JMNE (2014) 1:85-104 DOI 10.14667/2283-5911-21-1-007ARTICLES AND TESTIMONIES

Managed Democracy Versus New Civic ActivityPivotal Features in Armenian Political Culture

Gayane Novikova

Abstract Over the last ten years Armenia has experienced a variety of grassroots social movements of differing intensity. They indicate an intensification of social, political, and economic polarization of Armenian society and a slow growth of civic protest activity under conditions of continuing and deepening economic and demographic crises. The major impulse toward change emanates from below and from groups now experiencing civic engagement for the first time. All new groups are still extremely weak and poorly organized. Moreover, coordination of activity between them is lacking and the society in general is not ready to take large steps in their direction.

Although it is still too early to discuss the emergence of a powerful new political or social movement in Armenia, each small advancing step by grassroots activists in the social, politi-cal, and ecological spheres can stimulate a large protest movement aiming to achieve social justice. Casting a glance across Armenia’s very complicated and turbulent recent political en-vironment, it must be acknowledged that any spontaneous mass protest could lead to unpre-dictable developments.

This article analyses the complex dynamic between the ruling elite and the opposi-tion, some features of the grassroots movements, and the protest potential in Armenian society.

Keywords Armenia - Civil society - Grassroots movement - Ruling elite and opposi-tion.

Introduction

Over the last ten years Armenia has experienced a variety of grassroots social move-ments of differing intensity. Among them are ecological movements (for example, “Save

Gayane Novikova ()Founding Director Center for Strategic Analysis, YerevanUNESCO Chair on Human Rights, Democracy and European Studies, Yerevan State University of Languages and Social Sciences, Armeniae-mail: gnovikova@spectrum.am

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Teghut Forest,” “Let us conserve Trchkan Waterfall”1). Other activists aim to prevent the construction of new buildings; many are opposing the demolition of old buildings in Yerevan’s center. Widespread (in correlation to the Armenian scale of social mobiliza-tion) protests have been provoked by declining standards of living for the majority of the population and by various forms of social injustice.2 In June-July of 2013, steaming societal tension that unified different strata around a social issue and demonstrated their anger, was provoked by the decision of the mayor of Yerevan to increase bus transporta-tion tickets from 100 to 150 AMD.3 This decision was then rescinded. In January 2014, this civic movement celebrated its next victory: The Constitutional Court of Armenia has suspended the implementation of the mandatory component of the Law on Cumulative Pensions. Implementation of a decision regarding the new system of sale taxes for small businesses, adopted in July 2014, was postponed until February 2015, under the pressure of the businessmen street protests in October, 2014.4

These developments indicate an intensification of social, political, and economic polari-zation of Armenian society and a slow growth of civic protest activity under conditions of continuing and deepening economic5 and demographic6 crises. Protesters employ non-violent techniques and more and more often – in parallel with demands to solve various narrow issues – seek to challenge the political regime and the ruling elite. Although peaks of protest activity have usually coincided with electoral campaign cycles,7 we are now witnessing growing civic activity long before a new round of parliamentary and presidential elections. However, this new-found civil activism must be addressed also in reference to the complex dynamic between the ruling elite and the opposition, for the latter uses civic protest activity to enlarge its social base. The post-election protests in March, 2013, clearly indicated this trend.

In this regard, an array of heterogeneous factors must be considered: for example, interper-sonal relations, political ambitions, and the creation of external “enemy(s)” image inside the “ruling elite - opposition” relationship. Not least, personal and group economic interests must be acknowledged, as well as the ways in which opportunities and mechanisms to manipulate certain segments of the population are exploited.

At first glance, the ruling elite has become more consolidated and the political opposition more fractured as a result of the parliamentary election of 2012 and the presidential election of 2013. In the meantime, neither the elite nor the opposition have been able to propose a way

1 Armine Ishkanian. Civil Society, Development and Environmental Activism in Armenia. At: https://drive.google.com/folderview?id=0B4DnKMVSU8IjdnloaG1MTGNkZEk&usp=sharing2 Among these issues are the increase in gas and electricity costs since July 7, 2013, and the bankruptcy of Armavia, Armenia’s flagship airline.3 100 AMD is about 25 US cents. However, this increase is significant for the vast majority of the population. It should not be forgotten that the minimum wage for 2014 is roughly 120 USD per month. 4 Tax Row: Rallies expected in protest of new law. At: http://armenianow.com/society/57340/armenia_tax_laws_aram_manukyan_armenian_national_congress5 Among the most negative parameters of the crisis should be mentioned the unemployment (17, 3%) and poverty (about 37%) rates, decline in school enrollment, etc. Please see the World Bank reports at: http://data.worldbank.org/country/armenia 6 According to the National Statistical Service, 108,005 people left within the last quarter (June-September, 2013) who did not return. (In total, 1,888,165 people departed from Armenia during June-September and 1,780,160 arrived.) See more in “Armenia In Decline: Outflow of citizens continues to threaten domestic future” at http://www.armenianow.com/society/50966/emigration_armenia_national_statistical_service7 Elections are considered as proper occasions for protests, to mobilize society, and to demonstrate – with relative impunity – concerns, wishes, expectations, and a demand for social justice and change. Donnacha Ó Beacháin and Abel Polese, eds.2012. The Colour Revolutions in the Former Soviet Republics. Successes and Failures. London and New York: Routledge, pp. 1-12.

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out of the deepening economic and social crises. The disagreements in both political camps are growing.8

In a milieu devoid of constructive programs and proposals from either side – and against the background of complex external (the Ukrainian crisis, and the civil war in Syria, together with the ISIS attacks on religious minorities, including Armenians) and regional developments (first of all those related to the unresolved Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, and the decision to join the Eurasian Union) – it is likely that severe social discontent, with negative consequences for Armenia, is on the medium-term horizon. Prevention of an open and broad societal confron-tation and improvement of the political environment might be possible through constructive dialogue and cooperation between the authorities and the opposition. Unfortunately, currently such a dialogue is lacking. A number of peculiarities inherent in the Armenian political culture explains this situation:9

- A separation of politics from the economy has not occurred; a classical interpenetration of political power with oligarchic capital remains in place.10

- Power is monopolized by a small-scale and tightly-knit elite circle; the formation of new governments involves only a rotation of its members’ roles and positions.

- An integrated political space is absent; instead, participants in the political process act separately and individually – that is, without coordination of their activities. Members of every political party are united mainly around a leader rather than around a program, an idea, or a vision for the future.

In light of its complete control of the state’s political and economic11 resources, the ruling elite has initiated a number of changes that have influenced the lives of citizens. A growing mistrust toward the authorities is forcing a significant part of the society to react more and more negatively to governmental initiatives; citizens seek to prevent the implementation of initiatives “from above” and to push forward their own agendas.

These factors, it must be emphasized, do not exist “in isolation.” Rather, they interact – and with clear consequences. They have led on the one hand to a gradual radicalization of society’s most socially active segment – youth – and on the other hand to growing apathy among the less socially protected strata.

