Journal of Applied Psychology

Linking Subordinate Political Skill to SupervisorDependence and Reward Recommendations: AModerated Mediation ModelJunqi Shi, Russell E. Johnson, Yihao Liu, and Mo WangOnline First Publication, December 31, 2012. doi: 10.1037/a0031129

CITATIONShi, J., Johnson, R. E., Liu, Y., & Wang, M. (2012, December 31). Linking Subordinate PoliticalSkill to Supervisor Dependence and Reward Recommendations: A Moderated MediationModel. Journal of Applied Psychology. Advance online publication. doi: 10.1037/a0031129

Linking Subordinate Political Skill to Supervisor Dependence and RewardRecommendations: A Moderated Mediation Model

Junqi ShiSun Yat-sen University

Russell E. JohnsonMichigan State University

Yihao LiuUniversity of Florida

Mo WangUniversity of Florida and Peking University

In this study, we examined the relations of subordinate political skill with supervisor’s dependence on thesubordinate and supervisor reward recommendation, as well as mediating (interaction frequency withsupervisor) and moderating (supervisor political behavior) variables of these relations. Our theoreticalmodel was tested using data collected from employees in a company that specialized in constructionmanagement. Analyses of multisource and lagged data from 53 construction management team super-visors and 296 subordinates indicated that subordinate political skill was positively related to supervisorreward recommendation via subordinate’s interaction frequency with supervisor. Although interactionfrequency with a supervisor was also positively related to the supervisor’s dependence on the subordi-nate, the indirect effect of subordinate political skill on dependence was not significant. Further, both therelationship between subordinate political skill and interaction frequency with a supervisor and theindirect relationships between subordinate political skill and supervisor reward recommendation werestronger when supervisors exhibited more political behavior.

Keywords: political skill, political behavior, interaction frequency, dependence, reward recommendation

A perspective shared by many organizational scholars is that orga-nizations are inherently political arenas, such that decisions and out-come allocations are not based solely on merit but also on interper-sonal ties that circumvent formal rules and procedures (Mintzberg,1985). It is therefore essential for employees to be skilled at readingand influencing other people at work, which requires political skill(Mintzberg, 1983, 1985; Pfeffer, 1981; for a review, see Ferris et al.,2007). Political skill is defined as “the ability to effectively understand

others at work and to use such knowledge to influence others to act inways that enhance one’s personal and/or organizational objectives”(Ferris et al., 2005, p. 127). Specifically, political skill involves socialastuteness (i.e., observing and attuning to the interpersonal interac-tions that take place at work), interpersonal influence (i.e., adaptingand calibrating one’s behaviors to different situations to elicit specificresponses from others), networking ability (i.e., identifying and de-veloping diverse contacts and social networks), and apparent sincerity(i.e., appearing to others to be authentic and in possession of highintegrity). Although it is one of several interpersonal skills that helpemployees interact effectively with others, political skill is a uniqueconstruct. For example, Ferris et al. (2005) empirically demonstratedthat political skill differs from emotional intelligence (political skillincludes interpersonal knowledge and skills that extend beyond emo-tions) and self-monitoring (political skill is used proactively to acquiredesired outcomes, whereas self-monitoring is typically used to avoidundesirable appraisals and outcomes).

Gaining an understanding of employee political skill is impor-tant for several reasons. First, research suggests that job perfor-mance and career success are at least partly influenced by inter-personal skills (Luthans, Hodgetts, & Rosenkrantz, 1988). Assuch, research on employees’ political skill can help advancepsychologists’ understanding regarding the particular interpersonalskills that influence personal outcomes in work environments thatare inherently political. Second, although researchers, in numerousstudies, have examined organizational politics (see Chang, Rosen,& Levy, 2009), far less attention has been paid to the competenciesof influencers who engage in political behaviors. Thus, there is aneed to better understand the personal resources that help employ-

Junqi Shi, Lingnan (University) College, Sun Yat-sen University,Guangzhou, People’s Republic of China; Russell E. Johnson, Eli BroadCollege of Business, Michigan State University; Yihao Liu, WarringtonCollege of Business Administration, University of Florida; Mo Wang,Warrington College of Business Administration, University of Florida, andGuanghua School of Management, Peking University, Beijing, People’sRepublic of China.

This research was supported by Grant 09CSH028 awarded to Junqi Shifrom the Natural Social Science Foundation of China and Key Project2009BAI77B04 in the Chinese National Science & Technology PillarProgram. This research was also supported in part by the Summer VisitingScholar Fund awarded to Mo Wang from Guanghua School of Manage-ment, Peking University. We thank John Kammeyer-Mueller for his feed-back on a draft of this article. We also thank Oscar Shatner for his help withediting and formatting the manuscript.

Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Russell E.Johnson, Department of Management, Eli Broad College of Business,Michigan State University, East Lansing, MI 48824. E-mail: johnsonr@bus.msu.edu

Journal of Applied Psychology © 2012 American Psychological Association2012, Vol. 98, No. 1, 000 0021-9010/12/$12.00 DOI: 10.1037/a0031129

1

ees successfully cope with and leverage politics, and political skillis a key skill that explains why politics benefit some employees butnot others (Ferris et al., 2005, 2007).

Although political skill has been shown to relate to job perfor-mance (Bing, Davison, Minor, Novicevic, & Frink, 2011; Ferris etal., 2005; Shi, Chen, & Zhou, 2011), Ferris et al. (2007) noted theneed to understand why the influence efforts of politically skilledemployees are successful. This is especially true in instancesinvolving social interactions with one’s supervisor, because pre-vious research has mostly focused on the effects of supervisorinfluence and power on subordinate compliance rather than viceversa (Yukl, 2008). Given that supervisors are the source of valuedsocial and economic resources (Tangirala, Green, & Ramanujam,2007; Zhang, Wang, & Shi, 2012; Zhou, Wang, Chen, & Shi,2012), subordinates must rely, in part, on their political skill toobtain such resources. As we propose below, interactions withpolitically skilled employees offer several benefits (e.g., access touseful information, emotional and task support), which lead togreater dependence and reward recommendations from supervi-sors. These relations are mediated by interaction frequency be-tween subordinates and supervisors. We also address a secondresearch gap in the political skill literature by examining a situa-tional factor that constrains the effectiveness of political skill (seeFerris & Judge, 1991). Supervisor behavior is a salient aspect ofthe organizational context (Tangirala et al., 2007; Zhou et al.,2012), and we suspect that subordinate political skill is moreinfluential in contexts where supervisor behavior is also political.We therefore proposed and tested the moderated mediation modelthat is illustrated in Figure 1 and described below.

