Psychological Review1998, \fcl. 105, No. 3, 499-529

Copyright 1998 by the American Psychological Association, Inc.C033-295X/98/S3.00

Intergroup Relations: Insights From a Theoretically Integrative Approach

Diane M. MackieUniversity of California, Santa Barbara

Eliot R. SmithPurdue University

In social psychology, specific research traditions, which often spring up in response to external events

or social problems, tend to perpetuate the theoretical assumptions and methodological approaches

with which they began. As a result, theories and methods that have proven powerful in 1 topic area are

often not applied in other areas, even to conceptually similar issues. The authors adopt a theoretically

integrative approach to the topic of intergroup relations. Theories and empirical approaches from

the domains of attitudes, impression formation, the self, personal relationships, and norms offer many

new insights into problematic issues, such as repeated findings of dissociations among stereotyping,

prejudice, and discrimination. This integrative approach not only promises new theoretical advances,

but also suggests numerous potential practical approaches to limiting or reducing destructive patterns

of intergroup relations.

As the discipline of social psychology has developed, many

factors other than the curiosity-driven quest for knowledge have

accelerated, impeded, and diverted its progress. Perhaps even

more than in other scientific fields, the events of the times have

driven and directed research interest in social psychological is-

sues. From the social turmoil of the Great Depression and the

massive scale of death and destruction wrought by World War

(1 to the currently accelerating global depletion of natural re-

sources, significant historical events have goaded social psychol-

ogy forward, held it back, and sometimes knocked it sideways.

In no subdiscipline of social psychology is this more obvious

than in the domain of intergroup relations. We define intergroup

relations as any aspect of thought, feeling, or action that occurs

because of group membership (Sherif, 1966). Since the system-

atic study of social psychology began, the consequences of

group affiliation and allegiance have been a centra] concern

(Allport, 1954; Ross, 1908; Sherif, 1936). Revelations of Nazi

genocide were a further impetus to the study of prejudice, dis-

crimination, and intergroup competition and aggression

(Adomo, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, & Sanford, 1950). For

many American social psychologists, the demands for racial

justice of the 1950s and 1960s were a clear reminder of how

much still needed to be understood. The cognitive revolution

that swept psychology during the 1970s and 1980s (Neisser,

1967) appeared to offer special promise to a discipline strug-

gling with the consequences of social categorization (Hamilton,

1981). And no review of intergroup relations can fail to note

Diane M. Mackie, Department of Psychology, University of California,

Santa Barbara; Eliot R. Smith, Department of Psychological Sciences,

Purdue University.

Preparation of the manuscript was supported in part by National

Science Foundation Grant SBR-9209995 and National Institute of Men-

tal Health Grants R01 MH46840 and K02 MH01178. We thank Sarah

Queller, Karen Neddermeyer, Crystal Wright, and especially Sarah

Hunter and Vinita Thakkar for help in preparing the manuscript.

Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Diane

M. Mackie, Department of Psychology, University of California, Santa

Barbara, California 93106-9660.

the dramatic impact that the growth of European social psychol-

ogy, with its overriding concern with social and national group

membership, has had on the field (Tajfel, 1978, 1982; Tajfel &

Turner, 1979),

Such events have clearly moved the study of intergroup rela-

tions forward, spawning new fields and subfields of interest,

broadening the way in which problems are conceptualized and

generating new approaches to old problems. Large literatures

have developed on stereotypes and stereotyping (heavily influ-

enced by the cognitive revolution) and on social identity (more

influenced by the European tradition). Our knowledge of the

causes and consequences of stereotyping, group and intergroup

impressions, and perceptions of group variability and homoge-

neity has increased dramatically (for reviews, see Hamilton &

Sherman, 1996; Leyens, Yzerbyt, & Schadron, 1994; Macrae,

Stangor, & Hewstone, 1996; Messick & Mackie, 1989; Park &

Judd, 1990; Sedikides & Ostrom, 1993; Turner, Hogg, Oakes,

Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987). So, too, has the richness of theoriz-

ing about the implications of identification with the in-group,

patterns of resource allocation between groups, and the means

by which other groups are systematically discriminated against

(Azzi, 1992; Brewer, 1979, 1991; Crosby, Bromley, & Saxe,

1980; Hogg & Abrams, 1993; Jost & Banaji, 1994; Major, 1994;

Opotow, 1990; Tyler, 1994). New paradigms have been devel-

oped and refined within each approach.

Although such growth has been impressive, a scientific focus

on solutions to specific social problems rarely encourages inte-

gration or cross-fertilization between topics. This is true of re-

search on intergroup relations. Although social psychologists

know much about stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination

individually, integration across these topics is largely lacking,

as recent attempts to bridge some of these gaps make clear

(Mackie & Hamilton, 1993; Sedikides, Schopler, & Insko,

1998). Moreover, although there are some exceptions, ap-

proaches to stereotypes, prejudice, and discrimination have de-

veloped largely without reference to work on similar concepts

in other traditionally separate research domains in social

psychology.

This state of affairs is not limited to the study of intergroup

499

500 MACKIE AND SMITH

relations. Indeed, it appears to be characteristic of the develop-

ment and current condition of social psychology. A diversity

of approaches is, of course, essential to the discovery of new

knowledge (Cronbach, 1986). However, development of a reli-

able body of accumulated wisdom—a hallmark of scientific

progress—is severely hampered when empirical observations

in one domain are explained by reference to principles or pro-

cesses that are independent of or even contradictory to those

developed in other relevant domains. Schaller, Resell, and Asp

(1998) argued that this problem reflects an incorrect application

of the scientific principle of parsimony to overly narrow content

domains. That is, if Factor X seems adequate to explain phenom-

ena in Domain A, and Factor Y is adequate within Domain B,

a scientist concerned only with Domain A is tempted to conclude

that Factor Y is unnecessary and to exclude it from theory

on the grounds of parsimony. However, a broader view that

incorporates both empirical domains will correctly reveal that

both factors are necessary for a complete understanding.

We thus believe that critical progress in the study of in-

tergroup relations—the understanding of intergroup percep-

tions, intergroup evaluations, intergroup behavior, and the un-

doubtedly complex relations among them—is now best served

by a conceptually integrative approach. The field of intergroup

relations can learn much from seeing how similar issues have

been conceptualized and empirically addressed and, in some

cases, even solved in other domains of social psychological

inquiry. The relations among cognitions about, evaluation of,

and actual action toward social objects have been a recurring

theme almost everywhere in social psychology. In intergroup

relations, the issues are the nature and interrelations of stereo-

types, prejudice, and discrimination. In the attitudes and persua-

sion domain, the focus is on the relations among beliefs, atti-

tudes, and behavior. Impression formation researchers are

concerned with mental representations of other persons, interper-

sonal attraction, and interpersonal behavior. When the self is

studied, the need to understand relations among self-knowledge,

self-esteem, and self-expressive behavior is uppermost. In rela-

tionships, the issues concern perceptions of the partner, feelings

about that person, and interactional behavior. Researchers who

deal with norms think about descriptive and prescriptive norms

and their consequences for behavior. The names change, but the

constructs not coincidentally seem very similar. By considering

the ways in which relations among cognition, evaluation, and

behavior have been theoretically conceptualized and studied in

other domains, we hope to contribute to further theoretical and

empirical progress in intergroup relations, offering new frame-

works for old problems, new approaches to crucial issues, and

new paradigms that might shed light on unresolved questions.

In the first section of this article, we briefly outline the tradi-

tional assumptions about the nature of and causal relations

among intergroup perceptions, evaluations, and behavior. The

traditional view, influenced heavily by early conceptions of atti-

tudes, assumes that stereotypes cause prejudice, which in turn

dictates discrimination. That is, perception precedes evaluation,

which in turn precedes behavior. We then turn to a consideration

of how the same constructs—perceptions, evaluations, and be-

havior—and their interconnections have been approached in

other research arenas. In particular, we look at research on atti-

tudes, person perception, the self and emotion, close relation-

ships, and norms and social influence, areas where these con-

structs have been extensively used and studied. Although our

review cannot be exhaustive, in each case we explore the poten-

tial benefits of importing theories, paradigms, or specific studies

from other domains to further the understanding of intergroup

relations. Next, we consider the implications of work in these

various domains for central issues of applied concern: changing

negative stereotypes, prejudice, and discrimination. This section

allows us to assess the fruitfulness of our approach in suggesting

new avenues for future research. Finally, we draw some general

conclusions about and evaluations of the integrative approach.

Stereotyping, Prejudice, and Discrimination

Social psychologists have long attempted to understand in-

tergroup relations in terms of three central concepts—stereo-

types, prejudice, and discrimination—and the complex relations

among them (Allport, 1954; Ashmore & Del Boca, 1981; Brig-

ham, 1971). After providing brief definitions and descriptions

of the ways in which these components and their interrelations

are currently viewed and studied, we refer to current issues of

concern or debate that may be illuminated by the integrative

approach proposed here.

Stereotypes

Stereotypes are typically defined as the characteristics, at

either the individual (Hamilton & Trolier, 1986) or collective

(D. Katz & Braly, 1933) level, associated with membership in

a particular social category. Traditionally, these characteristics

were denned as traits. More recently, however, stereotypes have

been assumed to contain information about many different kinds

of characteristics, such as physical attributes, attitudes, prefer-

ences, or social roles typically associated with group member-

ship (Andersen & Klatzky, 1987; Blair & Banaji, 1996; Brewer,

1988; Deaux & Lewis, 1983, 1984; Dovidio, Brigham, John-

son, & Gaertner, 1996; Hamilton & Sherman, 1996; Leyens et

al., 1994; Lippman, 1922; Zebrowitz, 1996). The concept has

always been central to the field, perhaps because it initiates the

assumed causal sequence: The proximal cause of discrimination

is prejudice, but its distal cause is a negative stereotype.

The conceptual importance of stereotypes is reflected in the

extensive research attention focused on the topic. Stereotypes

have been measured in diverse ways, from the traditional D.

Katz and Braly (1933) checklist to response time measurements

of unconscious associations between group labels or group

members and trait concepts (Banaji & Greenwald, 1995; Dovi-

dio, Evans, & Tyler, 1986; Fazio, Jackson, Dunton, & Williams,

1995; Perdue, Dovidio, Gurtman, & Tyler, 1990). In the last

decade and a half, considerable progress has been made in un-

derstanding the mental representation of stereotypes, as well as

the cognitive processes that contribute to stereotype formation

and change. On the other hand, perhaps discouraged by the

empirical failure of early attempts at defining the motivational

roots of stereotypes and prejudice, researchers have paid much

less attention to the social, interactional, and functional pro-

cesses dictating stereotype formation and structure. And despite

its role in the assumed causal chain, little is actually known

about the relation between stereotypes and prejudice. Some re-

INTERGROUP RELATIONS AND THEORETICAL INTEGRATION 501

search has documented that specific stereotypic beliefs about

groups do dictate both group evaluations (Hamilton & Gifford,

1976; Schaller & Maass, 1989) and group treatment (Ayres,

1991; Farley, Steeh, Krysan, & Jackson, 1994; Massey & Den-

ton, 1993; Sadker & Sadker, 1994). At the same time, some

commentators have argued not only that the traditionally as-

sumed direction of causality between stereotypes and prejudice

needs to be reversed, but that the stereotype concept itself may

be superfluous (Jussim, Nelson, Manis, & Soffin, 1995; E. R.

Smith, 1993).

Prejudice

Prejudice has typically been defined as a positive or negative

evaluation of a social group and its members, and many com-

mentators and researchers have drawn implicit or explicit paral-

lels between prejudice and attitudes as evaluations of social

objects and issues (Allport, 1954; Ashmore, 1970; Brigham,

1971). Prejudice has been measured in quite direct ways (e.g.,

thermometer readings and questions about how likable members

of social groups are) and with more subtle assessments, such

as measurements of electrical activity in facial muscles known to

be associated with positive and negative evaluations (Brigham,

1993; Dovidio & Fazio, 1992; Eagly & Mladinic, 1989; Esses,

Haddock, & Zanna, 1993; Vanman & Miller, 1993). Despite the

attention that stereotyping has received in the recent literature,

prejudice is undoubtedly understood to be the core aspect of

intergroup relations. Yet the multiple roots of prejudice, its psy-

chological structure, and the processes that dictate its activation

and use are not well understood. Neither is there universal agree-

ment about its place in the causal chain. Some recent theorizing

suggests that prejudice may in fact dictate stereotypes, in con-

trast to the usually accepted direction of causality (Dovidio et

al., 1996; Schaller & Maass, 1989). At the same time, the almost

universal assumption that prejudice is the proximal cause of

discriminatory behavior has gone largely unexamined, despite

the fact that Allport (1954) long ago argued that both prejudice

and stereotypes result from attempts to justify discriminatory

behavior.

Discrimination

Finally, discrimination is typically defined as the behavioral

component of intergroup relations, being any positive or nega-

tive behavior directed toward a social group or its members on

account of group membership (Allport, 1954; J. M. Jones,

1972). Although intergroup relations is clearly an area in which

behavioral dependent measures are of the utmost importance,

little conceptual attention has been devoted to measurement in

this area, as in many other social psychological domains. Among

the reasons for this state of affairs are the facts that research

on "measurement issues," despite its importance, is generally

accorded little professional acclaim; process and judgment data

came to dominate as fruitful laboratory paradigms for studying

intergroup relations developed; and the ethical consequences of

laboratory-induced discriminatory behavior seem problematic

for both actor and recipient. For these reasons, behavioral mea-

sures have tended to be limited to resource allocations; offers

of aid; unobtrusive social distance measures (e.g., how close a

participant sits to a target); and, more recently, competitiveness

(Brigham, 1971; Crosby etal., 1980; Dovidio &Gaertner, 1981;

Insko et al., 1992; Jussim, 1991; Macrae, Bodenhausen,

Milne, & Jetten, 1994; McConahay, 1986; Opotow, 1990; Weitz,

1972; Word, Zanna, & Cooper, 1974). Some of these measures

have face validity—for example, allocation measures are in-

tended as an analogue of societal distributions of social and

material resources. Nevertheless, work on discrimination clearly

lacks measures that capture some of the forms of discrimination

that have made national headlines. These include the systematic

mistreatment of African American customers by a national res-

taurant chain (Kohn, 1994), consistent differences in negotia-

tion strategies used against men and women by car sales person-

nel (Ayres, 1991), and the differential encouragement given to

boys and girls in classrooms (Sadker & Sadker, 1994). Even

more important, social psychological research has avoided mea-

sures of "hot hate," the kinds of measures that bridge the gap

between mere dislike of an out-group and hate crimes, ethnic

cleansing, pogroms, enslavement, and genocide (see Opotow,

1990; Staub, 1990).

Relations Among Stereotypes, Prejudice,

and Discrimination

Traditionally, social psychological theory and research has

proceeded on the assumption that stereotyping promotes preju-

dice, which promotes discrimination (see Dovidio et al., 1996).

That is, beliefs about what a group is like are assumed to deter-

mine liking or disliking for the group, which in turn dictates

favorable or unfavorable action toward it. This assumed causal

sequence implies that changes in knowledge can promote in-

tergroup harmony. It thus lies at the heart of the contact hypothe-

sis, the primary prescription for improving intergroup relations

offered by social psychology over the decades (Allport, 1954;

Amir, 1969; Cook, 1971). More generally, the assumption that

cognitions and evaluations influence behavior has been the

sometimes explicit but more often implicit justification for the

discipline's current interest in how people think about and evalu-

ate others (Bodenhausen, Macrae, & Garst, 1998; S. T. Fiske &

Taylor, 1991; Hamilton &Trolier, 1986; Schneider, 1996).Social

identity theory also takes as its starting point the idea that cogni-

tions (the knowledge gained from self-categorization) define

evaluations (the emotional impact of social identity), which in

turn determine discriminatory behavior (Hogg & Abrams, 1988;

Tajfel & Turner, 1979).

