LOIS PINEAU

DATE RAPE: A FEMINIST ANALYSIS

ABSTRACT. This paper shows how the mythology surrounding tape enters intoa criterion of 'teasonableness' which operates through the legal system to makewomen vulnerable to unscrupulous vicdmizadon. It explores the possibility fotchanges in legal procedures and presumpdons that would bettet serve women'sinterests and leave them less vulnerable to sexual violence. This requites that wetefotmulate the criterion of consent in terms of what is teasonable from awoman's point of view.

The feminist recognidon that dominant ideologies reinforce concep-tual frameworks that serve patriarchal interests lies behind what mustnow be seen as a revoludon in polidcal analysis, one which for thefirst dme approaches the problems that women face from a woman'spoint of view. One of those problems is the ongoing difficulty ofdealing with a society that pracdces and condones violence againstwomen. This is pardcularly the case with date rape.

Date rape is nonaggravated sexual assault, nonconsensual sex thatdoes not involve physical injury, or the explicit threat of physicalinjury. But because it does not involve physical injury, and becausephysical injury is often the only criterion that is accepted as evidencethat the actus reas is nonconsensual, what is really sexual assault isoften mistaken for seducdon. The replacement of the old rape lawswith the new laws on sexual assault have done nothing to resolve thisproblem.

Rape, defined as nonconsensual sex, usually involving penetradonby a man of a woman who is not his wife, has been replaced in somecriminal codes with the charge of sexual assault.' This has the advan-

' Geis, G. and R. Geis. 'Rape Reform: An Appreciadve-Cridcal Review', Bulletinof the American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law 6, 301—312. Also see, MichaelDavis, 'Setdng Penaldes: What Does Rape Deserve', Law and Philosophy 3, 61 —110.

Law and Philosophy»: 217-243, 1989.© 1989 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printedin the Netherlands.

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tage both of extending the range of possible vicdms of sexual assault,the manner in which people can be assaulted, and replacing a crimewhich is exclusive of consent, with one for which consent is adefence.̂ But while the consent of a woman is now consistent with theconvicdon of her assailant in cases of aggravated assault, nonaggravatedsexual assault is still disdnguished from normal sex solely by the factthat it is not consented to. Thus the quesdon of whether someone hasconsented to a sexual encounter is still important, and the criteria forconsent condnues to be the central concern of discourse on sexualassault.̂

However, if a man is to be convicted, it does not suffice to establishthat the actus reas was nonconsensual. In order to be guilty of sexualassault a man must have the requisite mens rea., i.e., he must either havebelieved that his vicdm did not consent or that she was probably notconsenting." In many common law jurisdicdons a man who sincerelybelieves that a woman consented to a sexual encounter is deemed tolack the required mens rea, even though the woman did not consent,and even though his belief is not reasonable.̂ Recently, strong dissent-ing voices have been raised against the sincerity condidon, and theargument made that mens rea be defeated only if the defendant has areasonable belief that the plaindff consented.*" The introducdon of

- Under Common Law a petson cannot consent to aggravated assault. Also,consent may be irrelevant if the vicdm was unfit to consent. See Michael Da"vis'Setdng Penaldes: What Does Rape Deserve', 104—105.^ Discussion Paper No. 2, Rape and Allied Offenses: Substantive Aspects, LawReform Commission of Victoria, August (1986).* In a recent Australian case a man was convicted of being an accomphce to arape because he was reckless in determining whether the woman raped by hisfriend was consendng. The judge ruled that his 'reckless indiffetence' sufficedto establish mens rea. This ruling was possible, however, only because unreason-able belief is not a tape defence in Australia. Australian Law Review 71, 120.^ This is true, at present, in jurisdicdons which follow the precedent set byMorgan vs. Morgan. In this case, four men were acquitted of tape because theysincerely thought that theit "vicdm had consented, despite their admitdng thatshe had protested vigorously. See Mark Thornton's 'Rape and Mens Rea',Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Supp. Vol. VIII, 119—146.<• Ibid-

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legislation which excludes 'honest belief (unreasonable sincere belief)as a defence, will certainly help to provide women with greaterprotection against violence. But while this will be an important stepforward, the question of what constitutes a reasonable belief, theproblem of evidence when rapists lie, and the problem of the en-trenched attitudes of the predominantly male police, judges, lawyers,and jurists who handle sexual assault cases, remains.

The criteria for mens rea, for the reasonableness of belief and forconsent are closely related. For although a man's sincere belief in theconsent of his victim may be sufficient to defeat mens rea, the court isless likely to believe his belief is sincere if his belief is unreasonable. Ifhis belief is reasonable, they are more likely to believe in the sincerityof his belief. But evidence of the reasonableness of his belief is alsoevidence that consent really did take place. For the very things thatmake it reasonable for liim to believe that the defendant consented areoften the very things that incline the court to believe that she con-sented. What is often missing is the voice of the woman herself, anaccount of what it would be reasonable for her to agree to, that is tosay, an account of what is reasonable from her standpoint.

Thus, what is presented as reasonable has repercussions for fourseparate but related concerns: (l) the question of whether a man'sbelief in a woman's consent was reasonable; (2) the problem ofwhether it is reasonable to attribute mens rea to him; (3) the questionof what could count as reasonable from the woman's point of view; (4)the question of what is reasonable from the court's point of view.These repercussions are of the utmost practical concern. In a culturewhich contains an incidence of sexual assault verging on epidemic, acriterion of reasonableness which regards mere submission as consentfails to offer persons vulnerable to those assaults adequate protection.

The following statements by self-confessed date rapists reveal howour lack of a solution for dealing with date rape protects rapists by ,failing to provide their victims with legal recourse:

All of my rapes have been involved in a dating situation where I've been outwith a woman I know. . . . I wouldn't take no for an answer. I think it hadsomething to do with my acceptance of rejection. I had low self-esteem and notmuch self̂ confrdence and when I was rejected for something which I considered

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to be rightly mine, I became angry and I went ahead anyway. And this was thesame in any situation, whether it was rape or it was something else.'

