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Justifying  Absoluteness:  Disentangling  the  Gafgen  v  Germany  Decision    

Melissa  Conway*    

 

A.  Introduction  

Article  3  of  the  European  Convention  on  Human  Rights  (‘ECHR’)  protects  individuals  from  

torture  and  inhuman  or  degrading  treatment  or  punishment.1  As  with  other  rights  under  the  

ECHR,  it  has  been  interpreted  by  the  European  Court  of  Human  Rights  (‘ECtHR’  or  ‘the  

Court’)  as  comprising  both  a  negative  and  a  positive  obligation.2  The  former  prohibits  a  

State  from  subjecting  individuals  to  Article  3  conduct;  the  latter  requires  that  a  State  take  

proactive  measures  to  ensure  respect  for  the  right.3  Moreover,  this  provision  admits  no  

exceptions,  and  the  protection  it  provides  cannot  be  derogated  from  under  any  

circumstances.4  This  has  led  to  Article  3's  classification  as  an  ‘absolute  right’  –  one  which  

trumps  or  limits  all  other  rights  when  there  is  a  conflict,  applies  in  all  situations  and  pays  no  

regard  to  the  victim's  conduct.5  6  Taken  together,  therefore,  the  Court  has  developed  a  

protective  framework  for  Article  3  that  is  intended  to  be  both  comprehensive  and  strong.  

 

*  BA  (Cantab),  LL.M  (UCL).  This  paper  was  submitted  as  the  author’s  LL.M  dissertation  at  University  College  London.  

 1  “No  one  shall  be  subjected  to  torture  or  to  inhuman  or  degrading  treatment  or  punishment.”  2  The  concept  of  ‘positive  obligations’  was  first  introduced  by  the  Court  in  the  Belgian  Linguistic  Case  (1968)  1  EHRR  252,  

para  3:  “By  the  terms  of  the  first  sentence  of  this  Article  (P1-­‐2),  ‘no  person  shall  be  denied  the  right  to  education’…  The  negative  formulation  indicates,  as  is  confirmed  by  the  ‘preparatory  work’…  that  the  Contracting  Parties  do  not  recognise  such  a  right  to  education  as  would  require  them  to  establish  it  at  their  own  expense,  or  to  subsidise,  education  of  any  particular  type  or  at  any  particular  level.  However,  it  cannot  be  concluded  from  this  that  the  State  has  no  positive  obligation  to  ensure  respect  for  such  a  right  as  is  protected  by  Article  2  of  the  Protocol  (P1-­‐2).  As  a  ‘right’  does  exist,  it  is  secured,  by  virtue  of  Article  1  (art.1)  of  the  Convention,  to  everyone  within  the  jurisdiction  of  a  Contracting  State”  (emphasis  added).  

3  See  e.g.  J.  Akandji-­‐Kombe,  'Positive  obligations  under  the  European  Convention  on  Human  Rights'  (January  2007)  <www.echr.coe.int/LibraryDocs/DG2/HRHAND/DG2-­‐EN-­‐HRHAND-­‐07(2007).pdf>  accessed  5  August  2014;  J.  Eadie  and  K.  Gallafent,  'Blackstone  Chambers:  Positive  Obligations  under  Articles  2  and  3  of  the  ECHR'  (18  November  2005),  <www.blackstonechambers.com/document.rm?id=143>  accessed  5  August  2014.  

4  Although  Article  15(1)  ECHR  allows  states  to  derogate  from  the  ECHR  “[i]n  time  of  war  or  other  public  emergency  threatening  the  life  of  the  nation...”,  Article  15(2)  ECHR  states  that:  “No  derogation  from…  Article  3…  shall  be  made  under  this  provision.”  

5  See  e.g.  Ireland  v  UK  (1978)  2  EHRR  25,  para  163;  Selmouni  v  France  (1999)  29  EHRR  403,  para  95;  Chahal  v  UK  (1996)  23  EHRR  413,  para  79.  But  note  Judge  Sir  Gerald  Fitzmaurice’s  concerns  with  regarding  the  prohibition  as  absolute:  Tyrer  v  UK  (1978)  2  EHRR  1,  Separate  Opinion  of  Judge  Sir  Gerald  Fitzmaurice,  para  3.  

6  A.  Gewirth,  'Are  There  Any  Absolute  Rights?'  (1981)  31  Philosophical  Quarterly  1,  p.2:  “A  right  is  absolute  when  it  cannot  be  overridden  in  any  circumstances,  so  that  it  can  never  be  justifiably  infringed  and  it  must  be  fulfilled  without  any  exceptions.”  

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However,  in  Gafgen  v  Germany,7  the  ECtHR  cast  doubt  on  the  extent  to  which  Article  3's  

protection  is  truly  absolute.  In  its  decision  the  Court  determined  that,  contrary  to  past  

rhetoric,  the  distinction  drawn  in  Article  3  between  'torture'  and  'other  ill-­‐treatment'  is  no  

longer  confined  to  issues  of  fair  labelling,8  but  rather  has  practical  consequences.  This  is  

demonstrated  by  the  fact  that  the  Court  held  that  whilst  the  admission  of  real  evidence  

obtained  by  torture  would  render  a  trial  unfair,  and  is  therefore  prohibited,  the  admission  of  

real  evidence  gained  by  ill-­‐treatment  would  not,  and  is  therefore  allowed.9  In  reaching  this  

conclusion,  the  ECtHR  diluted  the  absolute  nature  of  Article  3  protection;  allowing  evidence  

obtained  by  ill-­‐treatment  indirectly  undermines  the  State's  positive  obligation  to  ensure  full  

enjoyment  of  the  right  that  Article  3  creates.    

 

Why  was  the  Court  led  to  create  such  an  exception  to  the  'absoluteness'  of  Article  3?    This  

paper  seeks  to  explain  the  Gafgen  decision,  and  answer  this  question,  by  examining  a  

separate  but  overarching  problem:  what  are  we  trying  to  achieve  through  affording  a  right  

absolute  protection?  It  will  be  argued  that  absoluteness  pursues  the  primary  aim  of  

restricting  conduct  that  is  morally  reprehensible  and,  in  order  to  give  effect  to  it,  the  

secondary  aims  of  clarity  and  inclusiveness.  However,  the  way  in  which  the  ECtHR  applies  

Article  3  –  by  reading  torture  narrowly  and  ill-­‐treatment  broadly,  whilst  protecting  both  

absolutely  –  fails  to  balance  these  aims  appropriately.  Consequently,  in  Gafgen  v  Germany  

the  Court  opted  to  abandon  its  legal  framework  for  Article  3  in  order  to  reach  a  decision  

that  was  consistent  with  the  moral  justification  for  absoluteness.    

 

In  Section  B,  the  Gafgen  case  will  be  summarised  and  the  Court's  reasoning  explained.  After  

outlining  the  problems  with  the  ECtHR's  current  approach,  Section  C  will  put  forth  two  

alternatives.  The  first  is  to  define  torture  and  ill-­‐treatment  narrowly  in  order  to  protect  both  

absolutely.  The  second  is  to  read  ill-­‐treatment  broadly,  but  protect  only  torture  absolutely.  

In  Section  D,  these  alternatives  will  be  evaluated  against  the  aims  of  absoluteness  in  order  

7  Gafgen  v  Germany  (2010)  52  EHRR  1.  8  See  e.g.  Ireland  v  UK,  n5,  para  167:  “The  Court  considers  that...  it  was  the  intention  that  the  Convention,  with  its  

distinction  between  'torture'  and  'inhuman  or  degrading  treatment',  should  by  the  first  of  these  terms  attach  a  special  stigma  to  deliberate  and  inhuman  treatment  causing  very  serious  and  cruel  suffering”  (emphasis  added).  

9  Gafgen  v  Germany,  n7,  paras  172-­‐188.  

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to  determine  which  is  better  able  to  strike  an  appropriate  balance  between  the  aims.10  It  

will  be  concluded  that  the  second  alternative  is  preferable  in  terms  of  its  compatibility  with  

the  justifications  for  absoluteness.  Finally,  in  Section  E  the  approach  under  the  second  

alternative  will  be  applied  to  the  facts  of  Gafgen  to  illustrate  how  it  could  improve  on  the  

reasoning  of  the  ECtHR.    

 

B.  The  Gafgen  Case  

Background  

 

The  Gafgen  case  concerned  a  law  student  who  kidnapped  a  child,  Jakob.  After  killing  the  boy  

and  hiding  his  corpse  in  a  pond,  Gafgen  proceeded  to  leave  a  ransom  note  at  Jakob’s  

parents’  residence.  The  note  gave  the  impression  that  Jakob  was  still  alive:  it  demanded  one  

million  euros  and  stated  that  the  parents  would  see  their  son  again  if  the  kidnappers  

received  the  ransom  and  managed  to  leave  the  country  with  it.11    

 

Three  days  later,  Gafgen  collected  the  ransom.  He  was  subsequently  arrested  at  Frankfurt  

am  Main  airport  –  from  where  he  was  trying  to  flee  the  country  –  and  taken  to  the  police  

station  to  be  questioned.  At  the  police  headquarters,  Gafgen  was  informed  that  he  was  

suspected  of  having  kidnapped  Jakob.  He  was  then  questioned  in  relation  to  the  matter.  

Gafgen  told  the  police  that  Jakob  was  being  held  by  other  (fictitious)  kidnappers  in  a  hut  by  

a  lake.  Failing  to  get  concrete  information  from  Gafgen,  and  operating  under  the  belief  that  

Jakob  was  still  alive,  the  police  became  concerned  that  time  was  running  out  to  save  the  

boy.  Thus,  contrary  to  superior  orders,  the  deputy  chief  of  the  Frankfurt  police  ordered  

officer  E  to  threaten  Gafgen  with  considerable  physical  pain.  He  also  authorised  E  to  

administer  such  pain,  if  necessary.  E  carried  out  the  order  to  threaten  Gafgen  but  did  not  

inflict  the  pain  upon  him  because,  approximately  ten  minutes  after  being  threatened,  

10  This  will  be  assessed  normatively,  ignoring  the  textual  limitations  of  the  ECHR  and  instead  simply  assessing  the  

approaches  on  the  basis  of  merit.  11  Gafgen  v  Germany,  n7,  paras  10-­‐12.  

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Gafgen  disclosed  the  location  of  Jakob’s  body.  The  police  then  drove  Gafgen  to  the  named  

location,  a  lake,  where  he  told  them  where  he  had  hidden  the  body.12  

 

During  Gafgen's  criminal  trial  for  the  extortionate  abduction  and  murder  of  Jakob,  the  

German  Courts  acknowledged  that  the  police  officers’  threat  to  inflict  pain  on  Gafgen  not  

only  breached  German  law,  but  also  constituted  a  violation  of  Article  3  ECHR.  However,  the  

Frankfurt  am  Main  Regional  Court  refused  to  discontinue  criminal  proceedings  on  this  

basis.13  Moreover,  whilst  the  Frankfurt  Court  did  take  the  view  that  all  prior  confessions  and  

statements  made  by  the  applicant  were  inadmissible,  it  was  happy  to  admit  the  real  

evidence  derived  from  these  statements  (the  ‘fruit  of  the  poisonous  tree’),  such  as  Jakob’s  

corpse.14  Following  the  ruling  that  such  evidence  was  admissible,  Gafgen  admitted  to  having  

killed  Jakob.  He  was  convicted  of  murder  and  kidnapping  with  extortion  causing  the  death  

of  the  victim,  and  sentenced  to  life  imprisonment.15  

 

Gafgen  attempted  to  appeal  the  decision  on  points  of  law  concerning  the  refusal  to  

discontinue  criminal  proceedings  against  him,  and  the  use  of  evidence  obtained  by  his  

mistreatment.  However,  both  the  Federal  Court  of  Justice  and  the  Federal  Constitutional  

Court  dismissed  his  appeal.16  The  applicant  then  applied  to  the  ECtHR  to  consider  his  case.    

