South African Instit

ute of Inte

rnat

iona

l Affa

irs

African perspectives. Global insights.

South African Foreign Policy and African Drivers Programme

O C C A S I O N A L P A P E R N O 8 9

Intertwined Paths: Portugal and Rising Angola

A u g u s t 2 0 1 1

P e d r o S e a b r a & P a u l o G o r j ã o

A b o u t S A I I A

The South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA) has a long and proud record

as South Africa’s premier research institute on international issues. It is an independent,

non-government think-tank whose key strategic objectives are to make effective input into

public policy, and to encourage wider and more informed debate on international affairs

with particular emphasis on African issues and concerns. It is both a centre for research

excellence and a home for stimulating public engagement. SAIIA’s occasional papers

present topical, incisive analyses, offering a variety of perspectives on key policy issues in

Africa and beyond. Core public policy research themes covered by SAIIA include good

governance and democracy; economic policymaking; international security and peace;

and new global challenges such as food security, global governance reform and the

environment. Please consult our website www.saiia.org.za for further information about

SAIIA’s work.

A b o u t t h e S o u t h A f r I c A n f o r e I g n p o l I c y A n d A f r I c A n d r I v e r S p r o g r A m m e

Since the fall of apartheid in 1994, South Africa’s foreign policy has prioritised the

development of Africa. To achieve its ‘African Agenda’ objectives, South Africa needs to

intensify its strategic relations with key African countries. SAIIA’s South African Foreign Policy

and African Drivers (SAFPAD) Programme has a two-pronged focus. First, it unpacks South

Africa’s post-1994 Africa policy in two areas: South Africa as a norm setter in the region and

South Africa’s potential to foster regional co-operation with key African states and other

external partners, in support of the continent’s stabilisation and development. Second, it

focuses on key African driver countries’ foreign policy objectives that have the ability to

influence, positively or negatively, the pace of regional co-operation and integration.

SAFPAD assumes a holistic examination of the internal and external pressures that inform

each driver country’s foreign policy decisions by exploring contemporary domestic factors;

the scope of their bilateral relations; their role in the regional economic communities; and

lastly their relations with South Africa.

Programme head: Dr Nomfundo Xenia Ngwenya Xenia.Ngwenya@wits.ac.za

© SAIIA August 2011

All rights are reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or utilised in any form by any

means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying and recording, or by any information or

storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher. Opinions expressed are

the responsibility of the individual authors and not of SAIIA.

Please note that all currencies are in US$ unless otherwise indicated.

A b S t r A c t

Since independence, Portuguese–Angolan relations have been constrained by their

historical past and by Angola’s own internal vicissitudes. However, the end of Angola’s civil

war in 2002, and the stability and national reconciliation process that followed, marked

the start of a visible mutual effort in advancing the bilateral relationship. Although some

past issues have been left unresolved, regular political contact between both countries’

authorities has supported an increased rapprochement and created new opportunities

for bilateral engagement. Wide co-operation avenues, an overall co-ordination in terms

of foreign policy and extensive economic and trade ties have embedded the present

strategic partnership in both countries’ foreign priorities. In turn, this has also strengthened

Portugal’s position in withstanding competition from other international suitors in Angola.

A b o u t t h e A u t h o r S

Pedro Seabra is a researcher at the Portuguese Institute of International Relations and

Security (IPRIS). He holds a Bachelor’s Degree in Law from Oporto University and a Master’s

Degree in Political Science and International Relations from the New University of Lisbon. His

research and publications have focused on Brazil and Lusophone Africa.

Paulo Gorjão is currently the director of IPRIS. He holds a Bachelor’s Degree in International

Relations from Lusíada University in Portugal and a Master’s Degree in Political Science

and International Relations from the Catholic University of Louvain in Belgium. He is also a

lecturer at Lusíada University and has published extensively on Portuguese foreign policy

and Lusophone countries.

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S O U T H A F R I C A N F O R E I G N P O L I C Y & A F R I C A N D R I V E R S P R O G R A M M E

A b b r e v I A t I o n S A n d A c r o n y m S

AICEP PortugueseAgencyforInvestmentandForeignTrade

BCP BancoComercialPortuguês(PortugueseCommercialBank)

BPI BancoPortuguêsdeInvestimento(PortugueseInvestmentBank)

CPLP CommunityofPortuguese-speakingCountries

EPA EconomicPartnershipAgreement

FDI foreigndirectinvestment

ICP IndicativeCooperationProgramme

IPRIS PortugueseInstituteofInternationalRelationsandSecurity

MPLA People’sMovementfortheLiberationofAngola

PALOP Portuguese-speakingAfricanCountries

PS SocialistParty

PT PortugalTelecom

UNHRC UNHumanRightsCouncil

UNITA NationalUnionfortheTotalIndependenceofAngola

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I n t r o d u c t I o n

AngolaandPortugalhavelonghadalove-haterelationship.Significanttraumasfrom

thepast,untappedbilateralpotentialandanever-evolvinginternationalcontexthave

contributedtothepresentunorthodoxpursuitofcommongoals,wealthanddevelopment.

Thepaperanalysesthecurrentstateofbilateralrelations,andtriestoassessPortugal’s

standinginAngola’sforeignprioritiesandcalculations.Ittakestheincreasinglyregular

politicalcontactbetweentherespectivegovernmentsintoaccount,aswellaspastissues

thatstillcloudtherelationship.Thepaperprovidesexamplesofco-operationindifferent

sectors,followedbyacomprehensiveoverviewofthecurrentextensiveeconomicties

between the twocountries. It reviews foreignpolicyco-ordination,especially in the

lightofgrowinginfluenceofotherinternationalsuitorsandconcludesbydiscussingthe

significanceoftheintertwinedpathsofAngolaandPortugal.

p o r t u g A l ’ S I n t e r e S t S I n A n g o l A S I n c e I n d e p e n d e n c e

InthepastPortugal’sforeignpolicyseldomdeviatedfromitscoreparadigmofEuropean

integration, transatlantic relations with the US and historical-cultural ties with the

Portuguese-speakingcountries scatteredacross theworld.1However, since2005 the

countryhastriedtorecalibratethisapproach.IthasshownrenewedinterestinAfricaas

asourceofopportunitiestobroadenPortuguesepoliticalandeconomicpresenceabroad.

PortugueseForeignMinister,LuísAmado,wentasfarastoexpresshopethatthenext

decadewouldbedevotedtoaspecialrelationshipwithAfrica.2Understandably,theend

oftheAngolancivilwarin2002andthegrowingboomofinternationalcommodityprices

–whichmadethecourtingofenergyproducersanecessityonadailybasis–helpedto

sustainthisre-energisedfocus.Asexpected,AfricanPortuguese-speakingcountrieshave

beenattheforefrontofthisrenewedPortugueseinteresttowardsAfrica.Amongthese

preferentialdestinations,Angolahasstoodoutfromthestartasprimus inter pares.