Nevertheless, measures of stereotyping, prejudice, and behav-

ior are often empirically dissociated, despite theoretical reasons

to think they should be closely linked (Brigham, 1971; Stangor,

Sullivan, & Ford, 1991). Consider the following classic and

contemporary examples:

1. In 1934, LaPiere surveyed 251 restaurant and hotel owners

and managers and found them overwhelmingly opposed to hav-

ing Chinese Americans as guests in their establishments. How-

ever, LaPiere and a Chinese couple had visited these same places

of business 6 months earlier and were routinely served with

courtesy. Although this lack of consistency between attitudinal

and behavioral measures helped trigger a crisis in theorizing in

the attitude domain, it is actually a prime example of a dissocia-

tion between intergroup evaluation and intergroup behavior.

502 MACKffi AND SMITH

2. Esses et al. (1993) collected data on Canadians' cognitive

representations and global evaluations of four naturally oc-

curring out-groups. When assessed in the context of other con-

tributing factors, stereotypes played almost no role in predicting

prejudice, providing a contemporary example of a dissociation

between intergroup cognition and intergroup evaluation.

3. Participants asked to publicly evaluate African American

targets reported positive attitudes toward the group, but when

they made evaluations under bogus pipeline conditions (which

led them to believe their "true" attitudes could be assessed),

their attitudes toward African Americans were much more nega-

tive (Carver, Glass, & Katz, 1978). Thus dissociations may

appear even between overt and covert assessments of the same

aspect of intergroup evaluation.

4. Measures of White Americans' cognitions about African

Americans have been found to be basically unrelated to behav-

ioral measures, such as the severity of White Americans' recom-

mendations for punishment of African American defendants

(Brigham, 1971), or to indexes of social distance (Stangor et

al., 1991, Experiment 2).

5. Struch and Schwartz (1989) found that measures of in-

group favoritism such as point allocation and measures of out-

group aggression were virtually unrelated. In fact, unique ante-

cedents predicted each. Thus even different measures that pre-

sumably tap discrimination have been found to be inconsistent.

How may these dissociations be explained? When, if at all,

can researchers expect consistency among intergroup percep-

tions, evaluations, and behaviors? Complicating the search for

answers to these questions is a lack of solid theory about in-

tergroup dependent measures (Messick & Mackie, 1989;

Schneider, 1996). Little is known, for example, about whether

a person who shows increased activity in corrugator muscles

when viewing a photo of a member of an out-group exhibits

"prejudice" of the same nature as someone who dislikes the

out-group for threatening cherished values. When dissociations

among different aspects of intergroup relations are found, it

is often unclear whether to attribute them to methodological

deficiencies or to theoretically significant reasons. Nevertheless,

their prevalence in the literature indicates the need for greater

theoretical sophistication. In the sections that follow, we con-

sider research from other areas that suggest theoretically princi-

pled reasons for predicting when intergroup cognitions, evalua-

tions, and behavior should and should not be consistent.

Issues in Intergroup Relations: Integrative Approaches

The nature of stereotypes, prejudice, and discrimination and

the interrelations between them are thus central to understanding

both classic and contemporary puzzles in intergroup relations.

We now consider how similar constructs have been treated in

other domains of social psychological research. Are there other

ways of thinking about cognitions, evaluations, and behavior

that might prove useful in the intergroup relations area? Are

there possible relationships among the concepts that have yet to

be considered in the intergroup literature? Our suggestions are

intended to advance theoretical and empirical integration and,

ultimately, the understanding of intergroup perceptions, evalua-

tions, and behavior.

Attitude Theory and Intergroup Relations

Given the many parallels between the conceptualizations of

stereotypes, prejudice, and discrimination and the conceptual-

izations of beliefs, attitudes, and behavior, it is surprising how

few theories and paradigms developed in the attitude domain in

the last three decades have been applied to the intergroup do-

main. Attitude researchers, for example, have made substantial

progress in understanding the structural and functional bases of

attitudes, as well as the processes through which attitudes form,

change, and guide behavior. Yet little of this knowledge has

been transferred to or assessed within studies of intergroup

relations. Developing further the idea that belief-attitude-be-

havior and stereotype-prejudice-discrimination are conceptual

parallels might allow valuable insights.

New Models of Attitudes

Although models that considered cognitions to be the sole

building blocks of attitudes have long held sway in social psy-

chology, more comprehensive models of attitudes are now gain-

ing attention. In this regard, Zanna and Rempel's (1988) model

of attitudes resulting from cognitive, affective, and behavioral

information is the most influential. In this model, attitudes can

be based on cognitive information (as suggested by expectancy-

value approaches; Ajzen and Fishbein, 1977), affective informa-

tion (e.g., attitudes formed through mere exposure or condition-

ing; Zajonc, 1968), behavioral reactions (e.g., attitudes formed

on the basis of counterattitudinal actions; Bern, 1972; Festinger,

1957), or any combination of these components.

Developing a similar framework for understanding the bases

of prejudice would have great value. First, such an analysis

demands broadening the concept of stereotype, so that informa-

tion about beliefs is supplemented by information about feelings

and actions. As noted above, this trend is already beginning and

may be facilitated by a framework that suggests what other

kinds of material may be incorporated, and how. Second, such

an analysis allows for a wide range of experience to feed into

prejudice. It suggests, for example, that prejudice might be

based on emotional responses or on approach and avoidance

reactions to a group, and not just on the kind of experience that

results in explicit beliefs about them.

Third, this approach raises the possibility that even though

prejudice, like an attitude, is an evaluative summary, the nature

and effect of that evaluative summary may depend on its pre-

dominant constituent base. Such a view suggests multiple testa-

ble hypotheses in the intergroup domain. It may be predicted, for

example, that the constituent base will determine the intensity of

prejudice, its persistence, or its resistance to change. Moreover,

prejudice based on affective information may best be changed

by inconsistent affective rather than cognitive information (Ed-

wards, 1990). In addition, the predominant component of preju-

dice may dictate what behavior is produced and the extent to

which prejudice guides behavior.

Finally, such an analysis has greatly increased interest in

ambivalence as a central component of attitudes (Priester &

Petty, 1996; see Eagly & Chaiken, 1993, for a general discus-

sion). When multiple items of information contribute to an

evaluative summary, not all are evaluatively consistent, a situa-

INTERGROUP RELATIONS AND THEORETICAL INTEGRATION 503

tion that may result in ambivalence. Greater attention to the

consequences of such ambivalence is particularly likely to gener-

alize usefully to the intergroup domain, where models of ambiv-

alence already exist (Hass, Katz, Rizzo, Bailey, & Eisenstadt,

1991; Hass, Katz, Rizzo, Bailey, & Moore, 1992; I. Katz, 1981;

I. Katz & Glass, 1979; Maio, Bell, & Esses, 19%).

Whereas attitude researchers have frequently modeled atti-

tudes as cognitively represented structures, few such attempts

have been made to model prejudice. Conceptualizing attitudes

as mental representations that are associated with other represen-

tations (regardless of what particular model of memory is as-

sumed) has led to at least two major theoretical thrusts in the

attitude domain.

The first focuses on attitudes as representations activated in

response to attitude inquiries or opportunities to act in attitude-

related ways. For example, people who were asked questions

about government responsibilities later expressed attitudes more

favorable to welfare spending compared with attitudes ex-

pressed by people who first thought about the value of individual

effort (Tourangeau & Rasinski, 1988). If context-dependent ac-

tivation leads to the expression of different attitudes, any individ-

ual might have multiple context-dependent attitudes (Wilson &

Hodges, 1992), "new" attitudes could be constructed in an ad

hoc and context-dependent manner, and the potential presence

of attitudinal ambivalence might be more the exception than the

rule. All of this implies that the concept of an attitude as a

relatively long-lasting, stable structure needs to be reexamined.

At a more general level, this raises the issue of whether judg-

ments and behavior depend on the retrieval of abstract knowl-

edge or on dynamically constructed combinations of individu-

ally retrieved episodes (see Kahneman & Miller, 1986; Lin-

ville & Fischer, 1993; E. R. Smith, 1990; E. R. Smith & Zarate,

1992).

The potential importance of this question as applied to preju-

dice warrants its further consideration in the context of in-

tergroup issues. An individual's attitudes toward a group may

not be unyieldingly positive or negative but rather may have

nuances and degrees as a result of the particular combination

of representations or components activated. Prejudice against

immigrants, for example, might be quite different if ideas about

America as a land of opportunity rather than concerns about

economic competition are momentarily predominant. More

broadly, it is worth at least entertaining the idea that there is no

such thing as a single concept of prejudice, or single evaluative

summary of a target group. Such a possibility would clearly

explain some of the evaluative dissociations noted above.

The second major theoretical direction resulting from concep-

tualizing an attitude as a component in a mental representation

focuses on the conditions under which attitudes are activated,

and particularly when activation is automatic (Bargh, Chaiken,

Raymond, & Hymes, 1996; Fazio, Powell, & Herr, 1983). Ac-

cording to such models, a positive or negative evaluation of an

object is linked to the representation of the object. Repeated

activation of this associative link can strengthen it, so that mere

activation of the attitude object (e.g., its very presence or saying

its name) automatically activates the associated evaluation. The

idea that objects and attitudes can bring one another to mind

mutually and without awareness does not depend on a particular

model of mental representations or attitudes. However, the idea

has obvious import if prejudice is thought of as an intergroup

attitude. According to this perspective, the mere presence of a

group or a group member may automatically activate positive

or negative evaluations without any conscious intent to evaluate

the person (Fazio et al., 1995; S. T. Fiske & Pavelchak, 1986).

This notion goes beyond Devine's (1989) idea that some stereo-

types might be so closely and routinely associated with their

groups that mere activation of the group label activates the ste-

reotype. The parallel is that presence of the group activates its

associated evaluation without necessary reference to the infor-

mational foundation on which the evaluation might have origi-

nally been based (Lingle & Ostrom, 1979). Indeed, applying

this model in the intergroup domain leads to predictions that

prejudice can be completely divorced from the informational

structures assumed to contribute to it. Such an approach might

help explain often mentioned instances in which prejudice

seems completely separate from "rational" concerns and pro-

vides another reason why changing prejudice through traditional

means of adding stereotype-inconsistent information may be

difficult.

Attitude-Behavior Relations

Fazio's model of attitude accessibility has also become the

cornerstone of new attempts to understand the complex relations

between attitudes and behavior. Attacks on the very idea that

attitudes determine behavior turned attitude researchers to a

more sophisticated consideration of the conditions under which

attitudes can and do influence behaviors. Fazio's (1990) Motiva-

tion and Opportunity as Determinants (MODE) model of atti-

tude-behavior processes is the most ambitious attempt to inte-

grate this literature, positing both a direct and an indirect means

by which activated attitudes guide behavior. In the direct path-

way, activated attitudes bias subjective perceptions of the atti-

tude object's qualities, and these qualities in turn guide behavior.

Because a positive (or negative) attitude makes the attitude

object appear to have more positive (negative) qualities, and

those positive (negative) qualities elicit positive (negative) be-

haviors, this direct route increases the likelihood of attitude-

consistent behavior. The indirect route of the MODE model

incorporates traditional theories of reasoned action and planned

behavior (Ajzen, 1991; Ajzen &Fishbein, 1980). In these mod-

els, activated attitudes (in conjunction with norms and percep-

tions of behavioral control) produce intentions to act, leading

to attitude-behavior consistency (provided that other inhibtory

factors are absent). More recently, the impact of intentions on

behavior has been extended to consideration of activation and

evaluation of goals and plans (Carver & Scheier, 1981; Goll-

witzer, 1990; Wegner & Vallacher, 1986). Not surprisingly, these

more conscious attempts to make attitudes and behaviors consis-

tent require the investment of both cognitive and motivational

resources.

Taking a similar approach in the intergroup domain seems

likely to shed light on several nagging problems (see Dovidio

et al., 1996). The conceptual and empirical questions raised

by observed dissociations between intergroup evaluation and

intergroup behavior parallel those raised by attitude-behavior

inconsistencies. Rather than asking whether prejudice deter-

mines discrimination and coming up with conflicting answers,

504 MACKIE AND SMITH

intergroup researchers can borrow accumulated knowledge from

the attitudes domain to ask more productive questions and make

clear predictions. What activates prejudice? When is activated

prejudice likely to result in discrimination? What mechanisms

increase prejudice-discrimination consistency, and what mech-

anisms decrease it? Does perceptual bias (part of Fazio's direct

route) operate for prejudice, and what conditions facilitate or

inhibit it? Even if intentions are favorable, what other conditions

need to exist for behavior to follow? Seeing prejudice as an

attitude that must be activated to influence behavior and can

operate through direct and indirect routes presents many possi-

bilities for interventions. Under what conditions can activation

be blocked (Gilbert & Hixon, 1991; Lepore & Brown, 1997)?

Do all kinds of prejudice result in perceptual distortion, or can

changing the strength, consistency, or component base of preju-

dice change its impact on perceptions of the object? Can behav-

ioral control be moved from the direct to the indirect route, and

vice versa?

Thinking of prejudice as a cognitive structure linked to other

structures allows another kind of solution from the attitude do-

main to be applied to the puzzle of apparent inconsistencies

between intergroup attitudes and behavior. Consider one com-

mon but apparently irrational pattern in intergroup relations:

People dislike a group but have no problem interacting with a

particular member of that group. This example parallels well-

documented inconsistencies between attitudes and behaviors.

Attitudes toward birth control in general are not good predictors

of use of a particular form of birth control. Attitudes toward

charitable giving do not predict donations to a particular charita-

ble organization. As Ajzen and Fishbein (1980) demonstrated,

attitudes and behaviors must be equally specific if their consis-

tency is to be correctly evaluated. A similar case for matching

the specificity of prejudice and discriminatory behaviors could

certainly be made. In general, specificity in both the attitude

and intergroup domains can be fruitfully thought about in terms

of matching the representational attitude object (the object that

evokes the attitude) to the object of behavior. When the kind of

people participants think about when asked their attitude toward

the group and the kind of people participants actually encounter

are similar, behavior should match evaluations. And, in fact,

Lord and his colleagues (Lord, Desforges, Ramsey, Trezza, &

Lepper, 1991; Lord, Lepper, & Mackie, 1984) demonstrated that

when actual behavioral targets matched the representation that

students activated when they thought about the group, attitudes

toward the group predicted behavior toward the group. When

attitudinal and behavioral targets differ, however, there is no

reason to suspect that attitudes and behavior should be consis-

tent. This reasoning provides a simple explanation of one of the

first demonstrations of dissociations between intergroup atti-

tudes and intergroup behavior, which catalyzed much anguish

over the lack of attitudinal predictability: the classic LaPiere

(1934) study noted earlier. If, when called on the phone, restau-

rant and hotel managers in this study envisioned a target group

much different from the polite, well-dressed Chinese couple

who actually asked to be served at their establishments, the

lack of consistency between intergroup attitudes and intergroup

behavior is not surprising. When attitude objects and behavioral

targets are quite different, prejudice-discrimination dissocia-

tions are to be expected and do not provide evidence for the

ineffectualness of prejudice as a guide for behavior.

A recent study by Fazio et al. (1995) also shows that the

measured attitude depends on the exact nature of the attitude

object that perceivers encounter. The researchers used a priming

technique to assess the evaluations that were automatically acti-

vated when people observed Black or White faces. This measure

was found to correlate with racially related judgments and with

behaviors toward a Black experimenter. On the other hand, the

measure failed to correlate with scores on the Modem Racism

Scale (McConahay, 1986), a measure that on its face assesses

a variety of political and social attitudes and has been widely

assumed to provide a disguised assessment of racial attitudes.

Overall, the studies reported by Fazio et al. (1995) show that

attitudes toward individual group members (assessed by the

priming technique and by unobtrusive behavioral observations)

and attitudes toward the political and social status of a group

as a whole (assessed by the Modern Racism Scale) need not

correlate. By understanding the mechanisms by which this hap-

pens (the nature of the attitude object that is activated), however,

such dissociations become understandable.

Behavior—Attitude Relations

As noted above, prejudice has traditionally been seen as a

precursor of discrimination, paralleling the idea that attitudes

determine behavior. However, attitude theory has a long tradition

of also considering the opposite direction of causality: the fact

that behavior can and does under certain circumstances deter-

mine attitudes. There are two main approaches in this tradition.