This article will address several questions: How strong is the protest potential in Armenian society? Could simmering protest be transformed into a strong political and/or social move-ment capable of advancing various forms of positive changes? Will Armenia face turmoil in the mid-term future, or is there a possibility to address the accumulated problems peacefully through broad reforms, significant transformations, and substantive shifts in power? Some an-swers to these questions can be formulated from the demarcation of a constellation of pivotal qualitative variables and an analysis of their interaction. Among these variables are the state and the opposition. The third substantial component is the society at large and the extent of its civic engagement – that is, the willingness of citizens to be engaged in on-going reform activi-

8 See, for example, the debates in the Parliament and in the mass media related to Armenia’s possible integration with the European Union and the Eurasian Union in March - December 2013. 9 Some of these peculiarities are common to the entire post-Soviet space.10 Who controls what in Armenia – U.S. Embassy cable by WikiLeaks.http://iwpr.net/report-news/armenian-government-just-coasting, accessed June 7, 2013.11 A significant part of the economic resources in Armenia is controlled by Russia. The Armenian state owns shares of varying value in the joint enterprises. However, this share is reducing: in December 2013, the Armenian government sold its 20%-share in the domestic gas distribution network to Russia’s Gazprom monopoly.

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ties. It should be emphasized that in Armenia all three factors are undergoing transformation, and all three are attempting independently to adjust to changes. Various combinations of these variables will determine the protest movement’s success or failure.

The State: Managing Democracy

In regard to the posture assumed by the state on the eve of social protest, much depends on the attitudes of the ruling elite and its commitment to democracy. Several broad-scope factors have characterized the transformation of the Armenian state and its political elite. They can be defined by reference to the particularities of Armenian history, culture, customs, and national character, as well as the nation’s civic “maturity” in general.

None of the post-Soviet countries became democracy immediately after their independ-ence. Armenia was not an exception. Immediately prior to the Soviet Union’s collapse, some rudiments of democratic processes began to appear simultaneously with local outbursts of discontent and mass protests against the Union Center. One might at this point draw analogies to processes in Eastern Europe in 1980s. However, it is necessary to acknowledge, first, that, the central Soviet authorities tried to suppress mass unrest in Armenia by force and, second, that the Nagorno Karabakh conflict was escalating.

Any analysis of the first years of independence in Armenia should stress that the leaders who initiated changes possessed only vague ideas regarding democratic forms of governance. Immediately after independence, amid a general atmosphere of pluralism, some positive shifts appeared as the nation experienced a transition from a semi-totalitarian regime to semi-demo-cratic governance: freedom of the press and assembly were exercised; activity of both the old traditional political parties (banned by the Soviet regime) and the newly-established political parties and NGOs, as well as participation in mass demonstrations were allowed. The same period saw the formation of a new political elite and some development in the direction of a viable civil society.

In 1991, the first (and to this day only) democratic election of the president of Armenia fully confirmed as legitimate. Many violations marked the referendum on the Constitution and the parliamentary election of 1995. The presidential election of 1996 was evaluated by interna-tional observers and oppositional forces as corrupt, fraudulent, and unfair.12

The absence of experience with the democratic self-governance procedures, the deep economic crisis, the unresolved Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, the non-structured character of power, and the inability of powerful governmental figures to address society’s demands led to crises and to a further rupture of social relations and ties. Certain authoritarian features already appeared during the second term of the Levon Ter-Petrosyan presidency (1996-1998). Furthermore, the political, economic, and legislative mistakes inevitable in the first stage of a democratic transition, and disagreements regarding the very essence of reforms, occurred in conjunction with an underdeveloped civil society.13 Finally, the fact that the main political

12 See: Armenia: The 1995 Parliamentary Elections. Materials Prepared by the On-Site IFES Team, August 1, 1995 International Foundation for Electoral Systems at http://www.ifes.org/Content/Publications/Reports/1995/Armenia-The-1995-Parliamentary-Elections-Materials-Prepared-by-the-On-Site-IFES-Team-August-1-1.aspx Armenia’s Parliamentary Election and Constitutional Referendum, July 5, 1995. A Report Prepared by the Staff of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 1995. Armenian Presidential Elections September 24, 1996. Final Report by Simon Osborn. OSCE/ODIHR International Observer Coordinator. At: http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/armenia/1414913 Nearly 100 political parties were registered on the eve of the second parliamentary elections; trade unions were

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figures of this period held diverging views regarding the appropriate routes toward democ-racy exacerbated tensions. In the newly-independent state, which was engaged in the Nagorno Karabakh conflict with Azerbaijan, the army and paramilitary forces, especially Yerkrapah, were strongly influential. All contributed to an early split within the ruling party and the first manifestations of a political opposition. Armenian society itself simultaneously experienced serious fragmentation.

In 1996, Armenia became the first state in the post-Soviet space that tried to implement a peaceful transition of power. After announcement of the presidential election results,14 the sup-porters of Vazgen Manukyan, the first Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia (1991-1993) and the main opponent of the incumbent president, organized rallies. However, after several days of peaceful demonstrations turned into violent demonstrations: Manukyan’s supporters marched to the Parliament building, demanded a vote recount, and then forcibly entered the building. The protesters were evicted by the police, a curfew was imposed, and the army was deployed in Yerevan’s main streets. Street protests of varying intensity have occurred after the presidential elections of 2003, 2008, and 2013.15

The internal developments in Armenia in the second half of the 1990s prepared the ground for the former leader of the Communist Party of Armenia, Karen Demirchyan’s16 reappearance in the political arena. It signaled widespread disillusionment and manifested a degree of nos-talgia for the “good Soviet times.”17 Hence, it was not surprising that in the early presidential election of 1998, which was held after the resignation of L. Ter-Petrosyan, K. Demirchyan stood against the acting Prime Minister, Robert Kocharyan.18 According to some Western ana-lysts, Kocharyan’s victory signified the entrance of hard-liners into power.19 However, this outcome was in fact an attempt to consolidate power and to restore its legitimacy after the parliamentary elections of 1996.

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almost dissolved and did not function. NGOs were in the process of formation; they mainly offered assistance to socially unprotected groups of the population. One of the rare functioning think tanks was the Armenian Center for National and International Studies, established by the former Armenian Foreign Minister Raffi Hovannisian in 1994. 14 The incumbent President Levon Ter-Petrosyan received 51.75% of the vote, and his opponent Vazgen Manukyan 41.3% of the vote.15 It should be noted that second rounds in presidential elections of 1998 and 2003 were held. 16 Karen Demirchyan’s reappearance in the political arena signaled widespread disillusionment and manifested a degree of nostalgia for the “good Soviet times.”In Georgia and Azerbaijan, as early as the second or third years of independence, democratically elected presidents were ousted and former Communist leaders came to power, namely, respectively. E. Shevardnadze and H. Aliyev. 17 It must be noted that in Georgia and Azerbaijan, as early as the second or third years of independence, democratically elected presidents were ousted and former Communist leaders came to power, namely, respectively, E. Shevardnadze and H. Aliyev.18 After the first round the votes were distributed as 38,5% of votes for R.Kocharyan, and 30,5% for K. Demirchyan. In the second round of the presidential election on March 30, 1998, Robert Kocharyan received 59,49% of the vote. Karen Demirchyan received 40,51%. For more details see: Republic of Armenia. Presidential Election March 16 and 30, 1998. Final Report. OSCE/ODIHR http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/armenia/14192. Demirchyan later formed the People’s Party, teaming up with defense minister Vazgen Sargsyan to form the Miasnutyun (Unity) alliance to run in the May 1999 parliamentary elections. In June 1999, K. Demirchyan became Speaker of the Parliament and Vazgen Sargsyan became Prime Minister. Both were assassinated on October 27, 1999, in the Armenian Parliament. 19 Stephan H. Astourian. 2000. FromTer-Petrosian to Kocharian: Leadership Change in Armenia. Berkeley Program in Soviet and Post-Soviet Studies. Working Paper Series. University of California, Berkeley.At http://iseees.berkeley.edu/bps/publications/2000_04-asto.pdf, accessed July 23, 2013.