 

The  ECtHR  Decision  

 

Before  the  ECtHR,  the  applicant  claimed  a  violation  of  two  of  his  ECHR  rights,  namely:  

● His  Article  3  right,  which  he  argued  was  violated  by  his  treatment  during  the  police  

interrogation;17  and  

● His  Article  6  right,18  which  he  argued  was  violated  by  the  admission  of  evidence  

obtained  as  a  result  of  a  confession  extracted  from  him  in  breach  of  Article  3.19  

12  ibid,  paras  13-­‐17.  13  Gafgen  v  Germany,  n7,  paras  26-­‐27.  14  ibid,  paras  28-­‐31.  15  ibid,  paras  32-­‐33.  16  ibid,  n7,  paras  37-­‐45.  17  ibid,  para  75.  18  Article  6  ECHR  protects  the  right  to  a  fair  trial.  19  Gafgen  v  Germany,  n7,  para  133.  

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The  case  initially  went  to  the  Chamber  of  the  ECtHR,20  in  which  the  majority  essentially  

agreed  with  the  German  Court's  finding  that  Gafgen's  Article  3  right  had  been  violated,  but  

that  the  violation  had  been  sufficiently  remedied  through  domestic  proceedings  against  the  

police  officers.21  However,  Gafgen  appealed  to  the  Grand  Chamber,  which  accepted  the  

case.  Three  main  issues  were  at  stake:  (1)  whether  the  threats  made  by  the  police  officers  

constituted  a  violation  of  Article  3;  (2)  if  so,  whether  Germany  had  successfully  remedied  

the  breach;  and  (3)  whether  the  use  of  real  evidence  in  the  criminal  trial  against  Gafgen  was  

permissible.22  

 

The  Court  first  examined  Gafgen's  Article  3  claim,  and  agreed  with  the  applicant  that  his  

right  had  been  violated.  The  Court  began  its  evaluation  of  the  issue  by  reiterating  that  

Article  3  is  absolute  in  nature  and,  consequently,  applies  irrespective  of  the  victim’s  

conduct.23  It  was  therefore  irrelevant  to  the  Court's  evaluation  of  the  matter  that  Gafgen  

was  suspected  of  kidnapping  Jakob.  The  Court  then  went  on  to  assess  the  treatment  to  

which  Gafgen  was  subjected.  The  Court  referred  to  earlier  decisions  stating  that  a  threat  of  

torture  could  constitute  a  violation  of  Article  3.  On  this  basis,  it  found  that  the  severity  of  

the  treatment  was  sufficient  for  it  to  cross  the  minimum  threshold  of  Article  3.24  However,  

relying  on  its  distinction  between  torture  and  other  ill-­‐treatment,  the  Court  determined  that  

the  conduct  was  not  serious  enough  to  constitute  torture  and  instead  was  more  suitably  

classified  as  ill-­‐treatment.25    

 

Before  the  Court  could  go  on  to  conclude  that  Article  3  had  been  violated  as  a  result  of  

Gafgen's  ill-­‐treatment,  it  had  to  consider  whether  Gafgen  could  still  be  considered  a  ‘victim’  

20  Gafgen  v  Germany  [2008]  ECHR  565.  21  Judge  Kalaydjieva  dissented,  arguing  that  the  applicant  remained  a  victim  of  forced  self-­‐incrimination,  which  had  

rendered  his  trial  unfair:  Gafgen  v  Germany,  n20,  Dissenting  Opinion  of  Judge  Kalaydjieva,  pp.34-­‐35.  22  L.  Oette,  ‘Redress  Newsletter:  The  European  Court  Grand  Chamber  Judgment  in  Gafgen  v  Germany’  (2010)  p.6  

<www.redress.org/Gafgen_v_Germany_Lutz_Oette_article.pdf>  accessed  29  July  2014.  23  Gafgen  v  Germany,  n7,  paras  87,  107.  24  This  'severity  test'  is  applied  by  the  Court  in  all  Article  3  cases,  to  determine  whether  the  conduct  is  serious  enough  to  be  

considered  under  the  provision,  and  it  “depends  on  all  the  circumstances  of  the  case,  such  as  the  duration  of  the  treatment,  its  physical  or  mental  effects  and,  in  some  cases,  the  sex,  age  and  state  of  health  of  the  victim.”:  Gafgen  v  Germany,  n7,  para  88.  

25  ibid,  para  108.  

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under  Article  34  ECHR.26  The  Chamber  had  found  that  Gafgen  had  no  standing  as  a  victim  

because  the  domestic  courts  had  expressly  acknowledged  that  he  had  been  subjected  to  

Article  3  treatment,  and  the  police  officers  had  been  prosecuted  and  convicted  in  domestic  

criminal  trials,  thereby  providing  Gafgen  with  sufficient  redress.27  However,  the  Grand  

Chamber  of  the  ECtHR  rejected  this  argument  because,  although  subjected  to  criminal  trials,  

the  officers  involved  were  treated  very  leniently:  their  convictions  were  met  with  suspended  

sentences,  and  one  of  the  officers  had  even  been  promoted  within  the  police  force.28  

Consequently,  the  Court  took  the  view  that  Gafgen  was  indeed  the  victim  of  an  Article  3  

violation.  

 

However,  of  primary  concern  for  us  is  the  claim  brought  under  Article  6.  It  was  here  that  the  

Court’s  reasoning  diluted  the  'absoluteness'  of  Article  3.  This  aspect  of  the  case  turned  on  

the  question  of  whether  the  real  evidence  obtained  as  a  result  of  Gafgen’s  subjection  to  

Article  3  treatment  could  be  admissible  in  the  criminal  trial  against  him,  without  rendering  

the  trial  unfair  under  Article  6.  This  was  not  the  first  time  the  Court  was  faced  with  the  

issue.  In  the  earlier  case  of  Jalloh  v  Germany,29  an  emetic  was  forcibly  administered  to  the  

applicant,  in  order  to  force  him  to  regurgitate  a  plastic  bag  that  was  believed  to  contain  

drugs.  This  evidence  was  later  used  to  help  secure  a  criminal  conviction  against  the  

applicant  for  drug  trafficking.  When  the  case  came  before  the  ECtHR,  the  Court  considered  

whether  the  applicant's  treatment  rendered  the  trial  unfair.  The  Court  clearly  stated  that:    

 

“incriminating  evidence    –  whether  in  the  form  of  a  confession  or  real  evidence  –  

obtained  as  a  result  of  acts  of  violence  or  brutality  or  other  forms  of  treatment  

which  can  be  characterised  as  torture  –  should  never  be  relied  on  as  proof  of  the  

victim’s  guilt,  irrespective  of  its  probative  value.”30  

 

26  This  provision  requires  that  an  individual  be  a  ‘victim’  in  order  for  the  Court  to  hear  their  case:  “The  Court  may  receive  

applications  from  any  person,  nongovernmental  organization  or  group  of  individuals  claiming  to  be  the  victim  of  a  violation  by  one  of  the  High  Contracting  Parties  of  the  rights  set  forth  in  the  Convention  or  the  Protocols  thereto.  The  High  Contracting  Parties  undertake  not  to  hinder  in  any  way  the  effective  exercise  of  this  right.”    

27  Gafgen  v  Germany,  n7,  para  109.  28  ibid,  paras  121-­‐130.  29  Jalloh  v  Germany  (2007)  44  EHRR  32.  30  ibid,  para  105  (emphasis  added).  

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In  other  words,  the  Court  prohibited  the  use,  in  a  criminal  trial,  of  confessions  or  real  

evidence  gained  by  torture.  However,  with  respect  to  the  use  of  real  evidence  obtained  by  

ill-­‐treatment,  the  Court  in  Jalloh  then  seemed  to  suggest  that  the  unfairness  of  a  trial  will  be  

case-­‐specific.  Nevertheless,  having  found  that  on  the  facts  Article  6  had  in  fact  been  

violated,  the  Court  did  not  provide  much  in-­‐depth  reasoning  on  the  issue.31    

 

Thus,  in  Gafgen  v  Germany  the  Court  was  presented  with  the  opportunity  to  clarify  the  

point.32  Despite  stating  unequivocally  in  its  evaluation  of  Article  3  issues  that  the  right  is  

absolute,  it  was  not  persuaded  that  this  extended  to  the  use  of  real  evidence  in  criminal  

trials.  Instead,  the  majority  focused  on  “whether  the  proceedings  as  a  whole,  including  the  

way  in  which  the  evidence  was  obtained,  were  fair.”33  The  Court  noted  that  the  use  of  

statements  obtained  as  a  result  of  Article  3  treatment  would  render  a  trial  unfair.  However,  

with  respect  to  the  admission  of  real  evidence,  the  Court  took  the  view  that,  because  the  

real  evidence  was  corroborated  by  untainted  evidence,  “there  was  a  break  in  the  causal  

chain”  between  the  applicant's  ill-­‐treatment  and  his  conviction  at  trial.34  Consequently,  the  

Court  found  that,  as  the  use  of  real  evidence  was  not  determinative  of  the  applicant's  

conviction  and  Gafgen's  defence  rights  were  respected,  there  had  been  no  breach  of  Article  

6.35  

 

Such  a  result  does  not  fit  with  the  absolute  nature  of  Article  3,  which  leaves  no  room  for  

balancing  prohibited  conduct  against  its  weight  as  evidence  in  a  criminal  trial.  The  existence  

of  corroborating  evidence  does  not  render  the  use  of  Article  3  conduct  acceptable,  and  it  

has  even  been  suggested  that  without  the  evidence  obtained  by  Article  3  Gafgen’s  

conviction  may  have  been  restricted  to  a  lesser  crime.36  However,  it  was  clear  that  the  Court  

31  ibid,  paras  106-­‐108.  32  Gafgen  v  Germany,  n7,  para  167:  “In  its  Jalloh  judgment,  the  Court  left  open  the  question  whether  the  use  of  real  

evidence  obtained  by  an  act  classified  as  inhuman  and  degrading  treatment,  but  falling  short  of  torture,  always  rendered  a  trial  unfair,  that  is,  irrespective  of,  in  particular,  the  weight  attached  to  the  evidence,  its  probative  value  and  the  opportunities  of  the  defendant  to  challenge  its  admission  and  use  at  trial”.  

33  ibid,  para  163.  34  ibid,  para  180.  35  ibid,  paras  187-­‐188.  36  N.  Simonsen  argues  that  the  untainted  evidence  could  have  supported  a  conviction  for  kidnapping  with  extortion,  but  

not  necessarily  a  conviction  for  murder.  She  also  notes  that  it  is  possible  the  applicant  may  not  have  confessed  if  the  real  evidence  had  been  excluded  at  his  trial:  ‘Is  torture  ever  justified?’  (EJIL:Talk!,  15  June  2010)    <  www.ejiltalk.org/%E2%80%98is-­‐torture-­‐ever-­‐justified%E2%80%99-­‐the-­‐european-­‐court-­‐of-­‐human-­‐rights-­‐decision-­‐in-­‐gafgen-­‐v-­‐germany/>  accessed  28  July  2014.  