On the one hand, self-perception theory (Bern, 1972) argues

for a relatively simple inferential process of attitudes from un-

constrained behavior: I ate ice cream, therefore 1 must like ice

cream. Researchers know little about the self-perception process

as it involves intergroup attitudes. Imagine a situation in which

a person acts aggressively toward a member of another group.

The person often attributes such negative behaviors externally—

he or she was forced by circumstances to act in such a way. It

might therefore be unlikely that this negative behavior could be

the basis for an inference of a negative attitude toward the group,

at least through self-perception processes. On the other hand,

people often think of their positive behaviors as freely chosen

and internally motivated (see E. E. Jones, 1990, for a review),

setting up the conditions for an inference that they have favor-

able attitudes toward the group. From a self-perception point of

view, the prediction could be made that performing an equal

number of positive and negative behaviors toward another group

is more likely to result in an inference of a favorable attitude

than it perhaps should. Perhaps this effect helps account for the

fact that most people believe themselves to be relatively free of

negative prejudice and may contribute to the fact that out-group

derogation seems to be less of a factor than in-group favoritism

in many forms of intergroup behavior (Brewer, 1979). It is also

possible, though, that some kinds of negative behaviors do af-

ford internal attributions. Perhaps avoiding someone is morelikely to be internally attributed ("I'm keeping out of his

way"), for example, than acting aggressively ("I had to hithim"), and thus avoidant negative behaviors might lead to

spontaneous inferences of unfavorable intergroup attitudes. We

INTERGROUP RELATIONS AND THEORETICAL INTEGRATION 505

know of no evidence relevant to these kinds of predictions gener-

ated by thinking about the possible role of self-perception pro-

cesses in the relation between intergroup attitudes and behavior.

The other main mechanism by which behavior can influence

attitudes is cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957). Especially

since the focus of cognitive dissonance theory has broadened

to include mechanisms that engage self-evaluation as well as

arousal (e.g., J. Aronson, Blanton, & Cooper, 1995; Steele &

Liu, 1983), the relevance of these mechanisms to attitudes

formed in intergroup encounters is obvious. Intentionally bring-

ing harm to another person presumably challenges an individ-

ual's concept of him- or herself as a good and just person and

thus may provide the perfect conditions for self-justificatory

reactions that bring attitudes in line with actions (' 'They deserve

what they get"). However, as noted earlier, it may be difficult

to produce circumstances in which such negative behavior is

perceived as being freely chosen and unconstrained. Neverthe-

less, discriminating against others with only minimal "insuffi-

cient" justification may be a frequent occurrence that elicits

prejudice through dissonance reduction processes.

In fact, this process may frequently operate when "institu-

tional racism'' or discriminatory structures are traditional in a

given society. People who participate in, say, old-boy hiring

practices that exclude women and members of ethnic minorities

from particular jobs—and even more so, people who directly

benefit from these practices—should be likely to justify their

behavior and benefits by shaping their prejudices accordingly.

For example, they may come to believe that members of ex-

cluded groups lack the necessary talent. In effect, they end up

rationalizing the patterns of societal inequality and discrimina-

tion from which they benefit, and the nature of their vested

interests may make such attitudes difficult to change (Jost &

Banaji, 1994; Opotow, 1990). Such arrangements will have a

powerful additional effect, as well. As members of different

groups are assigned to different types of jobs and roles, others

conclude that those are the positions for which they are inher-

ently best suited. This is one version of the "correspondence

bias" (E. E. Jones & Davis, 1965): the belief that people's

intrinsic qualities, rather than external forces, account for their

behavior. If women are largely found in child-raising roles and

men in paid employment, or if Whites are found in managerial

jobs and Mexican Americans mostly in menial positions, mem-

bers of the society may assume that these roles match these

groups' talents and abilities (Eagly & Steffen, 1984; Hoffman &

Hurst, 1990). Because social roles shape behavior and as a result

shape attitudes, reducing prejudice and reducing discrimination

must go hand in hand. Changing the way people think may also

require changing the way they live.

Exploring mechanisms such as self-perception and cognitive

dissonance that make behavior a contributor to (rather than a

result of) prejudice also points up other conditions under which

attitude-behavior consistencies may or may not occur. Whereas

self-perception processes always increase attitude—behavior

consistency, cognitive dissonance processes need not always do

so. Recall that Fastinger (1957) suggested several means other

than attitude change by which any tension aroused by inconsis-

tent behavior might be resolved. When cognitions are added to

either attitude or behavior, for example, attitudes may not change

to match behavior. In addition, because routes of dissonance

reduction may be indirect (e.g., self-affirmation; Steele, 1992),

intergroup behaviors need not translate into consistent in-

tergroup evaluations. These theoretical positions provide predic-

tions about the conditions under which positive or negative dis-

crimination will and will not produce consistently valenced

prejudice.

Functional Analyses of Attitudes

Some of the earliest theoretical work on intergroup relations

was grounded in the idea that prejudice serves psychological

functions. For the authoritarian personality theorists, for exam-

ple, prejudice was the result of people's attempts to protect

themselves from inner conflict and self-doubt (Adomo et al.,

1950). D. Katz (1960) and M. B. Smith, Bruner, and White

(1956) systematized the functional approach to attitudes, but

their potentially influential theoretical approach foundered on

methodological ambiguity and a lack of empirical support. Since

then, the sophistication of functional theories of attitudes has

developed considerably, and it is surprising that only recently

have functional theories of stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimi-

nation started to emerge again (Snyder & Miene, 1994). Modern

functional analyses assume that attitudes can serve one or more

functions, predict when those functions will be important, and

describe how those functions will increase or decrease attraction

to the object (Shavitt, 1990). In parallel fashion, prejudice may

also have multiple functional bases, with different conditions

for activation producing different evaluations and different be-

havior in different situations. The multiplicity of possible func-

tions of prejudice against others suggests that prejudice favoring

one's own group is also multifaceted. It is unlikely that group

membership and its consequences depend entirely or even pre-

dominantly on the need for positive self-esteem, as is assumed

by social identity theory (Tajfel, 1978, 1982; see Crocker &

Schwartz, 1985; Deaux, Reid, Mizrahi, & Ethier, 1995; Hogg &

Abrams, 1988). Research programs that explore alternative mo-

tivations for group belonging (e.g., need for accuracy, distinc-

tiveness, reduction of uncertainty, and regulation of relation-

ships) and the effects of these motivations on in-group bias

and out-group discrimination are just beginning (Brewer, 1991;

Deaux, 1993; Hogg & Abrams, 1990; Jost & Banaji, 1994;

Prentice & Miller, 1994; Seta & Seta, 1996; Sidanius, 1993).

Such a functional analysis has the added potential of providing

answers to questions such as why people stereotype one group

more than another (Schneider, 1996).

As is often the case, behavior has suffered most from a lack

of functional analysis. As has been pointed out in the attitude

literature, an attitude cannot be expected to guide a behavior

unless the attitude is functional in helping to guide behavior.

Fazio, Blascovich, and Driscoll (1992; Blascovich et al., 1993),

for example, showed that only judgments relevant to a choice

were useful in easing that choice when it had to be made quickly.

In the intergroup domain, then, researchers might not expect

every intergroup attitude to dictate behavior—discrimination

might often be dissociated from prejudice when activated atti-

tudes are not relevant to the action at hand. Perhaps this helps

explain situations in which general prejudice disappears in the

workplace when it is not considered relevant to efficiency or

productivity (Minard, 1952). On the other hand, such a notion

506 MACKIE AND SMITH

allows specific predictions of prejudice-related behavior, on the

assumption that prejudice held for a particular reason dictates

behavior of a particular sort. For example, prejudice held to

bolster self-esteem might demand disparagement and subjuga-

tion of the out-group. Prejudice held for an instrumental or

utilitarian reason—because the group is associated with punish-

ments, for example—may mean the group is feared and

avoided. A functional analysis might also help predict the kinds

of issues and objects over which groups clash: Allocation of

resources, for example, may be implicated when utilitarian func-

tions are uppermost, whereas glorification of symbols may be

more relevant when social identity or value expressive functions

predominate.

Dual Processes of Persuasion and Attitude Change

In the last decade or so, persuasion researchers have devel-

oped "dual-process" models of attitude change (Chaiken, 1980;

Petty & Cacioppo, 1981; see E. R. Smith, 1994). The basic

assumptions of these models include the idea that most of the

time, people process incoming information to a minimal extent

and without much conscious effort. If a persuasive message

is noted at all, only its general aspects (e.g., its length or its

attractiveness) may affect the person's attitude. On the other

hand, when adequate motivation and cognitive capacity are avail-

able and are brought to bear—as they are when much is at

stake—people may study a message in depth and think system-

atically about its implications for their attitudes. The difference

between processing modes makes a difference in that systematic

processing leads to longer lasting attitude change, greater resis-

tance to later persuasion attempts, and more control of attitudes

over behavior (Cacioppo, Petty, Kao, & Rodriguez, 1986).

The dual-process framework is just beginning to be applied

to intergroup relations (see Chaiken, Lieberman, & Eagly, 1989,

for suggestions), but its implications are widespread and im-

portant. Although many of the motivational and capacity condi-

tions necessary for systematic processing have been studied

(accountability, available resources, positive vs. negative af-

fective states, repetition, and so forth; see Eagly & Chaiken,

1993, for a review), these factors have yet to be mapped on to

intergroup encounters that differ in systematic ways. However;

researchers are starting to learn when and how cognitive, af-

fective, and motivational conditions interact to determine

whether people respond to group information in depth or only

superficially (see Mackie & Hamilton, 1993, for reviews). For

example, Johnston and Coolen (1995) manipulated task

involvement and found that the quality of the arguments used

in a counterstereotypic message predicted stereotype change

when involvement was high, but the credibility of the source of

the information also had an effect when motivation was low.

Processing time, recall, and thought-listing dependent measures

also indicated differential processing of the message under con-

ditions of high versus low motivation, demonstrating the applica-

bility of the dual-processing framework to attempts to change

intergroup perceptions. Other predictions that arise from the

dual-processing approach include the kinds of individual differ-

ences that affect people's willingness and ability to process

information about groups (suggesting a new approach to the

concepts of open- and closed-mindedness, for example) and the

impact of motives other than accuracy (e.g., ego defense and

impression management) for careful processing of group-rele-

vant information (Chen, Shechter, & Chaiken, 1996; Macrae,

Shepard, & Milne, 1992).

Thus, despite the fact that thinking about intergroup relations

has traditionally been framed in terms of beliefs, attitudes, and

behavior, more recent research in the attitude domain has not

been fully incorporated into intergroup research. The preceding

are some of the attitudes-related theoretical issues and innova-

tions that we believe would spur further progress in understand-

ing intergroup relations.

Impression Formation Research and

Intergroup Relations

As is the case with attitude theory, some theory and research

on person perception or impression formation have already been

applied to intergroup relations. First, basic memory mechanisms

that determine the impact of stored information on further data

acquisition and processing have been explored in the impression

formation domain (e.g., Wyer & Srull, 1994), and their rele-

vance for intergroup relations is well recognized. For example,

Bodenhausen et al. (1998) reviewed the processes involved in

activation and use of stereotypes and the conditions that facilitate

and inhibit their influence on intergroup evaluations and behav-

ior. One finding with potential practical importance is that, as

is the case in attempts to suppress thoughts in general, at-

tempting to suppress unwanted stereotypic thoughts may have

unintended perverse effects, leading to increased use of those

stereotypes at a later time (Macrae et al., 1994).

In related work, many researchers have investigated the way

stereotypes and other information about groups are represented

in memory (Hamilton & Sherman, 1994; E. R. Smith & Zarate,

1992). Major alternative positions include the idea that group

information is represented purely abstractly (e.g., as associa-

tions between the group and traits or other characteristics),

that it is represented purely in the form of specific exemplars

(individual group members and their characteristics), and that

both types of representation are present. The current consensus

favors the mixed-representation view, and ongoing research is

attempting to determine the conditions under which people ac-

cess and use each type of representation (e.g., Fazio et al.,

1995). This is a point with obvious relevance to intergroup

relations, given that general group representations and specific

exemplars may differ in evaluation or other characteristics.

In another area of research, investigations of the effects of

perceivers' expectations on the target of those expectations have

proceeded in parallel on the interpersonal (e.g., Darley & Fazio,

1980; Snyder, Tanke, & Berscheid, 1977; Swann & Ely, 1984)

and intergroup (Steele & Aronson, 1995; Word et al., 1974)

fronts. In both areas, the possibility of self-fulfilling prophecies

has been recognized and research has revealed something about

how they are mediated and when and how targets can resist. An

important new theme in this area, particularly well developed

in Steele's work (Steele & Aronson, 1995), is that being the

target of a generally shared stereotype or expectancy can have

special effects beyond the effects of an individual perceiver's

unique idiosyncratic expectancy.

A fourth area of research that has developed in the context

INTERGROUP RELATIONS AND THEORETICAL INTEGRATION 507

of impression formation but has important applications to ste-

reotypes and intergroup relations is the impact of affect on the

processing of information and the formation of judgments. Of

course, stereotype use and prejudice often occur in potentially

affect-laden intergroup encounters (for overviews, see Dovidio,

Gaertner, Isen, Rust, & Guerra, 1998; Mackie & Hamilton,

1993; Mackie, Queller, Stroessner, & Hamilton, 1996). Despite

the intuitive appeal of arranging a positive context for intergroup

interactions, the experience of positive affect typically exacer-

bates judgments of stereotypicality and homogeneity. Negative

affect such as anxiety (and in some, but not all, cases, sadness)

typically has similar effects (Mackie et al., 1996; Wilder, 1993),

whereas the processing consequences of anger still await sys-

tematic investigation. Differences that may occur because affect

is induced incidentally to or as an inherent part of the informa-

tion-processing situation also demand more recent attention,

with obvious relevance to the intergroup situation (Boden-

hausen, 1993).

Despite these well-studied parallels between person percep-

tion and group perception, Hamilton and Sherman (1996) have

recently advanced a general theoretical model outlining reasons

to expect differences in the processing of information about

individual persons and groups. Their model even predicts that

different types of groups (e.g., social categories such as women

or Hispanics vs. smaller, interacting, goal-oriented groups) will

elicit different types of processes. This work exemplifies the

new insights that can emerge when conceptually related work

in distinct topic areas is put side by side and compared. In this

section, we outline additional theoretical and empirical develop-

ments related to person perception that may offer the potential

for novel and interesting insights when applied to intergroup

relations.

Traditional models of impression formation, such as those of

S. T. Fiske and Neuberg (1990) or Srull and Wyer (1989),

assume that the underlying process in impression formation is

a search through memory for a schema or knowledge structure

that fits the available information about a target person. This

schema might represent a group stereotype (e.g., truck drivers)

or a personality type (e.g., extrovert). Whatever its nature, if

the schema's accessibility and fit to the target information are

high enough, it is used to interpret incoming information, gener-

ate inferences about unobserved attributes, and perhaps trigger

evaluation of or behavior toward the target.

Recently, the assumption that a single schema is selected to

drive processing in impression formation has come under ques-

tion. Work by Hastie, Schroeder, and Weber (1990); Kunda,

Miller, and Claire (1990); and Gastardo-Conaco (1990) demon-

strates that when a target person is said to be a member of more

than one group (e.g., an elderly truck driver, a Harvard-educated

carpenter, or a soldier-statesman), both stereotypes influence

the resulting impression. In addition, emergent attributes often

appear—attributes that are believed to characterize the combi-

nation of the two groups (e.g., "nonmaterialistic" for the Har-

vard-educated carpenter) but are not salient for either of the

parent groups. Results suggest that people have learned repre-

sentations for some familiar group combinations, but these kinds

of contents characterize even completely novel combinations

that have not been encountered before (Gastardo-Conaco, 1990;

Kunda et al., 1990). Thus impressions appear to be based on

multiple sources of information.

