Determinants of radical right vote in Greece: The socio-demographic and attitudinal characteristics...

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Department of Government

Dissertation topic:

eterminants of radical right vote in Greece: Differences and similarities in

the basis of

Course:

Msc Political Behaviour

Name: Angelos Kontogiannis-Mandros

Student ID:1001404

Supervisor

pr. Paul Whiteley

October 2011

14/10/2011-04:31:11 <GV993-7-FY_10a1_1001404_ABDA54F1D528C5E2CA3986C667156E63398056AA>

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Contents:

Acr ..3

....4

Introd

Part 1: Why focusing on the Greek c

Part 2: The European ..14

Par

Part 4: The socio-demographic and attitudinal characteristics of

.28

Part 5: Differences and similarities in the basis of radical right support

.........36

Conc ....39

..42

...................43

Ref ..44


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Acronyms: B.N.P.-‐British National Party F.N.-‐ Front National (the French one) F.P.O.-‐ Austrian Freedom Party K.K.E.-‐Communist Party of Greece LA.O.S.-‐Popular Orthodox Rally L.N.-‐Northern League N.D.-‐ New Democracy PA.SO.K. Panhellenic Socialist Movement P.S.-‐Political Spring R.R.-‐ Radical Right R.R.P.-‐Radical Right Parties V.B.-‐ Vlaams Block X.A.-‐ Chrysi Aygi


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Tables:

.29-‐30

.33


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Introduction

During the last three decades Europe has experienced some radical socio-

economic and political changes. The shift of social-democratic and socialist

parties to more economically liberal policies, the reduction of the growth rates

accompanied by an increase in unemployment and the big migratory flows that

followed the collapse of the eastern Block and the economic recession of the 80s

and the 90s are just some of them. As it was expected all these developments had

significant implications in the political level and reshaped, at least partially, the

majority of the political systems around Western Europe.

One of the most important developments that stemmed out from that was the

emergence of strong radical right parties (r.r.p) in many countries across the

continent. Especially the last decade the expansion of the electoral scope of radical

right parties and their increased importance in the political scene of many

countries, has made radical right (r.r) one of the most interesting contemporary

political phenomena.

In this broader context the present paper seeks to examine what are the main

determinants of radical right vote in Greece and on what aspects do they differ

from what we know about the radical right electorate in other western-European

countries. My research is focused upon the profile of the electorate of LA.O.S, the

major political force in the right extreme of the Greek party system and the only

one that has parliamentary representation since the 80s1. The analysis presented

below mainly focuses on the socio-demographic and attitudinal characteristics of

the Greek radical right voters and leaves out other more structural parameters, like

1 Political Spring of Antonis Samaras that also entered the parliament for one term in the mid 90s is a borderline case of radical right party.


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party organization and the structure of the Greek party system. Despite that

institutional variables have been taken into account at some parts of the essay and

especially at the end but mainly as a hunch for further research upon the topic.

Having given an outline of the two main targets of my dissertation, namely

the structure of the profile of the Greek radical right voters and the comparison of

the latter with their European counterparts, I will now make an overview of the

structure of the whole work.

In the first part I analyze my hypothesis and justify the s

voters as the most appropriate case for the investigation of the key determinants

behind radical right vote in Greece. Moreover I explain how the comparison

between

going to take place. A more comprehensive analysis of the latter is presented in

the methodological part of the essay.

What is more, in the second part I will present an overview of the relevant

literature and structure an average profile of the European radical right voter and

his main socio-demographic and attitudinal characteristics. This in turn will

explain the use of specific variables in my models for the examination of the

Greek case and give the theoretical background of my analysis. The works of

Kitschelt, Mudde, Ignazi, Norris and especially Lubbers et al2, are of crucial

importance in that part of the essay.

In the third part that is the methodological one, I give details about the

datasets and the models that I use in my analysis upon the Greek case. I also

address in greater detail questions relevant with the part of the comparison

2 The emphasis here is on Lubbers et al because this work is the only one that I found that has almost a pan European research scope and gives an average description of the determinants of the radical right vote in Europe, while avoiding the characteristic case biases of the relevant research upon the topic.


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radical right voter, as the latter is structured in the second part of the current paper

(e.g. the compatibility of the cases etc ).

After that in the fourth part, which is the most central in my work, I present the

findings of my and reach some conclusions about

the key determinants of radical right vote in Greece. The findings of this part are

compared with the conclusions of part two, in relevance with the average profile

of radical right voters in Western Europe, in an attempt to point out similarities

and differences amid the two. This is going to take place in the fifth part of the

essay, where I will also try to explain the occurred differences.

Finally in the sixth and final part I make a summary of the findings of the

previous parts and give some hunch for further investigation in questions that

remain unaddressed/unanswered in relevance with the expansion of the electoral

scope of radical right such as the favorable opportunity structures provided by the

electoral systems and issues of agenda priming of radical right discourse.

Part 1: Why focusing

Before explaining consist the most suitable case for the

examination of the profile of the Greek radical right voters let me justify the

choice of Greek radical right per se. The reasons that lead me to focus my research

on the Greek case are mainly two. The first one has to do with the fact that is one

of the least examined in the Western-European context and the second with its

sudden breakthrough into the mainstream political scene the last decade. In less

than ten years Greek radical right managed to come out of the shadows and


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become an important political player that restructured the political landscape of

the right, as the latter was formed and stabilized for more than thirty years after the

Moreover the last two years its political

significance has grown even more since various scenarios about the formation of a

unite government with the participation of LA.O.S, have been published in the

daily press, with LA.O.S re-enforcing them from time to time.

Coming back to the initial question of this part of the essay, I need to point out

that there is an ongoing debate in relation with the political characteristics of

LA.O.S and its categorization as a radical right party. Some of its political

maneuvers3 especially the last two years have reinforced arguments that LA.O.S is

in reality a party that can be located in the center-right of the political spectrum

and thus quite far away from the extreme right. And it is true that some of its

choices do not feet the profile of a radical right party but more of a party that in a

rational choice framework would be characterized as pure office seeking. And

indeed this is mainly a characteristic of centrist and not extreme/outlier parties that

use to have very strong ideological positions.

Following a more moderate but in some points similar analysis many analysts

argue that LA.O.S has followed a process of normalization at such an extent that

the core of its political orientation has been generically modified from a radical

right outlier party to a mainstream party that seeks to present its self as a

responsible governing agent while keeping a minimum of its original platform. For

3 LA.O.S voted together with the center-left PA.SO.K the entrance of the country to the so-called

-EU-ECB while the main center-right party N.D. rejected the plan. Since then LA.O.S has in many cases make parliamentary agreements with PA.SO.K in relevance to a variety of bills despite the negative stance of N.D. Moreover its president G.Karatzaferis has repeatedly provide its support for the Papandreou government and also asked for the formation of a unite government by what he calls responsible political powers (i.e PA.SO.K., N.D., LA.O.S ). Itstance and especially the occasional consolidation with the socialists while N.D.(the mainstream center-right party) is in the opposition, is something at least odd for a radical right party.


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some, the rumors that some of its most prestigious members were in contact with

N.D, in order to leave LA.O.S for the former were evidence of this4. And indeed at

least in the level of the lowest echelons of the party, moves like that did occur

when A.Samaras was elected president of N.D. pushing the party to more rightist

positions5.

