Institution Building in EAP countries: A Structure vs. Process Analysis

Institution Building in EAP countries: A Structure vs. Process Analysis281

dr. simona r. soare282

The paper addresses the apparent disconnect between the structural and process aspects of civil crisis management modern, democratic institution building in the Eastern Partnership. However, the analysis finds that the EaP process and structure performances are relatively correlated and balanced. However, the EaP’s average performance in civil crisis management reform is only minor, indicating little, unsubstantial progress in most relevant indicators measured in a modified 2x2 table. Moreover, there are major differences between the EaP performance across the EaP partner countries, i.e. Armenia and Georgia are best performers; Ukraine’s performance is the lowest, while Azerbaijan and the Republic of Moldova have average performances.

Keywords: Eastern Partnership, flagship initiatives, civil crisis manage-ment, Prevention, Preparedness, Response to Disasters (PPRD-East), institution building, efficiency, effectiveness, EaP performance matrix.

1. Introduction

The eastern partnership (eap) was launched in 2009 to facilitate the “ap-proximation to the european union” (Council of the european union, 2009: 5) of the eastern partners through their democratic modernization (raik, 2011: 5, 11). The european union (eu) acknowledged its security is interdependent with the security of the eap partners; thus, it strives to reform the partners’ civilian

281 a version of this paper was also presented at the 84th annual international Conference of the southern political science association held in orlando (fl), usa, January 3-5, 2013.

282 simona r. soare holds a ph.d. (2011) in political sciences – international relations from the national school of political studies and public administration in Bucharest (nspspa). she is researcher with the institute for political studies of defense and Military History. she was also executive director of the Center for East European and Asian Studies (Ceeas) and editor of the Journal for East-European and Asian Studies (Jeeas) in 2008-2011.

252 MiHaiL e. ionesCu

crisis management (CCM) systems through the lens of human security (ferre-ro-Waldner, 2005). While there is increasing research on the eap (Bosse, 2009; Christou, 2010; Korosteleva, 2011a; 2011b; Manoli, 2011; Made, 2012), little of it is focused on the eap partners’ human security or civil crisis management sys-tem. The partners seem to make efforts, within and independent from the eap to move from state security to individual or community security by means of mod-ern, democratic institution building reforms; but significant progress towards a bottom-up CCM approach remains elusive. armenia and Georgia made progress unlike azerbaijan and Belarus, Moldova or ukraine who are rolling back previous reforms. Given the eap’s 2013 vulnerability and crisis indexes, the eap’s civil crisis management performance begs further scrutiny. The specific literature empha-sizes the eap’s underperformance and low value-for-money of enacted reforms (Hillon and Mayhew, 2009; Lavenex and schimmelfennig, 2009: 792-3; Weber, 2010; delcour, 2011: 6; pelcynzska-nalecz, 2011; Wolczuk, 2011: 5).

The purpose of this paper is to assess the eap’s performance in modern, democratic institution building by reference to the directly proportional varia-tions of structural performance (efficiency) and process performance (effective-ness) in the field of civil crisis management. This paper’s research hypothesis is the eap has focused more on the structural performance of institution building in civil crisis management and insufficiently on the process performance which may cause a decoupling of modernization from democratization in the sectorial re-forms implemented by the partner countries. Consequently, the bottom-up civil security approach remains on paper and the conceptualization of civil security is slowly moving from state to individuals’ security despite the eap’s efforts.

The paper is structured as follows. first, i define the theoretical concepts. Then, i use a mixed-method modified 2x2 table analysis of the data concerning the structural and process dimensions of the eap partners (except Belarus) insti-tution building reforms in the field of civil crisis management for 2009-2012. Last, i formulate the conclusions of the analysis and explore further implications of this paper’s findings.

2. Research design

Measuring the eap’s performance in promoting human security-based modern, democratic CCM institution building is a challenging task because there is no adequate methodology to measure human security (rothschild, 1995; Mcrae and Hubert, 2001; paris, 2001; King and Murray, 2002; Macfarlane and Khong, 2006; Kaldor, 2007; Kaldor et.al., 2007; tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, 2007; nye and Welch, 2011). More specifically, the eap multilateral track promotes a bottom-up approach in which “human security is about how we respond to an urgent

253EASTERN PARTNERSHIP: THE ROAD SO FAR

physical or material threat to individuals and communities. (...) [Thus] the aim is not just political stability; it encompasses a notion of justice and sustainability” (Kaldor et.al., 2007: 279). The eap’s multilateral track focuses on an inclusive ap-proach to the CCM reform that emphasizes four different principles: the respect for human rights, the establishment of legitimate political authority, multilateral-ism, and a bottom-up approach (Kaldor et.al. 2007: 283-5).

Civil crisis management is a significant part of human security and it refers to civil protection, disaster risk reduction, preparedness, prevention, mitigation, response to and recovery from civil crises that do not normally involve the use/application of coercive force (Bossong, 2013). The four pillars of human security (Kaldor et.al., 2007) further translate into two distinctive dimensions of demo-cratic, modern CCM institution-building: structural (administrative capacity building) and process (standardization, procedures, regulations) (feaver, 2010). Structure refers to the specific functional arrangement of state institutions de-signed to operate as a whole, based on the premise of a clear division of roles and responsibilities as established by comprehensive legislative/political reforms. By contrast, process refers to the specific functional and institutional set of stan-dard operating procedures, norms, standards, principles and values that inform the daily activity of state institutions as established by sector reforms, internal organizational regulations, statutes, etc. Thus, the eap’s structural performance, understood as efficiency focuses closely on eu mechanisms connected with CCM administrative capacity building, technical assistance, and legislative reforms that constrain the officials’ ability to bypass the law; this reflects in the establishment of relevant legitimate political authority which impacts security perceptions. By contrast, the eap’s process performance, understood as effectiveness refers to the establishment of a legislative framework representative of a bottom-up approach that focuses on who, why and how is involved in the CCM system (Kaldor et.al., 2007); regulates the relations between relevant stakeholders and constrains the incentives, inclination and disposition of officials to bypass the law; emphasizes the respect of human rights; conceptualizes security as a service provided to all citizens; emphasizes security as the removal of threat and acknowledges impor-tance of addressing the individuals’ and communities’ legitimate security needs even through affirmative action.

to measure the efficiency and effectiveness of eap-endorsed civil crisis management reforms, i use a modified 2x2 table (fig. 7) for interpreting the col-lected data in every eap country, except Belarus. each indicator of the 2x2 table is measured with answers corresponding to yes – 1; no/unknown – 0; and partially – 0.5. The 2x2 table includes five distinct categories of indicators adapted from the human security principles: legitimate political/institutional authority; respect for human rights; multilateralism, bottom-up approach and ability or inclination/


incentive/disposition of public officials to resist the legal framework in CCM (for further details see annex 1).