Bilateralrelationsbetweenthetwocountrieshavefrequentlystumbledonpolitical-

ideologicalleftoversfromtheirsharedpast.Portugal’scolonialruleandthesubsequent

independencestruggleleftAngolawithseriousscars.Thesehaveprovendifficulttoerase

andforget,evenaftermorethan35yearssincepartingways.However,themishandling

ofthetransitionperiodtoindependenceandthesuccessiveinternalconflictbetweenthe

People’sMovementfortheLiberationofAngola(MPLA)andtheNationalUnionforthe

TotalIndependenceofAngola(UNITA)woulddictatethetermsandinevitablyconstrain

Angola’srelationshipwithitsformercolonialpower.Theresponseandcondemnation

ofthisconflictbyPortugal’s twomainpoliticalparties–theSocialistParty(PS)and

theSocialDemocraticParty–preventedanydevelopmentofbilateralrapprochement

thatoccasionallysurfacedthroughouttheyears.3Aswiththeinternationalcommunity,

Portugal’spoliticalpartiesfrequentlydisagreedonhowtodeveloparelationshipwith

Angolawithoutalienatingtheotherwarringside.Anevolvingrapportwitheitherthe

MPLAorUNITA–oftendependentonthecourseofthewar–wasthereforecommon

practiceintheearlyyearsofPortugal’sforeignpolicywithAngola.

High-profilePortuguesemediationefforts,suchasthe1991BicesseAccords,failedto

findanymeaningfulandpermanentwayoutofthisconflict.Thiscontributedtoageneral

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perceptionthatanyseriousPortuguesecommitmenttowardsthedevelopmentoffruitful

relationswascontingentonAngolaresolvingitsconflict.Angolanlocalpartieswould

needtoreachaconsensualsolutiontoendthecivilwarandplaceAngolaonapeaceful

andstablepath.

TheopportunityforchangearoseafterthedeathofUNITA’sleader,JonasSavimbi,

in2002andthesubsequentnationaltruce.Awidespreadandmassivereconstruction

processsoonfollowed,aimedatinvestinginanddevelopingawar-tornnation.Angola

quicklybegantoattracttheattentionoftheinternationalcommunityforitsdouble-digit

growthrates,vastnaturalwealthanditsgrowingbusinessopportunities.Indeed,‘rising

Angola’washowThe EconomistbrandedtheburgeoningAfricancountryinearly2010.4

Notwantingtobeleftbehind,Portugalskillfullypositioneditselfinabidtoreapthefruits

oftheinescapablehistoricalbondbetweenthetwocountries,andthepossibilitiesthat

thisallowed.

c o n t e n t I o u S I S S u e S v e r S u S p o l I t I c A l e n g A g e m e n t

The last few years have witnessed revitalised political contact between Angola and

Portugal.However,since2002pastissuesfromtheearlyyearsofAngola’sindependence

havestubbornlyhinderedanyrealprogress.

Theso-called‘visaissue’hasbeenattheforefrontofeachpoliticalagenda.Bureaucratic

constraintsandthetimerequiredtoobtainavisatotravelbetweenthecountrieshavebeen

raisedateachvisitbyaPortugueseauthoritytoLuanda,andviceversa.5Thisdeadlock

wasnotduetoalackofofficialpoliticalwill.Ratheritwascausedbyinstitutionalstiffness

andtheinabilityofbothstatestructurestoprovideadefinitesolutiontotheproblem.6

ThesubjecthasremainedpoliticallyrelevantwiththegrowingnumbersofPortuguese

andAngolannationalsmovingbetweenthetwocountries.In2009Portuguesecustoms

estimatesrankedAngolansasthefifth-largestgroupinPortugal’s foreignpopulation.

Angolansrepresented6%ofthetotal,with26 557residentcitizens.Thiswasaslight

decreasefromthe27 619residentcitizensin2008.7PortugueseemigrationtoAngola

hasalsofacedanimpressiveboom.AccordingtothePortugueseEmigrationObservatory,

Portuguesenationals,orpeopleofPortuguesedescent,increasedfrom21 000in2003

to91 900in2010.8Consequently,itisunsurprisingthattherespectiveauthoritiestake

thevisaissueseriously.Delaysinvisaprocessingobstructmigrationflowsand,more

importantly,thepursuitofbilateraltradeandtransnationalbusiness.

ThestatusofAngolanpropertyclaimsmadebyPortuguesecitizensisanotherissue

thatisyettoberesolved.AnumberofPortuguesecitizenssawtheirassetsnationalised

inthewakeofAngola’s independence.Officialquantificationof themonetaryvalues

inquestionwasneverproperlyundertaken.However,severalcivilsocietymovements

continuedtopushforPortugueseauthoritiestoaddressthematter,eventhoughlittle

couldbedoneduringAngola’scivilwar. In2005Portugal finallyestablisheda joint

taskforcewithofficialsfromitsownforeignaffairsministry,financeministryandsocial

securityministry.Thetaskforceaimedtoanswer‘theproblemsandinjusticethataffect

asignificantnumberofPortuguesewhowereforcedtoreturntoPortugalduringand

becauseofthedecolonisationprocess.’9However,aswithpastattempts,thechangeof

governmentinPortugalandsubsequentstartofPSPrimeMinisterJoséSócrates’tenure

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haltedanysignificantprocess.Despiteitsimportance,theissuehasbeenabsentfrom

bilateralpoliticaldiscourseinrecentyears.

The samecannotbe saidofAngola’sdebt toPortugal,whichgrewexponentially

afterthepost-independenceperiod.Inlightofitsowninternalcontingencies,Angola

wasforcedtointerruptitspaymentsin1992.Twoyearslater,thecountriesreacheda

debtsettlementagreement.Theagreementforesawarealisticcourseofactiontohonour

Angola’sobligationsthroughamixpackageofoilexports,creditlinesandrescheduling

ofallmajordeadlines.10Still,resultsendedupfarfromexpectedandthevalueofAngola’s

totaldebt toPortugal subsequently remained thehighestof allAfricanPortuguese-

speakingcountries.

