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Chapter 6 Islamic Opposition in Azerbaijan: Discursive Conflicts and Beyond

Sofie Bedford

In 2004 the Azerbaijani authorities decided to evict the Juma mosque community from the mosque in

Baku’s old town where they had been conducting prayers since 1992; under the auspices they lacked

the proper registration and the facilities were state property. As the community resisted eviction,

police entered the mosque during prayer time, physically removed the worshippers and closed it

down. Preceding this, the popular imam of the Juma Mosque had been arrested during a political

demonstration and sentenced to a five year suspended sentence for violating Azerbaijani law by

engaging politically despite being a religious leader. These episodes rendered a lot of attention at the

time as they highlighted a conflict between a religious group and the state in Azerbaijan, a country

generally described as one of the more secular in the former Soviet Union. Almost 10 years after the

Juma incidents the relationship between the Azerbaijani authorities and certain parts of the Islamic

community is still tense and does from time to time manifest itself in open controversies. In order to

shed light on how some Muslim groups in Azerbaijan became perceived as oppositional, this chapter

focuses on colliding discourses that become societal and intensified as the authorities with all means

try to control discursive as well as social practices.

Problems Emerging

Just before perestroika and during the first years of independence, restrictions on religion were lifted

in Azerbaijan, like in many other former Soviet republics. The right to worship, celebrate religious

holidays, open and build mosques, study religion at home and abroad and register religious

organizations were among the privileges reinstated. In 1993 an Azerbaijani translation of the Qur’an

was published for the first time in many years1 (Gasanov 1999). As noted by among others Balci and

Goyushov, foreign religious influences played an important part in this revival (Balci and Goyushov

2013). Missionaries from neighbouring Iran and Turkey as well as some of the Gulf countries arrived

1 Gasanov, R. 1999. ‘Islam v Obshestvenno-Politicheskoy Zhizni Sovremonnogo Azerbaydzhana’, История

(Istoria), No. 28. Available at: http://his.1september.ru/article.php?ID=199902802 (accessed 5 December 2013).

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in the country to educate the Azerbaijani Muslims, who to a large extent were uneducated in the

Islamic faith. There was an enormous demand for religious knowledge and many were also given the

opportunity to study religion abroad in other Muslim countries. They brought back religious literature,

knowledge and ideas about how to practise religion in what they saw as a correct way. After some

time the religious euphoria was dampened when a number of laws were introduced that banned

foreign missionary activity and in other ways sharply decreased the autonomy of religious

organizations. When some Muslim groups, such as the Juma mosque community mentioned above,

questioned the need for religious activities to be overseen by authorities, these came to be seen as

oppositional troublemakers.

This study is based on the premise that the key to understanding the conflict that arose from

this renewed state monopoly on religion is to be found in the authorities’ and believers’ very

incompatible perceptions of Islam and, perhaps most importantly, its role in the post-Soviet

Azerbaijani society. These perceptions can be analysed as a public (and sometimes private) discourse

used by the involved parties to enforce, legitimate and reproduce their own views as well as challenge

the way others are relating to this issue (Fairclough 1995). This definition of discourse resonates with

that of Jørgensen and Phillips: ‘as a particular way of talking about and understanding the world (or

an aspect of the world)’ (Jørgensen and Phillips 2002: 1) with the important reservation that neither

the discourse nor its advocates should be perceived as static. The study is to a certain extent guided by

the basis of critical discourse theory in that it will highlight uneven power relations (Jørgensen and

Phillips 2002). It also adheres to the principle that texts are embedded within a wider social practice

and cannot be analysed without their contexts. Every ‘discursive event’ is an example of social

practice in the way that it reproduces or challenges the existing discourse structure (Fairclough 1992:

198). This will become very noticeable in the analysis of the Azerbaijani case.

What for the sake of simplicity will be referred to as the Azerbaijani state discourse portrays

an ideal non-political Islam and religious practice and expression that are strictly controlled,

submissive and low-key. This has traditionally been the dominant discourse in Azerbaijan and is

advocated mainly by state representatives and religious authorities known for their close relations

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with the government. Still, in some instances it will become noticeable that certain aspects of this

discourse are reinforced also by those who in most other cases represent what can be called a counter-

discourse. The counter-discourse refers to the viewpoints of many post-Soviet believers, often young,

that consider the state discourse a Soviet-inherited, out-dated or simply incorrect approach to Islam.

At the same time it is also important to keep in mind that there are great differences within the

Azerbaijani Muslim community that have, so to speak, in one way or another fallen out with the state.

One important such is the growing number of believers that chose to identify themselves as either

Sunnis or Shiites. The hegemonic discourse on Islam in Azerbaijan is maintaining that a special

tolerance exists between the country´s Shia majority and Sunni minority and that, in principle,

religious difference between them are artificial. Nevertheless, both according to what can be observed

in the mosques and the discursive practices extracted, this is no longer the case. Furthermore, as noted

by Wiktor-Mach, it is likewise important to note that the Sunni and Shiite communities in Azerbaijan

by no means should be seen as homogeneous (Wiktor-Mach 2012).

Throughout this chapter a number of illustrations of the conflicting discourses will be

analysed. These are extracted mainly from interviews, statements and texts by the main parties during

the conflicts’ initial phase; representatives of the State Committee for Work with Religious

Associations and the Caucasus Muslim Board, and members of the Abu Bakr and Juma mosque

communities as well as the Islamic Party of Azerbaijan, the three latter sharing the faith of being

labelled ‘oppositional’. The purpose of the study is to elaborate on how the interaction between these

two different discourses has shaped the conflict between the state and Muslim communities in

Azerbaijan. To show the sustainable character of this conflict, examples of how it has regenerated

after the first stage will to a certain extent also be added to the analysis. The chapter will begin with

an introduction to the problem through an outline of the Soviet and post-Soviet religious context in

Azerbaijan followed by an overview of the major actors and issues of contention.

The Religious Context

According to most sources about 90 per cent of the inhabitants in Azerbaijan consider themselves

Muslims while the rest adhere to Russian Orthodoxy, the Armenian Apostolic Church, other Christian

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groups, Judaism or are nonbelievers (US Department of State 2011). In research from the early post-

Soviet period Azerbaijan is nonetheless often described as the most secularized of the post-Soviet

Islamic republics. Some figures estimated that no more than 5 per cent of the population were active

believers, although a majority of the population identified themselves as Muslim (Hadjyzade 2005).

Conventional Muslim traditions, such as daily prayers, the paying of charity tax and fasting, were rare

even in the most rural areas. Islamic traditions and beliefs in certain forms have been a part of many

Azerbaijanis everyday life since Soviet times, although most often understood as national rather than

religious customs. Despite its anti-religious and atheist policies the Soviet Union did provide an

opening for religious traditions and customs to live on through the special emphasis on one’s national

identity. To the extent Muslim rituals and celebrations became incorporated in the national identity,

they became synonymous with ethnic traditions, hence encompassing the whole nation rather than just

the believers. As a result, being Muslim became a national identifier rather than an expression of a

particular religious belief (Dragadze 1994; Motika 2001). This merging of religious and ethnic

identities seems to have made certain Islamic traditions legitimate in the eyes of the Soviet and post-

Soviet authorities as well as the public by de-Islamizing them.