Parallel research similarly suggests that multiple knowledge

structures can influence evaluative reactions to a target. Tb ex-

plain the independence of target evaluations and memory for

target characteristics often found in the person perception litera-

ture, for example, Hastie and Park (1986) presented a dual-

representation model of impression formation. In this model,

people sometimes construct an overall evaluative summary of

the target at the same time they separately encode specific char-

acteristics. When this occurs, evaluation and recall are dissoci-

ated, because they draw on separate mental representations. At

other times, evaluations are based on recall or on both recall

and the previously constructed evaluative summary.

At the same time, the last decade or so has produced evidence

for the impact of specific experiences or episodes on thoughts,

feelings, and behavior (e.g., Jacoby, Baker, & Brooks, 1989;

Linville & Fischer, 1993; E. R. Smith, 1990; E. R. Smith &

Zarate, 1992). For example, in the domain of political person

perception, Abelson, Kinder, Peters, and Fiske (1982) found

that people's experience of pride, disappointment, anger, and

the like in encounters with political candidates were important

predictors of their evaluations of the candidates. This predictive

value exceeded that of perceptions of the candidates' politically

relevant characteristics, such as honesty or competence. Consis-

tent with this finding, emotions experienced in specific encoun-

ters with groups are important causes of people's overall reac-

tions to groups (Eagly, Mladnic, & Otto, 1994; Esses et al.,

1993; Dijker, 1987; Jackson & Sullivan, 1989; Jackson et al.,

1996), and specific encounters with single group members can

influence group impressions (Henderson-King & Nisbett,

1996).

Thus, there is a developing theoretical viewpoint that impres-

sions, evaluations, and behavior often reflect the combination

and integration of multiple knowledge structures (Kunda & Tha-

gard, 1996; E. R. Smith & DeCoster, 1998). This view stands in

stark contrast to the more common assumption in the intergroup

domain that a single piece of information—group member-

ship—drives stereotypes, prejudice, and discrimination. Per-

haps in extreme situations of intergroup conflict, such as war-

fare, the color of the uniform someone wears may be all that

matters to a soldier. Even in wartime, however, soldiers despise

their in-group lieutenants or admire the daring of an out-group

flying ace, thereby allowing characteristics other than group

membership to influence them. In less extreme conflict situa-

tions, the impact of multiple pieces of information must be the

rule rather than the exception. This is not the same as saying

there is a continuum from interpersonal interaction (in which

individual characteristics rather than group membership are sa-

lient determinants of behavior) to intergroup interaction (Tajfel,

1982; Tajfel & Turner, 1979), along which people can shift over

time. Rather, it is saying that multiple characteristics of the

target, and multiple knowledge structures within the perceiver,

interact to determine stereotypes, prejudice, and discrimination

every time. For example, an encounter with a person who be-

longs to a disliked group will have different consequences de-

pending on that person's individual characteristics (smiling and

friendly vs. scowling and hostile), the situation (the person is

a new coworker vs. a passerby on the street), and relevant social

508 MACK1E AND SMITH

norms (norms holding that one should be polite and accepting

vs. norms sanctioning avoidance or discrimination).

The idea that multiple knowledge structures contribute to

judgments and social behaviors predicts theoretically specified

dissociations among impressions, evaluations, and interactions.

That is, different information sources may be used when a per-

son characterizes what a group is like, reacts affectively to its

members, and chooses behaviors toward them. Thus, intergroup

researchers should expect to find dissociations among stereo-

types, prejudice, and discrimination. In fact, many such dissoci-

ations have been observed. For example, Minard's (1952) clas-

sic study found that the successful racial integration of a work-

place did not affect White workers' prejudiced attitudes. More

recently, Wittenbrink, Park, and Judd (1998) showed that stereo-

type activation and evaluation depended on the configural pro-

cessing of a number of different pieces of information about

social targets. Their experiments showed, for example, that judg-

ments about a target were quite different depending on whether

or not different items of information were processed together.

Different particular combinations produced different percep-

tions and evaluations. In addition, Wyer and Gordon (1982),

Dovidio et al. (1986), and Judd, Park, Ryan, Brauer, and Kraus

(1995) have all provided empirical evidence regarding the con-

ditions under which out-group characteristics are stored and

used independently of feelings about the out-group (see also

Stephan & Stephan, 1993).

Research and theory developed largely in the area of impres-

sion formation predict three specific types of dissociation. First,

there should be some independence between judgments and feel-

ings about specific group members versus the group as a whole

(e.g., Fazio et al., 1995). This is because, as noted above, sepa-

rate knowledge structures representing groups and individuals

may be stored in memory. Second, dissociations should be ex-

pected between the perceiver's implicit associations of traits or

other characteristics with a social group and his or her explicit

or consciously endorsed beliefs about the group (e.g., Devine,

1989). Knowledge is not all held in the same format, and not

all stored knowledge is consciously retrievable and verbally

reportable. Third, affective and cognitive reactions to a group

may also have some degree of independence (Esses et al., 1993).

These predictions help make theoretical sense of seemingly

paradoxical observations. For example, people may believe a

group (say, Asian Americans) to have desirable traits such as

intelligence and ambitiousness, yet still dislike them. This disso-

ciation may reflect the fact that the dislike is driven by affectively

tinged appraisals of the threat posed by the group (e.g., in

competition for college admissions or good jobs; see E. R.

Smith, 1993), rather than by the evaluative implications of the

group stereotype. The predictions also help account for the ap-

parent dissociations that characterize what has been called

"aversive" (Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986), "symbolic" (Sears,

1988), or "modern" (McConahay, 1986) racism, in which cog-

nitive, evaluative, affective, and normative components of in-

tergroup reactions are often inconsistent. Typically (at least in

college student populations) expressed racial or ethnic stereo-

types are mild or generally positive (in contrast to the overt

negative stereotypes characteristic of "old-fashioned" racism),

yet negative intergroup affect and negative behaviors (such as

avoidance) are still readily identifiable.

A final reason for some dissociations among different types

of judgments and behaviors is based not in fundamental princi-

ples of social cognition, but in the specifics of the ways people

use response scales. Biernat, Vescio, and Manis (1998) demon-

strated that perceivers used group-specific standards for judging

the behaviors or other characteristics of group members. Just

as people may think of 5 ft. 11 in (180 cm) Anne as tall (for a

woman), the same principle may apply in other domains besides

height where groups are stereotypically expected to differ. The

result may be that judgments reveal little or no difference be-

tween groups (because the judgments are based on group-spe-

cific standards), whereas the perceivers' subjective impressions

and behavioral reactions to members of different groups still

differ. Biernat et al. speculated that this type of dissociation

may be most pronounced when reward allocations or other zero-

sum behavioral choices are at issue. Non-zero-sum types of

behaviors, such as giving praise for good performances, should

show patterns that are more similar to judgments, including the

potential effects of group-specific standards.

All this research suggests the benefits to be gained from

developing theoretical models of the interactive influence of

multiple mental representations—schemas, episodes, situations,

and norms—to replace the outdated assumption that a single

knowledge structure will be identified and used in every situa-

tion. The research developments discussed herein provide fur-

ther avenues of integration between impression formation and

intergroup relations that we believe to be particularly timely.

Research on the Self and Intergroup Relations

The interrelations of beliefs, evaluations, and behaviors are

also central in social psychological research devoted to under-

standing the self. In this area, beliefs about the self (usually

referred to as the self-concept), evaluations of the self (self-

esteem), and self-relevant behavioral choices (e.g., self-expres-

sive or self-verifying acts) have long been of research interest.

Of course, social identity theory (Tajfel, 1978, 1982) and its

relatives, such as self-categorization theory (Turner, 1987), posit

that intergroup relations are fundamentally tied to the self, be-

cause of the implications of in-group membership for the self.

Here we review some relevant areas to highlight other potential

implications of research on the self for the study of intergroup

relations.

Social and Contextual Influences on the Self

One of the enduring paradoxes in the study of the self is the

contrast between individuals' strong sense of stable and endur-

ing personal identity and the demonstrable fact that they can act

like different people in different social situations. Whereas ear-

lier research emphasized the stability of the self, its flexible and

fluid nature is a common theme in more recent research (see

Linville & Carlston, 1994). Markus and Wurf (1987), for exam-

ple, introduced the notion of the working self-concept, the subset

of self-characteristics that is activated by cues and goals in the

current social situation. Other attributes, while still linked to

the self, might not be accessible in a given situation and so have

little or no impact on self-judgments or behavior.

Other research has made the point that specific experiences.

INTEROROUP RELATIONS AND THEORETICAL INTEGRATION 509

such as favorable or unfavorable social comparisons (Morse &

Gergen, 1970) or particular types of self-presentations (Rhode-

wait & Agustsdottir, 1986), can cause thorough, if temporary,

shifts in the self-concept as well as in self-esteem. Even a brief

social interaction with someone who holds particular expecta-

tions can influence a target's self-concept and social behavior

(Darley & Fazio, 1980; Snyder et al., 1977). Of course, there

are limits on these phenomena. For example, a firmly held aspect

of the self-concept is not likely to change substantially as a

result of a brief, superficial interaction with a stranger (Swann &

Ely, 1984). Still, fluidity and context sensitivity seem to be more

the rule than the exception with regard to the self-concept. In

fact, Turner, Oakes, Haslam, and McGarty (1994) advanced the

radical suggestion that "the concept of the self as a separate

mental structure does not seem necessary, because we can as-

sume that any and all cognitive resources—long-term knowl-

edge, implicit theories, . . . and so forth—are recruited, used,

and deployed when necessary" (p. 459) to construct a situation-

ally appropriate self-representation.

Do these ideas have any implications for intergroup relations?

They surely do. Tajfel (1982; Tajfel & Turner, 1979) postulated

a dimension from interpersonal to intergroup and proposed that

interactions could fall anywhere along it. Interpersonal interac-

tions depend on the unique personal attributes of the participants

and hence show considerable variability from person to person.

In contrast, intergroup interactions are driven by the group mem-

berships of the participants and are expected to show little vari-

ability from person to person; different members of a group

become almost interchangeable. This insight was later formal-

ized in Turner's (1987) self-categorization theory (SCT). The

key idea in both of these formulations is that a participant's

self-concept, as well as the way he or she treats others, depends

on the nature of the interaction situation.

One implication of the interpersonal-intergroup distinction,

and of SCT, is that an interaction can rapidly shift between these

poles. Imagine, for instance, an interaction in a racially mixed

setting such as a neighborhood bar. An African American and

an Asian American begin arguing over purely private matters.

The interaction is at the interpersonal level, and bystanders have

no reason to feel that they are involved. However, imagine that

as the argument grows heated, one of the participants utters a

racial slur or contemptuously sneers, "You people are all alike."

The whole affair is instantly transformed into an intergroup

situation, and the onlookers may feel themselves unwillingly yet

inevitably becoming part of the dispute. Situations] factors seem

able to rapidly transform a situation (and shape the self-concepts

of the participants) along interpersonal or intergroup lines. One

recent theoretical discussion of flexible self-categorization (Si-

mon, 1998) has drawn on Linville's (1985) model of multiple

self-aspects to make the point that an individual has many poten-

tial collective selves (i.e., socially shared self-aspects) as well

as many individual selves (unique configurations of self-as-

pects). This theoretical direction illustrates once again the po-

tential power arising from theoretical integration across content

domains.

Similarly, it seems that transient factors such as social com-

parisons, self-presentations, and social expectations can influ-

ence people's thinking about in-groups and out-groups and

hence affect the tone of intergroup relations. An athletic team

that has just won a contest certainly thinks differently about

itself than does a team that has just lost and is likely to interact

differently with the opposing team. A group that is trying to

portray fearless pride feels differently about itself than does a

group that is trying to come across as nonthreatening and innoc-

uous. A group that knows of others' high expectations for it

behaves differently than a group that realizes others expect little

(e.g., Steele, 1992; Steele & Aronson, 1995). Just as social

situations and interactions affect the self-concept, they influence

group members' thoughts, feelings, and behavior and hence alter

the course of intergroup relations.

Self-Related Motives

The question of what motives are important in driving in-

tergroup behavior has received relatively little research attention.

Research on self-related motives provides some clues. Three

such motives have been identified: self-enhancement, self-de-

fense, and self-expression or self-verification. As some commen-

tators have noted, consideration of such motives needs also to

be tied to functional analyses (Chaiken et al., 1989; Greenwald,

1980; Kelman, 1961; Shavitt, 1990), providing another cross-

domain link.

Self-enhancement. Most people (at least those with an aver-

age or high level of self-esteem) seek to maintain and enhance

their standing in others' eyes and their own (Kunda, 1990;

Ross & Conway, 1986; Taylor & Brown, 1988; Weinstein,

1980). This most familiar of self-motives is responsible for

people's efforts to seek out tasks that they can perform well,

to put their best foot forward, and to compare themselves with

those who are worse off. The implications of this motive for

intergroup relations have long been recognized. Social identity

theory holds that people seek positive differentiation of their

own groups from others (Tajfel, 1978, 1982). In a minimal

intergroup situation, for example, in which the two groups are

essentially identical and have equally unknown characteristics,

people can positively differentiate their group by assigning more

points to members of their own group than to members of the

out-group. Lemyre and Smith (1985) suggested that such in-

tergroup discrimination can enhance self-esteem. Moreover,

stereotypic biases and simplistic reasoning are more likely to

occur if they result in the in-group's looking good (Schaller,

1992), and the formation of group stereotypes is more likely

when a group-defining trait casts the in-group in a positive light

(Ford, 1993). Similarly, discrimination against out-groups is

more prevalent when it can be justified by something external,

so that positive self-images remain intact (Gaertner & Dovidio,

1986).

However, the self-enhancement motive may be able to account

for only mild preferences for the in-group over the out-group,

rather than strong prejudice and vicious intergroup discrimina-

tion. For example, Insko et al. (1992) found that when two

groups interacted in a Prisoner's Dilemma game, each initially

sought to maximize its own outcome without regard to how the

other group was doing. Similarly, perhaps, in a world in which

self-enhancement or group enhancement was the only motive,

people would slightly prefer their own group, perhaps by identi-

fying unique dimensions on which the group excels. In contrast,

after one group attacked the other in the game, each group

510 MACKIE AND SMITH

turned to competing by trying to maximize its advantage over

the other (even at the expense of its own absolute reward level).

Thus, once perceived threat or goal conflict turns group en-

hancement into group defense, intergroup relations begin to

deteriorate.

It is interesting to note an asymmetry in the operation of the

group enhancement motive. In North American society, political

and cultural movements that aim to enhance the self-esteem of

members of minority groups are at least tolerated and often

actively encouraged by the majority. However, contrast the toler-

ant reaction to a National Association for the Advancement of

Colored People or Black Pride movement with the reaction to

the National Association for the Advancement of White People

or a White Pride movement (M. J. Rodin, Price, Bryson, &

Sanchez, 1990). It seems that our society recognizes that power-

ful majorities may slide easily from self-enhancement to self-

defense motivation, especially if they have the resources to im-

pose the sentiments behind such movements.

Self-defense. Threats to the self that require defense stem

from many sources, from obviously negative life events such as

illness or the death of a spouse to everyday hassles and troubles

such as conflict with coworkers, and even from positive events

such as marriage, if they require changes in the self-concept.

When an individual's self-concept is threatened, negative affect

is triggered and coping mechanisms come into play. Researchers

have categorized ways of coping as problem focused versus

emotion focused (Fblkman & Lazarus, 1988). People who use

problem-focused strategies seek to remove the source of the

threat itself, whereas those who use emotion-focused ones deal

more directly with their reaction to the threat. Defending against

threats is serious business, with implications for physical as

well as mental health and well-being (Lazarus, 1984; O'Leary,

1990; Pennebaker, 1989; J. Rodin & Salovey, 1989).

