Tobacco lobby political influence on US statelegislatures in the 1990s

Michael S Givel, Stanton A Glantz

AbstractBackground—Throughout the 1990s thetobacco lobby was a potent political forcein US state legislatures advancing its pro-tobacco agenda.Objective—To describe the market andpolitical motivations of the tobacco lobbyand the strategies they use to achievethese goals in US state legislatures.Design—This study is a content analysisand summary overview of recentlyreleased historical tobacco industry docu-ments; tobacco related government docu-ments; and recent state tobacco controlpolicy reports.Results—In the 1990s, the tobacco lobbyengaged in a comprehensive and aggres-sive political eVort in state legislatures tosell tobacco with the least hindrance usinglobbying, the media, public relations,front groups, industry allies, andcontributions to legislators. These eVortsincluded campaigns to neutralise cleanindoor air legislation, minimise taxincreases, and preserve the industry’sfreedom to advertise and sell tobacco. Thetobacco lobby succeeded in increasing thenumber of states that enacted statepre-emption of stricter local tobacco con-trol laws and prevented the passage ofmany state tobacco control policies.Public health advocates were able toprevent pre-emption and other pro-tobacco policies from being enacted inseveral states.Conclusions—The tobacco lobby is a pow-erful presence in state legislatures.Because of the poor public image of thetobacco lobby, it seeks to wield this powerquietly and behind the scenes. State andlocal health advocates, who often havehigh public credibility, can use this factagainst the tobacco lobby by focusingpublic attention on the tobacco lobby’spolitical influence and policy goals andexpose links between the tobacco lobbyand its legislative supporters.(Tobacco Control 2001;10:124–134)

Keywords: political lobbying; state legislatures;industry

When health advocates pursue tobacco controleVorts in state legislatures of the USA, a keyconsideration in the success of such eVorts hasbeen the nature and scope of the power andinfluence of the tobacco lobby. Before therelease, as a result of recent tobaccolitigation,1–3 of more than 32 million pages ofpreviously secret tobacco industry documents,public health advocates were often left to

infer4 5 internal industry strategies forexercising political influence over state tobaccocontrol policy making. Analysis of tobaccoindustry documents, combined with detailedcase studies of tobacco policy making in severalstates,6–20 allows us to integrate and add to theunderstanding of how the tobacco industry hasadvanced its broader objective of defendingand expanding its market and politicalinterests.

The industry’s public policy objective hasbeen to preserve and expand its customer base,sales, and profits through sophisticatedlobbying and political eVorts in statelegislatures. Linked to this primary policy goalhave been the ongoing identification andadvancement of specific profit and salesenhancing goals such as the defeat of cleanindoor air legislation, cigarette excise taxincreases, and restrictions on marketing andpromotion as well as enactment of tort andproduct liability reform legislation designed toreduce legal risks and litigation costs. Theindustry achieves this objective through a bun-dle of comprehensive insider lobbyingapproaches coordinated with registeredcontract tobacco lobbyists in each statethrough a collaborative and hierarchalrelationship with company top managementand Tobacco Institute lobbying oYcials.

The tobacco lobbyists’ comprehensiveapproach to influencing state policy makinghas included direct campaign contributions,gifts, honoraria, and charitable contributionsto legislators’ pet programmes, indirect (or softmoney) contributions to legislators’ politicalcaucuses and parties for non-campaignpolitical education and technical assistancepurposes, and providing group entertainmentsuch as hunting trips or sporting events to“bond” with state legislators in order to buildmutual political trust and support.8 21–27 It hasalso included building political support withand through allied and front groups such assmokers’ rights groups,4 28 restaurant, bar,hotel, and motel associations,7 16 and funding“special projects” designed to secretlyundermine state tobacco control policy, suchas legislatively opposing educational anti-tobacco ASSIST (American stop smokingintervention study) programme eVorts inWashington.24 29

These policy objectives and approaches haveled to and are also connected to collective statelegislative outputs or governmental actionsrelating to tobacco control legislation and pro-grammes, including enactment of state lawspreempting local clean indoor air and other

Tobacco Control 2001;10:124–134124

University of CaliforniaSan Francisco,Institute for HealthPolicy Studies andCardiovascularResearch Institute,Department ofMedicine, SanFrancisco, California,USAM S GivelS A Glantz

Correspondence to:Stanton A Glantz, PhD, Box0130, University ofCalifornia, San Francisco,CA 94143, USAglantz@medicine.ucsf.edu

Received 5 August 2000 andin revised form17 December 2000.Accepted 18 January 2001

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tobacco control ordinances and keeping statetobacco excise taxes low.

MethodsThis research is descriptive and analyticalbased on a content analysis and summaryoverview of recently released tobacco industrybudgetary, planning, and policy documents;government documents; and recent statetobacco control policy reports. The more than32 million pages of tobacco industrydocuments already made public due to the1998 legal settlement in the case of State ofMinnesota, et al, v Philip Morris, Inc, et al, No.C1-94-8565, 2nd District, Minnesota, and thesubsequent Master Settlement Agreementbetween 46 other states and the major cigarettemanufacturers in the USA. Under the terms ofthese legal agreements, each tobacco company,tobacco trade association, and tobaccoresearch organisation established a searchableweb site. (These sites are accessible throughhttp://www.tobaccoarchive.com.) Search termsin which hits occurred included: employmentdiscrimination, tort reform, tobacco market-ing, solid waste, packaging, tobacco taxes,clean indoor air, hospitality industry, fire-safe,vending machine, product liability, initiative,referenda, ASSIST, sales restrictions, AD-AMHA, Synar, AAA, accommodation, pre-emption, five year plan, lobbyist evaluation,corporate plan, tobacco issues, state govern-ment relations, strategic plan, issues brief,1990 budget, 1994 budget, 1995 budget, 1996budget, 1997 budget, 1998 budget, and 1999budget, as well as names of key individualsidentified in relevant documents. Although allrelevant tobacco industry web sites weresearched, the Philip Morris, Inc and TobaccoInstitute sites provided most of the relevantdocuments. Our primary focus was on the dec-ade of the 1990s, although many of the strate-gies we found predate that period.