Theoretical Framework and Hypotheses

As shown in Figure 1, we propose that subordinate political skill isrelated to their interaction frequency with their supervisor (i.e., theamount of work-related interactions subordinates have with theirsupervisors; McAllister, 1995). Subordinates’ interaction with theirsupervisor is the channel through which valuable social and economicresources pass to subordinates (Andrews & Kacmar, 2001; Fairhurst,Rogers, & Saar, 1987). Politically skilled subordinates are expected tohave greater interaction with their supervisor for several reasons. First,politically skilled subordinates are motivated to build connections,

alliances, and coalitions with those in positions of power at higherorganization levels so that they may accrue resources (Ferris et al.,2005, 2007), and one’s direct supervisor represents the most directlink to those resources. Because of their strong networking ability,politically skilled subordinates attain central positions in their team’scommunication network, granting them disproportionate access totheir supervisor. Second, politically skilled subordinates, through theirsincerity and adaptability, are able to inspire confidence and trust fromothers, thereby facilitating a positive relationship with their supervi-sors (Ferris et al., 2007). Interactions with politically skilled subordi-nates are therefore pleasant for supervisors, which prolongs interac-tions and prompts supervisors to initiate interactions withsubordinates. Third, politically skilled subordinates are more astute insocial situations; thus, they are more likely to see and successfully acton opportunities to interact with supervisors. For these reasons, wehypothesized the following:

Hypothesis 1: Subordinate political skill will be positivelyrelated to subordinate interaction frequency with supervisor.

Because political skill is an interpersonal resource, whateverbenefits are accrued from political skill necessitate social interac-tions with others. Through frequent interactions with their super-visor, politically skilled employees increase the likelihood thattheir supervisor depends on them and makes reward recommen-dations for them. Dependence occurs when one’s outcomes arecontingent on the actions of another (Sheppard & Sherman, 1998).Although leadership research has largely focused on subordinatedependence on supervisors (e.g., Kark, Shamir, & Chen, 2003),Weick (1979) pointed out that supervisors also depend on subor-dinates, especially when subordinates have specialized task orrelational skills (Pfeffer, 1981; Tjosvold, 1985). Supervisors alsoroutinely make reward recommendations for subordinates (Allen& Rush, 1998), which not only reflect subordinates’ task skills buttheir relational skills as well (Sims, Gioia, & Longnecker, 1987).For example, Kiker and Motowidlo (1999) found that interpersonalfacilitation, which is aided by political skill (Treadway, Ferris,Duke, & Adams, 2007), is associated with more favorable super-visor reward recommendations.

There are at least four reasons why interactions with politicallyskilled subordinates contribute to supervisor dependence and re-

H3/H4b/H6b

H5/H6a/H6b Team Level

H2/H4a/H6a

H1/H4a/H4b

Supervisor Political Behavior

Subordinate Political Skill

Supervisor Reward Recommendations

Supervisor’s Dependence on Subordinate

Individual Level

H6a/H6b

Interaction Frequency with Supervisor

Time 1 Time 2

Figure 1. Hypothesized model. All the hypothesized relationships are positive. H � Hypothesis. H4a and H4brepresent indirect effects. H5, H6a, and H6b represents cross-level moderation effect.

2 SHI, JOHNSON, LIU, AND WANG

ward recommendations. First, as mentioned earlier, politicallyskilled subordinates occupy a central position in the team network,with connections to many other members. Through interactionswith these well-connected subordinates, supervisors come to de-pend on them to disseminate information and facilitate interactionswith other members. Occupying a central position in the workteam also means that politically skilled subordinates are the pri-mary conduit through which supervisors receive information aboutongoing projects and feedback on their performance. These ben-eficial interactions not only breed dependence, but they may alsobe recognized in the form of reward recommendations for thesubordinate. Second, more frequent interactions with politicallyskilled subordinates also provide support for supervisors, espe-cially emotional support owing to the social astuteness and sincer-ity of such employees. Even in cases where the subordinate’s ownperformance might be the source of the problem, politically skilledsubordinates adapt and calibrate their behavior according to oth-ers’ expectations to create positive impressions of themselves(Ferris et al., 2005). Thus, interactions with politically skilledsubordinates are unlikely to be negative ordeals. Third, frequentinteractions expose subordinates to the values and goals of theirsupervisor, offering insight into the types of work behaviors thatsupervisors deem important and worthy of recognition. The infor-mation that subordinates glean from these interactions can then beleveraged by acting in ways that are aligned with those values andgoals, which likely cultivates supervisor dependence and rewardrecommendations. Fourth, frequent interactions may increase su-pervisor liking due to mere exposure effects because repetitiveexposure, in and of itself, enhances the positive affect that isattached to the person (Zajonc, 2001). All of these benefits (i.e.,access to useful information, support, goal alignment, and liking)require frequent supervisor–subordinate interactions, which areresponsible for translating political skill into positive outcomeslike supervisor dependence and reward recommendations.

Hypothesis 2: Subordinate interaction frequency with the su-pervisor will be positively related to supervisor dependence onthe subordinate.

Hypothesis 3: Subordinate interaction frequency with the su-pervisor will be positively related to supervisor reward rec-ommendations for the subordinate.

Hypothesis 4: Subordinate interaction frequency with the su-pervisor mediates the relationships of subordinate politicalskill with supervisor (a) dependence on the subordinate and(b) reward recommendations for the subordinate.

Supervisor political behavior refers to the extent that supervi-sors use interpersonal influence to achieve team and personal goalsthrough informal means (Ferris, Russ, & Fandt, 1989; Mayes &Allen, 1977). Examples include championing the team and adver-tising its accomplishments throughout the organization, acquiringdesired resources via friendship and affiliate channels, and beingagreeable with higher-ups in the company (Ferris & Kacmar,1992). We suspect that the direct and indirect effects of subordi-nate political skill are stronger when subordinates report to super-visors who engage in high (vs. low) levels of political behavior.We believe this for a few reasons. First, from a supervisor–subordinate fit perspective, political supervisors may value subor-

dinates who are similarly politically skilled. A favorable similar-to-me bias would therefore augment the benefits to subordinatesfor being politically skilled. Second, there is also better fit betweenthe person and the situation when politically skilled subordinatesreport to politicking supervisors. That is, politicking supervisorscreate a weak situation in which recognition and resources are lessconstrained by formal rules and procedures, which affords politi-cally skilled subordinates more opportunity to leverage their in-terpersonal influence (Andrews, Kacmar, & Harris, 2009). In fact,supervisors who engage in political behaviors communicate totheir subordinates that it is acceptable to achieve goals by relyingon interpersonal influence (Treadway, Hochwarter, Kacmar, &Ferris, 2005), thus prompting subordinates to take advantage oftheir political skill. Last, supervisors who politick on the behalf oftheir team may accrue more recognition and resources from theorganization, which trickles down to subordinates. Thus, politi-cally skilled subordinates who report to political supervisors enjoygreater access to a larger pool of resources than do less politicallyskilled team members. In contrast, subordinates working for non-political supervisors are at a disadvantage when it comes to lever-aging their political skill because they fit less well with theirsupervisor, they are in a strong situation that is guided by formalrules and policies, and the pool of available resources is smaller.Thus, we expect that the direct relation of subordinate politicalskill with interaction frequency and the indirect relations of sub-ordinate political skill with supervisor dependence and rewardrecommendations are bounded by supervisor political behavior.

