New Findings on Arabs and Democracy (Journal of Democracy)

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New FiNdiNgs oN ARAbs ANd democRAcy

Mark Tessler, Amaney Jamal, and Michael Robbins

Mark Tessler is Samuel J. Eldersveld Collegiate Professor in the De-partment of Political Science at the University of Michigan and co-director of the Arab Barometer Survey. Amaney Jamal is associate professor of politics at Princeton University and codirector of the Arab Barometer Survey. Michael Robbins is a political scientist and project manager for the Arab Barometer Survey.

Journal of Democracy Volume 23, Number 4 October 2012© 2012 National Endowment for Democracy and The Johns Hopkins University Press

Throughout 2011, a wave of protests swept the Arab world. Although multifaceted, with causes and implications specific to each country, these protests shared a number of themes, including frustration over poor economic performance, anger at corruption and the existing politi-cal system, and the demand for a government that cares about ordinary citizens and treats them with dignity. These uprisings have dramatically altered the balance between the state and society in many cases, leading to the fall of dictators and a reversal of the deliberalization process that had been going on in many countries for well over a decade.

Against this backdrop, we examine public-opinion data pertaining to governance and politics from the first and second waves of the Arab Ba-rometer survey project, which were carried out in 2006–2007 and 2010–2011, respectively. One constant between the first and second waves is the overwhelming support for democracy in the region. At the same time, support for the role of religion in politics and government de-clined between the two waves while new questions in the second round revealed that large majorities believe in racial tolerance, support having women in the workplace, and prefer having a range of politicians who espouse diverse political ideas.

The first wave of Arab Barometer surveys was administered via face-to-face interviews to nationally representative samples of men and women aged 18 and older in seven countries: Algeria, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Morocco, Palestine, and Yemen.1 Findings based on these sur-veys were reported in the Journal of Democracy in 2008.2 The second

90 Journal of Democracy

wave of the Arab Barometer employed similar methods and was carried out in all these counties except Kuwait, as well as in Egypt and Tunisia (where political conditions had prevented the conduct of surveys dur-ing the first wave), Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Sudan. This essay focuses mainly on the five countries that were surveyed in both waves, plus Egypt and Tunisia.3

As a result of the mass uprisings in the region, the political context in which the second wave of interviews was carried out varied from country to country, depending on when they were taken. Four surveys—in Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine, and Sudan—were conducted just weeks before the 17 December 2010 self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi in Tunisia and the subsequent protests that sparked the “Arab Spring.”4 A second battery of surveys was completed in early 2011 as revolutions were sweeping Tunisia and Egypt: In Saudi Arabia, the survey began before the 14 January 2011 ouster of Tunisian dictator Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali but ended before Egyptian ruler Hosni Mubarak stepped down on February 11;5 in Yemen, the survey was conducted in the first half of February—thus after Ben Ali’s fall, though some interviews were conducted before Mubarak’s deposal and others after; in Iraq, the survey was completed soon after the overthrow of Mubarak. The surveys in the four remaining countries—Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia—were conducted months after these events took place, in the late spring, sum-mer, and fall of 2011.

According to Freedom House’s annual Freedom in the World re-port for 2010, no Arab country was a democracy at the time of either the first or the second wave of surveys, yet support for democracy is extremely high by a range of measures (see the Figure on page 91). In fact, support for democracy in these countries is higher than in many longstanding democracies.6 The level of support for a “democratic po-litical system” remained fairly consistent between the two waves, rang-ing between 83 and 96 percent in all countries.7 The biggest change was in Algeria, where public support for democracy increased by 6 percentage points.8 In Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine, and Yemen, support for democracy remained essentially unchanged (within the margin of error of the survey).

As Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan as well as others have argued, de-mocracy is most likely to be fully consolidated when it is perceived not only as a desirable political option but also as “the only game in town.”9 The Arab Barometer therefore gauges not only general support for de-mocracy but also ordinary citizens’ commitment to the democratization process. After priming respondents with three questions about potential problems associated with democratic governance—the economy runs poorly in democracies, democracies are indecisive, and democracies are not good at maintaining order—investigators asked survey partici-pants if they still believed democracy to be the best political system

91Mark Tessler, Amaney Jamal, and Michael Robbins

despite these possible drawbacks. Not surprisingly, a smaller share of respondents indicated support for democracy in this context, yet levels remained very high, ranging between 81 percent and 92 percent in all the countries surveyed.