Another source of data for this contentanalysis was a review of all tobacco lobby legis-lative lobbying tactics documented andanalysed in recent comprehensive tobaccopolicy case studies in 12 states (Arizona,6

California,10 18–20 Colorado,11 Florida,8 Massa-chusetts,16 New Jersey,12 New York,7 Ohio,13

Oregon,9 Pennsylvania,15 Washington,17 andWisconsin14) located in all regions of the USAincluding the northeast, south, midwest, andwest.

We used all available data from the fourthquarter 1999 status of state tobacco controllegislation from the US Centers for DiseaseControl and Prevention, National Center forChronic Disease Prevention and HealthPromotion, OYce of Smoking and Health (thisinformation was accessed on 17 July 2000 at:http://www2.cdc.gov/nccdphp/osh/state) tomeasure state legislative outputs associatedwith tobacco control (that is, the number ofstates with laws pre-empting stricter local cleanindoor air ordinances). We also used 1990Coalition on Smoking or Health pre-emptiondata.30

ResultsTHE TOBACCO INDUSTRY’S POLICY GOALS

In its state legislative political campaigns andlobbying eVorts, the tobacco industry’s publicposition is almost always that its activities growout of concern over protecting individual free-dom of choice or freedom from undue govern-ment regulations and taxes.8 22 31 32 In contrast,in its private corporate communications, theprimary impetus for the tobacco industry’spolitical eVorts in state legislatures ispreserving and bolstering its sales and profits.As a 1991 internal Philip Morris memoran-dum noted:

“During the next five years, PM-USA [PhilipMorris, USA] plans to continue its profit growth,generating operating income increases of 13.5%annually. Domestic cigarettes will contribute acumulative $18.0 billion to the corporate cashflow over the plan period. Market share will reach49.6% in 1995, while volume will grow at a com-pound annual rate of half a percent.“PM-USA volume growth will occur despite a2.9% compound annual decline in industryvolume. Industry volume will be negatively aVectedby increasing smoking restrictions, the decreasingacceptability of smoking and increasing excise taxes.Corporate aVairs will use direct lobbying, the media,and industry allies to minimize state and local taxincreases, promote accommodation in public placesand preserve the industry’s freedom to advertise andpromote cigarettes to adult smokers.”33 [emphasisadded]

This goal of preserving the tobacco market wasrepeated many times, such as in this 1995Philip Morris internal document, which stated:

“Our goal is to help shape regulatoryenvironments that enable our businesses toachieve their objectives in all locations where wedo business.“Our overall approach to the issues is to fightaggressively with all available resources, againstany attempt, from any quarter, to diminish ourability to manufacture our products eYciently,and market them eVectively.“We are also becoming more and more proactivein launching programs and hope that we cancontrol the regulation which results from a publicsense of inaction.“We also know that in a world where our businessinterests have enemies—sometimes the bestoVense is to aim right at the heart of the problem[health consequences of tobacco use] our criticsraise.“By solving the problem, we take away theirammunition to harm us.“In short, we are very clear about ourobjective—an unyielding and aggressive defenseof our rights to make and sell our products andour consumers’ rights to have a free marketplaceso that they can choose and use thoseproducts.”34

The tobacco industry’s public rhetoric nevermentions its primary objective: to ensure alarge customer base, stable markets, and higherprofits.

Table 1 summarises the major state policymaking issues in which the tobacco lobby wasinvolved during the 1990s according tointernal tobacco industry national planningand policy documents.31 33–40 These documentsindicated that the industry’s objective ofmaximising profits clashed with public policygoals of protecting the public health,

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enhancing environmental protection, promot-ing greater direct democracy, and increasingconsumer protection.

This situation, of course, reflects the factthat tobacco companies are foremost large cor-porations seeking, at all costs, to maintain andexpand their markets. Although this is acommon feature of capitalist economics, whatmakes this case particularly unique are theserious health eVects associated with the use oftobacco products.41–43

This clash of public goals and values, in largepart, drives the political and social intensity ofthese issues in the various state legislative are-nas in which the tobacco lobby and healthadvocates are present. Because of this intensepolitical climate, the tobacco lobby has had todevelop politically sophisticated and powerfulapproaches in state legislatures to support itspolicy issues and objectives to maintain andprotect tobacco as a viable product in statemarketplaces.

TOBACCO LOBBY EFFORTS TO BUILD POWER AND

INFLUENCE IN STATE LEGISLATURES

LobbyistsThe primary approach by the tobacco industryto advancing these political and market objec-tives has been the employment of eVective andwell connected registered contract lobbyists ineach state legislature who were skilled atadvancing the tobacco industry’s intereststhrough quiet, behind the scenes, insiderstrategies.22–27 44 45 Table 2 provides a listing ofthe names and amount of compensation in1997 that the Tobacco Institute—the tobaccoindustry’s political arm—budgeted for regis-tered lobbyists for each state legislature. (Thisamount of compensation represents only a verysmall portion of the total amount that thetobacco industry spent to influence state legis-lation through the funding of legislators, legis-lators’ political organisations, and allied andfront organisations.6–20 22 24 25 45–48) In addition,the tobacco producers, manufacturers, and

Table 1 Major tobacco lobby policy issues and tactical approaches for US state legislatures