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An analysis of Armenia’s internal political processes leads to a particular designation: this nation’s current political development must be understood as a “managed democracy.” On the one hand, the state adheres to democratic values (freedom of speech, press, and assem-bly, mass rallies and demonstrations, etc.) and defends the rights of national and religious minorities; on the other hand, the state directly and indirectly uses its resources to found po-litical parties such as the Prosperous Armenia and MIAK (United Liberal National) parties, pro-governmental NGOs (the Noravank Foundation, European Integration, the International Center for Human Development), and to establish, finance, and control the mass media.20 The latter is viewed by the elite as necessary in order to restrain relatively independent media activ-ity – restraint which is perceived as critical in light of intensifying societal tensions. The ruling elite also antagonozes its political opponents by tracing the flows of their financial dealings. In particular, the activities of Khachatur Sukiasyan and Vartan Oskanyan21 were monitored in 2008 and 2012-2013, respectively.

Concurrently, internal developments, as well as obligations and commitments to European institutions, oblige Armenian authorities to demonstrate their adherence to democratic values.22 All formal legal and institutional structures inherent in a democratic system of governance exist in Armenia; however, political decisions and elite recruitment remain under the purview of only a very narrow circle. The citizenry in general is pushed aside and excluded from governance.

The presidential election of 2008 and the aftermath events23 demonstrated the existence of a high conflict potential in Armenian society and the possibility for high politicization and strong political polarization. Fertile soil for a snow-balling of protest moods continues to exist. Serious unresolved economic and social problems – including growing economic and social inequality, a deepening demographic crisis owing to the emigration of highly-trained youth and representatives of the middle and working classes, and high rates of impunity among criminal suspects closely connected to the inner circle of the ruling elite – constitute now a wide foundation for civil discontent. Both the reappearance of Levon Ter-Petrosyan in Sep-tember, 2007, in the political arena after a ten-year hiatus and the creation in August, 2008, of the Armenian National Congress must be viewed in this context.24

20 A widespread belief prevails that the idea to found a second pro-government party (Prosperous Armenia) originated from the office of the former president, Robert Kocharyan. Mediamax News Agency strongly supported Kocharyan. The youth party MIAK, as well as a wide chain of the Armenian mass media, including the Armenia Media Holding, Panorama.am, ArmNews, Tert.am, and others, are under the control of Mikael Minasyan, the former deputy head of the Office of President and the President’s son-in-law. 21 Khachatur Sukiasyan is one of Armenian oligarchs (The controlling share package of ARMECONOMBANK OJSC belongs to the Sukiasyan family; he is one of the co-founders of the Union of Manufacturers and Businessmen, and the founder of SIL Group). Three times was elected Deputy of the National Assembly of Armenia, non-party. Vartan Oskanyan is the former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Armenia (1998-2008), member of the Prosperous Armenia Party, and a founder of Civilitas Foundation. 22 The second term of President Robert Kocharyan (2003-2008) was marked by the adoption of programs related to the fight against corruption and the overcoming of poverty. At that time Armenia signed the Action Plan within the framework of the European Neighborhood Policy. Progress toward a democratic transformation allowed Armenia to become a recipient of the USAID Millennium Program. 23 Post-election disturbances in February, 2008, reached a high point of intensity. The race between Serzh Sargsyan and Levon Ter-Petrosyan was resolved in a very tragic manner on March 1, 2008. After two weeks of peaceful rallies in the center of Yerevan, tensions escalated into an open conflict. This event is widely considered post-Soviet Armenia’s most severe political crisis. Clashes between protesters and the police, which led to 10 deaths, affected not only the image of Armenia, but also its economy: several development programs, sponsored by USAID and other international agencies, were withdrawn or suspended. 24 L. Ter-Petrosyan used all the protest or revolutionary attributes of the period of late1980s-beginning 1990s in an effort to revive memories of the nation’s unity, so inspiring on the eve of Armenia’s independence.

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No electoral transfer of power occurred during this 20-year period. This fact confirms the managed character of the Armenian model of democracy. Attempts to challenge the results of presidential elections occurred in 1996 and 2008; however, after clashes with the police, in both cases mass protests ceased. The parliamentary election of 2012 and the presidential elec-tion of 2013 were also well-managed by the ruling elite. The parliamentary election revealed some disagreements between the Republican Party of Armenia (RPA) and the Prosperous Ar-menia Party (PAP), as well as a significant shift in the electorate. This is evident in particular in the distribution of seats in the fourth (2007) and fifth (2012) Parliaments and in the redistribu-tion of roles in Armenia’s political field.25 See Table 1:

Table 1 Distribution of seats in the fourth (2007) and fifth (2012) ParliamentsYear/ Numbers of MPs 2007 2012Republican Party of Armenia 64 69Prosperous Armenia Party 25 37Armenian Revolutionary Federation 16 5Rule of Law Party 8 6The Heritage Party 7 5The Armenian National Congress - 7Not included in those factions 11 2

Both the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (ARF Dashnaktutyun) and the Country of Law Party are continuing to lose support. It appears clear that the ARF, which currently can be considered as an oppositional party, will remain out of the political landscape at least in the mid-term perspective. Clear reasons are apparent: it is losing gradually its relatively stable electorate owing to its failure to formulate a realistic program to address economic issues, charismatic leadership is lacking, and discussions with Ter-Petrosyan on behalf of the nomina-tion of a united oppositional candidate have failed. Although the party retains five MP seats, it has been unable to influence decision-making. The Country of Law Party, a completely pro-ruling and puppet organization which had eight seats in the previous Parliament, lost two seats in the parliamentary election of 2012. It has had no impact.

The Republican Party of Armenia and the Prosperous Armenia Party remain the main actors in the Parliament. Both parties improved their representation, not least owing to the ameliora-tion of a presumed rivalry. Their disagreements are not fundamental; for both, it is crucial to preserve control over the Parliament and over the flow of finance.

The Prosperous Armenia Party succeeded in gaining an additional 12 seats at the expense of that part of the electorate undecided in previous elections and because of its populist slogans, the charitable activity of its leader, and its soft critique of the government’s policies. The ap-pearance of Vardan Oskanyan, the former Minister of Foreign Affairs, in PAP ranks gave the party a fashionable glow and attracted new supporters from the Armenian intelligentsia.

How do these changes play out today? The very fact of an active – although reactive and short-lived – expression of discontent in the society immediately after the presidential elec-tion is forcing the ruling elite to take measures to reduce tensions. Among the actions aimed to achieve this goal should be mentioned: the dismissal of several mid-level officials; the resignation of several others from the second and third echelons of power; and the introduc-

25 The Armenian Parliament consists of 131 Deputies: 90 should be elected proportionally and 41 on a majoritarian principle.

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tion to the public of compromising information on some public and political figures, includ-ing members of the ruling elite.26 It should also be emphasized that the number of oligarch members of the Republican Party, better known by their nicknames, was reduced in the 2012 Parliament.27 There were also long-lasting speculations and discussions about the replacement of Prime Minister T. Sargsyan (RPA), who has occupied this post since April 2008.28 After his resignation, the position is occupied by H. Abrahamyan (Speaker of the Armenian Parliament in 2012-2014, and member of RPA, and one of the Armenian so called oligarchs).