* * *When I did date, when I was younger, I would pick up a girl and if she didn'tcome across I would threaten her or slap her face then tell her she was going tofuck — that was it. But that's because I didn't want to waste dme with anycome-ons. It took too much dme. I wasn't interested because I didn't like themas people anyway, and I just went with them just to get laid. Just to say that Ilaid them.*

There is, at this dme, nothing to protect women from this kind ofunscrupulous victimizadon. A woman on a casual date with a virtualstranger has almost no chance of bringing a complaint of sexual assaultbefore the courts. One reason for this is the prevailing criterion forconsent. According to this criterion, consent is implied unless someemphatic episodic sign of resistance occurred, and its occurrence canbe established. But if no episodic act occurred, or if it did occur, andthe defendant claims that it didn't, or if the defendant threatened theplaindff but won't admit it in court, it is almost impossible to find anyevidence that would support the plaintiff's word against the defendant.This difficulty is exacerbated by suspicion on the part of the courts,police, and legal educators that even where an act of resistance occurs,this act should not be interpreted as a withholding of consent, and thissuspicion is especially upheld where the accused is a man who isknown to the female plaindff

In Glanville Williams's classic textbook on criminal law we arewarned that where a man is unknown to a woman, she does notconsent if she expresses her rejecdon in the form of an episodic andvigorous act at the 'vital moment'. But if the man is known to thewoman she must, according to Williams, make use of "all meansavailable to her to repel the man".' Williams warns that women oftenwelcome a 'mastery advance' and present a token resistance. He quotesByron's couplet.

^ Why Men Rape, Sylvia Levine and Joseph Loenig, eds., (Toronto: Macmillan,1980), p. 83.8 Ibid., p. 77." Wilhams, Textbook of Criminal Law (1983), p. 238.

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A litde sdll she strove, and much repentedAnd whispering 'I will ne'er consent' — consented

by way of alerdng law students to the difficulty of disdnguishing realprotest from pretence.'" Thus, while in principle, a firm unambiguousstand, or a healthy show of temper ought to be sufficient, if estab-lished, to show nonconsent, in pracdce the forceful overriding of sucha stance is apt to be taken as an indicadon that the resistance was notsedously intended, and that the seducdon had succeeded. The con-sequence of this is that it is almost impossible to establish thedefendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

Thus, on the one hand, we have a situadon in which women arevulnerable to the most exploidve tacdcs at the hands of men who areknown to them. On the other hand, almost nothing will count asevidence of their being assaulted, including their having taken anemphadc stance in withholding their consent. The new laws havedone almost nothing to change this situadon. Yet clearly, somesoludon must be sought Moreover, the road to that soludon presentsitself clearly enough as a need for a reformuladon of the criterion ofconsent. It is patent that a criterion that collapses whenever the crimeitself succeeds will not suffice.

The purpose of this paper is to develop such a criterion, and Ipropose to do so by grounding this criterion in a concepdon of the'reasonable'. Part of the strength of the present criterion for consentlies in the belief that it is reasonable for women to agree to the kindof sex involved in 'date rape', or that it is reasonable for men to thinkthat they have agreed. My argument is that it is not reasonable forwomen to consent to that kind of sex, and that there are furthermore,no grounds for thinking that it is reasonable. Since what we want toknow is when a woman has consented, and since standards for consentare based on the presumed choices of reasonable agents, it is what isreasonable from a woman's point of view that must provide theprincipal delineadon of a criterion of consent that is capable ofrepresendng a woman's willing behaviour. Developing this line of

Ibid.

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reasoning further, I will argue that the kind of sex to which it wouldbe reasonable for women to consent suggests a criterion of consentthat would bring the kind of sex involved in date rape well within therealm of sexual assault.

THE PROBLEM OF THE CRITERION

The reasoning that underlies the present criterion of consent isentangled in a number of mutually suppordve mythologies which seesexual assault as masterful seducdon, and silent submission as sexualenjoyment. Because the prevailing ideology has so much informed ourconceptualizadon of sexual interacdon, it is extraordinarily difficult forus to disdnguish between assault and seducdon, submission andenjoyment, or so we imagine. At the same dme, this failure todisdnguish has given rise to a network of rationalizadons that supportthe conflation of assault with seducdon, submission with enjoyment. Itherefore want to begin my argument by providing an example whichshows both why it is so difficult to make this disdncdon, and that itexists. Later, I will idendfy and attempt to unravel the lines of reason-ing that reinforce this difficulty.

The woman I have in mind agrees to see someone because she feels an inidalattracdon to him and believes that he feels that same way about her. She goesout with him in the hope that there will be mutual enjoyment and in the courseof the day ot evening an inctease of mutual interest. Unfortunately, these hopesof mutual and reciprocal interest are not realized. We do not know how muchinterest she has in him by the end of theit dme together, but whatever herfeelings she comes under pressure to have sex with him, and she does not wantto have the kind of sex he wants. She may desire to hold hands and kiss, toengage in mote intense caresses or in some fotm of foreplay, or she may notwant to be touched. She may have reasons unrelated to desire for not wandng toengage in the kind of sex he is demanding. She may have tehgious reservadons,concerns about pregnancy or disease, a disinclinadon to be just another conquest.She may be engaged in a seducdon program of her own which sees abstainingfrom sexual acdvity as a means of building an important emodonal bond. Shefeels she is desirable to him, and she knows, and he knows that he will have sexwith het if he can. And while she feels she doesn't owe him anything, and that itis het ptetogadve to refuse him, this feeling is patdy a defensive teacdon against

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a deeply held behef that if he is in need, she should provide. If she buys into themyth of insistent male sexuality she may feel he is suffedng from sexual frustra-don and that she is largely to blame.

We do not know how much he desires her, but we do know that his desirefor etodc sadsfacdon can hardly be separated from his desire for conquest. Hefeels no dadng obhgadon, but has a strong commitment to scodng. He uses themyth of "so hard to control" male desire as a rhetodcal tacdc, telhng her howfirustrated she will leave him. He becomes overbearing. She resists, voicing herdisinclinadon. He alternates between telling her how desirable she is and taking ahosdle stance, chatging her with misleading him, accusing her of wandng him,and being coy, in short of being deceitful, all the dme engaging in ratheraggressive body contact. It is late at rdght, she is dred and a bit queasy fi-om toomany drinks, and he is reaffirming her suspicion that perhaps she has misledhim. She is having trouble disengaging his body from hers, and wishes he wouldjust go away. She does not adopt a strident angry stance, partly because shethinks he is acdng normally and does not deserve it, partly because she feels sheis partly to blame, and pardy because there is always the danger that her angerwill make him angry, possibly "violent. It seems that the only thing to do, givenhis aggression, and her queasy fadgue, is to go along with him and get it over"with, but this decision is so entangled "with the events in process it is hard toknow if it is not simply a recognidon of what is acmally happening. She findsthe whole encounter a thoroughly disagreeable experience, but he does not takeany nodce, and wouldn't have changed course if he had. He congratulateshimself on his sexual prowess and is confitmed in his opinion that aggressivetacdcs pay off Later she feels that she has been raped, but paradoxically tellsherself that she let herself be raped.