Figure 7. Model of the modified 2x2 table used to measure the EaP CCM performance (2009-2012)

The national results of the modified 2x2 table are then integrated into the

eap civil crisis management performance matrix (see fig. 8); the eap’s performance in promoting the human security-based democratic reform of the partners’ civil crisis management systems is calculated as the average of efficiency, effectiveness, vulnerability and crisis indexes respectively. While the first two indexes are cal-culated by the methodology developed in this paper, the latter to indexes are bor-rowed from the eu’s Monitoring and information Centre on Crisis Management (eu MiC). The eap performance is measured on the following scale: 0-1 = critical performance indicating insignificant or absent progress in most indicators; >1-3 = minor performance indicating little, unsubstantial progress in most indicators; >3-5 = moderate performance indicating uneven and inconsistent progress in less than half the indicators; >5-8 = good performance indicating satisfying, relatively sustained and consistent progress in at least half the indicators; and >8 major performance indicating important, substantial, sustained and consistent progress in most indicators.

Figure 8. Model Matrix to measure the EaP average performance in modern, democratic CCM reform


3. An assessment of EaP performance in the field of civil crisis management

The eap covers the partners’ civil crisis management system reform through a series of projects; the most representative is the preparedness, prevention and response to disasters flagship initiative (pprd-east) which deals with disaster management, partner capacity building and disaster risk reduction (ddr) at lo-cal, national and regional level (european Commission, 2013a; 2013b: 19); it also progressively facilitates the eap partner’s approximation to the eu MiC, through a simultaneous top-down and bottom-up approach of the civil crisis management reforms. However, similar flagship initiatives like the integrated Border Manage-ment (iBM), the small and Medium-sized enterprises (sMe), the environmental governance initiative, the energy flagship initiative and the eu’s Comprehensive institution-Building (CiB) instrument also cover CCM institution-building as-pects (european Commission, 2013c).

a closer look at the operation, objectives and implementation of the CCM components of the eap’s multilateral framework reveals a mixed record. reform implementation depends on the will of political elites and the allocation of suf-ficient funding. This uneven progress in civil crisis management reform over the past four years is consistent with more general trends regarding the progress partner countries in the eap framework (european Commission, 2013a, 2013b; pprd-east, 2012). But „[o]verall, in 2011-12 no distinct progress towards those [democratic] standards could be observed in the eap region. Cases of worsen-ing performance were more frequent than the opposite, reflecting on-going resis-tance to more reliable and accountable” institutions (sekarev et.al., 2012: 6). The eu-funded soros 2012 EaP European Integration Index take a more positive view of the partial progress made by at least half the eap partner countries – i.e. arme-nia, Georgia and the republic of Moldova (open society foundation, 2013: 14-15). next, i will analyze each of the five eap partners’ CCM system to determine the variation of the eap’s sectorial efficiency and effectiveness respectively.

3.1. Armeniain armenia the Ministry of emergency situations (Mes) was established

in 2005; the legislation is well developed and the civil crisis management system is functional (ionescu, 2012: 32, 36). The legal division of roles and responsibili-ties between the components of the integrated civil crisis management system, headed by the national Crisis Management Center is very clear; this is a fully-functional, decentralized decision-making, planning and implementation system that comprehensively covers prevention, preparedness, mitigation, response to and recovery at the national, regional and local levels. However, there is “an over-


lap and duplication in coordination of quick response forces, information collec-tion and communication and other functions between the Ministry of emergency situations, armenian rescue service, “national service of seismic protection” agency, agency of state reserves and other ministries and agencies” (undp, 2009a: 12).

armenia’s framework and sectorial legislation has been recently modern-ized and fully updated in close cooperation with Western institutional partners (undp, 2009a: 8). integrated planning and risk assessment is performed in an inter-agency framework; both the undp – through the national disaster obser-vatory (ndo) – and pprd-east – through the national advisory Group (naG) – had much to do with its establishment (pprd-east, 2011: 19). The latter insti-tutions assisted the armenian rescue service (ars) and the state academy of Crisis Management (saCM) with the development of a national hazard matrix which revealed that over 80% of armenia’s population risks exposure to large-scale hazards (undp, 2009b). Much of the civil crisis management legislation, albeit not the one concerning large-scale crises which was under public debate in 2012, has been upgraded. The most recent CCM legislation was adopted in 2010 and its implementation received positive reviews.

one of the areas in which armenia stands out in comparison to other eap partners is the involvement of civil society in civil crisis management. in 2011-2012 the armenian Mes was building-up nGo capabilities, expertise and re-sponsibilities in the integrated, national plan for the prevention, preparedness, mitigation, response to and recovery from civil crises. The planning cycle is still based on a top-down system, but the armenian authorities are willing to embrace a whole community-based CCM approach by involving local communities, vol-unteers, the civil society and the business sector in this effort (interview undp senior official 2011).

Much like inclusiveness and participation, inter-agency in armenia works only on paper. The armenian institutions feel comfortable sharing information and horizontally communicating among themselves; but there is no certainty ar-menia’s Ministry of environment will be allowed to share information horizon-tally with other regional actors within the pprd-east’ electronic regional risk atlas (erra) if the state authorities consider other regional states might use that information against them in the ongoing frozen regional conflicts.

The armenian civil crisis management institutions are un-transparent and militarized, but they are considered highly efficient. although assessed positively by the representatives of the civil-society, there is room for improving civil soci-ety’s relations with the government (author conclusions inss roundtable 12 ar-menian nGos 2011). unfortunately, many of the issues that are under-addressed in armenia’s civil crisis management reform are focused on process performance.


