Intra-EU migration: a socio-demographic overview

Intra–EU Migration: A Socio–demographic Overview

Ettore Recchi

Damian Tambini Emiliana Baldoni David Williams Kristin Surak Adrian Favell

STATE OF THE ART REPORT

PIONEUR Working Paper No. 3 – July 2003

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This series of working papers stems from a research project funded by the European Commission: Pioneers of Europe's Integration ‘from Below’: Mobility and the Emergence of European Identity among National and Foreign Citizens in the EU (PIONEUR) (Fifth Framework Programme – Contract HPSE–CT–2002–00128).

The institutions involved are:

- Centro Interuniversitario di Sociologia Politica (CIUSPO) – Università di Firenze – Italy;

- Observatorio Europeo de Tendencias Sociales (OBETS) – University of Alicante – Spain;

- Centre for Socio–Legal Studies (CSLS) – Oxford University – United Kingdom;

- Centre d'Etude de la Vie Politique Française (CEVIPOF) – CNRS – France;

- Zentrum für Umfragen, Methoden und Analysen (ZUMA) – Mannheim – Germany.

The research project and the working paper series are coordinated by Ettore Recchi at the Centro Interuniversitario di Sociologia Politica (CIUSPO) – Università di Firenze.

Additional information can be found on the PIONEUR web site: http://www.labdp.ua.es/pioneur.

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http://www.unifi.it/dispo/ciuspo.html

http://www.labdp.ua.es/obets/

http://pcmlp.socleg.ox.ac.uk/staff.htm

http://www.cevipof.msh-paris.fr/

http://www.gesis.org/zuma



TABLE OF CONTENTS 1. The Early PionEURs: Postwar intra–European Migration 4 1.1. Introduction: The Structural Context of Immigration 4 1.2. The Redesigning of Europe’s Borders after WWII 5 1.3. Organised (Often Employer–initiated) Quota Migration in the 1950s and 1960s 5 1.4. Family Migration and the New Map of European Migration: from the 1970s to the 1990s 7 2. Stocks and Flows of Intra–EU Migration in the 1990s 10 2.1. Growth and Differentiation 10 2.2. Intra–EU Migration on the Eve of the XXI Century 15 2.3. Intra–EU Migration in Germany, Italy, Spain, Great Britain, and France 26 3. Emerging Trends of Intra–EU Migration 33 3.1. Highly Skilled Migration 33 3.2. Retirement Migration 34 3.3. Student Migration 38 4. Conclusions 39 4.1. Intra–European Migration in a Changing EU Labour Market and Institutional Context 39 4.2. Summary 44 References 46

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PIONEUR – SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHIC OVERVIEW – JULY 2003

Intra–EU Migration: A Socio–demographic Overview

Ettore Recchi, Damian Tambini, Emiliana Baldoni, David Williams, Kristin Surak, and Adrian Favell

1. The Early PionEURs: Postwar intra–European Migration 1.1. Introduction: The Structural Context of Immigration Free movement was generally possible throughout Europe until the late nineteenth century when immigration controls, passport holding and the rise of nation–specific civil, political and social rights became barriers to migration. However, even during this prehistory of migration, numbers of movers remained low, because the economic preconditions for migration were absent. Where large scale intra–European migration occurred this was part of a general movement from the periphery to the newly industrialising areas, particularly the North–western coal and steel areas. After the introduction of passport and visa controls, quotas, and more government involvement in migration, a more complex pattern emerged. This brief historical overview will outline patterns of migration particularly in the post–war period. Two major groups of structural variables are commonly used to explain large scale migration patterns: the socio–economic and labour market inequalities that give individuals economic motivations to seek better fortunes in other countries, and the civil and political rights – e.g. the right to cross national borders – that make migration possible. Leaving aside the phenomena of illegal migration and asylum both economic incentives and an enabling legal framework are necessary to make migration flows possible. As this brief overview will show, current knowledge and awareness of European migration leaves a great deal to be explained for two main reasons. First, the currently available data are inadequate, as they are constructed in ways that leave unclear the impact of phenomena such as naturalisation and intermarriage. Secondly, they leave out important micro phenomena like the ‘para–legal’ barriers to migration, such as cultural, subjective and experiential bases of migration in this particular geographical and historical context. Stocks and flows of migrants within Europe have been explained by economic variables, but also in relation to the changing context of civil and political rights – i.e., legislation on free movement in the EC. These perspectives have been largely unable to explain the relationship between structural change and migration inside the EC. At best we have some evidence of a correlation between structural/labour market change and migration patterns. It is clear that post–war European integration presents a dilemma: on the one hand the civil and political rights permitting free movement are now widely accepted; on the other hand, the structural inequalities within Europe are now less marked than ever. For whilst European integration has removed the formal barriers to migration by implementing the basic free–movement rights since the Treaty of Rome, it also – through general economic convergence and a common space of investment and prosperity – removes the main spur to migration.

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1.2. The Redesigning of Europe’s Borders after WWII Rodríguez-Pose writes: ‘The end of the Second World War brought about a profound resettlement of population. The redesigning of European borders at the end of the war and the flow of war refugees back to their places of origin put an estimated 25 million people on the move. (Kosinski 1970). The flow of people was mainly from east to west. It involved approximately 12 million ethnic Germans expelled from former German territories in East Prussia, Pomerania, and Silesia, which became parts of Poland and the Soviet Union, and from their former homes in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, and the Soviet Union. Around 4 million ethnic Germans initially settled in East Germany, but the bulk of the migration of ethnic Germans (around 8 million people) was into West Germany. The movement was not just in one direction. 10.5 million displaced persons, which included prisoners of war, camp survivors, and people who had worked as slave labour – but also ordinary people – left Germany. The redesigning of Europe’s borders also generated movements of ethnic Poles, Russians, Finns, Hungarians, Italians, and Turks (King 1993b)’ (2002, 92-93). A significant number of migrants from the countries with newly-established communist regimes moved from east to west during the post-war period. Nearly four million East Germans, and lower numbers of Poles, Czechs and Hungarians moved west before the construction of the Berlin Wall in 1961. 1.3. Organised (Often Employer–initiated) Quota Migration in the 1950s and 1960s The main geographical direction of migration to and within Western Europe during the 1950s and 1960s was from south to north (Figure 1). Economic growth (90 percent real GDP increase between 1960 and 1974 in the then EC) and increasing industrialization (industrial output grew by 103 per cent) in the western and central European countries resulted in a shortage of labourers for poorly paid work. Southern European (Italian, Spanish, Portuguese and Greek), then Turkish and Yugoslav, and finally, Maghrebi and Third World migrants moved north and west to find jobs primarily in the construction, manufacturing, and service industries (Rodriguez Pose 2002). It was often the case in the 1950s and 1960s that this south to north migration was initiated by employers, managed by states, and mediated by national consulates and ministries. The host country migrant communities that were established as a result of this process attracted families, friends, and neighbours in the sending countries who then joined the communities on their own accord – not necessarily under the aegis of the aforementioned businesses and state institutions.

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Figure 1. Main international labour migration flows to western European countries, 1945 – 1973

Table 1. Percentage of foreign population of select European countries, mid–1970s %

Belgium 10 France 5–10 Germany 5–10 Luxembourg 25 Netherlands 5 Sweden 5–10 Switzerland 15

Source: Sopemi (1977)

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Data from the mid-seventies demonstrate the demographic impact of the south to north migration trend that characterized the 1950s and 1960s (table 1). For example, the foreign population of Germany was greater than 5 per cent, and it included more than one million Turks and 600,000 Italians. The foreign population of Belgium was 10 per cent, of which 300,000 people were Italian. There were nearly one million Portuguese and 800,000 Algerians living in France (SOPEMI 1977). 1.4. Family Migration and the New Map of European Migration: from the late 1960s to the 1980s It should be noted that while most international flows in post–war migration were at first comprised mainly of workers – single men and sometimes single women – this started to change towards the end of the 1960s. By then (and even earlier in some countries like the UK and France), ‘family migration’ was allowed and the composition of flows began to change, with more women and children involved. The so–called ‘guest workers’, whose presence had been thought of as temporary, started the transformation into permanent or long–term immigrants by settling with their families, or forming new family nuclei in their new countries of residence. It is also relevant to note that these migrants were not, generally, the result of free movement in Europe, but were allowed to move due to government sponsored quota and Gastarbeiter schemes. Table 2. Employment sector and nationality of male foreign workers in France, 1968 (%)

Italian Spanish Portuguese Agriculture, forestry 10.3 17.4 8.0 Extractive industries 3.9 1.2 11.6 Metal production 6.9 2.3 1.4 Engineering, electrical goods 10.7 12.8 7.9 Building, public works 41.6 34.6 58.2 Commerce 6.4 7.7 3.3 Total for six sectors 69.8 76.0 80.4 Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 No. of workers (‘000) 205.0 198.5 156.3

Source: Pinder (1998, 270)

The examples of France and Germany illustrate the concentration of these Southern European migrants in the labour market (tables 2 and 3). They were overwhelmingly concentrated in agriculture, engineering, building and public works sectors. The lack of transferability of many qualifications – such as university degrees – was a brake on the migration of more skilled people, though we might also predict that language is a stronger factor impeding migration. Clearly more detailed research is needed on these points.

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Table 3. Employment sector and nationality of foreign workers in West Germany, 1973 (%) Italian Spanish Portuguese Greek Yugoslav Turkish Other Total Agriculture, forestry

18.7 10.7 4.3 2.9 16.5 21.6 25.3 100.0

Mining 15.7 5.6 2.5 4.3 11.4 46.0 14.5 100.0 Iron, steel production

13.2 8.4 3.3 13.7 9.7 41.4 10.3 100.0

Iron, steel fabrication

23.1 11.0 3.1 16.0 14.1 21.6 11.1 100.0

Vehicles 16.7 8.7 2.7 16.1 13.5 32.2 10.1 100.0 Chemicals 21.2 10.3 2.4 19.7 9.6 15.2 21.6 100.0 Textiles 19.7 7.5 15.3 15.3 12.9 29.0 7.9 100.0 Construction 20.5 3.6 2.8 2.8 35.0 19.3 17.0 100.0 Transport 20.4 15.2 5.3 4.6 11.9 22.4 20.2 100.0 Total foreign workers (%)

17.5 7.6 2.9 11.4 20.0 22.5 18.1 100.0

Total foreign workers/(‘000)

409.7 177.5 69.0 268.1 466.1 528.2 426.5 100.0

Source: Pinder (1998, 271) During the 1980s a new map of European migration unfolded with new patterns and forms of movement. This new map replaced the south–to–north labour migration flows from the Mediterranean basin countries to industrial Europe. By the 1970s they had been replaced by return migration flows. Three major new forms of migration emerged as a result of new economic realities coupled with an increasingly overt anti–immigration policy by the European Community member states. First was an increase in the international migration of skilled workers within the EU and between EU countries and other areas of the global economy. This trend reflected the increasingly high–tech nature of European industry and the growth of advanced producer services as a multinational phenomenon. Secondly, there was a sharp rise in the number of asylum–seeking migrants, especially after the mid–1980s. Finally, the expansion and diversification of secret and illegal migration into Europe, both of which King (1998, 281) attributes to the closing off of ‘normal’ channels of entry into Europe and the gathering strength of push factors for migration from other regions of the world.

