Influencing renewal: an Australian case study of tenant participation’s influence on public...

Influencing renewal: an Australian case study of tenant participation’s influence on public housing renewal projects

Andrew Romanin

i6050032 MSc. Public Policy & Human Development Thesis

20 August 2013

Supervisor: Carlos Cadena Gaitán

Second reader: Dr. Victor Cebotari

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Abstract It is standard practice nowadays for tenants to participate in decision making

processes regarding the renewal of their public housing estates. While this is

certainly a positive thing, the mechanisms of participation can provide tenants with

varying degrees of influence. This thesis argues that the number of mechanisms and

tools of tenant participation, while perhaps advantageous, do not necessarily

increase influence in decision making, and are in fact often insufficient in delivering

assured, consistent and lasting influence for tenants. Additionally, within the context

of a public-‐private partnership (PPP) model and a neoliberal-‐led renewal project, it

argues that these macro level concepts present additional challenges and hurdles to

attaining decision making influence. The Bonnyrigg Living Communities Project

(BLCP) in Sydney, Australia acts as the focus of the empirical analysis. A data

collection process consisting of a document analysis and a series of interviews with

key informants from the BLCP informs the thesis. An analytical framework is

developed, specifically an evaluative model for tenant participation. The thesis

reveals that, while many and varied, the participation mechanisms tenants were able

to access in the BLCP did not provide influence in decision making. At best, they

placed tenants no higher than the negotiation rung of the model; a degree of

tokenistic participation. Also, tenants were further constrained in their ability to

influence the “big” issues due to the PPP model and neoliberal-‐led renewal. These

converge on the tenant participation mechanisms to downgrade the influence

tenants can wield.

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Acknowledgements

In the six and a half weeks that it has taken me to research and write this thesis I

would like to primarily thank the individuals who made themselves available on such

short notice to be interviewed, and to lend crucial advice and insight to the topic.

Some of the conversations were extremely enlightening and could have gone on for

hours. Without all of them I would have nothing to say.

Secondly, I appreciate the time and effort my brother has spent constructing the

graphics in a far more presentable manner than I ever could, and my sister, Alisia, for

double checking my spelling and grammar. Also a note of gratitude to Dr. Victor

Cebotari for acting as my second reader.

Finally, my thesis supervisor, Carlos Cadena Gaitán, for continually providing me with

positive feedback and guidance, even when I felt it was undeserved.

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Table of Contents

Abstract 1

Chapter 1. Introduction 8

1.1 Problem statement 9

1.2 Research question and objectives 11

1.3 Hypothesis 12

1.4 Dependent and independent variables 12

1.5 Limitations 13

1.6 The Australian public housing context 15

Chapter 2. Associated literature 18

2.1 Defining terms and parameters 18

2.1.1 Tenant participation 18

2.1.2 Public housing 20

2.1.3 Renewal 21

2.1.4 Public-‐Private Partnerships (PPP) 22

2.2 Existing research themes 23

2.2.1 The why and how of renewal 23

2.2.2 The good and the bad of tenant participation 26

2.2.3 Barriers and potential for tenant participation 30

2.2.4 Gaps and usefulness 31

Chapter 3. Analytical framework 32

3.1 The neoliberal and PPP context 33

3.2 Power 35

3.3 Arnstein’s Ladder of Citizen Participation 37

3.4 Variables of tenant participation 39

3.5 Alternative participatory frameworks 41

3.6 A new ladder and model for tenant participation 42

Chapter 4. Research methodology 45

4.1 Type of analysis 45

4.2 Case selection 45

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4.3 Data collection 46

4.3.1 Document analysis 46

4.3.2 Semi-‐structured interviews 47

4.4 Participant selection 49

4.5 Method of analysis 51

Chapter 5. Case study: Bonnyrigg Living Communities Project (BLCP) 52

5.1 An overview of the BLCP 52

5.2 The Bonnyrigg community 55

Chapter 6. Tenant participation in the BLCP 56

6.1 The methods of tenant participation and their influence 57

6.2 Findings of the tenant participation model 60

6.2.1 The first sub-‐finding 63

6.2.2 The second sub-‐finding 67

6.2.3 The third sub-‐finding 69

6.3 The findings applied to Clegg’s understanding of power 72

6.4 Considering the PPP model and neoliberal-‐led renewal 73

Chapter 7. Conclusion 78

Reference List 84

Appendices 94

Appendix 1: Alternative models of participation 94

Appendix 2: Key informants 96

Appendix 3: Collated data on tenant participation indicators in the BLCP 98

Appendix 4: Collated findings from key informants on barriers and

promoters for tenant participation in the BLCP 100

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List of Tables

Table 1. Number of households assisted in Public Housing (PH) and State Owned and

Managed Indigenous Housing (SOMIH), by state and territory, 30 June 2011 15

Table 2: Total rebated households, by principal source of income of main tenant,

at 30 June 2009(a) 16

Table 3. Process rungs for a new ladder of tenant participation 43

List of Figures

Figure 1. Arnstein’s Ladder of Citizen Participation 39

Figure 2. A model for tenant participation 44

Figure 3. BLCP estate prior to the renewal 53

Figure 4. BLCP Staging Map 54

Figure 5. Influence of tenant participation in the BLCP, by variables 61

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List of Abbreviations Bonnyrigg Advisory Tenants Group (BATG) Bonnyrigg Community Reference Group (BCRG) Bonnyrigg Living Communities Project (BLCP) Bonnyrigg Private Owners Group (BPOG) Bonnyrigg Public Tenants Group (BPTG) Commonwealth Rent Assistance (CRA) Commonwealth State Housing Agreement (CSHA) Community Housing (CH) Community Action Plan (CAP) Community Consultative Team (CCT) Crisis Accommodation Program (CAP) Department of Housing (DOH) Development Application (DA) Expression of Interest (EOI) Fairfield City Council (FCC) Fairfield Migrant Resource Centre (FMRC) Housing Action Trust (HAT) Indigenous Community Housing (ICH) National Affordable Housing Agreement (NAHA) New Public Management (NPM) New South Wales (NSW) Partnership Agreement (PA) Private Management Company (PMC)

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Public Housing (PH) Public-‐Private Partnership (PPP) Request for Detailed Proposal (RDP) State Housing Authority (SHA) State Owned and Managed Indigenous Housing (SOMIH) Sydney Statistical Division (SSD) Terms of Reference (TOR) University of New South Wales (UNSW) University of Western Sydney (UWS)

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Chapter 1. Introduction

Making decisions about one’s home, for most people, is not generally a major issue.

In many cases the decisions themselves might be difficult ones, but the ability to

definitively choose one option over another rests with the individual. In the case of

public housing, it is not so simple. There are a broad range of factors that facilitate or

inhibit this ability. Regardless, the idea of involving tenants in decision making about

public housing renewal is standard practice these days, and authorities are acutely

aware of the consequences of exclusion. While tenant participation’s active

promotion is a positive thing, the forms this kind of participation takes and the

extent to which tenants can influence decision making in renewal projects varies

greatly. In the context of renewal projects administered by public-‐private

partnerships (PPP) and constructed in from a neoliberal platform, tenant

participation faces an additional challenge and hurdle in attaining influence in

decision making.

This thesis argues that the number of mechanisms and tools of tenant participation,

while perhaps advantageous, do not necessarily increase influence in decision

making, and are in fact often insufficient in delivering assured, consistent and lasting

influence for tenants in public housing renewal projects. Additionally, it argues that

the dynamic of the PPP model and a neoliberal-‐led renewal project further constrain

decision making influence.

In order to demonstrate this, a case study of the Bonnyrigg Living Communities

Project (BLCP)1 in Sydney, Australia acts as the focus of the empirical analysis. To aid

this, a data collection process consisting of two components will be carried out: a

document analysis of key content pertaining to the BLCP, such as the masterplan,

1 To clarify naming terms in the thesis: the Bonnyrigg Living Communities Project (BLCP) is the name of the project, it will be frequently referred to. Bonnyrigg Partnerships (BP) is the original and ongoing name of the overarching legal entity in charge of the BLCP renewal and will only be used where necessary to identify BP in this capacity. Newleaf Communities, formerly the Bonnyrigg Management Company, oversees the integration and coordination of all renewal services and activities. It will be frequently used to refer to the private consortium. Additionally, the actual physical estate site is no longer called Bonnyrigg, but has now been rebranded as Newleaf Bonnyrigg.