There was a shift on this measure between the first and second waves in Lebanon and Jordan, with support in the former dropping by almost ten percentage points and in the latter by five, though overall support remained high in both countries. The other three countries saw no sig-nificant change. In sum, both waves demonstrated that most people in these Arab countries believe that democracy, whatever its problems, is the best political system.

Understandings of Democracy

How do Arabs understand the word “democracy”? By asking respon-dents which characteristic they most associate with democratic gov-ernance, the Arab Barometer found important differences in ordinary citizens’ understanding of democracy.10 Survey participants were given four response options: free elections, freedom of speech, low economic inequality, and basic necessities for all. In the first-wave surveys, none is identified by more than a third of respondents in any country as the

*“All” represents an average calculated on a pooled sample of respondents from Algeria, Jor-dan, Lebanon, Palestine, and Yemen (the five countries included in both waves). It should be noted that the number of respondents differs between these five countries.Note: Sample sizes vary by country as follows: All = 6,191, Algeria = 1,220, Jordan = 1,188, Lebanon = 1,392, Palestine =1,200, Yemen = 1,200, Egypt = 1,219, Tunisia = 1,196.

Figure—Support For Democracy (SeconD-Wave reSultS)


primary characteristic of democracy. The second-wave surveys yielded a similar result, although there were two additional response options in this round—political equality and eliminating corruption.

In both waves, understandings about democracy form along two di-mensions: economic and political. When examined in these broader cat-egories, the data reveal that citizens are divided on what they understand democracy to mean. In the first wave, citizens in Algeria and Lebanon were more or less equally divided, with just over half stating that economic characteristics are more essential to democracy. By contrast, in Palestine a sizeable majority (58 percent) stated that political characteristics are more important, while in Jordan an even larger majority (62 percent) stated that economic characteristics are most essential in defining democracy.

In the second wave, most Lebanese respondents (56 percent) chose economic characteristics—a moderate increase from the first wave (51 percent). Likewise, more Palestinians chose economic characteristics in the second wave than in the first, although a majority in Palestine still chose political characteristics. In Algeria, however, there was a sizeable increase (11 percentage points) in the selection of political characteris-tics between the two surveys, with just over 60 percent of respondents citing political characteristics in the second wave.

Although this item was not asked in Yemen in the first wave, 61 per-cent of second-wave respondents identified a political characteristic as being the most critical aspect—a level similar to that found in Algeria in the second wave. Unlike in Jordan, Lebanon, and Palestine, the surveys in Yemen and Algeria were conducted after the Arab uprisings began. Thus one effect of the Arab Spring may have been to increase the under-standing of democracy in political terms throughout the region.

All the countries surveyed by the Arab Barometer have multiple in-stitutions typically associated with democracy, such as elections and parliaments. Yet at the time of the survey, political power remained con-centrated in the hands of either nonelected elites or those whose election had been all but guaranteed, with elected legislatures generally lacking significant power. In other words, these were (and most still are) hybrid regimes—neither fully autocratic nor clearly democratic. As Ellen Lust has noted, elections in these societies are competitive and can have sig-nificant implications even though they rarely include any debate over actual policies.11 To what degree, then, do ordinary citizens consider their regimes to be democratic or authoritarian?

The first wave of Arab Barometer surveys found important differenc-es in the responses to this question (see Table 1 on page 93). Nearly two-thirds of Jordanian respondents believed that their country was closer to being fully democratic than fully authoritarian on a ten-point scale. In Palestine, the survey took place only months after the largely free and fair January 2006 parliamentary elections, which resulted in an opposi-tion victory, yet slightly fewer than half of respondents saw Palestine as


more democratic than authoritarian. In Algeria, and particularly Yemen and Lebanon, the proportions believing their countries to be more demo-cratic were much lower.