Coming up with the same conclusion but from a different analytical

perspective, some researchers argue that LA.O.S is not a typical radical right party

due to the fact that in Greece radical right elements were, and for some still are,

absorbed by N.D and even PA.SO.K, thus leaving no audience for a pure radical

right party. And it is true that due to the specific process of evolvement of the

Greek political and party system N.D has historically absorbed the majority of the

radical right elements, from ex-members of the anticommunist guerillas of Group

ex-

6. And

indeed as many analysts have argue even after the creation of LA.O.S and the

expansion of its electoral scope, the traditional r.r audience still lies inside the

electorate of N.D.

Furthermore from 1970s until now a big part of the agenda of radical right

was part of the program of the mainstream parties. The stance of PA.SO.K and

N.D in relevance to minority issues (Muslims and Pomaks) or the Macedonian

issue7 was clearly nationalist, leaving only a limited space for the formation of an

4 See the widely publicized case of M.Boridis, one of the more active and prestigious MPs of LA.O.S that according to the press was in contact with N.D. 5 party that had highly prioritized the national issues and especially the one related with the name of the neighboring F.Y.R.O.M (Former Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia). P.S , as I mentioned earlier in the paper, is considered by some analysts a borderline case of a radical right party. 6 Dimitras,page.252 7 Ellinas,2010, page.145


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autonomous radical right party8. A characteristic example of this is that, one of the

9 , while until

recently many profound members of the nationalist camp were members of the

socialist party (see for example Papathemelis) 10 . Even the Communist Party

(K.K.E) had in many aspects assimilate the nationalist agenda11.

Despite all that I argue that LA.O.S is for many reasons a characteristic

member of the radical right party family, both in terms of policy positions and

history. First of all the majority of its members and MPs were members of various

extreme right organizations, some of which had even militant characteristics12.

Hellenic Front of Voridis and Front Line of Plevris were the two most famous

ones, with an extreme anti-immigrant and anti-Semite rhetoric 13 . Even after

joining LA.O.S almost all of this personnel retained its political beliefs. For

example while a member of LA.O.S Plevris was in trial for anti-Semitism14. As

Ellinas has demonstrate in a series of interviews with high ranked members of the

party, including its president, the majority of them adapts some times a very

aggressive radical right discourse and ideology15.

only the political background and the views of some of its members that qualifies

LA.O.S as a radical right party but mainly its present political program. Ellinas

8 Dimitras,page.251 9 Dimitras,page.252 10 Ellinas,2010,page.145,7/ P.Hainsworth,2008,page.65 11 See the political position of Kaneli (MP of the K.K.E) in relevance to the national issues, or the electoral cooperation of K.K.E. in Salonika with Sofianos that some years latter supported openly radical right positions in line with the local MPs of LA.O.S. 12 See for example the Youth of EPEN of which Voridis (now MP of LA.O.S) was the leader. E.P.E.N is characterized by Mudde as a typical case of extreme right party. See C.Mudde,2009,page.49 13 P.Hainsworth categorizes these two organizations in the neo-fascist spectrum/P.Hainsworth,2008,page.66 14 According to Mudde, LA.O.S as a party holds anti-Semitic positions. See C.Mudde,2009,page.189 15 Ellinas,2010,page.133,134-5/ According to Ellinas, Karatzaferis himself has strong anti-Semitic rhetoric. See Ellinas, 2010,page.139.


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16.

In the most recent political program of the party the reader can point out many

positions that can be characterized as typical of radical right discourse.

The whole manifesto is characterized by anti-immigration discourse and

open condemnation and rejection of the idea of multicultural society17. In this

context the protection of the demographic status is of crucial importance, while

minority groups such as the Gypsies and the Muslims are seen as being

unproductive and lazy that make ends meet just by taking advantage of the welfare

benefits that were supposed to help the hard working Greek families18. The latter

is a typical paradigm of welfare chauvinism agenda that characterizes the program

of many radical right parties across Europe 19 . Furthermore immigrants are

presented as responsible for the observed increase in the criminality rates20and the

growth of unemployment21. These two usually are the common denominator of the

political agenda of radical right. In many parts of its program there are also

references in relevance to the interrelationship between domestic centers of power,

alization establishment and the U.S. i

national sovereignty of Greece22. This kind of argumentation that is sometimes

very close to conspiracy theories, that envision a hostile international environment

16 Ellinas,2010,page.137 17 Political Manifesto of LA.O.S, 2007,page.44 18 Political Manifesto of LA.O.S, 2007,page.44 19 J.Rydgren, 2008,page.746 20 Political Manifesto of LA.O.S,2007, page.46-7 21 Political Manifesto of LA.O.S, 2007,page.9,43 22 Political Manifesto of LA.O.S,2007, page.9


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that seeks to harm the nation 23,

is still another similarity with the discourse of other radical right groups.

Another fact that supports my argumentation about the categorization of

LA.O.S as a radical right party is that according to some recent research there are

evidence between the electoral base of LA.O.S and that of

Chrisi Avgi (X.A), which is a militant neo-fascist organization. The latter implies

that inside the broader electorate of LA.O.S there are elements characterized by an

extreme right political orientation with anti-democratic and highly racist

sentiments. According to P.Koustenis in the local elections of 2010 in Athens24,

X.A draw in some cases almost 70% of its electoral strength from the electoral

electorate of the two. This implies that altho

radical right base is still under the umbrella of N.D25, LA.O.S expresses parts of

the electorate that form/adapt radical right political orientations based on more

contemporary phenomena such as immigration and issues of law and order.

Of course the argumentation presented in the first half, of that part about the

characteristics of LA.O.S is not completely wrong, what I suggest here is that

many of these arguments are missing parts of the broader transformation of the

Greek political and party system and also the progressive change of LA.O.S itself.

My argument here is that LA.O.S changed, from being in its early years what

23 K.Gemenis et al, 2010, page.190 24 The elections took place in a Constituency\periphery and municipality level at the same time. LA.O.S had an independent candidate in the Constituency of Attica but supported the candidate of N.D in the municipality of Athens, while X.A had an independent candidate only in the latter. According to the research of Koustenis a big proportion of those that voted the candidate of LA.O.S in the constituency level, voted the candidate of X.A. in the municipality/ P.Koustenis,2011,page52 25 its profile and program based on the traditional cleavages of the Greek political scene (i.e. the civil war, the Junta etc) but upon a more contemporary agenda. traditional cleavages do not influence its ideology at all.


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Ignazi describes as an extreme right party to something very similar with the

definition of Mudde about populist radical right. So it never actually moved away

from the political spectrum of radical right26. In their in-depth analysis upon the

policy position of the Greek parties, Gemenis and Dinas accept both the radical

right and the populist character of LA.O.S27 thus giving more solid bases to my

argument.

Taking all these into consideration and also by pointing out the fact that LA.O.S

is the only radical right party in Greece the last 30 years that has achieved such a

wide electoral support and parliamentary representation, I think I have proved why

I selected its voters as the ideal case for the examination of the determinants of

radical right vote in Greece.