Policy issue Tobacco lobby position on policy issue Public health advocacy positions Tobacco industry’s general tactical approaches

Clean indoor air Oppose or weaken all clean indoorair restrictions

Promote smoke free workplaces andpublic places to promote public health

Oppose or weaken state clean indoor air laws.Pre-emption of stricter local laws.* Promotevoluntary areas of “accommodation” for smokersand non-smokers. Form alliances with and, ifnecessary, create covert “hospitality” front groupsto oppose clean indoor air legislation

Smokers’ rights Make it illegal for employers to takesmoking status into account inhiring, firing, and promotiondecisions

Prevent enactment of tobacco industrysmokers’ rights legislation to protectpublic health

Frame smoking as a civil right. Enlist support ofgroups like ACLU, women, and minoritycommunity groups

Tobacco excise taxes Oppose all tobacco excise taxincreases

Seek increases in excise taxes,sometimes with a portion allocated totobacco control to promote publichealth

Oppose all taxation legislation. Pre-empt localauthority to tax tobacco. Work with and fundanti-tax groups

ASSIST (a federally fundedanti-tobacco educationaleVort)

Support stringent restrictions onASSIST to make it more diYcult touse the policy making process topromote public health

Support state ASSIST programmeeVorts to promote public health

Promote legislative attacks on ASSIST for“illegal” lobbying

Product liability reform Restrict litigation costs andmonetary damage awards in productliability cases

Protect status quo or enact legislationthat facilitates litigation against thetobacco industry to promote consumerprotection and public health

Create and finance product liability reformcoalitions, often with medical groups (concernedabout malpractice) and other business groups

Tort reform Restrict litigation costs andmonetary damage awards in tortcases

Protect status quo or enact legislationthat facilitates litigation against thetobacco industry to promote consumerprotection and public health

Create and finance tort reform coalitions, oftenwith medical groups (concerned aboutmalpractice) and other business groups

Tobacco marketing andpromotion

Avoid all restrictions on tobaccoindustry marketing and promotion

Restrict location and nature of tobaccoindustry marketing and promotion topromote public health

Pre-emption of stricter local laws. Oppose orweaken all state marketing legislation

Sales to minors (includingfederal Synar Amendmentyouth access lawenforcement eVorts)

Oppose meaningful restrictions andpenalties on retailers. Supportminimum age restrictions on sales tominors, but without meaningfulenforcement

Penalties on retailers for sales tominors, licensing retailers, enforcementthrough “stings” done by children topromote public health

Pre-emption of stricter local laws. Outlaw“stings”. Support state legislation that makes itmore diYcult to meet goals set in SynarAmendment

Sales restrictions on vendingmachines

Oppose restrictions on vendingmachines and tobacco signplacement in outlets

Eliminate vending machines or restrictlocations to “adults only” venues topromote public health

Pre-emption of stricter local laws. Whenlegislation is inevitable, support ineVectivemeasures such as electronic locks on vendingmachines

Tobacco packaging and solidwaste

Oppose all tobacco solid waste taxesand other restrictions

No active position to promote publichealth and environmental protection

Oppose or weaken all new state solid waste tax orrecycling legislation. Support and bolster currentrecycling programmes without new legislation

Fire safe cigarettes Oppose application of fire safestandards to tobacco products

Seek fire safe standards for tobaccoproducts to promote consumerprotection

Oppose all fire safe cigarette legislation. Allianceswith (and funding of) fire safety organisations.Agree to studies to delay, if meaningful legislationappears immanent

Initiatives and referenda Eliminate or make it more diYcultfor citizens to mount initiative andreferendum campaigns

No active position to promote publichealth and greater direct democracy

Sponsor legislation restricting ability to qualifyinitiatives and referenda on the ballot

Death certificates Oppose listing tobacco as cause ofdeath on death certificates

Support listing tobacco as a cause ofdeath on death certificates to promotepublic health

Oppose all legislation that requires tobacco to belisted as cause of death on death certificates

*Occasionally public health advocates have supported pre-emption in the belief that some progress at the state level was worth accepting pre-emption.8 15 101 Thiscompromise rarely advanced public health in the long run.

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distributors also spent substantial sums on lob-bying directly.7 8 11 12 14 17–20 22 32 49 Tobacco lob-byists have also cross lobbied for a variety ofother industries including primarily: “ . . .ad-vertising, insurance, vending machine, alco-holic beverage, restaurant, convenience stores,and banks . . .”50 In some instances theselobbyists also represented health interests, afundamental conflict of interest.50 Becausetobacco lobbyists simultaneously representmultiple powerful and wealthy clients besidestobacco, they are able to magnify theirinfluence by brokering votes and support forvarious legislation, including tobacco legisla-tion.50

Coordination of these state lobbying eVortsoccurred through a hierarchal relationship withhigher tobacco company top management andTobacco Institute lobbying oYcials whoconsulted with the state tobacco lobbyistsregarding preferred public policy issues andoutcomes.22 51 Provisions in a 1996 internalTobacco Institute generic contract agreementfor all registered state contract lobbyists delin-eated this relationship:

“Your responsibilities as consultant to The[Tobacco] Institute will be to represent the Insti-tute before state legislative, regulatory, andadministrative bodies on all issues of interest tothe tobacco industry; to report to the Institute onall such legislative, regulatory or administrativeactions, including bill introductions, hearingsand votes and proposed regulations and otheradministrative actions; in limited instances, atThe Institute’s request, to furnish incidentalassistance in Federal legislative or administrativematters; to attend national and regional meetingssponsored by The Institute; to register as TheInstitute’s representative and file reports asrequired by state law, send copies of such reportsto The Institute’s Vice President . . .and to adviseThe Institute on its reporting responsibilities as alobbyist employer, and to provide similar servicesas mutually agreed . . .“ . . .The Institute’s Vice President for yourregion, will supervise your activities inconnection with the Agreement. You shouldmake oral and written reports to The Institute[Vice-President who] is responsible forcoordinating tobacco industry legislative, regula-tory, and administrative activities in theState . . .and will assist you in developing plansand other strategies to deal eVectively withindustry issues.”52 53