In the second wave, the percentage of respondents (except in Jor-dan) indicating that their country was closer to a democracy had con-verged to about 33 percent. Respondents’ belief that Palestine was democratic decreased dramatically during this period, dropping by nearly 15 percentage points, while in Lebanon this figure increased by 11 percentage points. The results from Algeria and Yemen remained more or less constant. In Jordan, a majority still believed that their system was more democratic than authoritarian, but this share fell by nearly 9 points.12

Overall, support for democracy is consistently high, and a majority of respondents surveyed in both waves of the Arab Barometer believe that their countries fall short. Nevertheless, Arab citizens generally have a cautious attitude toward the pace of reform. In the first wave of sur-veys, over 77 percent of respondents in all five countries agreed that reform should proceed gradually rather than all at once. This preference for gradualism declined in each of the five countries surveyed in both rounds, with an especially steep drop in Algeria (from 91 to 63 percent). Yet, as Table 1 shows, there remained a broad consensus in all the coun-tries that reform should proceed gradually.

Democratic Political Culture

Scholars have long recognized that stable democracy depends upon having not only the proper political institutions but also a democratic political culture. This includes, for example, high levels of interperson-

“Closer to Democracy than Dictatorship” (Percent)

1st Wave 44.0 37.8 64.6 24.2 46.9 28.5 - -

2nd Wave 37.3 34.8 55.7 35.6 32.3 27.7 47.9 28.0

Mean Democratic Rating (10-point scale)

1st Wave 5.3 4.8 6.6 4.1 5.4 4.3 - -

2nd Wave 4.8 4.8 6.0 4.6 4.3 4.2 5.6 4.5

“Reform Should Proceed Gradually” (Percent)

1st Wave 89.5 91.4 90.4 85.2 92.5 87.0 - -

2nd Wave 77.7 63.3 85.1 82.8 86.6 69.2 88.9 92.0

table 1—political SyStem evaluationS anD preFerenceSAlgeria

All*Jordan

Lebanon

Palestine

Egypt

Yemen

Tunisia

*“All” represents an average calculated on a pooled sample of respondents from Algeria, Jor-dan, Lebanon, Palestine, and Yemen (the five countries included in both waves). It should be noted that the number of respondents differs between these five countries.


al trust, political interest, involvement in community and civic organi-zations, and tolerance of others. These characteristics tend to be low among Arab citizens in the five societies that were surveyed twice and generally decreased between the first and second waves.13

Levels of interpersonal trust varied among societies in the first wave, but in no society did more than half of respondents agree with the state-ment that “most people can be trusted.” Only in Lebanon did trust re-main essentially constant between waves, hovering just above 16 per-cent. In Yemen, the level of trust fell only 1.6 points to 37 percent in the second wave, but in the remaining three societies, the level of trust de-creased dramatically, dropping more than 10 percentage points in each. Levels of political interest also exhibited significant variation across both time and space. In the first wave, a slight majority of respondents in Lebanon (59 percent) and Palestine (54 percent) were interested or very interested in politics. Political interest was significantly lower in the other three countries, ranging from 29 percent in Jordan to 36 percent in Yemen. In the second wave, levels of political interest converged to be-tween 33 and 40 percent in all cases except Algeria. This was the result of sharp declines in political interest in Lebanon (19 percentage points) and Palestine (14 percentage points), offering further evidence that the high levels found in both societies in the first wave were probably the result of specific political events.

Rates of civic engagement tend to be relatively low across the re-gion, although there is significant variation from country to country. In the first wave of the Arab Barometer, this rate varied from a low of 6 percent in Jordan to a high of 26 percent in Yemen, with rates of orga-nizational membership falling between 17 percent and 22 percent in the remaining cases. In all countries except Algeria, rates of civic engage-ment were significantly higher in the second wave, although different items were employed in the two waves to determine this variable.14 The most dramatic increase was in Yemen, where civic participation rose by 23 percent. Beyond differences in question wording, it is unclear why participation rates would increase so dramatically in this case. Increases in Jordan, Lebanon, and Palestine were all a little less than 9 percentage points, while the participation rate declined by 7 points in Algeria.

Results for a number of measures show variation in levels of toler-ance across the countries.15 Respondents were asked if they would mind having certain types of people as neighbors, including members of a different race or religion. In both waves, the country most tolerant in terms of both race and religion was Lebanon. In other cases, levels of tolerance varied over space and time. In the first wave, Algerian soci-ety was the least tolerant. Tolerance was somewhat higher in Yemen and significantly higher in Jordan. Somewhat surprisingly, a number of noteworthy changes took place between the two waves. In Algeria, religious tolerance rose 21.5 percentage points to 70 percent, and racial


tolerance rose 12 percentage points to 80 percent. Levels of tolerance in Yemen were only slightly higher than in Algeria in the first wave and were essentially unchanged in the second wave. In Jordan, levels of tol-erance increased by about 10 percentage points between the two waves.

