uncertainties and complexities that are involved (Eccles, 1981a, p. 355). It is to these conditions that the discussion now turns.

SITE MANAGEMENT IN THE CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY

Construction, at least at site level, probably represents one of the most significant contemporary examples of an industry in which subcontracting remains a focal feature of the organization of productive activities. For example, Austrin (1980) refers to the flexibility provided by labour-only subcontracting in an industry where projects are of relatively short duration and labour must be mobile between them, although Scase and Goffee (1982, p. 140) point out the distinction between the core of ‘central’ tradesmen which employers may seek to retain from job to job, and the more ‘peripheral’ workers who may be seen as more disposable. Moore (1981) demonstrates that the self-employed represent an increasing proportion of the construction workforce. Similarly Leopold and Leonard (1983) chart the increase in self-employment and the reduction of direct employment in recent years, and Langford (1985) analyses the varieties of labour-only subcontracting used in construction and assesses their impact on the industry.

Moreover, the construction site appears to represent a situation where some important forms of managerial control may be difficult to exercise. For example, the breaking down of work tasks and the deskilling of labour may be of limited feasibility (Scase and Goffee, 1982, p. 62), and detailed supervision and close quality control and inspection may present special problems. There may also be severe limitations on management’s ability to dictate the location, spatial organization, and sequencing of work tasks, as well as limitations on the ability to control the physical conditions of work (given that much of it is performed out of doors).

The origins of certain characteristic problems are to be found in the special features of construction projects. Products tend to be large and rather variable in nature, indeed they are very often literally unique, and hence the standardization on which the highly detailed breaking down of work tasks depends may be difficult to achieve. In addition, and perhaps most importantly, the finished product is immobile. It cannot be transported for delivery to the client, but has to be assembled at the point of consumption. Thus construction firms must form


a series of transient ad hoc production systems as their activities move from site to site. Quite clearly, however, the strength of such constraints does vary between different types of construction activity. Thus, for example, standardization may be much more feasible where a relatively large number of smaller units is being produced (as in housing). In such circumstances, prefabrication may also be introduced as a means of applying factory production methods to the construction process.

Standardization and ‘industrialization’ have also been introduced, to some extent, into the production of larger units. However, a recently published study of the French construction industry (Campinos-Dubernet, 1985) illustrates the limitations on this process. Survey analysis of sites at the structural and load- bearing phases indicated a significant tendency amongst the larger French firms to rationalize work processes and to fragment work tasks along the lines of Taylorism. Early attempts to stabilize the highly variable construction process included the off-site production (in factory conditions) of prefabricated sections. Campinos-Dubernet suggests that this approach was relatively unsuccessful since it lacked flexibility, and the market for such components was too small to be profitable, given that factories could serve only a limited area around their location due to the high transport costs of heavy concrete sections (Campinos-Dubernet, 1985, p. 8).

Later attempts at rationalization adopted what Campinos-Dubernet refers to as a more sophisticated ‘neo-Taylorist’ approach involving work study and more elaborate planning and sequencing techniques. However, the limitations on such attempts to extend managerial control appear to remain important. In particular Campinos-Dubernet stresses the variability of the construction process, which means that even where some rationalization occurs, gangs still need to retain a relatively high degree of autonomy.

There are limits to how much labour efficiency can be increased by means of control and the strict execution of work prescriptions. These limits become clear when we consider the problem posed by. . . the. . . variability of processes. Variability needs flexible use of tools and machinery (Campinos-Dubernet, 1985, p. 6).

More generally, Thompson (1983, pp. 151-2) argues that while management may wish to exercise control over the labour process along various dimensions, it will still depend upon a degree of ‘responsible autonomy’ exercised by the workforce. The level of such autonomy is likely to vary widely between different industries and different work settings. The construction process would appear to be one setting where the required level would seem to be relatively high.

CONSTRUCTION SITES AS TEMPORARY ORGANIZATIONS

If variability and restricted opportunities for standardization impose constraints on the nature of managerial control in the construction industry, an additional factor must also be considered: the fact that construction sites are temporary phenomena. As Bryman et al. (1986) have pointed out, social scientists have

610 A. D. BEARDSWORTH, E. T . KEIL, M. BRESNEN, A. BRYMAN

shown only limited interest in the concept of the the temporary organization or temporary system. However, quite clearly the anticipated duration of a system or organization may have crucial implications for its form and functioning (Faulkner and Anderson, 1987). Working attitudes and practices may be significantly influenced by the fact that an organization’s members recognize that it has only a temporary existence, that it has a clearly visible time horizon.