Hypothesis 5: Subordinate political skill will interact withsupervisor political behavior such that the positive relation-ship between subordinate political skill and subordinate inter-action frequency with the supervisor will be stronger whensupervisor political behavior is high (vs. low).

Hypothesis 6: The indirect relationships of subordinate polit-ical skill with (a) supervisor dependence on the subordinateand (b) supervisor reward recommendations will be strongerwhen the supervisor exhibits high (vs. low) political behavior.

Method

Sample and Procedure

Data were collected from a construction management companyin South China. Employees worked in different construction man-agement teams that corresponded to different construction proj-ects. They performed tasks such as scheduling the project inlogical steps; budgeting the time required to meet deadlines; andconferring with local supervisory personnel, owners, contractors,and design professionals to discuss and resolve issues involvingwork procedures, complaints, and construction problems. Employ-ees also prepared contracts and negotiated revisions and additionsto contractual agreements with architects, consultants, clients, andsuppliers. Following government regulation, they are responsiblefor preparing and submitting budget estimates, progress reports,and cost-tracking reports. Each project team had one supervisor.

Survey data were collected at two time points separated by 3months. At Time 1, subordinates responded to measures of polit-ical skill and interaction frequency, while supervisors completed a

3SUBORDINATE POLITICAL SKILL

measure of political behavior.1 Three months later, at Time 2,supervisors rated their dependence on and reward recommendationfor each subordinate in their work team. Before the data werecollected, Junqi Shi explained the purpose of the research to theemployees via e-mail and solicited voluntary participation. It wasguaranteed that all of the responses would be kept confidential andused only for third-party research purposes. Surveys were distrib-uted to 350 subordinates in 53 project management teams. A totalof 296 subordinates and 53 supervisors responded to the survey, fora response rate of 84.6% for subordinates and 100% for supervisors.Among the subordinates, 23.3% of them were women, their averageage was 33.1 years (SD � 9.18), and their average organizationaltenure was 6.3 years (SD � 6.85). For supervisors, 10.7% of themwere women, their average age was 37.9 years (SD � 8.56), and theiraverage organizational tenure was 15.4 years (SD � 11.45). Teamsize ranged from 3 to 14 members (Mdn � 5).

Measures

Following Brislin’s (1980) translation–back translation proce-dure, English scales were first translated into Chinese by onegraduate student fluent in both English and Chinese. Anothergraduate student, who was also fluent in both English and Chinese,translated the Chinese versions back into English. Two bilingualtranslators then discussed and resolved the discrepancies in the twoEnglish versions. Except for the measures of interaction frequencyand reward recommendation, participants responded to all itemsusing a 5-point Likert-type scale (ranging from 1 � stronglydisagree to 5 � strongly agree).

Subordinate political skill. Subordinate political skill wasmeasured using a six-item scale developed by Ferris et al. (1999).In previous research, two measures of political skill are commonlyused: the 18-item political skill inventory developed by Ferris et al.(2007) and the concise six-item political skill inventory developedby Ferris et al. (1999). We used the six-item political skill scalethat taps overall level of political skill rather than its four compo-nents, which tend to be highly correlated with one another (e.g.,mean r � .50; Ferris et al., 2005). Sample items are “I am good atgetting others to respond positively to me” and “I am able to makemost people feel comfortable and at ease around me.” Cronbach’salpha for this scale was .75. Although it is short, the concisesix-item scale adequately and representatively captures the essen-tial elements of political skill (Ahearn, Ferris, Hochwarter, Doug-las, & Ammeter, 2004). For example, Ferris et al. (2005) reporteda correlation of .78 between political skill scores measured usingthe six-item scale and the 18-item scale.

Supervisor political behavior. Supervisors reported their po-litical behavior using four items developed by Treadway et al.(2005). A sample item is “I use my interpersonal skills to influencepeople at work.” Cronbach’s alpha for this scale was .72.

Interaction frequency with supervisor. Interaction fre-quency was measured using three items developed by McAllister(1995). Subordinates responded to items using a 5-point scale(from 1 � almost never to 5 � almost always). Sample items are“How frequently do you interact with your supervisor at work?”and “How frequently do you initiate work-related interaction withyour supervisor?” Cronbach’s alpha for this measure was .81.

Supervisor dependence on subordinate. The supervisor’sdependence on the subordinate was measured using four items

developed by Deshpande, Joseph, and Prasad (2008) and Bartoland Martin (1989). A sample item is “It would be very difficult forme to find a replacement for this subordinate if he were to leave.”Cronbach’s alpha for this scale was .80.

Supervisor reward recommendations. We used the five-item scale developed by Allen and Rush (1998) to measure super-visor reward recommendation. Supervisors rated the extent towhich they would recommend each subordinate for five kinds ofrewards (salary increase, promotion, high-profile project, publicrecognition, and opportunities for professional development) via a5-point scale (from 1 � never to 5 � very frequently). Cronbach’salpha for this scale was .86.

Control variables. We controlled for the subordinate’s work-ing time with the current supervisor because the length of thesupervisor’s and the subordinate’s working relationship influencessupervisor ratings of subordinates (Duarte, Goodson, & Klich,1994). Variance in interaction frequency due to gender similaritywas also controlled for. Last, we controlled for possible effects ofteam size on individual-level endogenous variables (i.e., interac-tion frequency with the supervisor, the supervisor’s dependence onthe subordinate, and supervisor reward recommendation).

Results

Means, standard deviations, reliabilities, and intercorrelations ofthe focal variables are presented in Table 1.2 Subordinate politicalskill was positively related to subordinate-reported interaction fre-quency with the supervisor (r � .22, p � .01). Interaction frequencywith the supervisor was positively correlated to supervisor depen-dence on the subordinate (r � .12, p � .05) and supervisor reward

1 Although supervisor political behavior was rated by supervisors, we be-lieve this behavior is visible to subordinates for three reasons. First, it is in theinterest of political-minded supervisors to ensure their subordinates are awareof politicking behaviors that benefit the team (e.g., promoting the team tohigher-ups). Second, political supervisors presumably leverage their interper-sonal influence when dealing with people both within and outside the workteam. Note also that the items used to measure political behavior do not specifythe target; thus, they also apply to subordinates. Third, there is empiricalevidence that subordinates have a fairly accurate understanding of their super-visor’s status and relations with others in the organization (Venkataramani,Green, & Schleicher, 2010; Zhou et al., 2012).