One particularly noticeable such practice is shrine pilgrimage and worshipping of saints – a

type of religious expression that survived and possibly flourished during Soviet times. Activities at the

shrines can consist of circling a grave or other holy object, the kissing or touching of the same and,

most importantly, the donation of cash, silk, sugar cubes, tea or other food as well as the tying of

ribbons or strips of cloth at or near a shrine, all in order to get your wish granted. As noted by Grant,

shrines ‘have been at the centres and peripheries of almost every major religious tradition of the

region: Zoroastrianism, Judaism, Christianity, Islam, and Buddhism’ (Grant 2011: 654). In the former

Soviet Union these shrines can be in the shape of virtually anything; a tree or a rock, or a full size

temple complex, and they did in a sense come to substitute the religious buildings that had been

closed or demolished during the Soviets’ anti-religion campaigns. But as a result of the Soviet

strategy to detach Islamic traditions from their religious context, many of those who visit the shrines

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today see this as a ‘neutral’ kind of worship uncommitted to any specific direction of, or commitment

to, Islam (Dragadze 1994; Shaffer 2002).

As most mosques were closed due to the Soviets’ anti-religious efforts, visiting shrines was

for a long time many pious Muslims’ only option. However, as a part in a campaign to increase

support for the war among the Muslim part of the population, Stalin in 1944 created four ‘Muslim

Spiritual Boards’ (Dukhovnoye Upravlenye Musolman), also referred to as muftiats, in Baku,

Tashkent (Uzbekistan), Ufa and Buinaksk (Russia). These were headed by religious leaders, muftis,

willing to support the Soviet policies and serve as mediators between the Muslim population and the

state. The muftis became the base of an ‘official Muslim clergy’ educated within the Soviet Union,

acknowledged by the Soviet system and striving, not always very successfully, to establish a new

identity including both Muslim and Soviet (Ro’i 2000). To a certain extent all religious activities not

approved by the muftiats were considered unofficial (hence illegal). Consequently much of the

activity at the shrines came to be part of a parallel Islam, unsanctioned by the state. Some, like Grant,

have questioned the tradition to describe Islam in terms of official and unofficial that has become

mainstream in studies of religion in the Soviet Union, arguing that the unofficial Islam (also referred

to as parallel Islam) was not as informal, private and hidden as it has been made out to be (Grant

2011). However, what is important in this distinction is that the religious (and other) activities

conducted and controlled by the muftiats were sanctioned and approved by the secular authorities,

hence perceived as non-threatening. This is important because it is still influencing the relationship

between the state and religion in independent Azerbaijan.

According to the 2001 Law of the Republic of Azerbaijan on Freedom of Religious Belief,

membership in the Caucasus Muslim Board (the direct successor of the Stalinist creation) is

mandatory for Islamic religious communities in Azerbaijan.2 The mission of the Board is to

coordinate the activities of the Islamic community in Azerbaijan, Georgia and (in theory) Russian

North Caucasus. It is responsible for, among other things, appointing religious servants and

2 Law of the Republic of Azerbaijan on Freedom of Religious Belief, Chapter 1, Article 8. Available at:

http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/47fdedc12.html (accessed 22 April 2013).

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associates, organizing pilgrimage to holy places and educating religious leaders.3 In theory, the Board

and its leaders are independent, but in reality it is obvious they are liaised with the secular authorities

and very loyal to the power structures. The law on religion is emphasizing freedom of conscience in

Azerbaijan, but has repeatedly been generating criticism from local and international religious rights

groups for imposing restrictions on religious life. Criticism often concerns the increasingly

complicated and sometimes expensive process of obtaining the obligatory state registration for

religious organizations. Registration is important as without it religious organizations lack the status

of legal entity and cannot rent property, open bank accounts and so on. Moreover, as noted in the

2011 US State Department’s Religious Freedom Report, without registration some groups are very

vulnerable to government raids. The State Committee for Work with Religious Associations

(SCWRA) and its chairman have broad powers over registration and may also appeal to the courts for

the suspension of activities of a religious group (US Department of State 2011).4 Also restrictions on

religious education, import of religious literature and places of worship are regulated by law and

overseen by SCWRA.5 A 2013 amendment of the law has imposed the most comprehensive

restrictions so far on the sales of religious materials. Religious books, video and audio-tapes, as well

as discs, can now only be sold if they carry a special marking ensuring they are allowed for sale in the

country. Moreover, the selling of religious materials is limited to a few specially designated shops.6

Matters of Contention

When certain Muslim communities refused to renew their state registration in accordance to the new

policy, and also disputed the right of the restored Muslim Board to oversee their activities, this

became the start of a stormy relationship between the secular and (state-authorized) religious

3 Interview with Agayev, Hajji Akif, Deputy of the Caucasus Muslim Board, Baku, 22 April 2004.

4 Corley, Felix 2011. ‘Azerbaijan: Communities to Be Forced to Begin Re-registration Again?’ Forum 18 News, 8 June.

Available at: http://www.forum18.org/Archive.php?article_id=1578 (accessed 22 April 2013).

5 Sultanova, Shahla 2012. ‘Religion: Worshiping in the Cross Hairs’, Transitions Online, 7 August. Available at:

www.tol.org (accessed 22 April 2013).

6 ‘Azerbaijani Parliament Limits Sales of Religious Materials’, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 22 February, 2013.

Available at: http://www.rferl.org/content/azerbaijan-limits-religious-materials/24909902.html (accessed 22 April 2013).

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authorities and Muslim communities considered oppositional. The most well known of these were the

Shiite Juma mosque community and the Sunni Abu Bakr mosque community in Baku. As mentioned

initially, the schism between the state and the Juma mosque community was initiated when the

mosque’s popular imam, Ilgar Ibrahimoglu, was arrested during a political demonstration in 2003,

accused of using his religious position for political purposes, illegal according to Azerbaijani law.7

After his release he continued to loudly criticize the government for the lack of human and political

rights in the country, particularly in the position as chairman of DEVAMM (Centre for the Protection

of Freedom of Conscience and Religion), an organization created by his community. The dispute

around the Juma mosque community intensified in the summer of 2004 as they were evicted from the

fourteenth century Juma mosque where they had been located since 1992. The mosque was closed on

the grounds that it was to be renovated. Even though it has since reopened, Ibrahimoglu is barred from

preaching at the facilities.8 The community has chosen to become increasingly politically active,

joining forces with the secular political opposition, something that has angered the secular authorities.

Another aspect that has contributed to the Juma community’s conflictual relationship with the state is

that Ilgar Ibrahimoglu is educated in Iran, something that, for reasons that will be discussed below,

has made him and his community suspect in the eyes of the authorities.

Also the Abu Bakr mosque, opened in 1998 through funding from the Foundation for Islamic

Heritage of Kuwait, did initially refuse state registration. The leaders of the mosque were however

rather quick to rethink their strategy choosing instead to cooperate with religious and secular

authorities. Still, this did not completely neutralize the relations between the mosque community and

the state. Being representatives of Sunni Islam in majority Shiite Azerbaijan is one reason. Another,

perhaps more major reason, is that as adherents of Salafism, the community members lead a

conservative religious lifestyle not very common in post-Soviet Azerbaijani society. Their beliefs and

exterior, such as long beards, three-quarter pants and hijabs, rendered much suspicion both among the 7 Constitution of the Republic of Azerbaijan, Section 3, Chapter 5, Article 85. Available at:

http://en.president.az/azerbaijan/constitution/ (accessed 22 April 2013).