The paradoxical feelings of the woman in our example indicate herawareness that what she feels about the incident stands in contradic-don to the prevaihng cultural assessment of it. She knows that she didnot want to have sex with her date. She is not so sure, however, abouthow much her own desires count, and she is uncertain that she hasmade her desires clear. Her uncertainty is reinforced by the culturalreading of this incident as an ordinary seducdon.

As for us, we assume that the woman did not want to have sex, butjust like her, we are unsure whether her mere reluctance, in thepresence of high-pressure tacdcs, consdtutes nonconsent. We suspectthat submission to an overbearing and insensidve lout is no way to goabout attaining sexual enjoyment, and we further suspect that he felt

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no compunction about providing it, so that on the face of it, from theoutside looking in, it looks like a pretty unreasonable proposition forher.

Let us look at this reasoning more closely. Assume that she was notattracted to the kind of sex offered by the sort of person offering it.Then it would be prima facie unreasonable for her to agree to have sex,unreasonable, that is, unless she were offered some pay-off for herstoic endurance, money perhaps, or tickets to the opera. The reason isthat in sexual matters, agreement is closely connected to attraction.Thus, where the presumption is that she was not attracted, we shouldat the same time presume that she did not consent. Hence, the burdenof proof should be on her alleged assailant to show that she had goodreasons for consenting to an unattractive proposition.

This is not, however, the way such situations are interpreted. In theunlikely event that the example I have described should come beforethe courts, there is little doubt that the law would interpret thewoman's eventual acquiescence or 'going along with' the sexualencounter as consent. But along with this interpretation would go theimplicit understanding that she had consented because when all wassaid and done, when the 'token' resistances to the 'masterful advances'had been made she had wanted to after all. Once the courts haveconstructed this interpretation, they are then forced to conjure upsome horror story of feminine revenge in order to explain why sheshould bring charges against her 'seducer'.

In the even more unlikely event that the courts agreed that thewoman had not consented to the above encounter, there is littlechance that her assailant would be convicted of sexual assault." Thebelief that the man's aggressive tactics are a normal part of seductionmeans that mens rea cannot be established. Her eventual 'going along'

' ' See Jeanne C. Marsh, Allison Geist, and Nathan Caplan, Rape and The Limits ofLaw Reform (Boston: Auburn House, 1982), p. 32. According to Marsh's study onthe impact of the Michigan reform of rape laws, convictions were increased fortraditional conceptions of rape, i.e., aggravated assault. However date-rape, whichhas a much higher incidence than aggravated assault, has a very low rate of arrestand an even lower one of conviction.

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with his advances consdtutes reasonable grounds for his believing inher consent. These 'reasonable' grounds attest to the sincerity of hisbelief in her consent. This reasonableness means that mens rea wouldbe defeated even in jurisdicdons which make mens rea a funcdon ofobjecdve standards of reasonableness. Moreover, the sympathy of thecourt is more likely to lie with the rapist than with his vicdm, since, isthe court is typical, it will be strongly inclined to believe that thevicdm had in some way 'asked for it'.

The posidon of the courts is supported by the widespread beliefthat male aggression and female reluctance are normal parts ofseducdon. Given their acceptance of this model, the logic of theirresponse must be respected. For if sexual aggression is a part ofordinary seducdon, then it cannot be inconsistent with the legidmateconsent of the person allegedly seduced by this means. And if it isnormal for a woman to be reluctant, then this reluctance must beconsistent with her consent as well. The posidon of the courts is notinconsistent just so long as they allow that some sort of protest on thepart of a woman counts as a refusal. As we have seen, however, itfrequendy happens that no sort of a protest would count as a refusal.Moreover, if no sort of protest, or at least if precious few count, thenthe fauure to register these protests will amount to 'asking for it', itwill amount, in other words, to agreeing.

The court's belief in 'natural' male aggression and 'natural' femalereluctance has increasingly come under attack by feminist crides whosee quite correcdy that the endre legal posidon would collapse if, forexample, it were shown empirically that men were not aggressive, andthat women, at least when they wanted sex, were. This strategy is oflitde help, however, so long as aggressive men can still be found, andrelics of reluctant women condnue to surface. Fortunately, there isanother strategy. The posidon collapses through the weakness of itsinternal logic. The next secdon traces the several lines of this logic.

RAPE MYTHS

The belief that the natural aggression of men and the natural reluc-tance of women somehow makes date rape understandable underlies

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a number of prevalent myths about rape and human sexuality. Thesebeliefs maintain their force pardy on account of a logical compulsionexercised by them at an unconscious level. The only way of refudngthem effecdvely, is to excavate the logical proposidons involved, andto expose their misapplicadon to the situadons to which they havebeen applied. In what follows, I propose to excavate the logical supportfor popular atdtudes that are tolerant of date rape. These myths arenot just popular, however, but often emerge in the arguments ofjudges who acquit date rapists, and policemen who refuse to laycharges.

The claim that the vicdm provoked a sexual incident, that 'sheasked for it', is by far the most common defence given by men whoare accused of sexual assault.'̂ Feminists, righdy incensed by thisresponse, often treat it as beneath contempt, singling out the defenceas an argument against it On other fronts, sociologists have idendfiedthe response as part of an overall tendency of people to see the worldas just, a tendency which disposes them to conclude that people forthe most part deserve what they get.'̂ However, an inclinadon to seethe world as just requires us to construct an account which yields thisoutcome, and it is just such an account that I wish to examine withregard to date rape.