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social impact report, evaluative studies, and a series of key informant interviews. An

analytical framework is developed, specifically an evaluative model for tenant

participation that is used to measure and test the hypothesis and variables chosen

for the thesis. This is conducted over two stages of the BLCP.

The problem, research questions, objectives and limitations are discussed in the rest

of this introductory chapter, setting the specific parameters for the thesis. The

remainder of the thesis is organised as follows. Chapter 2 explores the existing

literature on the topic, explaining in detail the major themes and concepts of the

thesis. It also identifies where the thesis sits in relation to current research. Chapter

3 outlines the analytical framework that is operationalised to measure and analyse

the level of tenant influence. Chapter 4 addresses the key methodological

approaches and considerations of the thesis. Chapter 5 introduces the BLCP as the

case study. Chapter 6 tests the data collected in applying it to the analytical

framework and discusses the subsequent findings and analysis. Finally, Chapter 7

provides a recap of the thesis, highlighting the findings, and concludes with a series

of possible policy and practical considerations.

1.1 Problem statement

The provision of suitable housing in our ever-‐growing cities is a significant challenge

stemming from a range of reasons such as lack of political commitment, affordability

and space. The right kind of housing should be able to provide a wide variety of

benefits, including economic, social and political, for the individuals who inhabit

them, the communities in which they are situated and the authorities and

developers who invest in them (Kelly, 2010). Managing the development, renewal

and growth of housing in our cities, by involving the right stakeholders and making

the right decisions is key to achieving such outcomes.

Nowhere more relevant is this than in the case of the provision of public housing.

Public housing has long been an endangered species in many Western urban

contexts (Jacobs, Atkinson, Colic-‐Peisker, Berry, & Dalton, 2010). Furthermore, in

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many major urban metropolitan areas where space is a premium, the renewal of

public housing sites provides an opportunity for governments to capitalise financially

on the renewal process. This can lead to a top-‐down governance approach, focused

on reaping optimum financial return through engaging private investment at the

expense of inclusion and engagement at the community level, namely the very

tenants who inhabit public housing (Harvey, 2008). As such, what we are often left

with is not only an issue of scarcity in regards to public housing provision, but also a

broader question about the inclusiveness of public housing renewal for its

inhabitants.

The stated “inclusive” mantra intends to consider the interests and concerns of all

parties in the renewal process, and thus implies a level of influence on the decision

making agenda for tenants. Yet, in many instances, while tenant concerns and

interests are certainly aired, heard and to some extent considered, it is not

guaranteed that they will be influential and tenants properly empowered. In fact, in

the case of PPPs the interests of private developers or governments are stronger and

quite likely to dominate the process.

It is the extent to which tenant participation mechanisms are influential, judged by

their ability to wield power, in the decision making process which is the primary

concern addressed in this thesis. A secondary concern is the impact on the ability of

tenant participation to be influential in PPPs and a neoliberal-‐led approach to public

housing renewal; a growing practice in large, urban renewal projects in Australian

cities.

Hence, it is pertinent to ask what is exactly the influence of tenant participation on

public housing renewal? It is all well and good to espouse values of engagement and

consultation, but seriously incorporating the interests, concerns and preferences of

tenants into the decision making process is another matter. Cairncross, Clapham and

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Goodlad (1994), and a host of others2, conclude that there is no easy answer to the

question of whether promoting participation actually empowers tenants. In the

Australian context where PPPs are becoming increasingly common, is the

domination of the renewal process by stronger commercial actors the reality? Or can

there be a substantive and legitimate place for tenant participation to realistically

influence decision making? Within the context of neo-‐liberal, market-‐driven renewal

this is perhaps highly contestable.

1.2 Research question and objectives

This thesis seeks to explore the utilities of tenant participation in affecting decision

making, according to an adaptation of Arnstein’s (1969) Ladder of Citizen

Participation and within the confines of Clegg’s (1989) understanding of power in

public housing renewal projects. This will be analysed in the context of large, urban

estates in Australian cities, through the use of a case study of the Bonnyrigg Living

Communities Project renewal in Sydney. The ultimate goal is to understand whether

tenant participation plays a role in influencing decision making in regards to the

renewal project. To this end, the main research question to be considered is:

To what extent does tenant participation influence decision making in

Australian public housing renewal projects within the context of public-‐

private partnerships?

More broadly, the thesis aims to provide a rethink on how tenant participation can

be measured and what future renewal projects might consider in ensuring tenants

are able to influence the decision making process.

A series of further sub-‐questions have been developed in order to assist in answering

the main research question and the broader objectives of the thesis:

2 Darcy (2012); McKee and Cooper (2008); Pawson, Bright, Engberg & van Bortel (2012); Foley and Martin (2000); Marsh and Rhodes (1992) all raise the question of whether structures, processes, or the like, of tenant participation actually devolve influence to tenants.

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1) What insights can be offered by citizenship/participatory frameworks,

theories of power, and neoliberalism in regards to tenant participation’s

influence on decision making?

2) How do structures, organisation and tactics of tenant participation impact

tenants ability to be influential?

3) What barriers do PPPs and a neoliberal-‐led renewal agenda present to tenant

participation achieving greater influence?

4) What policy and practical considerations can be identified that may allow

tenant participation to be more influential public housing renewal projects?

1.3 Hypothesis

In light of the claims, rhetoric and actions of authorities placing value on tenant

participation in Australian public housing renewal projects, it is fair to assume that

this is done in order to realistically give tenants an opportunity to influence decision

making outcomes. However, mixed results suggest that tenants are not always

provided with the tools to fulfil these claims, particularly with the added a layer of

complexity to power relations and competing interests created by private sector

involvement in renewal projects. Thus, with this in mind, and having stated the

research question above, the hypothesis derived for the research focus, which will

be tested and evaluated in the thesis is as follows:

The number of tenant participation structures, organisation and tactics in

public housing renewal PPP projects do not increase the decision making

influence of tenants.

1.4 Dependent and independent variables

In order to accurately answer the research question and test the hypothesis a

dependent and an independent variable have been selected.

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In light of the research question the dependent variable has been identified as the

level of tenant participation influence on decision making in public housing renewal,

measured by the processes of tenant participation. While the independent variables

are identified as the tools or mechanisms of tenant participation, defined as the

structures, organisation and tactics.

The dependent variable will be measured by using an adopted version of Arnstein’s

Ladder of Citizen Participation (1969) to determine the extent of tenant participation

on decision making with regard to the BLCP. The processes of tenant participation

are scaled on a figurative ladder to determine the degree of influence in decision

making. As tenants move up the ladder each “process rung” marks a higher degree

of influence. This is the rationale behind using processes of tenant participation as a

proxy for the level of influence. A discussion of the applicability of Arnstein’s Ladder,

as well as further explanation of what the processes are and how an adapted model

will be used as a measurement tool will occur in Chapter 3.

The independent variables have been selected as proxies for the tools and

mechanisms of tenant participation. These have been adapted from a previous

analysis of tenant participation by Cairncross et al. (1994) and they reflect the basic

mechanisms which constitute tenant participation. Again, further clarification and

discussion of these will demonstrate how these variables are useful for the

objectives of this thesis.

1.5 Limitations

Like any study, there are various limitations associated with the research that will

undoubtedly impact the design, analysis or findings.

Firstly, measuring exactly what level of influence has been achieved was likely to be

contentious. The use of qualitative data analysis means there is always a danger that

the specification for such a measurement tool maybe subjective and will vary

according to the individual’s perception (Sofaer, 2002). As stated above,

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measurement tools and variables were chosen based on their previous application to

similar studies. This was done to ensure that there were parameters and guidance

around how the collected data was utilised. In doing so, it is hoped that subjective

use of the data was mitigated to the greatest possible extent.