As I already said in the prologue the aim of the present paper is double. First

of all to structure the socio-demographic and attitudinal profile of Greek radical

right voters and secondly to compare the latter with that of their European

counterparts in an attempt to identify and point out possible differences and

process of evolvement of the Greek political and party system that lead to a

constant but in a way, unorthodox presence of the radical right. I chose to make

the comparison with an average profile of the European radical right voters in

order to avoid selection/case biases. The latter as I explain later in the

methodological part of the paper, could become a major problem due to the fact

that despite the similarities, radical right electorates across Europe are

characterized occasionally by significant differences. In the following part I 26 policies that the latter imposed although create some confusion are still inside the policy range of radical right, a big part of which has economic neo-liberalism as part of its agenda. See the

- -21 27 K.Gemenis et al, 2010, page.188


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structure the average profile of the European radical right voters, based on an

extended bibliography of both, case and comparative studies upon the field and

Part 2: The European radical right electorate

Some scholars, like Kitschelt, argue that there are no common patterns between

r.r voters (based between others to the lack of a common type of r.r party28) and

thus that any generalization about them is misleading. Despite that a significant

number of evidence gathered from a series of other researchers has demonstrated

the opposite at least to some extent29, i.e. r.r voters share some common socio-

demographic and attitudinal characteristics, that enable us to speak about the

determinants of r.r vote, at least in a broad sense. Immigration, unemployment,

educational level, age and gender are some of the most usually examined variables

in the research for the main determinants of r.r vote. I will start from the first two

due to the fact that they have attracted the most attention not only in the public

speech but also in the scientific debate30.

Immigration is an issue that is generally thought of being correlated with the

growth of conservatism, negative stereotyping against the foreigners or even

clearly racist and hostile behaviours against them. The increase of anti-immigrant

28 R.R. parties have some times serious differences in their political profile and agendas and thus attract different voters, which in tern leads to problems in comparing and reach solid conclusions about the latter (common characteristics and differences). See T.E.Givens,2005, page.47/ H.Kitschelt, 2008, page. 20-24. Furthermore even the boundaries on which are and which are not r.r. parties is some times difficult to be drawn due to the similarities of the latter with neo-conservative parties. See C.Mudde, 2009, page. 27-28,32,50 29 Lubbers et al,,2002, page.367/T.E.Givens, 2005, page. 66 30 According to Lubbers et al, attitudinal parameters such as the anti-immigrant attitudes are considered to be the most important in explaining voting for the r.r. See Lubbers et al, 2002,page.348


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sentiments among the population is considered to be one of the main bases for the

appearance and the growth of r.r coalitions and political parties. A first level

analysis shows that indeed the vast majority of the parties identified in the right

extreme of the political spectrum (see F.N in France, FPO in Austria, Vlaams

Block in Belgium, B.N.P. in Britain etc.) have very highly prioritized in their

agendas the issue of immigration and its negative derivatives (according to them:

cultural pluralism and increased diversity, which leads to the loss of the

homogeneity of the traditional identities, loss of jobs from the part of the natives

in favor of the cheep labor force of the immigrants, increase in criminality rates,

etc. 31 ). According to Givens this general perception about the effect of

immigration on the rise of r.r parties is correct, although it is mediated, as we will

see by other factors too32. What has become more than obvious is that the anti-

immigrant speech is based mainly upon three issues: the correlation of

immigration with higher rates of unemployment for the natives, the decrease of

cultural homogeneity in the society and the higher criminality rates33.

Many citizens see the emergence of cultural differences, caused by the

presence of large numbers of immigrants as a threat to the homogeneity of the

society, which is in their perception the backbone of social stability and welfare.

According to P. Norris cultural indicators are sometimes more powerful in

explaining the increase of anti-immigrant sentiments and thus r.r vote, than other

economic related factors 34 . Other researchers like T.Givens, have paid more

attention to the correlation between the rise of anti-immigration speech and

31 J.Rydgren, 2008,page.740/ C.Green-Pedersen et al,2008, page.628 /J.Rydgren, 2005, page.432-3/T.E.Givens, 2005, page. 37 32 T.E.Givens, 2005, page. 75-6 33 J.Rydgren, 2008,page.746/ R.Ford et al, 2010,page.20-2/Y.Michelogianakis,2009,page.158/J.Rydgren et al,2011,page.1,22 34 P. Norris, 2005, page. 182


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economic problems like high unemployment and the use of immigrants as political

scapegoats for the latter35. In this line of research cultural aspects are coming into

the second place. Immigration is considered to influence r.r vote due to its link

with economic problems (unemployment, welfare state benefits, etc). It is very

interesting for example that K. Arzheimer has found that the correlation between

immigration and unemployment, as key irritant of r.r vote from the one side and

welfare state from the other, is very important. According to his findings welfare

state benefits, under certain conditions, can seriously affect the r.r parties electoral

scope 36 . There is also, as it was already mentioned above, evidence linking

immigration as a determinant of r.r vote to issues of law and order37. Although this

needs to be considered seriously. In many cases, citizens are turning to the r.r due

to the fact that they fill unprotected in a hostile environment for which they blame

immigrants, especially in that are often presenting

there. Before proceeding to the examination of unemployment as a key

determinant of r.r vote, it is worth pointing out which of the three factors,

mentioned above, or which combination of them is the stimuli for the rise of anti-

immigrant discourse and r.r vote. This is crucial in order to understand the

differences between the various cases of r.r parties around Europe, their electoral

scope and their policy profiles.

Unemployment is generally considered as another key determinant for the

appearance and increase of r.r vote. Of course there is an open academic debate

35 T.E.Givens, 2005, page. 76 36 K. Arzheimer, 2009, page. 262, 272-3/ H.Kitschelt, 2008, page. 258 37 P.Hainsworth,2008, page.76/J.Rydgren,2008,page. 737/T.E.Givens, 2005, page. 78


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about the exact effects of unemployment on r.r vote, some times with even

contradictory arguments and evidence 38 , but as I already mentioned

something that characterizes the whole research about the r.r According to the

approaches that consider unemployment as a key determinant of r.r vote, job

insecurity or underemployment is creating sentiments of frustration and fear due to

difficulties in the job market. These difficulties are caused between others by rapid

so allow, to significant parts of the labor force to

adapt to the new conditions. Increased sentiments of fear and frustration are

leading according to Adorno to the formation of authoritarian personalities39 ,

which in turn create discourse (like anti-

immigration, etc.) and thus vote for r.r parties. The assumption that authoritarian

predispositions are related with the vote for the r.r is also strongly supported by

beliefs only with unemployment but with broader societal and economic changes

in the advanced capitalism40. This leads us to the examination of economical

factors in general as determinants of r.r vote. In this context unemployment is the

best economic feature that reflects the consequences of the changes in the

economy, in the level of the masses. Post industrialism has created new conditions

in the economic level that have serious negative impacts in parts of the society and

the labor force, which inevitably see themselves as losers of the modernization

processes41

38 P. Norris, 2005, page. , 11-2,143-4,174/ T.E.Givens, 2005, page. 77-8/ K. Arzheimer, 2009, page. 261-3/ R.W.Jackman et al,1996,page.517 39 P. Norris, 2005, page. 12 40 H.Kitschelt, 2008, page. 1-2, 5 41 P. Norris, 2005, page. 11/ Using similar logic Lipset and Bell are speaking for the appeal of the R.R. to the losers of industrialization, P.Norris, 2005, page. 131/On the other hand Zaslove although he agrees about the importance of economic issues in the programs of r.r. parties, he disagrees with the a


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forming under conditions42 the audience of the r.r parties. This approach supports

the assumption that r.r parties do not gain their support equally from all the social

sectors/categories, as some researchers have claimed43, but their audience has

more or less specific characteristics44. According to many researchers, like Givens

and Kitschelt, blue collar workers and employees of the private sector are more

likely to vote in favor of a radical right party in comparison with white collar

employees and civil servants 45 . The same holds true for parts of the petite

bourgeoisie, like the free-lancers.