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Table 4. Distribution of foreign workers by nationality for selected countries, 1976

Foreign Workers (million)

Principal Nationalities

(%)

Foreign Workers (million)

Principal Nationalities

(%) West/Germany

Turkish Yugoslav

Italian Greek

2.17 27.2 20.1 14.3 9.2

Sweden Finnish

Danish/or/Norwegian Yugoslav

Greek

0.23 43.7 13.3 11.5 5.3

France Nth./African* Portuguese

Spanish Italian

1.90 35.1 22.8 12.9 12.6

Belgium Italian

Spanish Nth./African^

Turkish

0.20 32.0 10.0 9.3 5.0

Switzerland Italian

Spanish French

German

0.55 47.7 11.5 10.7 10.1

Netherlands EC (Nine)

Turkish Nth./African+

Spanish

0.18 30.1 21.1 16.6 8.8

* mainly Algerian ^ mainly Moroccan + nearly all Moroccan

Source: Pinder (1998, 266) Table 5. Stocks of foreign workers in immigration countries, 1981 (thousands)

From EEC*

Total Foreign Workers

Austria 12.5 176.3 Belgium 81.5 332.2 France 49.4 1436.4 West Germany 151.6 2081.9 Luxembourg 23.4 52.2 Netherlands 45.5 238.5 Sweden 39.5 233.5 Switzerland 85.2 515.1 * Excluding Italy and Greece Source: SOPEMI (1983) In the early 1980s, intra–European migrants formed the majority of the foreign born population in only a few countries, such as Luxembourg. In the vast majority of cases, the influx from outside the EEC was far greater than that within the EEC. The range of origin of these communities was (and still is) particularly wide in Italy. However, especially because of ongoing colonial legacies, there is a very great divergence in the countries of origin of third–country immigrants from one EU member state to another.

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2. Stocks and Flows of Intra–EU Migration in the 1990s 2.1. Growth and Differentiation

The percentages of foreign-born residents in EU countries continued to rise during the 1990s (figure 2). Migration flows during the 1990s differed from those of the 1950s, 60s, and 70s in four ways (Rodríguez-Pose 2002, 96-98). First, the south to north trend of migration within EU countries of earlier decades did not continue in the 1990s. Another difference was the near disappearance of the involvement of businesses and governments in the initiation and management of foreign labour migration. Also, the 1990s witnessed an increase in illegal migration in comparison with earlier decades. Finally (and most importantly, according to Salt 1992), a diversification in the types of foreign migrants to the EU (vis-à-vis the earlier trend of mainly unskilled labourers) took place.

Rodríguez-Pose (2002, 98) divides 1990s foreign migrants to and within the EU countries into three groups: a) the highly qualified: the highly qualified migrants are generally citizens from other

EU states who take advantage of the free movement of people within the EU, or even workers from other developed countries (e.g. the US, Japan, or Australia), who benefit from the greater mobility of skills in a globalised world;

b) low–skilled economic migrants and clandestines: economic migrants from developing countries form the majority, often forced to enter the EU illegally as a result of the more restrictive immigration legislation;

c) refugees and asylum seekers: political migrants mainly from developing countries escaping wars and political persecution.

Figure 2. Growth in the stocks of foreign population and EU–foreigners in EU member states, 1990–2000 (1990=100)

80

90

100

110

120

130

1990 1993 1996 2000

Total foreigners Total EU-foreigners

Source: total of foreigners, SOPEMI (2002); total of EU–foreigners, Eurostat New Cronos database (2001)

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Table 6. Stocks of foreign population and EU foreigners in EU–15 countries, 1990–2000 (thousands)

1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000

B 904,5 922,5 909,3 920,6 922,3 909,8 911,9 903,2 892,0 897,1 861,7 555,6 559,3 541,6 548,5 552,3 554,5 559,6 562,0 562,5 563,6 – DK 160,6 169,5 180,1 189,0 196,7 222,7 237,7 249,6 256,3 259,4 258,6 38,4 39,2 40,5 42,4 44,6 46,5 48,9 51,2 53,2 53,8 54,3 D 5342,5 5882,3 6495,8 6878,1 6990,5 7173,9 7314,0 7365,8 7319,5 7343,6 7296,8 1644,8 1698,8 – 1750,2 1779,9 1811,7 1839,9 1850,0 1854,3 1858,7 1872,7 EL 229,1 253,3 262,3 149,1 152,8 155,5 161,1 165,7 – – – 59,1 61,6 64,7 42,9 43,7 44,4 45,0 44,1 – – – E 278,7 360,7 393,1 430,4 461,4 499,8 539,0 609,8 719,6 801,3 895,7 255,8 289,8 181,8 200,5 219,8 235,6 251,9 260,6 295,3 312,2 375,5 F 3596,6 – – – – – – – – 3263,1 – 1311,9 – – – – – – – – 1195,5 – IRL 80,0 87,7 94,9 89,9 91,1 96,1 118,0 114,4 111,0 117,8 126,5

– – 73,0 67,0 70,7 73,4 86,8 81,3 85,3 85,0 92,2 I 781,1 863,0 925,2 987,4 922,7 991,4 1095,6 1240,7 1250,2 1252,0 1338,2 163,9 160,7 160,8 120,3 124,9 128,5 133,5 – – 148,5 153,8 L 113,1 117,8 122,7 127,6 132,5 138,1 142,8 147,7 152,9 159,4 164,7 – – – – – – 127,8 131,4 – – – NL 692,4 732,9 757,4 779,8 757,1 725,4 679,9 678,1 662,4 651,5 667,8 174,0 181,9 188,7 193,9 193,1 191,1 188,3 190,2 192,2 195,9 201,6 A 456,1 532,7 623,0 689,6 713,5 723,5 728,2 732,7 737,3 748,2 757,9 – 79,4 – – – – – – – – 219,8 P 107,8 114,0 123,6 131,6 157,1 168,3 172,9 175,3 177,8 190,9 208,2 29,9 – – 32,7 36,2 – 41,5 43,7 48,2 52,4 56,8 FIN 26,3 37,6 46,3 55,6 62,0 68,6 73,8 80,6 85,1 87,7 91,1 11,4 11,9 12,2 12,5 12,9 13,7 14,1 14,9 15,7 16,3 16,7 S 483,7 493,8 499,1 507,5 537,4 531,8 526,6 522,0 499,9 487,2 477,3 195,7 190,5 186,3 182,6 180,3 179 178,2 176,8 177 177,4 180,1 UK 1723,0 1750,0 1985,0 2001,0 2032,0 1948,0 1934,0 2066,0 2207,0 2208,0 2342,0 781,0 818,0 – 812,0 – 818,0 805,0 877,7 859,1 856,2 –

Total foreigners 14975,5

15551,4 16249,7 18915,3

Total EU–foreigners 5501,7

4832,6 5735,8 6014,3

Source: total of foreigners, SOPEMI (2002); total of EU–foreigners, Eurostat New Cronos database 2001 * Note: when data are missing for the total of EU–foreigners, the closest available year is used Data about migration in different EU member states still suffer from well–known limitations, depending on discrepancies in the sources and methods of statistics collection (cf. Poulain 1996 and 1999). With this caveat in mind, in 2000 the stock of foreign population in EEA (European Economic Area)1 is estimated to consist of 20,381,000 persons, representing 5.4% of the total residents. In that same year, 1 EEA includes Norway, Island and Liechtenstein.

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inflows of foreign population in those same countries amounted to 1,426,000 persons. In the fifteen European Union member states, from January 2000 to January 2001 population rose from 376,455,200 to 377,507,900. This growth was mainly due to the net inflow of foreign migrants (680,000), while natural growth (births minus deaths) contributed to about one third of the total (372,000) (Eurostat 2002). Thus, migration constitutes the most important factor of population change in the EU. In the last ten years, migrations of both third–country nationals and EU citizens moving within the European Union have been on the rise. However, while the proportion of foreign residents in the EU has increased by 26%, the proportion of EU citizens living in another EU country has grown by 9%. More precisely, the total foreign resident population has risen from 14,976,000 in 1990 to 18,915,000 in 2000 and the number of EU citizen-foreigners has grown from 5,502,000 to 6,014,000. As shown in figure 2, the highest growth rate of the foreign population took place in the period 1996–2000, while the number of EU–foreigners decreased during 1990–1993 and than gradually increased until 2000. In greater detail (table 6), the 1990–2000 decade saw a constant expansion of the total foreign population in almost all the countries of the European Union. Exceptions to this trend are Greece, (but data after 1997 are not available), France (but again with serious data limitations) and Belgium. Moreover, some countries have experienced sharp fluctuations. For example, in the Netherlands the number of resident foreigners has risen from 692,400 in 1990 to 779,800 in 1993, but then it dropped down to 667,800 in 2000. Equally, Sweden has recorded the highest level of immigrant population in 1994 (537,400 persons). Afterwards, the stock of resident immigrants decreased to 477,300 (a 11% decrease) in 20002. In sharp contrast, in Germany, United Kingdom, Spain and Italy the population of foreign residents has expanded in the 1990–2000 period constantly and considerably (+1.9 millions in Germany, +619,000 in the UK, +617,000 in Spain and +557,000 in Italy). In France, the lack of data in the mid–1990s makes it impossible to have a clear idea of the migration trend between 1990 and 1999. At the end of the period, in 2000, four EU member states had over one million foreigners as legal residents in their territory: Germany (7,296,800), France (3,263,100 in 1999), Great Britain (2,342,000) and Italy (1,338,200). The first three countries were also the countries with the largest stocks of foreigners at the beginning of the decade, whereas Italy overcame Belgium as the country with the fourth largest number of immigrants. In contrast, despite high rates of increase, stocks of foreigners remain relatively small in Finland (91,100), Ireland (126,500) and Portugal (208,200). 2 Unfortunately, we are not in a position to estimate the possible impact of naturalizations on the changing figures of foreign–born residents.

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Table 7. Stocks of foreign population 1990–2000 (% of total population) 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 B 9.1 9.2 9.0 9.1 9.1 9.0 9.0 8.9 8.7 8.8 8.4 DK 3.1 3.3 3.5 3.6 3.8 4.2 4.7 4.7 4.8 4.9 4.8 D 8.4 7.3 8.0 8.5 8.6 8.8 8.9 9.0 8.9 8.9 8.9 EL 2.2 2.2 2.5 2.5 1.4 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.6 – – E 0.7 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.6 1.8 2.0 2.2 F 6.3 – – – – – – – – 5.6 – IRL 2.3 2.5 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 3.2 3.1 3.0 3.1 3.3 I 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.6 1.7 2.0 2.1 2.1 2.2 2.4 L 29.4 30.2 31.0 31.8 32.6 33.4 34.1 34.9 35.6 36.0 37.3 NL 4.6 4.8 5.0 5.1 5.0 4.7 4.4 4.3 4.2 4.1 4.2 A 5.9 6.8 7.9 8.6 8.9 9.0 9.0 9.1 9.1 9.2 9.3 P 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.6 1.7 1.7 1.8 1.8 1.9 2.1 FIN 0.5 0.8 0.9 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.6 1.6 1.7 1.8 S 5.6 5.7 5.7 5.8 6.1 5.2 6.0 6.0 5.6 5.5 5.4 UK 3.2 3.1 3.5 3.5 3.6 3.4 3.4 3.6 3.8 3.8 4.0 Source: SOPEMI (2002) (Greece and France: Eurostat New Cronos Database 2001) The proportion of non–nationals is very high in Luxembourg (37,3%). In three countries (Belgium, Germany and Austria) it ranges between 8.4 and 9.3 per cent. In all remaining countries foreign population constitutes less than 5.6 per cent and in four cases (Greece, Finland, Portugal and Italy) less than 3 per cent of the total (table 7). In the last decade, the number of foreign citizens increased in the bulk of EU member states. In general, rates of increase have been higher in several of the countries with the smallest share of immigrants (Finland, Spain, Portugal, Italy). To some extent, these countries were beginning to catch up to the traditional hosts of immigrants (like Germany, Belgium and France): In Belgium, the Netherlands and Sweden, immigrant stocks diminished slightly after 1994. Equally in France the proportion of foreigners dropped, which is probably due to naturalizations. But again, the lack of consistent data does not allow us to assess this plausible explanation of the 10% decrease in the number of foreign citizens in the Hexagone. A substantial decline occurred also in Greece especially in the 1993–1994 period (however, no update after 1998 is available), while the foreign ‘colonization’ of Luxembourg continued all along the decade at a steady pace (from 29.4% in 1990 to 37.3% in 2000). Generally speaking, in the fifteen EU member states, European foreigners represent about one third of the total population of non–nationals. Nonetheless, this average varies greatly from one country to another. Only in Luxembourg, Belgium and Ireland are intra–EU immigrants a majority among non–national residents. In spite of restrictive migration policies for non–EU citizens, in all other EU member states the bulk of foreign residents come from outside the European Union. Labour immigration and family reunification of third–country nationals makes for a large share of the immigrant population in those countries where the stocks of immigrants are higher:

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Germany (74% of foreign residents are not EU citizens), France (63%), the United Kingdom (61%) and Italy (almost 90%). Table 8. Variation in the stocks of EU foreigners, 1990–2000 (1990=100) 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 B 100 100.7 97.5 98.7 99.4 99.8 100.7 101.2 101.3 101.4 – DK 100 102.0 105.5 110.4 116.2 121.2 127.5 133.4 138.5 140.2 141.4 D 100 103.3 – 106.4 108.2 110.2 111.9 112.5 112.7 113.0 113.9 EL 100 104.3 109.4 72.5 73.9 75.0 76.1 74.6 – – – E 100 113.3 71.1 78.4 85.9 92.1 98.5 101.9 115.4 122.1 146.8 F 100 – – – – – – – – 91.1 – IRL – – 100 91.8 96.8 100.5 118.9 111.4 116.8 116.4 126.3 I 100 98.0 98.1 73.4 76.2 78.4 81.4 – – 90.6 93.8 L – – – – – – 100 102.8 – – – NL 100 104.5 108.5 111.5 111.0 109.8 108.2 109.3 110.4 112.6 115.9 A – 100 – – – – – – – – 276.8 P 100 – – 109.5 120.9 – 138.9 146.3 161.3 175.3 189.9 FIN 100 105.0 107.7 110.0 113.5 120.8 124.3 131.3 138.4 143.7 146.5 S 100 97.3 95.2 93.3 92.1 91.4 91.1 90.3 90.5 90.7 92.1 UK 100 104.7 – 104.0 – 104.7 103.1 112.4 110.0 109.6 – Source: Eurostat New Cronos Database (2001) Note: When data for 1990 are not available, the earliest available year is taken as a baseline (=100). Nonetheless, in the last decade the number of EU foreigners has grown in the bulk of member states, with Greece, France, Sweden, and Italy as exceptions (table 8). This increase has been spectacular in Austria (the number of EU non–nationals has almost tripled) and Portugal (the number has almost doubled). In Finland, Spain, and Denmark there are almost 50% more EU immigrants in 2000 than there were in 1990, while in Ireland, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom the rate of increase has been lower. Generally speaking, trends are quite regular, save for Greece which experienced some growth in the 1990–1992 biennium, and followed by a downturn (i.e., a 37% decrease from 1992 to 1993). Data on flows are much less complete than data on the stocks of migrants in the EU. Only some sketchy indications at best can be obtained from some countries, as sufficient time series are available only for Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Portugal and Sweden (table 9). During the 1990s, the inflow of EU citizens in each of these countries tended to either rise slightly or remain constant. More variation took place in the last three years of the decade: in France and Germany inflows declined substantially (but data for Germany stopped in 1998), whereas an acceleration of inflows was recorded in Portugal and Sweden. The stocks of EU immigrants have not changed in Sweden, thus we might suggest that these inflows are paralleled by outflows in those same years.

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Table 9. Inflows of foreign population and EU–foreigners 1991–2000 (thousands)

1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 A* – – – – – – – 59,2 72,4 66,0 – – – – – – – 12,1 13,5 13,6 B* 54,1 55,1 53,0 56,0 53,1 51,9 49,2 50,7 68,5 68,6 24,8 27,1 26,4 27,0 26,6 28,7 27,6 27,4 28,0 29,6 DK* 17,5 16,9 15,4 15,6 33,0 24,7 20,4 21,3 20,3 – 2,6 2,7 3,0 3,7 4,4 3,9 4,9 5,1 – – FIN* 12,4 10,4 10,9 7,6 7,3 7,5 8,1 8,3 7,9 9,1 – – – – – – – – – – F** 109,9 116,6 99,2 69,3 56,7 55,6 80,9 116,9 86,3 95,2 11,7 25,9 14,4 10,8 7,9 7,1 6,4 6,1 5,6 5,3 EL** – – – – – – – 38,2 – – – – – – – – – – – – DE* 920,5 1207,6 986,9 774,0 788,3 708,0 615,3 605,5 673,9 648,8 147,4 140,8 136,7 155,8 177,2 172,5 151,5 136,0 – – IRE** – – – 13,3 13,6 21,5 23,5 20,8 21,6 24,1 – – – 9,6 9,0 13,3 13,7 14,1 14,7 14,2 I** – – – – – – – 111,0 268,0 271,5 – – – – – – – – – – L* 10,0 9,8 9,2 9,2 9,6 9,2 9,4 10,6 11,8 10,8 7,8 7,1 7,1 7,1 7,1 – – – – – NL* 84,3 83,0 87,6 68,4 67,0 77,2 76,7 81,7 78,4 91,4 20,8 22,3 19,7 16,0 14,8 19,2 20,3 19,9 20,4 22,1 P** – 13,7 9,9 5,7 5,0 3,6 3,3 6,5 10,5 15,9 – 1,5 1,8 2,3 2,4 1,9 1,9 2,9 4,4 4,6 S* 49,9 39,5 54,8 74,8 36,1 29,3 33,4 35,7 34,6 33,8 7,2 6,2 5,8 7,0 7,9 7,9 7,1 8,4 8,8 10,8 UK** – 203,9 190,3 193,6 206,3 216,4 236,9 258 276,9 288,8

– – – – – – – – – – Source: SOPEMI (2002) Note: in bold letters: total inflows of foreigners; in normal letters: inflows of EU citizens * Inflows data based on population registers ** Inflows data based on residence permits or on other sources 2. 2. Intra–EU Migration on the Eve of the XXI Century On the basis of available data (shown in table 10), in 2001 Germany had the largest number of non–nationals among its residents (7.3 million), followed by France (3.3 million), the United Kingdom (2.5 million) and Italy (1.5 million). Equally, the highest share of EU–15 internal migrants (1.9 million) and immigrants from candidate member states (436,000) lived in Germany. The largest part of the latter group comes from Poland and Hungary, which are also the two most populated enlargement countries. It is difficult, however, due to the limitations of current data, to assess to what extent the high figure in Germany is due to higher migration and what proportion is explained by lower naturalisation.

15


Table 10. Stocks of foreign population in EU member states, 2001

Country EU–15 foreigners

% of total foreigners

EUR–10 foreigners


Other countries


Total foreigners

% of total population

B 563,556 66.0 : : : : 853,369 8.3 DK 54,310 21.0 8,811 3.4 195,509 75.6 258,630 4.8 D 1,872,655 25.7 435,914 6.0 4,988,248 68.4 7,296,817 8.9 EL 44,108 26.6 7,364 4.5 114,179 68.9 165,651 1.6 E 375,486 40.6 10,708 1.2 537,686 58.2 923,880 2.3 F 1,195,498 36.6 41,946 1.3 2,025,742 62.1 3,263,186 5.6 IRE 102,655 66.0 : : : : 155,528 4.1 I 153,825 10.5 41,613 2.8 1,269,151 86.7 1,464,589 2.5 L 131,410 89.0 : : : : 147,700 34.9 NL 201,574 30.2 10,326 1.5 455,902 68.3 667,802 4.2 A 219,817 29.2 : : : : 753,528 9.3 P 56,783 27.3 516 0.2 150,899 72.5 208,198 2.0 FIN 16,656 18.3 12,885 14.1 61,533 67.6 91,074 1.8 S 180,191 37.8 24,039 5.0 273,082 57.2 477,312 5.4 UK 856,156 34.8 : : : : 2,459,934 4.2 Total 6,024,680 31.4 : : : : 19,187,198 5.1 Source: Eurostat, New Cronos database (2001) Note: B = 2000; EL = 1998; F = 1999; L = 1998; A = 2000; UK = 2000 With regards to EU internal migrants, their weight on the total immigrant population varies across EU member states. In relative terms, the highest proportion of immigrants from EU countries is found in Luxembourg (89%), but there are also considerable shares of EU citizens among the aliens living in Belgium and Ireland (66% in both countries). In Ireland, three quarters of them are Britons. Overall, however, the bulk of foreign citizens living in EU member states originates from outside the European Union. In the ten EU countries for which detailed data are available, third country nationals form at least 57% of the immigrant population (the least being in Sweden). Italy has the lowest proportion of intra–EU migrants among its alien residents (13.3%). Finland has the largest share of Eastern European immigrants, due to the preponderance of cross–border migrating Estonians. The composition of immigrant stocks is paralleled by that of immigrant flows, available for the 1995–1999 period (on average of the period). If we distinguish between three categories of immigrants (returning nationals, EU non–nationals, third–country nationals), we see that in the late 1990s, Luxembourg was the country in which the immigrant flow was composed by the largest proportion of intra-EU migrants. In contrast, in Italy intra–EU migrants represented only a tiny share of the total of foreigners legally settling down in those years. It is interesting to note that Italy seems to intercept a smaller part of retirement migration flows from Northern European countries than Spain, Portugal and Greece. This may be due to relatively higher costs of housing and living, but the issue remains to be explored empirically in greater detail (see § 3.2). Finally, Ireland is the EU member state that welcomes the proportionally largest number of nationals returning to their home country (more than half of the total).

16


Figure 3. Composition of immigration flows in EU member states: returning nationals, EU citizens, third–country nationals (average 1995–1999)

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

B, 9

5/99

DK

, 95/

98

D, 9

5/99

E, 9

5/99

IRL,

95/

99

I, 95

/96

L, 9

5/99

NL,

95/

99

A, 9

7/99

FIN

, 95/

99

S, 9

5/99

UK

, 95/

99

Third-country nationals EU non-nationals nationals

Source: Eurostat (2003) One serious shortcoming of the available international datasets on migration in EU countries has to do with the impossibility to break down statistics by age groups. However, a recent Eurostat paper points out that among EU nationals moving between member states, 37.5% of men and 43.5% of women were in their 20s in the 1995–1999 period (Thorogood and Winqvist 2003, 3). To a large extent internal mobility in the European Union coincides with the lifecourse stage in which migration projects are normally initiated at all latitudes. Analyzing the stocks of EU foreigners in each EU member state (with the exception of Austria for which this information is not available), Italians and Portuguese stand out as largest communities of EU citizens living abroad in the EU – more than one out of three internal migrants originate from Italy or Portugal (table 11). This is certainly the heritage of past migration inflows (see § 1). South–North migrations of the 1950 and 1960s have left an enduring mark on the structure of European population, that is still visible almost half a century later. In contrast, leaving aside the case of Luxembourg due to the tiny size of its national population, Danish and Swedish citizens are the least represented nationalities among EU internal movers (respectively, they are 86,592 and 89,682).