A second key limitation arises from the case study of the BLCP as a current, ongoing

project, thus rendering it difficult to ascertain the extent to which influence has

occurred or might improve over the course of the remaining stages. Throughout the

10 years since the renewal project began, tenants have come and gone, as have

frontline staff and varying personnel. This may have had a very real impact on the

ability of tenant participation to influence decision making. The inconsistency of

personnel may feed into many other elements, such as individual negotiating skills of

tenants at a given point in time. This may have ultimately diluted tenant

participation influence and, as these individuals are no longer accessible, it means

that such data is likely to be missing. Similarly, the ongoing nature of the project will

mean there are still future opportunities for tenant participation to be employed and

to have an impact. Thus, caution should be shown when extending current

observations and conclusions beyond the current timeframe. Ongoing research and

monitoring over the life of the project will be beneficial in accounting for this factor.

Thirdly, obtaining access to the key informants for interviewing and up-‐to-‐date data

collection proved problematic at times. A number of key individuals and

organisations contacted were unavailable at the time or did not reply to requests to

be interviewed. The major limitation in this regard was the difficulty of interviewing

tenants; only one private residents couple could be spoken to. Moreover, no public

housing tenants could be interviewed. As a study on tenant participation, it is logical

to gather as much input from tenants as possible and as this was not the case it

poses a serious limitation. Furthermore, data for the most recent stage of the BLCP is

not as tightly collated and readily available as the planning phase, thus there are

likely to be gaps in the data that has been analysed. It is probable that this has

impacted the findings and outcomes of the thesis.

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1.6 The Australian public housing context

In order to grasp the contextual profile of public housing in Australia one must first

look at the plethora of statistics on dwelling types, demographics, location and

condition that quantitatively describe it. Additionally, an overview of the funding and

governance arrangements in place between the Federal, State and Local

governments is helpful, as well as knowledge of its most immediate challenges.

At June 30 2011, Australia’s public housing stock stood at 331,000 dwellings across

all states and territories, the majority (three-‐quarters) of which are located in major

cities, over a third in NSW alone (Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, 2012;

see Table 1). While the vast percentage remains in the public provided sector, the

last seven years has seen a decline in stock of 14,000, with community housing

gaining 31,000 dwellings in the same period (Australian Institute of Health and

Welfare, 2012). A distinction between community and public housing will be

provided in the next chapter.

Table 1. Number of households assisted in Public Housing (PH) and State Owned and Managed Indigenous Housing (SOMIH), by state and territory, 30 June 2011

(a) Western Australia ceased to have SOMIH program in 2010-‐11. Households and dwellings

that were previously reported in SOMIH have been transferred to PH. Source: Australian Institute of Health and Welfare (2012)

Dwelling types including flats, units and apartments are common in public housing

and mainstream community housing, comprising 32% and 36% respectively

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(Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, 2011). While the vast majority of social

housing dwellings are tenantable, since 2009 the Nation Building and Jobs Stimulus

Plan has seen 15,400 new social housing dwellings built, with a further 3,800

dwellings under construction (Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, 2012).

Additionally, around 80,000 social and community housing dwellings have benefited

from repairs and maintenance work (Australian Institute of Health and Welfare,

2012).

Demographically, social housing occupants are typically on low incomes and are

accessing government pensions and payments (Australian Institute of Health and

Welfare, 2011; see Table 2). The most common government assistance packages are

the Disability Support Pension and the Age Pension, making up 88% of public

housing welfare recipients. This is consistent with the roughly one-‐half of public

rental housing and mainstream community housing households deemed to have a

member of their household with a disability, health or other condition (Roy Morgan

Research, 2007). Furthermore, at 54 years of age, public housing tenants are on

average older than the general population (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2009).

Table 2: Total rebated households, by principal source of income of main tenant, at 30 June 2009(a)

(a) Data is not available for mainstream community housing (CH), indigenous community housing (ICH) and Crisis Accommodation Program (CAP). Source: Australian Institute of Health and Welfare (2010)

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Two additional statistics pertinent to the issue of tenant participation and influence

in decision making is that around half of all tenants report as having had ‘little or no

involvement’ with their housing organisation (Roy Morgan Research, 2008). While

only one third indicated they have a lot of input into decision making regarding their

specific housing type. Security of tenure demonstrates relative stability as the

majority of public housing tenants have lived in the same dwelling for over five years

(Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, 2011). This infers a level of satisfaction

with the standard of living experienced in the dwelling, as well as satisfaction with

the community in which they live. Residing in a specific location for such a period of

time suggests that individuals have invested in, or are likely to be concerned about,

the long term prospects of that community.

The financing of social housing (inclusive of public housing) is provided under the

National Affordable Housing Agreement (NAHA). This is an agreement between the

State, Territory and Federal governments to assist in the provision of housing needs.

It replaced the old Commonwealth State Housing Agreement (CSHA) as of January 1,

2009. Under the conditions of the NAHA, parties agree to a number outcomes,

including providing social housing, assistance to people in the private rental market

and the improved use of existing housing stock and assets (Council of Australian

Governments, 2009).

The governance responsibilities as outlined by the NAHA determine that the Federal

government is primarily concerned with the financial delegation necessary for

administering and delivering housing services. For example, this includes

Commonwealth Rent Assistance (CRA), home purchase assistance, taxation, and

financial regulation (Council of Australian Governments, 2009). Meanwhile State and

Territory governments assume the role of service providers across all categories of

social housing and some financial assistance. Key here is their responsibility for land

use, supply of social housing, urban planning and development (Council of Australian

Governments, 2009). Importantly, Local government is also a contributing party in

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this sense, holding responsibility for building approval, local urban planning and

development processes.

Alongside the statistics and governance structures, there are several key challenges

facing public housing that fuel the debate about its value, provision and future

direction. The continual decline in public funding directed towards ongoing service

provision, renewal and stock accumulation has jeopardised the utility and future of

public housing as a publicly provided good. Under the CSHA the decline in real

funding amounted to 15 per cent between 1989 and 1999 (Kathy Arthurson, 2003).

This has run parallel with the gradual residualisation of public housing, something

that has occurred internationally, as well as in Australia (R. G. Atkinson & Jacobs,

2008). Amongst other issues, this residualisation is premised on: increasing stigma

and a negative perception of tenants and public housing in general; high

concentrations of socially disadvantaged on single estates; high rates of crime,

unemployment and anti-‐social behaviour; and locational disadvantage (R. G.

Atkinson & Jacobs, 2008; Australian Housing Research Fund, 2000). The dual

challenges of residualisation and decreasing funds exacerbates the challenge of

management and stock maintenance for authorities and, as will be explored, has led

to the utilisation of other funding sources and providers, principally in the private

sector.

Chapter 2. Associated literature

2.1 Defining terms and parameters

2.1.1 Tenant participation

On the surface, appropriately defining tenant participation might seem quite

straightforward and obvious. Logically, looking at the inference of the term itself, it

may simply be understood as tenants participating or being involved in certain

processes or activities. While this is certainly the case, as Goodlad (2001) contends

tenant participation is a contested concept with its array of definitions leading to

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unique approaches to assess its impact. At a broad conceptual level, tenant

participation can be considered in two ways. One, something that can be considered

an action, or two, an outcome. In many instances, when enacted in public housing

renewal projects, tenant participation is posited as fulfilling both of these.

Authorities espouse the ideals that it will be a tool for action and simultaneously a

goal to be achieved (McKee & Cooper, 2008). To this end, Pawson et al. (2012)

suggest that it includes a spectrum of goals such as involvement, empowerment,

participation or engagement. While, on the other hand tools could include

everything from distributing a newsletter to facilitate awareness and involvement,

conducting a consultation meeting to determine concerns and preferences, or

establishing formal committees and governance structures to boost empowerment

in decision making (Cairncross et al., 1994). This demonstrates how the differing

identified forms of tenant participation shape the kinds of activities that are labelled

in the same way. This is as Goodlad (2001) alluded to. In this thesis, both the goals

(dependent variable: processes) and tools (independent variables: structures,

organisation, tactics) are considered.