8 Liles, Thomas 2013. ‘’An Apparatus of Mediators’ Religion in Azerbaijan’, The Tuqay, 18 March. Available at:

http://thetuqay.com/index.php/2013/03/18/an-apparatus-of-mediators-religion-in-azerbaijan/ (accessed 22 April 2013).

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authorities and the community in general. References to the community and its members as

‘Wahhabis’, which in a post-Soviet context has come to be synonymous with Muslim radicalism,

terrorism and extremism, were especially common in the mid-2000s. When in 2001 some visitors of

the Abu Bakr mosque were sentenced for planning to fight in Chechnya and some others for being

members of the infamous Hizb-ut-Tahrir movement, this rendered further mistrust against the mosque

that nevertheless remained open although restrictions were put on their activities.9 A 2008 grenade

attack, allegedly carried out by a radical Dagestani Islamist group, damaged the mosque and injured

some community members. The premise was closed, pending investigation, and has yet (2013) to be

reopened.10 As will be discussed more below, the conflict between the state and the Abu Bakr

community is less about breaking formal rules and more about underlying values and interpreting

religion. Moreover, just as in the Juma case the fact that the imam of the Abu Bakr mosque received

his religious education abroad, in this case in Saudi Arabia, is another source of concern for the state

authorities.

Another illustration of the continuity of conflict-ridden relations between the state and certain

groups with religious connotations is the fate of the Islamic Party of Azerbaijan (IPA). The party was

created in 1991 and officially registered in 1992. Its founders were citizens of Nardaran, a village on

the Absheron peninsula outside Baku known for its conservative Shiite population. In connection to

the 1995 municipal elections the party’s registration was revoked and the party banned on the grounds

it was unconstitutionally mixing political and religious activities as well as receiving financial support

from abroad (Iran). In May 1996 four persons from the party’s leadership were arrested for ‘anti-state’

activity and later received long prison sentences (Gasanov 1999). Three of them were released after

three and a half years, and the fourth died during his time in prison due to unknown circumstances.

Nevertheless the party continued to exist under a more moderate leadership and without official

registration.11 Over the years these types of accusations have reappeared regularly and other members 9 Fuller, Liz 2002. ‘Could ‘Alternative’ Islam Become a Force in Azerbaijani Politics?’, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty

Newsline, 15 March. Available at: http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1142636.html (accessed 22 April 2013).

10 Liles 2013 (see note 7 above).

11 Interview with Askerovich, Hajji Hadjiaga Nuri Ali, Islamic Party of Azerbaijan, Baku, Azerbaijan, April 2004.

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have been detained. In 2002, for example, the party leader Ali Akram Hajji was arrested in connection

to clashes between police and inhabitants of Nardaran as a result of a social protest. In 2012 their new

chairman, Movsum Samadov, and a number of other members were charged with public disorder

during protests against a hijab (head scarf) ban and sentenced to long terms in prison.12

While the above cases illustrate a conflict between the state and specific groups, or

individuals, there are other aspects of this controversy that indicate the issue relates to a more general

discrepancy over the way in which religion is understood, practised and expressed. The disagreement

concerning the right to wear the hijab in Azerbaijan is a demonstration of this. The issue of the hijab

and its place in a secular society has become increasingly contentious in Azerbaijan where many

women were affected by a law banning women from wearing the head scarf in photographs on all

identity documents, including driver’s licenses and internal passports. The initial decree dates back to

the late 1990s, but the issue became urgent in 2005 when the old Soviet identity card expired and

women seeking to renew theirs faced difficulties when refusing to remove the hijab for their

photograph and hence found themselves without a valid ID.13 In 2010 the issue flared up again as a

result of the Ministry of Education deciding to strictly enforce a law on uniforms for school children,

which in practice meant banning the hijab in schools. This resulted in pro-hijab demonstrations and

clashes with the police, after which many participants were arrested, including members of the IPA as

mentioned above (Freedom House 2012). While it is the hijab problem that has become most overtly

politicized, the beard, as will be discussed below, is another feature of the conflict over religious

expression causing major concerns.

The examples above show how state use of formal means, like laws and regulations, to

maintain control over religion and religious expression has backlashed as believers and communities

are resisting control in various ways. But, the conflict between state and religious believers has a more

12 Abbasov, Shahin 2011. ‘Azerbaijan: Arrest of Islamic Party Leader Puts Religion in the Political Spotlight’,

Eurasianet.org, 11 January. Available at: http://www.eurasianet.org/node/62692 (accessed 22 April 2013).

13 Vazirova, Aysel 2005. Freedom and Bondage: The Discussion of Hijab in Azerbaijan, South Caucasus Regional Office the

Heinrich Boell Foundation's Scholarship Program. Available at:

http://www.ge.boell.org/downloads/Aysel_Vesirova_2005.pdf (accessed 22 April 2013).

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informal dimension. Besides formal regulations, religious activities are also affected, and to some

extent regulated, by negative attitudes among secular authorities, and others, towards those who have

another approach to Islam than that considered to be the norm. Informal ‘black public relations

campaigns’ are not uncommon in this context, during which government-controlled press has been

actively used to spread the state’s hegemonic discourse, painting an unpleasant picture of certain

religious communities and those who support them. This has at times had a strong impact on public

opinion and attitudes towards certain mosques and their members (US Department of State 2011;

Wiktor-Mach 2012). Such impact was especially noticeable during the initial controversy involving

the Abu Bakr mosque community when the image of community members as radical ‘Wahhabis’ and

the mosque as a harbour of terrorists was mainstreamed. ‘Sometimes there has been very bad

propaganda against me’, the imam says. ‘I sit and watch the news and suddenly I hear something bad

about myself. One time I went to Dubai and on the [Azerbaijani] news they reported I had fled the

country. Sometimes this has been very difficult for me to handle.’14

In some cases the general scepticism towards Islamic communities that stray from the ‘norm’

has even resulted in physical victimization. Both Juma and Abu Bakr community members have been

subjected to forced eviction on the basis of their affiliation with a controversial mosque. Some have

been arrested, more than once, for no apparent reason. Constant house searches as well as harming of

friends and relatives were other forms of pressure described. Especially visitors to Abu Bakr note that

they were often harassed in various ways because of their faith or physical appearance. This could

mean getting their beards shaved off, being arrested or beaten up – all while being accused of

extremism.15 Often, however, the assaulters are neither necessarily representatives nor acting on

behalf of the national authorities but local police or other local authorities doing what they think is

demanded from them.

14 Interview with imam Gahmet Sulemanov, Abu Bakr Mosque, Baku, 20 April, 2004.

15 Interviews in the Juma and Abu Bakr Mosques, Baku, 2004 and 2005; Corley, Felix 2008. ‘Azerbaijan: Muslims Banned

From Praying Outside Mosques, Raids On Jehovah's Witnesses Continue’, Forum 18 News, 18 September. Available at:

http://www.forum18.org/Archive.php?article_id=1188 (accessed 22 April 2013).

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To conclude, the above situation points to a number of issues that complicate the relations

between state and religion in Azerbaijan. The next section of the chapter will analyse the discourses

that reinforce this contention.