InNovember2002,underthegovernmentofformerPortuguesePrimeMinisterJosé

ManuelDurãoBarroso,ajointcommissionwasformedtoevaluatethetotaldebtand

proposeanewresolutiontothegrowingvalues.FollowingPrimeMinisterDurãoBarroso’s

widely toutedvisit toLuandaayear later,PortuguesePrimeMinisterPedroSantana

LopesreapedthefruitsofthislabourinAugust2004,whenheunveiledanewpayment

schedule.TheschedulewasstructuredaroundanimmediatereimbursementbyAngolafor

27%ofthetotaldebtowed(around$258million).Theremaining$698millionwasspread

overconsecutivetranchestobedeliveredinthenext25yearsbeginningin2009,andwith

a1%interestrate.Angolahasfollowedthisprocedurewithoutfault.Thisisindicatedby

theBankofPortugal’sfiguresfor2009,whichalreadypointto$28millionlessthanwhat

AngolaowesPortugal.11

Nevertheless,itisimportanttonotethatresolutionoftheoutstandingdebtwasonly

achievedafter2002.ThisindicatesthrivingpoliticalwilltomendtieswithAngola,which

inturnhelpstounderstandtheseriesofconsecutiveofficialvisitsbetweenrespective

officials.12Thefour-dayvisitbyPrimeMinisterDurãoBarrosotoLuandainOctober2003

iswidelyconsideredalandmarkinbilateralrelationsforhelpingtokick-startlong-stalled

institutionaldynamicsandtogeneratetrustbetweenbothparties.13Similarly,thethree

visitspaidbyPrimeMinisterSócratestoAngola,in2006,2008and2010areclearsigns

ofofficialinterestandanintentiontoexpandeconomicpresence.PrimeMinisterSócrates

statedduringhisfirststayinLuandathat‘thereisnotrustintheeconomywithoutequal

trustinthepoliticalinstitutions’.Accordingly,bothcountriespraisedtheendofthecivil

warandsubsequentwidespreadstability.14

ThevisitbyAngolanPresidentJoséEduardodosSantos–hardlyafanofforeigntravel

himself–toPortugalinMarch2009wasinterpretedasasignofAngola’sreciprocalinterest

indevelopingtieswithPortugal.PresidentdosSantosprimarilysoughttopromotemore

equitableandbalancedeconomicandtradeflows.However,theclimaxofthismutual

bilateralengagementwasreachedwhenPortuguesePresidentAníbalCavacoSilvavisited

AngolainJuly2010,underthepretextoftheVIIIHeadsofStateandGovernmentSummit

oftheCommunityofPortuguese-speakingCountries(CPLP).15Theoccasionallowedfor

anapparentresolutiontoanotherdebt.ThiswastheestimatedEUR 1.5 billionowedby

AngolatoPortuguesecompaniesdoingbusinessinAngola,particularlylargeandsmallcivil

constructioncompaniesparticipatinginthepost-2002nationalreconstructionprocess.

Portugalinsistedonaswiftresolution.Notwishingtocauseanydamagetotheireconomic

ties,Angolanauthoritiesproposedacrediblepaymentplan,whichensuedsoonafter.16

PresidentCavacoSilva’svisitalsosoughttoelevatePortuguese–Angolanrelationsto

thenextstage.Thisincludesformalisingastrategicpartnershipwitharegularandformal

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frameworkmechanismofhigh-levelconsultations,whichisexpectedtohappeninthe

nearfuture.17Inhindsight,thetimerequiredtoachievethispointofpoliticalconvergence

mightbeextended,giventhe2002startingpoint.However,areminderofhowstrained

relationswereinthepasthelpstoexplainbothcountries’cautioninmovingforward.

S e c t o r A l o p p o r t u n I t I e S : f r o m e d u c A t I o n t o t e c h n I c A l – m I l I t A r y c o - o p e r A t I o n

Theofficialvisitswouldbemeaninglesswithoutpoliticalcapital relayed intovisible

co-operation. Given Angola’s structural shortcomings, it was understandable for

Portugal to step in and increase the value of development aid to its former colony.

BuiltaroundIndicativeCooperationProgrammes(ICPs),Portugueseaidclimbedfrom

EUR 13.262 millionin2001toEUR 15.325 millionin2002andtoEUR 17.249 million

in2003.Portugalthenimplementedamulti-yearframeworkfor2004–2006,withatotal

budgetofEUR 42 million.18Assistanceinthehealthandeducationsectors,institutional

strengthening, human resources training, social reintegration and employment

promotionwerethemaintargetareas.However,progresswassomewhatdisappointing

dueto‘politicalcircumstances’associatedwithAngola’sfragileinternalpeaceand‘the

acknowledgedscatteringofactivitiesandresources,aswellasbythedeficientarticulation

ofmeans’.19SincetheninternationalaidtrendshaveevolvedandthelatestICPforthe

2007–2010timeframeallocatedEUR65millionaroundtwoaxes–goodgovernance,

participationanddemocracy;andsustainabledevelopmentandthefightagainstpoverty

–togetherwithapossiblebilateralco-operationclusteraimedatpromoting‘thesustained

developmentofaspecificlocationthroughanintegratedanddecentralisedintervention

thatcreatessynergiesamongthevariousagentsandinterventionareas.’20

Twoareasofco-operationareworthmentioning.Thefirstiseducation,wherePrime

MinisterSócratesannouncedduringhis2008visittoLuandathatPortugalwouldsend

200ofitsownteacherstoAngola’sfurthestregions.21Theprogrammeonlybeganayear

laterandfacedseriouslogisticaldifficulties.However,itexemplifiedthecommitmentto

anareathat‘contributestotheconstructionofmoreopen,moredemocraticandmore

justandequalsocietiesandisoneofthemostpowerfulinstrumentsinreducingpoverty

andinequality.’22TheassistanceoftheinitiativeinconsolidatinganddiffusingPortuguese

languagethroughoutAngolashouldnotgounnoticed,especiallywhensimilarefforts

byothercountries–suchasBrazil–arealsoontherise.Inaddition,therehasbeen

co-operationinhighereducationwhereover3 500Angolanstudentsattendedcoursesin

Portugueseuniversitiesin2008/09.23

Thesecondareaistechnical–militaryco-operation.AswithremainingLusophone

peers,24 Portugal has long held tight links with Angola in this domain. Since its

establishmentundera1996comprehensiveDefenseCooperationAgreement,technical–

military co-operationhasbeenoneof the fewareasunaffectedbybilateralpolitical

negligenceovertheyears.Portugalhasfocusedontheprovisionoftrainingtoallmilitary

ranks25andtheprovisionoflogisticalandadministrativesupport.Ithasaimedtoequip

theAngolanArmedForceswithahighlevelofprofessionalism,toenablethemtobe

‘subordinatedtothepoliticalpowerandfullyinsertedwithintheframeworkofdemocratic

regimes.’26However,toadapttonewtimes,bothcountriesarecurrentlyintheprocess

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ofexploringnewavenues,includingdefenseeconomyopportunities,whilecontinuing

toinvestheavilyintrainingAngolanmilitarypersonnel,bothlocallyandinPortugal.27

e c o n o m I c t I e S : A t w o - w Ay r o A d

Unsurprisingly, sectoral co-operation isnowadayseasilyovershadowedby the sheer

weightofeconomicandtradetiesinthewidercontextofPortuguese–Angolanrelations.