As we already mention a series of researchers have pointed out the importance

of authoritarian predisposition in the emergence of r.r. Based on the work of

Kitschelt about the relation of education with the libertarian-authoritarian

dimension we will turn our focus on education as a parameter of R.R. vote.

According to Kitschelt highly educated persons tend to have more developed

cognitive capabilities, which in turn lead to the formation of more liberal political

opinions46

of only crude schematizations of social reality, are more inclined to opt for

-6 /

also M.Minkenberg,2000,page.182 42 Conditions like the break down with the traditional political affiliations and the decreased importance of previous societal cleavages, increased immigration, and others that we are going to examine later. See, for more details: P. Norris, 2005, page. 11./ Norris is providing also a brief critique of the sociological approach in page 12. 43 W.Brug , 2003, page. 69/ C.Mudde,2009 , page.135 44 P. Norris, 2005, page. 139 45 Kitschelt gives a very comprehensive explanation about why these particular groups are more attracted by the R.R. discourse (H.Kitschelt, 2008, page. 9-10). Despite the limitation of space here it is very interesting to point out that Kitschelt has found evidence that link the formation of predispositions in favour of the R.R. with the nature of the working environment, namely if someone is working in the private or in the public sector. The former tend to be more liberal and leftist in contrast to the latter. (H.Kitschelt, 2008, page. 13). There have been also some evidence that the combination of these two groups in the electorate of the R.R. parties may lead to controversies in their economic policies and thus reduce their electoral scope (E.Ivarsflaten, 2005, page.489) 46 H.Kitschelt, 2008, page. 7/ K. Arzheimer, 2009, page. 259,263


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47, and thus more probabilities

to be attracted by the r.r parties discourse. Of course this general assumption about

the correlation between education and r.r vote does not stand the same way in all

the cases, as Givens has demonstrated in the case of the Austrian FPO48. Based on

the findings of his research Givens claims that not only education level is not a

common pattern between the r.r voters in different countries, but rather is one of

their major differences49. Still the majority of the researchers have found at least a

weak correlation between low or moderate level of education and r.r vote50.

Except for education, authoritarian predispositions are also linked with

religiosity. According to Altemeyer people that have religious affiliations tend to

radical right discourse, mainly because religions tend to promote obedience and

dogmas that stand in clear contrast with the development of critical reasoning51,

which is according to many the cornerstone of liberal thinking. Based on that and

going one step further he also right wing authoritarianism and

traditional religiousness help produce 52 . Despite the solidness of

there are other researchers like Lubbers that found the opposite

results (i.e. r.r. voters are mainly non-religious)53.

The agreement upon other factors like gender, as determinants of the R.R.

vote, seems to be much wider between the researchers. In most cases there has

47 H.Kitschelt, 2008, page. 7 48 T.E.Givens, 2005, page. 47-8 49 T.E.Givens, 2005, page. 61-2, of course his comparative analysis has taken into account quite a few countries and thus increasing the probability of wrong generalizations about that. 50 P.Hainsworth,2008 ,page.94/P. Norris, 2005, page.141/ H.Kitschelt, 2008, page. 7/ K. Arzheimer, 2009, page. 259 51 B.Altemeyer, 1996, page.148 52 B.Altemeyer, 1996, page.165 53 M.Lubbers et al, 2002, page.348,370-1


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been found that men tend to vote more for r.r than women due to a series of

reasons, that have to do both with the profile of the r.r parties (e.g. more rough

discourse and violent attitudes54) but also with differences in the socialization

processes and the social roles between the men and women55. Thinks are getting

more complicated when we come to the parameter of age. Due to the fact that

there have been observed large differences between various countries, it is quite

difficult to find consistent evidence upon which solid conclusions could be

reached about the age as a factor in voting for the r.r.56. Despite that there have

been evidence that in general, young people may be more likely to vote for the

R.R., because unemployment is some times higher in those ages and young people

in general tend to have weaker party affiliations57.

Except the socio-demographic characteristics described above and the

perception of immigration that I already talked about, there is still one very

important attitudinal characteristic that has a strong effect on the vote for radical

right, namely political dissatisfaction (or protest vote). According to Lubbers et al,

political dissatisfaction and anti-immigrant attitudes are considered to be the two

most important variables in explaining voting for the r.r. Here political

dissatisfaction may have to do either with the broader political system (i.e. the way

that democracy works, or the political elites, etc) or with more particular aspects

such as the way that the current government deals with specific problems58 .

Except Lubbers et al a series of other researchers, like Cutts et al, and Bergh, have

54 C.Mudde, 2009, page.111 55 C.Mudde, 2009, page.90-118/H.Kitschelt, 2008, page. 7/ T.E.Givens, 2005, page. 59-60 / P. Norris, 2005, page. 145-6 56 P. Norris, 2005, page. 147 57 T.E.Givens, 2005, page. 58, 60 / In contrast to that D.Cutts et al in their work upon the B.N.P found that the latter draws its support from older age cohorts. See D.Cutts et al, 2010, page. 10 58 J.Bergh,2004, page.368/ D.Cutts et al, 2010, page.15/R.Karapin,1998,page.214


21

also pointed out that the vote for radical right has many times the characteristics of

protest voting. Despite that general consensus, other scholars like W.Brug et al,

contradict the argument that r.r vote tends to have the characteristics of protest

vote (at least in comparison with the vote for the other parties) and argue that the

strongest determinants of voting

59.

Based on all these we could say that r.r voter is more likely to present the

following socio-demographic characteristics: a) he is blue collar worker, employed

in the private sector or part of the petit bourgeoisie60, b) with low or moderate

level of education and non-religious, c) probably man and young61. As far as his

attitudinal profile is considered he is characterized by anti-immigrant attitudes and

feelings of political dissatisfaction 62 . Especially the former is in many cases

correlated with unemployment. Of course the above profile is very sharp and

cannot apply to all the cases. The description made, is based upon the common

findings of the majority of the researchers upon the field. It is worth pointing out,

here, that Lubbers et al, on their research upon the determinants of radical right

vote in 16 Western European Countries, came up with a very similar if not

identical profile (i.e socio-demographic and attitudinal characteristics) of the

average radical right voter 63.

The above description of the general characteristics of the Western European

radical right voters provides not only the basis for the comparison that will take

59 W.Brug et al, 2000,page.94 60 H.Kitschelt, 2008, page. 9-11/ T.E.Givens, 2005, page.60-2/ K.Arzhaimer et al,2006,page.438-40 61 M.Lubbers et al, 2002, page.364,370-1 / P.Ignazi,2003,page.100-5,114-9,134-8 /K. Arzheimer, 2009, page. 259/ H.Kitschelt, 2008, page. 9-10/ D.Cutts et al, 2010, page. 10 62 M.Lubbers et al, 2002, page.348,352,365,370-2/ D.Cutts et al, 2010, page.10,16 63 M.Lubbers et al, 2002, page.367-371


22

place in part five, but also the theoretical background of the models that I use in

the examination of the Greek case as they are presented in the next chapter.

Part 3: Methodology

As I already mentioned the aim of the present paper is double;; the first is to

identify what are the key determinants of radical right vote in Greece, in terms of

the socio-demographic and attitudinal characteristics of Greek r.r voters and the

second to compare these with the average profile (i.e. socio-demographic and

attitudinal characteristics) of their Western European counterparts in an attempt to

point out common patterns and differences in the basis of radical right support.

to deal with both of these questions and try to answer various questions related to

the general methodology used in my analysis. At the first part of this chapter I

pr

After that I try to address in greater detail some methodological questions

regarding the second scale of my work which is the comparison of the Greek r.r

voters with their European counterparts, and especially to justify my choice to

make the comparison based on an average profile of the European r.r voters that is

bibliographically structured.