In the intergroup arena, threats to a group's image of itself

and its proper place also elicit defense motivation. Suppose, for

example, that a low-status minority group that had previously

accepted its situation now forms a civil rights movement and

begins to agitate for improved treatment. Such demands are

likely to pose a threat to the dominant group's self-image, either

as powerful and in control of its fate or as paternalistically

responsive to the needs of the disadvantaged group. Problem-

focused coping might take the form of efforts to resolve the

most immediate and obvious of the expressed problems (a

"guilty White liberal" strategy) or to repress the challenging

group (a "hard-line conservative" strategy). Emotion-focused

coping might involve denial of the problem ("Most of them

are happy with their situation—it's just a few outside agitators

who are making trouble") or escape (ignoring information or

news about the group, in effect rendering them invisible).

Further exploration of such parallels between ways of coping

with threats and specific patterns of intergroup relations seems

likely to be both theoretically and practically profitable. First,

such an approach makes clear the importance of real or symbolic

threat in determining intergroup relations. Although threat was

a part of Sherif, Harvey, White, Hood, and Sherif's (1961)

thinking about the genesis of real group conflict, more recent

theorizing about groups has been less affectively and function-

ally derived. Second, the coping literature makes clear that dif-

ferent individuals may share a particular evaluation of another

group and yet react to this evaluation in different ways. Third,

these differences suggest yet another source of dissociations

between prejudice and discrimination. Finally, whether threats

are dealt with emotionally or in a problem-focused way has

implications for prejudice reduction, a topic to which we return

later.

Self-expression/self-verification. Self-expression, or acting

in ways that confirm or verify one's existing view of the self,

is also rewarding, particularly for low self-monitors (Snyder &

Gangestad, 1982; Swann & Hill, 1982; Swann & Read, 1981).

Similarly, groups value expression of their unique identities in

such domains as religion, culture, art, and language. Though

such expressions appear innocent and even valuable, intergroup

relations can become so negative that one group's expression of

its pride and cultural values may directly threaten other groups

(Biemat, Vescio, & Theno, 1996). Thus, in the United States in

recent years, Gay Pride marches have been severely criticized by

antigay groups, and Hispanic groups' emphasis on their cultural

distinctiveness (including the Spanish language) has been coun-

tered by "English-only" movements. However, this may happen

only when the dominant group feels threatened anyway, so that

the mere existence of alternative cultural or value systems is

distressing.

Tesser's Self-Evaluation Model

lesser (1988) advanced a comprehensive model of self-re-

lated motives invoked by social comparisons. The self-evalua-

tion model (SEM) points to the closeness of the comparison

target and the personal relevance of the dimension of comparison

as important factors. Several outcomes are possible. If a close

other performs superbly on a nonrelevant dimension, people

may "bask in reflected glory" and derive personal esteem from

the other's accomplishment. However, if the dimension is rele-

vant to the self, being outperformed by another person represents

a threat, which is magnified by the other's closeness. One way

to defend against this threat is to reduce the dimension's rele-

vance to the self ("Oh, well, I didn't really want to be a profes-

sional ballplayer, anyway"), and another is to reduce the other

person's closeness, perhaps through avoidance or rejection.

Transferred to an intergroup context, SEM theory has signifi-

cant parallels with Tajfel's (1978) ideas about seeking positive

differentiation. Groups choose intergroup comparison dimen-

sions on which they believe they excel. Suppose a dominant

group in a particular society values such dimensions as intelli-

gence, ambition, and entrepreneurial skills. Imagine further that

some out-groups have positive attributes that are irrelevant to

those dimensions (like musical or athletic talent). The out-

groups might be admired for their accomplishments in these

domains, which do not directly threaten the dominant group, or

they might be disliked for their assumed negative characteristics

(e.g., hostility or laziness). However, out-groups that are per-

ceived as intelligent and hard-working (as are Asian Americans)

or ambitious and entrepreneurial (like Jews) may directly

threaten the dominant group, because they provoke comparison

on centrally relevant dimensions. These groups, then, may excite

dislike and discrimination precisely for their positive socially

valued attributes. The majority's derogation of groups that

seemingly adhere to its most cherished values may be responsi-

INTERGROUP RELATIONS AND THEORETICAL INTEGRATION 511

ble for what Freud termed the ' 'narcissism of small differences''

(see Rothbart & Lewis, 1994). As Freud (1926/1959) observed,

"Closely related races keep one another at arm's length; the

South German cannot endure the North German, the Englishman

casts every kind of aspersion upon the Scot, the Spaniard de-

spises the Portuguese" (p. 33). The underlying dynamic is, as

Tesser's (1988) SEM theory proposes, the potential threat of

comparisons against similar or closely related groups compared

with distant or nonsalient groups.

Emotions and Intergroup Relations

E. R. Smith (1993) introduced a conception of stereotypes,

prejudice, and discrimination that draws on emotion theory and

links these intergroup phenomena directly to the self. As we

noted earlier, in the framework of traditional attitude theory

stereotypes have been identified with beliefs about an out-group;

prejudice, with the perceiver's attitude toward the group; and

discrimination, as attitude-driven behavior. However, this frame-

work emphasizes only the valence of reactions to out-groups,

suggesting that an out-group that excites fear and hatred and

another that elicits disgust and contempt are disliked and dis-

criminated against in identical fashion across situations, con-

texts, and occasions.

As a theoretical alternative, E. R. Smith (1993) combined

the idea of a socially extended self (drawn from social identity

theory; Tajfel, 1982) and modern appraisal theories of emotion

(C. A. Smith & Ellsworth, 1985). The social extension of the

self—the incorporation of an in-group as part of the self

(E. R. Smith & Henry, 1996) —means that the in-group acquires

affective and emotional significance (Cialdini et al., 1976). Out-

groups that threaten or support the in-group thus excite emo-

tional reactions. From this perspective, stereotypes are identified

as appraisals of the out-group's characteristics that potentially

affect the in-group; prejudice, as an emotion experienced with

respect to a social identity as an in-group member; and discrimi-

nation, as emotion-driven behavior (Frijda, Kuipers, & ter

Schure, 1989). This allows specific predictions to be made about

affective and behavioral reactions to out-groups. For example,

an out-group that is seen as violating in-group norms can be

expected to elicit disgust and avoidance, an out-group that is

seen as threatening elicits fear and hostile actions, an out-group

that is seen as benefiting unjustly from government programs

at the expense of the in-group elicits resentment and actions

aimed at reducing those benefits, and so forth.

Because it makes emotion and the self theoretically central,

this conception may further understanding of the ' 'hot'' aspects

of prejudice and discrimination. It also sheds light on the highly

situation-specific nature of prejudice. For example, members of

a minority group may not be viewed negatively if they take only

unwanted menial jobs, but they become threatening as they

begin to compete for skilled labor positions. Thus dissociations

between attitudes toward a group at two points in time are

explained by the different appraisals of the group made at those

times. In addition, conceptualizing prejudice as emotional re-

sponses provides a means of integrating the literature on emo-

tion-triggered aggression into the intergroup domain. Extensive

research has delineated the antecedents and consequences of

emotional (rather than instrumental) aggression (Berkowitz,

1989, 1993; Geen, 1990; see Normative Control of Behavior),

but this evidence has not been applied systematically to an

understanding of violent intergroup behavior. If the failure to

make this application has been due in part to the fact that preju-

dice has been viewed primarily as evaluative, reconceptualizing

it as anger, for example, makes clear prerequisite conditions for

' 'irrational'' forms of intergroup behavior. In addition, the fact

that quite specific and different behaviors are triggered by differ-

ent and specific emotions helps solve the puzzle of when and

why prejudice has so many different behavioral manifestations.

Finally, a socially extended appraisal theory of intergroup

emotion is consistent with recent conceptualizations of positive

and negative emotions as independent (Cacioppo & Berntson,

1994; Larsen & Diener, 1992). On the optimistic side, this

means that lack of positive affect toward a group does not

necessarily mean that the group elicits negative affect. On the

other hand, it suggests that reducing negative intergroup affect

will not guarantee positive views of groups. Such a view also

allows for different forms of intergroup relations to be based

on the independent presence or absence of positive and negative

feelings. For example, Pettigrew and Meertens (1995) recently

argued that virulent forms of prejudice and discrimination re-

flect the presence of negative affect, whereas their more subtle

forms reflect the absence of positive affect toward out-groups

and the presence of such positivity for the in-group. Consistent

with this, Pettigrew (1997) used data from surveys of four

European countries that included a question eliciting how proud

the respondent felt to be British, Dutch, French, or German.

Responses to this question correlated with indicators of preju-

dice against relevant ethnic minority groups, even when several

well-known correlates of prejudice (age, education, conserva-

tism, etc.) were controlled. Similarly, Brewer and Miller (1996)

argued that in-group bias depends more on the fact that the in-

group, and not the out-group, elicits positive emotions, regard-

less of whether the out-group elicits negative affect. Thus the

promotion goes to the son of the old schoolmate, because having

"our kind of people" in the boardroom just feels right. Actual

dislike for out-group members may play little, if any, role.

Given the central place that the self enjoys in theories of

social identity and group belonging, an integration of research

approaches to the self and to intergroup relations seems a natural

development. The foregoing are some of the ways that this inte-

gration could proceed.

Relationships and Intergroup Relations

One of the most active areas of research in social psychology

in recent years deals with personal relationships (Collins &

Read, 1990; Kazan & Shaver, 1990; Reis & Shaver, 1988;

Shaver, Hazan, & Bradshaw, 1988). This area has grown far

beyond its origins in studies of "interpersonal attraction," in

which people were asked how much they would like fictitious

others whose purported attitude responses they had seen. Cur-

rently, a wide range of theoretical and empirical approaches are

being vigorously applied to the understanding of friendships

and romantic relationships, and we believe that some of these

approaches also promise to shed light on intergroup relations.

512 MACKIE AND SMITH

Mental Models and Attachment Styles

Adult attachment theory has emerged as an extremely influ-

ential perspective on close relationships (Hazan & Shaver, 1987;

Shaver & Hazan, 1994). This theory holds that experiences in

past relationships give rise to different "mental models'' of the

self and others, which in turn influence feelings and behavior in

current relationships. Mental models are schematic knowledge

structures that portray the self as lovable and valuable (or not)

and other people as trustworthy and responsive (or not) (Bartho-

lomew & Horowitz, 1991). Crossing these two dimensions gives

rise to four basic attachment styles, often labeled as "secure"

(self+,other+), "preoccupied" (self—.others +), "fearful"

(self-, others — ),and "dismissing" (self+, others — ) . Corre-

lational studies based on self-reports (e.g., Collins & Read,

1990) or observations (Simpson, 1987, 1990) assessed people's

attachment styles and documented a variety of their important

correlates and consequences, including affective patterns, rela-

tionship satisfaction, and relationship longevity. Within this gen-

eral perspective, theorists differ on important issues such as the

relative causal importance of the early infant-mother bond ver-

sus adult romantic relationships and the stability of an indi-

vidual's basic attachment style over time and over successive

relationships.

Given the role that such conceptions play in interpersonal

interactions, it seems reasonable that people also have basic,

relatively stable ideas about themselves and others as group

members. That is, people may have mental models of themselves

as a good team player and worthy group member and of in-

groups as accepting and rewarding versus cold and rejecting.

By analogy with adult attachment theory, these models should

combine to yield distinct group attachment styles that should

correlate with various outcomes, such as group identification.

Two studies by E. R. Smith, Murphy, and Coats (1996) confirm

these predictions. The studies showed that group attachment

styles could be measured with good reliability and stability, that

they were distinct (empirically as well as conceptually) from

attachment in personal relationships, and that they related in

theoretically meaningful ways to group identification. Although

these patterns may be quite stable, mental models of group

attachment might also vary with the nature of the relationship

with particular groups. As Hogg (1992, 1993) and Prentice,

Miller, and Lightdale (1994) demonstrated, members belong to

different groups for different reasons, and group evaluations and

identification are influenced by whether members are attracted

to the group per se or to other members of the group. Assessing

variants in group attachments at the cognitive and evaluative

level could extend this work.

A further extension of these ideas is to mental models of

out-groups. Imagine that people have basic conceptions of out-

groups as interestingly different or as dangerously hostile. These

basic conceptions would lead to responses that correlate across

different out-groups, much as the authoritarian personality was

supposed to reject all out-groups. Questions such as the origins

of these group attachment variables (in early childhood or in

more recent experiences), their stability, and their impact on

thoughts and feelings about group membership and intergroup

relations await further research.

In a related vein, A. P. Fiske's (1991) taxonomy of basic

human relationships at the interindividual level could also be

used to characterize relations between groups and thus the kinds

of belief and evaluative systems that develop between them.

Consider the following predictions that follow from such a view.

Communal sharing relations may promote rather differentiated

representations of other groups as well as positive feelings, a

proposition that could be seen as consistent with evidence for

groups who share superordinate goals (Sherif, 1966). Authority

ranking relations, however, suggest that hierarchically dominant

groups might have relatively undifferentiated stereotypes of sub-

ordinate groups, which might need to develop quite detailed

ideas about their superiors (Claire & Fiske, 1998; see Hagen-

doora, 1995, and Sidanius, 1993, for other possible ways power

and status relationships affect intergroup relations). At the same

time, market pricing or exchange relationships may encourage

depersonalized views, whereas equality matching represents the

kind of reciprocal relations that should promote individuated

and differentiated impression formation.

In-Group or Partner as Part of the Self

Another important parallel between in-groups and personal

relationships is that both involve the incorporation of the other

as part of the psychological self. With regard to the group, this

incorporation is a basic postulate of social identity theory (Taj-

fel, 1978, 1982) and self-categorization theory (Turner et al.,

1987), and it underlies the empirical phenomenon of self-stereo-

typing (when group membership is salient, members attribute

group characteristics to themselves; Hogg & Turner, 1987; Si-

mon & Hamilton, 1994). With regard to relationship partners,

Aron and his associates (Aron & Aron, 1986; Aron, Aron, Tu-

dor, & Nelson, 1991) have developed a similar idea. In one

study, they used response time measurement to show that people

represent a close other (their spouse) as part of the self. People

filled out questionnaires about their own and their partner's

standing on 90 diverse traits and then made speeded self-descrip-

tiveness judgments about the same traits. Responses of partici-

pants who were unlike their partners were slower and more error

prone compared with responses of participants who were like

their partners, indicating that overlapping mental representations

of the self and partner caused this confusion.

E. R. Smith and Henry (1996) used the same method to

determine whether moderately salient in-groups (e.g., liberal

arts or engineering majors) are incorporated in mental represen-

tations of the self. Results were identical to those of Aron et al.

(1991): Participants were slower and made more errors describ-

ing themselves when their characteristics mismatched rather than

matched their in-groups. Matching or mismatching relevant out-

group traits had no effect. These studies, applying social cogni-

tion methods to investigate cognitive structures, show that the

"incorporation of the partner or group as part of the self" is

more than an appealing metaphor. Instead, it is a fundamental

truth about psychological representations of the self and other

(see also Davis, Conklin, Smith, & Luce, 1996), which has

clearly detectable effects on information processing. Such find-

ings also help explain the benefits of improving intergroup rela-

tions by encouraging the formation of a mental representation

in which two conflicting groups are merged into one. The com-

mon in-group identity model (Gaertner, Dovidio, Anastasio,

INTERGROUP RELATIONS AND THEORETICAL INTEGRATION 513

Bachman, & Rust, 1993; Gaertner, Mann, Dovidio, Murrell, &

Pomare, 1990; Gaertner, Mann, Murrell, & Dovidio, 1989),

for example, suggests that attention to a superordinate group

category transfers in-group loyalties and biases from the original

in-group to the new inclusive in-group. Accordingly, conceptions

of the self should be merged with representations of both former

in-group and former out-group members. Whether or not this

merger occurs after the kinds of manipulations used to achieve

common in-group identities could be assessed using the method-

ologies described here.