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wanted  to  reach  such  a  decision  –  even  if  it  had  to  ‘fudge’  its  legal  reasoning  in  order  to  do  

so.  This  is  evidenced  by  the  fact  that  the  Court  avoided  a  full  examination  of  the  implications  

for  Article  3  associated  with  allowing  the  real  evidence,  by  viewing  the  issue  solely  through  

the  lens  of  Article  6.  This  enabled  the  Court  to  justify  allowing  the  evidence  on  the  grounds  

that:    

 

“…  contrary  to  Article  3,  Article  6  does  not  enshrine  an  absolute  right...  the  Court  

considers  that  both  a  criminal  trial’s  fairness  and  the  effective  protection  of  the  

absolute  prohibition  under  Article  3  in  that  context  are  only  at  stake  if  it  has  been  

shown  that  the  breach  of  Article  3  had  a  bearing  on  the  outcome  of  the  proceedings  

against  the  defendant,  that  is,  had  an  impact  on  his  or  her  conviction  or  sentence.”37  

 

Framing  the  issue  in  this  way  meant  that  the  Court  was  able  to  pursue  reasoning  based  on  

an  assessment  of  whether  the  real  evidence  was  too  ‘tainted’  by  the  Article  3  treatment  for  

it  to  be  admitted,  rather  than  acknowledging  that  evidence  obtained  by  Article  3  treatment  

should  be  automatically  excluded  –  as  its  admission  would  be  contrary  to  the  absolute  

nature  of  the  right.38  Consequently,  the  ECtHR  was  able  to  conclude  that,  as  the  real  

evidence  had  not  impacted  Gafgen’s  decision  to  confess  at  trial,  the  admission  of  the  

evidence  violated  neither  Article  3  nor  Article  6  of  the  ECHR.39    

 

The  Problematic  Nature  of  the  ECtHR’s  Reasoning  

 

The  ECtHR’s  approach  in  Gafgen  is  both  flawed  in  its  reasoning  and  problematic  in  its  

consequences.  As  was  alluded  to  above,40  it  is  inappropriate  to  frame  the  issue  of  real  

evidence  obtained  by  Article  3  treatment  solely  through  the  lens  of  Article  6.  This  is  because  

the  fulfilment  of  States’  positive  obligation  to  protect  individuals  from  conduct  prohibited  

by  Article  3  depends  on  whether  and  in  what  way  the  fruits  of  Article  3  conduct  are  used.  

The  link  between  Article  3  and  Article  6  cannot  be  ignored:  refusing  to  prohibit  real  

37  Gafgen  v  Germany,  n7,  para  178.  38  This  was  the  view  taken  by  the  dissentients  in  the  case.  See  below,  ‘The  Problematic  Nature  of  the  ECtHR’s  Reasoning’.    39  Gafgen  v  Germany,  n7,  paras  179-­‐188.  40  See  section  A.  

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evidence  obtained  by  ill-­‐treatment  indirectly  undermines  Article  3.  The  consequences  for  

Article  3  are  relevant  to  the  application  of  Article  6  because  the  former  is  absolute.  

 

Not  only  does  the  Court’s  approach  result  in  improper  legal  conclusions,  it  also  ignores  the  

heart  of  what  is  at  stake:  the  moral  abhorrence  of  Article  3  conduct.  This  was  recognised  by  

Lord  Bingham  in  the  UK  House  of  Lords’  decision  in  A  and  Others  (No  2),  in  relation  to  the  

question  of  the  permissibility,  under  English  law,  of  evidence  obtained  by  torture:  

 

“It  trivialises  the  issue  before  the  House  to  treat  it  as  an  argument  about  the  law  of  

evidence.  The  issue  is  one  of  constitutional  principle,  whether  evidence  obtained  by  

torturing  another  human  being  may  lawfully  be  admitted  against  a  party  to  

proceedings  in  a  British  court,  irrespective  of  where,  or  by  whom,  or  whose  authority  

the  torture  was  inflicted.  To  that  question  I  would  give  a  very  clear  negative  

answer.”41    

 

Thus,  by  ignoring  the  importance  of  the  fact  that  Article  3  was  involved,  the  majority  in  

Gafgen  trivialised  the  issue.  This  was  recognised  by  the  dissentients,  who  heavily  criticised  

the  majority's  reasoning  on  the  grounds  that  no  “intellectual  construct  can  overcome  the  

inherent  wrong  that  occurs  when  evidence  obtained  in  violation  of  Article  3  is  admitted  into  

criminal  proceedings”42  and,  because  Article  3  is  absolute,  “all  violations  thereof  are  serious  

and,  in  our  view,  the  most  effective  way  of  guaranteeing  that  absolute  prohibition  is  a  strict  

application  of  the  exclusionary  rule  when  it  comes  to  Article  6.”43    

 

Moreover,  in  an  effort  to  reach  its  desired  conclusion,  the  Court  treated  Article  6  as  superior  

to  Article  3,44  and  in  so  doing  created  an  exception  to  the  absoluteness  of  Article  3.  This,  in  

turn,  has  a  number  of  negative  consequences.  Firstly,  attaching  practical  effects  to  the   41  A  and  others  v  Secretary  of  State  for  the  Home  Department  (No.2)  [2006]  2  AC  221,  para  51  (per  Lord  Bingham).  Note  

that  in  the  preceding  paragraph  Lord  Bingham  referred  to  the  importance  of  the  common  law's  treatment  of  torture  with  abhorrence.  This  view,  he  points  out,  is  now  shared  by  the  numerous  States  that  have  signed  up  to  the  UN  Convention  Against  Torture.  

42  Gafgen  v  Germany  (2010)  52  EHRR  1,  Joint  Partly  Dissenting  Opinion  of  Judges  Rozakis,  Tulkens,  Jebens,  Ziemele,  Bianku  and  Power,  para  9.  

43  ibid,  para  10.  44  K.  Rigg,  'The  Prohibition  on  Torture  in  Cases  Heard  by  the  European  Court  of  Human  Rights'  (2011)  1(1)  RECorDIP,  p.19:  

“...  the  Court  should  not,  as  it  did  in  Gafgen  v  Germany,  see  the  issue  through  the  lens  of  article  6,  as  such  a  position  makes  article  3  subservient  to  article  6.”  

10

distinction  between  torture  and  ill-­‐treatment  is  a  cause  of  concern  for  legal  certainty.  As  

Article  3  is  absolute,  the  reasoning  that  was  outlined  in  Jalloh  v  Germany  in  relation  to  the  

use  of  torture  evidence  should  have  applied  equally  to  all  other  ill-­‐treatment  that  reached  

the  threshold  of  severity  for  Article  3.  Thus,  there  should  have  been  no  question  whether  

the  evidence  was  admissible:  if  obtained  by  Article  3  conduct,  it  should  be  excluded.  It  is  

unclear  why  the  Court  in  Jalloh,  and  subsequently  in  Gafgen,  felt  justified  in  treating  

evidence  obtained  by  torture  differently  from  that  obtained  by  other  ill-­‐treatment.45  

Indeed,  this  very  point  was  made  by  a  number  of  the  dissentients  in  the  Gafgen  case  itself,  

who  queried:    

 

“If  [real  evidence  obtained  by  inflicting  inhuman  treatment  upon  an  accused  person]  

can  have  no  bearing  [on  the  outcome  of  trial  proceedings],  what,  one  wonders,  is  

the  purpose  of  its  admission?  And  why,  in  principle,  should  the  same  reasoning  not  

now  apply  to  real  evidence  obtained  by  torture?  If  a  break  in  the  causal  chain  from  

torture  to  conviction  can  be  established  –  where,  for  example,  a  torture  victim  

chooses  to  confess  during  trial  –  why  not  permit  the  admission  of  such  evidence  at  

the  outset  of  his  trial  and  wait  to  see  if  any  break  in  the  causal  chain  might  occur?  

The  answer  is  manifestly  obvious.  Societies  that  are  founded  upon  the  rule  of  law  do  

not  tolerate  or  sanction,  whether  directly,  indirectly  or  otherwise,  the  perpetration  

of  treatment  that  is  absolutely  prohibited  by  Article  3  of  the  Convention.”46  

 

This  supports  the  view  noted  above,  that  allowing  real  evidence  obtained  by  ill-­‐treatment  

indirectly  supports  Article  3  conduct.47  Yet,  the  majority  in  Gafgen  did  not  take  this  view;  

they  were  happy  to  draw  a  distinction  between  the  way  in  which  the  Court  treats  torture  

and  other  ill-­‐treatment,  as  well  as  between  the  way  in  which  it  treats  the  admission  of  

statements  at  trial  and  the  admission  of  real  evidence.  Consequently,  the  Gafgen  decision  

leaves  the  law  in  a  state  of  flux:  how  do  we  know  when  exceptions  to  Article  3  will  apply?  

This  question  is  particularly  difficult  to  answer  because  in  Gafgen  the  Court  focused  its  

reasoning  on  Article  6,  thereby  providing  little  guidance  as  to  when  an  exception  to  Article  3  

45  K.  Rigg,  n44,  p.18.  46  Gafgen  v  Germany,  n42,  para  9.  47  See  section  A.  

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might  be  justified.  Moreover,  Article  3  gives  no  indications  of  how  we  should  treat  

exceptions;  presumably  this  is  the  result  of  the  provision  being  intended  to  apply  absolutely.  

 

Additionally,  the  Gafgen  decision  is  significant  in  its  impact  on  borderline  cases.  Giving  

practical  effect  to  the  torture/ill-­‐treatment  distinction  means  that  the  classification  of  

conduct  takes  on  critical  importance.  For  example,  in  its  evaluation  of  the  Gafgen  case,  

Redress,  an  NGO,  took  the  view  that  the  treatment  to  which  Gafgen  was  subjected  could  

have  been  characterised  as  torture.48  Not  only  does  correct  classification  of  conduct  have  

fair  labelling  implications,49  but  it  also  highlights  the  fact  that  the  ECtHR’s  decision  to  

characterise  the  conduct  as  ill-­‐treatment  was  not  clear-­‐cut.  Yet,  the  Court's  finding  that  

Gafgen  was  subject  to  ill-­‐treatment  rather  than  torture  made  the  difference  between  the  

admissibility  of  evidence  being  acceptable  and  it  rendering  the  trial  unfair  and  an  ECHR  

violation.  It  is  therefore  clear  that  this  is  not  a  trivial  matter.  

 

A  final  possible  consequence  of  the  Court's  reasoning  in  Gafgen  is  that  it  has  the  potential  to  

threaten  the  protection  of  more  serious  conduct  under  Article  3.  If  the  Court  is  willing  to  

develop  exceptions  for  cases  of  ill-­‐treatment  –  which  is  supposed  to  be  absolute  –  we  are  

led  to  wonder  what  is  to  prevent  either  the  ECtHR,  or  other  courts  which  apply  its  

jurisprudence,  from  extending  such  reasoning  to  cases  of  torture?50  Particularly  worrisome  

in  this  regard  is  the  fact  that,  when  considering  the  admissibility  of  real  evidence,  the  Court  

in  Gafgen  willingly  flouted  the  very  statements  it  had  made  in  relation  to  the  Article  3  only  a  

few  paragraphs  earlier.  The  Court’s  approach  is  therefore  inconsistent  and  unpredictable;  it  

seriously  threatens  the  Court's  credibility  in  protecting  Article  3.  

 

48  L.  Oette,  n22,  p.1:  “As  recognised  by  the  Court,  threatening  G.  with  intolerable  pain  instilled  ‘considerable  fear,  anguish  

and  mental  suffering’  which  made  him  talk.  The  threatened  treatment  would  have  certainly  caused  ‘very  serious  and  cruel  suffering’  and  it  is  not  readily  apparent  why  the  ‘severity  of  the  pressure  exerted  and  the  intensity  of  the  mental  suffering  caused’  should  not  be  equated  with  torture.”  