17

Table 11. Stocks of EU foreigners in EU–15 member states by nationality, 2001

Country of residence B DK D EL E F IRL I L NL P FIN S UK Tot

B 520 23,494 1,183 18,272 66,666 5,208 13,200 25,860 2,115 116 629 8,230 165,493 DK 3,240 20,963

1,238 6,173 4,500 2,237 2,000 2,588 767 580 25,567 16,739 86,592

D

34,321 12,701 9,369

88,651 78,381 38,183 10,020 54,811

10,374 2,201 16,357 62,087 417,456EL 18,386 660 365,438 866 5,768 13,538 1,250 5,692 143 312 4,407 26,307 442,767 E 45,917 1,802 129,471 670 161,762 14,867 2,910 17,155 12,189 533 3,320 46,560 437,156 F 107,240 3,296 110,173 5,094 46,376 29,713 16,530 13,326 7,186 859 4,709 85,592 430,094 IRL 3,295 1,094 15,690 495 3,413 5,314 2,204 930 3,990 446 218 1,146 411,834 450,069 I 200,281 2,833 619,060 5,493 27,874 201,670 19,890 18,248 3,031 774 4,512 97,230 1,200,896 L 4,353 18 5,981 40 354 3,640 257 312 85 11 26 544 15,621 NL 85,763 4,531 110,786 2,701 21,763 24,745 7,312 3,810 4,073 623 3,801 28,822 298,730 A 2,072 746 187,742 1,424 4,088 4,139 6,256 500 3,366 542 217 2,767 5,958 219,817 P 25,560 555 133,726 241 43,340 553,663 4,639 54,490 9,765 118 1,317 33,859 861,273 FIN 2,688 2,085 15,903 954 5,420 2,748 1,579 620 1,980 506 98,571 11,950 145,004 S 4,284 10,839 18,875 1,812 9,879 7,252 3,240 860 3,077 1,232 7,887 20,445 89,682 UK 26,156 12,630

115,353

13,394

99,017

75,250

77,320

24,592

4,400

41,404

14,094

2,207

13,062

518,879

EU–15 foreigners 563,556 54,310 1,872,655 44,108 375,486 1,195,498 102,655 153,825 131,410 201,574 56,783 16,656 180,191 856,156 Source: Eurostat, New Cronos database (2001) Note: B = 2000; EL = 1998; F = 1999; L = 1998; A = 2000; UK = 2000

18

Table 12. Stocks of EU foreigners in EU–15 countries by nationality, 2001 (% per country of residence)

Country of residence B DK D EL E F IRL I L NL P FIN S UK B 1.0 1.3 2.7 4.9 5.6 3.4 10.0 12.8 3.7 0.7 0.3 1.0 DK 0.6 1.1 2.8 1.6 0.4 1.5 1.5 1.3 1.4 3.5 14.2 2.0 D 6.1 23.4 21.2 23.6 6.6 24.8 7.6 27.2 18.3 13.2 9.1 7.3 EL 3.3 1.2 19.5 0.2 0.5 8.8 1.0 2.8 0.3 1.9 2.4 3.1 E 8.1 3.3 6.9 1.5 13.5 9.7 2.2 8.5 21.5 3.2 1.8 5.4 F 19.0 6.1 5.9 11.5 12.4 19.3 12.6 6.6 12.7 5.2 2.6 10.0 IRL 0.6 2.0 0.8 0.9 0.4 1.4 0.7 2.0 0.8 1.3 0.6 48.1 I 35.5 5.2 33.1 12.5 7.4 16.9 15.1 9.1 5.3 4.6 2.5 11.4 L 0.8 0.0 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 NL 15.2 8.3 5.9 6.1 5.8 2.1 4.8 2.9 7.2 3.7 2.1 3.4 A 0.4 1.4 10.0 3.2 1.1 0.3 4.1 0.4 1.7 1.0 1.3 1.5 0.7 P 4.5 1.0 7.1 0.5 11.5 46.3 3.0 41.5 4.8 0.7 0.7 4.0 FIN 0.5 3.8 0.8 2.2 1.4 0.2 1.0 0.5 1.0 0.9 54.7 1.4 S 0.8 20.0 1.0 4.1 2.6 0.6 2.1 0.7 1.5 2.2 47.4 2.4 UK 4.6 23.3 6.2 30.4 26.4 6.3 75.3 16.0 3.3 20.5 24.8 13.3 7.2 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

1.1

Source: Eurostat, New Cronos database (2001) Note: B = 2000; EL = 1998; F = 1999; L = 1998; A = 2000; UK = 2000 Table 13. Stocks of EU foreigners in EU–15 countries by nationality, 2001 (% per nationality)

Country of residence B DK D EL E F IRL I L NL P FIN S UK Tot DK 3.7 24.2 1.4 7.1 5.2 2.6 2.3 3.0 0.9 0.7 29.5 19.3 100.0 D 8.2 3.0 2.2 21.2 18.8 9.1 2.4 13.1 2.5 0.5 3.9 14.9 100.0 EL 4.2 0.1 82.5 0.2 1.3 3.1 0.3 1.3 0.0 0.1 1.0 5.9 100.0 E 10.5 0.4 29.6 0.2 37.0 3.4 0.7 3.9 2.8 0.1 0.8 10.7 100.0 F 24.9 0.8 25.6 1.2 10.8 6.9 3.8 3.1 1.7 0.2 1.1 19.9 100.0 IRL 0.7 0.2 3.5 0.1 0.8 1.2 0.5 0.2 0.9 0.1 0.0 0.3 91.5 100.0 I 16.7 0.2 51.5 0.5 2.3 16.8 1.7 1.5 0.3 0.1 0.4 8.1 100.0 L 27.9 0.1 38.3 0.3 2.3 23.3 1.6 2.0 0.5 0.1 0.2 3.5 100.0 NL 28.7 1.5 37.1 0.9 7.3 8.3 2.4 1.3 1.4 0.2 1.3 9.6 100.0 A 0.9 0.3 85.4 0.6 1.9 1.9 2.8 0.2 1.5 0.2 0.1 1.3 2.7 100.0 P 3.0 0.1 15.5 0.0 5.0 64.3 0.5 6.3 1.1 0.0 0.2 3.9 100.0 FIN 1.9 1.4 11.0 0.7 3.7 1.9 1.1 0.4 1.4 0.3 68.0 8.2 100.0 S 4.8 12.1 21.0 2.0 11.0 8.1 3.6 1.0 3.4 1.4 8.8 22.8 100.0 UK 5.0 2.4 22.2 2.6 19.1 14.5 14.9 4.7 0.8 8.0 2.7 0.4 2.5 100.0 Source: Eurostat, New Cronos database (2001) Note: B = 2000; EL = 1998; F = 1999; L = 1998; A = 2000; UK = 2000

19


Overall, three main intra–EU migration patterns can be discerned:

a) Stocks reflect the legacy of traditional south–north movements. As shown in tables 12 and 13, the presence of the Portuguese is still prevailing in France (46.3% of EU immigrants) and Luxembourg (41.5% of EU immigrants), as is that of the Greeks in Germany (19.5%), of the Spaniards in France (13.5%) and of the Italians in Germany (35.5%) and Belgium (33.1%). In absolute figures, Italians in Germany form the single largest community of EU non–nationals in a EU member state (619,000 persons).

b) Movements linked to geographical and cultural proximity. For example, in

Ireland British citizens constitute 75.3% of EU foreigners, while in the United Kingdom the Irish are 48.1% of EU non–nationals. Austrians are 10% of non–German EU citizens living in Germany; the French form 19% and the Dutch 15.2% of the non–national EU citizens living in Belgium (the Dutch are likely to be in greater number in the Flanders). Established patterns of movements of population between Scandinavian countries exist: in Sweden there live almost 100,000 Finns (i.e., 54.7% of EU non–nationals), and some 25,000 Danes (i.e., 14.2% of EU non–nationals), while in Finland Swedes are 47.4% of the EU non–nationals.

c) Retirement migrations. As § 3.2 of this paper illustrates in greater detail, a

substantial part of the Central–Northern European citizens living in the Southern countries of the continent moved at a relatively late age in search of more favourable weather and leisure conditions. This helps explain the preponderance of Germans settled in Spain (23.6% of non–Spanish EU citizens living there) and Italy (24.8%) as well as that of Britons living in Spain (26.4%), Greece (30.4%) and Portugal (24.8%).

Table 14. Lieberson’s index of immigrant population diversity per country of residence and nationality

Per country of

residence Per nationality DK .80 .81 D .83 .86 EL .82 .31 E .83 .75 F .73 .81 IRL – .16 I .85 .67 L .77 .72 NL .84 .76 A – .27 P .83 .55 FIN .73 .52 S .66 .86 UK .73 .88

20


More generally speaking, how much do intra–EU migrants concentrate in different countries? Applying Lieberson’s index of diversity (Lieberson 1969), it turns out that Italy, the country with the lowest proportion of intra–EU migrants among its foreigners, has also the highest variability within them (table 14). More than other countries, Italy attracts a large spectrum of Europeans. It must also be considered that Italy is known for having a very mixed composition of its immigrant population from outside the EU – more than 10 different nationalities are needed to form 50% of its non–national residents. Other EU member states enjoy, in fact, a sort of preferential appeal to some nationalities. The lowest level of diversity of EU immigrant population is shown by Sweden, due to the overwhelming presence of citizens from other Nordic countries – an effect of cultural proximity but also of legal facilitation for mobility across these states regardless of European citizenship. Lieberson’s index can also be applied using the data of table 13, which presents the distribution of each nationality of EU–migrants among the EU member states. Some migrants move to typical destinations. This is the case for the Irish (who disproportionately move to Great Britain), the Austrians (who tend to migrate to Germany), and the Greeks (who also are more likely to move to Germany than anywhere else). Greater variability is shown by the Britons, Germans and Swedish. Generally speaking, it seems that more recent waves of migration (such as those from the above mentioned country) have more diverse destinations than traditional intra–EU migration fluxes dating back to the 1950s and 1960s. Intra–EU migrants settle down abroad for a variety of possible reasons. One of the key issues to be addressed by the PIONEUR project, in its following research stages, will be that of the motives of migration. In particular, we will explore the ways that motives may vary by gender. For the time being, some information is available on the gender composition of immigrants by country of residence. Overall, 51.9% of intra–EU migrants are men and 48.1% are women. More importantly, about half the 15 EU member states have a majority of male immigrants, and the other half a majority of female immigrants3. At the extremes we find Finland (63.7% of men) and Italy (58.1% of women). In Finland, in particular, males are a majority in all national communities of EU immigrants (table 15). With the sole exception of the UK, the more established immigration countries (i.e., Central and Northern continental European countries) host a majority of male EU migrants. The reverse is true for Southern European countries (except Portugal), where female migrants are in larger numbers. This is especially the case in Italy, where almost 6 out of 10 immigrants are women. Possibly, this can reflect migration for intermarriage as being more common than migration for work, since residence choices have traditionally depended on breadwinner’s residence (traditionally breadwinners being males residing in their home country). In terms of ‘national’ orientations by gender, it can be noted that Greek migrants are disproportionately men in all EU countries (being 86% of the Greeks in Finland and 76% of the Greeks in Denmark), whereas Finnish women are a majority among Finns living in all other EU member states (being 84% and 76% of their nationals residing in Greece and Italy). Like Finnish women, also Swedish and Danish women outnumber 3 Data about Luxembourg and Spain are not available.

21


their male co–nationals in every EU member state but Portugal and Finland (and Sweden for Danes who migrate). The lion’s share of the immigrants from enlargement countries residing in EU member states is taken by the Polish (table 16). Although the available statistics on the size of this population (of which a sizeable part is likely not to be registered, like overstayers or fake tourists) are not complete, we can estimate that about two thirds of them are Polish citizens. With the exception of Finland, where Estonians form 84% of the immigrants from enlargement countries, in all other EU member states immigrants from Poland outnumber residents from the rest of EU–10 countries. In Germany, in particular, there are over 300,000 legally residing Polish. The second largest community from candidate countries, the Hungarian, is much smaller, counting on 54,000 individuals. In fact, the Polish are the third largest nationality of European immigrants living in Germany, after Italians and Greeks (not including Turks). Poland seems to maintain its traditional position in the international division of labour as a manpower exporting country, with Germany being the main recipient of these migration fluxes. The gender composition of immigrants from enlargement countries in the EU reveals something relatively unusual in immigration statistics: everywhere but in Germany, women outnumber men (table 17). Migration from Central and Eastern European accession countries into the European Union is largely female migration. This is especially the case in the Netherlands, Denmark, and Sweden. In some EU countries, it is rare indeed to find men from the smallest EU–10 states – e.g., less than 10% of the 205 Estonians legally residing in Italy are men, and there are only nine men from Lithuania in Greece (but 103 women). Germany is the only country in which there is a majority (51.2%) of men from these countries, probably due to a more established integration of Eastern European immigrants into the German industrial sector. If we limit the analysis to the largest immigrant communities, we see that more Polish men than women can be found in Germany only, and more Hungarian men than women in Germany and Finland (where, however, the Hungarian community amounts to only 654 individuals). In sharp contrast, demand for immigrant labour in other EU countries is more concentrated in personal and domestic services (a sector that employs mostly women migrants). Somewhat more balanced is the composition of the immigrants from Cyprus and Malta – few in absolute numbers, except in the United Kingdom where there are 8,821 Cypriots and 9,763 Maltese.