The survey by Bryman et al. of the available literature suggests that the differences between temporary and permanent organizations have been seen as including the idea that temporary systems are likely to be more ‘organic’, with less hierarchical differentiation than permanent ones, which are seen as more ‘mechanistic’ in nature. Other differences include the idea of higher stress levels in temporary sytems (due to uncertainty and tight deadlines for example), and the notion of higher levels of role ambiguity in such systems (also associated with uncertainty). The concept of the construction site as a temporary system is present, for example, in Cherns and Bryant (1984), where such sites are termed ‘temporary multi-organizations’. However, the distinction between temporary and permanent is in some ways a rather blurred one, and in a sense the construction site can be seen not so much as a temporary organization in itself, but as a temporary focus of co-operation between organizations which are permanent (or would certainly prefer to be permanent).

For this reason, the form of the construction site might be thought of as an ‘alliance’, involving a co-operative venture of finite duration undertaken by a temporary alignment of autonomous or semi-autonomous permanent organizations providing their own distinctive inputs. The demands of management within the context of such shifting alliances of main contractors, subcontractors, labour- only subcontractors, consulting engineers, architects and the like are likely to present a range of distinctive problems and pressures.

THE ROLE OF THE CONSTRUCTION SITE MANAGER

At a pivotal location within the alliance which is created around any given construction project is the site manager.i4] An important contribution towards an understanding of the position of site managers can be provided by the analysis of perceptions with the construction industry concerning the nature of the role they play and of the demands which such a role makes upon them, and the nature of the problems and pressures which they face. Evidence concerning such perceptions is available from a set of interrelated studies carried out by the authors between the years 1982 and 1985. The first of these studies focused on labour recruitment to construction sites, and the second and third set out to analyse the effectiveness of site management in terms of leadership orientations.

The programme was funded by the Science and Engineering Research Council, and data were obtained through the use of detailed interviewing of site managers and other key informants like contracts managers (who are responsible for overseeing several different projects). Respondents from 43 construction sites were interviewed, the projects themselves being medium to large ones, valued at €2 million and upwards. The locations were selected by sampling at random from a listing of sites which fulfilled the studies’ overall criteria obtained from

MANAGEMENT, TRANSIENCE AND SUBCONTRACTING 61 1

the Contract Journal.[5] The interviewing technique combined a number of closed-ended or fixed response questions from which quantitative data could be obtained, with open-ended questions designed to yield more unstructured responses and qualitative data. A follow-up exercise examined three further sites, and subjected them to a considerably more detailed case study analysis in order to produce even more detailed qualitative data.

The sample of 43 site managers covered a wide spectrum in terms of experience, background, education and training. A broad distinction could be discerned, however, between what might be termed ‘staff and ‘trades’ site managers. This distinction was based upon a series of questions which asked respondents how they had arrived at their current position. A contrast was identified between site managers who had begun as craftsmen and moved up through such positions as foreman and general foreman (trades), and site managers who had risen through the engineer route (staff). The ‘staff site managers tended to hold degrees or qualifications like HNC and HND, whereas the ‘trades’ site managers tended to hold trades qualifications like City & Guilds or Full Technical Certificate. Table I compares the two groups in terms of their background and experience.

Table I . Background and experience of site managers

Variable

Mean score jo r all

managers For Staff For ‘trades’ interviewed SMs only SMs only (N = 43) (N = 20) (N = 23)

Age* 42.55 35.89 48.91 No. firms worked for’ 4.56 3.35 5.61 No. sites managed’ 8.69 4.01 12.86 Years in current position 5.54 4.55 6.48 Years in firm 11.88 10.25 13.61

Indicates a statistically significant difference in means between the two groups of site manager (at thep<0.05 level).

Thus the ‘trades’ group appears to be significantly older than the ‘staff group, having worked for more firms and managed more sites, although it did not appear to be the case that the two groups differed significantly in terms of the number of years worked for their present firm, or the number of years in their current position. However, whatever the route by which the respondents in the sample reached their current position, they are likely to face a number of common problems which are characteristic of the site manager role. For the purpose of presenting the findings of the study, these problems can be subsumed under four main headings: issues of planning and design; transience and ‘activity density’; relations with subcontractors; perceptions of the site manager’s role.

Planning and Design The first set of problems emerges out of the possibility that site managers may often find themselves in the position of managing a project in whose underlying


planning and conceptualization they have had relatively little involvement. When asked to assess their influence over various aspects of the planning process, the 43 site managers inteviewed provided the responses laid out in Table 11.