49  See  n8.  50  This  'slippery  slope'  argument  is  explained,  more  generally,  in  O.  Gross,  'The  Prohibition  on  Torture  and  the  Limits  of  the  

Law'  in  S.  Levinson  (ed.)  Torture  (OUP,  2004),  p.11.  

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These  unsatisfactory  consequences  of  the  Gafgen  judgment  have  been  considered  in  detail  

by  a  number  of  commentators.51  However,  of  more  interest  to  us  is  the  question  of  why  the  

Court  was  led  to  make  a  decision  that  diluted  Article  3  protection,  in  spite  of  such  

consequences  and  in  complete  disregard  of  its  prior  affirmation  of  the  absolute  nature  of  

the  right.  

 

C.  Understanding  the  ECtHR’s  Reasoning  

This  paper  takes  the  view  that  the  ECtHR’s  decision  in  Gafgen  may  be  explained  by  

reference  to  the  way  in  which  the  Court  has  applied  the  torture/ill-­‐treatment  distinction.  By  

interpreting  torture  narrowly  and  ill-­‐treatment  broadly,  whilst  protecting  both  absolutely,  

the  ECtHR  has  created  a  framework  in  which  it  affords  protection  to  conduct  which  falls  

beyond  the  moral  justification  for  absolute  protection.  This  position  will  be  elaborated  and  

contrasted  with  two  alternative  approaches.  

 

 

The  ECtHR’s  Approach    

 

The  ECHR  prohibits  Article  3  conduct  absolutely  –  it  trumps  or  limits  all  other  rights  when  

there  is  a  conflict.52  Within  the  provision,  however,  several  forms  of  prohibited  conduct  may  

be  identified:  torture,  inhuman  treatment  or  punishment,  and  degrading  treatment  or  

punishment.  As  was  noted  above,  the  ECtHR  has  chosen  to  distinguish  'torture'  from  'other  

ill-­‐treatment'.  It  has  interpreted  the  former  narrowly  and  the  latter  broadly.53  Thus,  for  

conduct  to  be  torture  there  must  be  both  a  particular  degree  of  severity  and  an  element  of  

purpose.54  By  contrast,  other  ill-­‐treatment  may  include  conduct  that  we  would  consider  far  

51  See  e.g.  K.  Rigg,  n44  (arguing  that  the  Court's  decision  regarding  the  admissibility  of  real  evidence  weakens  the  absolute  

prohibition  on  inhuman  and  degrading  treatment);  N.  Simonsen,  n36  (critiquing  the  Court  for  emphasising  the  absolute  nature  of  Article  3  ECHR  in  a  way  which  is  not  borne  out  in  the  result  of  the  case).  

52  See  section  A.  53  K.  Rigg,  n44,  p.14.  54  With  respect  to  severity,  see  Ireland  v  UK,  n5,  in  which  the  Court  defined  torture  as  “deliberate  inhuman  treatment  

causing  very  serious  and  cruel  suffering”.  The  purposive  element  of  torture  was  highlighted  in  the  Greek  Case,  in  which  the  Court  referred  to  torture  as  an  “aggravated  form  of  inhuman  treatment”  which  “has  a  purpose,  such  as  the  obtaining  of  information  or  confession,  or  the  infliction  of  punishment.”  See  Report  of  5  November  1989,  Yearbook  XII  (1969)  p.186.  

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less  serious  –  such  as  claims  of  insufficient  social  benefits.55  Thus,  the  absolute  nature  of  

Article  3  combined  with  the  Court's  reading  of  'other  ill-­‐treatment'  means  that  the  Court  has  

created  a  framework  in  which  it  is  likely  for  there  to  be  conflict  of  rights  involving  ill-­‐

treatment  that  is  fairly  trivial.  

 

In  such  cases,  it  seems  inappropriate  for  Article  3  to  automatically  trump  all  other  rights  –  

including,  for  example,  the  right  to  life.  This  is  because  it  does  not  fit  with  the  moral  

justification  for  the  absoluteness  of  Article  3.  The  primary  aim  of  absoluteness,  particularly  

in  respect  of  Article  3,  is  to  prohibit  conduct  that  is  considered  so  morally  reprehensible  that  

it  is  never  acceptable.56  57  This  rationale  for  absoluteness  suggests  “that  some  acts  are  

inherently  immoral  or  would  certainly  be  incompatible  with  fundamental  human  rights  or  

basic  notions  of  justice  or  fairness.”58  Particularly  with  respect  to  torture,  “there  has  been  a  

broad  and  confident  consensus  that  [it]  is  uniquely  'barbaric'  and  'inhuman':  the  most  

profound  violation  possible  of  the  dignity  of  a  human  being.”59  This  has  two  implications:  

no-­‐one  should  be  subjected  to  such  treatment,  and  balancing  is  irrelevant  to  determining  

wrongfulness.60  

 

However,  by  defining  ill-­‐treatment  broadly  the  ECtHR  has  extended  Article  3  beyond  the  

scope  of  the  abhorrence  that  justifies  its  absolute  nature.  Consequently,  cases  come  before  

the  Court  in  which  it  must  protect  conduct  absolutely,  as  a  logical  consequence  of  its  

interpretation  of  Article  3,  but  which  do  not  fit  with  a  key  justification  underlying  the  

prohibition.  As  a  result,  “the  need  to  take  a  more  nuanced  approach  to  its  application  has  

increased.”61  Indeed,  this  is  why  the  Court  was  led  to  its  decision  in  Gafgen:  the  Court  

justified  ignoring  the  legally  correct  result  on  the  basis  that  the  evidence  was  sufficiently   55  Larioshina  v  Russia  (App  no.56869/00)  (2002)  Second  Admissibility  Decision,  para  3:  “...  the  Court  considers  that  a  

complaint  about  a  wholly  insufficient  amount  of  pension  and  other  social  benefits  may,  in  principle,  raise  an  issue  under  Article  3  of  the  Convention…”  

56  O.  Gross,  n50,  p.1;  Y.  Shany,  ‘Can  the  Absolute  be  Relativized?’  (2007)  56  Catholic  University  Law  Review  837,  p.843.  57  D.  Sussman  suggests  that,  in  the  case  of  torture,  the  conduct  is  considered  so  abhorrent  because  the  victim  is  made  to  

feel  complicit  in  their  loss  of  agency  and  their  pain:  “What  is  distinct  about  torture...  is  that  it  does  not  just  traduce  the  value  such  dignity  represents  by  treating  its  subject  as  a  mere  means.  Rather  torture,  even  in  the  'best'  case,  involves  a  deliberate  perversion  of  that  very  value,  turning  our  dignity  against  itself  in  a  way  that  must  be  especially  offensive  to  any  morality  that  fundamentally  honours  it.”  See  'What's  Wrong  With  Torture?'  (2005)  33  Philosophy  and  Public  Affairs  1,  p.19.  

58  Y.  Shany,  n56,  p.843.  59  D.  Sussman,  n57,  p.2.  60  T.  Nagel,  'Personal  Rights  and  Public  Space'  (1995)  24  Philosophy  and  Public  Affairs  83,  pp.84-­‐85.  61  M.  Evans,  'Getting  to  Grips  with  Torture'  (2002)  51  ICLQ  365,  p.373.  

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‘untainted’  for  the  trial  to  be  fair.  The  implication  of  the  Court’s  latter  finding  is  that  Article  

3  conduct  was  not  so  morally  reprehensible  as  to  justify  trumping  the  rights  of  the  

kidnapped  boy  and,  by  extension,  limiting  the  use  of  real  evidence.62    

 

One  could  challenge  the  view  that  the  use  of  real  evidence  obtained  by  the  ill-­‐treatment  of  

Gafgen  was  morally  justified;  it  could  be  argued  that  there  was  in  fact  no  disconnect  

between  the  legal  conclusion  the  Court  should  have  drawn  and  the  moral  justification  for  

absoluteness.63  However,  assuming  the  Court's  evaluation  of  the  morality  of  admitting  real  

evidence  is  appropriate,64  the  fact  remains  that  the  Court  understood  the  case  before  it  as  

presenting  a  choice  between  a  legally  correct  answer  and  a  morally  correct  one.  Yet,  rather  

than  narrowing  its  definition  of  ill-­‐treatment  (which  would  have  allowed  the  real  evidence  

to  be  used  on  the  grounds  that  the  threats  were  not  Article  3  conduct)  or  protecting  Article  

3  absolutely  (the  legally  correct  choice,  given  that  the  Court  accepted  Gafgen's  treatment  

met  the  minimum  threshold  for  Article  3),  the  majority  instead  focused  on  whether  the  

proceedings  as  a  whole,  including  the  way  in  which  the  evidence  was  obtained,  were  fair.65  

In  so  doing,  the  Court  chose  to  dilute  the  absoluteness  of  Article  3.    

 

Gafgen  v  Germany  highlights  the  problem  with  defining  ill-­‐treatment  broadly  when  it  is  

protected  absolutely:  it  creates  results  which  conflict  with  the  moral  justification  for  

absoluteness.  In  such  cases,  it  becomes  necessary  for  the  Court  to  choose  between  legal  

formality  and  finding  a  way  to  reach  what  it  considers  the  morally  appropriate  result.  

Neither  option  is  particularly  satisfactory.  Fortunately,  the  ECtHR’s  approach  is  not  the  only  

one  available;  there  are  two  other  ways  in  which  the  torture/ill-­‐treatment  distinction  may  

be  drawn  which  produce  a  more  legally  sound  framework.  

 

62  This  is  the  view  taken  by  Greer,  who  accepts  the  Gafgen  decision  as  morally  justified  because  the  Court  chose  to  allow  

the  use  of  evidence  obtained  by  ill-­‐treatment  (which,  on  the  facts,  Greer  characterises  as  a  fairly  low  degree  of  seriousness)  in  order  to  protect  the  rights  of  the  kidnapped  boy,  J  (namely  his  right  to  life  and  his  right  to  be  free  from  torture  and  ill-­‐treatment):  S.Greer,  'Should  Police  Threats  to  Torture  Suspects  Always  be  Severely  Punished?  Reflections  on  the  Gafgen  Case'  (2011)  11  HRLR  67.  

63  See  e.g.  L.  Oette,  n22,  p.7;  Gafgen  v  Germany,  n42,  para  10.  64  N.  Simonsen,  n36,  notes  that  the  applicant's  argument  that  the  real  evidence  tainted  his  confession  at  trial  is  somewhat  

undermined  by  the  fact  that  he  had  made  statements,  both  at  trial  and  in  a  published  memoir,  that  his  confession  was  solely  out  of  remorse.  

65  See  above,  ‘The  Problematic  Nature  of  the  Court’s  Reasoning’.  

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Alternative  One:  Narrow  Definition,  Absolute  Protection  

 

The  first  alternative  to  the  ECtHR's  approach  is  to  define  both  torture  and  ill-­‐treatment  

narrowly,  and  afford  absolute  protection  to  both.  On  this  view,  the  distinction  between  the  

two  categories  of  conduct  would  have  no  practical  consequences.  This  distinction  could  be  

drawn  in  two  ways:  (1)  on  the  basis  of  the  severity  of  the  treatment,  or  (2)  on  the  basis  of  

the  purpose  of  the  treatment.    

The  Severity  Approach  

 

Distinguishing  between  torture  and  ill-­‐treatment  on  the  basis  of  severity  involves  reading  ill-­‐

treatment  more  broadly  than  torture.  However,  in  order  to  protect  both  absolutely,  the  

standard  for  the  minimum  threshold  would  be  set  much  higher  than  that  under  the  ECHR.    