Tolerance and Control

When secular and state-backed religious authorities in Azerbaijan are discussing religion, religious

communities and their activities, the theme of control is particularly noticeable. According to their

perspective, Azerbaijan is in a very vulnerable position. If the wrong people were to spread their

hazardous ideas among the population, this could end in chaos and in worst cases an Islamist

government in place. In this view, Azerbaijan today is an extremely tolerant country in terms of

religion. Hence strict government control of many spheres of religious life is needed in order to ensure

this does not change. Below a closer look of various components of this discourse follows.

One important feature of the state discourse is the view of Azerbaijan as a multi-religious,

tolerant country. Geographically located at what can be seen as the religious crossroads between

Christianity and Islam, the Azerbaijani government is proud of the country’s ‘tradition of dialogue,

reconciliation, and mutual understanding among the religions’ (Orudjev 2011: 93). Also, Hajji Salman

Musaev of the Caucasus Muslim Board is emphasizing the unique tolerance in Azerbaijan’s religious

life:

When we talk about religion we need to remember that not only Muslims live in

Azerbaijan. Russian-Orthodox churches are functioning; there is a synagogue as well.

It has always been like that. [ … ] You don’t see Episcopalians, Muslims, Jews,

Christians celebrate together anywhere else. But here [in Azerbaijan] this is achieved.

Here this is tradition and we are very carefully trying to preserve this tradition.16

In the same line of thinking, secular and religious authorities often pursue the idea of a special

tolerance between Azerbaijan’s Shia majority and Sunni minority. Sunni Islam is traditionally

dominant among Lezgins and Avars in the northern and western parts of Azerbaijan that border the

Russian Caucasus, while the central, eastern and southern parts (bordering Iran) of Azerbaijan as well

as Baku and its suburbs, are traditionally Shi’ite communities. Of the Azerbaijani Muslims about 65

16 Interview with Hajji Salman Musaev, First Deputy, Caucasus Muslim Board, Baku, May 2005.

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per cent allegedly adhere to Shia Islam, but as noted by Goyushov and Balci, ‘in general, mainstream

Azeris until recently had little connection to the age-old Sunni-Shiite rivalry, and viewed the simple

public pronunciation of the words ‘Shiite’ and ‘Sunni’ at least as impolite’ (Balci and Goyushov

2013). This can be seen as a result of the Soviet policy against Islam in Azerbaijan as it, according to

most researchers, did not differentiate between Sunnis and Shiites, but as Balci writes,

‘unintentionally contributed to the smoothing out of differences between the two doctrines’ (Balci

2004: 207). In her anthropological study of Islamic traditions in Azerbaijan, Wiktor-Mach found that

many people that insisted on calling themselves Muslim instead of Shia still expressed an adherence

to customs and beliefs correlating to Shiite tradition, which highlights the need to problematize the

use of these terms in the Azerbaijani context (Wiktor-Mach 2012).

The Caucasus Muslim Board is organized to meet the needs of all Azerbaijani Muslims. The

head of the board, Sheikh-ül-Islam, is Shiite and his deputy Sunni. But according to Hajji Salman

Musaev, ‘you cannot say from looking at them who is Sunni and who is Shiite – they look the same

and they pray together in the same mosque’.17 Still, Rafik Aliyev recognizes that the situation is

changing in this respect and points out that the change is threatening to the Azerbaijani society.

Previously Muslims were Sunni and Shia who lived in peace and many of them

didn’t know to what current they belonged. Now there are ten Muslim currents in

Azerbaijan [ … ] The committee is working with them: we do our best for

maintenance of public order and observance of tolerance principles. Yet we enjoy

some harmony. But nobody can guarantee the reign of everlasting harmony, and that

the state won’t have to take measures to restore the order, as it used to do it before.18

The quotation points to another important aspect of the tolerance matter, the perception that a

precondition for inter- as well as intra-religious peace is a strong government, capable of controlling

religious life preventing controversies from turning into open conflicts (Orudjev 2011).

The Threat from Abroad

17 Interview with Hajji Salman Musaev, First Deputy, Caucasus Muslim Board, Baku, May 2005.

18 Interview with Rafik Aliyev, Chairman of the State Committee for Work with Religious Associations, Baku, 28 May,

2005.

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At the time of the so-called religious boom, when the system of religious education in Azerbaijan was

weak and the level of religious knowledge low, much informational input in the sphere of religion

came, not surprisingly, from foreigners inside or outside the country. This influx of knowledge

continues, as noted by Balci and Goyushov, as a result of the ‘natural globalization of religion’ (Balci

and Goyushov 2013). As more and more people in Azerbaijan are becoming interested in religion at

the same time as speedy technological advancements make original sources and other information

from abroad very easy to access, this is unavoidable. However, from the point of view of the leaders

of independent Azerbaijan, this foreign influence and new approaches to religion could harm the

unique nature of Azerbaijani Islam discussed above.

Due to its predominantly Muslim demography and geographical location, neighbouring both

the Islamic republic of Iran and the instable Russian North Caucasus, the leading discourse emphasize

that lack of state control could enable the spread of different strings of Islamic radicalism from other

parts of the region. It is the responsibility of the government to ensure that this does not happen. Rafik

Aliyev, for example, is stressing the need for the state to control foreign activities, albeit in a

‘moderate’ way:

The threat of Islamic fundamentalism really exists and it is a real danger [ … ] Many

Muslim states are trying to spread this current in our country, pursuing only their own

interests. It is not of religious but political nature. We should think about it and take

necessary measures that must be sophisticated and balanced (Aliyev 2004: 47).

Another head of SCWRA, Hidayat Orudjev, agrees: ‘As the Soviet past gradually fades into

history the new generation grows interested in religious doctrines. To prevent fanaticism the

authorities support works to enlighten the population’ (Orudjev 2011). To tackle this problem the

Azerbaijani parliament adopted an amendment to the Law of the Republic of Azerbaijan on Freedom

of Religious Belief in 1996, banning the activities of ‘foreigners and persons without citizenship’

from conducting ‘religious propaganda’.19 In this context brands of Islam from North Caucasus, Iran

and Saudi Arabia are most often described as political and dangerous by the authorities. In particular,

it is the approach to religion in Iran and the risk of Iranian bad influence on the Azerbaijani society

19 The Law of the Republic of Azerbaijan ‘On Freedom of Religious Belief’, Chapter 1, Article 5 (see note 1 above).

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that is stressed. The perception is that religious traditions in Azerbaijan are softer than in Iran and

because of this vulnerable to the influx of aggressive Iranian revolutionaries. The threat posed by

Iranian religious leaders who would like to turn Azerbaijan into an Islamic state is used to justify state

registration of religious organizations, to control the import of religious literature and to keep

religious figures, such as the Juma mosque’s imam, away from the political arena. As emphasized by

a representative of the SCWRA:

Azerbaijan does not want to turn into Iran. Now you can walk here in your own

clothes and do what you want. Have you been to Iran? If you go there, you will see

the difference. And then you will understand why we have this law [that religious

persons may not be politically active] and why this fallen Imam [of the Juma

mosque] is not let into politics.20

Traditionally the work of Turkish Islamic groups, such as the Fethullahci movement, has been

perceived as apolitical, hence a more appropriate role model. These have faced fewer restrictions.