The least sophisdcated of the 'she asked for it' radonales, and in asense, the easiest to deal with, appeals to an injuncdon against sexuallyprovocadve behaviour on the part of women. If women should not besexually provocadve, then, from this standpoint, a woman who issexually provocadve deserves to suffer the consequences. Now it will

'̂ See Marsh, p. 61, for pardcular good example of this response. Also see JohnM. MacDonald, 'Vicdm-Ptecipitated Rape', Rape: Offenders and their Victims(Illinois: Charles C. Thomas, 1971), pp. 78—89, fot a good example of thisresponse in academic thinking. Also see Menachem Amir, Patterns in ForcibleRape (University of Chicago Press, 1972), p. 259." See Eugene Borgida and Nancy Brekke, 'Psycholegal Research on Rape Tdals',in Rape and Sexual Assault, Ann Wobert Burgess, ed., (New York: Garland Press,1985), p. 314. Also see M. J. Lerner, 'The Desire for Jusdce and Reacdons toVicdms', Altruism and Helping Behaviour, J. Macaulay and L. Berkowitz, eds. (NewYork: Academic Press, 1970).

Date Rape: Feminist Analysis 227

not do to respond that women get raped even when they are notsexually provocadve, or that it is men who get to interpret (unfairly)what counts as sexually provocadve.'^ The quesdon should be: Whyshouldn't a woman be sexually provocadve? Why should this behav-iour warrant any kind of aggressive response whatsoever?

Attempts to explain that women have a right to behave in sexuallyprovocadve ways without suffering dire consequences still meet withsurprisingly tough resistance. Even people who find nothing wrong orsinful with sex itself, in any of its forms, tend to suppose that womenmust not behave sexually unless they are prepared to carr)' through onsome fuller course of sexual interacdon. The logic of this responseseems to be that at some point a woman's behaviour commits her tofollowing through on the full course of a sexual encounter as it isdefined by her assailant. At some point she has made an agreement, orformed a contract, and once that is done, her contractor is endded todemand that she sadsfy the terms of that contract. Thus, this viewabout sexual responsibilit)^ and desert is supported by other assump-dons about contracts and agreement. But we do not normally supposethat casual nonverbal behaviour generates agreements. Nor do wenormally grant private persons the right to enforce contracts. Whatradonale would support our conclusion in this case?

The radonale, I beheve, comes in the form of a belief in theespecially insistent nature of male sexuality, an insistence which lies atthe root of natural male aggression, and which is extremely difficult,perhaps impossible to contain. At a certain point in the arousalprocess, it is thought, a man's radonal will gives way to the preroga-dves of nature. His sexual need can and does reach a point where it isuncontrollable, and his natural masculine aggression kicks in to assurethat this need is met. Women, however, are naturally more contained,and so it is their responsibility not to provoke the irradonal in themale. If they do go so far as that, they have both failed in theirresponsibilides, and subjected themselves to the inevitable. One does

'•* As, for example, Lotenne Clark and Debta Lewis do m Rape: The Pnce ojCoercive Sexuality (Toronto: The Women's Press, 1977), pp. 152—153.

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not go into the lion's cage and expect not to be eaten. Naturalfeminine reluctance, it is thought, is no protecdon against a sexuallyaroused male.

This belief about the normal aggressiveness of male sexuality iscomplemented by common knowledge about female gender develop-ment. Once, women were taught to deny their sexuality and to aspireto ideals of chastity. Things have not changed so much. Women sdlltend to eschew conquest mentalities in favour of a combinadon of sexand affection. Insofar as this is thought to be merely a culturalrequirement, however, there is an expectadon that women will be coyabout their sexual desire. The assumpdon that women both want toindulge sexually, and are inclined to sacrifice this desire for higherends, gives rise to the myth that they want to be raped. After all,doesn't rape give them the sexual enjoyment they really want, at thesame time that it relieves them of the responsibility for admitdng toand acdng upon what they want? And how then can we blame men,who have been socialized to be aggressively seducdve precisely for thepurpose of overriding female reserve? If we find fault at all, we areinclined to cast our suspicions on the modves of the woman. For it ison her that the contradictory roles of sexual désirer and sexual denierhas been placed. Our awareness of the contradiction expected of hermakes us suspect her honesty. In the past, she was expected to denyher complicity because of the shame and guilt she felt at havingsubmitted.'= This expectation persists in many quarters today, and iscarried over into a general suspicion about her character, and the fearthat she might make a false accusation out of revenge, or some otherlow motive.""

But if women really want sexual pleasure, what inclines us to thinkthat they will get it through rape? This conclusion logically requires atheory about the dynamics of sexual pleasure that sees that pleasure asan emergent property of overwhelming male insistence. For theassumpdon that a raped female experiences sexual pleasure implies

'' See Sue Bessner, The Laws of Rape (New York: Ptaeget Publicadons, 1984), pp.111 — 121, for a discussion of the legal forms in which this suspicion is expressed.'" Ibid.

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that the person who rapes her knows how to cause that pleasureindependently of any information she might convey on that point.Since her ongoing protest is inconsistent with requests to be touchedin particular ways in particular places, to have more of this and less ofthat, then we must believe that the person who touches her knowsthese particular ways and places instinctively, vwthout any directivesfrom her.

Thus we find, underlying and reiniorcing this belief in incommu-nicative male prowess, a conception of sexual pleasure that springsfrom wordless interchanges, and of sexual success that occurs in aplace of meaningful silence. The language of seduction is accepted as atadt language: eye contact, smiles, blushes, and faintly discerniblegestures. It is, accordingly, imprecise and ambiguous. It would be easyfor a man to make mistakes about the message conveyed, understand-able that he should mistakenly think that a sexual invitation has beenmade, and a bargain struck. But honest mistakes, we think, must beexcused.

In sum. the belief that women should not be sexually provocative islogically lmked to several other beliefs, some normative, some empiri-cal. The normative beliefs are that (l) people should keep the agree-ments they make (2) that sexually provocative behaviour, taken beyonda certain point, generates agreements (3) that the peculiar nature ofmale and female sexualit)' places such agreements in a special category,one in which the possibility of retracting an agreement is ruled out, orat least made highly unlikely, (4) that women are not to be trusted, insexual matters at least. The empirical belief, which turns out to befalse, is that male sexuality is not subject to rational and moral control.

DISPELLING THE MYTHS

The 'she asked for it' justification of sexual assault incorporates aconception of a contract that would be difficult to defend in any othercontext and the presumptions about human sexuality which functionto reinforce sympathies rooted in the contractual notion of just desertsare not supported by empirical research.