 

Such  an  approach  appears  to  be  taken  under  the  International  Covenant  on  Civil  and  

Political  Rights  (‘ICCPR’).  Article  7  of  the  ICCPR  states  that  “No  one  shall  be  subjected  to  

torture  or  to  cruel,  inhuman  or  degrading  treatment  or  punishment…”  This  has  been  

interpreted  by  the  treaty’s  monitoring  body,  the  Human  Rights  Committee,  as  including  

conduct  such  as  violent  arrests,66  but  not  extending  to  acts  such  as  forcing  an  applicant  to  

leave  an  experimental  clinical  trial  in  order  to  serve  detention.67  Moreover,  the  Committee  

has  emphasised,  like  the  ECtHR,  that  statements  obtained  by  either  torture  or  other  ill-­‐

treatment  are  inadmissible  at  trial:  “It  is  important  for  the  discouragement  of  violations  

under  article  7  that  the  law  must  prohibit  the  use  of  admissibility  in  judicial  proceedings  of  

statements  or  confessions  obtained  through  torture  or  other  prohibited  treatment.”68  

However,  the  absolute  nature  of  Article  7  has  not  been  subject  to  the  same  challenges  as  

Article  3  ECHR,  as  the  Human  Rights  Committee  considers  far  fewer  cases  than  the  ECtHR,  

and  the  Human  Rights  Committee  has  not  had  the  occasion  to  comment  on  the  use  of  real  

evidence  at  trial.  Nevertheless,  one  would  hope  that  it  would  reason  consistently  with  its  

66  Horvath  v  Australia,  Views  of  the  Human  Rights  Committee  concerning  Communication  No.  1885/2009  (2014)  paras  3.5-­‐

3.8,  8.8.  67  G.J.  v  Lithuania,  Decision  of  the  Human  Rights  Committee  concerning  Communication  No.  1894/2009  (2014)  paras  3.1,  

4.6.  68  UN  Human  Rights  Committee,  ‘CCPR  General  Comment  20’  (1992)  para  12.  

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existing  jurisprudence  by  reading  ill-­‐treatment  narrowly  but  ensuring  it  was  protected  

absolutely  –  thus  rendering  such  evidence  inadmissible.  

 

The  Purpose  Approach  

 

Alternatively,  the  absolute  protection  of  ill-­‐treatment  alongside  torture  could  be  justified  if  

the  distinction  between  the  two  forms  of  conduct  were  achieved  by  drawing  the  distinction  

qualitatively,  or  horizontally.  This  means  that  the  difference  in  treatment  would  be  based  

not  on  severity  but  rather  on  the  purpose  for  which  such  treatment  was  inflicted.  Such  an  

approach  is  favoured  by  Evans,  who  describes  it  as  such:  

“Why  not  abandon  all  thoughts  of  a  'vertical  model'  and  replace  it  with  a  'horizontal  

model',  in  which  'torture'  and  'inhuman'  and  'degrading'  treatment  and  punishment  

all  stand  alongside  each  other.  The  first  question  to  be  asked  would  be  whether  the  

form  of  ill-­‐treatment  or  punishment  is  sufficiently  serious  to  be  deemed  'inhuman'.  If  

that  threshold  is  met,  then  the  next  question  is  whether  the  ill-­‐treatment  was  

purposive  (in  the  sense  of  Article  1  of  the  UN  Convention).  If  it  was,  then  it  should  be  

characterised  as  'torture'.  It  should  not  be  necessary  for  the  'suffering'  to  be  of  a  

greater  severity  as  well.  It  is  the  very  fact  of  its  purposive  use  that  is  the  aggravating  

factor.”69    

 

This  horizontal  approach  appears  to  have  been  adopted  by  the  European  Committee  for  the  

Prevention  of  Torture.  The  Committee  treats  torture  as  severe,  purposive,  and  requiring  

some  form  of  preparation;  it  views  'inhuman'  and  'degrading'  treatment  as  applicable  to  

detention  conditions.  Thus,  the  terms  do  not  represent  a  hierarchy  of  severity  but  rather  

treatment  that  is  different  in  kind,  based  on  the  presence  or  absence  of  purpose.70  

 

69  M.  Evans,  n61,  p.382.  Note  that  Evans  is  discussing  the  Convention  Against  Torture,  but  his  suggestion  could  function  

equally  within  the  framework  of  the  ECHR.  See  also  M.  Nowak  &  E.  McArthur,  'The  United  Nations  Convention  Against  Torture:  A  Commentary'  (OUP,  2008)  p.558.  

70  M.  Evans,  n61,  p.374.  

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Regardless  of  whether  a  'severity'  or  'purpose'  approach  is  adopted,  drawing  the  outer  

boundary  of  ill-­‐treatment  narrowly  means  that  the  conduct  that  falls  within  the  scope  of  

Article  3  will  fit  with  the  view  that  we  are  seeking  to  prohibit  that  which  is  morally  

reprehensible.  

 

Alternative  Two:  Mixed  Definition,  Mixed  Protection  

 

The  second  alternative  to  the  ECtHR’s  approach  is  to  allow  a  definition  of  ill-­‐treatment  that  

is  far  broader  than  that  of  torture,  but  to  balance  this  by  affording  absolute  protection  only  

to  torture.  This  option  accepts  that  the  severity-­‐based  distinction  between  torture  and  ill-­‐

treatment  has  practical  consequences.  Setting  a  limit  on  the  absoluteness  of  protection  is,  

however,  justified  because  a  broad  category  of  ill-­‐treatment  falls  outside  the  moral  

rationale  for  absoluteness.  Although  this  has  the  potential  to  be  tricky  in  borderline  cases,  it  

is  more  appropriate  than  the  ECtHR’s  approach  in  respect  of  cases  of  less  serious  ill-­‐

treatment.  

 

A  clear  example  of  this  approach  is  found  in  a  plain  text  reading  of  the  UN  Convention  

Against  Torture  (‘CAT’).  Article  2  of  the  Convention  treats  the  prohibition  on  torture  as  

absolute  and  non-­‐derogable.71  By  contrast,  other  ill-­‐treatment,  which  is  provided  for  in  

Article  16,72  is  not  afforded  absolute  protection.73  74  Of  particular  relevance  to  our  

consideration  of  the  Gafgen  case  is  the  fact  that  Article  15  only  excludes  evidence  obtained  

by  torture.75  However,  in  contrast  with  the  ECtHR’s  approach,  the  CAT  is  up  front  about  the  

71  Article  2(2):  “No  exceptional  circumstances  whatsoever,  whether  a  state  of  war  or  a  threat  of  war,  internal  political  

instability  or  any  other  public  emergency,  may  be  invoked  as  a  justification  of  torture.”  72  Article  16(1):  “Each  State  Party  shall  undertake  to  prevent  in  any  territory  under  its  jurisdiction  other  acts  of  cruel,  

inhuman  or  degrading  treatment  or  punishment  which  do  not  amount  to  torture  as  defined  in  article  I,  when  such  acts  are  committed  by  or  at  the  instigation  of  or  with  the  consent  or  acquiescence  of  a  public  official  or  other  person  acting  in  an  official  capacity…”  

73  Although  Article  16(1)  notes  that  “In  particular,  the  obligations  contained  in  articles  10,  11,  12  and  13  shall  apply  with  the  substitution  for  references  to  torture  of  references  to  other  forms  of  cruel,  inhuman  or  degrading  treatment  or  punishment”,  this  is  not  extended  to  the  Article  2  absolute  prohibition.  

74  The  Committee  Against  Torture  has  interpreted  ill-­‐treatment  as  being  protected  absolutely  as  well:  'General  Comment  No.  2'  (2007)  para  3  states  that  “[i]n  practice,  the  definitional  threshold  between  ill-­‐treatment  and  torture  is  often  not  clear.”  However,  for  the  purpose  of  illustrating  an  alternative  to  the  ECtHR's  approach,  the  analysis  of  the  Convention  in  this  paper  will  be  based  on  a  plain-­‐text  reading  of  its  provisions.  

75  This  is  supported  by  the  House  of  Lords  in  A  and  Others  (No  2),  n41,  para  53.  But  see  M.  Nowak  &  E.  McArthur,  who  argue  that  Article  15  should  be  interpreted  to  include  evidence  obtained  by  other  forms  of  ill-­‐treatment:  n69,  pp.534-­‐535,  572.  

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fact  that  ill-­‐treatment  is  not  protected  absolutely.76  This  avoids  the  need  to  develop  ad  hoc  

exceptions  in  cases  that  appear  to  justify  them.  Instead,  the  Convention  can  be  read  

inclusively  in  the  knowledge  that  where  there  is  a  conflict  with  other  rights  it  may  be  

necessary  to  place  some  limits  on  the  reach  of  the  protection  of  ill-­‐treatment.  

 

This  alternative  is  also  favoured  by  Shany,  who  seeks  to  construe  the  framework  of  the  CAT  

as  composed  of  two  prohibitions:  an  absolute  prohibition  against  torture,  and  a  relative  

prohibition  against  other  ill-­‐treatment.  With  respect  to  the  latter,  he  understands  the  

relative  nature  of  the  prohibition  as  allowing  certain  criminal  law  defences  to  

perpetrators.77  Moreover,  Shany  takes  the  view  that,  inter  alia,  the  institutional  argument  in  

favour  of  an  absolute  prohibition  (i.e.  the  prospect  of  state  abuse)  is  weaker  for  ill-­‐

treatment,  which  is  less  serious  than  torture,    

 

“...because  the  number  of  scenarios  in  which  the  application  of  these  nasty,  yet  less  

harmful,  interrogation  techniques  could  be  justified  from  a  consequentialist  or  

relativist  perspective,  on  the  balance,  is  larger;  and,  as  a  result,  the  potential  for  

abuse  –  application  of  these  techniques  in  inappropriate  circumstances  –  is  smaller...  

Hence,  policy  considerations  might  support  the  proposition  that  the  absolute  bar  

against  torture  should  not  necessarily  carry  over  to  less  severe  forms  of  cruel,  

inhuman  or  degrading  punishment  or  treatment  prohibited  by  international  law.”78  

 

However,  Shany's  solution  continues  to  protect  the  prohibition  on  ill-­‐treatment  by  allowing  

deviations  only  in  very  limited  circumstances.  He  introduces  flexibility  into  the  prohibition  

by  adopting  the  approach  of  the  Israeli  Supreme  Court:  treating  'other  ill-­‐treatment'  as  

unlawful,  but  enabling  violators  to  plead  the  necessity  defence  in  criminal  trials.79  This  is  

only  one  way  in  which  to  limit  the  protection  of  ill-­‐treatment,  but  it  demonstrates  that  an  

approach  that  affords  absolute  protection  only  to  torture  would  still  be  able  to  uphold  the  

right  of  individuals  to  be  free  from  ill-­‐treatment.   76  Indeed,  M.  Evans  notes  that,  in  contrast  with  the  ECHR,  the  CAT  “formalises  a  distinction  between  torture  on  the  one  

hand  and  inhuman  and  degrading  treatment  on  the  other  by  attributing  different  legal  consequences  to  them.”  See  n61,  p.369.  

77  Y.  Shany,  n56,  p.840.  78  ibid,  p.853.  79  Y.  Shany,  n56,  p.869.  

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In  this  paper,  the  second  alternative  will  be  understood  to  apply  in  a  manner  that  seeks  to  

retain  fairly  strong  protection  of  ill-­‐treatment,  by  relying  on  the  aforementioned  distinction  

between  negative  and  positive  obligations.80  The  former  will  continue  to  be  protected  

absolutely,  thereby  recognising  that  ill-­‐treatment  continues  to  be  prohibited.  However,  the  

positive  obligation  will  be  protected  only  relatively,  allowing  exceptions  where  appropriate.  