Also the Turkish government has been allowed to promote ‘Turkish Islam’ through opening a

religious university in Baku as well as a theological institute for under-graduates. According to Balci

and Goyushov, this ‘moderate Sunni form of Islam has learned to compromise with a secular State’,

which is treasured by the Azerbaijani government (Balci and Goyushov 2013). Nevertheless, the

closure of two Turkish-built mosques in 2009 has indicated that the situation might be changing. Even

though the closure in both cases were allegedly temporary neither has reopened.21

It is interesting to note that the ‘threat from radicalism’ aspect of the state discourse to a

certain extent has become the most influential and widespread in general in matters relating to Islam

in Azerbaijan. In academic and news articles, even from outside the country, a majority of the studies

on this topic are struggling with the question whether Islamic radicalism will, or could, spread to

Azerbaijan (see, for example, Mirzayev 2013; Nedea, Jafarov and Mamadov 2012; Wilhelmsen 2009;

20 Interview with representative of the SCWRA, Baku, 22 April 2004.

21 ‘Turkish Mosque in Baku Closed for Repairs’, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 28 April 2009. Available at:

http://www.rferl.org/content/Turkish_Mosque_In_Baku_Closed_For_Repairs/1617374.html; Muradova, Mina 2009.

‘Azerbaijan: Mosques Close in Baku, ‘Capital of Islamic Culture’’, Eurasianet.org, 26 May. Available at:

http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insightb/articles/eav052709b.shtml (both accessed 22 April 2013).

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Cornell 2006 and Fuller 2002). Moreover, among those who are often accused of being under foreign

radical influence, this perspective is equally repeated. The imam of the Abu Bakr mosque complains

in an interview with Transitions Online about the fact that after the 2008 closure of the mosque,

outsiders can more easily propagandize radical Islam among the Salafis. ‘Now, anyone who has a

little Islamic education establishes his own group of believers and calls it Salafi. / … / Many people

come under the influence of foreign forces, especially of the North Caucasus’.22 On a similar note the

Juma imam explains:

That we [in Juma] are showing that Islam can be modern and so on is very important

because it takes the ground from those who say we need to be oriented towards

different countries. We say no. We say that we should be oriented towards

Azerbaijan, this is Azerbaijani Islam, this is modern Islam, this is Islam as it is.23

The Incompatibility of Religion and Politics

The political leaders of independent Azerbaijan promote religion as an important part of the national

ideology at the same time as the idea of a secular state is sacred. Rafik Aliyev is describing an

Azerbaijani political and development model that encompasses ‘the idea of Azerbaijanism, the idea of

a unitary secular state system as well as the moral values of Islam’ (Aliyev 2004: 14). However, he

also notes, that ‘interference of religious associations, centers, religion in politics is inadmissible and

contradicts current law’ (Aliyev 2004: 8). There are certain features of the legislation formulated to

enforce this cornerstone in the state’s discourse – the separation of politics and religion. Article 5 of

the Law of the Republic of Azerbaijan on Freedom of Religious Belief states that ‘religious

associations shall not partake in the activity of political parties and help them financially’.24 In the

same spirit, article 85 of the Constitution states that ‘religious men’ might not be elected deputies of

the Milli Majlis (Parliament) of the Azerbaijan Republic.25 In the light of this the crackdown on the

22 Sultanova 2012 (see note 4 above).

23 Interview with imam Ilgar Ibragimoglu, Juma Mosque, Baku, 20 April 2004.

24 The Law of the Republic of Azerbaijan ‘On Freedom of Religious Belief’, Chapter 1, Article 5 (see note 1 above).

25 Constitution of the Republic of Azerbaijan, Section 3, Chapter 5, Article 85 (see note 6 above). ‘Religious men’ according

to the English version of the constitution is ‘religioznii deyateli’ in the Russian version, which in my understanding indicates

being ‘active’ in the religious field rather than being just a believer.

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Juma mosque and the Islamic Party of Azerbaijan (IPA) can be said to illustrate the effects of this

discourse. By incorporating Islam in the name of their party and some of their political platforms as

something more than just an ethnic identifier, the IPA is perceived as threatening the secular state.

The Juma case is similar, even though the community has yet to create a political party. Instead they

have openly sided with the political opposition at a number of occasions and the imam has tried to be

a candidate for the parliament. At the time of his arrest he was, as noted above, participating in a

political demonstration protesting the election results according to which Ilham Aliyev, son of the

former president Heydar Aliyev, became the president.

Often the strong wish to keep religion out of politics is motivated by the concern that

Azerbaijan might become an Islamic republic à la Iran. Both the Juma community and the IPA have

faced allegations of being ‘Iranian agents’ and conducting anti-state activities. This ties into the issue

discussed above and once again points to the importance of control in the state discourse. If religious

expression, education and practice are left unchecked, foreign influence might politicize Azerbaijani

Muslims. Hajji Akif Agayev, another representative of the Caucasus Muslim Board, sums this up in

his explanation of the need for legislation that regulates the registration and activities of Muslim

communities:

We have already lived through the times when there was no such law [to register

religious communities]. Every mosque could choose which centre to obey, and some

countries were using this. You know every country has its own interests. This is

creating danger, chaos and a risk for a split and that someone is having pretensions on

government power occurs.26

The focus on control has become more and more visible as the government is extending their

control over different spheres of religious life and making already existing regulations stricter.27 Rafik

Aliyev describes the role of the SCWRA in this process as protecting the population from bad

ideologies:

26 Interview with Agayev, Hajji Akif, Deputy of the Caucasus Muslim Board, Baku, 22 April 2004.

27 Liles 2013 (see note 7 above).

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We will supervise the mosques not as religious but as ideological objects and make

sure that their ideologies are not trying to influence the common consciousness. Our

job is to ensure that they are not dominating the common consciousness.28

The Controversial Beard

The last aspect of the state discourse on religion to be highlighted is the view that religious expression

needs to be contained in order to best preserve the sacred secular state. This notion can be linked to a

prevailing Soviet ideal of religion as preferably ‘neither seen nor heard’. The Soviet anti-religious

propaganda was successful in the sense that explicit faithfulness is still often viewed with scepticism

as a symbol of the ‘old’ pre-modern society (Omel'chenko and Sabirova 2003). Even many of those

born in independent Azerbaijan have been raised in an anti-religious atmosphere and view overt

religious expression with suspicion. In the case of Azerbaijan the most obvious and most publicly

debated of such symbols are the long black beard and the hijab. While there is, for example, no law

against having a beard, this religious expression has been portrayed as a symbol for something not

commonly accepted in society and has become a constant source of confrontation. Through much of

the material dealing with the Muslim rebirth in the region after the fall of the Soviet Union the notion

of evil ‘Wahhabis’ as ‘beardy Muslim fanatics’ has become widespread. This perception is well

established in Azerbaijan as well and very common among the authorities. Rafik Aliyev, for example,

is using the beard to portray young people drawn to bad types of faith:

Certain radical believers demand from other citizens – relatives, parents, friends –

that they too should lead a religious life. According to them you must grow a beard,

wear short pants and pray. If you don’t they’ll call you an infidel and according to

Wahhabi rules they may kill you or destroy your property.29

This attitude has a very clear bearing on the lives of the male members of the Abu Bakr

mosque community who, in order to look like Muhammad and his contemporaries, grow long beards,

have short hair, and usually wear ankle-short trousers. Even though not obligatory, most still prefer

this look in order to show their affiliation with the community. As has already been mentioned above,

the community members have often faced abuse because of the way they look. The way one older 28 Interview with Rafik Aliyev, Chairman of the State Committee for Work with Religious Associations, Baku, 28 May 2005.