2 Confirmatory factor analyses were conducted to examine the construct valid-ity of the subordinate-level measures. A four-factor model was specified byloading items on their respective latent variables (i.e., subordinate political skill,interaction frequency with supervisor, supervisor dependence on subordinate, andsupervisor reward recommendation). Results showed that the four-factor mode fitthe data very well, �2(126, N � 296) � 233.45, p � .01, comparative fit index(CFI) � .94, standardized root-mean-square residual (SRMR) � .05, root-mean-square error of approximation (RMSEA) � .05. The correlations between thefactors range from .03 to .28, supporting the discriminant validity of the measures.Items all significantly loaded on their respective latent factors (standardized factorloadings ranged from .40 to .90). An alternative three-factor model was tested byloading all subordinate-rated items onto the same latent factor. This three-factormodel, �2(132, N � 296) � 546.64, p � .01, CFI � .75, SRMR � .10,RMSEA � .10, fit the data significantly worse than did the four-factor model,��2(6, N � 296) � 313.19, p � .01. We also tested another three-factor model byloading all supervisor-rated items onto the same latent factor. This three-factormodel, �2(129, N � 296) � 643.25, p � .01, CFI � .69, SRMR � .13,RMSEA � .12, also fit the data significantly worse than the four-factor model did,��2(3, N � 296) � 409.80, p � .01. On the basis of these model comparisonresults, it seems that measures used to assess subordinate-level constructs docapture distinctive constructs.

4 SHI, JOHNSON, LIU, AND WANG

recommendations (r � .15, p � .01). These bivariate results providedpreliminary support for the hypothesized relations.

Testing Main Effects and Mediation Effects

Because the data in this study have a nested structure, we usedmultilevel modeling to test the current hypotheses.3 Model estimationwas conducted using the Mplus 5.2 software (Muthén & Muthén,1998–2007). To test hypothesized main effects and mediation effects(i.e., Hypotheses 1–4), we first estimated a multilevel model (M1) thatspecified the Level 1 random slope effect of subordinate political skillon interaction frequency with the supervisor and the Level 1 randomslope effects of interaction frequency on supervisor dependence andreward recommendations. Following Bauer, Preacher, and Gil (2006),the covariances among random slope effects were also estimatedfor the purpose of testing the Level 1 indirect effects. We alsocontrolled the direct effect of subordinate political skill on outcomevariables. Time working with current supervisor was controlled on allLevel 1 endogenous variables. Gender similarity was controlled oninteraction frequency with the supervisor. At Level 2, supervisorpolitical behavior and team size were both controlled on Level 2intercepts of Level 1 outcomes. To facilitate the interpretation of thefindings, we group-mean-centered subordinate political skill to obtainan unbiased estimate of the individual-level relationship betweensubordinate political skill and interaction frequency with the supervi-sor (Enders & Tofighi, 2007; Hofmann & Gavin, 1998). In addition,Level 1 control variables (i.e., time working with current supervisorand gender similarity) were group-mean centered and Level 2 vari-ables (i.e., supervisor political behavior and team size) were grand-mean centered.

Table 2 presents unstandardized coefficient estimates for M1.None of the control variables’ effects were significant except forthe effect of team size on supervisor’s dependence on the subor-dinate (� � �.65, p � .01). The direct effects of subordinatepolitical skill on the two outcomes were also not significant.Predictors included in the model accounted for 6.6%, 5.1%, and2.0% of the individual-level variance in interaction frequency,supervisor dependence on subordinate, and supervisor reward rec-ommendations, respectively. These suggest that the Level 1 pre-dictors included in the model can explain sizable portions ofvariations in the outcome variables. Subordinate political skill was

positively related to interaction frequency (� � .43, p � .01),which supported Hypothesis 1, indicating that subordinates withhigher levels of political skill reported more frequent interactionswith their supervisors. Further, the variance of this random slopewas significant (� � .02, p � .05), suggesting that there wassufficient variance in this random slope that could be furtheraccounted for by Level 2 predictors.

Interaction frequency was positively related to supervisor depen-dence on subordinate (� � .09, p � .05) and supervisor rewardrecommendations (� � .43, p � .01), supporting Hypotheses 2 and 3.These results indicate that subordinates who reported more frequentinteractions with their supervisors were more likely to be depended onby their supervisors and receive more reward recommendations.

Mediation hypotheses (Hypotheses 4a and 4b) were tested viaMonte Carlo simulation procedure using the open-source softwareR (available at http://www.r-project.org/). This procedure wasused to accurately reflect the asymmetric nature of the samplingdistribution of an indirect effect (Preacher, Zyphur, & Zhang,2010).4 With 20,000 Monte Carlo replications, we found that theindirect effect for subordinate political skill ¡ interaction fre-

3 One-way random analysis of variance results showed that the variancesin supervisor-level means of the supervisor’s dependence on the subordi-nate, F(52, 243) � 8.81, p � .01, and supervisor reward recommendation,F(52, 243) � 1.50, p � .05, were significant. Intraclass correlation, orICC(1), is .59 for supervisor’s dependence on subordinate and .08 forsupervisor reward recommendation. Therefore, there were substantial vari-ances in the outcome variables that were related to supervisors, warrantingthe use of multilevel modeling for analyzing the current data.

4 The Monte Carlo simulation procedure uses parameter point estimatesand their asymptotic variances and covariances to generate random drawsfrom the parameter distributions (i.e., conducting parameter bootstrap-ping). In each draw, the indirect effect is computed following Formula 5offered by Bauer, Preacher, and Gil (2006, p. 147) in calculating the 1-1-1mediation effect in a multilevel model. This procedure is repeated a verylarge number of times, and the resulting simulation distribution of theindirect effect is used to obtain a percentile confidence interval (CI) aroundthe observed indirect effect. The key feature of the parametric bootstrap isthat only the parameter estimates are assumed to be normally distributed.No assumptions are made about the distribution of the indirect effect,which typically is not normally distributed. Advantages of this procedureare that it (a) yields asymmetric CIs that are faithful to the skewedsampling distributions of indirect effects, (b) does not require raw data touse, and (c) is very easy to implement (Preacher et al., 2010).

Table 1Means, Standard Deviations, Reliabilities, and Correlations Among Study Variables

Variable MWithin-unit SD

Between-unit SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

Level 11. Time working with current supervisor (year) 3.72 5.07 2.94 — �.01 .11 �.08 .06 �.08 .12 .192. Gender similarity .20 .40 .25 �.04 — .06 �.20 .13 �.31� �.29� �.073. Subordinate political skill 3.84 0.49 0.29 �.09 �.02 (.75) .01 .29� �.04 �.09 .044. Interaction frequency with supervisor 3.47 0.69 0.35 �.08 �.09 .22�� (.81) .14 .27� .00 .195. Supervisor’s dependence on subordinate 3.27 0.70 0.56 .11† .02 .11† .12� (.80) .16 �.40�� .026. Supervisor reward recommendations 2.82 0.69 0.39 .04 �.01 .03 .15�� .05 (.86) .12 �.34��

Level 27. Team size 5.59 2.54 — .27�

8. Supervisor political behavior 3.59 0.58 (.72)

Note. Gender similarity was coded as follows: 0 � the gender between subordinate and supervisor is the same and 1 � the gender between subordinateand supervisor is different. Correlations below the diagonal are individual-level correlations (N � 296). Correlations above the diagonal are group-levelcorrelations (N � 53). Cronbach’s alpha coefficients are in parentheses along the diagonal.† p � .10. � p � .05. �� p � .01.