 

In  order  to  evaluate  which  of  these  alternative  approaches  is  the  preferable  approach  to  

take,  it  is  necessary  to  flesh  out  the  aims  pursued  in  assigning  a  right  an  absolute  nature.  

Some  consideration  has  already  been  given  to  the  moral  justification  for  absoluteness,  but,  

as  will  be  seen  in  the  next  section,  this  is  not  the  only  relevant  aim.    

 

D.  Absoluteness  and  the  Torture/Ill-­‐Treatment  Distinction  

Despite  the  ECtHR’s  strong  jurisprudence  concerning  the  absoluteness  of  Article  3,  the  Court  

has  given  little  thought  to  the  question  of  what  it  is  trying  to  achieve  by  way  of  such  

characterisation.81  Yet,  it  is  the  answer  to  this  question  that  guides  the  evaluation  of  the  

most  preferable  approach  to  take  to  distinguishing  between  torture  and  ill-­‐treatment.    

 

In  her  article  on  the  issue,82  Mavronicola  notes  that  absoluteness  consists  of  two  criteria.  

The  first  is  an  ‘applicability  criterion’,  “which  focuses  on  the  question  of  whether  and  when  

the  applicability  of  a  standard  can  be  lawfully  ‘displaced’  by  other  considerations.”83  With  

respect  to  Article  3,  its  absolute  nature  means  that  it  can  never  be  lawfully  displaced.84  This  

may  be  justified  on  the  basis  of  moral  reprehensibility,  which  was  recognised  in  section  C  as  

one  of  the  central  bases  underlying  the  absoluteness  of  Article  3.    

 

80  See  section  A.  81  However,  a  few  commentators  have  undertaken  the  task.  See  e.g.  M.K.  Addo  and  N.  Grief,  ‘Does  Article  3  of  the  

European  Convention  on  Human  Rights  Enshrine  Absolute  Rights?’  (1998)  9  EJIL  510;  A.  Gewirth,  Human  Rights:  Essays  on  Justifications  and  Applications  (University  of  Chicago  Press,  1982),  Ch.9;  N.  Mavronicola,  ‘What  is  an  “absolute  right”?  Deciphering  Absoluteness  in  the  Context  of  Article  3  of  the  European  Convention  on  Human  Rights’  (2012)  12  HRLR  723.  

82  N.  Mavronicola,  n81.  83  ibid,  p.729.  84  ibid,  p.737.  

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The  second  of  Mavronicola’s  criteria  is  the  ‘specification  criterion’,  which  “focuses  on  the  

definition  and  delimitation  of  a  standard...”85  It  is  from  this  criterion  which  two  further  aims  

of  absoluteness  may  be  derived:  in  order  to  determine  the  boundaries  of  an  absolute  right,  

clarity  and  inclusiveness  must  be  balanced.    

 

Clarity  

 

If  a  right  is  to  be  considered  an  absolute  standard  it  is  crucial  that  its  scope  be  expressed  

clearly,  because  “...  a  very  general  principle  suffers  from  too  much  uncertainty  and  

disagreement  in  its  concrete  application…”86  Thus,  those  rights  which  we  consider  

important  enough  to  protect  absolutely  cannot  be  framed  as  a  general  standard,  but  must  

be  stated  with  a  degree  of  specificity  which  is  able  to  guide  individuals  and  state  officials.    

 

In  applying  this  to  Article  3,  it  is  necessary  for  there  to  be  a  clear  threshold  which  

determines  the  distinction  between  Article  3  and  non-­‐Article  3  conduct.  Developing  a  

minimum  level  of  severity  should  be  done  in  accordance  with  the  moral  justification  for  

absoluteness.  For  example,  Mavronicola  notes  that  one  of  the  elements  that  supports  the  

absoluteness  of  Article  3  is  that  it  applies  irrespective  of  the  victim’s  conduct.87  This  reflects  

the  fact  that  the  provision  is  intended  to  prohibit  conduct  that  is  so  morally  reprehensible  

that  it  is  never  acceptable.  The  minimum  threshold  for  Article  3  conduct  should  reflect  this.  

Thus,  if  within  Article  3  we  start  developing  exceptions  based  on  the  victim's  conduct,  the  

justification  for  absoluteness  is  shaky.  

 

The  ECtHR’s  approach  fails  here,  because  in  Gafgen  v  Germany  the  Court’s  willingness  to  

develop  an  exception  to  the  application  of  Article  3  in  the  context  of  Article  6  was  based  on  

the  fact  that  Gafgen  was  responsible  for  the  murder  of  Jakob.  As  was  stated  in  Section  B,  

this  is  problematic  for  legal  certainty  as  the  Court  has  created  exceptions  without  providing  

85  ibid,  p.729.  86  N.  Mavronicola,  n81,  p.724.  87  ibid,  p.736.  

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any  guidance  as  to  when,  or  on  what  basis,  such  exception  will  be  justifiable.88  Thus,  the  

alternative  approaches  must  be  assessed  on  the  basis  of  their  ability  to  predict  when  

conduct  is  prohibited  with  a  high  degree  of  legal  certainty.    

 

Inclusiveness  

 

Although  clarity  is  a  necessary  aspect  of  absoluteness,  it  nevertheless  gives  rise  to  two  

specific  risks.  The  first  is  over-­‐specificity,  where  the  desire  to  avoid  generality  results  in  a  

very  limited  set  of  circumstances  to  which  the  standard  may  be  applied.  This  is  problematic  

because  “a  highly  specified  standard  provides  little  ex  ante  guidance  and  is  not  ‘teachable  

and  usable’.”89  Such  standards  are  unsuitable  for  clearly  outlining  absolute  prohibitions.  

 

A  further  risk  attached  to  pursuing  clarity  is  that  relying  on  clear  dividing  lines  lends  itself  to  

the  possibility  of  abuse  by  States.  This  is  particularly  the  case  for  international  human  rights  

law,  which  is  largely    

 

“applied  in  the  absence  of  effective  judicial  review,  [meaning]  states  often  enjoy,  in  

practice,  an  unchallenged  power  of  discretion  on  the  manner  of  applying  relative  

norms.  This  state  of  affairs...  invites  abuse...  the  inclination  of  state  institutions  to  

guard  general  societal  interests,  even  at  the  expense  of  individual  rights,  might  lead  

to  the  misapplication  of  relative  international  legal  standards.”90    

 

The  risk  of  abuse  is  not  a  mere  hypothetical:  the  US  approach  to  torture  following  the  11  

September  2001  terrorist  attacks  provides  a  clear  example.  In  his  analysis  of  the  problem,  

Waldron  explains  this  approach.91  He  notes  that  the  Bush  Administration  attempted  to  

define  the  exact  point  at  which  a  definition  of  torture  takes  effect,  and  comments  that  this  

88  The  Court’s  willingness  to  make  exceptions  extends  beyond  the  issue  of  real  evidence.  In  particular,  it  has  been  willing  to  

accept  that  the  standard  used  for  Article  3  may  differ  in  deportation  cases.  See  e.g.  Babar  Ahmad  and  Others  v  UK  (2013)  56  EHRR  1,  para  177,  in  which  the  Court  stated  that  “...treatment  which  might  violate  Article  3  because  of  an  act  or  omission  of  a  Contracting  State  might  not  attain  the  minimum  level  of  severity  which  is  required  for  there  to  be  a  violation  of  Article  3  in  an  expulsion  or  extradition  case.”  

89  N.  Mavronicola,  n81,  p.742  (footnotes  omitted).  90  Y.  Shany,  n56,  p.844.  91  J.  Waldron,  ‘Torture  and  Positive  Law:  Jurisprudence  for  the  White  House’  (2005)  105  Colum.L.Rev.  1681.  

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appears  to  represent  “an  attempt  to  weaken  or  undermine  the  prohibition,  by  portraying  it  

as  something  like  a  speed  limit  which  we  are  entitled  to  push  up  against  as  closely  as  we  

can”,  or  which  we  might  expect  to  be  treated  with  some  degree  of  lenience.92    

 

Emblematic  of  the  US  attempt  to  weaken  the  prohibition  is  the  Bybee  memorandum.93  This  

legal  memorandum  was  signed  by  Jay  S.  Bybee,  the  Assistant  Attorney  General  for  the  

Office  of  Legal  Counsel  during  the  Bush  Administration.  It  provided  a  very  restrictive  

definition  of  torture  in  order  to  justify  US  conduct  in  extra-­‐territorial  interrogations.  In  the  

memorandum,  Bybee  purported  to  rely  on  the  ECtHR’s  decision  in  Ireland  v  UK,  which  found  

that  the  ‘five  techniques’,  which  were  the  subject  of  the  case,  were  ill-­‐treatment  rather  than  

torture.94  However,  he  failed  to  acknowledge  that  the  European  Commission  in  Ireland  v  

UK,95  and  indeed  the  ECtHR  in  subsequent  decisions,96  treated  the  conduct  as  torture.  

Moreover,  Bybee  ignored  the  fact  that  under  the  ECHR  both  forms  of  treatment  are  

protected  absolutely,  and  it  is  therefore  inappropriate  to  rely  on  the  distinction  drawn  by  

the  ECtHR  in  American  cases.97  Nevertheless,  in  defining  the  severity  of  pain  which  applies  

to  torture,  Bybee  relied  on  such  jurisprudence  in  order  to  reach  the  conclusion  that  

 

 “torture  [under  US  law]  covers  only  extreme  acts.  Severe  pain  is  generally  of  the  

kind  difficult  for  the  victim  to  endure.  Where  the  pain  is  physical,  it  must  be  of  an  

intensity  akin  to  that  which  accompanies  serious  physical  injury  such  as  death  or  

organ  failure.  Severe  mental  pain  requires  suffering  not  just  at  the  moment  of  

infliction  but  it  also  requires  lasting  psychological  harm,  such  as  seen  in  mental  

disorders  like  post-­‐traumatic  stress  disorder.”98    

 

Although  this  part  of  the  Bybee  memorandum  was  ultimately  rejected  by  the  Bush  

Administration,  it  illustrates  the  risk  of  abuse  attached  to  bright  line  reasoning:  not  only   92  ibid,  p.1703.  93  J.  Bybee,  'Memorandum  for  Alberto  R.  Gonzales,  Counsel  to  the  President,  Re:  Standards  of  Conduct  for  Interrogation  

under  18  U.S.C.  ss.  2340-­‐2340A'  (1  August  2002)  <http://news.findlaw.com/nytimes/docs/doj/bybee80102mem.pdf>  accessed  28  July  2014  (hereinafter  'Bybee  Memorandum').  

94  Bybee  Memorandum,  n93,  pp.  28-­‐29;  Ireland  v  UK,  n5,  paras  167-­‐168.  95  Ireland  v  UK  (1976)  Y.B.  Eur.  Conv.  on  Human  Rights  512  (Eur.  Comm.  of  Human  Rights)  (Report  of  the  Commission).  96  See  e.g.  Selmouni  v  France,  n5,  para  101:  “...the  Court  considers  that  certain  acts  which  were  classified  in  the  past  as  

'inhuman  and  degrading  treatment'  as  opposed  to  'torture'  could  be  classified  differently  in  future.”  97  J.  Waldron,  n91,  pp.1705-­‐1706.  98  Bybee  Memorandum,  n93,  p.46.  