The goals and tools outlined above also position tenant participation as a

manifestation akin to citizenship (Somerville & Steele, 1995). It is clear that many of

the elements associated with citizenship are commensurate with tenant

participation. The reference to tenant participation’s role in decision making is one

of these elements, and one that is often given particular importance and recognition

by scholars and practitioners alike. It is common to define tenant participation as

tenants participating in decision making processes and thus influencing decisions

(Pawson, Bright, et al., 2012; Scottish Office, 1999).

Arnstein (1969) explores this further in her discussion of the eight types of citizen

participation, in what she terms the Ladder of Citizen Participation. Using the Ladder

she argues that “citizen participation is a categorical term for citizen power”

(Arnstein, 1969, p. 216). By climbing up the rungs of the ladder, citizens move from

non-‐participation to degrees of tokenism to degrees of citizen power. She defines

citizen power as being manifested through one of the top three rungs: partnership,

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delegated power or citizen control. It is at this abstraction that decision making

power is achieved through participation. In light of this it is possible to frame tenant

participation as a form of citizen participation and to argue that it is the act of

influencing decision making.

It is in this regard that tenant participation is defined in this thesis. The all-‐

encompassing goals and tools associated with tenant participation constitute the

working definition, while evoking its link to citizenship allows for Arnstein’s Ladder to

be adapted for the purposes of measuring its decision making influence.

2.1.2 Public housing

The type of housing that forms the focus of this thesis, public housing, is just one

category of social housing assistance provided in Australia. In the context of this

thesis public housing has been taken to refer to “dwellings owned (or leased) and

managed by State and Territory housing authorities to provide affordable rental

accommodation” (Steering Committee for the Review of Government Service

Provision, 2012). This is distinguished from the growing community housing sector

which is delineated as rental housing managed by community-‐based organisations

that have received a capital or recurrent subsidy from government (Steering

Committee for the Review of Government Service Provision, 2012), but may also

involve ownership models in conjunction with a range of stakeholders.

As a point of clarification and distinction, social housing is an overarching term for all

types of rental housing assistance, including public housing and community housing,

but also indigenous community housing and crisis or transitional housing (Wiesel,

Easthope, Liu, Judd, & Hunter, 2012).

A further specification of public housing for the purposes of this research is that

public housing in Australian cities can take the form of either master-‐planned estates

consisting of low-‐density housing in suburban areas or high-‐rise apartment blocks

typical to inner-‐city areas (Australian Housing Research Fund, 2000). The thesis,

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while focusing on a suburban low-‐density master-‐planned estate, does not seek to

focus solely on this form, but contends that findings and outcomes can be applied to

either form of master-‐planned estates in major cities.

2.1.3 Renewal

Given a renewal project is chosen as the empirical focus of this analysis, it is valuable

to understand what exactly is meant by renewal and why this particular term has

been highlighted, as it is often used interchangeably with a number of similar

synonyms in housing discourse.

Jacobs et al. (2004) contend ‘renewal’ and ‘regeneration’ to indicate two different

processes, the former as physical demolition and replacement or refurbishment of

existing stock, and the latter as more encompassing of wider social undertakings,

including tenant participation and community development, alongside physical

reconstruction. Contrastingly, it is argued here that ‘renewal’ is inclusive of both the

physical and social renewal and thus was selected for the purposes of this thesis.

This may seem just a matter of semantics, but it is in fact common practice in

housing research related to processes of redevelopment, particularly when

considering elements of tenant or resident participation (Rogers, 2010; Wood, 2001,

2002). Furthermore, the term is used consistently by housing authorities to refer to

projects aiming to address both the physical and social decay and dysfunction of

master-‐planned public housing estates (Australian Housing Research Fund, 2000). A

quick look at the State Housing Authorities’ (SHA) websites demonstrates that this is

also common practice in governmental, political and professional jargon (see

Department of Housing and Public Works (Queensland Government), 2013; DHS,

2013). Within their understanding of renewal, the websites refer to commitments of

social and physical outcomes and goals that are to be achieved through renewal

projects. Specifically relating to the Bonnyrigg Living Communities project, Housing

NSW defined the project as an “integrated renewal” incorporating social, urban and

economic planning outcomes (Rogers forthcoming, 2013a, p. 5).

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The discussion of social and physical renewal perhaps also requires further

clarification for definitional and contextual purposes. In essence, physical renewal is

delineated as the physical or structural change of the urban environment (Wood,

2002). In the past, this type of renewal was considered to be a solution to many of

the broader social issues associated with the residualisation of public housing

estates, such as low unemployment (Atkinson & Jacobs, 2008). Yet there is

substantial international research that discusses the limitations of an isolated

physical approach in appropriately tackling such wider concerns (Anderson, 2002;

Kleinman, 1998; Moulaert, Swyngedouw, & Rodriguez, 2001). Randolph and Judd

(2000) further explore and question this within the Australian context, contending

that physical renewal policies are insufficient and in fact that community

participation needs to be utilised to improve the efficacy (Wood, Randolph, & Judd,

2002). Thus, as outlined by Darcy (2004), there is clear evidence that physical

renewal needs to be combined with social renewal: interventions that concern crime

prevention; services for groups and individuals with disabilities; and importantly,

more participatory decision making.

2.1.4 Public-‐Private Partnerships (PPP)

The increasing mobilisation of PPPs in public housing renewals has been alluded to

earlier and in general refers to a partnership between private developers and

authorities to jointly fund and control ownership of assets (Malone, 2005).

Furthermore, there is usually a capital and ongoing service delivery component,

which is complemented by government support in the form of land contributions,

capital works or revenue diversion (Malone, 2005).

With the huge financial burden that is required to maintain, upgrade or replace

stock, SHAs are turning to the private sector to shoulder the burden of ensuring this

public resource retains its utility and value. There are risks associated with this type

of approach and the jury is out on whether it provides the greatest cost-‐benefit for

governments. The biggest risk is the possible increase of private dwellings at the

23

expense of public housing stock. This is likely be a key non-‐negotiable for the private

developer who will seek to maximise their investment in the project (Kathy

Arthurson, 1998). This has flow on effects of increasing social impacts on tenants

who may need to be relocated or to those on waiting lists. Additionally, in the case

of decision making in renewal projects it is one key decision in which tenants may

have no involvement or say, let alone influence.

2.2 Existing research themes

2.2.1 The why and how of renewal

Looking at the push factors for, and approach to, renewal, it is important to

understand how public housing and tenants are framed in renewal projects. It is a

research area that has attracted great interest and entails a growing body of

literature, both domestically and internationally.

Current literature identifies a number of clear reasons for renewal. The two main

push factors to be discussed here are residualisation and obsolescence; while the

main policy intervention to addressing these push factors is tenure-‐mix. It appears

that all three carry varying levels of support and criticism. Furthermore, they are

employed individually or in combination with different motivations and objectives

on the part of authorities, physical and social renewal (often a combination of the

two). To this end, obsolescence can be deemed to fall within the category of physical

renewal, while residualisation is commonly in the social dimension. Mixed tenure is a

policy intervention that is commonly employed to tackle both. Importantly for this

thesis, all reasons have a discursive stream that feed into the pursuit of tenant

participation and PPPs (Chaskin & Joseph, 2010; Darcy, 2012; R. Weber, 2002).

The residualisation of public housing is commonly framed by notions such as

concentrations of disadvantage, neighbourhood effects, locational disadvantage,

stigmatisation and social exclusion. A growing concern for public housing in Australia

and abroad is that social dysfunction and decay is subsuming estates and locales,

24

triggering renewal as the solution (Atkinson & Jacobs, 2010; Darcy, 2012). The

allocation policies related to public housing, which often target those in “greatest

need” have resulted in redefinition of the social composition of estates, in many

instances reducing it to a process of “spatial ghettoisation of low income and high

needs households” (Atkinson & Jacobs, 2008, p. 13; Atkinson & Jacobs, 2010; Jacobs,

Arthurson, Cica, Greenwood, & Hastings, 2011). As outlined in the background

context to public housing, many current tenants are recipients of income assistance,

and more specifically disability and aged assistance, demonstrating the effect of

allocation policies.