In my analysis upon the Greek case I try to follow a similar methodology with

the one that Lubbers et al use in their examination of the extreme right electorates

in Western Europe. Following their logic I form three models, with the latter two

being more extended versions of the original one, with the dummy vote for

LA.O.S as the independent variable in all three of them. Due to the fact that my


23

independent variable is a dummy, I run all the models with the use of binary

logistic regressions. Before presenting my models in greater detail, let me first

give some information about the two datasets upon which the whole analysis is

based.

Due to the fact that there is no national election survey in Greece, my research

is based on two datasets provided by a leading survey company, named M.R.B.

Hellas S.A. The first is a PanHellenic

101 (out of a broader sample of 2100 people) conducted between

the 1 and the 7th of December of 2009 and the second is the exit poll of the general

elections that took place at the 4th of October of the same year. The latter was

conducted with the method of the ballot box outside of the electoral centers and

64.

Data about the electorate of LA.O.S were also available from the European Social

Survey of 2008. But due to the small size of the sample (only 44 cases) I preferred

not to use them at all, because the results would be highly biased and inefficient.

From the previous two datasets, the Exit Poll of the elections of 2009 would be the

ideal one for my analysis, due to the large sample size that enables more solid

inferences to be drawn. Unfortunately the latter has a very limited battery of

questions and thus it is used mainly for the confirmation of the results drawn from

the other dataset. The Exit Poll data are used primarily only in the examination of

the hypothesis that the vote for LA.O.S has the characteristics of protest vote in all

the other cases the analysis, presented in part four, is based on the Trend Survey of

December of 2009.

64 Further information for these two datasets is provided in Appendix B.


24

turning my focus on the presentation of the three models used in my analysis upon

the Greek radical right voters65.

The first model that consist the baseline of my analysis, includes in the right

hand side, only socio-demographic variables like, age, gender, educational level,

occupational category and affiliation with the church, that have been found to be

of some importance in the analysis of r.r vote, as it was demonstrated in part two.

Due to lack of appropriate data, some of these factors, like religiosity, are

examined with the use of proxy variables66.

Model:1

In the second model I add a series of attitudinal variables in order to see their

effect in voting for the radical right. According to Lubbers et al, attitudinal

variables are of crucial importance for the understanding of r.r vote67. Following

their analysis I mainly examine anti-immigrant attitudes and political

dissatisfaction. Despite that I have also introduced a series of other variables in an

attempt to test the existence of authoritarian predispositions and liberal economic

views amid the electorate of LA.O.S, since these parameters have been found to be

occasionally of crucial importance in voting for the radical right 68 . Political

dissatisfaction as a key parameter is also tested with the use of the 2009 Exit Poll

65 A detailed presentation of every model is given at the end of appendix A 66 of trust to

67 M.Lubbers et al, 2002, page.348 68 See appendix A.


25

dataset and a modified version of model two. The modification of the model was

necessary due to the smaller size of the questionnaire (and so of the available data)

of the above dataset. Despite that all the key socio-demographic variables are

tested. With the use of this dataset I had also the ability to check were the voters of

LA.O.S identify them selves in respect to the left-right dimension, since a relative

question was included.

Model:2

In the third and final model, I add some interaction terms in model 2 in order

to test for the combined effect of some variables such as immigration,

unemployment and criminality69. As I mentioned in part two, many researchers

have pointed out the significance of the relation of the above to factors as a key

irritant behind the r.r vote.

Model:3

69 See appendix A.


26

The theoretical background of all the three models presented above is given by

the literature review and the conclusions of part two. Having either directly, or

with the use of proxy variables included to my analysis upon the electorate of

LA.O.S, all the important variables that come out from the examination of the

relevant literature;; it is my belief that the analysis that follows, in part four, covers

all the significant socio-demographic and attitudinal factors linked with r.r vote.

Except the presentation of the models used in part four, there are some open

questions, related to the comparative part of my essay and more specifically, the

comparison of the profile of the Greek radical right voters with the one of their

European counterparts. In respect to that, there are two crucial methodological

issues that need to be addressed here. The first is my choice to make the

comparison based on an average profile of the characteristics of the European

radical right voters, and the second has to do with the fact that the latter is

structured bibliographically.

As pointed out in the literature review at part two the characteristics of radical

right in general and r.r electorate more specifically, present huge deviations across

countries and is not rare for different researchers to come up with contradictory

findings, even in the examination of the same case. In other words although

common patterns do appear, significant deviations are also present70, for a series

of reasons. One of the most important is that the radical right party family is not

such a homogenous group. The wide and continuing academic debate upon the

determination and delimitation of the r.r party family is an illustration of that71.

70 Based on that some scholars openly doubt our ability to draw generalizations about the radical right. 71 An extended analysis is not necessary here but indicative approaches can be found in the following: P.Ignazi,2003,page. 32/ C.Mudde, 2009, page.13-5, 32-5/ T.E.Givens, 2005, page. 44-50/P.Hainsworth, 2000,page.50-2/ J.Rydgren, 2005, page.413,432-3/ R.Karapin,1998,page.216-21/D.Prowe,1994,page.295-312


27

Depending on which definition someone follows, there may be changes in the

cases that he/she must use. Although the main r.r parties are included in the work

of all the key scholars significant differentiations do occur, C.Mudde for example

in his analysis of the populist radical right includes the Swiss S.V.P72, which is

excluded by P.Ignazi in his influential research upon the extreme right73. Another

problem is that the characteristics of the r.r voters may deviate from country to

g.

some r.r parties like the L.N. in Italy have a very strong local identification). The

first is especially important since bigger parties usually have been through a

process of normalization and thus the profile of their voters is closer to the general

average, in contrast to s

ideologically polarized electorate74.

In order to avoid these kind of selection biases I chose to make my comparison

with an average profile of the European radical right voters, which although may

lacks descriptive accuracy, provides better bases for valid generalizations. The fact

that scholars like Lubbers et al have used similar logic in collapsing all cases into

an average profile, I believe provides an additional support to my argument.

After clarifying the above, I now turn my focus on the way that this average

profile is structured. There in no doubt that the best way for me to do that would

be to use my own datasets and structure this average profile myself. The problem

here was that for smaller parties (e.g. B.N.P, the Belgian F.N., the German N.D.P,

etc that would be more appropriate to be used in a comparison with LA.O.S) it

72 C.Mudde, 2009, page. 41-6,123 73 Another very interesting paradigm is that of the True Finns as examined by Arter. See D.Arter,2010,page.502-3 74 This in turn raises issues of compatibility in the comparison of LA.O.S with much bigger parties like the F.P.O, the , F.N, etc.


28

was very difficult for me to find data, since the E.S.S of 2008 had a very limited

amount of cases for each of them and thus any result would be biased75. On the

other hand using the available data in order to structure the profile of only the

major r.r parties (e.g. F.N., F.P.O, V.B etc), would be inefficient, since the big

differences in terms of electoral scope, position to the party system, normalization

processes, etc., would almost inevitable bias my results and thus be

methodologically wrong. The lack of the necessary data, in reality forced me to do

a much weaker in methodological terms analysis by forming this average profile

of the European r.r voters bibliographically, based on an extended literature upon

the field that covers the vast majority of r.r electorates across Europe. The fact

that the biggest part of my analysis is based on wide comparative filed researches

counterbalances at least partially

this methodological weakness, by providing well based results about the

characteristics of r.r voters.