Table 11. Site managers’ influence in planning ~~

a g r e e of intucnce

None or Good little Some deal Missing To fa1

I n z m c e over: N (%) N (%) N (%) N (%) N (%)

Design 32 (74) 4 (9) 5 (12) 2 (5) 43 (100) Costings 37 (85) 2 (5) 3 (7) 1 (2) 43 (99) Programming 19 (44) 7 (16) 17 (39) 0 (0) 43 (99) Methods 19 (44) 11 (25) 13 (30) 0 (0) 43 (99) Appointments 21 (48) 12 (28) 10 (23) 0 (0) 43 (99) Materialdplant choice 15 (35) 12 (28) 16 (37) 0 (0) 43 (100) Subcontractor choice 18 (41) 10 (23) 15 (35) 0 (0) 43 (99)

Significantly, a majority of site managers felt they had little or no influence in crucial areas like design and costing, areas in which the decisions made set the framework within which site management must operate. Even in areas very directly related to the site manager’s task, like programming, appointments, choice of subcontractors, etc., a substantial minority of respondents indicated they felt they had little or no influence.

This overall lack of involvement in a key area like design, for example, is all the more significant since design issues seem to be particularly prominent in the site manager’s inventory of problems. When asked to identify the single most important problem involved in managing the project, no less than 14 (33 per cent) of the site manager respondents mentioned design related issues, this being the most frequently mentioned single item. Both this lack of involvement in design, and its perceived problematic nature, are perhaps not surprising, since the design function in construction (architectural and/or engineering) is the province of the client and the client’s representatives. What is of significance here is the extent to which extraneous factors have a direct influence on the performance of the site manager‘s role. Quite apart from the lack of extensive influence over the planning of the activities to be undertaken by the main contracting firm on the site, the site manager must cope with the constraints and contingencies which stem from the continuing evolution of the design itself. Furthermore, additional constraints and problems emerge out of the close inter- organizational working relationships which are involved. Interestingly, however, the second most frequently mentioned constraining factor was the weather, which was identified by 13 (30 per cent) of the site managers as their main problem on the project. This serves as a graphic reminder that whatever the organizational issues involved, the fact that management is frequently powerless to regulate the physical conditions of work represents a continuous threat to the maintenance of managerial control over the project as a whole. Taken together with the problem of design, this re-emphasizes the central importance of the extraneous conditions which confront the site manager.


Transience and Activity Density’ As has already been suggested above, the limited time horizon of construction projects and the transient nature of the multi-organizational alliances created around them generate pressing time constraints for site management. Thus, for example, while respondents indicated the crucial importance of motivating the workforce, there simply may be insufficient time to accomplish this effectively. The difficulties for the site manager in this connection were clearly recognized by one of the contracts managers in the sample:

To sit down and apply pure management principles. . . is extremely difficult, because for a lot of management theories to work, you need a fairly stable environment over a reasonable period of time to put the thing into practice and see them through to fruition. Talk about motivating guys. . .you get guys on the site and that manager must motivate them. But it’s purely time required to motivate people really. You don’t just get a gang of bricklayers in and motivate them day one. You’ve got to build up confidence in each other, they have got to trust you, you’ve got to be able to trust them. Almost before you’ve built that trust up, the job is finished or they’ve left the job, or they’ve gone off for some stupid reason. It’s very difficult. I think again in an industrial situation you have a chance to look at your labour force. . .You are aware of the organization, the style of the organization, aware of the - in broad terms - the labour force you are dealing with.

In fact, despite a strong emphasis on teamwork indicated by respondents, the site manager may literally find himself, at the start of a given project, faced with an unknown workforce, and with little opportunity to familiarize himself with it. Not surprisingly, therefore, we find expressed a preference for retaining a team of core workers from project to project:

When I was a site agent I had my own ganger man and my concrete gang and I’d take them from one job to the next and I knew that I didn’t have to go out and supervise them. They knew what I wanted, the ganger man knew what I wanted, the guys knew what I wanted, the guys below him have worked with him before for three, five, ten years. They knew what he wanted, and the work would flow. If you’ve got a lot of strangers. . .you get this whole learning process, and the job doesn’t run as smooth (sic). So that’s why it’s best to have people you know, the devil you know is far better than the devil you don’t (contracts manager).

And similarly:

The thing that I like to do is maintain a regular crew. Unfortunately, because of the lack of continuity of work in the trade, you cannot always do that. But if you can be lucky enough to have a pool or a nucleus of people that we use on virtually every job - the chargehand I’ve got has been with me for six years - so he knows exactly the lie of the land. It is nice to have a regular group of operatives (project manager).


However, because of the unpredictable flow of activity in the construction industry, labour force continuity even among direct workers may be difficult to achieve in practice, as the latter respondent points out.