The division of civil crisis management roles is clear, but there are no procedures or criteria for the effective assessment/monitoring, identifying and solving po-tential weaknesses and gaps; thus, public accountability remains low and CCM agencies are able to bypass their assigned tasks, avoid implementing assigned competencies or adhere to the current legislation. The unfortunate thing is these process-related CCM problems persist since the early 2000s and were repeat-edly mentioned in undp or eu reports (undp, 2009a: 9-12). The un-transparent political decision-making processes, the low governmental effectiveness, corrup-tion, wastefulness of public funds, governmental favoritism are among these high profile issues (sekarev et.al., 2012: 13-22).

in an integrated civil crisis management system, this process under-per-formance tends to have a multiplying effect. The 2009-2012 program for crisis mitigation, recovery and protection was approved on time by presidential decree; however, for lack of sufficient funding, the decree was partially implemented and a significant part of its subsequent sectorial civil crisis management plans were never adopted. Moreover, by 2011 there were no comprehensive institutional arrangements for civil crisis management coordination and oversight of imple-mentation put in place. The coordinating agency, the Mes rarely coordinates the tasks and responsibilities of other state agencies at the national, regional and local levels.

in general, international institutions have been enjoying a relatively stable and progressive cooperation with armenia on modernizing its civil crisis man-agement system (interview undp senior official 2011). international institutions such as the eu, nato or the undp emphasize that while armenia is the leader of CCM reforms among all eap partners, there is certainly room for improve-ment. armenia’s work within the pprd-east, concerning the establishment of the erra was supported by the governmental authorities; the completion of the work on erra in armenia is almost complete (european Commission, 2013d: 15). in 2009-2011, the undp and the eu worked jointly with the armenian au-thorities to establish the Crisis Management Center in Yerevan as well as to build, test and run the national disaster observatory (ndo) systems of vulnerability and risk-assessment, including in multi-hazard situations (undp 2011: 4).

Though much improvement remains to be done, not only is armenia the eap’s best performer in civil crisis management, but it is also one of the most advanced countries with regard to the implementation of the Hyogo framework for action on disaster risk reduction (drr). armenia launched its national plat-form which is regularly updated and expanded. of late, armenia is attempting to enlarge the range of its multi-sectorial CCM approach and draw in new third parties. The armenian authorities constantly and regularly consult with both the undp and the pprd-east in establishing and operating the national disaster


observatory (ndo) as well as adopting relevant legislation. Moreover, the na-tional progress report on the implementation of the Hyogo framework is up to date; the latest report (2011-2013) was published in early 2013 emphasizing sig-nificant progress in all five drr national priorities, including in sectorial areas of civil crisis management (Ministry of emergency situations 2013). Moreover “[s]pecial drr regional teams were formed to ensure the introduction of whole drr cycle at the local level. teams are consisted of main stakeholders’ representatives including government and non-government institutions” (undp 2011: 4).

The armenian authorities’ focus on a community-based, bottom-up ap-proach to civil crises even if it applies only to prevention, preparedness, and miti-gation of disasters. However, of all the eap partners only armenia implements the memorandum of understanding between the armenian Mes and undp on disaster management, preparedness and response; and focuses significantly on the process aspect of modern, democratic CCM institution building. The pprd-east is building on the undp’s work for the establishment of erra (pprd-east, 2011). The eap’s progress reports for armenia note substantial progress in the field of CCM (european Commission, 2013d: 15; 2013c). in 2011 armenia started to implement preventive measures such as the mandatory individual property insurance. prior to this, it had implemented several civil crisis management twin-ning projects in the fields of food security, waste control, pesticide control, etc. (undp 2009b: 8).

armenia is focused on the transfer of know-how, best practices, standard operating procedures, regulations and standards; it has the largest number of ap-plications for CCM expert exchanges among all the eap partners – over 50 ap-plications annually – and is interested in different training programs for its CCM personnel. However, none of armenia’s 15 twinning programs implemented in 2005-2013 was dedicated to disaster management; in 2009 armenia sent 220 par-ticipants to international or regional trainings, while in 2012, it sent over 500. However, few of these trained public officials actually work in civil crisis man-agement (european Commission, 2013e: 84, 89-90). The armenian authorities are improving their prevention and preparedness levels by the use of modern technologies. for example, armenia has an extensive training program both for experts as well as for the general population on the specific issue of how to behave and react in case of a disaster and/or crisis (author interview undp senior offi-cial 2011) because over 80% of the armenian population is highly vulnerable and exposed to catastrophic cases and over 30% of them are exposed to small-scale ones (undp, 2009a).

However clear and functional the armenian civil crisis management sys-tem is, its transparency and willingness to cooperate in regional frameworks are inhibited by the ongoing conflict with azerbaijan and the tense relations with


turkey. armenia is one of the most present actors in the regional cooperative frameworks, but the effectiveness of these frameworks is diminished by the ex-istence of these very conflicts and others. This has not stopped armenia from making goodwill gestures in the past, including to send aid and personnel to as-sist neighboring turkey and other states with natural disasters response between 2008-2010 (author interview undp senior official 2011).

The analysis of armenia’s 2x2 table indicates a 6.1 score in efficiency and a 5.6 score in effectiveness. to be sure, things could be much better in armenia’s CCM system, but still Yerevan’s are the highest scores among all eap partners investigated by this paper; the results suggest the eap’s structural performance is rated as good – i.e. satisfying, relatively sustainable and consistent progress is made in CCM reforms in at least half of the indicators – whereas its process per-formance is moderate – i.e. uneven and inconsistent progress in less than half the relevant indicators. This makes armenia the eap’s best performer with an overall score of 4.57, suggesting a modest eap performance in modern, democratic CCM institution building. There does not seem to be any decoupling between efficiency and effectiveness levels of civil crisis management reforms, indicating a balanced eap sectorial approach; but the fact that the crisis, vulnerability and disaster in-dexes remain high suggests more progress is required in the future, especially concerning effectiveness which lags slightly behind efficiency.