In the following fourth part of the paper I present the results of my analysis

u the basis for the comparative analysis

presented in part five.

Part 4: The socio-

voters.

In table one I present the results of my analysis from all the three models used

in the examination of the first dataset.

75 Except the British case of the B.N.P, for the rest of the parties it was almost impossible for me to find data from country based electoral studies.


29

Table: 1

Model 1 Model 2 Model 3

Variables B Sig Exp(B) B Sig. Exp(B) B Sig Exp(B)

Gender (male) .583 .011** 1.791 .531 .022** 1.701 .536 .021** 1.708

Age (18-25) .010 .689 1.010 .023 .388 1.023 .023 .377 1.023

Age (25-34) .008 .671 1.008 .013 .472 1.013 .014 .456 1.014

Age (35-44) .014 .247 1.014 .020 .118 1.020 .020 .115 1.020

Age (45-54) -.006 .544 .994 -.003 .769 .997 -.003 .796 .997

Age (55+) .004 .346 1.002 .006 .413 1.010 .003 .380 1.008

Educ.level (primary school)

.004 .634 1.004 .005 .541 1.005 .004 .568 1.004

Educ.level (secondary school)

-1.166 .282 .312 -1.191 .277 .304 -1.156 .292 .315

Educ.level (highschool) -.246 .815 .782 -.368 .731 .692 -.346 .747 .708

Educ.level (college) -.384 .707 .681 -.571 .581 .565 -.526 .612 .591 Educ.level (university) -.505 .632 .604 -.666 .532 .514 -.642 .548 .526 Educ.level (master/phd) -.524 .623 .592 -.666 .538 .514 -.619 .568 .539 Occupational status-general (freelancer)

.006 .984 1.007 .061 .848 1.063 .049 .879 1.050

Occupational status-general (private employee)

-.119 .765 .888 -.187 .647 .830 -.205 .616 .815

Occupational status-general (civil servant)

-1.532 .038** .216 -1.637 .028** .195 -1.630 .029** .196

Occupational status-general (unemployed)

-.239 .798 .787 -.284 .763 .753 -.335 .723 .716

Occupational status-general (rentier)

-17.842 .998 .000 -17.850 .998 .000 -17.885 .998 .000

Occupational status (white collar employees)

-.101 .789 .904 .050 .895 1.052 .030 .937 1.031

Occupational status (blue collar workers)

-.015 .971 .986 .134 .745 1.144 .136 .743 1.146

Affiliation with the church (level of trust to the church)

.234 .005***

1.264 .196 .100* 1.217 .200 .094* 1.222

Attitudinal characteristics (the importance of unemployment)

.084 .706 1.088 -.004 .986 .996

Attitudinal characteristics (the importance of immigration)

.786 .010** 2.194 -.422 .392 1.525


30

According to the results the only socio-demographic characteristics that play a

significant role in determining radical right vote are gender, occupational status

and the level of affiliation with the church. More specifically men are more likely

to vote for radical right than women and the same is true for individuals that are

Attitudinal characteristics (the importance of criminality)

.392 .215 1.481 .333 .329 1.395

Measures of political dissatisfaction (level of trust to the government)

-.225 .089* .798 -.218 .100* .804

Measures of political dissatisfaction (level of trust to the political parties)

.196 .165 1.217 .189 .183 1.208

Measures of political dissatisfaction/authoritarian predispositions (level of trust to the parliament)

.081 .581 1.085 .068 .648 1.070

Economic attitudes (level of trust to major domestic companies)

.149 .252 1.161 .145 .267 1.156

Economic attitudes (level of trust to multinational companies)

-2.143 .288 .867 -.144 .287 .866

Economic attitudes (level of trust to trade unions)

-.353 .001***

.703 -.353 .001***

.702

Authoritarian predispositions (level of trust to the armed forces)

.185 .174 1.204 .195 .154 1.216

Attitudes towards international actors (level of trut to the U.S.A)

-.063 .582 .939 -.060 .602 .942

Attitudes towards international actors (level of trut to the E.U)

.055 .628 .1.057 .053 .644 1.054

Interaction term 1 (immigration*unemployment)

.607 .348 1.835

Interaction term 2 (immigration*criminality)

.552 .553 1.737

Constant -3.579 .002 .028 -3.558 .003 .029 -3.510 .003 .030

Nagelkerke R Square .056 .099 .100

*p<.1, **p<.05, ***p<.001


31

more affiliated with the church. Hence there is, as expected, a male bias in the

electorate of LA.O.S and a strong relation between its voters and the church.

Finally according to the results there is a negative relation between voting for the

radical right and working in the public sector. Civil servants seem, in that sense, to

be the least likely occupational category to support LA.O.S. Other parameters like

age, educational level, or the distinction between blue-collar workers and white-

collar employees, seem to play no significant role in determining r.r vote in

Greece. This holds true even after the introduction of attitudinal variables, as the

results of model two demonstrate.

In relevance to attitudinal variables the results indicate that out of the fifteen

only three have a statistically significant effect on r.r vote. The prioritization

according to the respondents, of economic immigrants as a major problem both in

personal and societal terms is the first and most important one. As expected the

proxy for anti-immigration attitudes has a strong Exp(B) 2.194 and positive

relation with voting LA.O.S. In the examination of model 3 the significance of this

-immigration attitudes

is partially absorbed by the two interaction terms.

The second variable

on

and the results here suggest that indeed higher levels of trust to the government are

negatively related to r.r vote. Hence our data here indicate some kind of political

d Interestingly enough though the second

proxy for the examination of protest voting (i.e. the level of trust to the political

any significant impact. Hence making difficult to

draw any final conclusion in respect to that matter.


32

economic related variable that seems to have a significant effect in r.r vote. The

oters are more distant from the

Unions than the rest of the electorate76. But without having any significant result

in the rest of the economic proxies, no valid hypothesis can be inferred about the

As far as the rest of the attitudinal variables are concerned it is very interesting

that according to the present data there are no statistically significant evidence that

conservatism. The only element that indicates a greater level of conservatism is

the statistically significant, positive relation between affiliation with the church

and voting LA.O.S. But this was to be expected if someone takes into

consideration how highly church related issues are priorit

It is also interesting t

and the U.S seem to be more or less in line with those of the broader electorate,

despite the fact that LA.O.S has a very strong conspiracy discourse structured

especially around the role of the U.S77.

Last but not least it is very surprising that none of the interaction terms added

in model three, are statistically significant. Hence there is no evidence that

unemployment or criminality as problems are related with anti-immigration

attitudes. Despite that there are very strong indications that this is not true in

reality and so I present these findings with great caution.

76 A possible explanation for that is the absence of any serious presence of LA.O.S in the Unions. 77 The general anti-Americanism of the Greek political scene is perhaps a first explanation for that.