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might  states  use  torture,  but  they  might  try  to  legally  justify  it  by  developing  definitions  

which  place  serious  conduct  outside  the  boundaries  of  torture.99  Guarding  against  such  

prospects  is  crucial  for,  as  Waldron  notes:    

 

“To  be  willing  to  abandon  the  prohibition  on  torture  or  to  define  it  out  of  its  

existence  is  to  be  willing  to  sit  back  and  watch  the  whole  enterprise  unravel.  It  is  to  

be  ready  to  contemplate  with  equanimity  the  prospect  that  the  rule  of  law  will  no  

longer  hold  out  the  clear  promise  of  nonbrutality  –  that  the  state,  which  it  aims  to  

control,  will  be  permitted  to  operate  towards  some  individuals  who  are  wholly  under  

its  power  with  methods  of  brutality  from  which  the  law  itself  recoils.”100  

 

Consequently,  it  is  clear  that  there  is  real  merit  in  recognising  that  some  treatment  that  may  

not  reach  the  threshold  of  torture  is  nevertheless  abhorrent  and  should  be  prohibited.  This  

confirms  that,  whilst  it  is  important  for  absolute  rights  to  pursue  clarity,  they  must  not  be  

too  restricted  in  scope,  so  as  to  avoid  excluding  conduct  that  should  be  protected.  

 

Reconciling  Conflicting  Aims  

 

There  is  a  degree  of  tension  between  the  pursuit  of  clarity  and  inclusiveness,  in  a  way  that  

fits  with  the  moral  justification  for  absolute  prohibitions.  This  results  from  the  fact  that  if  

the  scope  of  the  prohibition  is  over-­‐inclusive,  it  may  capture  conduct  that  falls  beyond  the  

threshold  of  moral  reprehensibility.  Moreover,  it  reduces  the  clarity  of  the  right,  as  it  is  

difficult  to  draw  clear  boundaries  when  dealing  with  extensive  circumstances.  However,  if  it  

is  under-­‐inclusive,  unacceptable  conduct  may  fall  beyond  the  reach  of  the  prohibition,  

thereby  resulting  in  the  absence  of  legal  protection  for  morally  reprehensible  acts.  Thus,  the  

aims  pursued  by  the  absolute  prohibition  of  torture  and  ill-­‐treatment  are  not  entirely  

complementary.  The  ECtHR’s  approach  fails  to  balance  these  aims  properly:  by  reading  ill-­‐

treatment  broadly  the  Court  has  pursued  inclusiveness  in  a  manner  which  has  led  to  legal  

99  Similar  arguments  were  made  by  the  Israeli  Government  in  Public  Committee  against  Torture  in  Israel  et  al.  v  The  State  

of  Israel  and  the  General  Security  Service  (GSS),  Judgment  of  6  September  1999,  para  17.  100  J.  Waldron,  n91,  p.1743.  

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conclusions  that  do  not  fit  with  the  moral  justification  for  absoluteness.  Moreover,  

attempting  to  rectify  this  by  allowing  an  exception  to  Article  3  has  impacted  clarity,  as  doing  

so  ignores  the  boundaries  of  the  right,  by  choosing  to  exclude  Article  3  conduct  from  

protection.101  It  is  therefore  necessary  to  evaluate  which  of  the  alternative  approaches  

described  above  is  best  able  to  strike  an  appropriate  balance  between  these  conflicting  

aims.  

 

The  first  alternative  adopts  a  narrow  definition  of  torture  and  ill-­‐treatment  in  order  to  

protect  both  absolutely.  Doing  so  places  emphasis  on  moral  reprehensibility  and  clarity.  This  

is  because  adopting  a  narrow  definition  allows  for  a  division  between  acceptable  and  

unacceptable  conduct,  which  is  well  beyond  the  grey  areas  of  what  conduct  is  serious  

enough  to  be  protected  absolutely.  Consequently,  the  risk  of  controversial  borderline  cases  

is  smaller.  Moreover,  even  where  problems  do  arise  at  the  boundary,  and  the  Court  

oversteps  the  line  in  an  individual  case,  the  scope  is  narrow  enough  that  conduct  would  still  

fit  with  the  moral  justification.  Thus,  the  high  threshold  makes  it  easier  to  provide  clarity  

without  sacrificing  the  aim  of  protecting  individuals  from  moral  abhorrent  treatment.  

However,  a  significant  problem  with  this  approach  is  that  it  is  likely  to  exclude  a  broad  range  

of  mistreatment  from  any  protection  whatsoever.  Thus,  while  the  fairly  restrictive  nature  of  

this  approach  may  fit  with  the  view  that  only  a  limited  scope  of  conduct  should  be  protected  

in  a  manner  which  trumps  all  other  rights,  it  fails  to  recognise  and  account  for  the  fact  that  

we  may  not  want  less  serious  forms  of  ill-­‐treatment  to  escape  protection  altogether.  

 

The  second  alternative  attempts  to  strike  the  balance  between  the  aims  of  absoluteness  by  

allowing  a  broad  definition  of  ill-­‐treatment  but  restricting  absolute  protection  to  the  

prohibition  on  torture.  This  approach  balances  inclusiveness  with  moral  reprehensibility  by  

giving  practical  effect  to  the  distinction  between  torture  and  ill-­‐treatment.  Moreover,  the  

threshold  dividing  the  two  forms  of  treatment  promotes  clarity,  as  it  makes  it  explicit  when  

exceptions  may  be  applicable.  Additionally,  such  exceptions  must  be  clearly  defined,  and  are  

restricted  in  their  application  to  the  positive  obligation  to  protect  ill-­‐treatment.  However,  in   101  K.  Rigg,  n44,  pp.  13-­‐14:  “...many  cases  involve  treatment  that  does  not  fall  neatly  into  one  specific  category.  In  such  

cases,  the  Court  has  struggled  with  the  balance  between,  on  the  one  hand,  providing  legal  certainty  and  upholding  the  'absolute'  nature  of  the  prohibition  and,  on  the  other  hand,  adopting  an  inclusive  interpretation  that  takes  into  account  all  relevant  factors.”  

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contrast  with  the  first  alternative,  a  finding  that  conduct  constitutes  a  less  serious  form  of  

ill-­‐treatment  does  not  altogether  deprive  an  individual  of  protection.  This  is  important  

because,  as  Waldron  notes:    

 

“‘Inhuman  treatment’  means  what  it  says,  and  its  antonymic  connection  with  

‘human  rights’  is  not  just  happenstance.  To  treat  a  person  inhumanly  is  to  treat  him  

in  a  way  that  no  human  should  ever  be  treated.  On  this  basis  it  would  not  be  hard  to  

argue  that  the  prohibitions  on  inhuman  treatment  in  the  Universal  Declaration  of  

Human  Rights,  the  Covenant,  and  the  ECHR  are  as  much  a  paradigm  of  the  

international  human  rights  movement  as  the  absolute  prohibition  on  torture.”102  

 

Thus,  of  the  two  alternatives  it  appears  that  the  second  upholds  the  most  appropriate  

balance  between  the  aims  pursued  by  absoluteness.  This  is  because  it  maintains  clear  

divisions  which  allow  for  an  inclusive  approach  but,  by  accepting  ill-­‐treatment  as  non-­‐

absolute,  it  allows  the  moral  justification  of  absoluteness  to  be  maintained  without  avoiding  

scrutiny  of  such  conduct  altogether.  This  will  be  further  demonstrated  through  an  

application  of  this  approach  to  the  facts  of  the  Gafgen  case.  

 

E.  Gafgen  Revisited  

How  would  Gafgen  v  Germany  have  panned  out  if  the  second  alternative  approach  were  

applied  to  the  facts  of  the  case?  The  shift  in  the  absoluteness  of  the  right  requires  

consideration  of  both  aspects  of  the  case,  in  order  to  determine  how  it  might  apply.  

 

Ill-­‐Treatment  of  Gafgen  

 

The  conduct  to  which  Gafgen  was  subjected  was  classified  by  the  Court  as  ill-­‐treatment.  This  

would  be  the  same  under  the  alternative  approach,  as  the  definition  of  ill-­‐treatment  is  

unchanged.  This  means  that  Germany  interfered  with  Gafgen’s  Article  3  right.  Moreover,  it  

was  stated  above  that  under  the  second  alternative  the  negative  obligation  –  i.e.  the  

102  J.  Waldron,  n91,  p.1745.  

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prohibition  of  ill-­‐treatment  –  will  continue  to  be  protected  absolutely,103  thereby  rendering  

any  interference  with  the  right  a  violation.  However,  as  was  noted  in  footnote  62,  Greer  

takes  the  view  that  the  facts  of  the  Gafgen  case  reflect  a  conflict  of  absolute  rights:  Gafgen’s  

Article  3  right  versus  Jakob’s  Article  3  right.104  Consequently,  he  argues,  the  rights  cannot  

co-­‐exist  and  some  form  of  limitation  is  inevitable.  Greer  proposes  that  this  conflict  should  

be  resolved  on  the  basis  of  moral  reasoning,  as  this  is  the  most  appropriate  way  to  settle  

such  legal  deadlock.105  He  concludes  that  Jakob’s  right  should  prevail,  as  the  infringement  of  

Gafgen’s  right  was  far  less  serious.106  This  would  result  in  a  limitation  on  the  prohibition  of  

Article  3  conduct  in  cases  where  there  is  a  conflict  of  Article  3  rights.  

 

However,  Greer’s  reasoning  relies  on  a  conflict  of  absolute  rights  that  does  not  in  fact  

exist.107  This  is  because  he  ignores  a  crucial  distinction,  made  by  Nagel,  between  the  

concepts  of  agent-­‐neutral  and  agent-­‐relative  values.108  Nagel  describes  the  distinction  as  

follows.  Agent-­‐neutral  values  are  those  that  everyone  must  try  to  prevent  generally.  For  

example,  if  we  consider  murder  to  be  agent-­‐neutral  “it  means  that  everyone  has  a  reason  to  

try  to  minimise  the  overall  number  of  murders,  independent  of  who  commits  them  –  and  

this  might  in  some  circumstances  mean  murdering  a  few  to  prevent  the  murder  of  a  large  

number.”  By  contrast,  agent-­‐relative  values  are  imposed  on  individual  agents.109  Thus,  if  

murder  were  agent-­‐relative,  each  individual  would  be  prohibited  from  committing  murder,  

but  would  have  no  obligation  to  prevent  others  from  being  murdered,110  unless  there  was  

also  a  specific  positive  obligation  imposed  on  them.  With  respect  to  rights,  Nagel  argues  

that  they  are  agent-­‐relative:  they  “tell  us  in  the  first  instance  what  not  to  do  to  other  

people,  rather  than  what  to  prevent  from  happening  to  them.”111  This  is  important  because,  

in  Gafgen,  it  was  not  the  State  that  was  ill-­‐treating  Jakob  but  rather  Gafgen,  a  private  

individual.  The  absence  of  a  general  duty  on  all  individuals  to  prevent  Article  3  conduct  

103  See  section  C.  104  S.  Greer,  n62,  p.80  105  S.  Greer,  n62,  p.78.  106  ibid,  pp.84-­‐85.  107  See  also  S.  Smet,  ‘Conflicts  between  Absolute  Rights:  A  Reply  to  Steven  Greer’  (2013)  13(3)  HRLR  469,  p.473.  Smet  

disagrees  with  Greer’s  characterisation  of  the  facts  and  prefers  to  frame  them  as  a  conflict  between  Jakob’s  Article  2  right,  which  is  not  absolute,  and  Gafgen’s  Article  3  right,  which  is.  

108  T.  Nagel,  n60,  p.87  109  See  section  A.  110  T.  Nagel,  n60,  pp.87-­‐88.  111  Ibid,  p.88.  

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means  that  there  is  not,  as  Greer  asserts,  a  conflict  between  rights.  Rather,  there  are  simply  

two  independent  violations  of  the  right:  a  violation  of  Jakob’s  Article  3  right,  on  the  basis  of  

his  mistreatment  by  Gafgen,  and  a  violation  of  Gafgen’s  Article  3  right,  because  of  his  

mistreatment  by  officer  E.  Thus,  Greer’s  justification  for  restricting  Gafgen’s  right  falls  away,  

and  the  interference  by  Germany  seems,  on  the  face  of  it,  to  be  a  violation  of  Gafgen’s  right  

under  Article  3.  