In addition to the time constraints inherent in construction projects is the problem of what might be termed ‘activity density’, i .e. the fact that different tasks have to be carried out at the same time in the same areas:

The speed of the job means that everyone’s trying to work in the same areas at the same time. Now the difficulty is then, when you get that, it would be nice to say to the bricklayers ‘You can work in that area - that’s your area till you’ve finished.’. . . But what happens actually is that because of the speed of the job, it’s not possible. So you have to try to get them all working in the one area and obviously it’s not the best way for any of them. That then creates clashes if you like between ‘how can I do this while he is doing that’ - either access problems or things of that nature. And those are some of the problems that you have to sort out constantly. . .What happens actually is that you go into one area; you walk into the next and you’ve got the same chaos. . .It’s not as if any area remains static. And you can’t say: ‘look, you’ve got this one particular problem in this one area because it’s congested’. . . the whole job is like that. We’re even congested for stacking spaces and things like that. . .its just the fact that the speed means that we have to do all the external works at the same time as the building (project manager).

This clearly produces special demands concerning the management of congestion, where the spatial organization of the productive process has an improvised character and can involve overlapping activities with requirements difficult to reconcile with one another.

What is more, the speed at which a project proceeds may mean, in effect, that problems with the work emerge in close succession:

The problems that we have on this job are no different to what you would have on any job, I don’t think, except that the speed of the job increases the density of them. It concentrates them so that on a normal job you would have exactly the same problems but spread over a longer period and therefore they would only occur perhaps once a day, and on a faster job it crops up faster. So the density is increased, and that kind of pressure is increased on the individual who is running the job. . . In other words, if you are going to have an argument with somebody - and on average it’s once a week - the faster the job the more likely it is to be once a day. . .we have a fair proportion of clashes of personality mainly because of the speed of this job dictates if you like - everything - almost, has got to be done at one time (project manager).

Thus the problem of ‘activity density’ has two logically separable but in practice closely associated components: the need to perform overlapping work tasks simultaneously, and the need to work quickly.

As the above respondent points out, the very density of problems has the effect of increasing the likelihood of clashes and arguments, the containment of which


must become an additional demand upon the site manager. Further, the more intensive the time pressures, and the more ‘dense’ the problems, the more directive appears to be the style of management:[6]

I think a fast job, when there’s no room for messing about, you get a much more directive style of management. I think if you get time on the job, it’s a more consultative style of management, you are more willing to get blokes in to sort the thing out, be together, you’ve got time for a joint approach. On a really fast job, you can’t afford that. . .You are there just to direct that team, not to discuss it, just to get on with the job. The bigger the job, the more time you spend at meetings, the more time you spend in explanations. I’ve been on sites where you have recognized patterns of briefing groups. You’ve got that on a bigger job. You’ve got the benefits, because it does take time for the true benefits of this sort of approach to work. . . it’s just not worth doing on a short-term contract. You are just there to get the thing done, fast, and all the niceties go in the air (contracts manager).

Thus, there simply may be not time to develop consultative procedures and conventions, and management without explanation may itself become an extra source of friction, particularly in the context of a team whose members have little or no prior experience of working together.

Relations w i th Subcontractors There can be no doubt that the logic of subcontracting in the context of the construction project is a compelling one. When the 43 site managers in the sample were asked to provide a broad assessment of the balance of direct and subcontract labour on their site, and the reasons for that balance, their responses clearly demonstrate the significance of subcontracting (see table 111).

Table 111. The balance of direct and subcontract labour

Labour force composition and reasons Site manager response

N (%)

Predominantly subcontract due to technical and/or cost factors 15 (35)

Predominantly subcontract due to labour market factors 10 (23) Predominantly subcontract as a matter of company policy 7 (16)

factors 3 ( 7 ) Predominantly direct labour due to labour market factors 3 ( 7 ) Predominantly direct labour as a matter of company policy 2 (5) Missing cases 3 ( 7 )

Total 43 (100)

Predominantly direct labour due to technical and/or cost

Thus, overall 74 per cent of respondents characterize their sites as employing predominantly subcontract labour, the reasons being related mainly to technical, cost and labour market factors. But if the site n-inager is sometimes faced with problems because many of his own direct workforce may be unfamiliar to him,


this is even more the case for subcontract workers. As one project manager pointed out, one may have an opportunity to get to know directly employed workers, but this is not usually the case with subcontract labour:

You know what a man can and cannot do. If you work with labourers or bricklayers, and even the trades foreman, for a period of time, then you know what they are good at, you know where they may not be so good, you know what you can use them for and what you can’t, what they’ve done. You know some of them by first names, and you know exactly what to expect, the standard of work as well. You know which ones you might have to watch and which ones you wouldn’t, and you know what kind of work to give to which man. . . With subcontract labour you don’t necessarily know that. . . .