The belief that a woman generates some sort of contractual obliga-

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don whenever her behaviour is interpreted as seductive is the mostindefensible part of the mythology of rape. In law, contracts are notlegidmate just because a promise has been made. In pardcular, the useof pressure tacdcs to extract agreement is frowned upon. Normally, anagreement is upheld only if the contractors were clear on what theywere getting into, and had sufficient dme to reflect on the wisdom oftheir doing so. Either there must be a clear tradition in which theexpectadons involved in the contract are fairly well known (marriage),or there must be an explicit written agreement concerning the exactterms of the contract and the expectadons of the persons involved. Butwhatever the terms of a contract, there is no private right to enforce itSo that if I make a contract with you on which I renege, the onlypermissible recourse for you is through due legal process.

Now it is not clear whether sexual contracts can be made to beginwith, or if so, what sort of sexual contracts would be legitimate. Butassuming that they could be made, the terms of those contracts wouldnot be enforceable. To allow public enforcement would be to grantthe State the overt right to force people to have sex, and this wouldclearly be unacceptable. Granting that sexual contracts are legidmate,state enforcement of such contracts would have to be limited toordering nonsexual compensation for breaches of contract So it makesno difference whether a sexual contract is tacit or explicit. Thereare no grounds whatsoever that would jusdfy enforcement of itsterms.

Thus, even if we assume that a woman has initially agreed to anencounter, her agreement does not automadcally make all subsequentsexual activity to which she submits legidmate. If during coitus awoman should experience pain, be suddenly overcome with guilt orfear of pregnancy, or simply lose her inidal desire, those are goodreasons for her to change her mind. Having changed her mind, neitherher partner nor the state has any right to force her to continue. Butthen if she is forced to continue she is assaulted. Thus, establishing ;that consent occurred at a pardcular point during a sexual encountershould not conclusively establish the legidmacy of the encounter."

" A speech-act hke 'OK, let's get it over with' is taken as consent, even thoughit is extracted under high pressure, the sex that ensues lacks mutuahty, and there

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What is needed is a reading of whether she agreed throughout theencounter.

If the 'she asked for it' contractual view of sexual interchange hasany validity, it is because there is a point at which there is no stoppinga sexual encounter, a point at which that encounter becomes theinexorable outcome oí the unfolding of natural events. If a sexualencounter is like a slide on which I carmot stop halfway down, it willbe relevant whether I enter the slide of my own firee 'will, or ampushed.

But there is no e'vidence that the endre sexual act is like a slide.While there may be a few seconds in the 'plateau' period just prior toorgasm in which people are 'swept' away by sexual feelings to thepoint where we could jusdfiably understand their lack of heed for thecomfort of their partner, the greater part of a sexual encounter comeswell within the bounds of morally responsible control of our o'wnacdons. Indeed, the available evidence shows that most of the acd'vityinvolved in sex has to do 'with building the requisite level of desire, atask that involves the proper use of foreplay, the possibility of whichimphes control over the form that foreplay will take. Modem sexualtherapy assumes that such control is universally accessible, and so farthere has been no reason to quesdon that assumpdon. Sexologists areunanimous, moreover, in holding that mutual sexual enjoyment re-quires an atmosphere of comfort and communicadon, a minimum ofpressure, and an ongoing check-up on one's partner's state. Theymaintain that different people have different predilecdons, and thatwhat is pleasurable for one person is very often anathema to another.These findings show that the way to achieve sexual pleasure, at anydme at all, let alone 'with a casual acquaintance, decidedly does notinvolve overriding the other person's express reservadons and pro'vid-ing them with just any kind of sexual sdmtilus.'* And while we do not

are no ulterior reasons for such an agreement. See Davis, p. 103. Also see CarolynSchäfer and Marilyn Frye 'Rape and Respect', Readings in Recent Feminist Philoso-phy, ed. by Marilyn PeatseU (California: Wadsworth, 1986), p. 189, for a charac-tetizadon of the common nodon of consent as a formal speech-act.'̂ It is not just women who fail to find sadsfacdon in the 'swept away' approachto sexual interacdon. Studies of convicted rapists, and of conquest oriented men.

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want to allow science and technology a voice in which the voices ofparticular women are drowned, in this case science seems to concurwith women's percepdon that aggressive incommunicadve sex is notwhat they want. But if science and the voice of women concur, ifaggressive seduction does not lead to good sex, if women do not like itor want it, then it is not rational to think that they would agree to it.Where such sex takes place, it is therefore radonal to presume that thesex was not consensual.

The myth that women like to be raped, is closely connected, as wehave seen, to doubt about their honesty in sexual matters, and thissuspicion is exploited by defence lawyers when sexual assault casesmake it to the courtroom. It is an unfortunate consequence of thepresumpdon of innocence that rape vicdms who end up in courtfrequently find that it is they who are on trial. For if the defendant isinnocent, then either he did not intend to do what he was accused of,or the plaintiff is mistaken about his identity, or she is lying. Often thelast alternadve is the only plausible defence, and as a result, theplaindff's word seldom goes unquesdoned. Women are frequentlyaccused of having made a false accusadon, either as a defensivemechanism for dealing with guilt and shame, or out of a desire forrevenge.

Now there is no point in denying the possibility of false accusation,though there are probably better ways of seeking revenge on a manthan accusing him of rape. However, we can now establish a logicalconnection between the evidence that a woman was subjected to high-pressure aggressive 'seducdon' tacdcs, and her claim that she did notconsent to that encounter. Where the kind of encounter is not the sortto which it would be reasonable to consent, there is a logical presump-

indicate that men ate ttequently disappointed when they use this apptoach aswell. In ovet half of aggravated sexual assaults penetradon fails because the manloses his etecdon. Those who do succeed invariably tepott that the sex experi-enced was not enjoyable. This supports the prevailing view of sexologists thatmen depend on the posidve response of their pattners in order to fuel their ownresponsive mechanisms. See A. N. Groth, Rape and Sexual Assault. Also see WhyMen Rape, edited by Sylvia Levine and Joseph Koenig (Toronto: Macmülan, 1982)or consult any tecent manual on male sexuality.

Date Rape: Feminist Analysis 233

don that a woman who claims that she did not consent is telling thetruth. Where the kind of sex involved is not the sort of sex we wouldexpect a woman to like, tbe burden of proof should not be on thewoman to show that she did not consent, but on the defendant toshow that contrary to every reasonable expectadon she did consent.The defendant should be required to convince the court that theplaindff persuaded him to have sex with her even though there are novisible reasons why she should.