Campaign contributionsProviding substantial campaign contributionsto legislators is at the centre of the tobaccoindustry’s eVorts to influence legislativebehaviour,22 24 25 45–47 and it works; contribu-tions to legislators’ re-election campaigns fromthe tobacco industry are statistically related tomore pro-tobacco behaviour.48 54–56 As a highlevel internal 1996 Philip Morris corporatepolicy document explained:

“WHY DO WE GIVE?To maintain our ability to present PM’s [PhilipMorris’] point of viewTo support those who support usTo support those who facilitate our giving to oth-ersTo contribute at levels comparable to home-statebusinessWHO DO WE GIVE TO?Those current and potential elected oYcials,leadership committees and business PACs[political action committees] that share our pointof viewThose who share PM’s point of view but not onall issuesLeaders who should not be ignored”57

Philip Morris’ recognition of the importance ofsupporting legislative leadership, withoutregard to the leader’s current level of sympathywith the tobacco industry, is particularlyimportant. These campaign contributions havebeen provided to key legislative oYcials7 8 10 23–26

who are in positions of leadership or are chairsor members of key legislative committees, andso are in a position not only to vote on specificbills, but to control the legislative process.46 48 56

Depending on the tobacco industry’s needs,this control of the process allows them to sendbills to committees that will pass or kill them orsimply refuse to hold a hearing, eVectively kill-ing a bill without forcing legislators to go onthe record as supporting a pro-tobaccoposition.

Table 2 Tobacco Institute funded state lobbyists for 1997*

State Lobbyist name Amount

Alabama Lester White $50000Alaska Wes Coyner $44000Arizona Don Isaacson $70000Arkansas Stewart Bell $30000California Phil Dowd $155000Colorado Frank Hays $65000Connecticut Bourke Spellacy $95000Delaware Dave PoVenberger $35000Florida Guy M Spearman

Arthur Collins$78500$35000

Georgia Boyd Pettit $58000Hawaii Norman Suzuki $62000Idaho William Roden $38000Illinois John O’Connell $70000Indiana Thomas F Fruechtenicht $42000Iowa Charles Wasker $60000Kansas Pat Hubbell $42000Kentucky Roy Strange $37000Louisiana Johnny Koch $70000Maine Severin Beliveau $70000Maryland Bill Pitcher $68000Massachusetts John Burke $78000Michigan Governmental Consultant

Services, Inc$85000

Minnesota Tom Kelm $120000Mississippi Ellis B Bodron $34000Missouri John Britton $57500Montana Jerome Anderson $46000Nebraska Bill Peters $30000Nevada Jack JeVrey $42000New Hampshire Liz Murphy $38000New Jersey Roger Bodman $78000New Mexico Bob Baberousse $39000New York Daniel Adams

JeV Hill$65000$55000

North Carolina Roger W Bone $58000North Dakota Tom Smith $27500Ohio Pete O’Grady $50000Oklahoma Ken Nance $50000Oregon Richard Kosesan $50000Pennsylvania Eugene Knopf $82000Rhode Island Kelly Sheridan $40000South Carolina Sterling Smith $45000South Dakota Jeremiah Murphy $42500Tennessee Cleve Smith $55000Texas Jack Roberts $90000Utah Jim Stewart $52500Vermont Edward Miller $35000Virginia Anthony Troy $68000Washington William Fritz $52500West Virginia Rodney Berry $37000Wisconsin Steve Bablitch $80000Wyoming William Thomson $40000Total $2997000

*Source: Tobacco Institute 1997 budget25

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Contributions to legislators’ political caucuses andpartiesIn addition to direct contributions tolegislators, indirect or soft money contribu-tions for non-campaign political educationaland technical purposes have also been made tolegislators’ individual political caucuses,including specialised political caucuses such asAfrican American or women’s politicalcaucuses.25 45 The tobacco lobby’s interest inminority and women’s caucuses stems from itshistoric campaign to build relationships withthese groups to build coalitions to countertobacco excise taxes and promote smokers’rights legislation.58–60

Contributions have also been made to legis-lators’ political parties, who often spend thismoney, along with other special interest groupmoney, to provide technical support and paidpolitical advertising (not aimed at specificpolitical campaigns) to assist and bolster thepublic image of chosen legislators.7 8 10 21 Thepurpose of this type of contribution is toprovide electoral support, build goodwill, andgain further access and influence withlegislators. It also avoids the stigma that can beattached to a direct campaign contributionfrom the tobacco industry to a legislator.

Gifts and honorariaThe provision of gifts, honoraria, entertain-ment events, and charitable contributions tolegislators has been another important meansof influencing state legislative policy mak-ing.22 61 62 Gifts such as free meals and industryChristmas baskets, honoraria such as paymentfor the provision of public speeches and work-shops, and free entertainment events such asfishing trips, hunting trips, golf events, andsports tickets have all been provided to statelegislators22 61 62 with the primary purpose ofbuilding goodwill. The tobacco lobby has alsoprovided contributions to key legislators’favourite charities, not for corporate responsi-bility, but “ . . .where there is a politicalbenefit”.22 61 In the case of entertainmentevents, they have a further purpose of facilitat-ing “bonding” with legislators in order to buildmutual political trust, support, and acceptanceand understanding of various policy positions.