Overall, despite a strong desire for democracy and fairly high lev-els of tolerance, other key elements of democratic political culture are still underdeveloped in these five societies. Broadly speaking, trust is low, political interest is low, and involvement in political and civil soci-ety organizations is low to moderate. But these patterns may owe more to the political context than to deeply rooted cultural values that will necessarily persist in the future. Low levels of political interest prob-ably reflect the limited extent of political openings in these still fairly authoritarian regimes. Similarly, the widespread presence of secret po-lice (mukhabarat) and periodic crackdowns on civil society probably suppress both interpersonal trust and membership in organizations. As noted by a number of scholars, living in a more democratic system can foster the emergence of democratic values among the population, and thus these patterns are probably open to change.

Islam and Politics

There is a strong desire for democracy among Arab publics, but to what degree do citizens also desire religion to play a role in govern-ment and politics? Past research has demonstrated that Arab publics are largely divided about the role that religion should play in the political system, and this trend continues.

When asked in the first wave of the Arab Barometer if the govern-ment should implement only the laws of the shari‘a, a majority of re-spondents in each country agreed, except in Lebanon, where only 11 percent agreed. In Algeria, Jordan, and Yemen, an overwhelming major-ity of respondents (more than 85 percent) agreed. In Palestine, only 56 percent agreed, perhaps reflecting deep divisions over Hamas’s victory in the 2006 legislative polls and the party’s call for basing all aspects of the law on the shari’a.

The second-wave results in Jordan and Yemen changed little (less than 3 percentage points) from the first wave, while in Algeria there was a decline of nearly 8 percentage points. In Lebanon, support for the shari‘a jumped sharply to 26 percent in the second wave, but this remained by far the lowest level of any society surveyed. In Palestine, support increased dramatically between the two surveys from 56 to 83 percent. This level of support is similar to that of most of the other so-cieties, further suggesting that the dramatic change is most likely the result of the first survey having been conducted soon after Hamas’s elec-toral win.

At the same time, a majority of citizens in both waves also stated that


laws should be informed by the people’s wishes—perhaps an indica-tor of ambivalence or tension in popular views about the appropriate sources of legislation. It is possible that the “will of the people” and shari‘a align in many instances, but these remain two distinct sources of law. In the first wave, in each country except for Yemen (50 percent), a solid majority of respondents (ranging from 60 percent in Palestine to 73 percent in Lebanon) agreed with the statement that “laws should be made in accordance to the will of the people.” In the second wave, levels of support were generally similar to the first wave or even higher.

Alternative measures provide a somewhat different understanding of the desired relationship between religion and politics among Arab pub-lics. In response to a number of questions asking about the preferred role of religion in the political system, in nearly all cases a majority preferred a system without a strong role for Islam or religious actors. Moreover, in most cases the proportion of individuals desiring a role for religion in politics declined between the two surveys, suggesting that Arab publics generally oppose having religious actors affect the politi-

table 2—Support For political iSlam (percent)

Men of Religion Should Not Influence How People Vote in Elections1st Wave 67.8 67.9 75.2 77.2 54.8 67.0 - -

2nd Wave 81.2 83.3 78.0 91.0 79.1 75.1 86.7 78.4

It Would Be Better If More Religious People Held Public Office1st Wave 44.6 57.8 49.8 12.4 60.3 40.7 - -

2nd Wave 35.6 21.6 47.8 12.7 46.2 51.6 46.9 30.7

Men of Religion Should Influence Decisions of Government1st Wave 49.1 61.0 52.0 17.6 55.6 56.8 - -

2nd Wave 38.5 27.6 45.8 14.3 43.8 61.1 36.8 25.6

Religion Is a Private Matter and Should Be Separated from Sociopolitical Life1st Wave 53.7 35.9 58.3 83.0 48.1 47.5 - -

2nd Wave 65.1 73.6 56.0 87.8 49.9 50.7 79.7 78.4

Laws Should Be Made in Accordance to the Will of the People1st Wave 62.9 66.5 65.8 73.1 60.0 50.3 - -

