Is the US foreign policy shaped by the Israeli lobby?

Policy Debate

John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt tried to elaborate lobbies’ role on a country’s foreign

policy decisions by using Israel lobby in the USA. They started their work with exemplifying

the USA’s unconditional support to Israel, and questioned that ‘what motives leaded the USA

support to Israel in spite of Israel’s insufficiency for the USA in several aspect such as military

(war on terror), economy, or security.

The USA’s foreign policy toward Middle East has been shaped by the relationship with Israel

since 1967 war (Mearsheimer & Walt, p. 30). Even if one can argue that the USA advances

Israel because of ‘shared interests and compelling moral imperatives’, these two explanations

are lack of enough power to clarify the question of why the USA supports Israel at the expense

of losing its superior position in international community. Authors’ explanation for this is not

related to common interests or common threats like terrorism but it is related to a sub-state

actor’s competency in terms of affecting a state’s foreign policy (Mearsheimer & Walt, p. 30).

Mearsheimer and Walt used the USA’s giving extra opportunities and privileges to Israel that

are not given to other states in order to illustrate how the USA behaves differently if the case is

Israel. For instance, all aid recipient countries, except Israel, acquire aids quarterly and these

countries have to spend military aids on American products. However, Israel receives the aid

just at the beginning of each fiscal year and it is free to spend aid on wherever and whomever

it wants. Additionally, authors see Israel as a liability for the USA because of the facts that,

first, Israel indirectly caused Arab countries’ oil embargo which was detrimental for the West,

second, Israel is not powerful enough to serve American interests in Middle East where Israel

indirectly caused the emergence of terrorist groups, third, the USA’s supports for a country that

is occupant in Middle East according to especially Arab world cause anti-Americanism, four,

the reason of nuclear demands of Israel’s neighbors is due to Israel’s owning nuclear arsenal,

and five, Israel is not a loyal ally (Mearsheimer & Walt, p. 31).

The perception that Israel has been contained by Arabs is wrong due to Israel’s military

superiority over Arabs since its establishment. The idea that Israel should receive aids from the

USA because of its democratic aspect does not justify extreme aids because of the facts that,

first, there are lots of democratic countries in the world and they are not privileged as Israel is,

second, even though Israel is regarded as democratic, it does not let Palestinians to have

political rights, and third, Israel’s grasping democracy is not consistent with the USA’s due to

Israel’s founding as a Jewish state (Mearsheimer & Walt, pp. 35-36). Moreover, the argument

that Israel deserves special support because of its tragic history does not have a healthy base to

justify supports from the USA because Israel has put Palestinians into the situation that Israelis

suffered before (Mearsheimer & Walt, pp. 37-39).

The authors try to enlighten why the USA supports Israel that much by putting forward lobby

power of pro-Israeli citizens. In this respect, American Jewish leaders always seek to provide

security to Israel and they always check what Israel thinks in an issue (Mearsheimer & Walt, p.

41). Power sources of the Israel lobby are classified into five: influencing Congress and the

Executive, manipulating the media, influencing think tanks, and policing academia. Except

academia, the lobby is very successful to shape the US foreign policy and contribute Israel’s

interests. To be affective in universities, AIPAC tripled its spending to train pro-Israel students;

and groups in the lobby pressed universities in order to fire professors acting to the detriment

of Israel (Mearsheimer & Walt, p. 47). The lobby is not only trying to have effect on policy-

makers, or policy-shapers like Congressmen, think tank directors, or editors of mass media, but

also trying to shape public opinion to make Israel’s policies unquestionable, especially toward

Palestinians and occupied territories. Adherents of Israel lobby are ‘demonstrating, organizing

letter-writing campaigns, or boycotting’ against the newspapers that have anti-Israel news

within their content (Mearsheimer & Walt, p. 45) both to penetrate mass media and to hamper

expanding of anti-Israel ideas.

Israel lobby not just received financial aid from the USA but they got also the USA’s vast

capabilities on their behalf in Middle East. For foreign policy discussion, authors illustrate

lobby’s effect by using the cases of Iraq, Syria, and Iran. Even though Bush administration was

determined to halt expansionist policies of Israel in order to decrease anti-Americanism in the

region, at the end Washington Post wrote that “Bush and Sharon Nearly Identical on Mideast.”

And according to authors, this policy change mainly originated from the lobby’s influence. In

the process of attempting to wage a war in Iraq, to authors, lobby was not sufficient but

necessary condition (Mearsheimer & Walt, pp. 57-58). Even ‘dual containment’ policy that the

USA adopted after first Gulf War is first introduced in a pro-Israel think tank (Mearsheimer &

Walt, p. 58). These are concrete examples of how a sub-state actor could shape a sovereign and

one of the most powerful state’s foreign policies in such vital issues.