This type of policy contributes to many indicators of residualisation such as stigma

and poor image surrounding a public housing estate (R. Atkinson, 2008). Meanwhile,

low unemployment and disincentives are commonly associated with this type of

housing. This is manifested through the idea of neighbourhood effects, that living in

a particular locale of a certain social composition can be linked to an observed level

of employment. According to Dean and Hastings (2000) these elements compound

each other. The distribution of allocations triggers stigma and ultimately reduces

access to opportunities for employment. This feeds into social disconnection and

isolation that fragments social networks and once again compounds employment

limitations (Perri 6, 1997).

To address this perpetuating cycle of residualisation, public housing authorities have

acknowledged the need to redirect policy priorities and sought to reconstitute the

make up of these communities via mixed tenure developments, as is the case in the

BLCP. However, in light of this, a key critique has shed light on the potential for

tenant participation to be influential at this nexus. This materialises in the argument

posited by Lepofsky and Fraser (2003) and supported by Darcy (2012), that

neighbourhood and deconcentration discourse conspires to exclude tenants

perceived as poor, illegitimate contributors to decision making in PPPs. They term

this as a “hegemonic expression of who has the right to place-‐making in cities”

(Lepofsky & Fraser, 2003, p. 129).

25

The second reason extensively touted is obsolescence. In the Australian context it is

argued to be the major driver of estate renewal, sometimes even more so than the

residualisation debate. This has been supported by research carried out by the

Australian Housing Research Fund (2000) across all states and territories, covering a

total of 19 renewal projects. The research highlighted that stock obsolescence was

more often the trigger for renewal, although the perception of residualisation was

acknowledged.

Obsolescence, according to Weber (R. Weber, 2002, p. 522), implies something that

is out of date or has been “displaced by modernisation and progress”. There is a

distinction between functional and economic obsolescence; the former being

changes in building practices and utilisation, while the latter refers to external

factors such as rezoning that reduce demand and value. The decline in value

coincides with a decline in upkeep and maintenance, leading to eventual

deterioration and non-‐habitability (Cohen, 2001; Sternlieb & Burchell, 1973). At this

point obsolescence becomes a neoliberal defence for Schumpeter’s “creative

destruction” and for the government and private sector to take advantage of public

assets (R. Weber, 2002). As is the case with the discourse of residualisation, the

representation of public housing tenants as non-‐participants in the market, non-‐

contributors to capital or wealth-‐building homeowners renders them excludable and

their citizenship “right to the city” compromised in the marketised renewal project

(Darcy, 2012, p. 6).

As a policy response to residualised and obsolete communities, that mixed tenure

should form a central part of new developments and existing redevelopments has

gained consensus amongst many practitioners, governments and developers (Bailey

& Manzi, 2008).

Mixed tenure essentially involves mixing individuals, families and groups of diverse

social and economic status, age, and cultural and ethnic demographics. The mantra

from abroad and domestically is that substantial benefits arise for those living within

the community as well as the community as an entity (Bailey & Manzi, 2008; Housing

26

Corporation, 2006). Studies suggest that there is evidence of mixed tenure working

to make areas more desirable, reduce stigma, boost employment and reduce crime

(Allen, Camina, Casey, Coward, & Wood, 2005). Counter to this is growing evidence

that mixed tenure does very little to validate the claims it makes, damaging existing

social cohesion and networks, and further stigmatising public tenants who gain a

feeling of inferiority against their private counterparts (Kathy Arthurson, 2002, 2003;

R. Atkinson & Kintrea, 2000; Burgess et al., 2007; Kintrea, 2007; Oreopoulos, 2003;

Randolph, Wood, Holloway, & Buck, 2004).

Chaskin and Joseph (2010) highlight the impetus of the market in renewal projects

and the need to attract high-‐income residents in order to ensure their financial

profitability and viability. There is strong incentive for governments and the private

sector to take advantage of the mixed tenure mantra for reasons other than tackling

residualisation. Firstly, in this instance, the renewal process is dictated strongly by

the expectations and demands of the private sector, which as mentioned, is at odds

with many of the stated claims of mixed tenure renewal. Secondly, it may also place

existing tenants in opposition to each other, private developers or governments,

adversely impacting on the tenant participation and decision making processes

during renewal (Chaskin & Joseph, 2010).

2.2.2 The good and the bad of tenant participation

Research has covered a myriad of topics relating to the benefits, strengths,

weaknesses, influence, barriers and potential of tenant participation. Many have

focused on similar aspects that are the topic of discussion in this thesis. Evaluating

the veritable merits of tenant participation is not new. There is substantial evidence

to draw conclusions in favour of or against any of the above. Moreover, it is common

to address tenant participation within the parameters of many different studies,

such as community building, promotion of democracy or citizenship. For instance,

Lepofsky and Fraser (2003) explored the emerging notion of flexible and durable

citizenship, proxies for effective or ineffective participation, as a method to explore

the shaping of changes in cities. They concluded that flexible citizenship was allowed

27

for “non-‐residents” of a particular place to create discursive reasons for involving

themselves in the place-‐making process at the expense of durable citizens who were

located as “residents” within that space (Lepofsky & Fraser, 2003). This specific

example offers the potential lack of influence of tenant participation within a given

area, but it is highlighted here to demonstrate the variety of methods and angles

that tenant participation is explored from.

The case in favour of tenant participation as a beneficial and influential approach

reveals much and draws on a number of themes. As a starting point, tenant

participation is seen to be a mechanism to harness the invaluable knowledge and

know-‐how that tenants retain of the communities they live in (Donnison, 1998;

Forrest & Kearns, 1999; Gilmour, 2011; Marcuse, 2010; Medoff & Sklar, 1994). The

argument is that being “on the ground” they can provide feedback and vital

information to inform management or authorities. This information often differs

from the priorities and information of other stakeholders within the renewal

process.

Furthermore, the debate surrounding social capital and capacity building at the

individual and collective tenant level seeks to highlight the benefit that pursuing and

encouraging tenant participation serves to enhance the skills and aptitude that

tenants lack (Arthurson, 2004; Gilmour, 2011). Tenants who are actively involved

and connected are able to negate the social exclusion and decay present in their

community. Adding to the practical rewards of tenant participation, there is a

psychological aspect that provides residents with a sense of responsibility and an

ongoing connection and commitment to the renewal (Power, 1996).

International and domestic research sheds light on another advantage, the potential

for sustainability in renewal projects through the advent of active and ongoing, well

developed and resourced tenant participation and community engagement

arrangements (Kathy Arthurson, 2003; Carley, 1998; Fordham, 1995; Larsen, 1998;

Pawson, Davison, & Wiesel, 2012; Taylor, 1997; Wood, 2002). In doing so, renewal

projects become embedded in the community and interpolate local people or

28

agencies to carry on the foundational development that has been achieved in early

stages. This makes tenants central to the long term success of the renewal,

indicating that they are a key stakeholder with potential for positive influence.

Having explored the stated benefits of tenant participation, current literature also

attempts to gauge its ability to influence. Tenant participation manifests itself in

many ways and it is logical to expect that different approaches produce varying

degrees of influence. While some are designed to give structured authority and a

governance role, and possibly a definitive say in decision making, other approaches

are far looser, more akin to consumer involvement that facilitates preference

seeking and voice with perhaps minimal definitive influence.

A survey of the literature reveals that the UK and Europe appear to be promoters of

the former, while the US and Australia tend to lean towards the latter. For example,

evidence and case studies from the UK show tenants have a regular chance to

participate in renewal in a meaningful way. Stewart and Rhoden’s (2003, p. 27)

analysis of a renewal project in the Borough of Brent demonstrated that the Housing

Action Trust (HAT) established structured participation avenues (i.e. tenant advisory

committees, boards, subcommittees, block-‐base tenant associations or forums) and

gave “tenants real choice” in choosing design aspects that suited their preferences.