Botheconomieshavegrownconsiderablycloser inrecentyears,withseveralmutual

investmentsalreadyonthegroundhelpingtosustainlocaldevelopment.

Tradebalanceinparticulardemonstratesimpressiveprogress.In2002Angolawas

Portugal’sninthexportmarket–amere2%of thecountry’s total international trade

andlittlemorethanEUR 500 million.Lessthanadecadelater, in2009,Angolawas

thefourth-largestconsumerofPortuguesegoods.ItaccountedfornearlyEUR 2.2 billion

inbilateralexchangeandbecamePortugal’sbiggestcommercialpartneroutsidetheEU

–surpassedonlybyFrance,GermanyandSpain–andaddingupto80%ofalltrade

withthePortuguese-speakingAfricanCountries(PALOP).Machinery,foodsuppliesand

commonmetalshaveconsecutivelydominatedtheseflows,formingoverhalfoftotal

exportedproducts.However,2010witnessedaslightdeclineinthesenumbers,mostly

duetotheeffectsofthePortuguesedebtcrisis.Angolaexpressedanegativevariationof

14.8%andconsequentlyfelltothefifthoverallslot.28

Foreigndirect investment (FDI)has also followed thispattern.As illustratedby

Annexure4,AngolawasPortugal’s11thdestinationforFDIin2002,withEUR50million.

Sixyearslater,in2008,thesenumberspeakedtoanall-timehighofEUR775million.

ThisdecreasedtoEUR693millionin2009andtoEUR226millionin2010,againdueto

thePortuguesedebtcrisis.29

Angola’sbankingsectorhasbeenthepreferentialtargetoftheseinvestments.Asof

2010,everymajorPortuguesebank–includingCaixaGeraldeDepósitos;Santander

Totta;BancoPortuguêsdeInvestimento(BPI);BancoEspíritoSanto;andBancoComercial

Português(BCP)–hasheldaminorityorjoint-ventureoperationinAngolathrougha

numberofsimilarinstitutions.TheseincludeBancoCaixaGeralTotta;BancodeFomento

Angola;BancoEspíritoSantoAngola;andMilleniumAngola.EverymajorPortuguese

civil construction company – from Mota-Engil to Teixeira Duarte, Soares da Costa,

SomagueandEdifer–isalsopresentinAngola.Thecompaniesaimtobenefitfromthe

massiveinfrastructureconstructionbids.Cement-makerSECILandtelecommunication

companies,PortugalTelecom(PT),ZONMultimediaandVisabeira,haveactivelyinvested

inlocalprojects.TheyaimtoestablishthemselvesinanincreasinglycompetitiveSouthern

Africanmarket.ThePortugueseoilcompany,GalpEnergia,hasclosetieswithitsAngolan

counterpart,Sonangol.Theirrelationshipisbasedonthejointexplorationofseveraloil

blocksoffthecoastofAngolaoronthecombinedownershipofCapeVerde’sEnacol.This

relationshipreflectsthegrowingconvergenceofinterestsinthisdomain.

Therehasalsobeenanofficialpushtoredirecttheseinvestmentstodifferentprovinces

otherthanLuanda.Angolawishestosustainthediversificationofitseconomyandfight

thedesertificationofthecountry’sinterior.Italsowishestotakeadvantageofoverlooked

businessopportunitiesbyotherinternationalactorspresentinAngola.Targetedregions

include theHuílaProvince; theBenguelaProvince,whichhasa significantneed for

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infrastructure;andthehighlystrategicLobitoseaport.Portugalhaspaidattentionto

Angola’swishes.PresidentCavacoSilvahighlightedtheseefforts inhis latestvisit to

Angola,eitherbypubliclypromotinggreater localbusinesscontactsorbypolitically

backingtheestablishmentofanewPortugueseAgencyforInvestmentandForeignTrade

(AICEP)branchinBenguela.30

AsthePortugueseAmbassadortoAngola,FranciscoRibeiroTelles,recognised,‘the

businessrelationshipbetweenPortugalandAngolaisatwo-wayroad.’31Thelatestfigures

havesurelyprovenhimright.Angolarepresented0.16%ornomorethanEUR 70 million

oftotalPortugueseimportsin2002.Ithitanall-timelowat128thpositioninPortugal’s

importingmarketsin2004.In2008Angolabouncedback,sellingoverEUR 400 million

ingoodsandranking21st.By2010AngolahadbecomePortugal’s15thmainimporter,with

tradesurpassingEUR 560 million.Asexpected,oilcomprised99.2%ofthistotal,avisible

trendthroughoutthelastdecade.32

Furthermore,AngolaninvestmentsinPortugal–althoughstillmodestwithinthe

generalpicture–haverisenfromaninsignificantEUR 1.6 millionin2002toamore

respectableEUR 116 millionin2009,asAnnexure4demonstrates.33Thisreflectsthe

suddeninterest fromAngolancompanies inPortuguesebusinessopportunities,with

2007generallyconsideredtobethestartingpoint.AlthoughanumberofAngolanprivate

investors–includingGeneralHélderVieiraDias‘Kopelipa’,acloseallyofPresidentdos

Santos–haveconductedbusinessinPortugalthroughBancoBIG,asmallAngolanbank,

forsometimenow,thesectorhasclearlyattractedmuchattentionsince2007.Aroundthat

time,SonangolbegantoacquireasignificantstakeinPortugal’sbiggestprivatebank,BCP,

presentlytotaling12.44%.IsabeldosSantos,PresidentdosSantos’sdaughterandAngola’s

leadingbusinesswoman,co-fundedtheopeningofBancoInternacionaldeCréditoin

2008.In2009sheboughta9.8%stakeinanotherbank,BPI,andpurchased10%ofthe

multimediacompany,ZON.Still,themostsignificantinvestmentisundoubtedlySonangol

andIsabeldosSantos’sjointownershipof45%ofAmorimEnergia.AmorimEnergiain

turncontrols33.34%ofGalpEnergia–althoughifmediareportsaretobetrusted,notfor

muchlonger.34Bytheendof2010Angolaninvestmentcomprised3.8%ofPortugal’sstock

market,amountingtoasignificantEUR2.18billion.35

Officiallyencouragedandpromotedgrowthinbilateraltrade36haspavedthewayfor

alargerexchangeofintertwinedcapitalflowsbetweenAngolaandPortugal.Thishas

favouredthedevelopmentofwidetransnationalenterprises.Asbilateralexchangeshave

risen,sotoohavebusinessopportunitiesforbothPortugalandAngola’seconomicelites.