In the next section, I will try to link ‘domestic-international’ related articles with the policy

debate.

Linking articles to policy debate

Robert Putnam started his article with claiming that both international and domestic politics

affect each other to some extent (Putnam, s. 427). Like Mearsheimer and Walt used a case study

of Israel lobby, Putnam used Bonn Summit to show how domestic politics have weight on

international policy-decision making process. In the Israel case, lobby as a sub-state actor has

tried to be effective in foreign policy of a state; while in the Bonn Summit case, institutions as

a sub-state actors have tried to be effective in domestic policy for different reasons such as

forthcoming elections, or division in internal institutions in a specific political issue (Putnam,

s. 429). Here, for second reason Putnam used the notion that ‘bureaucratic politics’, and Graham

Allison saw this politics as an intra-national games (Putnam, s. 431), as we witnessed in the

case of MITI and MOF of Japan. In the Israel lobby case, we saw a similar situation where one

of the pro-Israel institution advised the USA to press on Israel, advisor was accused of ‘perfidy’

by other institutions and these institutions tried to unite because of the harsh position of Israel

in Middle East due to threats coming from Arab countries (Mearsheimer & Walt, p. 41), like

MITI tried to silence MOF by saying that ‘pressure from the USA is urging us to take an action

which would stimulate the Japanese economy’ (Putnam, s. 429). Putnam used Katzenstein and

Krasner’s point that main actors must take into consideration both domestic and international

factors (Putnam, s. 431). We can implement this idea to illustrate what position the USA in after

2000s. The USA was trying to abate the anti-Americanism and to hamper establishment of

terrorist groups in Middle East, however, Israel lobbies pressed to the USA to take action

against Arab countries, especially Iraq and Syria, and to favor Israelis in all political issues

including occupied territories. As Mearheimer and Walt stated “without [the lobby’s] efforts,

The United States would have been far less likely to have gone to war in March 2003”

(Mearsheimer & Walt, p. 58). This can prove that in Iraq war, internal effects (pressure from

Israel lobby and neoconservatives) outweighed international political realm. It is noteworthy to

say that Putnam’s approach is based on negotiations between representatives of different states.

But in Israel lobby case, the sides of negotiation are not totally different states, rather, while

one side is a sovereign state, the other side is sub-state group.

Putnam’s two-level games metaphor can help us to see Bush’s situation during his presidency.

Bush, as a decision maker, appears both national and international boards (Putnam, s. 434). For

Bush, a political issue can be vital or be worth to take a stance of in one board, while the same

issue can be negligible in another board of game. In international level of game, Iraq’s weapons

of mass destruction are not hot topic for the USA contrary to Israel. However, in the domestic

level of game, with the help of pro-Israel Congressmen, pro-Israel media, and directly Israel

lobby the perception of Iraq as a threat to the USA was created. And at the end, Bush decided

to intervene Iraq. But in the example of Syria, international level of game prevailed over

domestic level, and the USA did not take an action against Syria although Ariel Sharon and

other prominent Israeli incumbents urged the USA to intervene in Damascus as it did in

Baghdad (Mearsheimer & Walt, p. 59). I think we can conclude that one level of game does not

always become prominent relative to other level. It depends on the issue (whether it is a high

politics or low politics, and its probable repercussions that policy-makers would try to estimate),

political leaders, efforts and influences of domestic elements, and general atmosphere in

international political system. Additionally, it is noteworthy to say that in the Iraq intervention,

win-sets of the USA and Israel were overlapping substantially. Over 60% of Americans were

supportive of the Iraq intervention (Mearsheimer & Walt, p. 55), and it made easy for the lobby

to convince Bush administration. I think, Israel lobby’s effect on media to shape and change

public opinion toward Israel is a benchmark to make win-set larger.

Due to the fact that Israel does not need to appease its domestic elements (especially its

citizens), and that Israel lobby can easily make silence or exclude non-pro-Israel ideas within

their community, it is easy for them to focus on only international gains (like then Soviets)

(Putnam, s. 435), contrary to the USA mainly focusing on domestic politics (Putnam, s. 435)

due to its competitive democracy. I believe, their differentiation about privileged issues makes

them overlap because the USA policy-makers can have the supports of powerful Israel lobby

and neoconservatives, while lobby gets the USA’s support to be used for maintenance of

existence of Israel state, and relation between Israel and the USA can be regarded as a win-win

relationship to a certain extent.