This was, however, observed in the context where a community housing association

(the HAT) was the authority in charge of the housing stock, and may not be

applicable in the context of a public housing renewal process. It is common for

community housing authorities to pursue more structured and deliberate forms of

tenant participation in contrast to public housing authorities, something that

research also shows is common in Australia (Gilmour, 2011).

Yet there are Australian cases that have pursued deliberate and structured

approaches to ensuring tenant participation plays an influential role. The

Queensland Government’s renewal project at Manoora is one of those. At Manoora,

residents were mobilised in the development of a Community Action Plan (CAP) and

advised that all suggestions put forward would be incorporated in the final plan,

29

which they were (Queensland Department of Housing, 1999). The nature of it as a

CAP obviously suggests that it would be completely representative of tenant input,

but the key here is to demonstrate the potential design of approaches that facilitate

influence. This is not to say that formal and structured tenant participation provides

a certainty in regard to influence but there is evidence to support it.

On the other side of the debate there is literature that counters the basis for

influence, as well as the argumentation in favour of tenant participation generally.

Despite the claim that tenant participation draws on valuable first-‐hand experience

of tenants within their community, Darcy (2012, p. 6) argues that in fact the

“experience of residents is systematically devalued or excluded” from informing the

decision to pursue renewal, let alone the renewal process. Additionally, even the

façade of consultation and the implementation of specific mechanisms to allow

tenants to voice opinions, concerns and preferences is reduced when put into the

context that such efforts occur once major renewal decisions have been settled by

other stakeholders (Foley & Martin, 2000; Rogers, 2013b). Cameron and Davoudi

(1998, p. 250) often observe this, concluding that in essence tenants were “given a

mere presence rather than a voice”. The analytical research is supported by

empirical studies of large housing estate renewal projects, which reveal that in many

instances tenants do not feel they have an impact or involvement in making

decisions. A social impact study of the Kensington Estate Redevelopment in

Melbourne, Australia, a large mixed-‐density and tenure estate renewal in the inner

city, revealed that tenant-‐specific decisions such as relocation from the estate during

the renewal project were not in the hands of tenants. In this instance, if given the

opportunity to decide, four in ten households would have opted to remain (Hulse,

Herbert, & Down, 2004).

As suggested, the extent of influence through formal structures is not guaranteed.

Rogers (2013b) supports this argument, asserting that despite formal requirements

to utilise tenant participation initiatives, social housing authorities can determine

agendas for decision making and debate. Again, in this instance Rogers, exhibits that

predetermined decisions and agendas control the influence tenants can exert, often

30

being reduced to issues such as maintenance. Arthurson (2003) observed this in

reviewing the role of tenants in community consultation workshops of he Parks

renewal project in Adelaide, where residents were relegated to developing CAPs for

predetermined priority issues. As Balloch and Taylor (2001) conclude, all this

ultimately does is reassert existing power relations in renewal partnerships.

2.2.3 Barriers and potential for tenant participation

Taking account of what we know about the positives and negatives of tenant

participation, it is also necessary to consider what the barriers and potential for

tenant participation evolving in a normative way are. As most research pertaining to

tenant participation aims to shed light on how it can be facilitated in a more

influential way, there are a number of prominent proposals that arise from the

literature. These can be divided into categories of structural and capacity methods.

The structural methods promoted by Wood (2002) and Randolph and Judd (2000)

include conferring decision making or veto power to tenant bodies; establishing

participation structures that are inclusive of wide representation, enforcing

accountability and transparency; and investing money and time into ensuring they

have the ability to flourish. In terms of realigning power imbalances, authorities

need to be prepared to cede power and control to communities (Foley & Martin,

2000). Informally, up skilling tenants and professional housing practitioners’

communicative and relationship building competencies, as well as their ability to

deliver advocacy for tenants within or outside of their own organisation is seen as

paramount (Darcy, 2004; Wood, 2002).

With respect of the barriers that are identified in the literature, again they can be

placed in structural and capacity categories. Capacity-‐wise, Wood (2002) refers back

to the impact of neighbourhood effect, asserting that poverty and social

disadvantage are undermining factors to actual participation. It increases the

perception that tenants have little meaningful contribution to make. Additionally,

tenant representatives often refer to a sense of domination, manipulation or

disinterest by practitioners and constraint in operating as they wish. Access to

31

resources also reduces the power of tenant participation to compete against the

well-‐resourced and powerful interests of other stakeholders, such as property

developers (Arthurson, 2003; Foley & Martin, 2000). Finally, the lack of homogeneity

in the tenant “voice” also seeks to dilute tenant influence (Foley & Martin, 2000;

Wood, 2002). There is no suggestion that tenants should act in this way and it is

unrealistic to expect that they would, but it does mean that what strength of

numbers and resources they do have is likely to be fragmented and even

unrepresentative of what tenants really want.

Structural barriers exist in instances where formal arrangements are not in place to

allow effective and influential participation. Often, even where tenant committees

do exist they fall outside the legal or recognised structures that are considered in

decision making. In The Parks renewal project in Australia, this occurred where a

Community Consultative Team (CCT) was established but operated outside of the

legal agreement with the project partners (Badcock, Harris, Crafter, & Halsey, 1998).

As one example, this meant that they were unable to access specific documentation

which was considered too commercially sensitive and thus the essence of the CCT

was devalued, as well as their potential to operate effectively.

2.2.4 Gaps and usefulness

Much of the existing literature and research assists greatly to inform the focus of this

thesis. There is clearly substantial work that has been committed to understanding a

wide range of elements of tenant participation and renewal initiatives. The

comprehensive research that exists in Australian and international literature reveals

its own research gaps that require further exploration. For instance, Hoatson and

Grace (2002) identify a lack of Australian research on the challenges for renewal

stakeholders of resident participation processes in the contemporary context. While

Jacobs (2000) stresses as critical the need to further explore tenant perspectives and

the scope and capacity of involvement. This thesis will occupy a spot somewhere in

between. It will take a context-‐led, practical approach to evaluating the influence of

tenant participation in a contemporary context, namely that of PPPs and neoliberal-‐

32

led renewal. This distinguishes it from other tenant participation and PPP focused

research that often explores the topic through predictive theories. In other words, it

will critically analyse the influence of tenant participation through the real

mechanisms in which it is manifested. The intention is to provide more of a

functional evaluation rather than theory testing; something that has been more

frequent in international studies than the Australian context. The application of an

adapted model for evaluating tenant participation is expected to be one of the major

practical outputs of the thesis. Taking this “layman’s” approach and placing it in the

context of a PPP, the thesis aims to draw useful lessons and points for consideration

that may inform the decision making and construction of interventions by policy

makers and housing and urban renewal practitioners if establishing future PPP and

neoliberal-‐guided public housing renewal projects.

Chapter 3. Analytical framework

The analytical framework for this thesis is based on existing similarly focused studies

on tenant and citizen participation and power utilised in current literature. These

include Arnstein (1969); Cairncross et al. (1994) and Clegg (1989), which have been

adopted and adapted to create an appropriate analytical framework.

First, as defined earlier in the discussion, tenant participation can be framed as a

phenomenon akin to citizen participation and its decision making influence as citizen

power (Arnstein, 1969). Interpreting tenant participation in this way affords the

opportunity to evaluate tenant participation’s influence on renewal decision making

as a product of citizen participation. Arnstein’s (1969) typology of citizenship

participation has been adopted to evaluate how the processes, structures, tactics

and organisation of tenant participation actually conferred a degree of influence in

the renewal process of the BLCP. The structures, organisation and tactics are treated

as the variables of tenant participation and the processes as the dependent variable,

themselves adopted from a similar study by Cairncross et al. (1994). Meanwhile,

Clegg’s (1989) understanding and framing of power also inform the framework.

33

However, preceding this, a brief contextual summary highlights the rationale for

pursuing a PPP for this particular project.

3.1 The neoliberal and PPP context

The contextual basis for this theoretical approach is the increasing importance and

pervasiveness of neoliberal market-‐driven initiatives and interventions in many

policy areas and public sectors. Weber (2002) illustrates neoliberalism as a:

‘hypermarketised style of governance (i.e. government through and by the

market) that denigrates collective consumption and institutions. It is also an

ideological fetishisation of pure, perfect markets as superior allocative

mechanisms for the distribution of public resources.’