33

As I pointed out many times in the literature review the research about radical

right is very often characterized by different of even contradictory findings. This

also holds true for the analysis presented here. The examination of the second

dataset provides a series of results that deviate significantly from the ones

presented above. In table two I present the findings of my analysis based on the

2009 Exit Poll, of the general elections.

Table: 2

Model 4 (modification of model 2) Variables B Sig Exp(B) Gender (male) .549 .000*** 1.731 Age (18-34) .418 .018** 1.519 Age (35-54) .317 .052** 1.373 Age (55+) .310 .045** 1.220 Educ.level (primary school) 1.432 .003*** 4.188 Educ.level (high school) .1907 .000*** 6.730 Educ.level (university) 1.840 .000*** 6.298 Occupat.status (freelancer) .329 .072** 1.390 Occupat.status (civil servants) .225 .258 1.252 Occupat.status (private employees) .304 .080* 1.355 Occupat.status (unemployed) .373 .147 1.452 Occupat.status (housekeeper) .198 .441 1.219 Occupat.status (pensioner) .236 .299 4.108 Self placement in the right 1.413 .000*** 3.583 Self placement in the center-right 1.276 .000*** 3.583 Self placement in the center -.348 .048** .706 Protest vote 1.528 .000*** 4.609 Constant -6.605 .000 .001 Nagelkerke R Square

.167

*p<.1, **p<.05, ***p<.001

In contrast to the findings presented in Table one, the results here suggest that

the majority of the socio-demographic characteristics seem to have a statistically

significant effect on the dependent variable. The only exception is gender, where

both datasets provide evidence of a mail bias amid the electorate of LA.O.S. In


34

respect to the rest of the variables all age and educational categories seem to be

significant in the 95 or even the 90 percent confidence interval, indicating a

positive effect78. As far as the occupational status is concerned although there are

no contradictory findings, important deviations do occur. In contrast to my earlier

findings being a civil servant has no statistically significant effect on voting

LA.O.S, while on the contrary freelancers and private employees seem to be more

likely to vote for the radical right. The results upon the rest of the occupational

categories and especially unemployed present no difference, indicating an

insignificant relation with r.r vote.

Except the differences mentioned above in respect to the socio-demographic

characteristics, small differences have occured also in relevance to some

attitudinal variables and especially protest voting. The latter has been found to be,

by many researchers, of prime importance in the examination of radical right

voting and indeed my results here indicate the same. Protest voting seems to have

a statistically significant, strong Exp(B) 4.518and positive effect on r.r vote

even in the 90% confidence interval. Although a finding like that was theoretically

expected, it came as a surprise since in the examination of the previous dataset my

indications upon political dissatisfaction were more ambiguous.

Finally there are some very interesting findings in respect to the position of

-right dimension. My results here depict that although

as expected a self-placement at the center of the dimension is negatively related

with voting LA.O.S, the same does not hold true for those that identified them-

selves in the center-right. The latter is of course surprising for the electorate of a

78 As I argue further on it is my belief that the fact that all the educational and age variables have been found to be significant is due to the large sample size. That is why I do not emphasize the differences between the two dataset in respect to those factors.


35

party that as I argue here is member of the radical right party family79. Being

alter the ambiguity created from the above finding. The problem here consist

mainly to the fact that both the coefficients, the significance and the odds ratio of

the two categories are very close to each other indicating that individuals allocated

in these two groups hold almost the same possibilities of voting LA.O.S. In

relevance to that the following things can be said. First of all what actually this

finding implies is that voters identified in the center-right are more likely to vote

LA.O.S in comparison to the rest of the electorate, including centrist and leftist

voters. And indeed it is logically consistent that center-right voters are more likely

to vote for a radical right party than centrist or leftist ones. Moreover as I argued

in part two, LA.O.S has been transformed over the years from being an extreme

right party into a party of the populist radical right family. This in turn may

signify an e the

electorate, attracted by its populist discourse. Of course these arguments give

probably only a partial explanation of the question posed by the above finding80.

The results from the examination of all the four models presented above

highlight the key socio-demographic and attitudinal determinants of radical right

vote in Greece. In a nutshell, radical right voter in Greece seem to present the

following characteristics: a) he is male, b) probably works in the private sector or

is a freelancer81 and is very unlikely to work as a civil servant, c) he is strongly

affiliated with the church, d) he has strong anti-immigrant attitudes, e) and is

79 policy positions are not always identical and even significant deviation may occur. See J.W.P.Veugelers,2000,page.34 80 There is a very interesting contradiction between that and the findings of Koustenis presented in part 2. 81 In the Greek socio-economic context freelancers are a significant part of the petite bourgeoisie.


36

characterized by feelings of political dissatisfaction. In line with the conclusion of

Lubbers et al, the significant increase in the explanatory power of the models after

the introduction of the attitudinal variables, signifies that the latter and especially

anti-immigration and political dissatisfaction have a very strong effect in r.r vote.

While model 1 which tests only for socio-demographics has a Nagelkerke R

squared of .056, models 2,3 and 4 that examine also attitudinal variables have

.099, .100 and .167 respectively82. For factors like age and educational level I

presented no final conclusion since the examination of the two datasets gave

contradictory and ambiguous findings.

Before proceeding to the comparative examination of the Greek and the

European radical right electorates it is important to point out, that the difference in

the sample size that made easier the appearance of statistically significant relations

in the second dataset, is probable responsible for the differences in the findings

between the two datasets. On the other hand the fact that the Exit Poll dataset has

such a bigger sample size gave me the ability both to verify part of the results of

models 1 to 3 and also to give more solid bases to the formation of the profile of

the Greek radical right voters83.

Part 5: Differences and similarities in the basis of radical right support across

Europe.

In this fifth part of the paper I have two main goals;; the first is to identify

common patterns and differences in the basis of radical right support across

Europe and the second to propose possible explanations for the occurred

82 The explanatory power of model 4 is so big in comparison with the rest of the models due to the fact that model 4 is used in the examination of the much larger sample provided by the 2009 Exit Poll. 83 The big Nagelkerke R squared of model 4 is a justification of that.


37

differences. In this co

created above, with the average findings of the examination of their European

counterparts as the latter are presented in part 2.

My analysis indicates that Greek radical right voters present great

similarities with their European counterparts in respect to many key socio-

demographic and attitudinal characteristics. As most of the European radical right

voters, Greeks are more likely to be male and to work in the private sector, either

as employees or as freelancers. Hence the hypothesis that r.r parties draw their

electorates from social groups that are more exposed to the economic and social

changes, like employees in the private sector and free-lancers, seems to hold true

in the case of Greek radical right to. Moreover voting LA.O.S is also highly

related with anti-immigrant attitudes and political dissatisfaction, thus confirming

the scholars arguing that attitudinal characteristics are of crucial importance in

determining radical right vote.

Despite the above similarities important differences are also present. Unlike

their European counterparts L

between blue-collar workers and white-collar employs and very affiliated with the

church. In respect to the former the only possible explanation, irrelevant to the

mainly focused on issues of broader

acceptance, like immigration or law and order, that do not target specifically the

one or the other of these two social subcategories, but probably

horizontally84. As far as the positive relation between greater affiliation with the

church and voting LA.O.S is concerned, the results are not surprising. As I 84 It is important to note here that according to A.Fragiskou, Greek political culture has a more or less exclusive character, structured around the concept of cultural and religious homogeneity, thus

A.Fragiskou,2009,page.168


38

mentioned earlier church related issues are very highly prioritized in LA

the reason why its voters seem to have a stronger

attachment to the church than the rest of the electorate.

Other important variables like age and educational level are not included in

the current comparison since in respect

solid conclusions in the examination of the Greek case. The only thing that I can

infer in relevance to them, always with great caution, is that probably the

electorate of LA.O.S is more homogenously distributed in all the age and

educational categories85 , in comparison with the electorates of other main r.r

parties across the continent that present a significant bias towards younger voters

with low or moderate level of education.

Based on the above description and with a small emphasis on the attitudinal

characteristics I

profile of their European count mean in any case

that the differences found are of minor or no interest.