The ruling elite at the current stage of internal developments in Armenia, for the sake of its self-preservation, needs to make some concessions to reduce growing societal tension. How-ever, if in the past it was able to achieve this goal by referring to the unresolved Nagorno Karabakh conflict, currently this tactic is unsuccessful owing to increasing public attention to social and social-economic issues.

The Opposition in Opposition to Itself

In any analysis and evaluation of the prospects of success for the civic movements, the politi-cal opposition must play a very significant role. In the National Security Strategy of Armenia, adopted in 2007, a variety of internal threats are mentioned: - “- Deterioration in the efficacy of public administration and a decline of trust in the judiciary; - Insufficiency of the political system; - Insufficient level of democratic consolidation;- Polarization;- Urbanization; - Challenges from the market economy and problems of financial budget management; - Inadequate infrastructure;- Low level of science and education;- Inadequate intellectual and national education; - Negative demographic trends;- Environmental problems and efficient administration of natural resources;- Epidemics and disasters.”29

Within the context of this analysis, most important threats are related to the inadequacy of the political system and an insufficient level of democratic consolidation.30 Nonetheless, it

26 Among the recent examples should be mentioned an offshore scandal related to Tigran Sargsyan, the Prime Minister, and Archbishop Navasard Kchoyan, the leader of the Ararat Diocese of the Armenian Apostolic Church.27 Aram Karapetyan, the head of the New Times Party, during a press-conference in Yerevan on December 10, 2010, argued that the process of cleaning up the Armenian Parliament of MPs better known by their nicknames was developed by the then deputy head of the Office of President Mikael Minasyan. “The young personnel of the Office of the President have decided that there cannot be anymore nicknamed people in the electoral list of the Republican Party.”За год до выборов: Итоги и перспективы парламента Армении – сметет ли “молодняк” “кличкастых”? At http://www.regnum.ru/news/polit/1390458.html, accessed August 1, 2013.28 Even the forced resignation of President Ter-Petrosyan in 1998 was a result of conflict inside the ruling elite. 29 The National Security Strategy of the Republic of Armenia. Approved on January 26, 2007. At http://www.nsc.am/index.php?m=11, accessed May 5, 2013.30 “The current state of inadequacy among the political parties threatens the national security and the internal democratization and development of political parties is a key prerequisite for the consolidation of democracy in the country...Continuity and effectiveness of democratic systems of governance are at risk in all of the countries in transition. Direct threats in this regard include an inadequate protection of human rights, shortcomings in electoral

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should be emphasized that all of the above-mentioned threats are interrelated and interdepend-ent.

For example, the formation of a viable opposition in Armenia is taking place in a different manner than occurs in states with developed democracies. The analysis of the USAID team, “Armenia: Political Party Assessment” (2005), correctly summarized this situation:

... political parties are fractured and personality-based. Individuals use the parties as tools to gain power and do little with them to aggregate public interest. Parties arrange themselves along an ideological spectrum but, with the exception of a few mainly historical parties, their ideologies do not coherently relate to substantive distinctions or serve as a rationale for party loyalty. Party structures are hierarchical, and national party leadership is disconnected from the average citizen. Parties tend to be heavily dependent on the personality of the party leader. The ideologies of most of the parties are weak, and the parties place themselves on a vaguely-defined ideological spectrum. Being associated with a party in power brings benefits but, for the most part, party loyalty is weak. Although structures exist within most to connect the grassroots with party leaders, there are few signs that policy changes are the result of any bottom-up processes. For most parties, the selection of candidates for party lists and single constituency seats is largely an internal leadership exercise and lacks transparency or internal debate.31

Up until 2007, any discussions on the existence of a cohesive opposition in Armenia were meaningless owing to its fractured character and the absence of clearly articulated goals (al-though in 1996, for a very short period of time, the oppositional forces were able to unify around V. Manukyan). In the meantime, several factors contributed – and still contribute – to the formation of a favorable atmosphere for reformatting and unifying the oppositional forces against the background of gradually growing civic unrest. Among them are:

- a high level of corruption, especially “upper”-level corruption; - a strengthening of clan relations (the ruling elite’s children are entering quickly into the

power structure);32

- an increase in rates of poverty and a sharp reduction of the quality of public education; - a catastrophic demographic decline, and increasing emigration.33

By mid-2007 the combined negative effect of these factors called forth an attempt to unify the opposition against a background of simmering social unrest. For many people (including analysts of internal politics as well) a reappearance of Levon Ter-Petrosyan – with presidential ambitions – in September, 2007, was unexpected. In the meantime, the weak and fragment-ed oppositional parties needed a stimulus in order to overcome their internal contradictions. Hence, Ter-Petrosyan was able to assemble around himself more than ten political parties,

procedures and performance, and insufficient inclusion and engagement of civil society.” See: The National Security Strategy of the Republic of Armenia. At http://www.nsc.am/index.php?m=11, accessed May 5, 2013.31 Sue Nelson, Brian Katulis. 2005. Armenia: Political Party Assessment. Final report. USAID, IRD Inc., pp. V-VI.32 There are mainly sons, sons-in-law, and sons of the “best friends” because of the male-oriented character of Armenian society.33 Gayane Novikova, ed., 2007. Starting the AP ENP: Some Priority Issues for Armenia. Center for Strategic Analysis, Yerevan. The updated information is available on the official websites of Transparency International, World Bank, and others.

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which then established the Armenian National Congress (ANC) in August, 2008.34 The web-site of the ANC notes that this political organization has been established for the “institution-alization of the civil movement that began on the eve of the 2008 presidential elections.” It should be stressed that the process of integration of oppositional forces was based on a particu-lar principle: “THESE must go away, and then we will see.” This maxim is directed more to the mobilization of the protest movement than to the institutionalization of the civil movement. Ter-Petrosyan received 22% of the vote in the presidential election in February, 2008.35

An attempt in the fall of 2011 to establish a dialogue between the ruling elite and the op-position, as represented by the (already fragmented) Armenian National Congress, constituted an important step for the development of Armenia’s political culture. It failed owing to several objective reasons. First, neither the authorities nor the ANC were ready to compromise. There were no significant differences in respect to the goals articulated by each side. The main factors proved to be the mistrust and mutual hostility of the leaders, Serzh Sargsyan and Levon Ter-Petrosyan. Both seemed more interested to demonstrate their “good will” and “readiness for dialogue” to the Western states and concerned organizations than in reducing societal tensions.

Furthermore, the attempt to establish a dialogue had far-reaching negative consequences. Above all, it contributed to the further fragmentation of the oppositional political camp: the ARF and the Heritage Party, both of which were excluded from the political discussion at the time, sharply criticized Ter-Petrosyan and his ANC. In the confrontation between the opposi-tion and the ruling elite, the latter, backed also by Russia and the West, won unequivocally. Second, against the background of open confrontation before and after the tragic events of March 1st, 2008, the inability of the main political forces to find ways to overcome the coun-try’s political crisis has caused deep dissatisfaction in all political parties throughout a vast majority of the Armenian electorate.