22

Table 15. Stocks of EU–15 foreigners by gender, 2001 (%) B DK D EL ES F IRL I NL P FIN S UK

m f m f m f m f m f m f m f m f m f m f m f m f m fB 52.7 47.3 49.9 50.1 43.4

56.6 48.0 52.0 48.4

51.6 41.5 58.5 47.3 52.7 51.5 48.5 60.3 39.7 49.6 50.4 34.6 65.4DK

46.9 53.1 43.8 56.2 41.4 58.6 47.9 52.1 40.5 59.5 36.3 63.7 42.3 57.7 56.5 43.5 64.7 35.3 57.2 42.8 37.3 62.7

D 51.0 49.0 53.4 46.6 44.8 55.2 49.0 51.0 47.1 52.9 40.4 59.6 49.6 50.4 55.6 44.4 65.2 34.8 52.8 47.2 45.4 54.6EL

53.2 46.8 76.1 23.9 54.9 45.1 59.9 40.1 49.3 50.7 69.5 30.5 65.2 34.8 55.9 44.1 86.5 13.5 62.8 37.2 70.3 29.7

E

51.3 48.7 52.8 47.2 52.3 47.7 44.5 55.5 50.2 49.8 28.3 71.7 52.3 47.7 50.6 49.4 68.3 31.7 58.8 41.2 39.6 60.4F 48.3 51.7 58.2 41.8 46.5 53.5 52.9 47.1 45.9 54.1 40.1 59.9 48.9 51.1 52.6 47.4 64.0 36.0 59.3 40.7 44.4 55.6IRL

45.3 54.7 63.8 36.2 53.7 46.3 41.8 58.2 49.1 50.9 41.2 58.8 43.5 56.5 52.2 47.8 47.1 52.9 76.6 23.4 63.3 36.7 45.1 54.9

I 55.0 45.0 69.7 30.3 59.5 40.5 56.5 43.5 61.3 38.7 56.7 43.3 65.5 34.5 62.4 37.6 77.6 22.4 68.2 31.8 53.3 46.7L 57.6 42.4 72.2 27.8 54.2 45.8 40.0 60.0 52.0 48.0 51.6 48.4 45.5 54.5 51.0 49.0 67.1 32.9 81.8 18.2 38.5 61.5 100.0 –NL

55.3 44.7 59.3 40.7 54.2 45.8 33.7 66.3 48.3 51.7 48.5 51.5 42.6 57.4 55.0 45.0 77.7 22.3 58.4 41.6 40.4 59.6

A 48.8 51.2 55.8 44.2 54.7 45.3 38.7 61.3 49.1 50.9 40.5 59.5 32.8 67.2 50.4 49.6 53.1 46.9 62.7 37.3 64.7 35.3 47.5 52.5P 50.4 49.6 55.3 44.7 56.8 43.2 49.4 50.6 51.4 48.6 53.2 46.8 38.2 61.8 54.7 45.3 65.3 34.7

52.6 47.4 46.4 53.6

FIN

38.8 61.2 33.5 66.5 30.8 69.2 15.8 84.2 44.7 55.3 30.9 69.1 24.1 75.9 32.1 67.9 42.3 57.7 43.8 56.2 33.9 66.1S 47.5 52.5 43.2 56.8 44.9 55.1 31.7 68.3 45.4 54.6 36.7 63.3 34.4 65.6 42.6 57.4 54.5 45.5 55.7 44.3 33.5 66.5 UK 54.6 45.4 64.8 35.2 59.8 40.2 44.5 55.5 48.4 51.6 50.1 49.9 48.8 51.2 44.5 55.5 60.1 39.9 53.7 46.3 76.0 24.0 66.7 33.3 EU–15 52.7 47.3 55.4 44.6 55.6 44.4 44.9 55.1 49.4 50.6 52.1 47.9 47.8 52.2 41.9 58.1 53.4 46.6 53.7 46.3 63.7 36.3 50.8 49.2 45.7 54.3

Source: Eurostat, New Cronos database (2001) Note: B = 2000; EL = 1998; F = 1999; L = 1998; A = 2000; UK = 2000

23

Table 16. Stocks of foreigners from enlargement countries in EU member states, 2001

B DK D EL E F I NL P FIN S UK CZ 225 24,361 712 1,033 1,694 3,468 1,174 106 174 433 EE 458 3,649 39 61 224 205 121 5 10,839 1,554 HU 1,089 391 54,437 609 607 2,961 3,066 1,538 123 654 2,988 7,133 LV 742 7,915 71 79 336 467 173 8 227 694 LT 1,221 9,442 112 168 593 322 346 16 204 574 PL 6,749 5,548 301,366 5246 8,164 33,758 29,282 5,944 230 694 16,667 23,122 SK 127 14,657 361 341 1,159 1,583 719 12 51 349 SI 51 18,766 29 103 786 2,040 165 9 10 625 CY 25 965 133 89 254 260 48 3 24 104 8,821 MT 23 356 52 63 181 920 98 4 8 51 9,763 Total EU–10 8,811 435,914 7,364 10,708 41,946 41,613 10,326 516 12,885 24,039 Source: Eurostat, New Cronos database (2001) Note: B = 2000; EL = 1998; F = 1999; L = 1998; A = 2000; UK = 2000

24

Table 17. Stocks of foreigners from enlargement countries in EU member states by gender, 2001 (%) B DK D EL E F I NL P FIN S UK

m f m f m f m f m f m f m f m f m f m f m f m fCZ : : 36.9 63.1 41.9 58.1 30.9 69.1 38.5 61.5 44.7 55.3 21.2 78.8 25.3 74.7 47.2 52.8 48.3 51.7 30.9 69.1 : : EE : : 26.6 73.4 33.0 67.0 25.6 74.4 31.1 68.9 41.1 58.9 9.8 90.2 26.4 73.6 40.0 60.0 39.7 60.3 30.2 69.8 : : HU

41.8 58.2 44.2 55.8 62.7 37.3 28.1 71.9 40.5 59.5 54.1 45.9 23.9 76.1 34.4 65.6 41.5 58.5 55.7 44.3 40.2 59.8 43.3 56.7 LV : : 39.2 60.8 41.8 58.2 18.3 81.7 40.5 59.5 48.8 51.2 14.8 85.2 26.6 73.4 12.5 87.5 35.7 64.3 31.8 68.2 : : LT : : 40.4 59.6 32.9 67.1 11.6 88.4 47.6 52.4 44.4 55.6 26.1 73.9 17.1 82.9 50.0 50.0 36.8 63.2 37.3 62.7 : : PL 34.6 65.4 30.0 70.0 51.1 48.9 41.7 58.3 50.0 50.0 38.2 61.8 32.8 67.2 24.7 75.3 47.0 53.0 47.0 53.0 32.2 67.8 41.5 58.5 SK : : 35.4 64.6 45.2 54.8 26.3 73.7 45.7 54.3 45.1 54.9 26.8 73.2 27.3 72.7 58.3 41.7 58.8 41.2 38.1 61.9 : : SI : : 35.3 64.7 51.9 48.1 62.1 37.9 38.8 61.2 51.1 48.9 52.9 47.1 47.3 52.7 66.7 33.3 50.0 50.0 45.9 54.1 : : CY : : 52.0 48.0 57.7 42.3 32.3 67.7 53.9 46.1 42.1 57.9 58.5 41.5 68.8 31.3 66.7 33.3 87.5 12.5 72.1 27.9 48.8 51.2 MT : : 47.8 52.2 41.3 58.7 28.8 71.2 41.3 58.7 47.0 53.0 31.3 68.7 43.9 56.1 25.0 75.0 87.5 12.5 49.0 51.0 62.8 37.2 EUR–10 : : 33.1 66.9 51.2 48.8 37.8 62.2 47.9 52.1 40.2 59.8 31.7 68.3 26.9 73.1 45.7 54.3 41.1 58.9 33.8 66.2 : : Source: Eurostat, New Cronos database (2001) Note: B = 2000; EL = 1998; F = 1999; L = 1998; A = 2000; UK = 2000

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2.3. Intra–EU Migration in Germany, Italy, Spain, Great Britain, and France In this section we will focus on migration in Germany, Italy, Spain, Great Britain, and France (for which only data about the situation in 1990 and 1999 are available) – the five countries in which further research will be carried out. Germany Germany had 7.3 million foreign residents in 2000. The stock of foreign population increased from 1990 to 1996, then stabilised. In the 1990–2000 period the total number of EU nationals residing in Germany never went over 30% of the total of foreigners (figure 4). Figure 4. Stocks of foreign population and EU foreigners in Germany, 1990–2000

Germany

0

1000

2000

3000

4000

5000

6000

7000

8000

1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000

Foreigners EU non-nationals

Source: total of foreigners, SOPEMI (2002); total of EU–foreigners, Eurostat New Cronos database 2001 Spain In Spain during the 1990s, the total stock of foreign residents rose year after year, reaching in 2000 a total of 895,700 people – more than three times the amount in 1990. In spite of this extraordinarily high rate of increase (in percentage, from 0.7% of the population in 1990 to 2.2% in 2000), Spain still has one of the lowest proportions of resident aliens in the European Union. In fact, Spain has also one of the highest proportions of EU non–nationals among its foreigners (40.6%). In absolute numbers, their amount fell dramatically in the 1991–1992 period, but then recovered constantly until the end of the decade. Therefore, in

26


the 1990–2000 period the number of other EU citizens living in Spain increased by 46% (figure 5). Figure 5. Stocks of foreign population and EU foreigners in Spain, 1990–2000

Spain

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

900

1000

1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000


Source: total of foreigners, SOPEMI (2002); total of EU–foreigners, Eurostat New Cronos database 2001 Italy In Italy, the stock of foreign residents grew at a quite constant rate in the 1990s (apart from a slight decline between 1993 and 1994) (figure 6). In the same period, though, the number of EU non–nationals living in Italy went down. In 2000, Italy had lost 10,000 non–national EU residents compared to ten years earlier. Relative to the size of the alien population, the proportion of EU non–nationals in Italy is the lowest in the whole European Union. In fact, as in the recent past, the majority of migrants come from developing countries, especially from Northern Africa and Eastern Europe (Romanians being the most rapidly expanding nationality of immigrants after 2000). United Kingdom Data about the origins of EU non–nationals in the United Kingdom are incomplete (figure 7). Overall, however, the number of third–country nationals residing in Great Britain has expanded more rapidly than that of EU non–nationals. The total number of the latter has risen by less than 10% between 1990 and 2000. As in the past, the large majority of them are Irish citizens.