5SUBORDINATE POLITICAL SKILL

quency ¡ supervisor dependence was 0.04, with a 95% bias-corrected bootstrap CI of [�0.004, 0.086], containing zero. There-fore, the mediating effect of interaction frequency was notsignificant, counter to Hypothesis 4a. However, with 20,000Monte Carlo replications, we found that the indirect effect forsubordinate political skill ¡ interaction frequency ¡ supervisorreward recommendations was 0.18, with a 95% bias-correctedbootstrap CI of [0.079, 0.307]. This finding indicates that subor-dinate political skill was positively and significantly related tosupervisor reward recommendations via subordinate reports ofinteraction frequency, providing support for Hypothesis 4b.

Testing Cross-Level Moderation Effects

To test hypothesized cross-level moderation effects (i.e., Hy-potheses 5 and 6), on the basis of M1, we estimated a multilevelmodel (M2) that added the cross-level moderation effect of super-visor political behavior on the random slope for subordinate po-litical skills predicting interaction frequency. Unstandardized co-efficient estimates of M2 are presented in Figure 2 and Table 3.None of the control variables’ effects were significant except forthe effect of team size on the supervisor’s dependence on thesubordinate (� � �.64, p � .01). The direct effects of subordinatepolitical skill on the two outcomes were also not significant.Supervisor political behavior was positively related to the randomslope between subordinate political skill and interaction frequency(� � .09, p � .01). In addition, supervisor political behavioraccounted for 66.7% of the variance in this random slope (residualvariance � � .006, p � .10), suggesting that supervisor politicalbehavior explains a sizable portion of variation in this relationship.Following Cohen, Cohen, West, and Aiken’s (2003) recommen-dations, we plotted this interaction at conditional values of super-visor political behavior (1 standard deviation above and below themean). As shown in Figure 3, the relationship between subordinatepolitical skill and interaction frequency was stronger when super-visor political behavior was low (vs. high). This finding supportsHypothesis 5.

To test Hypotheses 6a and 6b, we estimated the indirect rela-tionships of subordinate political skill with outcomes via interac-tion frequency at higher (1 standard deviation) and lower levels(�1 standard deviation) of supervisor political behavior usingBauer et al.’s (2006) method. For supervisor dependence, theindirect effect was 0.04 (SE � 0.02, p � .01) when supervisorpolitical behavior was high versus 0.03 (SE � 0.02, p � .01) whenit was low. The effect of the difference between the two conditionswas 0.01 with a 95% CI of [�0.001, 0.022], indicating that themoderating effect of supervisor political skill on the indirect effectwas not significant, counter to Hypothesis 6a. For supervisorreward recommendations, the indirect effect was stronger whensupervisor political behavior was high (Estimate � 0.20, SE �0.04, p � .01) versus low (Estimate � 0.15, SE � 0.04, p � .01).The difference between the two conditions was 0.05 with 95% CI[0.014, 0.083]. Thus, Hypothesis 6b was supported, indicating thatwhen supervisor political behavior is higher, subordinate politicalskill has a stronger relation to supervisor reward recommendationsvia subordinate reports of interaction frequency.

Discussion

We found that subordinate political skill was positively relatedto subordinates’ reports of interaction frequency with their super-visor, which, in turn, were positively related to supervisor depen-dence on subordinate and supervisor reward recommendations.Subordinates’ reports of interaction frequency with their supervi-sor mediated the relationship between subordinate political skilland supervisor reward recommendation. In addition, supervisorpolitical behavior was found to strengthen the positive relationshipbetween subordinate political skill and interaction frequency. Theindirect relationship between subordinate political skill and super-visor reward recommendation was also strengthened by supervisorpolitical behavior. The mediating role of subordinate-reportedinteraction frequency in linking subordinate political skill to su-pervisor’s dependence on subordinate was, however, not sup-

Table 2Unstandardized Coefficients of the Multilevel Model (M1) for Testing Main Effects and Mediation Effects

Predictor

Interaction frequencysupervisor with

supervisor

Supervisor’sdependence on

subordinateSupervisor rewardrecommendations

Estimate SE Estimate SE Estimate SE

Fixed effectIntercept 1.81�� 0.28 3.19�� 0.21 1.25�� 0.42Gender similarity �0.11 0.12Time working with current supervisor �0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01Team size 0.10 0.11 �0.65�� 0.22 0.17 0.16Subordinate political skill slopea 0.43�� 0.07 �0.03 0.08 �0.05 0.12Interaction frequency with supervisor slope 0.09� 0.05 0.43�� 0.11

Variance componentIntercept 0.02 0.11 0.19� 0.08 0.03 0.05Subordinate political skill slope 0.02� 0.01Interaction frequency with supervisor slope 0.01� 0.00 0.01 0.01Residual 0.41�� 0.05 0.19�� 0.02 0.45�� 0.06

Note. Level 1 n � 296; Level 2 n � 53.a The effect of subordinate political skill was estimated as a random slope on interaction frequency with supervisor and as fixed slopes on supervisor’sdependence on subordinate and supervisor reward recommendations.� p � .05. �� p � .01.

6 SHI, JOHNSON, LIU, AND WANG

ported, nor was the moderating effect of supervisor political be-havior on this indirect effect.

Theoretical and Practical ImplicationsIn this study, we supported the idea that political skill is a

personal resource, much like other individual differences such ascognitive ability (Schmidt & Hunter, 1998) and action–state ori-entation (Diefendorff, Hall, Lord, & Strean, 2000), which enableemployees to effectively regulate their behavior to attain valuedoutcomes. In the case of political skill, though, rather than being atask-based resource that facilitates the development and applica-

tion of task-based knowledge and skills, it is an interpersonalresource that builds social capital with others and creates interper-sonal dependencies. Thus, the benefits of political skill, such ashigh performance ratings and reward recommendations, can onlybe unlocked by interacting with others, especially those withgreater influence and status. Consistent with this idea, we showedthat politically skilled employees reported more frequent interac-tions with their supervisors and that these interactions led to morereward recommendations. This finding is important because, todate, little is known about why and how political skill relates todesirable work outcomes (Ferris et al., 2007). Given the central

Table 3Unstandardized Coefficients of the Multilevel Model (M2) for Testing Cross-Level Moderations

Predictor

Interaction frequencysupervisor with

supervisor

Supervisor’sdependence on

subordinateSupervisor rewardrecommendations

Estimate SE Estimate SE Estimate SE

Fixed effectIntercept 1.84�� 0.31 3.22�� 0.21 1.27�� 0.48Gender similarity �0.10 0.13Time working with current supervisor �0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01Team size 0.05 0.10 �0.64�� 0.22 0.18 0.23Supervisor political behavior �0.23 0.38 0.05 0.14 �0.27�� 0.08Subordinate political skill slopea 0.42�� 0.08 �0.03 0.08 �0.05 0.12Interaction frequency with supervisor slope 0.09� 0.05 0.42�� 0.14Supervisor Political Behavior

Subordinate Political Skill 0.09�� 0.02Variance component

Intercept 0.03 0.15 0.19� 0.09 0.03 0.07Subordinate political skill slope 0.01 0.01Interaction frequency with supervisor slope 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00Residual 0.41�� 0.05 0.19�� 0.02 0.45�� 0.07

Note. Level 1 n � 296; Level 2 n � 53.a The effect of subordinate political skill was estimated as a random slope on interaction frequency with supervisor and as fixed slopes on supervisor’sdependence on subordinate and supervisor reward recommendations.� p � .05. �� p � .01.