However,AngolanlawhasstipulatedthatlocaloperationsbyPortuguesebanks,PT,ZON

MultimediaandMota-EngilinAngolaopentheiroperationstosomeformofAngolan

participation.ThishasinmostcasesrepresentedeitherSonangol’sorIsabeldosSantos’s

respectivetake,whichcouldbeconsideredanoddfactorinthisequation.Nevertheless,

boththeseinterlocutorshavecomeincreasinglytoleadtheAngolancapitalsurge.Thishas

been,forthemostpart,welcomedbyPortuguesecompanies,astheyseektodiversifytheir

ownshareholderstructureswhileopeningthedoortobusinessopportunitiesinAngola.

TheinvolvementofSonangolandIsabeldosSantosisthereforeseenasaconvenientand

mutuallybeneficialarrangement,despitetheoccasionaldoubtsoverthefulltransparency

oftheirinvestments.

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EconomictiesarepresentlythemaindrivingforcebehindAngolan–Portugueserelations.

However, foreign policy matters should not be discarded so easily. Three specific

multilateral dimensions of shared participation and interests are in need of further

analysis.ThesearetheLusophoneworld,theUNandtheEU.

ThehistoricalandculturaltiesthatbothPortugalandAngolasharearetranslated

intothepreferentialarenaforallPortuguese-speakingcountries,theCPLP.Withinits

framework,theindisputableinfluenceofheavyweightslikeBrazil,AngolaandPortugal

hasfrequentlyactedasthecentralcatalystforgreaterprogressanddevelopmentofthe

organisation’sowninstitutionalreach.Nevertheless,asAngolaassumedthebiannual

presidencyinJuly2010,stakesunderstandablyincreased.ForCPLPexecutivesecretary,

DomingosSimõesPereira,theorganisationrepresents‘theidealstageforAngolatoaffirm

itselfasaregionalpower.’Itsgrowingdemographicandeconomicpower‘shouldnowbe

translatedintoaleadershipstrategy’thatwillnotonlybenefitLusophoneco-operation,

butwillalsotacklesomeoftheobstaclesinitsway.37

Portugal’salignmentinthepursuitoftheseobjectivesisforthemostpartmutual.

ThisisdemonstratedbytheactivepromotionofthePortugueselanguageininternational

forums.However,Angola’sregionalconsiderationshavealsobeenincreasinglyondisplay.

DuringtheCPLP2010Summit,PortugueseForeignMinisterLuísAmadoexpressedhis

oppositiontoaLusophonemilitaryinterventioninGuinea-Bissau,owingtothecountry’s

dauntingunrest.However,PresidentdosSantoswasadamantthatnooptionsshouldbe

excludedintheprocessofsupportingGuinea-Bissau,includingamilitaryone.38Thispublic

pledgeofsupportwasmostlyseenasawaytotie,yetagain,theLusophonecommunity

tothefateofGuinea-Bissau.ItwasalsoseenasanopportunityforAngolatoreaffirmits

Africancredentials,asitseekstopresentitselfasacredibleactorwiththeforeigninfluence

tomatchitsresourcesandnaturalwealth.Similarpublicdivergencescanalsobefound

inbothcountries’stancesontheIvoryCoastcrisis,whicheruptedinlate2010.Still,

anydifferenceofopinionthatAngolaandPortugalmighthaveontheseissuesisquickly

surpassedbytheirsharedrecognitionofawiderexistingframeworkofunderstanding.

It is alsocommon forbothcountries tomutually support eachotherat theUN,

especiallywhenbroadsupportforanyoccasionalelectionforthemyriadofinstitutions

isrequired.Thebestexampleiswithregardtonon-permanentmembershipoftheUN

SecurityCouncil.Working throughapre-establishedCPLPconsensus,Angola fully

supportedPortugal’sbidforthe2011–2012biennium,muchlikePortugalhaddonefor

Angolain2003–2004.ThispatternofusefulendorsementswasalsoevidentwhenAngola

successfullyranfortheEconomicandSocialCouncilin2005,fortheUNPeacebuilding

Commissionin2006,andmorerecently in2010forasecondthree-yearterminthe

UNHumanRightsCouncil(UNHRC).PortugalissurelyalreadycountingonAngola’s

supportinadvancingitsowncandidacyfortheUNHRCfor2014–2017.Itisthuspossible

toobserveadiscrete,albeitpublic,arrangementforconsistentbilateralcollaboration

inachievingtheirrespectiveobjectivesintermsofinternationalrepresentation,which

highlights‘theimportanceofactiveallies.’39

AsforEU–Africarelations,Portugal’smembershipoftheEUisundoubtedlyaserious

factor to be reckoned with. For years now, Portugal has skilfully built an image of

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S O U T H A F R I C A N F O R E I G N P O L I C Y & A F R I C A N D R I V E R S P R O G R A M M E

particularsensitivitytoAfricanconcernsamiditsEuropeanpeersand,moreimportantly,

hasnothesitatedinactinguponit.40However,Angola’ssituationinthisrespectshould

beviewedfromtwodifferentangles.ThefirstconcernsAngola’scurrentengagement

in a deadlock negotiation with the EU over accession to the Interim Economic

PartnershipAgreement(EPA)fortheSouthernAfricanDevelopmentCommunityEPA

Group.Ostensibly,Angolaisunconcernedaboutthelackofprogress,sinceasaleast-

developedcountry,itcontinuestoreceiveEUtradepreferencesundertheEverything

ButArmsinitiative.41Inthiscase,PortugalcanonlysympathisewithAngolanclaims

regardingtheEPAnegotiationsbecausefullresponsibilityfortheconductionofmain

negotiationslieswiththeEU’sTradeCommissioner.Thesecondangleinvolvesadvancing

politicaldialoguebetweenEuropeandAngola.Portuguesediplomaticbackstagework

inthisregardhasproveninvaluable.TheEU’swishtoestablishaJointWayForward

mechanismwithAngolarepresentsamassivePortugueselobbyingeffortinassumingthe

roleofpreferredEuropeaninterlocutorwithitsformercolony.42Angolahaswelcomed

thisPortuguesebridge-buildingabilitywithintheEU,asitimpliestherecognitionof

itsgrowingpreponderance in theAfricangeostrategic scenario.Anotherexampleof

PortuguesesupportisseenintheAngolanaircarrierTAAG,whichwasblacklistedbythe

EUin2007andthereforeofficiallyprohibitedfromflyingtoEurope.Justtwoyearslater

andafterseveralPortuguesetechnicalassurancesandrecommendations,aresolutionwas

foundandthecompanyregaineditsflightpermits.ThisconfirmedPortugal’swillingness

toactuponitsofficialdiscourseofbilateralsupporttowardsAngola.43

Beyondthemultilateralrealm,theUS,BrazilandChinaarealsoworthmentioning.