3.2. AzerbaijanThe azeri civil crisis management reform is positively assessed by the in-

ternational institutions. The pprd-east 2011 report notes: “The system used in Civil protection in azerbaijan is very well operated, but only for limited users” (pprd-east, 2011: 19). But even though the Ministry of emergency situations (Mes) established in 2008 functions properly, there are serious shortcomings of this framework. There is no azeri integrated civil crisis management system. in-deed, much of the framework legislation, such as the law on civil defence, the protection of the environment, etc. date back to the late 1990s; and much of the sectorial legislation was updated in the late 1990s and the early 2000s – i.e. air protection, natural resources, protected environmental territories, mandatory environmental insurance, safety of hydro-technical installations, earth entrails, gas supply, technical safety, anti-radiation protection, safety of medicines, etc.

recently a national Joint operational Headquarters was created to inte-grate/coordinate the activity of all civil crisis management institutions in azer-baijan. However, the system operates on outdated laws and standards; it does not have a regulation operating an integrated and sectorial planning, monitoring and assessment system; and it does not have proper supervising authorities either. Thus, the system is reportedly rigid and fragmented, with much agency and role


duplication. for instance, among the Mes’ tasks are the population’s evacuation to safe areas, search and rescue and other emergency-response activities; but the same tasks are also performed by the Ministry of defense and the Ministry of interior. The Ministry of ecology and natural resources is in charge of the pre-vention of natural or technological hazards; but the Ministry of Health too is responsible for intervening to contain the negative consequences of such events. all these institutions are in charge of prevention measures against civil crises, but planning as well as risk/vulnerability assessment is not performed jointly; and they hardly cooperate with the other civil crisis management agencies. for this reason, each azeri civil crisis management institution has its own internal and independent response plan and risk/vulnerability assessment; there are no com-prehensive arrangements and standard operating procedures in place to allow effective coordination and cooperation on the ground between the different state agencies. The Mes which is in charge of coordinating all the other civil crisis management central and local authorities through the national Joint operational Headquarters does not possess the shared standard operating procedures allow-ing it to actually monitor, assess and coordinate the activity of all parties involved; these plans are still being developed. in general, the process aspect of CCM moni-toring, standardization and certification in azerbaijan remain problematic and no significant progress has been made over the past four years.

The response to civil crises is relatively efficient because it is coordinated by military, highly organized institutions; but there is still room for improve-ment. The azeri authorities seem less interested in institutional reform; instead, in previous years they have shown moderate interest in receiving technical inter-national assistance in the form of trainings or transfers of technical know-how for conducting public education programs, disseminating information, issuing early warnings, preparing lists of available local resources, organizing community safety teams, conducting rescue and evacuation operations, providing disaster relief and medical supplies to affected people, identifying community and individual needs, providing relief and recovery services, and providing rehabilitation assistance to disaster victims (ionescu, 2012: 43). if the eap manages to foster this azeri inter-est, then it might be a significant opportunity for national progress. Yet azerbaijan, along with ukraine and Belarus, has one of the lowest participation rates in civil crisis management twinning programs. The number of azeri officials participat-ing in international or regional trainings, seminars, workshops has been increas-ing since 2010; in 2009 azerbaijan trained the lowest number of officials, just 78; by 2012, over 500 azeri officials were receiving such trainings. However, few if any of them actually work in civil crisis management (european Commission, 2013e: 84); the eu still has no idea if and how the trained officials are disseminating the learned lessons and best practices throughout their host institutions.


azerbaijan is one of the least transparent states in the region, both in terms of regional cooperation as well as domestic practices. for example, azerbaijan has not been reported to implement the Hyogo framework, nor has it developed a national platform. While azerbaijan accepted to participate in erra, it is uncer-tain whether the militarized structures of the Mes will concede to share informa-tion with other participants in the system – armenia included – given they rarely share information on a regular basis with other azeri national institutions; while vertical information-sharing and communication is favored by the military chain of command, horizontal communication is not always facilitated, and the lack thereof obstructs inter-agency cooperation. The 2012 european Commission’s enp azerbaijan progress report (2013f: 13) notes: “The development of electron-ic regional atlas which is a part of the programme did not progress much due to difficulties with the accessibility of the data.” But the authorities in Baku remain skeptical of and unwilling to fully share information with other international ac-tors in the region. The field of civil crisis management is perhaps one of the areas where azerbaijan made little or no progress on the 2012 action plan. in addition, of azerbaijan’s 27 twinning projects under implementation since 2005, none were dedicated to civil crisis management, though components of the latter were in-cluded in the azeri twinning projects pursued in the fields of energy and energy transport (european Commission, 2013e: 89-90).

as for the involvement of the civil society in civil crisis management, the latter does not seem to be a part of any phase of the cycle; nor do other social actors or representatives of the business sector. in addition, recent studies show azerbaijan registers stable high public distrust in governmental institutions, cor-ruption, government inefficiency, wastefulness of public funds, dispersal of public funds, lack of public accountability, etc. (sekarev et.al., 2012: 13-22). These are not properly addressed in the civil crisis management system either.

This data was included in the 2x2 table and it reveals a minor eap perfor-mance (2.68 score) in modern, democratic CCM institution building indicating little and unsubstantial progress in most indicators in azerbaijan. and the data confirms there is an azeri consistency in this double efficiency and effectiveness under-performance, i.e. a 3.2 score for efficiency and 2.5 for effectiveness. even so, azerbaijan’s lack of significant progress in civil crisis management reforms is consistent with its overall performance levels (european Commission, 2013f); surprisingly enough, its overall score places it in the middle of the performance diagram, third after armenia and Georgia, which fares slightly better than in the eu’s overall progress reports where azerbaijan comes second to last.

3.3. GeorgiaGeorgia’s civil crisis management track record is mixed. While being con-

sidered one of the most developed civil crisis management systems in the region


(pprd-east 2011, pp. 19-20), there are still significant problems to work out: the way the overall system functions, the great discrepancies between the relative-ly well-developed institutional framework and its perceived low effectiveness to name but a few. Georgia’s civil crisis management system is coordinated by the department of emergency Management, part of Georgia’s Ministry of interior. since 2010 Georgia has an integrated civil crisis management system headed by the national security Council (nsC) through the temporary inter-agency Commis-sion for Coordinating the establishment of the united system of Crisis Manage-ment which effectively coordinates the activity and tasks of all CCM institutions in Georgia at the central level, replicated at the regional and local levels, too.