-.23

-.05

-.03

.42**

.09*

-.27** .05 .09**

Team Level

.42**

Supervisor Political Behavior

Subordinate Political Skill Interaction Frequency with Supervisor

Supervisor Reward

Recommendations

Supervisor’s Dependence on

Subordinate

Individual Level

Figure 2. Unstandardized estimates of the path coefficients. Solid lines represent statistically significant paths,whereas dashed lines represent statistically nonsignificant paths. � p � .05. �� p � .01.

7SUBORDINATE POLITICAL SKILL

role that politically skilled subordinates are believed to occupy intheir work environment, future research might extend the presentfindings by examining whether frequent interactions with teammembers and even coworkers external to the team also mediaterelations of political skill with its outcomes. We suspect that thebenefits of political skill are not restricted to supervisor–subordinate interactions. Another direction for future researchwould be to explore possible negative effects of subordinate po-litical skill. For example, less politically skilled subordinates whoare nonetheless deserving of recognition may come out on thelosing end if they are forced to compete with more politicallyskilled peers for interaction time with their supervisor. Thus,political skill may contribute to zero-sum resource distributionswithin teams.

It is interesting that although reports of greater interactionfrequency with one’s supervisor were associated with more rewardrecommendations for politically skilled subordinates, interactionfrequency did not mediate relations of political skill with supervi-sor dependence on the subordinate. We expected that political skillwould have an indirect effect on supervisor dependence becausepolitically skilled subordinates occupy a central position in theteam network and serve as the primary conduit through whichsupervisors disseminate and receive information. Politically skilledsubordinates may also offer emotional support for supervisors,thus increasing supervisor dependence. Perhaps one reason thisexpected indirect effect did not emerge is that political skill is asocial resource rather than a task-based resource. Subordinateswith high levels of task-based personal resources (e.g., cognitiveability) might be better positioned to provide helpful task-relatedinformation and feedback to supervisors, more so than politicallyskilled subordinates who do not possess the same task-basedresources. Although political skill helps employees understandsocial dynamics at work, it does not necessarily aid actual taskperformance in jobs where social networking is not the key driverof success. Take, for example, our sample of employees in aconstruction company, whose primary tasks involved schedulingprojects, budgeting time and resources, and preparing contracts.For these employees, high levels of political skill may not berequired for task accomplishment. Supervisors may therefore beless inclined to depend on politically skilled subordinates fortask-related information and feedback. Despite the fact that polit-

ical skill may not be required for successful task performance, itnevertheless helps politically skilled employees garner more re-ward recommendations. This is consistent with Fairhurst et al.’s(1987) theorizing that social interactions with supervisors are oneway in which subordinates accrue valued resources.

Our findings are also interesting because they demonstrated thatsupervisor political behavior is a cross-level moderator that repre-sents a contextual constraint on the effectiveness of political skill.Although it has been suggested that political work environment isa situational contingency that moderates the effects of politicalskill (e.g., Ferris & Judge, 1991), our study is one of the firstempirical tests of this proposition. In line with expectations, weobserved that when supervisors exhibited more political behavior,their politically skilled subordinates reported more frequent inter-actions with them, thereby increasing their opportunities for re-ward recommendations. Political skilled employees are better ableto build social capital in weak situations where interpersonalinfluence tactics are likely to pay off, and political supervisors whodo not base outcome allocations solely on formal rules and policiesare likely to be prime targets for such influence attempts. Theeffects of subordinate political skill may also be enhanced by highlevels of supervisor political behavior due to better supervisor–subordinate fit and a larger pool of available resources as a resultof the supervisor’s politicking behavior. In sum, our findingsdemonstrate that political skill is especially valuable in situationsthat favor (or at least do not discourage) political activity (An-drews et al., 2009).

We conclude this section by mentioning two practical implica-tions. First, our findings suggest that subordinates may benefitgreatly by improving their networking ability, becoming moresensitive to social cues, and increasing their capability to exertinterpersonal influence. The payoff may be substantial for subor-dinates who seek training to bolster their political skill and, in turn,facilitate fruitful supervisor–subordinate interactions. As pointedout by Ferris et al. (2007), though, there is need for research onhow best to develop political skill in employees. Second, themoderation effect observed in this study suggests that supervisors’values and behavioral orientations are critical for subordinates toattain benefits from their political skill. If supervisors rarely usepolitical means to achieve their goals, then subordinate politicalskill is less relevant for developing fruitful relations with supervi-

Figure 3. Supervisor political behavior moderates the effect of subordinate political skill on interactionfrequency with supervisor.

8 SHI, JOHNSON, LIU, AND WANG

sors. This idea of supervisor–subordinate fit is especially importantto consider in cases where there are mismatches, because politi-cally skilled subordinates may become frustrated with their lack ofinfluence on nonpolitical supervisors. Politically unskilled subor-dinates may similarly become frustrated owing to their inability tosway the decisions made by political supervisors. One practicalimplication, then, is to place politically skilled and unskilledemployees in situations that are appropriately matched to theirability to handle organizational politics.

Strengths, Limitations, and Conclusion

Methodological strengths of this study are that we collected datafrom multiple sources at different time points, thereby reducingthreats of common method variance (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee,& Podsakoff, 2003). To date, the majority of empirical work onpolitical skill has relied on single source, cross-sectional data(Ferris et al., 2005). Second, the hypothesized model was esti-mated following a path analytic framework (i.e., all hypothesizedrelations were estimated simultaneously), thus lessening problemsassociated with piecemeal and causal step approaches for testingmediation (Bauer et al., 2006; Edwards & Lambert, 2007; Preacheret al., 2010). As such, our study provides a rigorous empiricalexamination of the hypothesized multilevel model.

Our study, however, is not without limitations. One set oflimitations concerns how some of our focal variables were mea-sured. Subordinate political skill is multidimensional, yet we ex-amined it as a unitary construct. Although the scale we used isbelieved to adequately represent the essential elements of politicalskill, it may be worthwhile to examine political skill from amultidimensional perspective. For example, different components(e.g., networking ability and apparent sincerity) might have uniquerelations with outcomes, such as in-role and extra-role perfor-mance (Shi et al., 2011). There may also be some concern with ourmeasure of interaction frequency because it was self-reported bysubordinates and collected at the same time as measures of polit-ical skill. It would have been preferable to also collect supervisorratings of interaction frequency and verify that sufficient agree-ment exists across the two sources. Thus, our mediator measurereflected subordinates’ subjective reports of interaction frequencywith their supervisor rather than objective interaction frequency.