This fact can have important implications for the control and supervision of the subcontract workforce, for although in theory this workforce should not require supervision by the main contractor’s staff, this is not necessarily the case in practice, as one respondent pointed out:

You have to put a lot more in in terms of supervision. . . Bearing in mind that you are not actually doing the work. . . They (the subcontractors) should employ the supervision, because they look after their own work. In practice. . . on this job, we have to almost put the same amount of supervision on, to make sure that subcontractors do what they are supposed to do, and they do it properly (project manager).

However, the same project manager also indicated that in such a situation difficulties may arise because the lines of authority become decidedly ambiguous:

. . .the situation exists where their men are doing what our supervisors tell them and we’re telling them how it’s done and what the details are, and yet they are not working for us, directly. It’s almost like they accept that there is a subtle difference - they are not directly working for us and employed by us and any time they so choose, they can choose not to do it. They can then say ‘well, I’m doing something else because I don’t work for you and my supervisor says I’m to do this’.

Situations in which subcontract workers feel they have an option as to whether or not to follow the instructions of the main contractor’s representatives clearly signify a potentially very awkward anomaly for site management. What is more, respondents made it quite clear that in certain circumstances the work done by subcontractors did require careful supervision and monitoring, since it might not always be up to the required standard:

Generally speaking, they are on a price to do the job, and they will get away with whatever they can get away with. A plasterer, it won’t be nice and true and flat, it will be all bumpy if you let him (site agent).

Similarly, without supervision subcontractors may avoid performing work which they see as difficult or uneconomic:


Equally, you find that if it’s the job that’s not necessarily an easy job, or not necessarily a job that’s going to be cost effective to them, a subcontractor, there is a tendency not to do it. Even though it forms part of the subcontract (project manager).

These possibilities mean that the site manager may feel his responsibility is to remain one jump ahead of those subcontractors who would otherwise seek to avoid discharging their contractual obligations in full:

Controlling subcontractors is very difficult because you are dealing with personalities, and that’s not what is reflected in the bill of quantities. . .They are up to all the old wiles, and you’ve got to be foxier than them. That’s what management is all about, to know what the name of the game is, know what the rules are and to be foxier than them (site manager).

What is more, where subcontractors are seen as highly instrumental in their approach, motivated largely by the quest for short term profitability, site management may feel that such subcontractors have to be ‘manipulated’ in order to obtain their fullest contribution to the project:

. . . I know we are all in this business to earn money, but you find that with a subcontractor all he’s interested in is getting in, doing the job quickly, get his money and get out again. So you’ve got to manipulate him so that you get the best out of him (site agent).

The tasks of ‘manipulating’ or ‘out-foxing’ subcontractors clearly imply an additional workload for the site manager. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that a consistently recurring theme in the responses of site managers was an expressed preference for known subcontractors, with whom a sound working relationship had already been established. The importance of such a relationship was emphasized by one respondent in the following terms:

Yes, the more you work with people the more you understand them, the more they understand you. [With] continuity of one subcontractor from one contract to another, you are going to get more of an understanding and more of a relationship, rather than two strangers coming together with financial implications hanging over their heads. The first meeting. . .with any subcontractor that you’ve never worked with before, the other one is going to perform and react to situations. Whereas if you’ve got continuity over the years it’s ‘Hello Jack how are you, we’ve got another one here’. . .the approach is totally different (contracts manager).

Labour-only subcontractors known from previous jobs are also preferred for similar reasons:

. . .one tends to stick to the same (labour-only) subcontractors from one job to anotherjob, because they [ L e . site supervisors] know who they are dealing with. They know the men that the subcontractors are likely to engage, and things have worked successfully in the past. They’ve got a good working relationship with them (site manager).

618 A . D. BEARDSWORTH, E. T. KEIL, M. BRESNEN, A. BRYMAN

Equally, subcontractors who present problems are likely to be avoided on future jobs:

. . .quite obviously if you have a lot of trouble with a subcontractor on a particular job, and you find that at the end of the day he’s not completing the work in accordance with the programme, and he’s creating a lot of trouble with your management and with other subcontractors, well, obviously the next time you have got a similar job you’ll try and avoid him if you can. But equally, if you’ve got somebody who works in with your men, you are going to try and work with him again. And this is why overall, I think our list of subcontractors is relatively small because we do have repeat subcontracts all the time. This is why even now we have got subcontractors working on two or three sites that we are controlling all at the same time. It isn’t because there aren’t others, obviously there are. We find that we get on with some far better than others, and they suit some of our own site supervision. . .(contracts manager).