29 Interview with Rafik Aliyev, Chairman of the State Committee for Work with Religious Associations, Baku, 28 May 2005.

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man describes a beard-related incident certainly attest to the sensitivity of the beard and also touches

upon the developing Shiite-Sunni divide in the country:

Three days ago two policemen in the Kurdamir region approached me. They came up

to me and asked what I was doing there. They checked my documents for a long

time. They said to me: “we have representatives for the Nurcu sect here and we have

Wahhabis. That’s why we are so careful”. Then they asked “why are you not in the

[particular] mosque today? We are celebrating a Shi’ite holiday. You should go to

that mosque! Why are you Sunni? You need to be Shi’ite! Why do you have a

beard?”30

As has also been mentioned previously, veiling is another sensitive topic. The removal of the

veil played a major symbolic role in the Soviet anti-religious campaign. In Baku there is even a statue

dedicated to this event considered a step forward by many Azerbaijanis. The statue is called ‘Free

Woman of the East’ (Svobodnaya Zhenschina Vostoka) and pictures a woman removing her veil

which symbolizes ‘eradication of backward traditions and the emancipation of the whole society’

(Gureyeva 2005; Heyat 2008).

Furthermore, in many cases the public, especially the older generations, is still influenced by

a Soviet mind-set and used to see Islam as a part of the cultural heritage rather than as a religious

belief. In the Soviet system going to the mosque was considered ‘backward’, and it was unthinkable

that the young, enlightened and modern generations should, or should want to, pray. This image has

stuck, which means that many young people face great difficulties at home trying to defend their faith,

their right to visit a certain mosque and dress in accordance to their belief (Bedford 2009).

A Break with the Past as well as the Present: A Counter-Discourse

The advocates of what is here referred to as the counter discourse include representatives of very

different types of associations. At the same time they are expressing similar unwillingness to accept

the notion of state control and the dominating views of state-religion interactions. Hence, one

cornerstone of this discourse is the rejection of the way religion is practised and interpreted in state-

controlled mosques and among the general public. Another one is the understanding that religious

30 Interview with Melikov Galib Salikovich, Abu Bakr Mosque, Baku, 4 June 2005.

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communities do not have to be separated from societal and/or political change, as a matter a fact they

should be a part of it.

A perception of conventional Islam in Azerbaijan as dirty, corrupt and uneducated created an

image of independent Islam as its anti-thesis. At the time of this study, the Juma and Abu Bakr

mosques had become the centres of independent Islam. The imams of these mosques were young,

well educated and their open stance against religious malpractice and corruption was attractive to

many who were disappointed in old attitudes towards religion. Visitors of the Abu Bakr and Juma

mosques described ‘their’ mosques as preferable to outmoded state-controlled mosques mainly

because of their novel approach to worship. ‘I was reading a lot, was interested in religions. But felt

disgust for Islam [when I visited conventional mosques], what I saw in the mosques was not the right

Islam. It was dirty’, a visitor to Abu Bakr explained.31 It appears to be figuratively speaking and

relating to imams in these mosques turning them into places to do business. Much of the critique is

related to the tradition in conventional mosques to charge extensively for performing certain religious

ceremonies such as funerals and weddings. ‘I tried different mosques, but there everything was about

money, and people did not know what they were doing. I saw many things that were wrong’, one

woman from Abu Bakr said.32 ‘If you go to another mosque the mullah immediately asks who died.

And it is very expensive. A funeral costs around 200 dollars’, a man in Abu Bakr pointed out.33

The Caucasus Muslim Board, which is overseeing the activities of mosques in Azerbaijan, has

a notoriously bad reputation as corrupt. The issue of Nazir Qutusu, the ‘black boxes’ for donations

placed strategically inside or outside most mosques and other holy places in the country, is a constant

topic of complaint among the members of the ‘religious opposition’, as well as among the population

in general. According to the Caucasus Muslim Board, the rather large amount of money collected

from the boxes is used for paying salaries, renovations and other practical purposes. Yet, most people

are convinced that it goes directly to the pocket of the head of the board and his associates. In this 31 Interview with Woman 1, Abu Bakr Mosque, September 2005. In order to protect the community members, their names

will not be given if they did not specifically ask to be identified.

32 Interview with Woman 1, Abu Bakr Mosque, September 2005.

33 Interview with Man 3, Abu Bakr Mosque, Baku, September 2005.

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sense the Juma and Abu Bakr mosques are promoting themselves as an alternative. The Juma imam

explains how his mosque differs from the ‘others’:

We do our own thing – we are creating an alternative. We are showing that this is

possible. We are followers of the practical. We are showing that it is possible to do

things differently. It is not necessary to use the mosque as a source of income. It’s not

necessary to put ‘black boxes’ in the mosque for collecting money. It’s not necessary

to use the mosques for bad things – for corruption.34

The image about the poor state of Islam in post-Soviet Azerbaijan is resonated also outside

the Abu Bakr and Juma mosques. For example, a man referring to himself as a ‘self-taught mullah’

from the Absheron Peninsula notes:

The situation in Azerbaijan is chaos. In politics and in religion. Everyone is poorly

educated and say that they are Shiites but in reality they know nothing. In the

mosques they know nothing about Islam. They are saying the wrong things, doing the

wrong things. But old people who have done things one way their whole life do not

want to do things differently.35

This quotation comprises the bad reputation of traditional Islam in Azerbaijan, but it is also

interesting as it shows how widespread this image is. By referring to himself as mullah (Islamic

leader) and self-taught at that, this man embodies what many other promoters of this discourse see as

part of the problem. One girl in Abu Bakr explains:

Mullah is a title that people made up themselves – they open the Koran and start

reading your future. [In Azerbaijan] people who have lost something are coming to

the mullah so he can help them find it. The Koran is a book that tells you how to live

– it is no book of magic! And on top of everything they [the mullahs] charge for this!

This behaviour is against good conscience.36

Just as noted by the mullah in the above quotation, the low level of knowledge in state-

controlled mosques is another problem identified in this discourse. Education pursued in both the

Juma and Abu Bakr mosque communities is to the contrary well reputed, and the visitors of these

34 Interview with imam Ilgar Ibragimoglu, Juma Mosque, Baku, 20 April 2004.

35 Interview with Absheron Tofiq Aga, Baku, April 2005.

36 Interview with Woman 6, Abu Bakr Mosque, September 2005.

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mosques emphasize the quality of sermons and lectures there in comparison to the other ones. The

high religious educational level of the imams who are able to answer all questions about religion is

also described as very important, especially in the Abu Bakr mosque. Community members from

Juma note that the education conducted by the Juma imam is more open-minded than in conventional

mosques. As one of the male visitors pointed out, ‘nobody says it’s like this or like that. If you

wonder if there is a God you have to read and find out for yourself’.37

Change through Religion

Another aspect of the discourse contradicting the governing one is emphasizing religion’s ability, and

perhaps even obligation, to bring about change also to a more general level of society. At times when

many have been disillusioned by the failed promises of independence, a strong need to restructure the

existing social and political conditions of the country is wished for. Nevertheless, the views on how to

go about it and why this needs to be done differ very much between the proponents of this discourse.