A second set of limitations pertains to our examination ofinterpersonal outcomes (interaction frequency and supervisor de-pendence) and exclusion of task outcomes (e.g., job performance).Future research should therefore consider mediating mechanismsand boundary conditions that impact relations of political skill within-role and extra-role performance, as well as integrating theinterpersonal and task implications of political skill. Our exclusivefocus on interpersonal outcomes may have also created the possi-bility that some observed relations are due to likability. That is,politically skilled subordinates may be more pleasant and likablebut not necessarily better performers, and thus likability is respon-sible for higher rates of supervisor reward recommendations ratherthan interaction frequency. Our finding that interaction frequencymediated relations of subordinate political skill with supervisorreward recommendations but not supervisor dependence is consis-tent with this likability argument, as is the significant indirectrelation of the Subordinate Political Skill Supervisor PoliticalBehavior interaction with supervisor reward recommendations but

not supervisor dependence (i.e., subordinates who are liked may berewarded but not depended on). Unfortunately, we did not measurelikability and therefore cannot rule it out as an alternative expla-nation for our observed mediated and moderated relations. Subse-quent research that either controls for likability or examines it asan alternative pathway between subordinate political skill andoutcomes is needed to redress this limitation.

A final limitation is the lack of evidence for direct relations ofsubordinate political skill with supervisor dependence and super-visor reward recommendations. Although direct relations weresmall and nonsignificant in the multilevel mediation model (seeTable 2), they both had negative signs. Thus, the total effects fromsubordinate political skill to the two outcomes might be smallbecause the direct and indirect effects might have canceled eachother out. This may explain why the bivariate political skill–outcome correlations in Table 1 were not significant. In fact,opposing signs for direct and indirect effects is one reason why theassumption of direct relations from predictors to outcomes areoften relaxed when testing for mediation (MacKinnon, Fairchild,& Fritz, 2007; Shrout & Bolger, 2002). In addition, given the highICC values for the outcomes—for example, ICC(1) for supervisordependence was .59—it is inappropriate to interpret theindividual-level correlations in Table 1 because the observationswere not independent. On the basis of our data, it is indeed difficultto ascertain whether there were direct relations of subordinatepolitical skill with supervisor dependence and supervisor rewardrecommendations, which is a limitation.

Despite these limitations, our study is informative in that itidentified one reason why political skill relates to supervisorreward recommendations for subordinates (i.e., via the mediatingeffect of subordinate–supervisor interaction frequency). We alsoprovided insight as to when these relations are especially likely tomanifest, namely, when subordinates report to supervisors whoengage in political behaviors. Thus, we provide one example of aperson by situation interaction involving political skill, whichaddresses previous calls to do so (Ferris & Judge, 1991). Consis-tent with our findings as well as a recent review (Ferris et al.,2007), political skill is indeed an important personal resource inwork settings, and we look forward to future research that exam-ines this important phenomenon.

References

Ahearn, K. K., Ferris, G. R., Hochwarter, W. A., Douglas, C., & Ammeter,A. P. (2004). Leader political skill and team performance. Journal ofManagement, 30, 309–327. doi:10.1016/j.jm.2003.01.004

Allen, T. D., & Rush, M. C. (1998). The effects of organizational citizen-ship behavior on performance judgments: A field study and a laboratoryexperiment. Journal of Applied Psychology, 83, 247–260. doi:10.1037/0021-9010.83.2.247

Andrews, M. C., & Kacmar, K. M. (2001). Discriminating among organi-zational politics, justice, and support. Journal of Organizational Behav-ior, 22, 347–366. doi:10.1002/job.92

Andrews, M. C., Kacmar, K. M., & Harris, K. J. (2009). Got political skill?The impact of justice on the importance of political skill for job perfor-mance. Journal of Applied Psychology, 94, 1427–1437. doi:10.1037/a0017154

Bartol, K. M., & Martin, D. C. (1989). Effects of dependence, dependencythreats, and pay secrecy on managerial pay allocations. Journal ofApplied Psychology, 74, 105–113. doi:10.1037/0021-9010.74.1.105

9SUBORDINATE POLITICAL SKILL

Bauer, D. J., Preacher, K. J., & Gil, K. M. (2006). Conceptualizing andtesting random indirect effects and moderated mediation in multilevelmodels: New procedures and recommendations. Psychological Methods,11, 142–163. doi:10.1037/1082-989X.11.2.142

Bing, M. N., Davison, H. K., Minor, I., Novicevic, M. M., & Frink, D. D.(2011). The prediction of task and contextual performance by politicalskill: A meta-analysis and moderator test. Journal of Vocational Behav-ior, 79, 563–577. doi:10.1016/j.jvb.2011.02.006

Brislin, R. W. (1980). Translation and content analysis of oral and writtenmaterial. In H. C. Triandis & J. W. Berry (Eds.), Handbook of cross-cultural psychology (Vol. 2, pp. 349–444). Boston, MA: Allyn &Bacon.

Chang, C.-H., Rosen, C. C., & Levy, P. E. (2009). The relationshipbetween perceptions of organizational politics and employee attitudes,strain, and behavior: A meta-analytic examination. Academy of Man-agement Journal, 52, 779–801. doi:10.5465/AMJ.2009.43670894

Cohen, J., Cohen, P., West, S., & Aiken, L. (2003). Applied multipleregression/correlation analysis for the behavioral sciences (3rd ed.).Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.

Deshpande, S. P., Joseph, J., & Prasad, R. (2008). Impact of managerialdependencies on ethical behavior. Journal of Business Ethics, 83, 535–542. doi:10.1007/s10551-007-9637-4

Diefendorff, J. M., Hall, R. J., Lord, R. G., & Strean, M. (2000). Action–state orientation: Construction validity of a revised measure and itsrelationship to work-related variables. Journal of Applied Psychology,85, 250–263. doi:10.1037/0021-9010.85.2.250

Duarte, N. T., Goodson, J. R., & Klich, N. R. (1994). Effects of dyadicquality and duration on performance appraisal. Academy of ManagementJournal, 37, 499–521. doi:10.2307/256698

Edwards, J. R., & Lambert, L. S. (2007). Methods for integrating moder-ation and mediation: A general analytical framework using moderatedpath analysis. Psychological Methods, 12, 1–22. doi:10.1037/1082-989X.12.1.1

Enders, C. K., & Tofighi, D. (2007). Centering predictor variables incross-sectional multilevel models: A new look at an old issue. Psycho-logical Methods, 12, 121–138. doi:10.1037/1082-989X.12.2.121

Fairhurst, G. T., Rogers, L. E., & Saar, R. A. (1987). Manager–subordinatecontrol patterns and judgments about the relationship. CommunicationYearbook, 10, 395–415.

Ferris, G. R., Berkson, H. M., Kaplan, D. M., Gilmore, D. C., Buckley,M. R., Hochwarter, W. A., & Witt, L. A. (1999, August). Developmentand initial validation of the Political Skill Inventory. Paper presented atthe 59th Annual Meeting of the Academy of Management, Chicago, IL.