2nd Wave 64.5 74.2 64.4 75.4 53.4 56.7 72.8 86.4

Laws Should Be Made in Accordance with the Shari‘a1st Wave 67.3 89.4 86.9 11.4 56.1 93.2 - -

2nd Wave 73.4 81.8 88.4 26.3 83.3 94.6 79.7 65.1

Democracy and Islam Are Incompatible1st Wave 30.2 30.7 29.6 31.0 33.3 27.7 - -

2nd Wave 30.2 19.2 37.7 31.1 35.9 26.6 17.1 22.1

AlgeriaAll*

Jordan

Lebanon

Palestine

Egypt

Yemen

Tunisia

*“All” represents an average calculated on a pooled sample of respondents from Algeria, Jor-dan, Lebanon, Palestine, and Yemen (the five countries included in both waves). It should be noted that the number of respondents differs between these five countries.


cal behavior of ordinary citizens. When asked in the first wave if they believed that men of religion should not influence voters, for example, a majority of respondents in all five societies agreed. Indeed, in all cases but Palestine (55 percent), nearly two-thirds or more of respondents agreed or strongly agreed. Support for this statement was even higher in the second wave.

There was less of a consensus over the role that men of religion should play in government decision making.16 In the first wave, slight majorities (ranging from 52 percent in Jordan to 61 percent in Algeria) in all cases except for Lebanon (18 percent) agreed that men of religion should have influence over government decisions. In the second wave, however, except in Yemen (61 percent), only minorities held this view, ranging from 46 percent in Jordan to a low of 14 percent in Lebanon.

Another question in this battery asked respondents if they consider religion to be “a private matter” that “should be separated from socio-political life.” In three countries—Jordan, Palestine, and Yemen—re-sponses were split fairly evenly. In the first wave, support for this state-ment ranged from 48 to 58 percent in these three societies, and results were similar in the second wave. In Lebanon, in the first wave the vast majority of respondents (83 percent) were in agreement, and this share rose more than 5 percentage points in the second wave. In Algeria, agreement increased from just over a third of respondents in the first wave to nearly three-fourths in the second.

Overall, except in Lebanon, support for religion in public life remains an issue on which ordinary citizens are divided. In Lebanon, a general consensus has emerged that religion should have very little influence on politics, which may be a reflection of the country’s confessional diver-sity as well as fears of returning to the devastation of its sectarian civil war. In the remaining cases, there are important similarities but also clear divisions. First, it is clear that the concept of law under the shari‘a is popular, which highlights the positive connotation that shari‘a has in many communities. Although other response patterns demonstrate that most individuals do not desire a harsh Taliban-style legal system and that the law should also be guided by the will of the people, there remains broad agreement that laws should be consistent with people’s understanding of the shari‘a.

Second, there is an emerging consensus in most countries that men of religion should not seek to affect the political behavior of ordinary citi-zens. At the same time, there is significant disagreement on the role that religious officials should have in government decision making. Some individuals believe that government officials should consider the opin-ions of religious actors but that these actors should have only limited influence on citizens’ political activities.

In addition to these general patterns, the two rounds of surveys have revealed several interesting country-specific changes. In Algeria, sup-


port for political Islam dropped significantly between the two waves, perhaps a sign of the Arab Spring’s impact on public opinion. In Pales-tine, the belief that laws should be made in accordance with the shari‘a increased, but the view that religion should play a significant role in the political process declined. The changes in Palestine may be due, at least in part, to the postelection timing of the first-wave survey. Fears over the imposition of Saudi-style shari‘a law may have been higher in the immediate aftermath of Hamas’s victory but later diminished, whereas frustration over the party’s performance may have simultaneously con-tributed to the decline in support for giving religious officials a signifi-cant political role.17

A number of Islamist leaders have stated that they support democracy but seek a form of “Islamic democracy,” as opposed to a political for-mula that equates democracy and secularism. This raises the possibility that individuals who profess to support both democracy and political Islam might hold different attitudes and values than those who support democracy but prefer the separation of religion and politics. Assess-ing the degree to which this is true is particularly important in light of Islamist-party wins in several post–Arab Spring elections.