Moravcsik stated that behaviors of states are shaped by the relationship between states and

domestic-transnational social context (Moravcsik, s. 513) like Mearsheimer and Walt showed

via lobby’s presence on the USA’s policy behaviors toward Middle East. Contrary to

neorealism which asserts that external elements do not matter in behavior of states mostly in

the world political realm, Liberal theory asserts that demands of sub-state elements like

individuals and societal groups have weight (bottom-up) on politics because political action

intertwined with domestic and transnational civil society (Moravcsik, s. 517). According to

Moravcsik, after individuals define their interests, they “advance those interests through

political exchange” by behaving collectively and rationally (Moravcsik, s. 517). Lobby can be

regarded as a mechanism of those interests because it is trying to advance interests of its

members (individuals) through political exchange (influencing executive, elections, media, and

academia) collectively (AIPAC, WINEP). I think the most useful definition of state to

understand lobby’s effects on the USA is Moravcsik’s: “the state is not an actor but a

representative institution constantly subject to capture and recapture, construction and

reconstruction by coalitions of social actors” (Moravcsik, s. 518). It corresponds to that states

determine their policies under the effect of ‘identities, interests, and power of individuals and

groups’ and in this political arena, more powerful groups (Israel lobby, lobby of retired people,

or rifle association) may have more potential of changing state’s policies in comparison with

other small groups. According to Moravcsik, groups are not identical in terms of influence and

it is obvious that “state represents some individuals and groups more fully than others”

(Moravcsik, s. 518). To prove that groups have effect on states’ policies, Moravcsik used

concept of policy interdependence which indicates that states are constrained by sub-state

actors’ distinctive purposes and interests (Moravcsik, s. 520). For instance, on one hand, hawks

and Israel lobby, on the other hand entrepreneurs of MNCs exporting to Middle East put the

USA government into difficulty about policy preference due to their adverse interests over Iraq.

The thing that would determine policy preference was powers of these groups, to some extent.

Unlike previous scholars whose approach is enlightening how domestic politics affects

international one, Peter Gourevitch, in his ‘The Second Image Reversed: The International

Sources of Domestic Politics’, puts forward how international politics affects domestic

structure, to put it in a different way, how international politics is a source of domestic politics,

contrary to Waltz’s second image which refers to that state’s internal aspects (like types of

government regime) are determinant elements on understanding war and peace or external acts

of states. I will try to link Gourevitch to policy debate by using his ‘weak state vs. strong state’

differentiation which has its roots in a historical background. First, Gourevitch used

Gerschenkron’s argument that first industrialized countries benefit from lack of a competition.

On the other hand, late comers had to be centralist to acquire a place in the costly

industrialization race because of both ‘competition and changes in technology’ (Gourevitch, s.

885-888). Here, the causation mechanism is from international to domestic because the fact that

states must be centralized to become competitive in world economic system shapes domestic

structures of countries. Dependency school’s scholars are more assertive about the nature of

causation mechanism (from international to domestic) than Gerschenkron (Gourevitch, s. 888).

Second, we can bind Gerschenkron’s concept with Gourevitch’s state-centered policy networks

vs. society-centered policy networks as Gourevitch said both concepts are similar to each other

(e.g. strong states=state-centered policy networks). I took the USA as one of the first

industrialized state. The USA had been in relatively advantageous position to get richer without

taking other states’ economic power and competitiveness into consideration. Gourvetich

summarizes weak states - society-centered policy networks as “social forces are well-organized

and robust. Public institutions are fragmented; power is formally distributed among a large

number of interdependent but autonomous agencies” (Gourevitch, s. 902). This aspect of the

USA let sub-state actors compete to influence public policy more than others. Policy can be

regarded as a consequence of conflicts between sub-state actors interests’ and priorities

(Gourevitch, s. 902). Israel lobby is in the middle of this conflict due to its power, assertiveness,

prominent position on ‘media, government, and public opinion. Additionally, this idea has

enough explanation power if the case is Britain. Because Britain can be regarded as a society-

centered policy networks due to its position on the economic development history. After the

USA, the Israel lobby has the most influence in Britain. But, the question why Britain is the

second country although it is the first industrialized one cannot be explained by the causation

mechanism. We need some other internal and external elements of the USA and Britain (like

Hitler factor, the USA’s relatively more inclusive public strategies).

Graham Allison developed three models to explain actions of state. In Model I, rational policy,

states consider only their goals and objectives to maximize their well-being (Allison, s. 694).