InhisfirstStateoftheNationspeechonOctober2010,PresidentdosSantosincluded

PortugalalongsideChina,BrazilandtheUSasAngola’spresentstrategicpartners.They

arethusallunderstoodwithinthecontextofan‘urgentneedfornationalreconstruction

butalsowithinawiderperspectiveofthenationaldevelopmentprojectandofAngola’s

projectionintheinternationalplane.’44Theeconomicdominance,internationalgravitas

andpoliticalweightofthesecountriesisnotcomparable.Still,thepresident’sformal

recognitionalonesignifiesthestatuscurrentlyattributedtoPortugalinAngola’sforeign

priorities,especiallywhenthecountryistryingtoputtogetheramulti-vectorforeign

policythatcarefullyencompassesandnurturesalltheseactors.45

c o n c l u S I o n

PortugalandAngolahavetreadedabumpyroadovertheyears.Overcomingthelegacy

ofpainfulmemories isno easy task in itself, and this shadow is expected to linger

andsurgewheneverrelationsbetweenthetwocountrieshitasnag.Forthemostpart,

thesememoriesareinevitablyingrainedintheirrespectivenationalpsyches.However,

currentlybilateralrelationsandmorepracticalmattershavetakenprecedence.Thevisa

issuetoppedeveryagendainthefirstyearsofPortuguese–Angolanrapprochementafter

2002.ThishasbeenreplacedbyAngola’sdebttoPortugueseprivatecompanies.The

issuecontinuestoholdthepotentialtoseriouslytainttherelationshipandblockfurther

politicalendeavourstoenhanceit.Therespectiveauthoritieshavegoneoutoftheirway

toprovideanapparentsolutionforthisimpasse.However,factorssuchasthefrequent

variationofinternationaloilpricesmaycomplicateAngola’sregularpaymentcapabilities.

I N T E R T w I N E D P A T H S : P O R T U G A L A N D R I S I N G A N G O L A

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S A I I A O C C A S I O N A L P A P E R N U M B E R 8 9

Inthissense,theincreasedriskofinvestingintheso-calledAngolanElDorado46should

notbeunderestimated.

InternationalcompetitionforleverageinAngolaalsoraisesdoubtsaboutthecountry’s

owngeopoliticalcalculations.WithoiloverwhelminglytoppingtheUS,Brazil,Portugal

andChina’s shopping list,questionsunderstandablyariseaboutPortugal’s ability to

remainpoliticallyandeconomicallymeaningful toAngola’s futuredevelopmentand

growth.Portugal’sstatuspalesinsignificancetotheeconomicandinternationalclout

oftheUS.ThepenetrationofChinesecompaniesintolucrativelocalpublicworksbids

representsanunavoidablechallengetoPortugueseentrepreneurs.47Moreover,Portugal’s

constantleaningonapoliticaldiscoursethatstresses‘culturalaffinities’canequallybe

disputedbyBrazil’sgrowingpresenceinAngola,usingtheidenticalcardsthatPortugal

onceplayedinthepast.

Despitethis,PortugalunquestionablyretainsaholdoverAngolanelites.Thisisnot

easilyunderstoodbyoutsideobserverswhoareoftenpuzzledabouttheextentofthe

formercolonialpower’srealinfluenceinthecountry.Still,suchapreferentialrelationship

betweenAngolaandPortugalisrealandsustainedbyanumberoffactors.Theseinclude

their joint legacy from the past – which surpasses Brazil’s own linkages – the vast

immigrantcommunitiesandcitizenswhoflowbetweenbothcountries,andthemutual

recognitionthattheycanrepresentagatewayforeachother’sinterestsinthesurrounding

regionsandcontinents,thuscomplementingtheirownforeignpolicyagendas.

Increasedhigh-levelpoliticalcontactsbetweenAngolaandPortugalareenhanced

byextensiveandspecialisedaidefforts,andareheightenedbyafast-pacedeconomic

and trade relationship. Furthermore, historical-cultural ties are proudly and widely

highlighted.These ties enableAngola to join a selective and inclusive international

framework,andtosustainPortuguesesupportfortheforeignagendaofitsformercolony.

Inthiscontext,itisundeniablethatPortugalcontinuestorankhighlyamongAngola’s

externalpriorities.Itisthereforeonlylikelythatthesetieswillbefurtherenhancedas

Angola’strajectorycontinuestorisewithinthesurroundingcontinent.

A n n e x u r e 1

List of official visits between Portuguese and Angolan dignitaries, 2002 onwards

April 2002 Portuguese Foreign Minister António Martins da Cruz in Luanda

June 2003 Angolan Foreign Minister João Miranda in Lisbon

October 2003 Portuguese Prime Minister José Manuel Durão Barroso in Luanda

January 2005 Portuguese Foreign Minister António Monteiro in Luanda

December 2005 Portuguese Foreign Minister Diogo Freitas do Amaral in Luanda

April 2006 Portuguese Prime Minister José Sócrates in Luanda

March 2007 Angolan Foreign Minister João Miranda in Lisbon

February 2008 Portuguese Foreign Minister Luís Amado in Luanda

July 2008 Portuguese Prime Minister José Sócrates in Luanda

March 2009 Angolan President José Eduardo dos Santos in Lisbon

14

S A I I A O C C A S I O N A L P A P E R N U M B E R 8 9

S O U T H A F R I C A N F O R E I G N P O L I C Y & A F R I C A N D R I V E R S P R O G R A M M E

April 2009 Foreign Minister Luís Amado in Luanda

July 2009 Foreign Minister Assunção dos Anjos in Lisbon

July 2010 Portuguese President Aníbal Cavaco Silva, Prime Minister José Sócrates and Foreign Minister Luís Amado in Luanda

A n n e x u r e 2

Major agreements between Portugal and Angola

1978 General Cooperation Agreement

1979 Special Cooperation Agreement for Maritime Transportation; Cultural Agreement, Trade Agreement

1982 Economic Cooperation Agreement

1995 Legal and Judicial Cooperation Agreement

1996 Technical–military Cooperation Agreement

2003 Convention on Social Security

2006 Scientific and Technological Cooperation Agreement; Cooperation Agreement in Tourism

2008 Mutual Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement; Mutual Recognition of Drivers’ Licences Agreement

Source:PortugueseDocumentationandComparativeLawOffice.

A n n e x u r e 3

Trade balance percentages, 2002–2010

2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

Portuguese exports to Angola

2.00 2.23 2.17 2.58 3.40 4.40 5.81 7.06 5.20

Portuguese imports from Angola

0.16 0.01 0.00 0.05 0.09 0.62 0.64 0.29 0.99

Source:AICEP.