In conclusion, there are no grounds for the 'she asked for it'defence. Sexually provocadve behaviour does not generate sexualcontracts. Even where there are sexual agreements, they cannot belegidmately enforced either by the State, or by private right, or bynatural prerogadve. Secondly, all the evidence suggests that neitherwomen nor men find sexual enjoyment in rape or in any form ofnon-communicadve sexuality. Thirdly, male sexual desire is contain-able, and can be subjected to moral and radonal control. Fourthly,since there is no reason why women should not be sexually provoca-dve, they do not 'deserve' any sex they do not want. This last is awelcome discovery. The taboo on sexual provocadveness in women isa taboo both on sensuality and on teasing. But sensuality is a source ofdelight, and teasing is playful and inspires "wit. What a relief to learnthat it is not sexual provocadveness, but its enemies, that consdtutes adanger to the world.

COMMUNICATIVE SEXUALITY: REINTERPRETINGTHE KANTIAN IMPERATIVE

The present criterion of consent sets up sexual encounters as con-tractual events in which sexual aggression is presumed to be consentedto unless there is some "vigorous act of refusal. As long as we viewsexual interacdon on a contractual model, the only possibility forfinding fault is to point to the presence of such an act. But it is clearthat whether or not we can determine such a presence, there issomething strongly disagreeable about the sexual aggression describedabove.

In thinking about sex we must keep in mind its sensual ends, and

234 Lois Pineau

the facts show that aggressive high-pressure sex contradicts those ends.Consensual sex in dating situations is presumed to aim at mutualenjoyment. It may not always do this, and when it does, it might notalways succeed. There is no logical incompatibility between wanting tocontinue a sexual encounter, and failing to derive sexual pleasure fromit."

But it seems to me that there is a presumption in favour of theconnection between sex and sexual enjoyment, and that if a manwants to be sure that he is not forcing himself on a woman, he has anobligation either to ensure that the encounter really is mutuallyenjoyable, or to know the reasons why she would want to continuethe encounter in spite of her lack of enjoyment. A closer investigationof the nature of this obligation will enable us to construct a morerational and a more plausible norm of sexual conduct.

Onara O'Neill has argued that in intimate situations we have anobligation to take the ends of others as our own, and to promote thoseends in a non-manipulative and non-paternalistic manner.̂ " Now itseems that in honest sexual encounters just this is required. Assumingthat each person enters the encounter in order to seek sexual satisfac-tion, each person engaging in the encounter has an obligation to helpthe other seek his or her ends. To do otherwise is to risk acting inopposition to what the other desires, and hence to risk acting withoutthe other's consent.

But the obligation to promote the sexual ends of one's partnerimplies the obligation to know what those ends are, and also theobligarion to know how those ends are attained. Thus, the problemcomes down to a problem of epistemic responsibility, the responsi-bility to know. The solution, in my view, lies in the practice of a

''' Robin Morgan comes perilously close to suggesting that there is when shedefines rape as any sexual encounter that is not initiated by a woman out of herown heartfelt desire. See Going Too Far (New York: Random House, 1968), p.165.2" O'Neill, 'Between Consenting Adults', Philosophy and Public Affairs 14, 252—277.

Date Rape: Feminist Analysis 235

communicadve sexuality, one which combines the appropriate knowl-edge of the other vwth respect for the dialecdcs of desire.

So let us, for a moment, conceive of sexual interacdon on acommunicadve rather than a contractual model. Let us look at it theway I think it should be looked at, as if it were a proper conversadonrather than an offer from the Mafia.

Conversadons, when they are proper conversadons, as opposedto lectures, diatribes, or interrogadons, illustrate the logical reladonbetween communicadve interacdon and treadng someone as an end inherself in O'Neill's sense. This logical reladon can be illustrated by thedifference in kind between a typical contract and a proper sort ofconversadon, a difference that derives primarily from the differentreladon each bears to the necessity for cooperadon. The difference isthis: typically, where contracts are concerned, cooperadon is primarilyrequired as a means to some further end set by the contract. In properconversadons, as I shall define them here, cooperadon is sought as anend in itself

It is not inimical to most contracts that the cooperadon necessaryfor achieving its ends be reluctant, or even hostile. Although we canfind fault with a contractor for failing to deliver goods or services, wedo not normally cridcize her for her atdtude. And although there aresituadons where we employ people on the condidon that they becongenial, even then we do not require that their congeniality be thereal thing. When we are having a proper conversadon, however, wedo, typically, want the real thing. In conversadon, the cooperadon withthe other is not just a means to an interesdng conversadon; it is one ofthe ends we seek, without which the conversadon ceases to sadsfy.

The commutiicadve interacdon involved in conversadon is con-cerned with a good deal more than didacdc content and argument.Good conversadonalists are intuidve, sympathedc, and charitable. In-tuidon and charity aid the conversadonalist in her effort to interpretthe words of the other correcdy and sympathy enables her to enterinto the other's point of view. Her sensidvity alerts her to the tone ofthe exchange. Has her point been taken good-humouredly or resent-fully? Aggressively delivered responses are taken as a sign that ad

236 Lois Pineau

hominems are at work, and that the respondent's self-wordi has beencalled into question. Good conversadonalists will know to suspendfurther discussion undl this sense of self-worth has been reestablished.Angry responses, resentful responses, bored responses, even over-en-thusiasdc responses require that the emodonal ground be clearedbefore the discussion be continued. Often it is better to change thetopic, or to come back to it on another day under different circum-stances. Good conversationalists do not overwhelm their respondentswith a barrage of their own opinions. While they may be persuasive,the forcefulness of their persuasion does not lie in their being over-bearing, but rather in their capacity to see the other's point of view, tounderstand what it depends on, and so to address the essendal point,but 'with tact and clarity.

Just as communicadve conversadonalists are concerned with morethan didactic content, persons engaged in communicadve sexuality'will be concerned with more than achieving coitus. They will besensidve to the responses of their partners. They will, like goodconversadonalists, be intuidve, sympathedc, and charitable. Intuidonwill help them to interpret their partner's responses; sympathy wülenable them to share what their partner is feeling; charity will enablethem to care. Communicadve sexual partners will not overwhelm eachother with the barrage of their own desires. They will treat negadve,bored, or angry responses, as a sign that the erode ground needs to beeither cleared or abandoned. Their concern 'with fostering the desire ofthe other must involve an ongoing state of alertness in interpredng herresponses.