It should also be noted that the presence of seven MPs from the ANC in the 2012 Parlia-ment led to quite an interesting situation in Armenia’s legislative body. The Parliament is still controlled by the ruling elite. However, representatives of the ANC and the Heritage Party are increasingly concerned with social issues and, disappointed with the results of the elections, MPs from the Prosperous Armenia Party have been adding critical voices. Indeed, this Party now re-fers to itself as an “alternative force.” Its leader, G. Tsarukyan, who has stated that he cannot be in the opposition,36 has also emphasized that he is “together with the people.” Moreover, the party’s faction in Parliament acts as an oppositional force.37 Finally, it should be added that the puta-tive political parties cannot enter into strong and long-lasting coalitions because of the personal ambitions of their leaders, an absence of clear and strong programs and visions in the political, economic, and social fields, and a lack of strong financial support. The latter factor could fuel the pro-oppositional and oppositional mass media and provide indispensable mass participation.38

34 There are several different numbers on the ANC official website. In one place it mentions 18 political oppositional parties; however, only 13 parties are listed. At http://www.anc.am/am/aboutANC/. Another link mentions that “more than 20 political parties and movements, including the Heritage Party, the New Times Party, Yerkrapah.” At http://www.anc.am/am/aboutANC/category20/, accessed May 12, 2013.35 Supporters of Ter-Petrosyan have been trying to convince the public that he received many more votes and that the elections were stolen.36 Hovannes Igityan. 2013. Interviewed by Nelli Grigoryan,”Гагик Царукян показал, что он является политиком”.At http://ru.aravot.am/2013/05/17/155790/, accessed May 17, 2013.37 See for more information Parliament Monitoring at http://parliamentmonitoring.am38 Of course, the use of administrative resources by ruling elites in the developing democracy countries significantly exceeds the capabilities of the opposition.

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The Distribution of Political Forces in the 2013 Presidential Election

A cohesive opposition is essential for a number of reasons. If opposition leaders are engaged in a struggle for power against one another, they will be unable to challenge pro-presidential elites and will tend to wrestle voters from one another rather than from the ruling elite. The weaknesses of Armenian political parties, the fragmentation of the political arena, and specific features of the Armenian political culture are on the one hand the real obstacles to the forma-tion of a united and strong opposition as well as to beneficial relations – for the society at large – between the ruling elite and the opposition. On the other hand, high societal polarization has led to ongoing and intensive politicization. The post-election period has been one in which this politicization has repeatedly reached a highpoint. These features of the Armenian politi-cal landscape must be viewed in reference to the 2013 election’s major structural feature: the fragmented opposition.

In regard to the configuration of political forces and their leaders’ prospects for the presi-dency on the eve of the presidential election of 2013, at least three points must be stressed.

First, the ARF Dashnaktutyun has been a member of the ruling coalition since 1998. Its rep-resentatives mildly criticized the government in the fourth Parliamentary convocation (May, 2007 – May, 2012), especially in regard to the tragic events of March 1, 2008, following upon the presidential election of February 19, 2008. This party advocates socialism combined with nationalist ideas: a strong anti-Turkish position introduced through the Hay Dat (the Arme-nian Cause), recognition of the Armenian Genocide, and unification of the Nagorno Karabakh Republic with Armenia. On April 30, 2009, the ARF left the ruling coalition owing to a disa-greement regarding the announcement of the Armenian-Turkish Protocols.39 The absence of charismatic leadership, unsuccessful attempts to create a unified oppositional coalition,40 and disagreements inside the party have significantly marginalized the ARF in the nation’s political landscape. Without a charismatic figure, the ARF will be unable to compete for the presidency and also unable to increase its presence in the Parliament in the foreseeable future.

Second, Vardan Oskanyan, a member of the Prosperous Armenia Party and former Minister of Foreign Affairs, abandoned his 2013 presidential race soon after his enttance. According to his early statements, his entrance into active politics was related to his desire to eliminate the monopoly upon power held by the Republican Party. In his opinion, the development of both state and society is held back by this monopoly. Well-known in the Armenian Diaspora, Os-kanyan was not widely considered inside Armenia to be a strong political figure. His activity as an MP and as President of the Civilitas Foundation41 is not well-known. As a consequence of a 2013 financial scandal and an investigation initiated by the National Security Service, he now prefers to be engaged in low-level oppositional activity.42

39 “Protocol on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations Between Republic of Armenia and Republic of Turkey” and “Protocol on Development of Relations Between the Republic of Armenia and the Republic of Turkey” were signed in September, 2009.40 On the eve of the presidential elections in 2008, the Party held several meetings with Ter-Petrosyan and other members of the Armenian National Congress on behalf of efforts to create a unified coalition. The same unsuccessful attempt was made in 2013 with the ANC and then again immediately after the election with the Heritage Party of Raffi Hovannisyan.41 This organization is positioning itself as an independent analytical organization, and it benefits from the support of international donor organizations and individuals from abroad.42 However, during the election for the Yerevan mayor’s office in May 2013, V. Oskanian led the list of the Prosperous Armenia Party. He made several statements in regard to the NSS investigation, denouncing it as politically motivated. For more details see: Criminal investigation launched by the NSS has a political motive. At http://www.civilitasfoundation.org/cf/who-we-are/inside-civilitas/846-chronology.html, accessed August 8, 2013.

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Third, on the eve of the recent presidential elections, it became clear that only three men might compete with incumbent President Serzh Sargsyan: L. Ter-Petrosyan, R. Kocharyan, and G. Tsarukyan. These major political figures arrive at decisions based upon their:

- connections with each other;- personal connections with Russian and Western political and economic elites;- direct and indirect involvement in Armenian business;- direct and indirect involvement in business abroad, mainly in Russia;- and, most importantly, their popularity ratings among the Armenian electorate at large.

As a result of evaluation along all the above-mentioned lines, all three decided against participation in the presidential race.43 Thus, S. Sargsyan faced no real opponents. However, he was highly concerned in his first term in office to establish an overall climate of trust and fairness for the 2013 election and to avoid any repetition of the 2008 scenario.

A result favorable to the authorities was achieved because of several factors. First, within the framework of managed democracy the ruling elite succeeded both in overcoming exist-ing contradictions (in particular, an agreement on ‘noninterference’ was achieved between S. Sargsyan and G. Tsarukyan; R. Kocharyan, as early as December of 2012, made public his decision not to participate as a candidate in the election44) and in actually opening a space for the incumbent president.