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Figure 6. Stocks of foreign population and EU foreigners in Italy, 1990–2000

Italy

0

200

400

600

800

1000

1200

1400

1600

1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000


Source: total of foreigners, SOPEMI (2002); total of EU–foreigners, Eurostat New Cronos database 2001 Figure 7. Stocks of foreign population and EU foreigners in UK, 1990–2000

United Kingdom

0

500

1000

1500

2000

2500

1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000


Source: total of foreigners, SOPEMI (2002); total of EU–foreigners, Eurostat New Cronos database 2001

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Table 18 presents, for each country, the stocks of residents that are citizens of the other four EU member states on which the PIONEUR project focuses. The data refer to three points in time (except for France, due to data limitations) in the early 1990s, mid–1990s and early 21st century. In figures 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 these data have been transformed to better detect the trends of different nationalities in each country by making the earliest available figure equal to 100. The columns thus refer to variations of stocks relative to the first point of the time series. In Germany (figure 8), at the end of the 1990s, the stocks of immigrants from Italy and France expanded by 10% and 17% respectively, compared to 1994, while the number of Spaniards shrank slightly. The number of Britons grew by 4%from 1994 to 1997, diminishing in 2001 by 1%. All in all, the composition of these stocks of immigrant population did not change dramatically over the decade. The Spanish situation is different as a sizeable increase of all the four nationalities was recorded from 1993 to 2001 (figure 9). The German presence increased from 1993 to 1997 (+50%), and it almost doubled from 1997 to 2001. The growth of Italian, French and British residents was slightly less spectacular, but still took place at a very high rate – Italians and French have more than doubled in eight years, while Britons have increased by 85%. Both retirement migration and the expansion–internationalization of the Spanish economy are likely to account for this generalized growth of EU citizens settling down in Spain in the 1990s. Quite the contrary is true for Italy (figure 10). Only French residents increased slightly (+17% from 1993 to 2001, an increase concentrated in the post–1997 period). More precisely, no immigrant group (of the four under scrutiny) grew between 1993 and 1997, as a possible reflection of the political and economic turmoil of the country in those years. The 1997–2001 rise has only reconstituted the size that these immigrant communities had during the early 1990s. In the United Kingdom (Figure 11), only a modest increase of French and Italians was recorded between 1994 and 1997, while Spaniards decreased slightly and Germans almost doubled in those years. From 1997 to 2000, the number of Germans in Britain stabilized and that of French rose substantially (+50%). The Italian and Spanish communities also grew in the late 1990s, but not so spectacularly. The paucity of data does not allow us to produce a similar time–series analysis for France (figure 12). However, a mere comparison of 1990 and 1999 figures reveals that a sort of two–speed immigration has taken place: whereas the populations of Italians and Spaniards shrank substantially (–20% of Italians and almost –25% of Spaniards at the end of the decade), Britons and Germans have expanded considerably (+50% for both nationalities).

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Table 18. Stocks of Italian, German, Spanish, French and British Citizens in Germany, Spain, Italy, France and the United Kingdom, 1990–2000 (thousands)

GERMANY SPAIN ITALY FRANCE UNITED KINGDOM 1994 1997 2001 1993 1997 2001 1993 1997 2001 1990 1999 1994 1997 2000

D – – – 30,493 45,898 88,651 39,456 32,764 38,183 52,723 78,381 32,000 62,000 62,087 E 133,160 132,457 129,471 – – – 15,559 12,277 14,867 216,047 161,762 41,000 34,000 46,560 I 563,009 599,429 619,060 13,580 21,362 27,874 – – – 252,759 201,670 79,000 82,000 97,230 F 94,160 101,783 110,173 22,644 33,133 46,376 25,381 25,262 29,713 – – 57,000

59,000

85,592

UK 111,748 116,641 115,353 53,441 68,359 99,017 28,842 22,685 24,592 50,422 75,250 – – – Source: Eurostat, New Cronos database 2001

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Figure 8. Stocks of EU foreigners from I, E, F, UK in Germany (1994=100)

0 20 40 60 80 100 120

it

es

fr

uk

200119971994

Source: Eurostat New Cronos Database (2001) Figure 9. Stocks of EU foreigners from D, I, F, UK in Spain (1993=100)

0 50 100 150 200 250 300

de

it

fr

uk

200119971993

Source: Eurostat New Cronos Database (2001)

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Figure 10. Stocks of EU foreigners from D, E, F, UK in Italy (1993=100)

0 20 40 60 80 100 120

de

es

fr

uk

200119971993

Source: Eurostat New Cronos Database (2001) Figure 11. Stocks of EU foreigners from D, E, F, I in UK (1994=100)

0 50 100 150 200

de

es

fr

it

200019971994

Source: Eurostat New Cronos Database (2001)

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Figure 12. Stocks of EU foreigners from D, E, F, UK in F (1990=100)

0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140

de

es

it

uk

19991990

Source: Eurostat New Cronos Database 2001

Generally speaking, it seems that the frontiers between France and Great Britain are more permeable – in both directions – than those between these countries and Southern–European member states. Germans also move to France and Britain somewhat more readily than Italians and Spaniards do. Spain, in turn, is overall an equally attractive settlement for citizens of the other four EU member states, whereas Italy is equally unpopular, so to speak, as a destination for intra–EU migrations. It appears that a France–Britain–Germany circuit of internal migration is emerging, but it is impossible to assess with these data the complex interplay of push and pull factors that are involved. This emerging circuit may be a signal of the greater loosening of intra–EU labour market barriers for the citizens France, Britain, and Germany vis-à-vis the southern European countries. We are not now in a position to say how much this depends on labour–demand (due to the greater density of multinational organizations in these countries and especially their global cities) or labour–supply factors (due to comparatively more advanced education, training and skills, such as foreign language proficiency).

3. Emerging Trends of Intra–EU Migration 3.1. Highly Skilled Migration Rodríguez–Pose (2002, 98-100) describes the dramatic increase in the intra-EU migration of highly qualified individuals during the 1990s. He writes that these individuals moved to take jobs not only in multinational corporations, banking, and finance, but also in less traditional areas that one might not expect, such as the fashion industry, research centres, and public service. Britain is an excellent example of the recent trend of increased migration of highly qualified individuals. Salt (1992, 488-489) notes: ‘Each year since 1978 [in the UK],

33


around 60 per cent of immigrants and emigrants in employment were professional or managerial workers. He also writes that, ‘In 1989, as in other years, returning British citizens were more likely to be professional and managerial than manual and clerical workers. The total volume of professional and managerial flow is considerable, with a gross annual movement of around 145,000 in 1989, including 63,000 foreign nationals’ (1992, 489). Rodríguez-Pose identifies two key factors in the increase in migration of highly qualified individuals: ‘The simplification of the bureaucratic aspects of mobility and the preparation and willingness of younger generations of Europeans’ (2002, 99). Thus, agreements such as the Single European Act of 1986 and the Maastricht Treaty of 1993, and the increase in foreign language study and study abroad programs among European youth have contributed to the increase of the intra-EU migration of professionals. ‘In contrast to the low–skilled worker from the south of Europe, Ireland or Finland of the 1960s and early 1990s, the European migrant of the 1990s and early twenty–first century is a highly qualified young professional’ (ibid., 100). 3.2. Retirement Migration The social construction of old age was substantially transformed during the twentieth century due to the spread of retirement, increased survival, rising affluence, greater education, and improved housing. In addition, personal relationships and familial obligations that have tied aging people to particular locations have loosened in recent decades. For example, the rise in divorce and remarriage has diversified familial networks and promoted the establishment of ‘new lives’. The ‘evolutionary model’ of retirement migration describes three stages in its historical development. Initially there is the return of urban workers to their rural roots when they retire. In the second stage, following the declining importance of childhood connections, destinations become more diverse and are chosen based on accessibility, environment, housing, and social support. Finally, these choice destinations are extended beyond the local or regional to include international, a shift fuelled by the search for unspoiled rural amenities. In general, there has been a perceptible shift from family–related to lifestyle motivated retirement migration and a trend towards movement from urban to rural areas. There are four main factors channelling people towards international retirement migration (IRM). People who have worked abroad or lived abroad are more likely to retire abroad, as are those who have immigrated to the country or married an immigrant and thus maintain family ties outside their first country of residence. Furthermore, people who have vacationed abroad are more likely to develop knowledge of and attachments to foreign places. In addition, geopolitical history plays a role in connecting people with far away places, as is particularly evident for example in the case of British colonialism. Furthermore, there are four life course influences likely to affect the decision to retire internationally: whether or not such people developed contacts abroad while working;

34


the extent of their pension, life savings, and health insurance; the age at which they retire; and the experiences and knowledge they have developed through travelling. Among those who decide to retire to the south, four general types can be discerned along a continuum of attachment to the destination: long–stay international tourists, second–home owners, seasonal migrations, and permanent residents. The recent trend in IRM from northern to southern Europe is mainly due to lower cost of living, the attractiveness of the climate, the attractiveness of an idyllic rural way of life, and increased familiarity linked to the mass tourism boom. Limits to the extent of mobility include transportation, legal and institutional barriers, and familiarity with foreign places. IRM is intimately intertwined with tourism as the attractions of a locale that lure mass tourism also lure IRMs. In general, the development of mass tourism generally precedes the emergence of large–scale IRM. Mass tourism has not only informed potential IRMs about potential places to live, it has also helped develop a resort infrastructure to support this lifestyle choice. The post–WWII development of the mass tourism industry in southern Europe has been a central force propelling IRM in recent decades. In the past, IRMs tended to be elites. However, intellectuals settling in southern Europe in the 1960s and 1970s pioneered the way for the masses. Now people who retire internationally tend to be middle class or above, married, and have no dependents. The first wave of IRMs tended to have significant experience living or visiting abroad prior to their retirement move. However, the importance of such experiences has declined with more recent settlers. In addition, work and family ties to the destination are diminishing in importance while holiday travel is playing an increasingly significant role. Many people maintain strong ties to their home country after moving, although these can diminish with time. Regarding Britain, for example, a little less than half of IRMs maintain property in Britain after they move and most younger retirees do not claim permanent residence and continue to rely on British health care. As they age, however, there is a trend towards declaring residence and relying on local health care. Ties to home are also maintained by trips from friends and family members with the average IRM receiving seven such visitors a year. Furthermore, IRMs return to Britain to visit at least once a year on average. However, those that spend less of the year in the foreign retirement location tend to be treated with less respect and have a lower rank in the hierarchy of the expat community. In general, overall well–being increases with the amount of time spent in an area. Expat clubs, English media, gated communities, and churches provide a social network for newcomers. King, Warnes and Williams (2000) see language as the key to integration with the host society. Particularly those with local language skills also participate in clubs and volunteer activities in the local community. However, interactions with fellow IRMs of other European nationalities are overlooked in these studies. In general, IRMs describe their choice to move positively (but there is some selection on the dependent variable). Their main complaints concern language difficulties, separation from families, and bureaucracy.

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While King, Warnes and Williams (2000) question whether integration is even relevant for IRM, they do note that such migrants often adopt some local ways if only superficially. Friendships with the locals tend to be dependent on the English language capabilities of local residents. Mixed expat and local clubs tend to be quite popular and a place for mixing the two populations. However, British clubs are common as well. And frequently, the inward–facing geography of retirement communities separates them from their surroundings. To an extent IRM resembles early twentieth century coastal resorts, but more recent trends in Europeanization have had two important effects. Work and leisure are increasingly delimited within a European rather than a national space. Furthermore, there has been a cultural and economic convergence of lifestyles across the continent, easing transition from place to place. National boundaries are also leap–frogged in the political interests of the IRMs who tend to be concerned with local but not national politics. Most specific case studies look at Tuscany, Costa del Sol, Algarve, and Malta. Tuscany has a long history of British (and other) residents extending back to the nineteenth century. British migration was intensified, however, after WWII with the development of mass tourism and retirement farmhouses. IMRs to this region tend to be attracted to the cultural heritage of Tuscany and have generally visited or lived there before making the decision to retire. They also have relatively good language skills aiding in their integration. Mass tourism developed in the 1960s in the Costa del Sol and with the establishment of resorts also came people buying retirement property. Still IRM settlements are closely intertwined with the tourist industry. With the more recent success of the Spanish economy, now some Spaniards are beginning to retire to communities traditionally monopolized by foreigners. This has created some resentment among British expats who criticize their ‘loud and wild’ lifestyle. Algarve began developing its tourist industry in the late 1960s and has since lagged behind other retirement centers with respect to infrastructure. There are frequent complaints about the bureaucracy and medical system. IRMs tend to be heavily associated with the tourists. There is rather weak knowledge of Portuguese and low levels of mixing with the local community. IRM to Malta is closely connected to the history of British colonialism. The closure of the dockyards in the 1960s led to a mass exodus of male workers to Britain. Unsurprisingly, Malta has a relatively high proportion of women retirees who are married or have been married to Maltese men and a large number of working class migrants with previous experience with the shipping industry or the military. Because of the ‘Britishization’ of Malta during colonialism and because almost all Maltese speak English, there are lower barriers to integration. However, gated communities still exist.