One significant feature of these responses is the stress that they lay on the quality of working relationships on site, as opposed to an exclusive concern with technical issues and questions of efficiency. This suggests that an important component of the preference for known subcontractors is that work relationships with them are much more like those found within more stable work organizations. This idea was expressed directly by one respondent:

. . .we’ve got some tame subcontractors that we use on all our sites, so you know the people before they come here, and that’s a great help. You know the style, and hopefully, you know what sort of work they did on the last job, and they are almost direct labour, in that instance (our emphasis) (site agent).

Such a statement clearly highlights the importance of social relations, and their development over time, as moderating factors in the market-based relationship between the parties (Granovetter, 1985). Conditions which ‘augment’ the market mechanism (Butler and Carney, 1983) and which enable the advantages of a stable ‘quasi-firm’ type of arrangement to emerge (Eccles, 1981a) are clearly beneficial to the smooth running of the project from the site manager’s point of view.

However, this proposition suggests something of a paradox. Quite clearly, the logic of using subcontractors is related to the flexibility which subcontracting can provide, and to the desire of the main contractor to control and reduce costs. This latter aim, should, of course, be achieved by taking advantage of competitive bidding by potential subcontractors. Yet where respondents report that known subcontractors are being used repeatedly, then evidently familiarity as a criterion of choice may be overriding issues like cost. In a sense such ‘tame’ subcontractors may become ‘honorary’ sub-sections of the main contractor’s organization.

This apparent paradox can be resolved at least partially by a recognition of two conditions. Firstly, that the advantages and disadvantages of subcontracting may accrue to different levels of the main contracting firm. For the highest levels of management, the maintenance of flexibility and the limiting of costs are clearly


highly desirable goals. However, it is at site level where the disadvantages are acutely felt, by contracts managers, site managers, and the supervisors and foremen below them. Such disadvantages, as we have noted above, tend to revolve around issues of supervision and control. Secondly, particularly in a depressed market, the main contractor may well be able to pursue strategies that obtain the benefits of both low prices and familiarity. This may entail, for example, going out to tender for the work in question with a shortlist consisting mainly of known subcontractors. In such circumstances familiar and economically dependent subcontractors may be competing with each other, on price, for the job. In addition, higher prices submitted by known subcontractors may subsequently be negotiated down, within limits, to an acceptable level, e.g. to the prices submitted by ‘unknown’ firms tendering for the work. This process was commented upon by a number of respondents in the sample (Bryman et al., 1986). In such circumstances the benefits of trust through familiarity that might serve to ‘augment’ a market mechanism of control and thereby make opportunism a less likely prospect (Butler and Carney, 1983), are added to by the benefits of a ‘buyer’s market’ and the choice that this affords the main contracting organization.

Perceptions of the Site Manager’s Role Having examined some of the problems which are associated with site management it may be instructive to look briefly at the way in which respondents perceived the nature of the site manager’s role. Certainly, the role was seen as a highly demanding one:

I think, basically, one of the major problems is the fact that it is largely a short-term industry, with a transient labour force. There’s a high degree of subcontract labour, there is a tremendous amount of specialisms involved. The requirements on a site manager are tremendous really. The role of the site manager might be embodied in three or four people in a normal industrial situation. The fact that the man is in the front line controlling a labour force; he’s directly answerable to the client; to his own organization at a very high level; he’s responsible for millions of pounds worth of work, if you like, per annum. In a very fragile sort of environment: he is at the mercy of the weather, material deliveries, problems with labour, problems with getting information (contracts manager).

The above respondent’s eloquent summary of the multiple demands of the site manager’s role very effectively emphasizes the great diversity of responsi- bilities it entails. What is more, it is subject to certain crucial external influences (weather conditions, materials deliveries, etc.) which may be effectively outside the site manager’s control. It also involves a high degree of accountability, which implies that the site manager’s performance is under constant scrutiny. This sense of being continuously on trial was expressed by the same respondent as follows:

This is an industry without understanding. We don’t understand people, we don’t want to understand, we haven’t got time to understand. It’s a whole

620 A. D. BEARDSWORTH, E. T . KEIL, M. BRESNEN, A . BRYMAN

series of little exercises and each one is either a success or it’s a failure. If it’s a failure, somebody’s accountable - somebody’s got to be blamed, and it’ll be the site manager. It’s not like a production line, where you’ve got production over a long period. There’s something very finite about the end of a job - it dawned on me fairly early on that you are always on test. As soon as you’ve got a successful contract under your belt, you’re starting again, and being tested again.

This is not to argue, of course, that the site manager is in any way unique in having his performance constantly monitored. However, as the above respondent implies, the finite duration of construction projects means that their completion provides a series of ‘natural breaks’ in the site manager’s working career, each one providing a point at which his effectiveness can be assessed - although this assessment may be coloured by the tendency, alleged by the respondent, for the site manager to be the natural focus of blame for a project defined as a failure.