Alliances with other interest groupsBecause of the tobacco lobby’s poor publicreputation, it has often at times preferred tobuild mutual support and lobby quietly behindthe scenes63 64 for state tobacco policy issues inalliance with other organisations. Suchalliances have been characterised by covert orovert working political relationships in whichthe organisations are not substantially control-led or funded by the tobacco lobby.7 8 32 As wasnoted in a 1990 Tobacco Institute budget andplanning document, this was to beaccomplished by:

“ . . .activities to improve relations with groupsand individuals that fall into three generalcategories: (1) the tobacco family, (2) coalitionswith which we have existing relations amongsome but not all groups and/or on some but notall issues, and (3) coalitions with which we hadno relationship yet.

“We also propose activities to respond toincreased activity by the anti-smoking move-ment, particularly as this activity aVects our rela-tionships with our allies.“The success of many of these activities willdepend upon the involvement and cooperation ofstaV from other divisions within the TobaccoInstitute, and from member companies and othertobacco-related organizations.”65

The plan also indicated that:“Our allies’ greatest strength—independence—remains a limit on eVectiveness of thosecoalitions on our issues. Allies may not agree oreven have an interest in all industry issues, andmay not be willing or able to assist in all waysrequested.“Although a great deal of progress has been madein establishing and involving coalitions in ourissue programs, a great deal of additional workremains, particularly in the areas of tobacco fam-ily and farm issues, minority and women’s issues,and veterans’ issues.“In order to attract allies and maintain theirinterest in our issues, The Institute must becomemore involved in responding to requests forassistance on non-tobacco concerns, and in iden-tifying and oVering assistance on some issuesbefore we are asked.”65

Another indirect approach to state legislatorsthat the tobacco lobby used was throughnational organisations of state legislatorsincluding the American Legislative ExchangeCouncil, American Society of LegislativeClerks and Secretaries, Council of StateGovernments, National Conference of StateLegislatures, Southern Legislative Conference,State Government Foundation, and State Leg-islative Leaders Foundation.23–25 Workingthrough these organisations created opportuni-ties for the tobacco industry to influenceeducational and policy positions presented tolegislators while remaining in the background.The primary reason for the tobacco lobbyworking with these organisations is that itsconstituent members (often legislators) can belobbied regarding organisational policy recom-mendations on state legislation. As EllenMerlo, senior vice president for corporateaVairs at Philip Morris in 1996 stated:

“And, as our final objective, we are committed toEnhancing our Local, State and FederalNetworks.“ . . .We will also improve our coverage of stateand local issues by increasing contacts with stateand local oYcials and their staV to present ourpoint of view on the issues.“We will also improve our coverage and outreachwith key [state legislative] organizations such asNCSL [National Conference of State Legisla-tures], CSG [Council of State Governments],ALEC [American Legislative Exchange Coun-cil] . . .”66

The tobacco lobby has also contributed funds tonational groups not directly related to tobaccothat make policy recommendations, which caneVect state legislation24 25 45 while allowing thetobacco lobby to remain behind the scenes. Inthe 1990s, funding of these groups by theTobacco Institute included Women Involved inFarm Economics (WIFE), National LicensedBeverage Association (NLBA), National RetailFederation (NRF), and National TaxpayersConference (NTC).24 25 45 Specific political

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eVorts that these groups assisted the tobaccolobby with included the NTC and WIFE lobby-ing to fight tobacco excise tax increases,67 68 andthe NLBA and NRF assisting in symbolic andweak industry sponsored youth accesseducational campaigns.69 70

Front groupsIn addition to working in political alliances, thetobacco lobby has on some occasions covertlyworked to influence state legislation throughfront groups such as phoney restaurant andhotel and motel associations that aresubstantially funded and closely controlled bythe tobacco lobby.7 8 32 71–76 These eVorts haveoccurred while attempting to obscure the factthat these organisations are acting assurrogates for the tobacco lobby.4 5 7 8 32 71 77–79

These front groups have been used on an adhoc basis in various state political campaignsby the tobacco lobby.7 8 32 71

Besides supporting various front groups onan occasional basis,4 5 7 8 28 32 71 one significantapproach in the 1990s that the tobacco lobbyhas undertaken to influence state legisla-tion8 10 32 80 (as well as local legislation) hasbeen the establishment of a permanentnational front group known as the NationalSmokers’ Alliance (NSA). (The NSA, forinstance, was instrumental in supporting Cali-fornia’s proposition 188 in 1994, which wassponsored by the tobacco lobby and wouldhave created new state legislation that wouldhave preempted stricter local clean indoor airordinances.32 80 81 The initiative measure waslater soundly defeated.32 The NSA has alsoactively opposed clean indoor air laws andregulations around the USA and financedlitigation against health authorities whoattempted to regulate smoking.) The NSA wascreated by Phillip Morris (with some laterfinancial assistance from other companies) in1993 with the assistance of the internationalpublic relations firm Burson-Marsteller.80 82–84

In a general corporate document published in1993, Philip Morris said that the primary pur-pose of the NSA was:

“When it comes to individual oYceholders andpolicy makers, the current political environmentis one sided. Up to now the politicians and theanti-smoking activists have had a free shot at theirpolitical goals. The media’s cooperation in thiseVort is a side issue to the root cause. Thelawsuits, studies, public education, etc, are evenfurther removed from the basic touch point as tothe reason for the anti-smoking crowd’s string ofsuccesses. The reason politicians have joined orrolled over on this issue:“They have felt no political pain.“To date there has been no down side to stickingit to smokers. Politicians who engage inanti-smoking activity have been given thepleasant choice between getting favorable mediacoverage . . .or getting more favorable media cov-erage. They have felt they have nothing to fearfrom bashing smokers, because smokers have notgiven them any reason to respect their viewpointor their numbers.“Only when politicians recognize there is politicalrisk associated with joining an eVort, will they beless likely to become active in that eVort. Forthose who have already joined the other side,

there is opportunity in demonstrating that takinga stand should always carry a price.”85