Members of the religiously conservative Abu Bakr community argue for fundamental changes in the

moral values of Azerbaijani people much in the same way as other neo-fundamentalist groups

throughout the Arab world. They attempt to live their lives pure, as somebody said, ‘like it was in the

seventh century’, which means not listen to music, not dance, not drink alcohol, not go to movies or

cafés or engage in other such secular activities. ‘When you get married today it can be very expensive

and the party is immoral’, one man explains. ‘There is spirits, music, dancing and half-naked ladies.

Even though the most important thing is that you actually get married.’38 This change is to be

achieved from the bottom up, through influencing individual mind-sets rather than from the top down,

via political power.

The Juma community is to the contrary already heavily politicized and is more concerned

with bringing about change in the way the country is governed by promoting democracy and human

rights. The Imam, in his own words, promotes a democratic approach to Islamic practice and worship,

which made this congregation especially popular among young educated Azerbaijanis. The lectures

37 Group discussion with men of the Juma Mosque community, Baku, September 2005.

38 Interview with Man 3, Abu Bakr Mosque, Baku, September 2005.

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by the Juma community are not only of religious nature, but the imam teaches human rights and other

secular themes and is a popular human rights activist.39 The election turmoil and its aftermath created

an image of him as righteous and not afraid to speak the truth. This view is widespread among

mosque visitors and non-visitors alike. Many have read about his human rights activism and feel

encouraged by his efforts to stand up against the government.40

Also representatives of the Islamic Party of Azerbaijan promote democratic change, but at the

same time they stress that the democracy they promote is something different from the current

political system in Azerbaijan:

We have also had democracy in Azerbaijan, for about 10 years now. We understand

what democracy is. [ … ] The creators of this democracy what do they do? They are

supporting anti-democratic elections, they do not think about human rights. They are

interested in their own government’s interests only. So during these years

Azerbaijanis understood that this is not the right kind of democracy. It is about

robbing and using people for their own goals. The real democracy is created by the

Creator and described in the Koran and even before that in the Bible and before that

in other places.41

The ‘Right’ Islam

As the knowledge of Islam is growing, the believers of Azerbaijan are increasingly choosing sides as

far as what is the ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ way of worshipping. Members of the Abu Bakr mosque

community, for example, said that when visiting Shia mosques, they had been told not to pray ‘their

way’.42 Moreover, the education at the Baku Islamic University, one woman explained, was ‘not

good’. ‘They are teaching Shia – the wrong Islam. Shia – that is Iranian Islam’, she clarified.43

Similarly, I met equally negative views of the Abu Bakr community members in the Juma

39 It should be noted that the Imam’s public stance has since changed. He continues to be a human- and civic rights activists but when I interviewed him in May 2014 he repeatedly stressed no longer having any political ambitions. 40 Goltz, Thomas 2004. ‘Closure of Mosque Does not Auger Well for Azerbaijani Freedoms’, Eurasianet.org, 26 May.

Available at http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/civilsociety/articles/eav052704.shtml (accessed 22 April 2013).

41 Interview with Hajji Hadjiaga Nuri Ali Askerovich, Islamic Party of Azerbaijan, Baku, Azerbaijan, April 2004.

42 Interview with Man 2, Abu Bakr Mosque, Baku, September 2005.

43 Interview with Woman 2, Abu Bakr Mosque, Baku, September 2005.

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community, referring to them as Wahhabis, radicals and terrorists. One man clarified the differences

between the two communities: our Islam, he said, ‘follows sharia, but not in the same way as

Wahhabism – that is terrorism’.44

This split within the Azerbaijani Muslim community has been noticed by some authors who

are worried about the future development in this respect. ‘The increasing and region-wide Sunni and

Shia split is a major threat to Azerbaijan’s national stability because of its unique and mixed Shia and

Sunni religious identity’, Balci (2013: 2) writes. In another text it is concluded that ‘along with

Islamic faith, rivalry revived between the two denominations and relations between Sunni and Shiite

might deteriorate within the national community’ (Balci and Goyushov 2013). This approach to the

Sunni-Shia split can be said to reinforce above discussed fears of what might happen if religious life

in Azerbaijan is left unchecked. There has also been some actual incidents of what could be

interpreted as sectarian violence between Salafis and Shias in 2014 that demonstrated that perhaps the

idea of inter-religious tolerance is not as widespread in society as the government hopes.45

Change and Control: Colliding Discursive and Social Practices

The conflictual relations between authorities and certain members of the Muslim community in

Azerbaijan can be observed at a discursive level as well as in social practice. In most cases these two

are so intertwined it is almost impossible to analyse them separately. The main feature of the state

discourse is control. Its basis is the notion that the combination of religion and politics, for a secular

society, is something dangerous and capable of having catastrophic effects if left unchecked. Even

though this attitude is not unique to the former Soviet sphere it was perhaps easier and more natural

for post-Soviet states, given lingering Soviet attitudes, to turn this idea into a cornerstone of national

policy. Many Soviet leaders continued on as leaders of the independent states, bringing with them

their atheist ideals and communist experience. As a result Azerbaijan, just as many of the other new

states, kept many of the official and unofficial government organs to deal with religion in place,

possibly under new names, but still with the same purpose – to ensure that all religious activity took

44 Group discussion with men of the Juma Mosque community, Baku, September 2005.

45 Wahhabis attacked believers in Mushfigabad, Contact.az, 07 July 2014. Available at: http://www.contact.az/search/document.php?id=45899&vr=eng (last accessed 07 October 2014).

2    

place under state control. Related to this is the fear of imported radicalism, which initiated more

restrictions and harsher policies towards religious practitioners.

At least initially, the state representatives, through their discourse and in action, were quite

clearly pointing to certain behaviour and sometimes even communities or individuals as being or

doing something illegal. Actors such as the Juma mosque community and the Islamic Party of

Azerbaijan were publicly targeted for ‘mixing religion and politics’ and carrying out their work

without state endorsement, generating their label ‘oppositional’. Even though not always mentioned

by name, constant referencing to radicals and fanatics with ‘beards and short trousers’, the known

appearance of male members of the Abu Bakr mosque community, put them in the ‘religious

opposition’ in the mind of the authorities but also among the public. As this happened even though the

leadership of the Abu Bakr community explicitly declared they did not harbour any political ambition

and were cooperating with the authorities, it shows the importance of the concern with overt religious

expression. That being said, the Abu Bakr mosque did in fact manage to remain open despite being

criticized as opposed to the Juma mosque that was closed and had its community forcefully evicted.

Nevertheless, after the attack in 2008 the Abu Bakr mosque has not been allowed to reopen, which

indicates the authorities finally decided to put a stop to their activities.

By labelling these communities oppositional, and thus ‘creating’ oppositionists, the state

fortified the conflict. At the same time these groups portrayed themselves as oppositional in that they

rejected the way religion was traditionally practised and interpreted. Pressure on the mosque

communities brought community members closer together and reinforced this polarization. It forced

the perception of a ‘we and they’ and strengthened the feeling among community members that

change was needed, in the religious as well as in the societal spheres. Moreover, it seems the attempts

to restrict these communities’ activities were unsuccessful as at the height of the conflict both

mosques had more visitors than ever before.