When questioned directly about the various aspects of performing their role site managers themselves tended to agree with statements that implied they were often subject to conflicting demands on site, and that they were often under pressure from the amount of work expected of them. However, they were much less inclined to agree with statements which suggested that their role was unclear or ambiguous, or that they lacked sufficient authority (see table IV).

Thus while, for example, 58 per cent of respondents agreed with the statement thaL ,-,; much time was spent accommodating different demands, and 70 per cent with the statement that too much was demanded of them in the time available, a mere 20 per cent agreed with the notion that they were unsure of what was expected of them, and only 5 per cent agreed that they had insufficient authority. Quite clearly, while the job is seen as a highly demanding one, role ambiguity and lack of authority are not issues of great significance for this particular sample of site managers.

Furthermore, the levels of job satisfaction expressed by site managers appear to be relatively high. Table V details the responses to a series of questions relating to their degree of satisfaction with various aspects of their work role. The overall impression produced by these results is that site managers report themselves as satisfied, or indeed very satisfied with most aspects of their job. The exceptions to this appear in such areas as pay, with a substantial minority (35 per cent) saying they were dissatisfied or very dissatisfied, and working hours, with 28 per cent replying dissatisfied or very dissatisfied.

Areas relating to issues like autonomy and variety show very high satisfaction - for example, no less than 98 per cent of respondents said they were satisfied or very satisfied with the degree of freedom they had to choose their own working methods, and 86 per cent were satisfied or very satisfied with the variety which they experienced in their work. Thus the general picture to emerge was one of a high level of expressed satisfaction with the ‘intrinsic’ aspects of the job.

In other areas the respondents appeared more divided and unsure about their position, with 37 per cent of them undecided or ‘neutral’ about their promotion prospects, and 35 per cent ‘neutral’ about the degree of recognition they received.

MANAGEMENT, T R A N S I E N C E A N D S U B C O N T R A C T I N G 62 1

Table IV. Site managers’ role pereceptions ~~~

Agree Undec ided Disagree Miss ing Total The site manager N (%) N (%) N (%) N (%) N (%)

Spent too much time accommodating different demands on site

Felt pressure arising from the need to balance conflicting views and demands

Had to wear many ‘different hats’ in dealings on site

do too much in the time available

time responding to phone calls and visits

overwhelmed by information

Was not sure what was expected of him

sufficient authority

Had to work to ambiguous or unclear plans (established by the firm)

Was expected to

Spent too much

Was often

Did not have

25 (58) 7 (16) 11 (26) 0 (0) 43 (100)

23 (54) 13 (30) 7 (16) 0 (0) 43 (100)

24 (56) 3 (7) 16 (37) 0 (0) 43 (100)

30 (70) 6 (14) 7 (16) 0 (0) 43 (100)

19 (44) 10 (23) 14 (33) 0 (0) 43 (100)

15 (35) 8 (19) 20 (47) 0 (0) 43 (101)

1 (2) 0 (0) 42 (98) 0 (0) 43 (100)

2 (5) 2 ( 5 ) 39 (91) 2 (0) 43 (101)

7 (16) 2 (5) 32 (74) 2 (5) 43 (100)

Interestingly, these results appear to suggest a degree of ambivalence on the part of site managers towards their firm, particularly when coupled with the fact that substantial minorities in the sample reported themselves as undecided or dissatisfied with the firm itself (38 per cent), and the attention paid to their suggestions (25 per cent).

Yet in general satisfaction does appear to be high. This in turn suggests that the kinds of problems and pressures attached to the site manager role are not incompatible with high levels of job satisfaction along certain dimensions. Furthermore, a majority of the site manager respondents in the sample saw their present position as a stepping stone to higher managerial positions. Table VI summarizes site managers’ reported career expectations by grouping their responses under two main headings: (a) ‘mobile’, indicating an expectation of upward mobility within the firm, or an orientation to a wider management


Table V. Site managers’ job satisfaction

Degree of satisjaction

Very Dis- VerV Satisjaction satisfied Satisjied Neutral satisjied dirsatisjied Mirsing Totul with: N (%) N (%) N (%) N (%) N (%) N (%) N (%)

Pay Staff team Job security Superiors Freedom to

choose working methods

Recognition Amount of

responsibility Opportunities

to use abilities

Promotion prospects

Firm Attention paid

to suggestions

Working hours Variety in job

4 (9) 18 (42) 6 (14) 9 (21) 6 (14) 0 (0) 43 (100) 8 (19) 33 (77) 1 (2) 1 (2) 0 (0) 0 (0) 43 (100) 7 (16) 26 (60) 6 (14) 2 (5) 2 (5) 0 (0) 43 (100) 7 (16) 29 (67) 4 (9) 3 (7) 0 (0) 0 (0) 43 (99)