I N T E R T w I N E D P A T H S : P O R T U G A L A N D R I S I N G A N G O L A

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S A I I A O C C A S I O N A L P A P E R N U M B E R 8 9

A n n e x u r e 4

Investment flows in EUR millions, 2002–2010

2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

Portuguese investments in Angola

50.341 40.075 103.090 263.647 273.720 451.124 775.127 693.765 226.728

Angolan investments in Portugal

1.630 8.017 4.163 6.255 17.602 15.184 49.820 116.030 42.224

Source:AICEP.

e n d n o t e S

1 See Gorjão P, ‘Lusophonia and the continued centrality of the Portuguese-speaking

community’,inFerreira-PereiraL(ed.),Portugal in the European Union: Assessing Twenty-five

Years of Integration Experience.Routledge:forthcoming.

2 Lusa, ‘Luís Amado prepara nova abordagem da diplomacia portuguesa em África’,6Fevereiro

2010, http://www.ionline.pt/conteudo/45546-luis-amado-prepara-nova-abordagem-da-

diplomacia-portuguesa-em-africa.

3 PoliticalempathybetweenthesetwoPortuguesepartiesandbothAngola’sMPLAandUNITA

wasalsoinfluencedbythelargenumberofAngolanleaderssenttostudyandtraininPortugal,

andthesubsequentconnectionstheyformedwiththeirpeers.Angola’sformerambassadorto

Portugalandformerforeignminister,AssunçãodosAnjos,issuchanexample.

4 The Economist,‘RisingAngola:Oil,gloriousoil’,28January2010,http://www.economist.com/

node/15401935.

5 See for example, Lusa, ‘PR/Angola: Cavaco Silva admite que vistos exigem “cooperação

empenhada” de Portugal’, 20 July2010,http://noticias.sapo.pt/lusa/artigo/11319225.html;

CordeiroAD,‘Presidentes de Angola e Portugal garantem que problema dos vistos será resolvido’,

Público, 10 March 2009, http://www.publico.pt/Pol%C3%ADtica/presidentes-de-angola-

e-portugal-garantem-que-problema-dos-vistos-sera-resolvido_1368548; Lusa, ‘Angola e

Portugal estudam possibilidade de acordo sobre vistos – SENEC Gomes Cravinho’,17July2008,

http://noticias.sapo.pt/lusa/artigo/a8cdc817f4a5751c373ace.html.

6 Asanexample,theblackmarketsoaredforticketsjusttojointhequeuetorequestavisa

attheAngolanConsulateinLisbon.SeeCéuNeves,‘Senha para pedir visto para Angola por

500 euros’,DiáriodeNotícias,23January2009,http://www.dn.pt/inicio/interior.aspx?content_

id=1139414&page=1.

7 Portugal,ServiçodeEstrangeiroseFronteiras(SEF),Relatório de Imigração, Fronteiras e Asilo

– 2009.Oeiras:SEF,2010,p.28.However,itisimportanttonotethatthesenumbersdonot

includeillegalentriestothecountryandshouldthereforebeviewedwithcaution.

8 PortugueseEmigrationObservatory,data,http://www.observatorioemigracao.secomunidades.

pt/np4/paises.html?id=9.

9 Portugal,Despacho conjunto107/2005,DiáriodaRepública,IISérie,24,3February2005.

10 FerreiraM,‘Relações entre Portugal e África de língua portuguesa: comércio, investimento e dívida

(1973–1994)’,AnáliseSocial,129,1994,pp.1071–121.

16

S A I I A O C C A S I O N A L P A P E R N U M B E R 8 9

S O U T H A F R I C A N F O R E I G N P O L I C Y & A F R I C A N D R I V E R S P R O G R A M M E

11 Portugal,BancodePortugal,Evolução das Economias dos PALOP e de Timor-Leste2009/2010.

Lisbon:BancodePortugal,2010,p.150.However, it shouldbementioned that in2009

Angola’stotaldebtmountedto$1.36billion.Thisisanincreaseof$96millionfrom2008,

sinceitalsoincludesthestate’smediumandlong-termguarantiestothird-party loansin

dealingwithAngola,whichhaveconsistentlyrisentosupportbilateraltrade.

12 Foralistofvisitsbybothcountries’dignitariessince2002,seeAnnexure1.

13 GomesA,SoutoM&Lusa,‘Durão Barroso: Visita a Angola visou gerar confiança e não cobrar

dívidas’,Público,29October2003,http://www.publico.pt/Pol%C3%ADtica/durao-barroso-

visita-a-angola-visou-gerar-confianca-e-nao-cobrar-dividas_1173092.

14 RafaelA&RCoutinho,‘“Confiança” domina o discurso de José Sócrates em Angola’,Diário de

Notícias,8April2006,http://petrinus.com.sapo.pt/socrates2.htm.

15 SeeSeabraP&PGorjão,‘PortugalandAngola:TiesthatBind?’,IPRIS(PortugueseInstituteof

InternationalRelationsandSecurity)PolicyBrief,4.Lisbon:IPRIS,July2010.

16 BaboM,‘Angola paga 86 milhões de dívida à Mota-Engil e Somague’,Jornal de Negócios,26August

2010,http://www.jornaldenegocios.pt/home.php?template=SHOWNEWS_V2&id=440683.

17 TheGeneralCooperationAgreementof1978alreadyincludedaJointPermanentCommission

forCooperationtoprovidenecessarybilateralfollow-up,althoughmeetingswereinfrequent.

ForalistofmajoragreementsandtreatiesbetweenPortugalandAngola,seeAnnexure2.

18 Portugal,IPAD(PortugueseInstituteforDevelopmentAid),data,www.ipad.mne.gov.pt.

19 Portugal,IPAD,Indicative Cooperation Programme Portugal Angola 2004–2006.Lisbon:IPAD,

2004,p.7.

20 Portugal,IPAD,Indicate Cooperation Programme Portugal Angola 2007/2010.Lisbon:IPAD,

2008,p.69.

21 Lusa,‘José Sócrates anuncia envio de 200 professores para Angola’,17July2008,http://www.

publico.pt/Educa%C3%A7%C3%A3o/jose-socrates-anuncia-envio-de-200-professores-para-

angola_1335728.

22 Portugal,IPAD,2008,op. cit.,p.81.

23 Portugal,Ministério da Ciência e Ensino Superior, Gabinete de Planeamento, Estratégia, Avaliação

e Relações Internacionais,Inscritos no Ensino Superior [2008–2009] Informação Sócioeconómica.

Lisbon:GPEARI,2010,p.22.See, forexampleDelgadoA, ‘De Angola a Portugal por um

canudo’,Africa Today,5April2011,http://www.africatoday.co.ao/pt/edicao-impressa/5980-

Angola-Portugal-por-canudo.html.

24 SeeSeabraP,‘ASafeBet:PortugueseTechnical-MilitaryCooperationwithLusophoneAfrica’,

IPRISViewpoints,39.Lisbon:IPRIS,March2011.

25 ItisestimatedthatPortugalhastrainedover3 000Angolanmilitaryoverthelast20years.

Lusa,‘Três mil militares angolanos formados por Portugal’,7May2010,http://www.angonoticias.

com/full_headlines.php?id=27470.