The Georgian legislation establishes an integrated multi-hazard, multi-cri-sis system with decentralized responsibilities and capabilities at the local, regional and central levels. The system seems to be built on a simultaneous bottom-up approach at the local level and a top-down approach at the center; however, in practice the system remains monopolized by the top-down approach because the center still has disproportionate decision-making and funding power over the lo-cal authorities. Within the past few years horizontal communication and infor-mation-sharing has improved between the different components of the civil crisis management system which is indeed a positive development towards a structured and effective inter-agency cooperation in Georgia. But progress is slow and un-even; the pace of progress still seems dictated by the willingness of key officials in the Georgian institutions. and there are still problems with the timely imple-mentation of reforms. in 2011 the Georgian parliament voted a new national response plan on natural and Man-Made emergencies; in 2010 the Government of Georgia adopted the state strategy on regional development of Georgia for 2010-2017. However, further sectorial planning and strategies have yet to be de-signed three years later (Ministry of environment protection, 2011: 3).

The division of institutional roles specified by the legislation is relatively clear, especially between the national, regional and local levels; for example, the Ministry of interior focuses more on response to crises whereas the Ministry of environment and natural resources and the national environmental agency fo-cus more on ddr. The Ministry of interior, in particular the department for emergency Management, is the lead civil crisis management institution; while the national environmental agency is in fact responsible for all hazards, disasters and civil crises, the national environmental agency is in charge of the monitor-ing and assessment of all types of hazards in Georgia. But, duplication of institu-tional tasks remains high. in fact, “in Georgia [there] are challenges in delineat-ing lines of responsibility and especially in promoting cooperation between the institutions of observation, study, risk assessment, emergency services and local governmental bodies, the lack of legal and financial resources for disaster reduc-


tion complicates this cooperation” (Ministry of environment protection, 2011: 3). The standard operating procedures for horizontal communication and inter-agency cooperation are not clearly specified. in a nutshell, the basic framework of an integrated Georgian civil crisis management whole-community approach exists but its operation remains messy.

according to the partially updated Georgian civil crisis management leg-islation, the national level is in charge of the integrated planning, coordination and decision-making process; the main responsibility for the civil crisis manage-ment falls on the shoulders of the local leaders which have neither the financial resources, nor the authority to develop the system according to their needs (in-terview department for emergency Management senior officials 2011). indeed, existing Georgian legislation establishes the responsibility of local authorities to build emergency situations response plans as well as Local emergency response divisions made up of local authorities and volunteers in what was clearly intended to be a bottom-up, whole-community civil crisis management approach. Because the transparency of the Georgian Ministry of interior is low and corruption high, these financial allocations are made on different criteria than those of immediate needs (interview european Commission Humanitarian aid and Civil protection, undp and usaid Georgia senior officials 2011). The 2012 Georgian opinion polls reveals the lowest trust scores in public institutions of all eap partners; and the highest scores for the lack of public accountability, wastefulness of public funds, diversion of public funds, government inefficiency, corruption and governmental favoritism, lack of governmental transparency (sekarev et.al., 2012: 13-22).

The Georgian authorities are still interested in institutional capacity build-ing; modern civil crisis management institutions are in place, but standard opera-tional procedures for their proper functioning are not although Georgia has been deeply involved in CCM twinning programs, having one of the highest applica-tion rates in the region. The downside is Georgia has the lowest participating rate among all eap partners in international and regional trainings, workshops and seminar, with only 275 officials trained in 2012 (european Commission, 2013c: 84). This is a concerning trend given that national personnel turnover is high and expertise scarce.

Georgia’s legislation allows, but does not require the involvement of the civil society in the civil crisis management; unlike the local authorities, the central ones are skeptical and believe the nGos lack the proper expertise and reliability to be integrated the national civil crisis management plan (interview department for emergency Management senior officials 2011). The Georgian naG represen-tatives usually complain that the government institutions are not transparent and refuse to include them in the process. some nGos are highly influential with the governmental authorities and are typically consulted on civil crisis management


matters. But these nGos are headed by experts who were a part of the govern-mental apparatus or are close to key officials (author conclusions roundtable 15 Georgian nGos 2011). However, Georgia’s 2011 National Response Plan on Nat-ural and Man-Made Emergencies has specific provisions concerning the active involvement of the red Cross, as well as other Georgian nGos. The National Re-sponse Plan establishes the requirement for state institutions to meet and consult with the experts and representatives of national and international nGos – not the business sector, though – on a regular basis (author conclusions roundtable 15 Georgian nGos 2011).

There is uneven Georgian progress of the implementation of the comple-mentary pprd-east and Hyogo projects. The Georgian authorities are advanced in the establishment of the pprd-east’s erra; the work on the final phase of Georgian erra is almost complete as scheduled (european Commission, 2013g: 16), despite the Ministry of interior and the national environmental agency’s skepticism and unwillingness to share information in a network-like, regional system. Yet much work remains to be done on the implementation of the Hyogo framework (european Commission, 2013g: 16). although expressly interested in the latter, the Georgian authorities did not finish their national platform or their national progress reports. The latest Hyogo progress report, describing a mixed set of positive and negative developments was released in 2011. The 2013 report was expected in early 2013, but has yet to be released.

Thus, there is an uneven reform implementation among the different civil crisis management Georgian institutions, though this does not seem to reflect in their efficiency and effectiveness. indeed, there seems to be substantial coordina-tion between the structural and process civil crisis management reforms in Georgia which scores 4.5 for efficiency and 4.1 for effectiveness. Moreover, Georgia’s over-all eap performance in modern, democratic CCM institution building is 3.4 which makes Georgia the eap’s second best performer, with a moderate performance re-flected in uneven and inconsistent progress in less than half of the indicators.