Second, the ruling elite demonstrated its willingness to implement – to the certain degree – democratic principles: freedom of the press and demonstrations were largely permitted; force was not used to dispersal the rallies organized by the opposition in the aftermath of the election.45

To some extent, S. Sargsyan has been interested in confirming to the EU and the US that Armenia is a democratic state capable of implementing a balanced foreign policy, of protecting human rights for its citizens, and of holding free and open elections. At first glance, S. Sarg-syan and his team have succeeded: the democratic façade – enough for the evaluation of the

43 The first President of Armenia and the leader of the ANC, Ter-Petrosyan, stated that his advancing age prevented his participation. However, an alternative explanation must be noted: his political past and activities as the first President are still vivid in the memories of the middle generation. His presidential campaign of 2008 failed to mobilize the support of this group of voters. Robert Kocharyan, the second President of Armenia, would not run against Serzh Sargsyan. Despite growing disagreements between them, their long-term friendship and the unresolved Nagorno Karabakh conflict prevents their confrontation. See: Robert Kocharyan: The fight for power between two longtime companions was unacceptable for me. An interview of R. Kocharyan to Mediamax News Agency. December 25, 2012. At http://www.mediamax.am/en/ news/interviews/6600 /, accessed May 24, 2013. Gagik Tsarukian, the oligarch and the leader of the Prosperous Armenia Party, appears to have concluded that his business activity takes precedent over further political activity. However, he has tried to play the role, employing populist slogans and engaging in charitable activity, of the necessary, friendly, and honest critic of the government.44 Robert Kocharyan: “The fight for power between two longtime companions was unacceptable for me.” Interview with Robert Kocharyan at http://www.mediamax.am/en/news/interviews/6600/#sthash.lgTks6B7.dpuf, accessed May 24, 2013.It should be mentioned also that speculations of varying intensity regarding a possible return to power of Kocharyan continue to be exaggerated in Armenian political circles and among analysts, especially as the country approaches elections. See: Robert Kocharyan: I don’t rule out my return to big politics. Interview of R. Kocharyan to Mediamax News Agency. September 30, 2011. At http://www.mediamax.am/en/news/politics/2664/, accessed May 24, 2013. In January, 2014, Kocharyan actively criticized the government in mass media, which was interpreted as his willingness to return to an active political career. See in particular, his interview: Роберт Кочарян: Ущербный премьер – непозволительная роскошь для страны. At: http://www.tert.am/ru/news/2013/12/30/robert-kocharyan/ (accessed on Jan 24, 2014)45 It should be stressed that R. Hovannisyan fully contributed to this part of the success of the ruling elite: he demanded from his supporters that the protest demonstrations remain peaceful.

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elections as fair and free by international observers46 – has been completely preserved. After the election, the Freedom House scale of freedom in the world adjusted its rating for Armenia upward.47

Third, the opposition was unable to rejuvenate and to establish itself as an alternative politi-cal elite. The international observers paid special attention to the fact that no real opponent confronted the incumbent president.48

Six candidates for the presidency stood for election against the incumbent president. In the absence of an opposition leader in possession of charisma, only one candidate offered a serious challenge: Raffi Hovannisyan, the first Foreign Minister of Armenia (1991-1992) and the leader of the Heritage Party.

Since its founding in 2002, the Heritage Party has positioned itself as the organization that offers a liberal opposition. After receiving seven parliamentary seats in the 2007 parliamentary election, the party took over the role of the single critical voice against the incumbent president and the policies of his government. However, unsubstantiated statements and actions of its leader immediately after the 2007 election, and the absence of Larisa Alaverdyan (the former Ombudswoman of Armenia, who was one of Hovannisyan’s most enthusiastic supporters, and head of the NGO Fund Against Violation of Law) on the one hand and the participation of the ANC in the parliamentary election in 2012 on the other hand, resulted in the loss of two mandates by the Heritage Party in the fifth Parliament – in spite of dissatisfaction and anger throughout large segments of society with the politics of the government.49 Opinion polls held on the eve of the presidential election of 2013 are revealing.50

R. Hovannisyan conducted his campaign very skillfully, using the well-known tactics of non-violent protest movements. (The same tactics were chosen in Georgia and Ukraine in 2004, in Tunisia and in Egypt in Winter-Spring, 2011.) However, he was unable to take advan-tage of this opportunity – namely, to utilize the public’s dissatisfaction, which had accumulated over several years, and its willingness to support change. Furthermore, the opposition – or those forces and persons who introduced themselves as such – could not overcome internal contradictions or moderate the personal ambitions of their leaders. They did not support Ho-vannisyan.

As a result, the protest movement that arose immediately after the February 2013 election retained a peak of intensity for approximately two weeks. After the Yerevan City Council elec-tion on May 5th , 2013, the wave of post-election protests collapsed. The main reasons for the opposition’s defeat and withdrawal from the political campaign are the following:

46 “Armenia’s presidential election was generally well-administered and was characterized by a respect for fundamental freedoms, including those of assembly and expression… At the same time, a lack of impartiality on the part of the public administration and the misuse of administrative resources resulted in a blurred distinction between the activities of the state and those of the ruling party.” See: Armenian election generally well-administered with fundamental freedoms respected, but some key concerns remain, international election observers say. At http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/99676, accessed June 9, 2013. Please compare: Presidential Election 19 February 2008. Final Report. OSCE/ODIHR Observation Mission Report. Warsaw, 30 May, 2008. At http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/armenia/32115, accessed June 9, 2013.47 Freedom in the World.2013. Freedom House. At http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2013, accessed August 20, 2013.48 Presidential Election 18 February 2013. Final Report. OSCE/ODIHR Observation Mission Report. Warsaw, 8 May 2013. At http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/101314, accessed June 9, 2013.49 In the 2012 parliamentary election, the Heritage Party participated in tandem with the Free Democrats Party. The leader of this party became an MP; however, the Heritage faction in the Parliament soon fragmented. 50 Armenian Presidential Elections, 2013. At http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Armenian_presidential_election,_2013, accessed June 16, 2013.

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- A growing general disillusionment pushed a section of the population to vote in the presidential election AGAINST the powers that be rather than FOR the future.

- A strong united opposition candidate had not appeared. - No candidate had designed a clear political, economic, or social program; that is, an

introduction of gradual steps to overcome serious economic and social crises and an agenda capable of offering a clear alternative to the program of the incumbent. Rather, broad populist slogans and empty gestures dominated the campaign.

- A public debate between the candidates was lacking, and the ordinary voter could distinguish the differences in the positions of the several candidates for the presidency only with difficulty.

- The strength of the opposition was also measurable through the scarce economic means at its disposal.51 In regard to developments in the presidential election of February, 2008, the opposition acquired some support among the Armenian “oligarchs.” However, during the election campaign of 2013, the Armenian economic elite fully supported the incumbent president.

In the post-election discussions, R. Hovannisyan introduced himself as the “voice of the peo-ple” rather than as the leader of a party or only of a segment of the nation, and as the only candi-date concerned about the needs of the entire population. This posture could have been considered as a signal to all oppositional forces to seek unity. However, the crucial tactical mistakes of Hov-annisyan, his personal behavior, the decision by one element of the opposition to provide ‘moral’ but not ‘physical’ support (the ARF, and the Prosperous Armenia Party, in particular), and the growing internal disagreements in the ANC – all of these factors sharply reduced the intensity of the protests in Yerevan. His strategic mistake proved crucial: namely, his failure to formulate a clear program of action that could be announced a) in the event that dialogue with president-elect Sargsyan might take place and b) if such a dialogue met with failure.52

On the one hand, this array of errors led to a widespread public unwillingness to recognize and support Hovannisyan as a potential leader. On the other hand, it also helped the ruling elite to mobilize itself and to diminish the intensity of the social protest.

Hence, remaining within the framework of managed democracy, there were no changes of power. The 2013 election highly confirmed the weaknesses of the oppositional political forces and their inability to mobilize and direct the mood of protest evident among a significant part of the electorate.53 As a consequence, the deficit of trust in the ruling elite continues to grow.

Summing up, it should be emphasized that oppositional political forces, if their genuine success is to be achieved, need to overcome their internal disagreements and to create a com-mon platform capable of offering a foundation for viable competition with the ruling elite. The main goal of the existing Armenian political opposition is a formal change of power rather than either shifts toward a broader sharing of power by the population at large or significant societal change. The 2013 elections actually pushed all political actors from the 1990-2013 period off Armenia’s political stage.