States, as national actors, do not have to consider sub-state actors’ views and interest about

policy-making. Therefore, we cannot explain why Israel lobby is influential in the USA via

Model I. Even though, in Cuba Crisis, Allison illustrates why the USA chosen blockade toward

Soviets in the age of nuclear balance by using rational policy paradigm; we cannot explain Iraq

intervention by Model I, because as Mearsheimer and Walt stated the US President was

convinced to wage a war against Iraq by Israel lobby and neoconservatives (Mearsheimer &

Walt, p. 58). It means that states (in this case the USA) are not rational unitary decision makers,

which is inconsistent with Model I. Model II and Model III are more consistent with Israel case

which is a sign for existence of a causation mechanism from domestic to international. I will

combine Model II and Model III explanations due to their emphasis on non-state actors. Model

II and III put forward organizational process and bureaucratic process, in which actor is ‘a

constellation of which government leaders sit’ and ‘a number of individual players, respectively

(Allison, s. 699, 709). States’ preferences are constrained by small group pressures within the

organization, government allies, or players’ stance in a case. In Israel lobby case, we witnessed

that lobby tried to influence in government by the help of Congressmen who are explicitly

devoted themselves for Israel’s existence. And with the help of 9/11 lobby and neoconservatives

could convince Bush (player) to intervene Iraq.

Jack Snyder used realist, cognitive, and domestic political explanations for the question of why

“some states inclined toward extreme overexpansion” (Snyder, pp. 10-17). I will benefit

domestic political explanation to elucidate Israel lobby’s power on government decisions about

expansion (I deemed intervention as a kind of expansion, in our case, Iraq). Snyder stated that

self-serving groups can ‘hijack the state’ in order to reach their distinct interests. Even though

expansion decision hurts most part of the society, it can be beneficial to some groups; and these

groups become advantageous by diffusing cost of expansion to whole society (Snyder, p. 15).

Iraq and Afghanistan war cost $4-$6 trillion dollars to the USA however neoconservatives and

members of Israel lobby shared too little amount of this cost due to their minority positon

(Londono, 2014). Snyder summarized how domestic groups are effective in waging war as “the

more powerful and persuasive such groups are, the more the state will be inclined toward self-

defeating aggression” (Snyder, p. 15). Snyder asks how a small groups’ interest hijack states,

and I think Mearsheimer and Walt’s piece has enough explanation such as lobbies’ weight on

executive, media, or the Congress.

Personal Response

I agree the answer Putnam gave for the question ‘whether domestic politics really determine

international relations, or the reverse’: ‘Both, sometimes’. Israel lobby explicitly has effect on

the USA policy-decision making process as we read in Mearsheimer and Walt’s piece.

However, as they said lobby is necessary but not sufficient factor for changing a country’s

foreign policy preferences. And I think, by looking at Israel lobby we cannot make an induction

and agree that foreign policy preferences are solely shaped by a lobby. Here we need to make

a distinction between states regarding to their political structure. According to my opinion, if a

state is inclined to be democratic or it is a democratic in its nature, the causation mechanism

probably will be from domestic to international. Because, sub-state groups can easily reach

bureaucrats within states or they were encouraged to involve into in political decision processes

in democratic or weak-state. Otherwise, states would not leave enough room to be filled by sub-

state actors in policy making process. Therefore, Israel is influential on the USA’s foreign

policy ‘to some extent’ due to the USA’s weak nature. In articles, dependent variable (mostly

foreign policy) cannot be explained by only Israel lobby since it needs some other independent

variables to make causal mechanism reliable. While we can add some other variables such as

state’s military power, economic development path, military’s effect on policy making etc.,,

also it is possible to deem foreign policy as a control variable that can be used to shape domestic

politics, manage masses, increase solidarity among citizens.

References Allison, G. T. (1969). Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis. The American Political Science

Review, 63(3), 689-718.

Gourevitch, P. (1978). The Second Image Reversed: The International Sources of Domestic Politics.

International Organization, 32(4), 881-912.

Londono, E. (2014, March 28). Study: Iraq, Afghan war costs to top $4 trillion. Retrieved from The

Washington Post: http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/study-iraq-

afghan-war-costs-to-top-4-trillion/2013/03/28/b82a5dce-97ed-11e2-814b-

063623d80a60_story.html

Mearsheimer, J. J., & Walt, S. M. (2006). The Israel Lobby and US Foreign Policy. Middle East Policy,

XIII(3), 29-87.

Moravcsik. (1997). taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics.

International Organization 51, 4, 513-553.

Putnam, R. D. (1988). Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: the Logic of Two-LEvel Games. International

Organization, 42(3), 427-460.

Snyder, J. (1991). Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition. Ithaca: Cornell

University Press.