The ultimate clash in the discursive practice appears to be the government’s focus on

controlling religion for it to remain unchanged versus the communities’ wish to accomplish the

opposite. The wish for control is manifested through policies and institutions that limit the flexibility

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of religious expression and religious leaders. To this end the groups considered main oppositionists at

the time of this study have gradually been more or less successfully neutralized. The Abu Bakr

mosque is closed, the building has fallen into disrepair. Community members still meet at the

premises but not at all in the previous scale. The Juma mosque is open but their imam is not allowed

to conduct prayers there. Hence they have had to move their activities elsewhere and lost some of the

earlier momentum. Most of the leadership of the Islamic Party of Azerbaijan is once again

imprisoned, and over the years it has become clear that any attempt from the party’s side to mobilize

is followed by harsh repression from the government. Yet, the discursive conflict about religion lives

on. The continuous polemic regarding the hijab in a secular society is one example. It surfaced again

in 2010 in connection to the informal hijab ban in schools, discussed above. And again in March 2013

when news agencies reported that students and teachers at the Azerbaijan State Oil Academy (ASOA)

had been banned from entering the campus for wearing a hijab.46 This ban was later revoked because

of massive protests against it.

As the circumstances have changed, new religious actors and activities controversial to the

authorities have appeared and disappeared. One example of a new target of government suspicion is

Hajji Taleh Bagirzadeh, a Muslim theologian from Nardaran, educated in Iran. In 2013 he was

arrested on drug charges although his followers (and most others) relate the arrests to one of his anti-

government sermons. The arrest caused much anger among the Azerbaijanis and both known

members of the democratic opposition as well as religious activists and ‘just’ believers participated in

large demonstrations in his support in Baku and Nardaran.47 Also the imprisonment of Araz Guliev,

the editor-in-chief of the religious website xeber44.com, in 2013 has provoked harsh criticism. Most

46 ‘Students in Hijab Are Not Admitted to Lessons in the Oil Academy’, Contact.az, 2 April 2013. Available at:

http://www.contact.az/docs/2013/Social/040200033210en.htm#.UW_aOr85SfR (accessed 22 April 2013).

47 Abbasov, Idrak 2013. ‘Azeri Muslims Protest Theologian's Arrest’, Institute for War and Peace Reporting, 6 April.

Available at: http://iwpr.net/report-news/azeri-muslims-protest-theologians-arrest (accessed 22 April 2013).

2    

seem to agree that his sentence, eight years in prison on a number of charges ranging from possession

of illegal firearms to resisting authority, was a result of his professional activity.48

The trend of continuous colliding discourses and practices are also demonstrated by a number

of practical and administrative measures taken by the Azerbaijani government to strengthen their

control over religious life in the country. The re-registration process for religious communities is

gradually becoming more difficult. A number of Islamic television programs and Koranic education

courses have been cancelled, the sale of Islamic literature in book stores limited, a number of mosques

and prayer rooms throughout the country closed and from time to time restrictions in the sphere of

religious practices put in place. Among these, banning those who have studied abroad from leading

Islamic prayers can be noted.49

Conclusions and Epilogue

The Soviet influence on ideas and institutions makes the relationship between religion and politics

after independence in Azerbaijan complex. After the country received its independence, the

authorities decided that, on the one hand, the country would be secular, but, on the other hand, it

would distance itself from the atheist policies of the Soviet Union. The idea of a secular state is

‘sacred’ among the authorities, as religion and politics are to remain separate at all costs. At the same

time political leaders promote religion as an important part of national ideology and freedom of

religion as a constitutional corner-stone. This study has focused on the discursive and social conflict

that evolved from certain religious groups questioning the political leadership’s view on the role Islam

should play in post-Soviet Azerbaijan. At the heart of this conflict lays the concept of religious

freedom and, more precisely, what it should mean in practice. While the hegemonic state discourse

promotes a ‘controlled freedom’ à la Soviet Union, more and more voices among the Islamic

communities are calling for change in this respect. Even though this study focused on a phase of this

conflict that occurred some time ago, there is no indication that the parties are now any closer to 48 Committee to Protect Journalists, 5 April 2013. Available at: https://www.cpj.org/2013/04/azerbaijani-court-sentences-

editor-to-eight-years.php (accessed 22 April 2013).

49 Corley, Felix 2011. ‘Azerbaijan: Latest Repressive Laws Signed by President’, Forum 18 News Service, 15 December.

Available at: http://www.forum18.org/Archive.php?article_id=1648 (accessed 22 April 2013); Liles 2013 (see note 7 above).

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reaching consensus. Instead it seems the state’s perception is increasingly being challenged by yet

more religious actors.

Looking ahead at what the future might hold for state-Islam relations in Azerbaijan, there

appear to be three simultaneous developments. First, recent research indicates that Azerbaijanis are

increasingly thinking of themselves as more religious. The Caucasus Barometer and CRRC’s 2012

Social Capital, Media and Gender Survey show that as many as 30 per cent of Azerbaijanis claimed to

pray at home at least once a day, 27 per cent said they prayed at least once a week and 12 per cent

once a month.50 The amount of respondents that say they visit mosques is still very low. This might be

an indication that the scepticism against conventional mosques, controlled by ill qualified politically

appointed religious authorities, has spread. In the light of this it is reasonable to assume that the so-

called counter-discourse, promoting a renewed independent Islam, is alive and flourishing in

Azerbaijan, even though the Juma and Abu Bakr communities are not as prominent as before. It is

likely that it will continue to do so, especially considering the ‘globalization of Islam’ and the wealth

of information accessible online.

Second, the aftermath of the ‘colour revolutions’ in other post-Soviet countries has brought an

even more uncompromising approach towards any community, group or individual that the authorities

in Azerbaijan see as ‘oppositional’. Guided by a discourse rejecting change in the sphere of religion,

this has translated into increased restrictions for believers making it more and more difficult for

people to be a good Muslim and a good citizen at the same time. Out of the 98 names on the list of

political prisoners in Azerbaijan, compiled by civic- and human rights activists in August 2014, a

striking 52 are described as religious activists.51 A final interesting development, related to this, is the

indication that the secular and religious opposition might be joining forces against a repressive

regime. While the Juma mosque community has long been an ally of the democratic opposition, the

Islamic Party of Azerbaijan has always suffered from a notoriously bad reputation of being 50 Liles, Thomas 2012. ‘The Modalities of Azerbaijan’s Islamic Revival’, Social Science in the Caucasus. Caucasus

Research Resource Center, December 6. Available at: http://crrc-caucasus.blogspot.se/2012/12/the-modalities-of-

azerbaijans-islamic.html (accessed 22 April 2013).

51 The list of political prisoners in Azerbaijan. Available at: http://eap-csf.eu/assets/files/List_of_Political_Prisoners_AZ-(2)-(1).pdf (Accessed 07 October 2014).

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represented by an uneducated, anti-Semitic, pro-Iranian ‘lumpen-proletariat’ with little if any actual

influence beyond Nardaran. However, demonstrations in 2013 in support of imprisoned IPA members

and Hajji Taleh Bagirzadeh brought together IPA supporters and democracy activists alike. Moreover

representatives of the IPA are included in the democratic opposition’s election coalition, the National

Council of Democratic Forces (NCDF), hoping to nominate a presidential candidate to challenge

Ilham Aliyev in the 2013 election. This might indicate both that the IPA is now considered a more

legitimate political actor and that the political opposition is taking a bigger interest in issues of

religious freedom, which is an interesting development that needs more studying.

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