In order to accomplish this political objective,the 1993 NSA political plan also called for thefollowing general messages to be promoted:

“1. Basic messages about smokers’ rights, accom-modation [clean indoor air], fairness, etc. Theseare the messages of the membership. They will bedirected at the media, the policy makers, thepoliticians, and the pundits.“2. Political messages about taxes, voter anger,independent expenditure campaigns, key influ-encers, etc. These are the messages of the NSApolitical organization. They will be directedsolely at the politicians.”85

In order to implement this political campaignand these messages, the NSA (which claimedto have more than three million members, butin fact, this “membership” consisted largely oftobacco company employees and persons fromother industry data bases, not dues payingmembers84 86) has used various standard publicrelations tactics.82 87 This has included“grassroots” (or “Astro Turf” organising as it iscommonly referred to in the public relationsindustry87) third party advocacy not “linked” tothe industry, advocacy advertising, junkscience claims, litigation, and sponsoring otherfront groups.71 79 82 87 88 All of these eVorts havebeen designed to create orchestrated“simulations of enthusiasm”87 to place greaterpolitical pressure on legislators.

Depending on the time and circumstance,organisations that the tobacco lobby hasworked with in state policy making either in analliance or as a front group has included localgovernment associations, tobacco wholesalerorganisations, recreational organisations, un-ions, police chief associations, state conven-ience stores, hotel and motel associations,restaurant associations, retailer groups,manufacturer associations, property rightsgroups, and licenced beverage associations. Ithas also included working with and throughgeneral business organisations, vendingmachine operators, candy and tobacco distrib-uter associations, chambers of commerce, agri-business groups, statewide tort and productliability “reform” groups, medical associations,and state anti-taxpayer coalitions.7 24 25 27 32 45 89

LEGISLATIVE TACTICS

Two common techniques that the tobaccolobby has used is killing legislation in hostilelegislative committees or subcommitteesthrough adverse votes or by delays in votesuntil a legislative session ends.6–20 Table 3 pro-vides an overview of other political tactics usedby tobacco lobbyists in the 1990s6–20 to kill orweaken legislation in 12 states located in repre-sentative regions of the USA. As table 3indicates, the tobacco lobby has had mixedsuccess in employing these tactics with healthadvocates often being able to eVectively coun-ter the tobacco lobby’s manoeuvres.6–20

Many of these tobacco lobby tactics havealso been used to attempt to weaken or killtobacco control legislation after it is enacted.This is indicative of the political reality that thepolitical process is ongoing and that tobaccolobbyists’ recognise that a temporary legislative

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victory by tobacco control advocates canattempt to be overturned in a future politicalcontext.

In addition to quietly funding and buildingpolitical and policy support with various legis-lators,24 26 45 the tobacco lobby has also engagedin funding covert “special projects” designed tosecretly influence some aspect of statelegislative policy making and administrativeoversight. For example, this has included secreteVorts and campaigns to legislatively opposeand undermine ASSIST projects inWashington24–26 29 and countering California’sProposition 99.44

POLICY OUTCOMES IN STATE LEGISLATURES IN

THE 1990S

The combined political eVorts of the tobaccolobbyists (versus public health advocates) inthe state legislatures in the 1990s can beanalysed in terms of whether legislative outputsor governmental actions have favoured thetobacco lobby’s political eVorts in the states(including the District of Columbia).

Pre-emption of authority of communities toenact local tobacco control ordinances is thetobacco industry’s top priority in statelegislation. By the end of 1999, 17 statespre-empted local clean indoor air ordinanceswith weak and ineVective state clean indoor airlaws, compared to only seven in 1990.88 Inthose majority of states where no localpre-emption occurred, local governments arefree, of course, to adopt stricter ordinances. Atthe same time, few states had implementedeVective state clean indoor air legislation (table4). At the same time, 22 states had pre-emptedlocal laws restricting youth access to tobaccowith weak state youth access laws, compared toonly one in 1990.

Twenty states also had low rates of tobaccoexcise taxation of less than 25 cents percigarette pack, while 12 states had taxationrates of 25 cents to 49 cents per pack, and 19states had taxation rates of greater than 50cents per pack.90 The policy implication of thislow tax rate is more people consuming moretobacco and higher industry sales andprofits.91–97

Thirty six states had enacted total bans orsevere restrictions on vending machine accessby minors, while 15 states had limited or norestrictions on vending machine access byminors.90 This trend has meant that one meansfor youth to easily obtain tobacco products in alarge majority of the states has beensubstantially closed.

Finally, licensing of tobacco sellers, whichprovides governments and others with the abil-ity to statistically track tobacco sales andrevoke licences for violations, is now requiredin 30 states with respect to over-the-counter

Table 3 Tobacco lobby political tactics and outcomes in 12 state legislatures in the 1990s*

State Political tactic Year Industry success

Florida OVer “crippling” amendments causing withdrawal of eVective tobacco controllegislation including clean indoor air legislation in Florida and tobacco taxincrease in Oregon

1990 No

Oregon 1997 No

Florida File lawsuits to overturn legislation that made it easier to sue tobacco industryfor Medicaid (federal health care for the poor) funded illnesses due to tobaccouse

1994 No

California Pass legislation to overturn previously enacted tobacco control legislationincluding tobacco related Medicaid legislation in Florida and smoke free barlegislation in California

1998-99 No

Florida 1995-97 No

Florida Pass legislation to nullify tobacco related Medicaid lawsuit filed by state 1996-97 No

Arizona Pass weak state legislation that also pre-empts stricter local tobacco controllaws including pre-empting local tobacco sales restrictions and marketing lawsin Arizona; local clean indoor air laws in New York; and local excise taxes inOregon.