In the literature this is referred to in a number of forms such as managerialism and

New Public Management (NPM). In Australia, neoliberalism has commonly been

labelled as economic rationalism and has become a dominant ideology utilised

within government (Jacobs et al., 2010). Essentially, the ideology refers to the

encouragement of market exchange principles as a mechanism for allocating

resources across diverse social policy sectors (Peck, 2001).

According to Burke and Hayward (2000), the rise of this ideology and its applicability

for public housing has been influenced by three factors. The first, as just mentioned,

is the rise to dominance of neoliberalism within government as a means for

delivering previously public funded and provided services. In Australia this initially

followed the lead of the European social democratic and British public

administration tradition; characteristically defined by regulated markets, high tariffs

and state-‐owned enterprises. However, during the mid-‐1980s, a shift occurred in

favour of deregulating markets, cutting protectionist policies and privatising the

state-‐owned enterprises. As suggested by Pusey (1991), in order to be competitive,

the public sector needed to be reoriented to function in a more business-‐like

manner. The second factor was the increasing salience of public choice and agency

34

theories, again the focus being a mission to privatise and increase competitiveness.

Burke and Hayward (2000) refer to the Mant Report and an Industry Commission3

report that sought to push for the SHAs to relinquish their monopolistic hold on

public housing, which at the time rendered them unaccountable to government and

clients, inefficient and unresponsive to the consumer. The final factor was the

awareness that the social housing assistance sector required reform due to long

waiting lists, poor management and inadequate and poorly maintained stock. This

reform agenda was established at a time when government began to redirect

housing assistance towards private rental subsidies.

The underlying rationale for this shift was supported by recognition of the systemic

and financial advantages to pursing a neoliberal agenda. However, there was also its

ability to be a potent discursive tool that could be utilised to justify market

intervention into sectors traditionally administered by governments and the public

sector, or with the potential to alter relationships based on power (Kaščák & Pupala,

2011). In many instances, such neoliberal intervention materialises in the form of

PPPs. The applicability of neoliberalism to public housing renewal projects is

demonstrated in this regard. A primary example is linking the discursive narrative of

obsolescence as a driver for market-‐driven renewal in public housing. Thus the

undertaking of some projects under the auspices of PPPs is the context in which we

currently observe public housing renewal.. While it is not neoliberalism or economic

rationalism that is being assessed here, it is relevant to provide this context as a

trigger for the advent of PPPs and increasing influence and power of the private

sector in renewal (Arthurson, 2003). Additionally, it provides context for the

analytical framework that is the source of analysis. This neoliberal trigger is made

explicit by Lepofsky and Fraser (2003, p. 128), who refer to the increasing flexibility

of modes of accumulation (that are commensurate with a neoliberal, market-‐driven

agenda) and the emergence of a requirement for political economy of place, which

seeks to “mediate the competition for capital”. PPPs are an outcome of this

mediation process.

3 For more information see the Mant Report (Mant, 1992) and the Industry Commission report (Industry Commission, 1993).

35

The above is offered as a means of positioning public housing renewal PPPs as a

product of neoliberalism.

3.2 Power

In Arnstein’s typology (1969) she promotes citizen participation as being able to

achieve a categorical status of citizen power. Citizen power in this regard is the

redistribution of power that enables previously “have-‐not citizens” to be included in

decision making (Arnstein, 1969). Therefore it is a strategy that incorporates

processes, structures and the like, or, as she puts it, “the means by which they [have-‐

not citizens] can induce significant social reform which enables them to share in the

benefits of the affluent society” (Arnstein, 1969). This understanding, while clarifying

the notional action of citizen power, does not explain what power is. To understand

how the means of citizen power are translated into real power, the work of Clegg

(1989) is useful here.

Clegg (1989) attempts to offer an illustration and explanation of what power does,

as opposed to what it is. To this end, he posits that power:

‘is simply the effectiveness of strategies for achieving for oneself a greater

scope for action than for others implicated by one's strategies. Power is not

any thing nor is it necessarily inherent in any one; it is a tenuously produced

and reproduced effect which is contingent upon the strategic competences

and skills of actors who would be powerful’ (Clegg, 1989, pp. 32–33).

According to Clegg (1989) there is no single originating and dominant nexus of power

but in actual fact what one can observes is a series of alliances that are constantly

being redefined and are in no way concrete. This requires a perspective that “power

is best approached through a view of more or less complex organised agents

engaged in more or less complex, organised games” (Clegg, 1989, p. 20). Simply put,

it is a phenomenon that is relational, in the sense that one’s power is dependent up

36

being positioned against another agent of lesser or equal competence and skill.

Possession of power may only be fixed if “obligatory passage points” become fixed

(Clegg, 1989). This concept refers to the avenues through which power relationships

are manifested and battled over; they are the “rules of the game”. For Arnstein

(1969) they are the specific modes in, or through, which citizen participation is

conducted. If temporary, they can be influenced by exogenous factors or by the

agents themselves. Change can occur as a result of resistance to power being

exercised through the avenues at the disposal of the agents. Alternatively, the act of

resistance may consolidate itself to an extent that it creates a new “obligatory

passage point”; Clegg (1989) calls this “organisational outflanking” . Cairncross et al.

(1994) provide examples to illustrate both. The former could be exemplified in

tenants seeking to influence authorities over the details of a renewal project through

participation mechanisms. While the latter may involve tenants disputing the very

definition of tenant participation, seeking to restate its meaning in order to gain

more influence or control.

Clegg (1989) places considerable importance on the fluid and contingent nature of

power. He focuses attention on the ability of actors to organise and use strategies

and resources to redirect the power balance in their favour. Furthermore, he

emphasises the creation of networks and alliances to achieve this aim. Additionally,

the relational aspect maintains saliency to reiterate that power is based on agents

playing off against each other. Without it, power is meaningless. This is valuable in

the context of Arnstein’s (1969) typology which stresses the dynamics of interaction

between actors.

In evaluating tenant participation’s influence this understanding of power is useful.

Influence can be determined via how actors capitalise upon the “obligatory passage

points” as conceived by the various approaches and constructions of tenant

participation, alongside external factors.

37

3.3 Arnstein’s Ladder of Citizen Participation

In forming her typology on citizen participation Arnstein was questioning one of

democracy’s main tenets, that of “participation of the governed in their

government” (1969, p. 216). She was seeking to explore the activities and status of

the “have-‐nots”, those without power, and to do so within the parameters of

participation, which for the have-‐nots was understood as a redistribution of power.

This process of participation enabled the have-‐nots to attain a status within the

political and economic process, with the highest status being citizen power, the main

objective being to seek inclusion. Her reference to participation as a “strategy” infers

that it is an active process and an action that requires implementation (Arnstein,

1969). Through this “strategy” the have-‐nots take part in determining outcomes.

In referring to the notion of “empty ritual versus benefit” Arnstein posits the exact

hypothesis that this thesis explores, that “there is as critical difference between

going through the empty ritual of participation and having the real power needed to

affect the outcome of the process” (1969, p. 216). This leads to an airing and

listening of a broad range of views and interests, but sees that only some are

successful.

In defining terms earlier, the link between tenant and citizen participation was made

explicit. There is merit in framing tenant participation in this manner due to the

similarity in core characteristics and objectives of the two terms. The typology can

thus be adapted to evaluate tenant participation in the context of public housing

renewal programs. In fact, at the time Arnstein was a former Chief Advisor on Citizen

Participation in the US Department for Housing and Urban Development’s (HUD)

Model Cities Administration assessing citizen participation proposals. The Model

Cities program aimed to improve coordination of existing urban programs in cities

struggling to cope with poverty and local governance; cities included Oakland,

Seattle, California, Detroit and Michigan (Weber & Wallace, 2012). The program's

initial objectives centred on comprehensive planning, including not only rebuilding

but also rehabilitation, social service delivery and citizen participation. Following the

establishment of the Nixon administration in 1969, new policy objectives were

38

outlined and the focus on resident participation diminished (Weber & Wallace,

2012). In this regard, Arnstein was most certainly writing with the interests of

tenants in mind, at the time consisting of the racial minority groups of welfare-‐

assisted urban Latinos and African Americans. This provides authority to Arnstein as

the author of this typology and relevance for the applicability of the framework to

public housing tenants.

