ISA 2009 Why Have the Successful Attempts to Govern the World’s Production of Chlorofluorocarbons...

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Why Have the Successful Attempts to Govern the World’s Production of Chlorofluorocarbons Not Been Duplicated in Other Areas of Global Environmental Protection? Cities and Global Governance II: Environmental Politics ISA 2009 New York City Charles Laffiteau University of Texas at Dallas & Dublin City University

Transcript of ISA 2009 Why Have the Successful Attempts to Govern the World’s Production of Chlorofluorocarbons...

Why Have the Successful Attempts to Govern the World’s Production of Chlorofluorocarbons Not Been Duplicated in Other Areas of

Global Environmental Protection? Cities and Global Governance II:

Environmental Politics

ISA 2009 New York City

Charles LaffiteauUniversity of Texas at Dallas &

Dublin City University

Cities and Global Governance II: Environmental Politics

The issues surrounding the need to protect our global

environment have only recently come to light over the last fifty years, dating to the

1962 publication of biologist Rachel Carson’s groundbreaking

book, Silent Spring.

Cities and Global Governance II: Environmental Politics

While govt. officials are aware of the problems caused by

environmental degradation and abuse, they are often reluctant

to take the steps needed to curb such abuses lest they

offend special interest groups i.e businesses and multi-

national corporations (MNCs)

Cities and Global Governance II: Environmental Politics

“As governments and consumers in (wealthier nations of) the

global North have restricted or banned a number of tobacco

products, pharmaceuticals and pesticides; global marketing (by MNCs) has created new outlets for these goods in (developing countries of) the global South

and Far East.” [1]

[1] Jan Aart Scholte Globalization. A critical introduction, (New York: St. Martins Press, 2000):213-214

Cities and Global Governance II: Environmental Politics

Environment NGOs have been moderately successful raising overall global public awareness and in one particular instance, pressuring most countries to

sign an international agreement to deal with the environmental

issue of CFCs and ozone depletion.

Cities and Global Governance II: Environmental Politics

The ozone regime established through the 1985 Vienna Convention and the 1987 Montreal Protocol was particularly successful initially,

but less so more recently.

By 1997 world production of most ozone-depleting substances had fallen to 76 percent of the 1988

level.

Cities and Global Governance II: Environmental Politics

1. The limited number of uses for CFCs also weren’t considered essential in much of the world

2. DuPont scientists were able to develop an economically suitable replacement chemical (HFCs)

3. Only a few MNCs, operating mainly in the developed world, were producers of CFCs

Cities and Global Governance II: Environmental Politics

Unfortunately, progress on other environmental issues, such as cutting the CO2 emissions that contribute to climate change, has been slow to non-existent in most countries around the

world.

Cities and Global Governance II: Environmental Politics

These factors add to the political complexities of regulating fossil fuel greenhouse gas emissions

1. Many essential uses (heat, plastics, transport fuel, electricity, fertilizer)

2. Few if any economical substitutes3. Many national & MNC producers

Cities and Global Governance II: Environmental Politics

CFCs-few essential uses-refrigeration and air conditioning systems

Fossil fuels-many essential uses-electricity, heat, jet & auto fuel, ag fertilizer, plastics

CFCs-economical substitutes-HFCsFossil fuels-substitutes are much more costly

CFCs-few multinational corporate producersFossil fuels-many nations as well as many multinational corporate producers

Cities and Global Governance II: Environmental Politics

In the classical economics model, the search for and development of economical substitutes for any product is driven by a need or a desire by consumers and producers for lower cost

alternatives.

Figure 1: Inflation adjusted price of imported oil for past ten years

vs 1981 peak

Figure 2: Inflation adjusted real vs. nominal price of imported oil

past 30 years Im ported Crude Oil Prices: Nom inal and Real

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Figure 3: Inflation adjusted real vs. nominal price of gasoline for

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Cities and Global Governance II: Environmental Politics

It is therefore hard to envision any international agreement to

regulate the use of fossil fuels and reduce greenhouse gas

emissions being as achievable or successful as the agreement on ozone depletion, especially

since the world's two biggest emitters, the US and China, have

still not cut their outputs under Kyoto.

Cities and Global Governance II: Environmental Politics

Many countries in the EU have signed and ratified the Kyoto Protocol but have actually made less progress cutting their rate

of growth in green house gas emissions than the oft-criticized US which, under President Bush, has refused to ratify Kyoto.

Figure 4: Total EU greenhouse gas emissions in relation to the

Kyoto target

Cities and Global Governance II: Environmental Politics

Given this lack of progress, some environmentalists have now come to the conclusion

that a more expeditious way to address their environmental

concerns might be through the use of existing international

agreements and public international law.

Cities and Global Governance II: Environmental Politics

Currently, the only existing international institution within the framework of

public international law that is in a position to mediate and adjudicate environmental

issues and global trade disputes, is the WTO.

Cities and Global Governance II: Environmental Politics

“The WTO Appellate Body decision in the Shrimp-Turtles dispute

actually strengthens the right of the state to adopt conservation measures

(sympathetic to environmental NGO concerns) by a liberal

interpretation of ‘exhaustible natural resources’” [1]

[1]Tanyarat Mungkalarungsi “The Trade and Environment Debate” Tulane

Journal of International and Comparative Law, Vol. 10 (2002): 381

Cities and Global Governance II: Environmental Politics

My analysis of the WTO Appellate Body’s decision in

Shrimp-Turtles suggests that best allies for NGOs would be

sympathetic WTO member states that are both willing to implement trade related

environmental restrictions and also apply these policies

fairly.

Cities and Global Governance II: Environmental Politics

How do you persuade governments to be more

sympathetic to environmental concerns and to implement trade related environmental restrictions?

Cities and Global Governance II: Environmental Politics

Environmentalists should also concentrate on developing

relationships with their native country’s business and social

elites.

If business and social elites can be convinced that there is an urgent need for action, then they will make sure government officials

cooperate.

Cities and Global Governance II: Environmental Politics

What is ultimately needed?

An international institution such as a World Environment

Organization (WEO), with enough regulatory and governance

powers to protect society and the environment from the

negative impacts of climate change.