3.4. The Republic of Moldovaan uneven reform performance among different civil crisis management

institutions is also noticeable in Moldova. Chișinău is depicted as the eap’s over-all best performer nowadays. However, civil crisis management is not a field in which Moldova excels. Chișinău’s work with the pprd-east is in accordance with the agreed workplan. The 2012 ENP National Progress Report (2013h: 18) notes:

“In May, Moldova signed with the European Commission an Administrative Arrangement on Civil Protection, committing the partners to strengthening their cooperation in disaster prevention, preparedness and response. Moldova continued to participate in the Eastern Partnership flagship project on prevention, prepared-


ness and response to natural and man-made disasters (PPRD East). As a part of the programme Moldova is contributing to the development of Electronic Regional Risk Atlas. Relevant Moldavian institutions are involved in respective activities and the development phase of the atlas is close to completing in the country.”

However, with the Hyogo framework things are not progressing at the same pace. in fact, Moldova did not publish its national platform; it appear to get any closer to finalizing it; nor does it publish progress reports regularly – e.g. the latest report dates back from 2011.

Moldova’s main civil crisis management decision-making and coordination body is the Civil protection and emergency situations service within the Ministry of internal affairs, which was established in the mid-2000s. The Moldovan secto-rial legislation are outdated, dating back from the mid-1990s (ionescu, 2012: 32) and no longer practical or efficient enough for effective implementation. More-over, its institutional framework is militarized which obstructs effective inter-agency cooperation and horizontal information-sharing. and effective reforms are still met with significant institutional resistance. for the Moldovan experts the standards used by the eu civil crisis management system are not suited for Moldova; the old standards are considered more appropriate and relevant as in the case of water pollution measurement standards (author conclusions Ceeas roundtable december 2012). Hence, there is much bottom-up pressure in Mol-dova to maintain the old standards.

While the partially updated legislation provides for a national plan includ-ing decentralized responsibilities and capabilities at all levels, there are still no sectorial policies and plans in place; the local authorities still have no decentral-ized civil crisis management budgets; and there are no common country assess-ment strategies (state Hydrometeorological service, 2011: 4). Thus, there is much difference between the Moldovan civil crisis management institutional perfor-mance. While the Ministry of interior is in charge of implementing the provisions of the pprd-east erra, the state Hydrometeorological service, a state agency under the Ministry of environment is responsible for implementing the provi-sions of Hyogo. There is also much discrepancy between the reformed structure components of Moldova’s civil crisis management system and the outdated legis-lation that establishes their roles. integrated and sectorial civil crisis management planning is poorly structured and regulated by law. duplication of institutional and sectorial roles is a common occurrence. While local authorities have the main responsibility in responding to civil crises and planning for their prevention or preparedness, the budgetary allocation is directed towards the central levels of government; thus, a vast majority of civil crises are tackled by local authori-ties in sub-optimal conditions. This consolidates a strangely enduring top-down, response-focused civil crisis management approach in Moldova.


transparency is also problematic in civil crisis management. The poor management of public and international funds, the high levels of corruption, the diversion of public funds, the low level of public accountability, the poor quality of regulatory frameworks, etc. all contribute to a relatively inefficient civil cri-sis management system (interviews Civil protection and emergency situations service, the Ministry of environment, and the disaster Medicine Center, Min-istry of Health senior officials 2011). The Moldovan civil society is one of the best developed in the eap. However, the outdated legislation as well as the lack of institutional transparency does not provide the right conditions for the greater involvement of the civil society within the political decision-making process or in overlooking the functioning of the civil crisis management system in Moldova. in general, governmental institutions neither consult with the nGos, nor sim-ply request and use their input. However, the role of the Moldovan civil society might become potentially important, at least in some CCM areas, because of their booming relations with the eu, especially in the framework of the eap Civil soci-ety forum (Csf). The Csf’s thematic panels provide an appropriate background for local Moldovan nGos to promote their agendas; but even with the recent progress (european Commission, 2013c: 2), much work still needs to be done to ensure not only the nGos’ participation in eap meetings, but also in the eap decision-making cycle as well as in the national CCM decision-making cycle. The representatives of Moldovan nGos argue the Csf national platform is still not free enough; and there are still a large number of Moldovan nGos which are not allowed in the Csf national platform.

Moldova may be the eap’s overall best performer, but in civil crisis manage-ment it is second to last. its overall eap performance score in modern, democratic CCM institution building is 2.27, lower than azerbaijan’s; the eap’s overall CCM performance in Moldova is minor, that is little, unsubstantial progress in most indicators. Moreover, Moldova’s efficiency and effectiveness scores are similarly modest, 2.6 and 2.2 respectively; indeed, had it not been for the low disaster and crisis index scores, Moldova’s performance would have looked even worse. Giv-en the positive progress in other negotiated chapters within the eap, it certainly looks like the field of civil crisis management is decoupled from them in Mol-dova’s case.

3.5. Ukraine ukraine was in fact the first eap state to establish a Ministry of emergen-

cies (Moe) in 1996 and a department for Civil defense in 1997 to ensure proper training for its CCM employees. Yet, ukraine is lagging behind other eap part-ners in civil crisis management reforms. until 2008 hardly any significant secto-rial reforms were implemented; the Moe only mobilized for the implementation


of substantial reforms in the aftermath of severe and devastating floods that same year (funai, 2012: 105). after the change of the political leadership in Kiev, pre-vious reforms were slowed, halted or rolled back, and international institutions were marginalized. Consequently, in 2012 “ukraine did not address most of the key recommendations;” it did enact new reforms requested by the eu, but their “implementation is flawed” (european Commission 2013a, p. 8). one of the most worrisome roll backs of CCM structural reforms implemented by ukraine was the december 2012 transformation of the former ukrainian Moe into the state emergency service, a civil crisis management agency subordinated to the Minis-try of defense (Mod). This roll back reduces the chances for significant progress towards democratic institution building, civil-military relations, and effective, modern development of an inclusive decentralized civil crisis management sys-tem based on a whole-community bottom-up approach.