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Table 19. Foreign residents in Spain by two age groups, 1997

Age Group EU citizens Foreign Residents

0–64 yrs ‘000

65+ yrs ‘000

0–64:65+ ratio

0–64 yrs %

65+ yrs %

65+/yrs %

Origin Countries Austria 2.5 0.3 8.0 1.3 0.7 0.5

Belgium 7.8 2.6 3.0 4.0 5.9 4.4 Denmark 3.9 1.3 3.1 2.0 2.9 2.2

Finland 2.7 0.8 3.3 1.4 1.9 1.4 France 29.4 4.9 5.9 14.8 11.1 8.4

Germany 43.3 6.6 6.6 21.9 14.8 11.2 Greece 0.6 0.1 6.9 0.3 0.2 0.1 Ireland 2.7 0.2 12.3 1.3 0.5 0.4

Italy 20.4 2.3 9.0 10.3 5.1 3.9 Luxembourg 0.2 0.0 4.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 Netherlands 11.3 3.1 3.6 5.7 7.0 5.3

Portugal 35.4 2.9 12.3 17.9 6.5 4.9 Sweden 5.1 1.9 2.6 2.6 4.4 3.3

United Kingdom 32.5 17.4 1.9 16.4 39.1 29.1 Total EU 197.8 44.4 4.4 100.0 100.0 75.7

Total non–EU 195.2 14.3 13.6 ––––––– ––––––– 24.3 Total all 393.0 58.8 6.7 100.0

Source: Observatorio de Personas Mayores: ‘Las Personas Mayores en Espana: Informe 2000’. Madrid: Instituto de Migraciones y Servicios Sociales, Ministerio de Trabajo y Asuntos Sociales. The relationship between IRM and internal retirement migration remains unclear. Still it is not known whether international retirement supplements or substitutes for internal movement and therefore future trends are hard to predict. However, as tourism is closely linked to IRM, Greece and Turkey will likely to see booms in coming years. Furthermore, it is possible that streams of migrants from other northern and southern European countries will displace current IRM populations. Tensions between tourists and IRMs could increase as more tourists seek out IRM facilities for their trips. This may lead to a shift in residential preferences towards more rural areas. Although IRM is likely to grow in the future, whether or not it will remain concentrated around the Mediterranean basin depends on the pace of environmental degradation, development, and the expansion of global tourism. Additionally, as the local economies in southern Europe improve, there might be an influx of Spaniards, Italians, Portuguese, and Maltese to northern European retirement enclaves and the ‘re–nationalization’ of such communities. 3.3. Student Migration In recent years, international student migration (ISM) has received increased attention and support from national and European institutions that have come to view it as a way to promote European integration both culturally and economically by developing a European consciousness and training an educated mobile labour force within European borders.

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The 1980s saw the emergence of ISM programs. The main avenue was the People’s Europe initiative whose goals were heightening awareness of European institutions, developing support for integration, and preparing for the establishment of a free market and free mobility. Furthermore, in response to the lack of interest in Europe among its purported citizens, throughout the 1980s there was a proliferation of more general programs aimed towards promoting European awareness and developing a European consciousness. This was to be accomplished through education in history and culture focusing on the commonalities and diversities of the European population and via cultural and educational exchanges. In addition, competence in two or more European languages has been promoted by the Commission and described as an essential prerequisite for full market integration. Since the 1980s, market imperatives have continued to be an important legitimizing discourse for ISM projects. Attempts by the Commission to coordinate education and homogenize curriculums have repeatedly been resisted by member states reluctant to yield control over this power mechanism for nation–building. Still, EU funding is available to support academic programs including a European dimension or content. From 1987 to 2000 approximately 750,000 students took part in the Erasmus and Socrates programs. This is still well below the Commission’s stated goal of involving 10% of all students. During 1999–2000 the UK received 20,705 students and sent out 10,056; France received 17,890 and sent out 16,824; Spain 15,197 (in), 16,297 (out); Germany 14,691 (in), 15,715 (out); Italy 8,029 (in), 12, 421 (out) (King and Ruiz–Gelices 2003). In their survey of 50 British students about to embark on a year abroad, Ruiz–Gelices, King and Favell (2003) found that the students they surveyed tended to come from middle–class and above families and that most rely on families and grants to support their education. (The Eurostudent 2000 report similarly finds that students from low–income families are underrepresented in ISM.) Furthermore, most students had parents of different nationalities, had spent time abroad before, and spoke a foreign language. They also tended to live with foreign students and have foreign friends at home. Over half reported appreciating the similarities they share with people from other backgrounds when they socialize together. However, this does not seem to be limited to European boundaries as most thought Europeans were different from others. Furthermore, for most students spending a year abroad was a necessary component of their degree. A little over half of the students viewed European integration as necessary and feasible. The most appealing aspects of integration for them were free movement followed by citizenship rights across countries. Most of the students also said they would be willing to migrate as a part of their career and around half thought career moves would likely take them to another country in Europe. Displaying a European economic consciousness, students show they have broadened their view of the job market from the national to the European level. In another survey, King and Ruiz–Gelices (2003) found that graduates of year–abroad programs generally found the development of language and cultural knowledge to be more highly valued benefits of studying abroad than career development. In comparison to students who did not do a year abroad, those who did felt more informed about the EU and more interested in EU affairs and displayed other pro–EU attitudes. Although results were mixed concerning the revision of

38


attitudes about the home country after their year abroad, most students found that their experience increased their sense of belonging to a European cultural space and that they became more attached to their host country. These feelings were much stronger among students who continued to live abroad after graduation, a population that also held a much weaker sense of belonging to their home country. Furthermore, in comparison to those who did not study abroad, year abroad graduates had higher rates of further education after graduation, lower levels of unemployment, higher salaries, better jobs, and were almost three times more likely to be living abroad. Almost all year abroad graduates said their experience in such programs has helped them on the job and over half use their host–country language during work. They were also nearly four times more likely to apply for employment in a foreign country and were more likely to move abroad for a job. In addition, students who have studied abroad develop a stronger propensity for feeling at home in more than one place. 4. Conclusion 4.1. Intra–European Migration in a Changing EU Labour Market and Institutional Context At the fin de siecle, economic convergence had removed some of the stark differences that act as spurs to migration in Europe. Taking the simple example of GDP/capita as an indicator of economic convergence, some of the distinctions between European countries have become much less marked, even in the decade between 1994 and 2003 (table 20). Taking the example of Spain, which in the 1960s and 1970s was exporting migrants to France, Germany and Belgium as we have seen, the GDP gap has reduced significantly in relation to all those countries. The same is true of unemployment, which is also often cited as a key structural factor explaining migration (table 21). Even when exceptional cases such as Ireland are removed, there is clearly significant labour market convergence going on within the same time period. In Spain, a reduction of unemployment from 18.6% to 11.3% followed a general trend throughout Europe. But in the Northern European countries that had previously been a target for Spanish economic migrants unemployment declined more slowly. In France from 11.3% to 8.7% and In Belgium from 8.6% to 7.3%. In Germany, the country that had in previous decades been a magnet for European workers there was actually an increase in unemployment over the same period. This overall process of labour market convergence is uncontroversial, and is supported by OECD (2003, 15) data on hourly earnings.

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Table 20. GDP per capita in Purchasing Power Standards (PPS) (EU–15=100)

Source: Eurostat (2003)

1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003

EU15 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100.0 f 100.0 f Eurozone 100.7 101.5 100.6 100.3 100.1 100.6 100.7 99.4 99.1 f 98.9 f

Belgium 113.5 112.6 111.4 111.4 110.7 106.5 107.5 108.6 108.5/f 108.6/f

Denmark 116 117.9 120.7 119.9 118.1 118.8 117.2 114.7 113.5/f 113.5/f Germany 109.6 110 107.7 107.8 106.2 106.4 106.5 103.2 102.6/f 101.8/f

Greece 64.6 64.8 65.2 64.2 64.9 66.1 65.5 64.6 66.5/f 68.3/f Spain 77.5 78.4 79.5 80.1 79.4 82.2 82.4 84 84.4/f 84.8/f

France 104 103.8 101.2 99 98.9 99.7 101.4 103.4 103.3/f 102.9/f Ireland 87.4 93.3 93.6 103.7 106.2 112.3 115.2 117.6 121.9/f 122.0/f

Italy 102.8 103.7 104.7 102.2 103.6 103.4 102.4 103 102.5/f 102.4/f Luxembourg 173.4 172.6 170.2 175 180.2 188.8 196.8 191.1 188.0/f 187.1/f Netherlands 105.9 109.6 109.3 112.7 115.5 114.6 111.4 114.8 112.7/f 111.6/f

Austria 111.1 110.6 111.9 111.2 110.1 111.3 114.5 110.8 110.4/f 109.8/f Portugal 69.4 70 70.2 73.5 72.3 72.3 68.5 69.1 69.2/f 68.8/f Finland 91.1 97.5 97.3 99.7 101.8 100.7 103.5 104 102.0/f 102.3/f

Sweden 103.4 106.4 106.2 106.1 105.3 105.2 106.8 102.3 101.7/f 101.2/f UK 98.3 96.5 100.4 102.5 103.4 100.6 100.4 101.5/f 103.2/f 104.5/f

Czech Rep. .. 62.26 64.17 62.37 60.22 59.16 56.57 59.48 59.21 ..

Estonia .. 33.97 35.37 38.42 39.57 38.7 40.42 39.85 40.29 .. Hungary .. 45.62 45.72 46.86 48.01 49 50.09 52.83 55.09 ..

Lithuania .. 33.04 33.43 35.55 37 34.5 35.6 38.22 39.57 .. Latvia .. 24.72 25.59 27.4 28.25 28.61 31.07 33.76 34.93 .. Malta .. 52.56 53.64 54.62 54.71 55.3 .. .. .. ..

Poland .. 34.39 35.97 37.56 38.37 39.01 40.68 40.5 40.62/f .. Romania .. 27.94 28.77 26.51 24.62 23.85 23.55 24.21 24.42 .. Slovenia .. 62.94 64.21 65.82 66.74 68.56 70.77 72.47 72.55 ..