Just as a conversadonalist's prime concern is for the mutuality ofthe discussion, a person engaged in communicadve sexuality will bemost concerned 'with the mutuality of desire. As such, both will putinto pracdce a regard for their respondent that is guaranteed no placein the contractual language of rights, duties, and consent The dia-lectics of both acdvides reflect the dialecdcs of desire insofar as eachperson's interest in condnuing is condngent upon the other personwishing to do so too, and each person's interest is as much fueled bythe other's interest as it is by her o'wn. Each respects the subjecdvity ofthe other not just by avoiding treading on it, but by fostering and

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protecdng the quality of that subjecdvity. Indeed, the requirement toavoid treading on the subjecdvity of the other entails the obligadon torespect the dialecdcs of desire.'' For in indmacy there is no passing byon the other side. To be indmate just is to open up in emodonal andpersonal ways, to share personal knowledge, and to be recepdve to theopenness of the other. This openness and sharing normally takes placeonly in an atmosphere of confidence and trust. But once availed ofthis knowledge, and confidence, and trust, one has, as it were, respon-sibility thrust upon one, the responsibility not to betray the trust bymisusing the knowledge. And only by respecdng the dialecdcs ofdesire can we have any confidence that we have not misused ourposidon of trust and knowledge.

CULTURAL PRESUMPTIONS

Now it may well be that we have no obligadon to care for strangers,and I do not wish to claim that we do. Nonetheless, it seems thatO'Neill's point about the special moral dudes we have in certainindmate situadons is supported by a conceptual reladon betweencertain kinds of personal reladonships and the expectadon that itshould be a communicadve reladon. Friendship is a case in point. It isa reladon that is gready underdetermined by what we usually includein our sets of rights and obligadons. For the most part, rights andobligadons disappear as terms by which fHendship is guided. They aresdll there, to be called upon, in case the reladonship breaks down, butinsofar as the friendship is a friendship, it is concerned with fosteringthe quality of the interacdon and not with standing on rights. Thus,because we are friends, we share our property, and property rightsbetween us are not invoked. Because we are friends, privacy is not anissue. Because we are friends we may see to each other's needs as oftenas we see to our own. The same can be said for reladons between

-' The sort of reladonship I have in mind exemphfies the 'feminist' apptoach toethics argued fot by Nell Noddings, Caring: A Feminine Approach to Ethics(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984). In patdculat, see het discussionof teaching as a 'duality', p. 195.

238 Lois Pineau

lovers, parents and dependent children, and even between spouses, atleast when interacdon is funcdoning at an opdmal level. When suchreladons break down to the point that people must stand on theirrights, we can often say that the actors ought to make more of aneffort, and in many instances fault them for their lack of charity,tolerance, or benevolence. Thus, although we have a right to endfriendships, it may be a reflecdon on our lack of virtue that we do so,and while we cannot be criticized for violadng other people's rights,we can be rightfully deprecated for lacking the virtue to sustain afriendship.

But is there a similar conceptual relation between the kind ofacdvity that a date is, and the sort of moral practice which that itrequires? My claim is that there is, and that this connecdon is easilyestablished once we recognize the cultural presumpdon that dadng is agesture of friendship and regard. Traditionally, the decision to dateindicates that two people have an initial attracdon to each other, thatthey are disposed to like each other, and look forward to enjoyingeach other's company. Dadng derives its implicit meaning from thistradidon. It retains this meaning unless other aims are explicitly stated,and even then it may not be possible to alienate this meaning. It is arare woman who vnll not spurn a man who states explicitly, right atthe onset, that he wants to go out with her solely on the condidonthat he have sexual intercourse with her at the end of the evening, andthat he has no interest in her company apart from gaining that end,and no concern for mutual satisfaction.

Explicit protest to the contrary aside, the convendons of dadngconfer on it its social meaning, and this social meaning implies areladonship which is more like friendship than the cutthroat comped-don of opposing teams. As such, it requires that we do more thanstand on our rights with regard to each other. As long as we areoperating under the auspices of a dadng reladonship, it requires thatwe behave in the mode of friendship and trust. But if a date is morelike a friendship than a business contract, then clearly respect for thedialectics of desire is incompatible "with the sort of sexual pressure thatis inclined to end in date rape. And clearly, also, a conquest mentalitywhich exploits a situation of trust and respect for purely selfish ends is

Date Rape: Feminist Analysis 239

morally pernicious. Failure to respect the dialectics of desire whenoperating under the auspices of friendship and trust is to act infiagrant disregard of the moral requirement to avoid manipulative,coercive, and exploitive behaviour. Respect for the dialectics of desireis prima facie inconsistent with the satisfaction of one person at theexpense of the other. The proper end of friendship relations is mutualsatisfaction. But the requirement of mutuality means that we musttake a communicative approach to discovering the ends of the other,and this entails that we respect the dialectics of desire.

But now that we know what communicative sexuality is, and that itis morally required, and that it is the only feasible means to mutualsexual enjoyment, why not take this model as the norm of what isreasonable in sexual interaction. The evidence of sexologists stronglyindicates that women whose partners are aggressively uncommunica-tive have little chance of experiencing sexual pleasure. But it is notreasonable for women to consent to what they have little chance ofenjoying. Hence it is not reasonable for women to consent to aggres-sive noncommunicative sex. Nor can we reasonably suppose thatwomen have consented to sexual encounters which we know and theyknow they do not find enjoyable. With the communicative model asthe norm, the aggressive contractual model should strike us as a modelof deviant sexuality, and sexual encounters patterned on that modelshould strike us as encounters to which prima facie no one wouldreasonably agree. But if acquiescence to an encounter counts asconsent only if the acquiescence is reasonable, something to which areasonable person, in full possession of knowledge relevant to theencounter, would agree, then acquiescence to aggressive noncommuni-cative sex is not reasonable. Hence, acquiescence under such conditionsshould not count as consent.

Thus, where communicative sexuality does not occur, we lack themain ground for believing that the sex involved was consensual.Moreover, where a man does not engage in communicative sexuality,he acts either out of reckless disregard, or out of willful ignorance. Forhe cannot know, except through the practice of communicativesexuality, whether his partner has any sexual reason for continuing theencounter. And where she does not, he runs the risk of imposing on

240 Lois Pineau

her what she is not willing to have. All that is needed then, in order toprovide women with legal protecdon from 'date rape' is to make bothreckless indifference and willful ignorance a sufficient condidon ofmens rea and to make communicative sexuality the accepted norm ofsex to which a reasonable woman would agree.̂ ^ Thus, the appeal tocommunicative sexuality as a norm for sexual encounters accomplishestwo things. It brings the aggressive sex involved in 'date rape' wellwithin the realm of sexual assault, and it locates the guÜt of date rapistsin the failure to approach sexual reladons on a communicadve basis.

THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS

Finding a proper criterion for consent is one problem, discovedngwhat really happened, after the event, when the only eye witnessesgive confiicting accounts is another. But while there is no foolproofway of getting the unadulterated truth, it can make a significantdifference to the outcome of a prosecudon, what sort of facts we areseeking. On the old model of aggressive seducdon we sought evidenceof resistance. But on the new model of communicadve sexuality whatwe want is evidence of an ongoing posidve and encouraging responseon the part of the plaindff This new goal will require quite differenttactics on the part of the cross-examiners, and quite different expecta-dons on the part of juries and judges. Where communicadve sexualityis taken as the norm, and aggressive sexual tacdcs as a presumpdonagainst consent, the outcome for the example that I described abovewould be quite different. It would be regarded as sexual assault ratherthan seducdon.

Let us then consider a date rape trial in which a man is cross-examined. He is asked whether he was presuming mutual sexualenjoyment Suppose he answers in the negadve. Then he would haveto account for why he persisted in the face of her voiced reluctance.He cannot give as an excuse that he thought she liked it, because he

As now seems to be the case in Australian Law. See fn. 4.

Date Rape: Feminist Analysis 241

believes that she did not. If he thought that she had consented eventhough she didn't like it, then it seems to me that the burden of proofwould lie with him to say why it was reasonable to think this. Clearly,her inidal resistance, her presumed lack of enjoyment, and the pres-sure tacdcs involved in getdng her to 'go along' would not support areasonable belief in consent, and his persisdng in the face of herdissadsfacdon would surely cast doubt on the sincerity of his belief inher consent.

But suppose he answers in the affirmadve. Then the cross-examinerwould not have to rely on the old criteria for non-consent He wouldnot have to show either that she had resisted him, or that she was in afearful or indmidated state of mind. Instead he could use a commu-nicadve model of sexuality to discover how much respect there hadbeen for the dialecdcs of desire. Did he ask her what she liked? If shewas using contracepdves? If he should? What tone of voice did he use?How did she answer? Did she make any demands? Did she ask forpenetradon? How was that desire conveyed? Did he ever let up thepressure long enough to see if she was really that interested? Did heask her which posidon she preferred? Assuming that the defendantdoes not perjure himself, he would lack sadsfactory answers to thesequesdons. But even where the defendant did lie, a skilled cross-examiner who was 'willing to go into detail could probably establisheasily enough when the interacdon had not been communicadve. It isextraordinarily difficult to keep up a consistent story when you are nottelling the truth.

On the new criterion, the cross-examinadon focusses on the com-municadve nature of the ongoing encounter, and the communicadvenature of an encounter is much easier to establish than the occurrenceof an episodic act of resistance. For one thing, it requires that a fairlylong, yet consistent story be told, and this enables us to assess theplausibility of the compedng claims in light of a wider collecdon ofrelevant data. Secondly, in making noncommunicadve sex the pri-mary indicator of coercive sex it provides us 'with a criterion fordisdnguishing consensual sadomasochism from brutality. For even if acouple agree to sadomasochisdc sex, bondage and whippings and therest of it, the court has a right to require that there be a system of

242 Lois Pineau

signals whereby each partner can convey to the other whether she hashad enough.̂ -' Thirdly, the use of a new criterion of communicadvesexuality would enable us to introduce a new category of nonaggra-vated sexual assault which would not necessarily carry a heavy sen-tence but which would nonetheless provide an effecdve recourseagainst 'date rape'.̂ *

CONCLUSION

In sum, using communicadve sexuality as a model of normal sex hasseveral advantages over the 'aggressive-acquiescence' model of seduc-tion. The new model des the presumption that consensual sex takesplace in the expectation of mutual desire much more closely to thefacts about how that desire actually funcdons. Where communicadvesex does not occur, this establishes a presumption that there was noconsent. The importance of this presumpdon is that we are able, incriminal proceedings, to shift the burden of proof from the plaindff,who on the contractual model must show that she resisted or wasthreatened, to the defendant who must then give some reason why sheshould consent after all. The communicadve model of sexuality alsoenables us to give a different conceptual content to the concept ofconsent. It sees consent as something more like an ongoing coopera-don than the one-shot agreement which we are inclined to see it as onthe contractual model. Moreover, it does not matter, on the commu-nicadve model, whether a woman was sexually provocadve, what herreputadon is, what went on before the sex began. All that matters isthe quality of communicadon with regard to the sex itself

But most importantly, the communicadve model of normal sex-uality gives us a handle on a soludon to the problem of date-rape. If

-' The SAMOIS jusdficadon of sadomasochism tests on the claim that sadomas-ochisdc ptactice can be communicadve in this way. See Coming To Power, Samois(Boston: Alyson Publicadons, 1981).^* See secdons 520e, Act No. 266, State of Michigan. Sexual assault in the fourthdegree is punishable by imprisonment of not more than two years ot a fine ofnot mote than $500, or both.

Date Rape: Feminist Analysis 243

noncommunicadve sexuality establishes a presumpdon of nonconsent,then where there are no overriding reasons for thinking that consentoccurred, we have a criterion for a category of sexual assault that doesnot require evidence of physical violence or threat If we are seriousabout date rape, then the next step is to take this criterion as objecdvegrounds for establishing that a date rape has occurred. The properlegisladon is the shortest route to establishing this criterion.

There remains, of course, the problem of educadon. If we are goingto change the rules about what is socially acceptable in sexual rela-dons, then it is only fair to let the public know. In a mass mediasociety, this is not hard to do. A public informadon campaign willspread the news in no dme at all. The real problem is the reluctanceof the mass media to deal "with quesdons of sexual reladons and sexualindmacy. Its polidcians are sdll curiously reluctant to stand up to anincreasingly small sector of society that is unwilling to admit, despiteall the evidence to the contrary, that anyone but well-meaninghusbands and "wives ever have sex. I would not be surprised if this sortof puritanical holdout were the very source of the problem of rape.Certainly, sexual ignorance must contribute significantly to the kind ofsocial environment conducive to rape.

Dapartment of Philosophy,

Kansas State University.

Manhattan, Kansas 66506,

U.SA

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