1995 No

New York 1995-96 No

Oregon 1997 No

Arizona Pass legislation weakening the implementation of eVective and ongoing statetobacco control education programmes

1996-97 YesOregon 1997 No

Ohio Sponsor pro-tobacco legislation, which diverts time and energy of public healthforces towards defeating such legislation and not promoting tobacco controllegislation

1991-98 No

California Pass legislation that diverts funding from initiative-created tobacco controleducational eVorts to other programmes

1991-95 YesOregon 1997 NoMassachusetts 1993-95 Yes

Arizona Pass legislation capping funding for state anti-tobacco education programmebelow amounts approved by state initiative

1995-97 Yes

California Pass legislation delaying previously passed tobacco control legislation related tosmoke free bars

1996-98 Yes (1996)No (1997-98)

Washington Request that legislative committee determine that administrative agencywritten rule regulating clean indoor air quality in public places not be adopted

1994 Yes

Pennsylvania Attach weak tobacco industry youth access bill to unrelated bill late inlegislative session to pass it without drawing public attention

1994 No

*The representative states are: Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Oregon,Pennsylvania, Washington, and Wisconsin.6–20

Table 4 Clean indoor air restrictions in the states and District of Columbia for the lastquarter of 1999*

Sites with cleanindoor airrestrictions

Nosmokingallowed

Designatedsmoking areaswith separateventilation

Designatedsmoking areasrequired orallowed

Norestrictions

Total number of stateswithout eVective smokingrestrictions (includingpermitting smoking withoutseparate ventilation)

State governmentwork sites 12 2 29 8 37

Private work sites 0 1 20 30 50Restaurants 2 1 28 20 48Day care centres† – – 7 22 29

*Source: CDC STATE: tobacco map reports.90

†The Centres for Disease Control and Prevention combined the categories of “no smokingallowed” and “designated smoking areas with separate ventilation”. The number of states in thiscombined category is 22.

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and vending machine licensing. In addition,three states now require only over-the-counterlicensing, three states require only vendingmachine licensing, and 15 states require nolicensing.90

Many of these trends, particularly pre-emption and low tobacco excise taxation, sup-port the tobacco industry’s goal of reducinggovernment regulations and taxes so that itmay maintain a favourable market. Lack oflocal pre-emption, on the other hand, is a trendthat favours tobacco control supporters whoare free to advocate and enact stricter localclean indoor air and other tobacco controlordinances.

DiscussionThe internal industry documents indicate thatthe tobacco lobby employs a comprehensivebundle of approaches to influence state legisla-tion, including providing campaign contribu-tions to legislators accompanied by variousovert and covert legislative lobbying and publicrelations tactics and strategies to protecttobacco market profits, sales, and customerbases and advance its political interests. As aninternal 1994 document by Ellen Merlo, PhilipMorris Vice president for corporate aVairs,noted, the primary reason for this was to:

“ . . .encourage and safeguard a social and regu-latory environment where we can sell ourcigarettes and where our consumers canpurchase and use them with the least amount ofhassle . . .[because] . . .the social battle oversmoking has escalated into an all-out war. Com-panies that market cigarettes are under constantattack at all levels of government.”98

Clashing with this primary market goal of thetobacco lobby is the severe health eVects asso-ciated with tobacco use. This clash of valuesand interests has created a uniquely intense cli-mate of political conflict in the statelegislatures, with the tobacco lobby waging anongoing and sophisticated political eVort toprotect and enhance its profits by a variety ofpowerful insider political approaches.

In support of this political eVort, the indus-try documents also indicate and confirm thatthe tobacco lobby maintains a virtuallyinvisible and far flung political presence, whichis deeply entrenched in all states, monitoringevery state government with respect toanything that impacts tobacco use and thetobacco industry.72 While the tobacco lobbyattempts to shift the emphasis of the debatefrom public health concerns regarding tobaccouse to such issues as freedom of choice andoppressive government regulation,22 theinternal tobacco documents also confirm thatthis political rhetoric is really designed toadvance the policy goal of allowing theindustry to promote and its customers to useand purchase tobacco with little or no impedi-ments.

The tobacco lobby has gained its politicalpower in the states, according to the internaldocuments, because of its sophisticated systemof policy issue development and lobbyinginfluence funded by its substantial financialresources. In all state legislatures, the power ofthe tobacco lobby is the epitome of the insider

legislative and interest group segment of politi-cal power based on an “iron triangle” or“issues network” relationship.99 In thelegislative and interest group segment of theiron triangle, powerful interest groups such asthe tobacco lobby with direct access to andinfluence over key legislators and legislativecommittees provide legislators with crucialpolicy information, electoral support, andcampaign contributions. In return for this sup-port, legislators provide favourable legislationfor the interest groups. In an issues network,which is slightly looser than an iron triangle,the political arrangements between interestgroups and legislators are the same as the irontriangle, but issues networks also incorporateoutside policy specialists because of thecomplexity of modern policy problems.99 Thisiron triangle and issues network system ofpolicy making by the tobacco lobby, which hasoperated almost invisibly in state legislaturesthroughout the 1990s, represents a permanentfixture of domination and influence on stategovernment, state legislators, and tobacco con-trol policy making.

This insider political power has also meantthat the tobacco lobby prefers to lobby at thestate level, rather than the local level where itloses many political battles. Local venues areoften better for public health, because it ismuch harder for the tobacco lobby to mobiliseand defeat a myriad of geographically diverselocal anti-smoking campaigns.72 It is mucheasier for the tobacco lobby to pre-empt sucheVorts at the state level49 72 by overridingstricter local ordinances with weaker and inef-fective state legislation100 for a variety of policyissues including: clean indoor air ordinances,the Synar programme, marketing, sales, andpromotion restrictions and local tobacco excisetaxes.