Ferris, G. R., & Judge, T. A. (1991). Personnel/human resources manage-ment: A political influence perspective. Journal of Management, 17,447–488. doi:10.1177/014920639101700208

Ferris, G. R., & Kacmar, K. M. (1992). Perceptions of organizationalpolitics. Journal of Management, 18, 93–116. doi:10.1177/014920639201800107

Ferris, G. R., Russ, G. S., & Fandt, P. M. (1989). Politics in organizations.In R. A. Giacalone & P. Rosenfeld (Eds.), Impression management inthe organization (pp. 143–170). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.

Ferris, G. R., Treadway, D. C., Kolodinsky, R. W., Hochwarter, W. A.,Kacmar, C. J., Douglas, C., & Frink, D. D. (2005). Development andvalidation of the political skill inventory. Journal of Management, 31,126–152. doi:10.1177/0149206304271386

Ferris, G. R., Treadway, D. C., Perrewe, P. L., Brouer, R. L., Douglas, C.,& Lux, S. (2007). Political skill in organizations. Journal of Manage-ment, 33, 290–320. doi:10.1177/0149206307300813

Hofmann, D. A., & Gavin, M. B. (1998). Centering decisions in hierar-chical linear models: Implications for research in organizations. Journalof Management, 24, 623–641.

Kark, R., Shamir, B., & Chen, G. (2003). The two faces of transformationalleadership: Empowerment and dependency. Journal of Applied Psychol-ogy, 88, 246–255. doi:10.1037/0021-9010.88.2.246

Kiker, D. S., & Motowidlo, S. J. (1999). Main and interaction effects oftask and contextual performance on supervisory reward decisions. Jour-nal of Applied Psychology, 84, 602–609. doi:10.1037/0021-9010.84.4.602

Luthans, F., Hodgetts, R. M., & Rosenkrantz, S. A. (1988). Real managers.Cambridge, MA: Ballinger.

MacKinnon, D. P., Fairchild, A. J., & Fritz, M. S. (2007). Mediationanalysis. Annual Review of Psychology, 58, 593–614. doi:10.1146/annurev.psych.58.110405.085542

Mayes, B. T., & Allen, R. W. (1977). Toward a definition of organizationalpolitics. Academy of Management Review, 2, 672–678.

McAllister, D. J. (1995). Affect- and cognition- based trust as foundationsfor interpersonal cooperation in organizations. Academy of ManagementJournal, 38, 24–59. doi:10.2307/256727

Mintzberg, H. (1983). Power in and around organizations. EnglewoodCliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.

Mintzberg, H. (1985). The organization as a political arena. Journal ofManagement Studies, 22, 133–154. doi:10.1111/j.1467-6486.1985.tb00069.x

Muthén, L. K., & Muthén, B. O. (1998–2007). Mplus user’s guide (5thed.). Los Angeles, CA: Muthén & Muthén.

Pfeffer, J. (1981). Power in organizations. Boston, MA: Pitman.Podsakoff, P. M., MacKenzie, S. B., Lee, J., & Podsakoff, N. P. (2003).

Common method biases in behavioral research: A critical review of theliterature and recommended remedies. Journal of Applied Psychology,88, 879–903. doi:10.1037/0021-9010.88.5.879

Preacher, K. J., Zyphur, M. J., & Zhang, Z. (2010). A general multilevelSEM framework for assessing multilevel mediation. PsychologicalMethods, 15, 209–233. doi:10.1037/a0020141

Schmidt, F. L., & Hunter, J. E. (1998). The validity and utility of selectionmethods in personnel psychology: Practical and theoretical implicationsof 85 years of research findings. Psychological Bulletin, 124, 262–274.doi:10.1037/0033-2909.124.2.262

Sheppard, B. H., & Sherman, D. M. (1998). The grammars of trust: Amodel and general implications. Academy of Management Review, 23,422–437.

Shi, J., Chen, Z., & Zhou, L. (2011). Testing differential mediation effectsof sub-dimensions of political skills in linking proactive personality toemployee performance. Journal of Business and Psychology, 26, 359–369. doi:10.1007/s10869-010-9195-0

Shrout, P. E., & Bolger, N. (2002). Mediation in experimental and non-experimental studies: New procedures and recommendations. Psycho-logical Methods, 7, 422–445. doi:10.1037/1082-989X.7.4.422

Sims, H. P., Jr., Gioia, D. A., & Longnecker, C. O. (1987). Behind themask: The politics of employee appraisal. Academy of ManagementExecutive, 1, 183–193. doi:10.5465/AME.1987.4275731

Tangirala, S., Green, S. G., & Ramanujam, R. (2007). In the shadow of theboss’s boss: Effects of supervisors’ upward exchange relationships onemployees. Journal of Applied Psychology, 92, 309–320. doi:10.1037/0021-9010.92.2.309

Tjosvold, D. (1985). Power and social context in superior–subordinateinteraction. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes,35, 281–293. doi:10.1016/0749-5978(85)90025-1

Treadway, D. C., Ferris, G. R., Duke, A. B., & Adams, G. L. (2007). Themoderating role of subordinate political skill on supervisors’ impressionof subordinate ingratiation and ratings of subordinate interpersonal fa-cilitation. Journal of Applied Psychology, 92, 848–855. doi:10.1037/0021-9010.92.3.848

Treadway, D. C., Hochwarter, W. A., Kacmar, C. J., & Ferris, G. R.(2005). Political will, political skill, and political behavior. Journal ofOrganizational Behavior, 26, 229–245. doi:10.1002/job.310

10 SHI, JOHNSON, LIU, AND WANG

Venkataramani, V., Green, S. G., & Schleicher, D. J. (2010). Well-connected leaders: The impact of leaders’ social network ties on LMXand members’ work attitudes. Journal of Applied Psychology, 95, 1071–1084. doi:10.1037/a0020214

Weick, K. (1979). The social psychology of organizing. Reading, MA:Addison-Wesley.

Yukl, G. A. (2008). Leadership in organizations (7th ed.). Upper SaddleRiver, NJ: Prentice Hall.

Zajonc, R. B. (2001). Mere exposure: A gateway to the subliminal. CurrentDirections in Psychological Science, 10, 224–228. doi:10.1111/1467-8721.00154

Zhang, Z., Wang, M., & Shi, J. (2012). Leader–follower congruence inproactive personality and work outcomes: The mediating role of LMX.

Academy of Management Journal, 55, 111–130. doi:10.5465/amj.2009.0865

Zhou, L., Wang, M., Chen, G., & Shi, J. (2012). Supervisors’ upwardexchange relationships and subordinate outcomes: Testing the multilevelmediation role of empowerment. Journal of Applied Psychology, 97,668–680. doi:10.1037/a0026305

Received February 27, 2012Revision received October 22, 2012

Accepted November 5, 2012 �

11SUBORDINATE POLITICAL SKILL