51 The most visible examples were the parliamentary elections in Georgia in 2012, and Bidzina Ivanishvili, who used his own financial sources. Another example can be mentioned: the participation of the Russian tycoon Mikhail Prokhorov in the presidential race in 2011 in Russia.52 It is no coincidence that, in the elections to the Yerevan City Council, the bloc “Hello, Yerevan,” led by the Heritage Party, received only 8,5% of the vote. This result constitutes strong evidence of a further loss of voter confidence in this party and in Raffi Hovannisyan personally.53 See the section “Awakening Civic Society” further below for more details.

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In the spring of 2014, the Armenian political opposition again attempted to reorganize itself. The group of four parties, including the Prosperous Armenia Party and the Armenian National Congress, announced a new round of internal negotiations aimed to unite all non-governing political forces. The goal was to “take the country out of systemic crisis.” However, a crucial question separated the parties: does Armenia require a revolutionary change of power or can positive changes be achieved through societal consolidation reform plans. It is obvious that currently the most powerful figure among the oppositional forces – the leader of the PAP, G. Tsarukyan – wants to avoid the duplicatation of the Maydan scenario in Armenia. 54 In the meantime, the meeting of the opposition on October 10, 2014, revealed the unwillingness of “the Four” to discuss new foreign policy shifts; it also indicated an incapacity to present to the public a coherent vision of Armenia’s future.

The consequent marginalization of many political parties has opened an opportunity for new grassroots actors. However, before turning to this theme, the enduring influence of exter-nal actors must be briefly addressed.

The Strength of External Actors

If the relationship between the different segments of the political elite is to be adequately depicted, the role of external actors must be rendered clear. External influences are strongly affected by a number of factors other than ideological and political factors. In oil-rich coun-tries the influence of these actors is limited (Azerbaijan) and not vital to the local economy. In Georgia, on the other hand, the parliamentary election led to a peaceful transition of power. Among the factors that initially brought the Georgian Dream coalition to power in 2012 was a total disillusionment of citizens with their rulers and the cynical manipulations associated with the Saakashvili administration.55

Yet even in this case the role of external forces cannot be excluded: the strongest factor was the visible decline of the Georgian economy owing to Russian sanctions. However, further external factors were also important: for example, the Saakashvili government’s loss of sup-port from the West (and the US, in particular); Ivanishvili’s personal funds and his strong con-nections with the Russian political and economic establishment, and the political consultation provided by several US think tanks. Thus, whenever it can become manifest, foreign support for the opposition can be a strong factor.

The critical external issue in regard to Armenia involves prevention of any escalation of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict and the preservation of relative stability in the region. Against this background, domestic stability is important to external actors: all of them view the current authorities as legitimate and capable.

At present, if we acknowledge the significant support provided to the ruling elite by the Western democracies (even despite the Armenian President’s decision to join the Russian-led Customs Union), as well as by the Russian authorities, we must conclude that the Arme-nian opposition cannot depend upon receiving substantial external support. Moreover, options available to the West, if it wishes to demonstrate disagreement or dissatisfaction with election results or human rights policies and general freedoms in Armenia, are limited: it can restrict or

54 A stagnation should not be an alternative to ‘Maydan’ (Аlternativoy Maydanu ne dolzhen bit’ zastoy; (In Russian). An interview by G. Tsarukian to Nezavisimaya gazeta newspaper on October 9, 2014, Moscow. At: http://www.ng.ru/cis/2014-10-09/6_armenia.html 55 The imprisonment of opponents, the torture scandal in the prisons, the use of violence against demonstrators, etc.

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suspend financial support on the state level (as occurred after the 2008 presidential election).56 However, in Armenia, as a country with a high level of corruption,57 the reduction of West-ern financial support remains invisible to the population at large. Moreover, Russian direct investments in the Armenian economy is approximately 40% of total foreign investments. Cognizance should also be taken of the fact that, in certain circumstances, foreign aid often is provided as a result of quid pro quo compromises.

In sum, the interests of external actors influence significantly domestic political develop-ments in Armenia. This dynamic should not be neglected in any analysis of this nation’s politi-cal culture.

Awakened Civic Society: Initiatives “From the Bottom”

Several critical factors affect every aspect of the lives of ordinary people.58 Rates of unemployment are high and political polarization is increasing. As well, a growing gap exists between the living standards of city dwellers as opposed to those of residents in the countryside. In addition, negative demographic trends (including high emigration rates and a depopulation of the nation’s northern and borderline regions) are striking and worrisome, as is decreasing access to higher education and medical care. More than 35% of the population lives below the poverty line. These trends shape the Armenian political environment and mold the political behavior of the electorate.

Let us turn first to the political climate. A strong distinction must be made in respect to each Armenian election since independence. As mentioned, whereas citizens voted for the future in the elections of 1991, 1998, and 2008, significant numbers voted in 1996, 2003, and 2013 against incumbent presidents.59 In 1996, 2008, and 2013 there were large – according to Armenian standards – post-election street protests. The trend to vote against the incumbent is introduced in Table 2:

Table 2 The trend to vote against the incumbent president.Year Incumbent %% of the vote Opponent(s) %% of the vote1996 L. Ter-Petrosyan 51.75 V. Manukyan 41.31998 R. Kocharyan1 58,9 K. Demirchyan 40,12003 R. Kocharyan 67,45 S. Demirchyan 32,55

2008 S. Sargsyan 52,82 L. Ter-PetrosyanA. Bagdasaryan

21,5017,70

2013 S. Sargsyan 58,64 R. Hovannisyan 36,75

Second, because street protests constitute a major tool of the opposition, it is important to understand how and why citizens react to stimuli from politics and civil society. It is also

56 In particular, the part of the USAID “Millennium Development Goals” Program was suspended. 57 According to the Transparency International, Armenia was ranked 94 among 176 countries (to compare: Georgia was ranked 55, and Azerbaijan and Russia - 127). Corruption Perceptions Index 2013. At: http://www.transparency.org/cpi2013/results58 See the results of the sociological survey, conducted by IPSC in June 2013. The evaluation of activity of the government: its transparency, achievements, omissions, and the strategic suggestions for development. At: http://www.gov.am/u_files/file/presentations/Jun-13_IPSC_GS%20Index%20Survey%20Presentation_Website.pdf, accessed August 8, 2013.59 A technical aspect of the voting in 2013 also should be mentioned. On the voting ballot seven candidates for the presidency were listed. However, there was no possibility to vote “against all.” Hence, voters had to chose either someone from the list– for many a decision between “bad” and “worst,” – or to destroy the ballot.

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important to comprehend to what extent they are able to organize by themselves and to what extent they prefer to follow a leader. In regard to the Armenian electorate, some peculiarities should be pointed out:

- a significant percentage of the citizenry is fearful of change and confident that each group of new leaders will be less capable than current leaders;

- a large segment of the population is preparing to leave the country and hence does not wish to be involved in civic activity;

- despite a strong protest potential, the citizenry at large does not remain in the streets or squares and demand change, as occurred during the “Bulldozer revolution” in Belgrade in 2000 and as was taking place July-August, 2013, in Egypt, or in December 2013-February 2014, in Ukraine. Street protests in Armenia are short-term, citizens do not believe in significant change, and leadership and goals that might unify persons from across the entire political spectrum are absent.