When relationship partners or in-group members become

linked to the self, they receive the benefit of self-enhancing

biases. Thus, researchers such as Fletcher and Fincham (1991)

have found that people in thriving relationships make "partner-

enhancing" attributions that, like self-serving attributions, ex-

plain negative actions by appeal to transitory or situations!

causes but positive actions as due to the person's basic desirable

qualities. When relationships decline, these patterns vanish or

even reverse. Now the spouse who fails to buy a gift for an

anniversary is viewed as uncaring rather than just forgetful. If

in-groups become part of the self, they should also benefit from

biased attributions. Research shows that they do (Islam & Hew-

stone, 1993; Pettigrew, 1979). For example, Oskamp and Hartry

(1968) found that American college students rated military ac-

tions (e.g., sending aircraft carriers to patrol near the coast of

another country) as more positive and justifiable if performed

by the United States than if performed by the Soviet Union.

Friendship and Intergroup Relations

The theoretical conception of both personal relationships and

group membership as involving incorporation of the other into

the self gives rise to another set of predictions. In an intergroup

conflict situation, if a person forms a friendship across group

lines, incorporation of the friend into the self implies incorpora-

tion of the out-group (because that is part of the friend's self).

This is one theoretical basis from which to predict a beneficial

effect of intergroup contact on intergroup relations, at least if

the contact leads to the formation of close friendships rather than

merely superficial acquaintanceships. Analyses of data from four

European countries by Pettigrew (1997) showed that individuals

who had out-group friends (those of a different culture, national-

ity, race, religion, or social class) had considerably lower levels

of prejudice than those who did not, even when other relevant

variables were controlled. Of course, this correlation could re-

flect selection (the person who is highly prejudiced avoids out-

group friends) as well as a causal impact of friendship patterns

on prejudice. Pettigrew analyzed the data using a nonhierarchi-

cal structural model that permitted the separation of these two

effects and found that although both were present in the data,

the effect of friendship on prejudice was stronger than the effect

of prejudice on friendship. Most encouraging of all, the effect

of having an out-group friend generalized to more favorable

attitudes toward a variety of out-groups—not just the group

represented by the friend!

The link between cross-categorization and friendship needs

to be explored. Categorization effects such as in-group bias and

discrimination can be reduced when multiple categorizations

crosscut, rather than overlay, one another. This mechanism offers

a possible alternative explanation for friendship effects, inas-

much as the friend category crosscuts the in-group/out-group

designation. Drawing on yet another literature, it may be that

friendship serves to individuate the out-group, as suggested by

some variants of the contact hypothesis (Miller & Brewer,

1986). Comparison of the viability of the relationship perspec-

tive with these other explanations for the effect awaits further

research.

The predicted effect of friendship on intergroup relations can

go even further What if a person learns that his or her in-group

friend has an out-group friend? If we take seriously the idea

that group memberships involve incorporation of the group as

part of the self, this indirect relationship also involves incorpora-

tion of the out-group as part of the self (indirectly, through the

friend) and thus should benefit intergroup relations. Wright,

Aron, McLaughlin-Volpe, and Ropp (1995) tested this hypothe-

sis in an imaginative study. They divided participants arbitrarily

into two groups for an all-day program of tasks that first in-

volved intergroup competition. As in the classic Robbers' Cave

study (Sherif et al., 1961), various measures showed that rivalry

increased negative intergroup attitudes. They then used a proce-

dure pioneered by Aron and his colleagues (Aron, Aron, &

Smollan, 1992), involving an increasingly intimate series of

self-disclosures and trust-building exercises, to create a friend-

ship between two members of different groups. The other mem-

bers of each group were aware of the strong feelings of closeness

produced by this task and were aware that the friendship crossed

group boundaries. Finally, measures of the intergroup climate

were once again administered. Of course, the individuals who

had been involved in the cross-group friendship showed im-

proved intergroup attitudes, as expected from the classic contact

hypothesis perspective. This study showed, however, that other

participants also showed a dramatic decrease in intergroup hos-

tility after this friendship formed, supporting the extended-con-

tact hypothesis. It thus may be unnecessary to have a personal

friendship across group lines but may be enough to know that

other in-group members have such friendships.

This result, like the other possible areas of research linkage

we have mentioned, underscores the important potential practi-

cal implications of a theoretical perspective that integrates at-

traction phenomena such as friendships and relationships with

concepts central to intergroup relations. In general, these lines

of research confirm the important parallels between close rela-

tionships and group memberships that deserve further empirical

exploration.

Norms and Normative Processes and

Intergroup Relations

Perhaps because of American social psychology's emphasis

on individual attitudes, comparatively little research effort has

been directed toward an understanding of norms in the last

three decades (for exceptions, see Berkowitz, 1972; Cialdini,

Kallgren, & Reno, 1991; Cialdini, Reno, & Kallgren, 1990;

Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975; Reno, Cialdini, & Kallgren, 1993;

Schwartz, 1977; Triandis, 1977). This trend eroded the centra]

place that norms and related concepts held in social psycholo-

gy's early days (e.g., Asch, 1952; Cooley, 1902; Kelley, 1952;

Sherif, 1936).

514 MACKIE AND SMITH

Yet norms seem central to thinking about stereotyping and

prejudice for a number of reasons. First, early work demon-

strated that those who conformed in other areas of social life

were also more likely to be prejudiced (Pettigrew, 1958). After

analyzing the stereotypes held by American soldiers during

World War U (Stouffer, Suchman, DeVinney, Star, & Williams,

1949), for example, Allport (1954) concluded that about half

of their prejudiced attitudes were based purely on the need to

conform.

Second, the normative quality of both stereotypes and preju-

dice is amply demonstrated by evidence of the effects that coop-

erative and competitive normative structures have on intergroup

perceptions and evaluations (Sherif, 1966; Sherif et al., 1961;

Wright et al., 1995). For example, views of enemy nations

change dramatically during and after warfare (Suedfeld & Tet-

lock, 1977), the introduction of jigsaw classroom procedures

can change perceptions of stigmatized groups (E. Aronson, Bla-

ney, Stephan, Sikes, & Snapp, 1978), and intergroup coordina-

tion of actions toward a common goal undermines prejudice

based on group categorizations (Dovidio, Gaertner, Isen, & Low-

ranee, 1995; Dovidio et al., 1998; Gaertner et al., 1990).

Third, the concept seems particularly useful for grappling

with a centrally occurring theoretical and methodological prob-

lem that plagues current prejudice research. Although research-

ers suspect that prejudice is alive and well in many of their target

populations, the socially unacceptable nature of expressing that

prejudice has made it hard to measure. For example, when covert

measures are used, evidence for in-group and out-group differ-

ences in stereotype content and evaluative reactions can be

found, even when overt measures show no impact of such differ-

ences on behavior (Crosby et al., 1980; Fazio et al., 1995;

although see also Wittenbrink, Judd, & Park, 1997). Indeed,

there is experimental evidence that participants systematically

alter their expressed attitudes and behaviors to appear more

unprejudiced and egalitarian than covert responses suggest

(McConahay, Hardee, & Bans, 1981).

Such dissociations raise many thorny questions. If social

norms have succeeded in Stirling public expressions of preju-

dice, should this not be taken as a moral and social victory? On

the other hand, the fact that public expressions of behavior

are controlled by norms suggests why private or undetectable

displays are unlikely to be controlled (e.g., Donnerstein, Don-

nerstein, Simon, & Ditrichs, 1972). Does this suggest that peo-

ple who still harbor prejudice will act on it when they can do

so undetected? Although some aspects of the answers to these

questions are beyond the social psychological realm, it is clear

that the thinking and the data that speak most clearly to them

come from the study of norms and normative processes such as

social influence. What benefits might be gained by thinking

about stereotypes, prejudice, and discrimination as norms and

normative behavior?

Stereotypes, Prejudice, and Discrimination as Norms

No doubt because the concept has been marginalized in the

discipline for so long, little theoretical development of the norm

concept has occurred (Krebs, 1970; Krebs & Miller, 1985).

Much more needs to be done, for example, to document the

difference between descriptive norms ("People love their par-

ents") and injunctive or prescriptive norms ("People should

love their parents"). Cialdini and his colleagues (Cialdini et al.,

1991; Cialdini et al., 1990; Reno et al., 1993) defined descriptive

norms as what most people do in a given situation and injunctive

norms as what people approve or disapprove of in a given

situation. Such distinctions presumably have more than merely

theoretical significance. For example, it may be predicted that

violations of descriptive and injunctive norms would trigger

quite different emotional reactions. Finding oneself out of step

with what most people do may invoke anxiety, whereas de-

parting from what most people approve of may induce shame

or guilt. Unfortunately, researchers know little about how these

emotions influence intergroup perceptions and behavior (al-

though Wilder & Shapiro, 1989a, 1989b, have demonstrated

some conditions under which anxiety exacerbates negative reac-

tions to out-groups).

Regardless of finer distinctions between descriptive and in-

junctive norms, the central aspect of the concept of norm as

compared to attitude is the shared or consensual nature of

norms. When systematic research on stereotypes began, the con-

cept was an inherently social one—stereotypes comprised those

traits that one group agreed were characteristics of another. For

example, the methodology of D. Katz and Braly's classic (1933)

study involving the assessment of group agreement on out-

groups' traits presupposed that stereotypes were shared. In cur-

rent North American theorizing, stereotypic mental representa-

tions belong by definition to the individual, although social

learning and conformity pressures are credited with ensuring

that individuals' representations are often similar. Despite the

assertion of die individuality of stereotypes, however, methods

often rely on consensually shared content of stereotypes, and

some theoretical positions do in fact refer to social or culturally

shared stereotypes (Devine, 1989; Krueger, 1996; Steele & Ar-

onson, 1995). The notion of culturally shared stereotypes has

remained more important in European social psychology, pro-

voked by Moscovici's (1988) concept of social representation.

Whereas the individually held mental representation of North

American theorizing is conceptualized as driving individual dis-

criminatory behavior (through the cognitive-attitude-behavior

framework), the socially shared and endorsed stereotype of the

European tradition has the weight of social support and collu-

sion behind it.

The implications of these two different ways of thinking about

stereotypes strikes us as worthy of further investigation for a

number of reasons (Gardner, Kirby, Gorospe, & Willamin, 1972;

Schneider, 1996; Stangor & Schaller, 1996). First, researchers

need to know whether the distinction has representational conse-

quences. Are people aware of a difference between individual

and consensual stereotypes, or (e.g., because of false consensus)

do they implicitly assume their ideas are shared? Devine (1989)

assumes that at least for low-prejudice people, the former is the

case.

Second, is shared information stored differently, tagged in

some special way, imbued with whatever properties confer con-

fidence or accessibility? Does shared information have more

impact on judgments than unshared information? Certainly the

idea that consensus directs attributions to external reality sug-

gests a special status. In addition, shared information seems to

have advantages when it comes to accessibility and likelihood

INTERGROUP RELATIONS AND THEORETICAL INTEGRATION 515

of expression (Stasser, Taylor, & Hanna, 1989) and perceptions

of confidence (McLachlan, 1986). Thus individually held and

socially shared information may have many different

consequences.

Third, the socially shared or nonshared nature of beliefs and

attitudes has several other implications. Norms that are univer-

sally shared are taken for granted and not questioned. They

represent' 'the way things are'' and are thought of as knowledge

rather than as beliefs. Thus in a society that sanctions slavery,

everyone assumes that slaves are less than human or are unsuited

for freedom, for example, and religious, philosophical, and

moral justifications might be brought forward for that shared

viewpoint. In contrast, when social change destroys the universal

character of the norm, even people who still hold the traditional

beliefs cannot hold them in the same way (Asch, 1952). They

now realize that the idea is controversial, that not everyone

agrees, that it cannot be taken for granted. The endorsement

of beliefs may be just as strong, but those beliefs lose their

unquestioned quality.

Taking this line of thought further, we would predict substan-

tial differences between individual attitudes that are held with

general normative support and those held without it. Most obvi-

ously, people who know that then- opinions are generally shared

are not reluctant to disclose them; those who realize that their

opinions are counternormative may well be so. This factor can

account for qualitative differences between prejudice toward

racial minorities (which is counternormative in most parts of

the present-day United States) and prejudice toward gays and

lesbians or the obese, which commands normative support in

many groups (Crandall, 1994; Crandall & Biemat, 1990; Kite,

1992). We believe that what some have termed "prejudice with

or without compunction" (Devine, Monteith, Zuwerink, & El-

Hot, 1991) is probably better termed "prejudice without or with

perceived normative support." It is possible, of course, that

prejudices contradict a person's own internal standards. It is

more likely, however, that people are aware of their prejudice's

contradiction of valued in-group norms and that this inconsis-

tency can give rise to feelings of guilt and efforts to conceal or

modify prejudiced responses (Devine & Monteith, 1993).

A fourth consequence of the shared nature of stereotypes and

prejudice was outlined by Steele (1992; Steele & Aronson,

1995), who introduced the concept of "stereotype vulnerabil-

ity," or people's knowledge that they are negatively evaluated

because of culturally shared stereotypes about their social group

membership and not just their idiosyncratic individual beliefs.

For example, a woman facing a math test might realize that if

she performs poorly, others will leap to the conclusion that her

difficulty reflects the "typical" female inability to deal with

numbers. In a number of studies, Steele and his colleagues

showed that stereotype vulnerability—and therefore the realiza-

tion that shared stereotypes about one's group are prevalent—

has a negative effect on group members' performance hi a vari-

ety of circumstances. Claire and Fiske (1998) and Simon

(1998) made similar arguments that shared stereotypes and prej-

udice have systematically different effects than do idiosyncratic

ones.

Norm Applicability and Group Boundaries

As noted earlier, social psychological research has lacked both

measures and theoretical approaches that adequately account

for severe forms of discrimination. The essentially group-based

quality of norms—norms are really of the in-group, by the in-

group, and for the in-group—also offers just such explanatory

potential. Although researchers tend to think about norms such

as "thinking well of one's fellow human beings" and ' 'treating

others as we would like them to treat us" as universal, recent

research suggests that the terms "human beings" and "others"

act as a proxy for "in-group members" (Opotow, 1990; Staub,

1990). Thus norm-governed evaluations and behavior apply

only within the group, and only violations of norms that affect

in-group members appear worthy of sanction. Opotow (1990)

used the terms "moral unconcern" and "moral exclusion" to

describe the fact that prosocial norms stop at in-group bound-

aries, resulting in out-groups' being treated quite differently.

This line of thought has obvious implications for intergroup

relations. First, it provides an alternative explanation of in-group

bias. In-groups are positively valued because they are seen as

the only worthy recipients of normatively approved prosocial

behaviors—indeed, socialization pressures implicitly convey

that worth by demanding that in-group members be treated well.

According to the moral exclusion perspective, out-group mem-

bers are never accorded the same value or worth; neither are

they entitled to such positive treatment. Not surprisingly, then,

in-groups seem inherently more worthy than out-groups.

Second, this line of thought is consistent with recent research

indicating that intergroup encounters are inherently more com-

petitive and abrasive than interpersonal encounters, an effect

labeled the "discontinuity effect" (Insko et al., 1988; Insko,

Pinkley, Hoyle, & Dalton, 1987; see also Otten, Mummendey, &

Wenzel, 1995). Whereas person-to-person interaction usually

(although not necessarily) involves personal identities, group-

to-group interaction makes group identities salient and activates

group norms. Norms that favor prosocial behavior are directed

toward the in-group (sometimes at the expense of the out-

group), and norms sanctioning negative acts toward the in-

group come into play. For example, Insko, Schopler, Hoyle,

Dardis, and Graetz (1990) demonstrated that two different

norms help support the increased competitiveness of intergroup

contact. On the one hand, there is socially sanctioned support

for greed; that is, group members are able to justify acting in

a self- or group-serving way by claiming such behavior is for

the good of the in-group. At the same time, there is consensually

confirmed fear that the out-group will act unjustly and dishonor-

ably toward the in-group, a possibility that must be preemptively

eliminated (Insko et al., 1990).

Third, considering the in-group-constrained nature of norms

provides a possible basis for thinking about intergroup atroci-

ties. A view of prejudice merely as positive or negative evalua-

tion does not explain why particular groups are targeted for

particularly virulent discrimination. If those out-groups are ex-

cluded from the definition of human being, however, the moral

and emotional constraints that usually inhibit severe destructive

behaviors no longer operate. Of even more consequence, out-

group members may invite the opposite of such norms, because

they do not fit the "human being" definition. Inhumane behav-

ior literally becomes more appropriate for out-group members

because the targets of that behavior are inhuman (Opotow, 1990;

Tyler & Lind, 1990).