The ukrainian civil crisis management legislation was established in the late 1990s and early-2000s, but its implementation remains selective and incom-plete. The legislation for the protection against technological disasters, fires and earthquakes is still blissfully disregarded in Kiev. and the new sectorial legislation is not developed in coordination with the eap or the undp which undermines Kiev’s approximation, standardization and interoperability with these institu-tions. in 2012 the rada passed a law on natural and man-made disasters on which international institutions were not consulted (interview undp senior officials 2012). similarly, the 2011 law on the public access to information was passed without prior consultations with international donors; it requires the state agen-cies to respond to public requests for information in 2-5 days; but the authorities can freely invoke national security to avoid answering these requests.

in 2004 ukraine committed to implement the Hyogo framework for action in drr. But its implementation came to a complete halt in 2010-2012; no nation-al progress report was ever issued; the only report published by ukraine in 2004 is only in ukrainian. Most information that reaches Geneva about ukraine’s drr progress comes from the undp office in Kiev, not the ukrainian authorities. The publication of the national platform was halted although it was almost complete (interview undp senior official 2012; author interview pprd east Gis expert 2012). even the joint efforts of the undp and the pprd-east to establish the na-tional disaster observatory (ndo) and the national advisory Group (naG) did not make a difference. indeed, it is difficult to make progress with the passive and skeptical ukrainian authorities for whom the Western interference is unwanted.

The prevention against civil crises is not a priority for the ukrainian au-thorities who de-emphasize the need prevention, preparedness, mitigation and risk/vulnerability reduction. in fact, the ukrainian authorities are reluctant to publicly acknowledge risks and vulnerabilities claiming they have the capabilities


to respond to these crises when and if they occur. They are especially dismissive of technological risks which represent approximately 60% of overall ukrainian disasters (funai, 2012: 107). for example, in downtown Kiev there is a real danger of mercury contamination from an old, disabled chemical plant, but it fails to be acknowledged by the state (interview pprd-east Gis expert 2012). The authori-ties emphasize the need to build-up the response to crises through the transfer and use of new technologies. indeed, over the past four years ukraine’s civil crisis manegement seems to have progressed only from a quantitative, structural per-spective; no accompanying shift in the political mindset towards proactive risk reduction and preparedness transpires.

ukraine remains one of the least accessible and transparent eap countries. The ukrainian opinion polls indicate relatively high levels of governmental cor-ruption, wastefulness and dispersal of public funds, government favoritism, cor-ruption, complemented by low public accountability, public institutions effective-ness, and regulatory quality; indeed, ukraine’s are the lowest scores among all the eap member states (sekarev et.al., 2012: 13-22; open society foundation, 2013: 32). The involvement of civil society in civil crisis management is regulated by a law voted by the rada in 2011 – the open Government partnership – which is unfortunately not implemented since it was first enacted two years ago. Most representatives of the ukrainian nGos complain the government is partial to the nGos it works with; in general, the government is more open to working with partisan nGos either financed or otherwise supported by the ukrainian state institutions or with nGos that are established and ran by former members of the ukrainian state agencies.

Moreover, the ukrainian government personnel turnover remains high. Governmental officials are usually changed every two years; this makes commu-nication and progress on specific reforms, especially in relation with international institutions, difficult because relations are constantly severed. for example, the undp and the pprd’s contacts in the governmental structures were changed four times in less than a year. Basically, since the summer of 2012 these institu-tions’ activities in ukraine have been frozen because they have no governmental counterparts to work with. also, the contact persons for different international institutions working on similar/complementary projects in ukraine are different even within the same institution, although most times these projects do not even share the same ukrainian governmental partner institution (interview pprd-east Gis expert 2012; interview undp senior official 2012). This manner of working makes it look as though the ukrainian authorities register a qualitative progress in developing a multi-sectorial civil crisis management approach by drawing in an increasing number of international actors and donors, albeit it is not true.

The ukrainian civil crisis management system was highly centralized and


militarized even before the events of december 2012. This situation persists be-cause of the fragmented national CCM system. The ukrainian civil crisis manage-ment system is a top-down, centralized and highly impenetrable one for Western influences. There is no integrated civil crisis management approach and the sys-tem is fragmented, lacking joint and multi-risk assessment matrixes or integrated risk/vulnerability assessment. Most resort institutions in ukraine have their own risk assessment systems. different institutions are tasked with different activities and they simply refuse to share information or cooperate with other institutions (interview pprd-east Gis expert 2012) for a misguided sense of ownership, ex-clusive or superior expertise and funding entitlements. to be sure, the ukrai-nian authorities are interested in upgrading their disaster risk assessment system called “risk passports” that still operates with Word documents updated every three years; but the ukrainians are unwilling to share it (pprd-east, 2011: 20).

The duplication of roles is common among the ukrainian civil crisis man-agement institutions. for example, the Ministry of environment has a specialized body that monitors the hydro-meteorological aspects; but so does the Hydro-meteorological state service under the state emergency service of ukraine. This virtually means the ukrainian authorities have no stimulus to implement protec-tive measures for the citizens; there is no mandatory insurance for the ukrainian properties despite the fact that they are exposed to high risks of which the au-thorities seem aware.

Because the structural reforms are rolled back, new ones cannot go for-ward properly. in 2010 the ukrainian authorities adopted a national civil protec-tion plan but it is not functional because the institutional components are not in place (interview pprd-east Gis expert 2012). in 2009 ukraine (and Moldova) requested specialized ddr trainings from the undp and the eu, but these plans were later canceled by Kiev (interview undp senior official 2011). ukraine has a long record of assuming civil crisis management projects financed by the eu, the undp or nato whose results remain simply on paper and are never integrated in institutional practices. Because the legislation is passed on paper, the ukrai-nian authorities can report it and be reimbursed for it. ukraine made a lucrative habit of this kind of practice, i.e. to make it look like they are complying with the West’s requests only to get their money and then forget to effectively implement the respective legislation (interview international foundation “united World” se-nior official 2012).

The ukrainian institutions have been involved in numerous international or regional trainings, seminars, workshops that focused on the transfer of CCM know-how, best practices, norms, principles and standard operating procedures. pprd-east organized several such events in the region; ukraine’s participation is one of the lowest. of the 38 twinning projects implemented by ukraine since


2005, none was dedicated to civil crisis management; pprd-east received no ap-plications for twinnings or exchanges of experts from ukraine in over two years, by comparison to armenia who has over fifty applications in 2012 (interview pprd-east Gis expert 2012). in 2009 fewer than 400 ukrainian officials partici-pated in eu trainings and workshops; by 2012, almost 1,700 ukrainian partici-pants enrolled (european Commission, 2013d: 84). However, only a small part of these trained officials actually work in CCM or are kept in the system long enough to spread the teachings of these trainings in their institutions.