Accordingly, Table 3 presents data from the second-wave surveys in Algeria, Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine, and Yemen, as well as Egypt and Tunisia, and compares the political values of individuals who support democracy but have different views about Islam’s political role.18 The three categories evaluate elements of democratic culture that some fear are less likely to be found under democratic systems in Islamic societ-ies: the desirability of openness to diverse ideas and opinions among

Openness to Diverse Political Ideas Racial Tolerance Equal Job

Opportunities for Women

Supporters Opponents Supporters Opponents Supporters Opponents

Algeria 37.9 51.8 88.8 85.3 69.7 85.9

Jordan 32.7 44.8 81.6 80.0 60.1 89.6

Lebanon 55.9 63.2 94.6 92.6 78.5 89.6

Palestine 31.1 35.6 80.0 84.4 61.9 76.6

Yemen 34.1 46.4 78.8 90.1 66.2 74.3

Egypt 28.8 32.4 83.3 80.4 67.1 95.9

Tunisia 44.5 43.9 95.4 95.9 81.4 86.6

All* 35.4 47.8 84.2 87.9 68.0 79.7

table 3—Democratic valueS among SupporterS anD opponentS oF political iSlam (percent)

*“All” represents an average calculated on a pooled sample of respondents from Algeria, Jor-dan, Lebanon, Palestine and Yemen (the five countries included in both waves). It should be noted that the number of respondents differs between these five countries.


political candidates;19 the acceptability of having a neighbor of a dif-ferent race; and the belief that men and women should have equal job opportunities.

The comparisons presented in Table 3 show that, among individuals who support democracy (the vast majority), there are some differences between the attitudes of those who favor political Islam and the attitudes of those who oppose it. For the most part, however, these differences are modest. In regard to openness to diverse ideas as a qualification for po-litical leadership, the greatest difference occurs in Algeria, with secular democrats being 14 points more likely than religious democrats to value this trait in a candidate for political office. Similar gaps are found in Jordan and Yemen, while smaller differences are observed in Lebanon and Palestine. In the cases of Egypt and Tunisia, the two groups hold similar beliefs.

Differences regarding racial tolerance are, with the exception of Ye-men (11 percent), extremely small. Moreover, tolerance is relatively high in every society, with more than three-quarters of respondents in each group across all seven countries indicating that they would not mind having a neighbor of a different race. There are larger differences between the two groups with respect to equality of opportunity for men and women. Save for Egypt, secular democrats are more supportive of equal rights for women. The difference is greatest in Algeria, where 86 percent of secular democrats support equality in job opportunities for men and women compared to only 70 percent of religious democrats. In Palestine, the difference between these two groups is 15 points, and in Lebanon and Yemen, 11 and 8 points, respectively.

Overall, it appears that those who support both democracy and politi-cal Islam are somewhat less likely to hold democratic values than are supporters of secular democracy. Yet in only eight of the 21 compari-sons in Table 3 does the difference exceed 10 percentage points (and it never exceeds 16 points). Moreover, Yemen and Algeria account for five of these eight instances, showing them to be the two countries where differences between religious democrats and secular democrats, although still modest, are most notable and frequent. Thus, both in gen-eral and in Egypt and Tunisia in particular, it does not appear that elec-toral victories by Islamist parties reflect the support of citizens who are significantly less likely than others to embrace democratic values.

Egypt and Tunisia in 2011–2012

Conducted in Egypt in June–July 2011, the Arab Barometer sur-vey found broad support for the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, which held authority at that time, perhaps because the mil-itary had refrained from suppressing the demonstrations earlier in the year. Somewhat surprisingly, support for democracy in Egypt


was not quite as high as elsewhere, with only 80 percent of respon-dents stating that democracy, despite its problems, is the best form of government. The vast majority of Egyptians understood democracy

in economic terms, with 77 percent offering an instrumental definition and citing such factors as the provi-sion of basic necessities for all, low levels of economic inequality, and the elimination of corruption. Only 6 percent of Egyptian respondents thought that free and fair elections were the most essential characteris-tic of democracy.

The Barometer also demonstrated that Egyptians are far more concerned about economic outcomes than politi-

cal issues—84 percent cited the economy as Egypt’s greatest challenge. Egyptians were extremely confident (with over 95 percent agreeing), however, that the revolution would bring an improvement in economic conditions. This confidence also extended to a range of other issues, such as achieving a democratic transition and improving respect for hu-man rights. Still, the vast majority of respondents were cautious about the speed of reform, with 89 percent preferring that it happen gradually rather than all at once.