26 Portugal,IPAD,2008,op. cit.,p.76.

27 Lusa, ‘Portugal e Angola vão ampliar cooperação técnico-militar’,20April2009,http://www.

angonoticias.com/full_headlines_.php?id=23373.

28 AICEP(PortugueseAgencyforInvestmentandForeignTrade),data,http://www.portugal

global.pt/EN/Pages/Home.aspx.SeeAnnexure3.

29 Ibid.

30 Lusa,‘Cavaco Silva/ Angola: “Delegação da AICEP em Benguela é “sinal claro” da importância

daquela província” – PR português’,22July2010,http://noticias.sapo.ao/info/artigo/1079766.

html;ANGOP(AngolaNewsAgency),‘Presidente Cavaco Silva considera claras prioridades de

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S A I I A O C C A S I O N A L P A P E R N U M B E R 8 9

Angola’,21July2010,http://www.portalangop.co.ao/motix/pt_pt/noticias/politica/2010/6/29/

Presidente-Cavaco-Silva-considera-claras-prioridades-Angola,1bad4f38-353f-4a09-9f10-

34edcec5e631.html.

31 BessaC,‘A relação entre Angola e Portugal é de dois sentidos’,Jornal de Angola,10June2010,

http://jornaldeangola.sapo.ao/20/0/a_relacao_entre_angola_e_portugal_e_de_dois_sentidos.

32 AICEP,op. cit.

33 Ibid.

34 BothAngolanplayershavepubliclyexpressedtheirwishtoassumeadirectcontrollingstake

inPortugal’soilcompanyandtoendthecurrentpartnershipwithPortuguesebusinessman,

AméricoAmorim.SeeLusa,‘Sonangol quer participação direta na GALP’,25February2011,

http://noticias.sapo.mz/lusa/artigo/12203762.html.

35 BarrosoR, ‘Peso de Angola na bolsa nacional subiu 18% em pouco mais de um ano’,Diário

Económico,4March2011,p.34.

36 Muchofthisboomisalsoduetotheexistenceofmultiplecreditlines.EUR 100 millionwas

madeavailablein2004tohelpfundnationalexports.ThisrosetoEUR 300 millionin2006,

EUR 500 millionin2008andtoEUR 1,000 millionin2009.Theincreasesalwayscoincided

withstatevisits.Onthelastoccasion,afurtherEUR 500 millionwasalsoputasidetofinance

publicinvestmentsandinfrastructuresprojectsinAngola.

37 KaliengueJ, ‘CPLP é “palco ideal para afirmação de Angola como potência regional”’,Lusa,

14May2010,http://www.opais.net/pt/opais/?id=&det=12603&mid=.

38 See Seabra P, ‘A Stabilisation Mission in Guinea-Bissau: The Illusive Panacea?’, IPRIS

LusophoneCountriesBulletin,15.Lisbon:IPRIS,January2011,pp.5–9.

39 CravinhoJ,‘A Campanha Portuguesa para o Conselho de Segurança’, Relações Internacionais’,28,

December2010,p.28.

40 PortugalgainedconsiderablecredibilityandleveragethroughouttheAfricancontinentwhen

ithelpedtoorganisethetwoEU–AfricaSummits.ThefirstsummitwasheldinCairoinApril

2000andthesecondinLisboninMay2007.BothtookplaceduringthePortugueseturnatthe

EU’srotatingpresidency.

41 OutofallSADCEPAmembers,onlyBotswana,Lesotho,SwazilandandMozambiquehaveso

farsignedtheinterimEPA.Angola,NamibiaandSouthAfricahaverefusedtodosoowingto

theiroppositiontoEuropeanproposalsontheMostFavorableNationclause,development

aidandexporttaxes.SeeMakombe,P, ‘EconomicPartnershipAgreementandSADC:The

controversycontinues’,Economic Justice Network,27September2010,http://www.ejn.org.za/

index.php/ejn-on-the-move/ejn-on-the-move-views/445-economic-partnership-agreement-and-

sadc-the-controversy-continues.

42 Thishigh-leveldialogue,yettobeformalised,istobeguidedbyfundamentalprinciplesof

ownershipandjointresponsibility,aswellasofinterdependencebetweenAfricaandEurope,

toaddressanumberofglobalissuesofcommoninterest,andtranscendthecurrentfocuson

aidanddevelopment.TheEU’songoingNationalIndicativeProgrammeforAngola2008–2013

iscurrentlyworthEUR 214 million–withafocusongovernanceandsupporttoeconomicand

institutionalreform;humanandsocialdevelopment;ruraldevelopment,agricultureandfood

security–withEUR 13.9 millionforemergencysituations.

43 CorreiaR,‘INAC ajuda a angolana TAAG a sair da “lista negra” da União Europeia’,Público,

3 July2009,http://economia.publico.pt/Noticia/inac-ajuda-a-angolana-taag-a-sair-da-lista-

negra-da-uniao-europeia_1390034.

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44 SpeechbyHisExcellencyJoséEduardodosSantos,presidentoftheRepublicofAngola,inthe

OpeningCeremonyoftheParliamentaryYearoftheNationalAssembly,Luanda,15October

2010:IV(Institutionalreinforcement).

45 MartinsV,‘KeepingBusinessInandPoliticsOut:Angola’sMulti-vectorForeignPolicy’,IPRIS

Viewpoints,22.Lisbon:IPRIS,October2010.

46 Forthepastfewyears,AngolahasbeenrepeatedlybrandedasanEl Doradoorasapreferred

destiny for thePortugueseyouth insearchofnewjobopportunitiesabroad.SeeBastoF,

‘Angola, novo Eldorado para a saída da crise’,Jornal de Notícias,2August2009,http://www.

jn.pt/PaginaInicial/Sociedade/Interior.aspx?content_id=1135829&page=-1;SimõesL,‘Angola,

o “El Dorado” do emprego’,Diário Económico,15May2009,http://economico.sapo.pt/noticias/

angola-o-el-dorado-do-emprego_10472.html;Lusa, ‘“El Dorado” angolano começa a perder

brilho, mas ainda atrai muitos portugueses’,10June2010,http://www.angonoticias.com/full_

headlines.php?id=27824.

47 China’sAngolan‘offensive’hasbeenprimarilyledbytheExport–ImportBankofChina(Exim

Bank);ChinaConstructionBank;ChinaNationalPetroleumCorporation;ChinaNational

OffshoreOilCorporation;andChinaPetroleum&ChemicalCorporation(Sinopec).Recent

reportspointtobilateraltradefiguresin2010of$24.8billion,a45.4%increasefromthe

previousyear.ANGOP,‘Confiança política entre China e Angola é cada vez mais forte’,22March

2011,http://www.angonoticias.com/full_headlines.php?id=31026.

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