The ability of LA.O.S to appeal evenly in both blue-collar workers and white-

collar a more in depth analysis, especially if

further evidence prove that the same is true for the distribution of its voters amid

the age and educational categories as implied by our data here. If that happens

then LA.O.S will present a more or less even appeal to almost all social categories.

And of course the latter will be surprising for a party with such a small electoral

scope (in 2009 elections, LA.O.S gained 5,63%) and radical right political

85 I say that because in the examination of the second sample all the age and educational variables seem to have a positive and significant effect that is more or less equal, while the exact same but reversed is true for the first sample.


39

agenda86, at least if someone accepts the argument that radical right electorates are

characterized by more or less specific socio-demographic characteristics, like the

ones presented in part three.

Conclusions

Despite the importance of socio-demographic and attitudinal factors as

determinants of radical right vote, their explanatory power is in many aspects

limited. There are a series of other parameters that a more in depth analysis of the

phenomenon, of contemporary radical right cannot miss.

Institutional factors like the nature of the electoral system and the structure of

the party system are of great importance in the understanding of r.r vote87. It is

without doubt that these parameters affect both the ability of r.r parties to gain

parliamentary representation and thus to be electorally more attractive (here is the

effect of electoral laws88) and also their ability to position them-selves in the

political space in such a way that will maximize their share of vote (here is the

effect of the structure of the party system)89.

86 Radical right parties have in some cases electorates that are in terms of socio-demographic and attitudinal characteristics very close to the average of the broader population, but that only happens when they have become part of the mainstream political powers, with much greater electoral scope and a less radical agenda (it may also be the case that the rest of the major parties adapt parts of their program/ see T.Bale et al, 2010). But is very unusual for a small radical right party to have such a normalized electorate. 87 R.W.Jackman et al,1996,page.516-7/ K.Arzhaimer et al,2006,page.438-40/E.Kestila et al,2007,page.786/ R.Koopmans et al,2009,page.659-60/K.Loxbo,2010,page.310-11/A.Cole,2005,page.222-3 88 W.D.Rae, 1967, page.88,91,152 89 The electability of the party, which is highly related both with the electoral system and its ability to occupy a vital political space, has a strong psychological effect in big parts of the electorate. A low level of electability may create feelings of wasted vote to the voters who will then either abstain or choose another party. See W.V.D.Brug et al,2000,page.95/P.Norris, 2005, page. 16/ Lubbers et al, 2002,365/The political space left available by the convergence of the main parties is also crucial. See L.Weinberg,2007,page.114


40

Moreover many researchers like Ellinas, Koopmans&Muis and Norris, draw

attention to other factors like agenda setting and priming90 or the effect of deep-

rooted social traits, like the existence of active social cleavages, that affect party

spectrum. And indeed the priming of r.r discourse into the mainstream political

agenda91 and the existence or not of social-cleavages, that create favorable or non-

favorable conditions for the expansion of the influence of r.r parties into broader

parts of the electorate 92 , is according to the evidence gathered of crucial

importance. For example Ellinas in his comprehensive analysis upon the Greek

case, has demonstrate how the expansion of the electoral scope of LA.O.S after

2003 is highly related with the priming of specific issues, relevant to its agenda in

the Greek media.

Only under the light of these parameters many of the findings of part four

may find a more coherent and analytically fruitful explanation. For example the

ability of LA.O.S to appeal at the same time in voters that identify them-selves in

the center-right and parts of the electorate with clearly extreme right political

orientation93 may have to do with the structure of the right half of the political

spectrum in Greece (i.e. the possible structural opportunities created both by the

vagueness of the political position of the center-right N.D. and the lack of a

serious competitor on its right).

question posed by the ex

the above fact. How can a radical right party, like LA.O.S, have an electoral

90 R.Koopmans et al,2009,page.642,659-60/Ellinas,2010,page.74 91 P.Ignazi, 2006, page. 239-40,245/R.Ford et al, 2010,page.20 92 P.Norris, 2005, page. 134-6 93 See the evidence of Koustenis about the movements of parts of the electorate between LA.O.S and X.A.


41

appeal that encompasses almost the entire spectrum of the right? Having no solid

evidence on that, I can only hypothesis here that indeed the answer lies on the

examination of the structure and the specific process of evolvement of the Greek

party system.

Finally it is very important to point out that the evidence presented above

validate the arguments of the scholars that emphatically support the opinion that

there are common patterns in the basis of radical right support. Despite the

occasional deviations, my findings here indicate that indeed a series of socio-

demographic and attitudinal characteristics seem to consist the common

denominator in the basis of radical right support across Europe.


42

Appendix A:

1) Further explanation of the models.

In model two I introduce a number of proxy variables in order to examine various parameters of the r.r vote such as anti-immigrant attitudes, political dissatisfaction, authoritarian predispositions, etc. amid the electorate of LA.O.S. More specifically, I examine anti-immigrant attitudes with the use of a proxy variable that measures the importance of immigration as a key problem in the

also examine the impact that unemployment and criminality, have in voting for LA.O.S. All these factors have been found to be of great importance for the understanding of the r.r vote by the majority of the researchers94. Many of them have also point out their correlation and especially the linkage between anti-immigrant attitudes with both unemployment and criminality that is why in model three I examine these factors, also in interaction. In order to test for the existence of authoritarian predispositions I use a series of questions that measure the level of trust of the respondents to institutions such as the party system, the parliament and the armed forces. The hypothesis here is that low levels of trust to the democratic institutions and high levels to the armed forces will be an indication of authoritarian predispositions. Moreover by examining the level of trust to institutions like the party system and the parliament I am able to trace signs of political dissatisfaction. Finally in model two, I add another three variables as proxies in order to draw some inferences about the economic views of measure the level of trust to Trade Unions, the major domestic companies/industries and multinational companies. The logic behind the introduction of these variables into the model is, that if the level of trust to the trade unions is low and the trust for the domestic and multinational companies is high, then probable the respondent holds more liberal economic views. I found the examination of these factors interesting due to the fact that both authoritarianism and libertarian appeals seem to be in many cases the key to success of many radical right parties. My hypothesis here is that LA.O.S presents

-According to the latter successful r.r parties present a combination of authoritarian and economically liberal agendas, thus drawing their voters from electorates with similar attitudes and beliefs. See H.Kitschelt, 2008, page. 19-21. In relevance to the second dataset used, only two thing needs to be said. The first is that the variable protest vote is a proxy. The initial variable measures why the respondent voted that day, and it has four options. From these four I isolated

94


43

condemn the party-

examination of the second dataset, I use a modified version of model two, due to the fact that all the key socio-demographics are controlled comparison between the models is possible. For the same reason I have tried to make the subcategories of variables like age and education similar. 2) The structure of the models in greater detail: Due to lack of space in the main body of the paper I gave only a synoptic description of the models. In all of them age, education, working sector and occupational category are examined through a series of dummy variables that test for each subcategory separately (e.g. the variable age is examined with the use of 5 dummies, one for every subcategory, etc). In order to make the presentation easier to the reader in tables 1 and 2 together with the general label of the variables I have put into brackets extra information about the variables (what exactly I measure and why). Appendix B: Dataset details

The samples of both datasets are weighted (statistically) in respect to gender,

age, area of living, LA.O.S and participation in the general elections of 2009. The

respondents are 49% male and 51%female and they are all over 18 years.

Unfortunately I do not have in my possession any information in respect to the

response rates.


44

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