As in other countries surveyed during and after the Arab Spring, support for political Islam in Egypt was relatively low. Only 37 per-cent stated that men of religion should influence government decisions, whereas 87 percent stated that they should not influence how citizens vote in elections. Nearly half (47 percent) felt it would be better for Egypt if more religious figures held public office, but the overwhelming majority (80 percent) agreed that religion is a private matter that should be separate from sociopolitical life.

The poll was taken more than four months before Egypt’s parliamen-tary elections began in late November 2011. In other words, campaign-ing had not yet begun for the first postrevolution elections. Party affilia-tion was extremely low, and few respondents reported strong attachment to a political party. When asked which party best represented their per-sonal political, economic, and social views, only 3 percent named the Muslim Brotherhood–affiliated Freedom and Justice Party (and only 47 percent said that they trusted the Muslim Brotherhood). At the same time, in part because of decades of grassroots activity and a history of opposition to the Mubarak regime, the Brotherhood had earned the loy-alty of a substantial number of Egyptians. Aided also by a superior mo-bilization effort, funds from wealthy Arab Gulf states (some of which also went to the Salafist al-Nour Party), and the limited time available

Even those opposing a political role for Islam saw an impossible choice: Support the Brotherhood candidate in the name of change, or support the military candidate and accept the status quo.


for new parties to organize, the Islamist formations were able to score a decisive victory in the parliamentary elections.

These findings shed some light on the complicated reactions of many Egyptians to the developments of mid-2012, when the Supreme Constitutional Court dissolved parliament and approved the presiden-tial candidacy of Mubarak’s last prime minister, Ahmed Shafiq. Many felt that the Court, backed by the military, had hijacked the country’s revolution. Even those opposing a political role for Islam—a large majority according to the Arab Barometer Survey—saw an impossible choice: Support the Brotherhood candidate in the name of change, or support the military candidate and accept the status quo. In the end, Mohammed Morsi, the Brotherhood candidate, narrowly won the elec-tion. The military announced in June 2012 that it would retain key executive powers and would itself name the constitution-drafting com-mission, thus setting up an ongoing contest between the Brotherhood and the military in which neither side represents the future desired by a majority of ordinary citizens. Two months later, in the next important development in the continuing struggle for political primacy, Presi-dent Morsi announced the forced retirement of Egypt’s top military leader, Mohamed Hussein Tantawi, as part of an effort to reverse the military’s power grab.

In Tunisia, the Arab Barometer survey was conducted in September–October 2011, just prior to elections for the Constituent Assembly. At this time, support for democracy remained high, with nearly 90 percent of respondents stating that despite its problems democracy is the best form of government. Like citizens of other Arab countries, Tunisians are divided in how they understand democracy, with a slight majority (52 percent) choosing as the primary characteristic a political element, such as free elections, freedom of speech, or political equality.

As in Egypt, the majority (68 percent) of Tunisians believed that the primary challenges facing their country were economic issues such as unemployment and inflation. The next most commonly cited challenge was corruption (13 percent). By comparison, only 2 percent cited con-solidating the democratic transition as the most important challenge. Similarly, a solid majority of Tunisians (63 percent) saw the underlying cause of the Jasmine Revolution as being economic in nature. Again, corruption was the next most frequently cited cause, selected by 17 per-cent of respondents. Only 14 percent saw political factors as the primary cause of the revolution.

While only half of the respondents felt that they themselves had ben-efited from the changes so far, Tunisians overall were confident that the Jasmine Revolution would be successful in a number of key ways. More than 90 percent believed that it would result in democracy, better economic opportunities, an improvement in human rights, the establish-ment of the rule of law, and greater social justice.


Despite the success of the Islamist Ennahda party in the country’s October 2011 elections for the Constituent Assembly, a large major-ity of Tunisians are not supportive of political Islam. For example, 79 percent of respondents stated that men of religion should not influence how people vote in elections; only 30 percent said it would be better for Tunisia if more religious leaders held public office; and only a quarter wanted men of religion to influence government decisions. Addition-ally, 79 percent affirmed that religion is a private matter that should be separate from public life.