The entrenched system of insider politicalpower in the states also represents a permanentimbalance in the equilibrium of insider powerin state legislatures with respect to healthgroups when they attempt to use the sameinsider political tactics. Health advocates cannever match the resources and public policyorganising structure of the tobacco lobby. Theymust use other tactics to successfully enactstrong tobacco control legislation. Fortunatelyit is easier to stop state legislation than enact it.So, the most productive approach for publichealth is probably to continue to engage in vig-orous anti-tobacco campaigns at the local levelwhile primarily fighting pre-emption (and evensometimes winning eVective tobacco controllegislation) at the state level. Health advocatesat the state level can also utilise insiderlobbying strategies in conjunction withgrassroots outsider tactics to advance othertobacco control legislation and hold politicianspublicly accountable for their pro-tobacco andanti-public health actions through low costnewspaper advertisements, community forumswith legislators, face-to-face sessions betweenhealth advocates and legislators, contactingopinion leaders, rallies, public demonstrations,and free media interviews.32 99

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An important part of this process is toeducate politicians about the documented eY-cacy of tobacco control social and educationalinterventions. Health advocates should alsopress their accountability eVorts at the crucialperiod before elections by supportingpro-tobacco control politicians, while defeatingpro-tobacco legislators at the polls. Publichealth advocates can also turn to the initiativeprocess (where a law is enacted by popularvote) to enact tobacco control in thestates.6 9 16 32 101

The tobacco lobby is a powerful presence instate legislatures. Because of the poor publicimage of the tobacco industry, it seeks to wieldthis power quietly and behind the scenes. Atthe same time, the tobacco industry has alsorecently engaged in intensive public relationseVorts, as well, to promote themselves aschanged and reformed. Nowhere has theindustry declared that they are prepared toabandon the practices documented in theseinternal tobacco industry documents.

State and local health advocates, who oftenhave high public credibility, can use these factsagainst the tobacco lobby by focusing publicattention on the tobacco lobby’s political influ-ence and policy goals and expose links betweenthe tobacco lobby and its legislativesupporters. Advocates can also use this recordto respond to the industry’s claim of new foundvirtue and innocence. One means to counterthe tobacco lobby’s political influence is byexposing tobacco industry front groups topublic scrutiny and attention at crucialjunctures in the legislative process. Healthadvocates should also use themes like industrymanipulation of smokers, secondhand smokedangers, and the toll of illness and deathcaused by tobacco use as a further means toillustrate and expose industry goals and claimsand to build political support for eVectivetobacco control programmes.

This work was supported by NCI grants CA-61021 andCA-87472, American Cancer Society grant CCG-294, andTRDRP grant 8FT-0095.

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6 Bialous S, Glantz S. Tobacco control in Arizona, 1973–1997.San Francisco: Institute for Health Policy Studies, Univer-sity of California, San Francisco, October 1997.

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9 Goldman L, Glantz S. Tobacco industry political expendituresand tobacco policy making in Oregon: 1985–1997. San Fran-cisco: Institute for Health Policy Studies, University ofCalifornia, San Francisco, May 1998.

10 Magzamen S, Glantz S. Turning the tide: tobacco industrypolitical influence and tobacco policy making in California1997–1999. San Francisco: Institute for Health PolicyStudies, University of California, San Francisco, Septem-ber 1999.

11 Monardi F, O’Neill A, Glantz S. Tobacco industry politicalactivity in Colorado. San Francisco: Institute for HealthPolicy Studies, University of California, San Francisco,May 1996.

12 Monardi F, Glantz S. Tobacco industry political activity andtobacco control policy making in New Jersey: 1982–1995. SanFrancisco: Institute for Health Policy Studies, Universityof California, San Francisco, May 1997.

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15 Monardi F, Glantz S. Tobacco industry political activity andtobacco control policy making in Pennsylvania: 1979–1996.San Francisco: Institute for Health Policy Studies, Univer-sity of California, San Francisco, December 1997.

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17 Monardi F, Glantz S. Tobacco industry political activity andtobacco control policy making in Washington: 1983–1996. SanFrancisco: Institute for Health Policy Studies, Universityof California, San Francisco, November 1996.

18 Monardi F, Balbach E, Bialous S, et al. Shifting allegiances:tobacco industry political expenditures in California January1995-March 1996. San Francisco: Institute for HealthPolicy Studies, University of California, San Francisco,April 1996.

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What this paper addsBefore the release of more than 32 millionpages of previously secret tobacco industrydocuments as a result of recent tobacco liti-gation in the USA, public health advocateswere left to infer behind the scenes industrystrategies for exercising political influenceover state tobacco control policy making.These industry documents, combined withdetailed case studies of tobacco policy mak-ing in several states, provide insights into theindustry’s hidden strategies to defend andexpand its market and political interests inUS state legislatures in the 1990s.

The industry’s public position contrastssharply with its behind the scenes behaviourand rhetoric. In public discussions, theindustry seeks a low profile and talks aboutprotecting freedom of individuals and theeconomic interests of other businesssectors, particularly the hospitality industry.It never discusses the impact of proposedtobacco control policies on tobacco sales.Privately, the industry focuses on protectingits freedom to market and use its productsin order to protect sales and profits. Othergroups, such as hospitality organisations,are viewed as vehicles to promote tobaccoindustry interests while allowing theindustry to remain out of the public eye.Campaign contributions and other dona-tions made to or on behalf of legislators areviewed as devices to influence policyoutcomes, not provide general civicsupport.

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