15 (35) 27 (63) 1 (2) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 43 (100) 2 (5) 19 (44) 15 (35) 7 (16) 0 (0) 0 (0) 43 (100)

9 (21) 32 (74) 1 (2) 1 (2) 0 (0) 0 (0) 43 (99)

11 (26) 27 (63) 1 (2) 3 (7) 0 (0) 1 (2) 43 (100)

2 (5) 19 (44) 16 (37) 5 (12) 1 (2) 0 (0) 43 (100) 4 (9) 23 (53) 8 (19) 8 (19) 0 (0) 0 (0) 43 (100)

4 (9) 28 (65) 7 (16) 4 (9) 0 (0) 0 (0) 43 (99) 0 (0) 23 (53) 8 (19) 10 (23) 2 (5) 0 (0) 43 (100)

10 23 27 (63) 3 (7) 3 (7) 0 (0) 0 (0) 43 (100)

Table VI. Site managers’ career expectations

Career orientation/ S t a f ‘Trades’ All expectations N (%) N (%) N (%)

‘Mobile’ ‘Static’

Total

17 (85) 10 (43) 27 (63) 3 (15) 13 (57) 16 (37)

20 (100) 23 (100) 43 (100)

career, and (b) ‘static’, indicating satisfaction with the present position, or a recognition that the present position is likely to be the highest the individual in question will attain.

Overall, 63 per cent of the site manager respondents expected to be upwardly mobile within their company, or saw themselves as on the first stage of a managerial career. However, when the previously pointed-out distinction between ‘staff and ‘trades’ backgrounds is employed, a distinct difference between the two groups emerges:”] the ‘staff group shows a much stronger expectation of upward mobility within the firm than does the ‘trades’ group. In fact, 13 per cent of the latter group put their main emphasis on long service and commitment to the company, 39 per cent of them indicating that they


expected site manager to be the highest position in their career, whereas none of the ‘staff group reported such an expectation. These differences in orientations and expectations would seem to be related to the different routes by which the two groups have entered site management, and also the significantly higher average age of the trades group (see table I). Thus the role of site manager may best be seen not as a position on a single career path, but as a common point on two separate but intersecting career paths.[8]

CONCLUSION

The findings reported in this article represent an attempt to make an empirical contribution to our understanding of the role of the construction site manager. This role, it has been argued, is one of particular interest, given the range of problems associated with it: the regulation of the labour process in circumstances in which many orthodox control devices may be difficult to apply; the management of congestion in the context of short time horizons; the implementation of evolving and often problematic designs; the management of delicate relations within a complex network of direct workers and subcontractors.

However, while it has been argued that the construction process in some senses represents a special form of productive activity, that is not to say that the issues raised are special to the industry. They may appear in a unique combination in the case of construction, but they are likely to occur singly o r in other combinations in other industrial and organizational contexts. Thus it is to be hoped that the findings presented here may illuminate broader managerial problems associated with, for example, the direction and regulation of subcontractors and their workforces. Given current views concerning trends towards the increased use of subcontracting, this would appear to be an aspect of managerial activity which will demand further detailed empirical research in the near future.

NOTES

[ l ] For a typology of managerial control strategies see Edwards (1979). [2] Marglin illustrates this point by using the example of Arkwright, whose success

was based upon his organizational and disciplinary skills, rather than his technical expertise (Marglin, 1980, p. 240).

[3] As Bradley reminds us, the employer is required ‘continually to pay attention to the subjective needs of his workers, and to acknowledge his dependence on them as subjects, as theirs on him’(Bradley, 1983, p. 507). In addition Friedman (1977) suggests that Braverman underplays the significance of ‘responsible autonomy strategies’ such as participation, job enrichment, etc.

[4] By the term site manager we mean the main contractor’s senior representative on site. Alternative designations include such terms as site agent and project manager.

[5] A fuller account of the statistical procedures and assumptions involved can be found in Bresnen et al. (1985).

[6] For a more detailed discussion of this point see Bryman et al. (1987).


[7] The Chi-square value (with Yates’ Correction) for table VI is 6.217, which exceeds the critical value of Chi-square for 1 degree of freedom at the 0.02 level (5.412), thus indicating a significant difference between the expectations of the two groups.

[8] Stewart, Prandy and Blackburn (1980, pp. 197-207) use the analogy of a railway system to argue that particular occupations may be held by a range of individuals who are in fact on very different journeys along the ‘lines’ of the occupational structure, and who will ultimately reach quite different destinations.

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