Third, a fragmentation of the Armenian political opposition endures, and mutual mistrust among leaders of the opposition is deepening .

Fourth, we are witnessing, in the course of post-election developments in Armenia, the in-ability of both the authorities and the opposition to motivate citizens. The electorate at large is currently more confused, apathetic, and depressed than before the presidential 2013 elections. The emergence of new “old” parties, such as the Armenian National Movement, and political unions, as well as the sheer numbers of new leaders, increases uncertainty.

However, these developments may contain a positive element: this confusion stimulates the growth of grassroots movements, the appearance of new activists, and the crystallization of new types of civic activity which is running outside the framework of political parties.60 This activity is unifying different strata of Armenian society – from students and youth61 actively using Facebook and Twitter to veterans of the Karabakh war. Although their activity is to some extent spontaneous, and unified action by different groups is absent (and support from other protest groups is lacking), it must be understood as an expression of a direct demand for change and as a societal-wide attempt to organize and reorganize the political landscape.

Another interesting grassroots movement originated in the autumn of 2012 on the occasion of the founding of the “Pre-Parliament of Armenia.” This group, which is still very amorphous, claims to express the aspirations of the entire population. Its program statement emphasizes that all members “take on responsibility to initiate a political process aimed to create state gov-ernance capable of formulating and solving national goals and objectives.”62An overwhelming majority of Pre-Parliament members are representatives of the intelligentsia. They seek to an-swer the classic questions: “What to do?” and “Who is to blame?” The Pre-Parliament is trying

60 On the developments in Armenia regarding the implementation of the mandatory component of the Cumulative Pension Law at the websites http://news.am/eng/news/190892.html; http://www.arminfo.am/index.cfm?objectid=7EDF85B0-8F15-11E3-BD5C0EB7C0D21663; http://www.arminfo.am/index.cfm?objectid=105005F0-8F12-11E3-BD5C0EB7C0D21663; http://www.1in.am/arm/armenia_politics_251582.html, and others. 61 Both L. Ter-Petrosyan in 2008 and R. Hovannisyan in 2013 tried to exploit its potential. However, until now the ruling elite and pro-government forces have managed to organize youth groups more effectively than have the opposition parties. Several years ago the Republican, Prosperous Armenia, and Rule of Law parties established youth branches. The ruling elite also founded the youth movement MIASIN (“Together”). The authorities further succeeded in preventing students from active participation in protests in the Winter of 2012 and the Spring of 2013, indeed placing, through administration measures implemented at higher education institutions, adverse pressure upon them.62 One of the main slogans of this group is “The 100th Anniversary (of the Armenian Genocide- G.N.) without this regime!” See in more details at http://preparliament.org (In Armenian.)

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to play a role analogous to Moscow’s “Bolotnaya Square.” In light of a lack of leadership and the absence of public support, perhaps little can be expected from its activities.

However, despite the fact that Armenian society today appears largely amorphous and apo-litical, even the semi-victory of activists in the struggle against increased transportation costs or the prevention of the construction of luxurious apartments by a small group of neighbor-hood people, or as the most significant, a suspension of the implementation of the manda-tory component of the Law on Cumulative Pensions in January 2014, may become a turning point that ignites street protests. Critical now to their continued activism is the emergence of a charismatic leader able to articulate realistic goals and to introduce pathways toward their fulfillment. However, in the absence of such a leader and a tangible program of action, the rul-ing elite retains the capacity to influence the varying reconstitution of groups and to alleviate, through small-scale concessions, tensions in Armenian society. Managed democracy remains in place.

Conclusion

The protest potential in Armenian society is not very high owing to several major features. Main trends from the 1990s to 2013 confirm that inertia in the nation’s political thinking and the ossification of established modes of political behavior cannot be overcome in the short term. Furthermore, serious demographic problems, including a sharp increase in emigration, unemployment and poverty, a high level of corruption, frustration caused by the ruling elite, as well as the weakness of opposition parties, have provoked a deepening of apathy among the vast majority of citizens.63

The absence of charismatic leadership, either among established political figures or grass-roots activists, and the lack of clearly articulated policy statements that take the improvement of living standards for significant strata as their goal and propose practical ways to implement this goal, also strongly contribute to this development. In addition, a significant segment of the Armenian citizenry believes that the preservation of internal stability is essential in light of the unresolved Nagorno Karabakh conflict and the high probability of its resumption. In turn, the ruling elite is still able to manipulate the population by offering insignificant concessions and hence providing to opponents the illusion of victory.

Nevertheless, the presidential elections of 2008 and 2013 clearly indicated that a growing segment of the population – 22% and 36% respectively – is anticipating serious changes across a wide spectrum of issues. The process of forming a civil society in Armenia has recently be-come invigorated and is acquiring momentum. The demonstrations in the Theater (Freedom) Square in Yerevan against the implementation of the mandatory component of Cumulative Pension Law have been organized by a group of politically active young people unified under the slogan “Dem em!” (I am against!).64 All four oppositional political parties represented in the Parliament, are trying to exploit the potential of this movement.

63 Very symptomatic in this context is the result of the sociological poll based on interviews with 114,000 people in 107 countries conducted by “2013 Global Corruption Barometer.” “Nearly 90 percent of global respondents expressed an eagerness to act against corruption, from signing petitions to taking part in protests, to spreading the word through social media… The only country surveyed in which less than half of respondents said they would be prepared to do anything was Armenia. Less than one-third of the respondents said they would not be willing even to sign a petition.”Richard Solash. 2013. Global Corruption ‘Worsening,’ But Citizens Prepared To Act. At http://www.rferl.org/content/golbal-corruption-survey/25040514.html, accessed July 13, 2013.64 See for more details at their website www.dem.am

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There is still a possibility of addressing the accumulated problems peacefully through broad reforms and shifts in the allocation of power. Furthermore, there should not be any serious turmoil in Armenia in the mid-term period owing to several objective circumstances. First, much will depend on the behavior of the ruling elite and the ability of its representatives to stimulate, and to be deeply engaged in, serious alterations of the system of governance, as well as in efforts to improve the economy.

Second, as Armenia approaches the next election cycle, oppositional political parties will be forced to restructure, to modernize and to regroup, and to take into consideration the mis-calculations and mistakes made in the course of the 2012 parliamentary and 2013 presidential elections. The process of transformation of the Republican Party of Armenia has already been initiated by the president.65 V. Oskanyan, G. Arsenyan, and, to some extent, N. Zohrabyan have become more and more active in the Prosperous Armenia Party. Internal turmoil exists in the ARF Dashnaktutyun. A new party – the All-Armenian National Movement (which will serve as a counter balance to the ANC of L. Ter-Petrosyan) – held its initial meeting in the fall of 2013.

The major impulse toward change emanates from below and from groups now experienc-ing civic engagement for the first time. Although it is still too early to discuss the emergence of a powerful new political or social movement in Armenia, each small advancing step by grassroots activists in the social, political, and ecological spheres can stimulate a large protest movement aiming to achieve social justice. All of these grassroots groups indicate a distinct move away from the form of political activity familiar to anyone who has studied Armenia’s last twenty years, and a qualitative step forward. However, all new groups are still extremely weak and poorly organized. Moreover, coordination of activity between them is lacking and the society in general is not ready to take large steps in their direction. Casting a glance across Armenia’s very complicated and turbulent recent political environment, it must be acknowl-edged that any spontaneous mass protest could lead to unpredictable developments.

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