 

Yet,  there  is  a  further  complication.  This  is  the  fact  that,  whilst  Article  3  is  not  an  agent-­‐

neutral  value,  it  nevertheless  imposes  on  the  State  both  a  negative  obligation  (not  to  ill-­‐

treat  an  individual)  and  a  positive  obligation  (to  prevent  private  individuals  from  ill-­‐treating  

other  individuals).  Here,  the  existence  of  the  State’s  positive  obligation  does  not  alter  the  

fact  that  the  right  is  to  be  considered  agent-­‐relative,  as  this  broad-­‐reaching  duty  is  not  a  

general  one  but  rather  is  imposed  solely  on  the  State.  Although  the  State  is  obliged  to  

uphold  both  its  positive  and  negative  obligations,  and  should  try  to  adopt  approaches  that  

reflect  this,  there  may  be  situations  in  which  it  is  forced  to  make  a  choice  between  them.  

The  facts  of  Gafgen  embody  such  a  case.  In  these  situations,  the  negative  obligation  takes  

precedence  over  the  positive  obligation,  because  under  the  second  alternative  approach  the  

former  continues  to  be  protected  absolutely  whereas  the  latter  does  not.112  This  is  further  

justified  by  the  fact  that  the  State  has  ultimate  control  over  whether  it  meets  its  negative  

obligation,  whereas  aspects  of  the  positive  obligation  may  be  out  of  its  hands.  This  is  

reflected  in  the  Court’s  recognition  that  the  positive  obligation  requires  that  a  State  take  

reasonable  measures,  not  that  it  must  definitively  prevent  the  use  of  Article  3  conduct  by  a  

private  individual.113  On  this  view,  the  State  should  have  refrained  from  ill-­‐treating  Gafgen,  

even  though  it  knew  this  would  restrict  its  ability  to  prevent  the  ill-­‐treatment  of  Jakob.  

Germany  was  therefore  responsible  for  violating  Article  3  on  account  of  its  ill-­‐treatment  of  

Gafgen.  This  shows  how  ill-­‐treatment  can  continue  to  be  protected  strongly  under  the  

second  alternative  approach,  by  protecting  the  negative  obligation  absolutely,  but  the  

positive  obligation  only  relatively.  

 

112  See  also  S.  Smet,  n107,  p.475.  113  Osman  v  UK  (1998)  29  EHRR  245,  para  116.  

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Use  of  Real  Evidence  

 

With  respect  to  the  use  of  real  evidence  obtained  through  statements  made  as  a  result  of  ill-­‐

treatment,  the  alternative  approach  allows  for  greater  clarity  of  reasoning  than  under  the  

ECtHR’s  approach.  In  Gafgen,  the  absolute  nature  of  Article  3  meant  that  the  Court  had  to  

‘fudge’  its  reasoning  in  order  to  reach  the  conclusion  that  it  was  acceptable  to  use  the  real  

evidence  in  Gafgen’s  criminal  trial,  despite  it  being  linked  to  confessions  obtained  by  his  ill-­‐

treatment.  However,  under  the  alternative  approach  ill-­‐treatment  is  not  protected  

absolutely,  and  it  is  therefore  possible  –  as  will  be  seen  below  –  for  the  Court’s  result  to  be  

reached  in  a  justifiable  manner.  

 

It  was  acknowledged  above  that  adopting  an  approach  which  affords  only  relative  

protection  to  the  positive  obligation  concerning  ill-­‐treatment  would  allow  protection  to  be  

limited  in  accordance  with  the  aim  of  prohibiting  morally  reprehensible  conduct.  Thus,  we  

may  want  to  protect  individuals  from  certain  conduct  but  accept  that  it  is  not  necessary  to  

rigorously  prevent  all  circumstances  in  which  the  prohibition  of  ill-­‐treatment  is  indirectly  

undermined.  Thus,  the  fact  that  ill-­‐treatment  is  not  absolute  means  that  the  approach  

which  the  Court  in  Gafgen  brought  in  through  the  back  door  –  assessing  the  impact  of  the  

‘fruits  of  the  poisonous  tree’  on  the  fairness  of  a  trial  –  may  be  explicitly  adopted  under  the  

alternative  approach.  The  difference  in  the  nature  of  protection  of  ill-­‐treatment  therefore  

allows  an  inclusive  approach  to  the  definition  of  ill-­‐treatment  to  be  adopted  without  raising  

concerns  for  the  moral  justification.  In  order  to  maintain  clarity,  rather  than  descending  into  

a  solely  case-­‐by-­‐case  analysis  of  the  application  of  ill-­‐treatment,  it  may  be  necessary  to  

determine  clear,  exhaustive,  exceptions  –  such  as  the  admissibility  of  corroborated  real  

evidence  –  or  at  least  to  acknowledge  that  in  the  context  of  trial  evidence  a  balancing  

approach  will  be  employed,  comparing  the  nature  and  weight  of  evidence  obtained  by  ill-­‐

treatment  with  its  impact  on  the  fairness  of  a  trial.  The  former  fits  with  the  Convention  

Against  Torture,  which  only  prohibits  statements  obtained  by  ill-­‐treatment;  it  omits  any  

reference  to  the  use  of  real  evidence.  

 

29

Thus,  when  applied  to  the  facts  of  the  Gafgen  case,  the  second  alternative  would  allow  the  

Court  to  apply  the  prohibition  of  ill-­‐treatment  in  order  to  find  a  violation  on  the  basis  of  

conduct  to  which  Gafgen  was  subjected.  However,  because  the  prohibition  is  relative  rather  

than  absolute,  the  ECtHR  would  also  be  free  to  acknowledge  the  use  of  corroborated  real  

evidence  as  a  specific  exception  to  the  positive  obligation  on  a  State  to  protect  the  right  to  

be  free  from  ill-­‐treatment.  Consequently,  the  Court  would  be  able  to  reach  the  result  that  

appeared  to  be  morally  appropriate  on  the  facts  of  Gafgen,  without  relying  on  its  

unsatisfactory  reasoning.  

 

G.  Conclusion  

The  ECHR's  prohibition  on  torture  and  other  ill-­‐treatment  was  intended  to  be  absolute:  

Article  3  is  framed  without  exceptions,  and  it  is  specifically  protected  from  derogation.114  

The  ECtHR  has  acknowledged  this  in  its  case-­‐law,  and  has  held  that,  as  a  consequence,  the  

provision  applies  irrespective  of  a  victim's  conduct.  This  paper  has  considered  the  

justification  for  affording  a  right  absolute  status.  It  was  argued  that  the  absoluteness  of  a  

right  reflects  three  aims:  primarily,  the  prevention  of  morally  reprehensible  conduct  and,  in  

addition,  the  pursuit  of  clarity  and  inclusiveness.  However,  the  way  in  which  the  ECtHR  has  

developed  the  framework  of  applicability  for  Article  3  has  led  to  a  very  wide  range  of  

conduct  being  included  within  the  absolute  prohibition.  Thus,  by  defining  torture  narrowly,  

but  other  ill-­‐treatment  broadly,  the  ECtHR  has  made  it  possible  for  the  legally  'correct'  result  

to  conflict  with  the  moral  justification  for  absoluteness.    

 

This  paper  put  forth  this  disparity  as  an  explanation  for  why  the  majority  of  the  Grand  

Chamber  in  Gafgen  v  Germany  was  led  to  its  decision  to  allow  the  use  of  real  evidence  

obtained  by  ill-­‐treatment  under  Article  3.  Having  used  the  judgment  to  illustrate  the  

unsatisfactory  nature  of  the  ECtHR's  current  approach  to  the  absolute  nature  of  Article  3,  

two  alternatives  were  put  forth.  These  were  assessed  with  reference  to  their  ability  to  

balance  the  aims  of  absoluteness.  It  was  demonstrated  that  it  is  preferable  to  read  ill-­‐

treatment  broadly  but  only  protect  torture  absolutely,  as  this  allows  for  a  wider  degree  of   114  Article  15  ECHR,  n4.  

30

clearly  delineated  protection  that  does  not  extend  beyond  the  moral  boundaries  of  

absoluteness.  An  application  of  this  approach  to  the  facts  of  Gafgen  v  Germany  showed  how  

the  Court  might  be  able  to  employ  greater  flexibility  in  cases  of  ill-­‐treatment  without  

sacrificing  coherent  reasoning  or  legal  certainty.    

 

It  is  the  hope  of  the  author  that  this  paper  has  demonstrated  the  importance  of  developing  

a  methodology  for  Article  3  that  not  only  acknowledges  the  consequences  of  absoluteness,  

but  also  the  justification  behind  affording  such  protection.  At  present,  the  text  of  the  ECHR  

restricts  the  Court’s  ability  to  implement  the  changes  proposed  in  this  paper,  as  it  requires  

equal  treatment  of  torture  and  other  ill-­‐treatment,  and  has  been  interpreted  in  the  Court’s  

jurisprudence  as  providing  absolute  protection.  However,  the  issues  highlighted  should  

provide  guidance  for  the  drafters  of  future  human  rights  documents,  and  an  impetus  for  

considering  the  redrafting  of  Article  3  ECHR.  

31

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TABLE  OF  CASES  

 

A  and  others  v  Secretary  of  State  for  the  Home  Department  (No  2)  [2006]  2  AC  221  

 

Babar  Ahmad  and  Others  v  UK  (2013)  56  EHRR  1  

 

Belgian  Linguistic  Case  (1968)  1  EHRR  252  

 

Chahal  v  UK  (1996)  23  EHRR  413  

 

Gafgen  v  Germany  [2008]  ECHR  565  

 

- Dissenting  Opinion  of  Judge  Kalaydjieva  

 

Gafgen  v  Germany  (2010)  52  EHRR  1  

 

- Joint  Partly  Dissenting  Opinion  of  Judges  Rozakis,  Tulkens,  Jebens,  Ziemele,  

Bianku  and  Power  

 

G.J.  v  Lithuania,  Decision  of  the  Human  Rights  Committee  concerning  Communication  No.  

1894/2009  

 

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Horvath  v  Australia,  Views  of  the  Human  Rights  Committee  concerning  Communication  No.  

1885/2009  (2014)  

 

Ireland  v  UK  (1976)  Y.B.  Eur.  Conv.  on  Human  Rights  512  (Eur.  Comm.  of  Human  Rights)  

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Ireland  v  UK  (1978)  2  EHRR  25  

35

 

Jalloh  v  Germany  (2007)  44  EHRR  32  

 

Larioshina  v  Russia  (App  no.56869/00)  (2002)  Second  Admissibility  Decision  

 

Osman  v  UK  (1989)  29  EHRR  245    

 

Public  Committee  against  Torture  in  Israel  et  al.  v  The  State  of  Israel  and  the  General  

Security  Service  (GSS),  Judgment  of  6  September  1999  

 

Selmouni  v  France  (1999)  29  EHRR  403  

 

Tyrer  v  UK  (1978)  2  EHRR  1  

 

- Separate  Opinion  of  Judge  Sir  Gerald  Fitzmaurice  

36

TABLE  OF  LEGISLATION  

 

 

European  Convention  on  Human  Rights  

 

- Article  3  

- Article  6  

- Article  15  

- Article  34  

- Protocol  1,  Article  2  

 

International  Covenant  on  Civil  and  Political  Rights  

 

- Article  7  

 

United  Nations  Convention  Against  Torture  

 

- Article  2  

- Article  15  

- Article  16