Although political Islam in general received relatively low support, nearly half of respondents had a favorable view of Ennahda, with 49 percent expressing a great deal of trust in the party. This level was high-er than for other political and civil society organizations, but signifi-cantly lower than support for the transitional government (66 percent) and the armed forces (93 percent). Only 12 percent considered Ennahda to be the party that best represented their aspirations for political, social, and economic development, but 20 percent indicated that they would vote for the party. Considering the 50 percent turnout rate, this finding closely matches Ennahda’s actual vote share of 40 percent. As was the case with Islamist electoral victories in Egypt, superior mobilization and a history of grassroots activity and opposition to the regime, as well as the absence of a well-organized alternative, were prominent among the reasons for Ennahda’s success at the polls. Thus, following the pattern in Egypt, perhaps as many as half of Ennahda’s votes came from Tu-nisians who wanted to signal a desire for change but do not support an Islamist platform.

Few Tunisians want Ennahda to pursue a strongly Islamist agenda, and the party promised that it would not do so, but there are competing tendencies within it. Further, Salafi militants have become increasingly confrontational and are pressuring the party to pursue a more religiously inspired agenda. Since many voters did not cast their ballots for En-nahda, and since the Arab Barometer survey demonstrates that among those who did many do not support an Islamist platform, Tunisians are waiting to see whether the changes brought about by their revolution are indeed the changes desired by the majority. Many in other Arab counties will be watching as well. With debates continuing about the role that Islam should play in political affairs, and also about the reasons for and against voting for an Islamist party, Tunisia’s postelection experience will be instructive.

NOTES

1. An additional first-wave Arab Barometer survey was carried out in Bahrain in 2009.

2. Amaney Jamal and Mark Tessler, “The Democracy Barometers: Attitudes in the Arab World,” Journal of Democracy 19 (January 2008): 97–110.


3. Morocco was included in both waves, but due to delays in completing the second-wave survey, the results are not available at this time.

4. Additional surveys were conducted in Lebanon and Sudan in March and April 2011.

5. Additional surveys were conducted in March and April 2011 in Saudi Arabia.

6. Ronald Inglehart, “How Solid Is Mass Support for Democracy—And How Do We Measure It?” PS: Political Science and Politics 36 (January 2003): 51–57.

7. For a comparison of the first- and second-wave results, see the Table “Support for Democracy” on the Journal of Democacy website at www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/supplemental-material. For a discussion of how support for democracy varied by country in the first wave, see Jamal and Tessler, “The Democracy Barometers: Attitudes in the Arab World.”

8. It should be noted that Algeria was sampled after the political transitions in Egypt and Tunisia had already taken place, whereas the majority of respondents in the other cases were surveyed earlier.

9. Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolida-tion: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 5.

10. See the table “Understandings of Democracy” on the Journal’s website.

11. Ellen Lust-Okar, “Elections Under Authoritarianism: Preliminary Lessons from Jordan,” Democratization 13 (July 2006): 456–71.

12. Interestingly, this finding represents a reversal of a long-term trend of increasing belief that Jordan was becoming more democratic; see Center for Strategic Studies, 2010 Annual Democracy Poll, available at www.jcss.org.

13. See the table “Political and Civic Engagement” on the Journal’s website.

14. In the first wave, respondents were asked if they were members of any organization and, if so, which two were most important to them. In the second wave, respondents were asked specifically if they were members of six different types of organization: political parties, charities, unions, youth clubs, tribal or village organizations, or an association for local development.

15. This item was not asked in Palestine in either wave.

16. Additional exploratory-factor analysis revealed that this item and the following item (which asks if it would be beneficial to have more religious people hold public office) are the survey’s two most reliable indicators of support for political Islam.

17. Surveys conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research have shown a decline in support for Hamas since the 2007 civil conflict.

18. The figures presented in Table 3 compare, among respondents who support democ-racy, the views of those who agree or agree strongly and those who disagree or disagree strongly that men of religion should have influence over government decisions.

19. Respondents were asked to rank six characteristics, including personal integrity, piety, and previous political experience, and Table 3 reports the percentages selecting openness to diverse political ideas as one of the three most important.

www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/supplemental-material

www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/supplemental-material

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New Findings on Arabs and Democracy (Journal of Democracy)

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