Slovak Rep. .. 45.97 47.94 49.46 50.05 49.5 46.21 47.26 47.8 .. Turkey .. 26.54 27.56 29.1 28.79 26.43 25.45 22.51 22.51 .. Iceland 106.8 114.6 117.3 114.6 115.5 116.3 114.6 113.2 110.7/f 110.3/f Norway 120.1 121 128.3 131.4 124 129 147.7 143.2 139.6/f 141.1/f

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Table 21. Total unemployment rate – unemployed persons as a share of the total active population

1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002

EU15 10.1 10.5 10.1 10.2 10 9.4 8.7 7.8 7.4 7.7

Belgium 8.6 9.8 9.5 9.2 9.3 8.6 6.9 6.7 7.3 Denmark 9.6 7.7 6.7 6.3 5.2 4.9 4.8 4.4 4.3 4.5 Germany 7.7 8.2 8 8.7 9.7 9.1 8.4 7.8 7.8 8.6

Greece 8.6 8.9 9.2 9.6 9.8 10.9 11.8 11 10.4 9.9 Spain 18.6 19.8 18.8 18.1 17 15.2 12.8 11.3 10.6 11.3

France 11.3 11.8 11.3 11.9 11.8 11.4 10.7 9.3 8.5 8.7 Ireland 15.6 14.3 12.3 11.7 9.9 7.5 5.6 4.3 3.9 4.4

Italy 10.1 11 11.5 11.5 11.6 11.7 11.3 10.4 9.4 9 Luxembourg 2.6 3.2 2.9 2.9 2.7 2.7 2.4 2.3 2.1 2.8 Netherlands 6.2 6.8 6.6 6 4.9 3.8 3.2 2.8 2.4 2.7

Austria 4 3.8 3.9 4.4 4.4 4.5 3.9 3.7 3.6 4.3 Portugal 5.6 6.9 7.3 7.3 6.8 5.1 4.5 4.1 4.1 5.1 Finland 16.3 16.6 15.4 14.6 12.7 11.4 10.2 9.8 9.1 9.1

Sweden 9.1 9.4 8.8 9.6 9.9 8.2 6.7 5.6 4.9 4.9 UK 10 9.3 8.5 8 6.9 6.2 5.9 5.4 5 5.1

Bulgaria : : : : : : : 16.4 19.2 18.1 Cyprus : : : : : : : 5.2 4.4 3.8

Czech Rep. : : : : : 6.4 8.6 8.7 8 7.3 Estonia : : : : 9.6 9.2 11.3 12.5 11.8 9.1

Hungary : : : 9.6 9 8.4 6.9 6.3 5.6 5.6 Lithuania : : : : : 11.8 11.2 15.7 16.1 13.1

Latvia : : : : : 14.3 14 13.7 12.8 12.8 Malta : : : : : : : 7 6.7 7.4

Poland : : : : 10.9 10.2 13.4 16.4 18.5 19.9 Romania : : : : 5.3 5.4 6.2 6.8 6.6 7 Slovenia : : : 6.9 6.9 7.4 7.2 6.6 5.8 6

Slovak Rep : : : : : : 16.7 18.7 19.4 18.6 Turkey : : : : : : : 6.6 8.5 10.4 Iceland : : : : : : : : : : Norway 6.0 b 5.4 b 4.9 b 4.8 4 3.2 3.2 3.4 3.6 3.9

9.7

Source: Eurostat (2003)

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Table 22. Major steps toward free movement in the European Union and the role of cross–border regional co–operation

EU Level Main provisions regarding free/movement

Developments on the regional level

Genesis: The 1950s – 1970s 1951 Treaty of Paris Council of European

Municipalities and Regions

1952 European Coal and Steel Community

Free movement for workers in the relevant industries

1957 Treaty of Rome 1958 European Economic

Community

The 1960s – 1980s 1965 First Commission

Communication on Regional Policy

1968 Regulation 1612/68, EEC

Completion of Common Market labour policy; free movement rights for EC workers and their families

1969 Second Commission Communication on Regional Policy

1971 Regulation 1407/71, EEC

Application of social security schemes to employed persons, self–employed persons, and to members of their families moving within the EC

1973 Free movement rights for self–employed EC workers

1975 European Regional Development Fund

1985 Schengen Agreement 1986 Single European Act

(SEA)

EU Level Main provisions regarding

free/movement Developments on the

regional level Consolidation and New Challenges: The 1990s 1990 Extension of free movement rights to

non–workers INTERREG Community Initiative adopted

1993 The Maastricht Treaty Citizenship of the European Union (Art. 7) Creation of the Committee of the Regions (COR)

1994 Eures network set up by Commission Creation of transparency for a European labour market

1998 The Amsterdam/Treaty

Expansion of the COR’s remit

Source: Schmidt and Salt (2001)

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If the story of economic convergence within Europe is one that we might expect to lead to declines in intra–European migration, the story of changing civil and political rights within Europe is one that we might expect to lead to the opposite outcome. We might expect the progressive granting of increased freedom to move, work and settle within European countries to lead to more movement. In research terms, the obvious next step would be to focus on those countries within Europe where clear and obvious economic incentives to internal migration remain, and where legal barriers have now been removed. This would enable us to understand the relative influence of economic and civic factors on migration patterns. This has not yet been done in any systematic way and could certainly provide a fruitful future direction of research. It would also provide findings that could be used to better predict the migration patterns and social effects that may accompany the addition of Eastern European countries and/or Turkey to EU membership. Table 22 summarises the major steps towards free movement within the EU since 1951 (cf. also Baldoni 2003, in this working paper series). It shows that the move towards free movement has been gradual and that it was only in the 1990s that the Maastricht Treaty extended genuine rights throughout Europe. The picture of legacy regulation, lack of implementation of these EC directives, and other para–legal and informal barriers to migration is incomplete and in need of detailed micro and qualitative study in order to fully understand the real barriers and spurs to migration. Williams (2001, 104) argues that: ‘For international migrants moving into or within Europe, the region represents a blurred map of disjointed spaces, uneven and differentiated rights, punctuated by borders of variable porosity. The freedom of movement of labour provisions of the Treaty of Rome, later widened to freedom of movement of persons in the Treaty of the European Union, has had a limited impact on this politicised landscape of migration rights, in terms of either imposing a second tier ‘European mobility space’, or of harmonizing the national systems of regulation.’ He argues further that the key question for the migrants from central and eastern Europe, as well as those from the former Soviet Union and elsewhere, is to which Europe they have secured access. The question will assume even greater importance as the accession negotiations reach their conclusion. Membership of Schengen is not a condition of EU accession, but full application of the Schengen acquis is a condition of access to the Schengen Agreement. This means that there is a distinct possibility that the real limits to the European single mobility space will be redrawn in the near future, even assuming that a lengthy transition period is imposed on free movement of labour. Before the Helsinki European Council, there was a real probability that the negotiations with only some favoured applicants would result in the frontier of fortress Europe dissecting central and eastern Europe. The opening of membership discussions with five other east European candidates diminished this possibility. Nevertheless, the multi–speed nature of the negotiations mean that the frontier will shift over time and may, if only temporarily, impact on flows within the region.

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Not only will the EU enlargement process redefine the roles of different territories in the international chains of labour migration and refugee flows, but it could transect the long established trans–border flows, such as those between friends and families across the Slovakia–Hungary border, the Hungary–Romanian border, and between Czechs and Slovaks across what had once been the an internal division within the former Czechoslovakia. In this case, the process of European integration could serve to fragment, while appearing to unify the larger European migration space. Whether this will happen remains to be tested, and will depend on the aggregate outcome of the separate negotiations, which have now been set in train with all of the central and eastern European countries (excepting parts of the Balkans). If some of the early new ‘eastern’ members do become party to the Schengen Agreement, this need not automatically imply a disruption to existing flows to and from neighbouring countries if the Agreement could be made sufficiently flexible to incorporate associate eastern members. Whether the existing Schengen members would be willing and able to accept this, however, depends on who those neighbours are, and the estimated prospective flows of migration which would result—not to mention the ebb and flow of the domestic politics of immigration. Beyond this, there are important issues of freedom of movement, such as those related to the Roma peoples, which may well add another twist to the racialized nature of immigration policy and of borders. 6.2. Summary Research and data on the recent history of intra–European migration and its causes is patchy, incomplete and presents significant blank spots regarding some of the most elementary trends and facts. This brief overview has outlined some of the existing research on migration within Europe and the overall picture of trends and evidence. In summary:

• Intra–European migration is generally understood to be split into distinct historical periods. In the initial post–war period until the seventies, the overall trend was for migration of unskilled labour from poorer periphery, particularly in southern countries to the industrial north. In the more recent period this has given way to a period where three types of migration have become much more prevalent: retirement, student and highly–skilled.

• Where the dominant trend in migration flows between 1945 and 1970 was south–north, this has given way to a more even picture within Europe, as more countries approach a neutral balance.

• Whilst the economic spur to migration in the form of economic inequality has been removed to a large extent, the enabling factor of free movement rights has been progressively extended.

• Cultural and educational integration may be one of the main barriers to migration in a Europe of diverse nations and languages, but this is surprisingly little studied.

• Overall numbers of intra–European migrants appear to remain constant, though there has been no consistent attempt to monitor numbers within a single methodological framework.

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• There are significant methodological uncertainties regarding current data sources, particularly with regard to non–legal barriers to migration, rates of intermarriage, and naturalisations.

• There is, in the current secondary research, little attempt to answer the most basic question facing research on European migration, namely, the total number of intra–European migrants stocks and flows. This is partly due to lack of data—such as those regarding naturalised and casual migration—but it is clearly a gap in the research that should be filled.

There is a clear need for more research in the following areas:

• Intermarriages and naturalisations, given the shortage of available data. • Structural accounts of migration stocks and flows, and variable analyses that

explain the relative importance of free movement rights versus economic indicators as they impact on migration flows.

• the micro-level and the subjective dimension of migration. Whereas socio–economic and legal changes can be said to impact migration, they do so only through the experiences of individual migrants. There is a need for more study of the migrants’ own experiences and outcomes, and the para–legal barriers to migration. Moreover, little is known about the effect of cultural difference (measured for example in relation to media consumption) on migration within Europe.

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References Baldoni, E. (2003). The Free Movement of Persons in the EU: A Legal–historical Overview, PIONEUR working paper 2003/2, Florence, CIUSPO. Eurostat (2002). ‘Migration Keeps the EU Population Growing’, Statistics in Focus–Eurostat, 7, 1–4. King, R. (1998a). ‘From Guestworkers to Immigrants: Labour Migration from the Mediterranean to the Periphery’, Pinder, D. (ed.), The New Europe: Economy, Society and Environment, New York, Wiley and Sons. King, R. (1998b). ‘Post–oil Crisis, post–Communism: New Geographies of International Migration’, Pinder, D (ed.), The New Europe: Economy, Society and Environment, New York, Wiley and Sons. King, R. and Ruiz–Gelices, E. (2003). ‘International Student Migration and the European ‘Year Abroad’: Effects on European Identity and Subsequent Migration Behaviour’, International Journal of Population Geography, 9, 229–252. King, R., Warnes, T. and Williams, A. (1998). ‘International retirement migration in Europe’, International Journal of Population Geography, 4, 91–111. King, R., Warnes, T. and Williams, A. (2000). Sunset Lives: British Retirement Migration to the Mediterranean, Oxford, Berg. Lieberson, S. (1969). ‘Measuring Population Diversity’, American Sociological Review, 34, 850–862. OECD (2003). Main Economic Indicators. June 2003, Paris, OECD. Pinder, D (ed.) (1998). The New Europe: Economy, Society and Environment, New York, Wiley and Sons. Poulain, M. (1996). ‘Migration Flows Between the Countries of the European Union: Current Trends’, in Rees, P., Stillwell, J., Convey, A., Kupiszewski, M. (eds), Population Migration in the European Union, Chichester, Wiley. Poulain, M. (1999). Confrontation des statistiques de migration intra–européennes: vers une matrice complete?, Eurostat Working Paper 5 – Theme 3, Luxembourg, Eurostat. Rodriguez–Pose, A. (2002). The European Union: Economy, Society, and Polity, Oxford, Oxford University Press. Ruiz–Gelices, E., King, R. and Favell, A. (2003). ‘International student migration in Europe and the institutionalization of a ‘European identity’’, mimeo. Salt, J. (1983–4). High Level Manpower Movements in Northwest Europe and the Role of Careers: an Explanatory Framework’, International Migration Review, 17, 633–652 Salt, J. (1992). ‘Migration Processes among the Highly Skilled in Europe’, International Migration Review, 26, 484–505. Salt, J. and Schmidt, S. (2001). ‘The Development of Free Movement in the European Union’, Papademetriou, D. and Meyers, D. W. (eds.), Caught in the Middle:

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Border Communities in an era of Globalisation, Washington, Carnegie Endowment Publications. Sopemi (various years). Trends in International Migration, Paris, Oecd. Thorogood, D. and Winqvist, K. (2003). ‘Women and Men Migrating to and from the European Union’, Statistics in Focus–Eurostat, 2, 1–8. Warnes, A. M. (2002). ‘The challenge of intra–Union and In–migration to ‘Social Europe’, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 28, 135–152. Warnes, A. and Patterson, G. (1998). ‘British Retirees in Malta: Components of the Cross–national Relationship’, International Journal of Population Geography, 4, 113–133.

Intra-EU migration: a socio-demographic overview

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