The same uneven record is apparent in ukraine’s CCM international col-laborations. ukraine used to collaborate with different international institutions on civil crisis management reform; but of late, this cooperation has been severely reduced or slowed down. The undp used to assist and the pprd-east used to council the Moe on civil crisis management policy issues before reforms and ma-jor pieces of legislation were passed; this is no longer the case (interview undp senior officials 2012; author interview pprd-east Gis expert 2012). This seems to be the case with the pprd-east’s erra project, too. There are several operating schemes for building it because of the fragmented ukrainian civil crisis manage-ment institutional scenery. The erra’s functioning would be greatly facilitated or imperiled depending on which operational scheme is convened with the par-ticipating countries. in the case of ukraine there are three alternative schemes between the former Ministry of emergencies and the Ministry of environment. Because these institutions are reluctant to share their information with others, an integrated system is virtually impossible to build (interview pprd-east Gis expert 2012). The transformation of the Moe into the state emergency service means the implementation of the erra in ukraine might be further obstructed, slowed or delayed indefinitely.

While it certainly looks like ukraine has developed an impressively exten-sive regional CCM cooperation network (republic of Moldova, Hungary, Belarus, russian federation, romania, Japan – ongoing negotiations), Kiev is generally not actively implementing these agreements. in 2006 and 2008 the ukrainian au-thorities were monitoring the situation of the floods on the prut river but they failed to pass it on to their Moldovan and romanian counterparts; this caused the latter two countries to incur significant damages which might have been partially avoided had cooperation been functional. Certainly, there are joint risk-reduction projects between ukraine, romania and the republic of Moldova, but these are limited by both time and funding (interview academy of sciences, the institute for ecological and environmental research official, and 5 euBaM senior officials 2012).

ukraine is the largest eap partner; it is, in more ways than one, the crown jewel of the eap initiative. However, in CCM modern, democratic institution


building ukraine comes in the last place among all other eap partners. More spe-cifically, the eap’s CCM performance is minor measuring 1.77; its efficiency score is 2.7 and its effectiveness score is 1.6. This indicates there is significant decou-pling between the eap’s structural and process performance levels in ukraine’s civil crisis management reform which has enduring consequences.

4. Conclusions

This paper’s research findings reveal the eap’s average performance in fos-tering modern, democratic CCM institution building is minor (see fig. 9), i.e. little and unsubstantial progress in less than half of the indicators for all the eap partner states (except Belarus) between 2009-2012. However, at a closer look, the eap’s performance analysis reveals some surprising findings.

Figure 9. Matrix to measure the EaP average performance in modern, democratic CCM reform (2009-2012)

first, the 2x2 table indicates a fragmented, uneven eap performance (see fig. 10 and 11) between the partner countries as well as between the five different categories of indicators measured to determine the eap’s efficiency and effective-ness respectively in civil crisis management. But the analysis does not seem to show a distinct and substantial decoupling of the eap’s civil crisis management ef-ficiency and effectiveness (see fig. 12). indeed, the average difference between the eap’s structural and process performance levels is 0.62, insufficient to justify such a presumed decoupling. as a matter of fact, such a score is indicative of a certain institutional resistance to process reforms. in a nutshell, the eap’s modern, demo-cratic CCM institution building quite balanced, consistent and comprehensive in promoting both structural and process performance. The only exception seems to be ukraine who measures a 1.1 difference between the eap’s efficiency and effectiveness in fostering civil crisis management reforms. This is indicative of a tendency towards such a decoupling in ukraine, rather than a present one.


Figure 10. The EaP scores in efficiency per each EaP country and per each sub-indicators (2009-2012)

Whereas armenia and Georgia are the overall and sectorial best perform-ers, azerbaijan, Moldova and ukraine have scores far under the eap average. it is hardly surprising armenia and Georgia are progressing in civil crisis management reforms. The eu’s and other independent reports confirm this progress is consis-tent with the progress in other sectorial policies. But it is certainly surprising that Moldova, the eap’s overall best performer, comes in second to last and that ukraine, the eap’s best performer prior to 2011, comes in last of all the partners while azerbaijan comes in third, ahead of them. This suggests the eap partners’ progress in different areas of interest varies greatly. azerbaijan’s progress record is the second to last according to the eu’s progress reports. Yet, azerbaijan’s eap performance in CCM reforms is moderate, above the eap average performance even though azerbaijan’s reforms are not democratic or emphasizing human se-curity per se. While the azeri institutions and standard operating procedures are in place, they do not necessarily and evenly reflect all five human security catego-ries taken into consideration in this analysis; those associated with democratic human security-based civil crisis management have the lowest scores.

secondly, the case of Baku is in fact emblematic for the average eap perfor-mance because it suggests a trade-off between political and technical success of pursued eap goals which is confirmed by all the other eap partners investigated here. More specifically, the fact that human security-based modern, democratic


CCM systems are still confined on paper in the eap partners is best explained by the decoupling between the eap partners’ civil crisis management modern-ization and their democratic, human security-based character; modernization is regarded by the partners as not necessarily tied to human security, which explains their uneven scores in the five different categories of indicators in the modified

Figure 11. The EaP scores in effectiveness per each EaP country and per each sub-indicators (2009-2012)

Figure 12. Comparison between the EaP average CCM performance and the EaP CCM performan-ce per each partner country (2009-2012)


2x2 table. While legitimate political authority and multilateralism usually have constant higher scores, the bottom-up approach and the human rights categories usually score far less or even nil. plainly put, for the eap partners the moderniza-tion of their civil crisis management is not necessarily democratic; because it is a highly technical area, civil crisis management is conducive for a potential over-look of the desirability of political human-security democratic goals and values in favor of the short-term feasibility of technical success. This might explain why while modern resort institutions and procedures are in place in the investigated eap partners, the ability and the inclination, incentive and disposition of public officials to resist the law remains positively high. in other words, some process reforms are enacted as window-dressing without a rigorous implementation.

However, further research is needed to show the potential consequences of the decoupling of modernization from the democratization reform process in the case of the eap partners as well as to show how the latter is undermining the long-term success and sustainability of the eap’s political goals.

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Institution Building in EAP countries: A Structure vs. Process Analysis

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