516 MACKIE AND SMITH

Social Influence Processes

Considering prejudice as a norm implicates other normative

processes in intergroup relations and thus means that advances

in thinking about social influence phenomena are also worth

applying to the intergroup domain. The distinction between in-

formational and normative influence (Deutsch & Gerard, 1955)

is well known in the literature. Although traditional thinking

asserts that only informational influence produces internaliza-

tion and thus true attitude and behavior change, more recent

thinking has questioned this assumption. For example, some

theorists have suggested that whereas informational influence

reflects concern for the reality-testing function served by (in-

group) others, normative influence reflects social identity and

belonging concerns, which may also produce (perhaps heuristic)

acceptance rather than mere public compliance. In fact, Turner

(1991) argued that public compliance reflects people's situa-

tional solution to dealing with pressure from groups with whom

they do not identify. In contrast, people's concerns about belong-

ing to groups with whom they do actually identify are highly

likely to produce at least some form of internal acceptance.

Regardless of motives, learning what other people think does

influence stereotypic beliefs. Wittenbrink and Henly (1996)

demonstrated just such an effect. They exposed participants to

(false) survey results supposedly reflecting others' beliefs about

African Americans. When participants learned that others had

negative views, they reported more negative beliefs about the

target group than they did when they were presented with data

suggesting that others had largely positive stereotypes. Evalua-

tions of a single African American target about whom perceivers

were given information also reflected the valence of the social

comparison information. Interestingly, these effects were limited

to participants with negative initial attitudes toward African

Americans: The manipulation of normative information did not

affect those whose beliefs were relatively positive. This may

suggest the particular susceptibility of those already predisposed

to prejudice (as already noted, those most likely to conform) to

normative information.

A number of predictions can be made about the impact of

reality testing or belonging motivations on stereotypes and preju-

dice. For example, reality-testing adherence to norms assumes

that a concrete reality exists "out there," making those who do

not see eye-to-eye seem "ignorant," "outlandish," or perhaps

"overly emotional" and even "immature"—all stereotypic

qualities that have been applied to groups designated as inferior.

Responses to such perceptions might then consist of attempts

to impose the correct worldview on the ignorant or exclude

wrong-headed individuals from power and decision-making pro-

cesses. On the other hand, ' 'belonging'' motivations might pro-

duce more emotional responses of disdain and contempt; infer-

ences of immorality, depravity, or dissoluteness; and consequent

attempts to avoid, repudiate, or even eradicate nonadherents. It

is also possible that reality-testing and belonging concerns, with

these different consequences, are invoked in situations that make

salient descriptive and injunctive norms, respectively. In addi-

tion, competition from reality-testing motives may set "reality

boundaries" on the more typically studied biases driven by

belonging needs (Doosje, Ellemers, & Spears, 1995; Ellemers,

Rijswijk, Roefs, & Simons, 1997). The relative weight of differ-

ent motives may be paralleled by or promulgated through use

of different influence strategies (R. S. Baron, Vandello, &

Brunsman, 1996; Deutsch & Gerard, 1955). Thus, empirical

dissociations among stereotypes, prejudice, and discrimination

can occur if these different concepts are measured in situations

subject to these different normative processes.

As noted, the power of norms to influence evaluations and

behaviors is directly related to the salience and importance of

group membership: The more salient the group, the more power-

ful the normative influence. This process can contribute to the

etiology of severe discrimination in the form of deindividuation.

Past conceptualizations of deindividuation as involving anonym-

ity were advanced as explanations of antisocial behavior (Die-

ner, 1979). More recent thinking has characterized deindividua-

tion as an extreme but consistent form of norm-governed behav-

ior (Johnson & Downing, 1979; Reicher, 1987). When social

identification with a group is high, group norms become the

sole determinants of evaluations and behavior. If group norms

dictate negative evaluations and negative treatment of the out-

group, this behavior will dominate, regardless of whether indi-

viduals are identifiable or not. Variations in the salience and

importance of group membership thus help explain empirical

dissociations between reported prejudice and actual discrimina-

tion. If, for example, initial measurements are made under condi-

tions in which the individual's personal identity is made salient,

but behavior is measured under conditions that make in-group

identification and in-group normative control of behavior salient,

quite different outcomes may occur (Froming, Walker, & Lo-

pyan, 1982; I. Katz & Hass, 1988; Miller & Crush, 1986).

Such dissociations underscore .the importance of the distinction

between public and private conformity, with their different im-

plications for intergroup behavior (Turner, 1991).

Other social influence phenomena may also contribute to ste-

reotyping, prejudice, and discrimination. lust as Sherif (1936)

demonstrated that norms form through the interchange of infor-

mation, so attitude polarization researchers have demonstrated

that further exchange among like-minded individuals leads to

extremitization and ossification of their ideas (Moscovici &

Zavalloni, 1969; Myers & Kaplan, 1976; Stoner, 1961). Thus

group processes may contribute to qualitatively different behav-

iors than beliefs or attitudes measured at the individual level

might lead one to predict. It is not known whether attitudes that

have undergone polarization are better predictors of behavior

than equally extreme but individually generated attitudes. Given

the social construction of much prejudice and discrimination,

such knowledge would be useful. As a small step from group

polarization, one might also consider how intergroup prejudice

might arise from groupthink processes, whereby a press for

consensus overrides collection and careful evaluation of relevant

information, producing often disastrous behavioral conse-

quences. One reason to think that groupthink might be relevant

to normative support for prejudice is that, like prejudice itself,

groupthink often arises in situations in which the in-group is

under considerable threat (Janis, 1982).

Finally, the effect of pluralistic ignorance on individual be-

havior is just beginning to be understood. Pluralistic ignorance

can produce dissociations between attitudes and behaviors (even

behavior that is clearly inconsistent with an individual's avowed

desires) because of ignorance about the true social norm. For

INTERGROUP RELATIONS AND THEORETICAL INTEGRATION 517

example, Prentice and Miller (1993) showed that college stu-

dents drank more than they personally thought was appropriate

because they believed that their peers all endorsed a norm of

heavy drinking. When a majority of individuals in a group think

this way, all are mistaken about the actual norm of the group

(seeing it as more extreme than it is), but all conform to the

perceived group norm, providing more evidence for their

misconceptions.

What can pluralistic ignorance processes tell researchers

about intergroup relations? First, they provide another social

source of prejudice-behavior dissociations. Because of per-

ceived norms, behaviors may be more or less discriminatory

man individual stereotypes or prejudice would dictate. People

may actually be prejudiced but feel that they are the only ones

who are and thus conform to the group's norms of nonprejudice.

Second, these processes suggest another social route for preju-

dice change. If individuals follow perceived norms, regardless

of whether they actually reflect reality, perceived norms control

behavior. Prejudice reduction may even be brought about by

creating illusions of what norms are: After all, behavior that

conforms to an illusory norm confirms that norm, creating a

self-fulfilling prophecy.

Given the group-based nature of norms and of social influ-

ence, consideration of the impact of social influence processes

on the development and maintenance of stereotyping, prejudice,

and discrimination seems natural. Providing contemporary evi-

dence for the crucial role of normative and social influence

structures for stereotypes and prejudice, Schaller and l.atane

(1996) argued that some stereotypes are better suited to commu-

nication than others and thus are more likely to become widely

endorsed and ingrained, maintaining prejudice (see also Harasty,

1997). Given its relevance to forming and changing norms,

application of the literature on majority and minority influence

processes (Crano & Hannula-Bral, 1994; Kruglanski & Mackie,

1990; Moscovici & Personnaz, 1980) to issues of prejudice

formation and change seems especially warranted.

Normative Control of Behavior

Despite North American researchers' almost exclusive focus

on attitudes as determinants of behavior, there are many reasons

to think that norms may in fact provide more effective behav-

ioral control. Groups often actively enforce their norms, but

more subtle processes also operate to increase behavioral con-

sistency. Most norms are internalized through socialization and

thus just "seem right." Because norms are socially shared,

social support for appropriate behavior is forthcoming, and ap-

propriate behavior is not undermined or sabotaged by lack of

cooperation from others. Because any cognitive structure needs

to be activated to influence behavior, group-based structures

such as norms have a natural frequency-of-activation advantage.

The presence of other group members, hearing group language

or seeing group symbols, the use of ethnic slurs, and even the

presence of out-group members can all activate group norms

and thus increase the likelihood of norm-consistent behavior.

Finally, considerable evidence now demonstrates that norm-

guided behavior has a powerful influence on individual re-

sponses. Not only do self-perception and dissonance principles

bring attitudes into line with behavior (particularly because the

power of group influence goes undetected and thus behavior

seems under voluntary control), but endorsing more general

norms (reciprocity, commitment, and obedience) also acts as a

powerful incentive to bring other cognitions into line (Cialdini,

1993; Cialdini, Cacioppo, Bassett, & Miller, 1978).

However, norms alone cannot change all types of group-re-

lated beliefs and attitudes. As Pettigrew and Meertens (1995)

pointed out, norms against the expression of blatant prejudice

may lead some people to hold "subtle prejudice," avoiding

overt expressions of intergroup hostility or overtly negative ste-

reotypes but still expressing prejudice when it can be cloaked

in ambiguity. For example, a person may oppose affirmative

action programs but proclaim that his or her reason is not oppo-

sition to racial minorities but opposition to government intrusion

in the employment market. Pettigrew and Meertens noted that

such individuals are not hiding their prejudice from others so

much as they are shielding themselves from the realization of

their prejudice—showing the effectiveness of the antiprejudice

norm even as they partially evade it.

Evidence for the compelling impact of social norms such as

commitment, reciprocity, and obedience provides another possi-

ble means of understanding atrocities perpetrated against the

out-group. We have already noted that selective application of

norms makes out-group members seem undeserving of humane

consideration or treatment. It would seem that the carefully

staged commitment processes and the escalating appeals to nor-

mative authority that allowed Milgram (1963) to induce partici-

pants to deliver electric shocks may be relevant to the perfor-

mance of other acts of fighting, killing, persecution, and annihi-

lation. This possibility gains further weight from evidence that

appeals to in-group and out-group norms coupled with Mil-

gram's technique for gradually committing targets to ever esca-

lating demands are effectively used to train torturers (Gibson &

Haritos-Fatouros, 1986).

The impact of norms on behavior is also crucial to under-

standing behavioral "habits" (other links between this literature

and the intergroup domain have been made by Devine, 1989),

Habitual behavior is under the automatic control of social and

situational constraints, explaining why ex-smokers and ex-

drinkers are much more at risk of relapse during social gather-

ings, for example. Considering discrimination as a habit under

the control of situations in which powerful normative pressures

occur suggests ways in which such environment-behavior links

can be short-circuited and how thoughtful control might be taken

over these contingencies (Hunt, Matarazzo, Weiss, & Gentry,

1979; Triandis, 1977). Such work may build on the factors

already known to increase the impact of individual attitudes,

alternative norms, and perceived control on behavior, applying

these same processes to intervene between environmental cues

and behavior (Devine & Monteith, 1993; Lepore & Brown,

1997).

Finally, we believe that the time is ripe for consolidating the

literatures on altruism and aggression, both of which have relied

heavily on normative concepts, with the still sparse research on

the etiology of intergroup discrimination. These literatures have

dealt extensively with the facilitative and inhibiting normative

factors that foster or discourage "hotter" forms of intergroup

behavior, such as actual violence. It should come as no surprise

that similarity both promotes altruism (Dovidio & Gaertner,

518 MACKIE AND SMITH

1981; Dovidio, Piliavin, Gaertner, Schroeder, & Clark, 1991)

and deters aggression (Miller & Eisenberg, 1988). In these re-

spects, similarity apparently acts as a proxy for in-group mem-

bership. Beyond this basic process, however, altruism and ag-

gression are influenced both by attitudes and by norms. Altruism

is determined in part by perceptions of the target's need and

deservingness (Latane & Darley, 1970; Schmidt & Weiner,

1988), and by the costs and rewards, including emotional ones,

of proffering help (Cialdini, Darby, & Vincent, 1973; Darley &

Batson, 1973; Schaller & Cialdini, 1988). Empathy seems par-

ticularly important to help giving (Batson, Duncan, Ackerman,

Buckley, & Birch, 1981), as does the presence of active role

models who undermine diffusion of responsibility.

Many of the same factors influence aggression (Berkowitz,

1993). Instrumental aggression is triggered by potential rewards

and suppressed by perceived costs or risks (Bandura, 1973;

R. A. Baron, 1983) and may be analogous to realistic conflict

at the group level. Much aggression is also emotionally triggered

(R. A. Baron, 1971; Berkowitz, 1993), often as a result of

perceived provocation (Dodge & Crick, 1990; Geen, 1990). As

noted above, researchers need to know much more about the

role of anger in intergroup aggression and, given its causal role,

the impact of intergroup differences on perceptions of provoca-

tion. Social norms often support and exacerbate violence (e.g.,

through media modeling or because norms provide "noninter-

ference" rules for certain kinds of aggression; e.g., Shetland &

Straw, 1976). Much is now known about the information-

processing sequences that lead to violence, including reliance

on violent cues (Berkowitz & LePage, 1967) and faulty or super-

ficial attributional processing regarding intent (Dodge & New-

man, 1981; Dodge & Somberg, 1987). Such processes need to

be applied to an understanding of negative intergroup behavior,

building on early work in the area that used interpersonal manip-

ulations and interactions (R. A. Baron, 1979; Donnerstein &

Donnerstein, 1973; Donnerstein et al., 1972; Rogers & Prentice-

Dunn, 1981). One of the most effective inhibitors of aggression

is empathy (Miller & Eisenberg, 1988; Staub, 1990), which

prevents dehumanization and activates prohibitions against

harming others. Given the central role of empathy in both al-

truism and aggression, its potential role in initiating and

maintaining positive intergroup relations warrants further

investigation.

Thus the research regarding a wide range of normative per-

spectives has clear relevance to the study of intergroup relations.

Among many others, one particularly useful result of integrating

these literatures will be a much more sophisticated understand-

ing of the conditions under which discrimination takes virulent

forms and how those conditions might be avoided.

Summary of Applied Implications

The social psychological study of intergroup relations has

long been motivated not only by the quest for basic knowledge,

but also by the most practical of concerns; How can stereotypes

be changed and prejudice and discrimination reduced? The tradi-

tional approach to stereotypes, prejudice, and discrimination as

beliefs, attitudes, and behavior yielded only a single primary

prescription for improving intergroup relations; Provide people

with positive information about out-groups to undermine their

stereotypes and thereby reduce prejudice and discrimination.

Considering parallels between theories in other areas of social

psychology and the phenomena of intergroup relations, on the

other hand, identifies an extensive range of research directions

that have practical as well as theoretical importance. To make

concrete some of the benefits of the integrative endeavor, we

note in this section some innovative research areas related to

stereotype, prejudice, and discrimination reduction suggested

by the other domains we have considered.

Considering stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination as

beEefs, attitudes, and behavior allows researchers to

1. Bring to bear the huge literature on attitude change and

persuasion, use the processes known to be responsible for turn-

ing factors such as source target and message characteristics

into long-lasting attitude change, expand the literature on affect

and attitude change to understand how emotion-tinged in-

tergroup encounters might impact acceptance and processing of

the information exchanged there, and use resistance techniques

(e.g., forewarning and inoculation strategies) to make nonpreju-

diced attitudes resilient to further attack.

2. Consider the constituent base and function of stereotypes

and prejudice to understand how they can be maintained (if

positive) or undermined (if negative) most effectively.

3. Use self-perception and dissonance theories to deduce the

conditions under which behavior change (even that which is

subtly induced, perhaps by use of social norms) will trigger

consistent attitude change.

4. Apply the idea that multiple processes intervene between

attitude activation and attitude-consistent behavior to maintain

the control of nonprejudicial attitudes over behavior and to un-

dermine the relation between prejudicial attitudes and behavior.

Considering possible parallels between impression formation

and intergroup research allows investigators to

1. Use what is known about the processing of inconsistent

information (when it is ignored, reinterpreted, attributed away,

contrasted, or set aside) to develop a theoretically derived model

of the kind of contact that will be effective (rather than further

revising the contact hypothesis when empirical results are

contradictory).2. Generalize the finding that impressions and evaluations

are the result of integration of multiple sources of information.

Contextual, normative, and target characteristics might be man-

aged to drive nonprejudiced impressions and evaluations. Di-

recting prejudice in different ways may also bring about changes

in any discriminatory behavior that follows.

3. Increase the role of specific exemplars and experiences in

intergroup perceptions and draw on previous research to facili-

tate attention to positive characteristics of those exemplars and

experiences.By viewing self-knowledge, self-evaluation, and self-expres-

sion as akin to stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination, re-

searchers may1. Explore the possibility that jntergroup behavior might ful-

fill the purpose of expression or verification of group motives

and values, just as self-expression reflects individual motives and

values. Changing intergroup behavior may thus require changing

group values or providing alternative means of value expression.

2. Consider undermining or manipulating the processes of

appraisal that lead to specific negative intergroup emotions and

INTERGROUP RELATIONS AND THEORETICAL INTEGRATION 519

thus to specific forms of discrimination. When specific emotions

are triggered, researchers may seek to undermine their links to

discriminatory behaviors. New techniques may be devised to

change or reduce appraisal-based, group-focused emotions and

their consequences.

3. Consider the ways in which the distinction between prob-

lem-based and emotion-based coping may offer different routes

for prejudice reduction. Can intergroup threat be diffused so

that coping mechanisms, especially problem-focused coping

strategies, are not triggered? Is emotion-focused coping such as

denial better or worse for the management of positive intergroup

relations? Can emotion-focused coping be informed by knowl-

edge of dissonance reduction processes or the resolution of self-

discrepancies such as those discussed by Higgins (1987)?

Assuming that the study of relationships has parallels in the

intergroup relations domain allows researchers to

1. Consider the causes of interpersonal attraction as means

for crosscutting group affiliations and take both attraction and

attachments into account to make multiple groups seem attrac-

tive and worthy of membership.

2. Consider whether the factors that move interpersonal rela-

tionships from exchange to communal relations might not be

used to move intergroup relations from competition to

cooperation.

3. Use strategies for creating even minimal friendships (e.g.,

in the classroom or work setting) to promote individuals' incor-

poration of out-group others as part of the self and exploit the

role of empathy in breaking down intergroup boundaries.

By focusing on the ways in which stereotyping, prejudice,

and discrimination reflect normative processes, researchers can

1. Create group contexts in which to forge new norms, pro-

mote the group contexts and conditions that activate norms

compatible with nonprejudice and nondiscrimination or those

incompatible with prejudice and promoting fair treatment,

strengthen nonprejudiced views through polarization and mini-

mization of the conditions promoting groupthink and pluralistic

ignorance, and use what is known about inducing rebellion and

resistance (providing social support and using some norms

against others) to provoke change in currently held prejudicial

norms.

2. Explore the different functions of informational and nor-

mative influence as causes of prejudice and discrimination and

use such processes to undermine consensual aspects of and

support for negative intergroup relations.

3. Use the emotional implications of violating injunctive

norms in particular to help motivate nonprejudicial attitudes.

Violations of "ought" standards produce different emotions

and different preferred resolutions that can be exploited to un-

dermine prejudice.

4. Undermine group-based inhibitions to treating out-group

members as human, so that processes such as moral exclusion,

dehumanization, and deindividuation are not potential sources

of prejudice.

5. Induce intergroup cooperation by applying an understand-

ing of the factors that maximize interpersonal altruism: reducing

ambiguity and making needs clear; fostering altruistic self-con-

cepts; promoting identification and empathy with those who

need help; activating helping norms; and focusing individual

responsibility.

6. Reduce intergroup hostility by defusing emotion-triggered

hostility, teaching thorough processing of aggression-linked

cues, promoting identification with others, and activating norms

against aggression.

This list of the possibilities is not exhaustive, even of all the

topics raised in earlier sections. It illustrates, however, the kinds

of contributions that other areas of established research knowl-

edge might make to stereotype, prejudice, and discrimination

reduction. We thus believe the benefits of such an integrative

exercise do not lie purely in uniting and enhancing theory devel-

opment in formerly disparate fields. As Lewin (1936) would

have us remember, what can be good from a theoretical point

of view can also have practical implications. Thinking about

intergroup relations in the broader context of parallels between

prejudice and attitudes, norms, relationships, interpersonal eval-

uations, the self, and emotions suggests many previously unex-

plored avenues for prejudice reduction.

Summary of Theoretical Implications

Review of Predictions Regarding Dissociations

Among the empirical findings on intergroup relations, the

various dissociations that are observed among and between ste-

reotypes, prejudice, and discrimination are the most problem-

atic. Throughout this article, we have identified a number of

predictions that can be made by bringing other bodies of theory

and research to bear on this issue; in this section, we review

some of the more significant ones. Although suggestive or pre-

liminary data are available in some cases, most of these predic-

tions currently lack definitive empirical tests. Thus they repre-

sent a number of conceptually important areas for further re-

search that will have both theoretical and applied implications.

Consider, for example, parallels between the attitudes and

intergroup domains. Researchers know that similar attitudes may

have different constituent bases and serve different functions;

this suggests conditions in which prejudice will and will not be

related to stereotypes. Similarly, activation of stereotypes in one

context and prejudice in another makes dissociations highly

probable; activation of similar contextual material at both times

makes consistency likely. In addition, based on Fazio's (1990)

work on the activation of attitudes, we predict that only when

prejudice is brought to mind when opportunities for discrimina-

tion occur will attitude-behavior consistency result; if prejudice

is not activated, we predict dissociations.

We also suggest that the current understanding of impressions,

evaluations, and interactions as functions of multiple sources of

input explains many dissociations in the literature. Tb the extent

that different sources are made experimentally available and

accessible when a group or group member is perceived, evalu-

ated, or acted toward, clear predictions about dissociations in

those responses can be made. If responses are experimentally

constrained so that the same information feeds into each re-

sponse, however, we predict consistency among them. The multi-

ple sources of input perspective dius make predictions similar to

those made and confirmed by the multiple targets of judgments

perspective (Lord et al., 1984).

Applying insights from the self literature also generates pre-

dictions regarding dissociations between prejudice and discrimi-

520 MACKIE AND SMITH

nation. If the self or group motivations that are active when

prejudice is assessed differ from those active when discrimina-

tion is measured, dissociations will be the rule rather than the

exception. Alternatively, we assume that prejudice results from

perceived threat to the in-group and, by implication, to the self.

If that threat is dealt with by emotion-focused coping (because

of situational constraints or individual differences), we predict

little correspondence between assessed prejudice and actual dis-

crimination. Problem-focused coping, on the other hand, should

result in measurable action against the out-group that is corre-

lated with prejudice.

Consideration of normative processes also clarifies conditions

under which intergroup responses will and will not be consistent.

Polarization and groupthink processes can extremitize an indi-

vidually assessed stereotype, weakening its relation to later prej-

udice and discrimination. The operation of pluralistic ignorance

means that discrimination (behavior) can differ from assessed

prejudice (attitudes). When social norms differ from individual

attitudes, dissociations between prejudice and discrimination

will result. When norms are activated during behavior but not

during assessment of prejudice or stereotyping, or vice versa,

dissociations will result.

A Theory of Intergroup Relations?

In this article, we have discussed ideas, problems, and issues

that have spurred theoretical and empirical progress in a wide

range of social psychological topics, highlighting their relevance

to the central issues of intergroup relations. Doing so has not

only clarified many parallels among the various topics, but also

suggested new perspectives, new methods for exploring old is-

sues, and new relations that demand research attention. Noting

the progress in recent thinking about the structure and content

of attitudes and conceptualizing stereotypes and prejudice as

descriptive or prescriptive norms, for example, suggest new

ways of thinking about the antecedents of prejudice and offer

explanations for when and why discrimination can be controlled.

Do these developments amount to an outline of a complete

and coherent social psychological theory of intergroup relations,

or are we at least suggesting that the development of such a

theory is close at hand? If what is meant is a theory specifically

for intergroup relations, our answer to this question is no. This

article is intended to illustrate conceptual and empirical commu-

nalities between other topic areas and the various phenomena

concerned with intergroup relations. From our perspective,

therefore, an adequate theory of intergroup relations would es-

sentially have to be an adequate theory of all of social psychol-

ogy: self, person perception, norms, attitudes, and so on. Social

psychology is not yet at the point where such a globally inte-

grative account is in sight (although some progress has been

made; see E. R. Smith & Mackie, 1997), so we are obviously

in no position to advance a theory of intergroup relations.

Nevertheless, the very exercise of considering the continuities

between the topics that form the research core of social psychol-

ogy offers some suggestions as to the kinds of underlying princi-

ples or processes that we think would be central to such an

integrated theory of the field. Two processes seem fundamental

to every aspect of social perception, social influence, and social

interaction that we have considered herein. The first is the psy-

chological and social construction of reality. Regardless of the

target of their perceptions, what people experience as reality is

contributed to both by each individual and by all individuals.

Researchers are used to thinking about the impact of individual

expectations, memories, and motives on the reality people in-

habit, but perceptions in every domain are also the product of

social forces, as sharing and consensus seeking produce reality

(Levine, Resnick, & Higgins, 1993). For example, stereotypes

acquire much of their power and pervasiveness from being so-

cially shared and therefore seemingly consensually validated.

The second process fundamental to every aspect of social life

is the pervasive interplay of influence between the individual

and the social context (or group). This is the process embodied

in the social psychological concept "the power of the situation,"

wherein behavior is a function of the interaction of external

social pressures and individual interpretations of those pres-

sures. When Milgram's (1963) authority figure elicits obedience

or Latane and Darley's (1970) bystanders fail to intervene, it

is because compelling social forces operate to activate internal

norms or reconstruals of situations, which then feed back on the

social situation. Regardless of whether the outcome is helping,

hurting, feeling good about oneself, stereotyping, prejudice, or

discrimination, influence always feeds back between the individ-

ual and the social context.

After reviewing generalities across domains, we conclude that

these basic construction and influence processes are mediated

by several more specific principles of processing and motivation.

Three processing principles stand out as operating regardless of

domain. One is conservatism, or the fact that mental representa-

tions and patterns of social action, once constructed, are slow

to change. Second, the principle of accessibility results in infor-

mation that is cognitively or socially ready at hand, having

extra impact. Third, depth of processing varies such that outputs

(judgments or behaviors) are based sometimes on simple heuris-

tics and other times on extensive effortful processing.

Similarly, three motivational principles crop up repeatedly,

regardless of topic. First is the desire for mastery, an understand-

ing of the world accurate enough to obtain available rewards.

This principle is frequently central in the attitude and self do-

mains, but it is also relevant in the group, relationship, and norm

domains (e.g., where reality concerns can limit enhancement

biases). Second is the motive for connectedness to others, be

they individuals or groups. Although the importance of this

principle is obvious in research on groups, the self, and relation-

ships, it is also central to attitude and norm research. The third

principle is the desire to maintain and enhance a positive view

of the self and anything associated with the self (relationship

partners, in-groups, values, attitudes, etc.).

We make no claim that these principles uniquely provide the

foundation of a theory of social behavior and thus intergroup

relations. However, they illustrate the kinds of broad principles

we believe social psychologists will eventually rely on as com-

mon explanations for the vast surface diversity of all forms of

social behavior. Until the identification of the set of basic social

and psychological processes underlying social behavior is the

subject of more consensual agreement, our goal is a more limited

one. By considering the continuities between other topics and

intergroup relations and applying the rich conceptual and meth-

odological developments from those areas, we wish to suggest

INTERGROUP RELATIONS AND THEORETICAL INTEGRATION 521

new insights and research approaches to perennial issues of

importance in the intergroup relations domain.

In arguing for conceptually integrated explanations lhat hold

across the field, we are also voicing skepticism that there is

anything unique and special about intergroup relations. Is there

anything about intergroup behavior that cannot be captured by

theories from other areas? Would anything be lost or glossed

over by attempting to develop theory in an integrative fashion

instead of building models specifically for the intergroup do-

main? Our answer to these questions is no. Of course, there are

empirical phenomena that are unique to intergroup relations.

From Insko and colleagues' (Insko et at,, 1987; Insko et al.,

1990; Insko et al., 1992) "discontinuity" between levels of

aggression in interpersonal and intergroup situations to racial

hatred, pogroms, and genocide, there are certainly striking dif-

ferences between the ways people behave when group member-

ships are and are not at stake. However, on the theoretical level

we hold that these are just phenotypically distinctive out-

croppings that stem from the operation of common underlying

principles. These principles, which involve the role of expecta-

tions in perception, judgment, and behavior; self-related mo-

tives; normative control of behavior; and the like, also operate

in other domains. Thus at the conceptual level they do not make

intergroup relations any different from any other domain in

which expectations, motives, norms, and so on are strongly

implicated.

Theorists in the social identity and social categorization tradi-

tion (Tajfel, 1982; Turner et al., 1987) have been important

contributors to theories built specifically around intergroup phe-

nomena. However, even these theories, when examined carefully,

do not claim that intergroup relations involve unique theoretical

principles. Intergroup phenomena, however striking and distinc-

tive at the overt level, are tied to more general underlying motives

and processes such as self-enhancement (Tajfel & Turner, 1979),

uncertainty reduction (Hogg & Abrams, 1990), and so on. These

motives and processes certainly operate in other domains as

well.

In summary, we are offering neither a theory of everything

social psychological nor a theory exclusively for the domain of

intergroup relations. The first of these alternatives is infeasible

at the present time, and the second is intrinsically impossible,

we believe. What we do offer is a number of specific suggestions

about ways in which theory and empirical approaches to in-

tergroup relations may be enriched and strengthened by breaking

down some of the artificial and merely traditional walls that

separate this domain from others in social psychology, in which

great research progress has been made.

Conclusion

Our intention in pointing out similarities in constructs related

to stereotypes, prejudice, and intergroup discrimination across

subdisciplines of social psychology has been threefold. First,

we hope that highlighting the similarities and differences in the

way similar concepts, problems, and puzzles have been dealt

with across domains will provide the impetus for new theoretical

and empirical progress in the study of intergroup relations. The

fact that this approach allowed us to generate numerous empiri-

cal propositions gives us some reason to believe that the hope

is not unfounded. Second, we hope that the benefits of such an

approach will encourage others to provide a similar kind of

analysis for other areas, so that wheels invented in one domain

need not be reinvented in another. More important, being able

to build a chassis onto those wheels should hasten the culmina-

tion of knowledge in the discipline as a whole.

Third, we see this integrative exercise as important beyond

any benefits it may bring to the study of intergroup relations.

Part of what makes social psychology an absorbing enterprise

for its practitioners and a useful science for society is that every

topic reveals human nature and touches our everyday lives. Be-

cause each topic is so fascinating in its own right, it may intu-

itively seem to require different theoretical and empirical ap-

proaches. Although such diversity is important for the discovery

of new knowledge, at some stage of scientific development fur-

ther progress is thwarted if empirical observations are explained

by independent or even mutually conflicting theories.

Our search now must be for the general principles that under-

lie the diversity of phenomena—the mechanisms that not only

tie stereotyping to prejudice and discrimination, but also unify

these topics with those in attitudes, persuasion, and social influ-

ence; the understanding of the self and its emotions; how people

perceive others; how relationships develop; and so forth. We

have refrained from propounding any particular view about

those principles and processes and instead limited ourselves to

highlighting many of the commonalities that exist across do-

mains. Those commonalities point the way to and provide a

basis for abstracting basic principles. The abstraction of those

basic principles and the resultant integration of the social psy-

chological understanding of intergroup relations with the knowl-

edge that has accumulated in other subdisciplines will allow the

field to develop and progress.

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Received July 16, 1996

Revision received November 18, 1997

Accepted December 26, 1997 •