Refocusing the typology to fit the tenant participation process of a public housing

renewal project, Arnstein’s (1969) “have-‐nots” would be considered tenants who vis-‐

à-‐vis other actors and stakeholders are understood to commence without any

power. At this point tenants are seeking to redistribute power through the means of

participation. Just as in Arnstein’s depiction, participation is the “strategy” which is

the active process and the implementation of actions, an example of which might be

the decision to conduct and subsequent carrying out of a tenant consultation

meeting. Through consultation sessions tenants aim to be influential in determining

outcomes for renewal, particularly for their own benefit and interest. Ideally, they

will seek to attain the highest possible degree of power through these participatory

mechanisms.

The Ladder itself consists of eight rungs, each responding to a differing degree of

citizen participation (see Figure 1). The eight rungs, from the bottom, are:

Manipulation, Therapy, Informing, Consultation, Placation, Partnership, Delegate

Power and Citizen Control.

39

Figure 1. Arnstein’s Ladder of Citizen Participation

Source: Pétursdóttir (2012)

3.4 Variables of tenant participation

The variables utilised to identify tenant participation in this thesis are adopted from

a previous study conducted by Cairncross et al. (1994). Their study took a similar

approach to evaluate whether tenant participation empowered tenants in the

context of six local housing authorities in Britain. In doing this they developed a

number of variables of tenant participation building on Clegg’s definition of power.

These have been picked up as the same variables to categorise what has occurred in

the way of tenant participation in the BLCP renewal. The four variables are:

1. Structures (independent variable): Broken into formal and informal, these

constitute the methods of tenant participation. Examples of the formal

methods include tenant representation on committees or advisory boards

and regular discussion meetings between tenants and authorities. In

contrast, informal methods range from newsletters, irregular meetings

40

between tenants and authorities, surveys and information handouts.

Intertwined with the structures are issues relating to accessibility of

participation, representation and frequency.

2. Organisation (independent variable): Means the effective utilisation of

resources at the disposal of the tenants. Clegg refers to this as dispositional

power (1989). In the case of tenants these are likely to be limited but are

exemplified by the collective force of a tenant community, the ability to

mobilize individually (i.e. sign a petition), having the means of

communication and the appropriate skills or knowledge to be influential.

3. Tactics (independent variable): Refer to matters of strategy that capitalise on

effective leveraging of the previous two indicators, of external factors or the

powerlessness and weaknesses of authorities or other actors. It relies on the

ability of tenants to present a strong argument. These could include the use

of the media or protests to oppose. They are often mobilised when more

“civilised” avenues have failed.

4. Processes (dependent variable): Occur within the established structures and

determine how the structures are operationalised. The eight processes used

by (Cairncross et al. (1994) are providing information, seeking information

(both which are labeled as prerequisites that feed into the remaining

processes), listening, consultation, dialogue, joint management, choice and

control. In this thesis, these replace the rungs of Arnstein’s (1969) ladder, for

which justification is provided in the remainder of this chapter. To reiterate

the reasoning for processes being chosen as the dependent variable, Chapter

1 outlined their scalability on a figurative ladder to determine the degree of

influence in decision making. As tenants move up the ladder each “process

rung” marks a higher degree of influence. This is the rationale behind using

processes of tenant participation as a proxy for the level of influence.

Defining the variables of tenant participation as such assist the thesis in two ways.

41

The first refined and coded the data collected, to clearly demonstrate what has and

what has not taken place in the BLCP. This fed into what the barriers and promoters

to tenant participation might be. The second was their applicability and adaptability

to Arnstein’s Ladder. As her typology is somewhat of a loose construction it lends

well to adaptation. The variables outlined here are generally a good fit for what is

described by Arnstein.

3.5 Alternative participatory frameworks

According to Franklin and Sloper (2006), the key element in choosing, constructing or

adapting a participatory framework is to understand the term “participation” and

thus define what kind of participation is appropriate and how it is best achieved.4

The fact that decision making is stated in Arnstein’s Ladder as the final desired

outcome of participation means that for this reason many of the frameworks, while

useful, do not fit the stated objective. For instance, while Warburton et al.’s (2007;

see Appendix 1) model for “Engagement in the policy cycle” and Davidson’s

(Davidson, 1998; see Appendix 1) “Wheel of Participation” provide excellent

opportunities for conceptualizing dimensions of participation, their integrated

circular approaches don’t specify a clear end point, nor in their present form do they

provide the possibility for an evaluative function.

Furthermore, the simplicity of Arnstein’s Ladder also provides for easy reading and

interpretation, as many of the alternative models, while aesthetically pleasing, are

often difficult to interpret and manoeuvre. Finally, of the frameworks considered, it

is one of the few that explicitly accounts for issues of power and how its

redistribution can take place. A comparison conducted by Martín (2010; see

Appendix 1) highlights the utility of Arnstein’s Ladder and how it actually goes

beyond later incarnations, such as the OECD’s Active Participation Framework.

4 A good source of participation models, frameworks and theories is provided by Karsten (2012) in Participation Models: Citizens, Youth, Online. The models covered focus on citizen, youth and online approaches.

42

3.6 A new ladder and model for tenant participation

The framework developed for this thesis reflects an amalgamation of Arnstein’s

(1969) Ladder of Citizen Participation, Cairncross et al.'s (1994) variables of tenant

participation and Davies' (2009) Matrix of Participation.

In developing the framework the premises and aims of Arnstein’s (1969) Ladder

explained above are retained but the processes (dependent variable) of tenant

participation outlined by Cairncross et al. (1994) replace the rungs of citizen

participation, essentially becoming a new ladder of tenant participation. The major

difference, and rationale for a new ladder, is at the lower end of the ladder where

Cairncross et al.’s (1994) “prerequisite” criteria (providing information and seeking

information) provide a more accessible manner of identifying and measuring tenant

participation than the rather ambiguous lower rungs proposed by Arnstein (1969)

(manipulation and therapy). This is a pragmatic decision based on the assumption

that any public housing renewal project that purports tenant participation will at the

very least satisfy the processes of providing and seeking information. Also, as this

thesis seeks to evaluate the case study the new ladder stipulates more definitive and

practical criteria that can be used to assess the mechanisms of tenant participation.

The overarching groups (non-‐participation and degrees of tokenism) are the same,

except for a change to the degrees of citizen power, which become degrees of

tenant power. The new ladder consists of the following eight process rungs:

providing information, seeking information, listening, consultation, dialogue, joint

management, choice and control. The descriptions for each process rung of tenant

participation are a combination of those used by Arnstein (1969) and Cairncross et

al. (1994). In most cases there were only small differences anyway. The descriptions

of the eight process rungs of the new ladder can be seen in Table 3.

43

Table 3. Process rungs for a new ladder of tenant participation5

5 Adapted from Cairncross et al. (1994) and Arnstein (1969).

44

This new ladder is subsequently placed into a larger model. This model is inspired by

Davies’ (2009) Matrix of Participation, in which he incorporates a horizontal axis

outlining the different approaches to participation. In this case the axis includes the

three independent variables: structure, organisation and tactics. These are further

divided up into sub headings to highlight the relevant indicators gleaned from the

data analysis that fall within each variable. The idea behind this is twofold. First, it

clearly deciphers the mass of data and orders it neatly and systematically. Secondly,

it places each identified structure, organisation and tactic on a rung (or multiple

rungs if applicable) of the ladder to demonstrate the intention or impact that each

participatory variable can have. The logic behind it is that in doing so the ladder,

within the model, will reveal where tenants are positioned in relation to decision

making influence as a result of the individual variable. The model, inclusive of the

new ladder of tenant participation, is provided below in Figure 2.

Figure 2. A model for tenant participation6

6 Adapted from Cairncross et al. (1994), Arnstein (1969) and Davies (2009).

45

Chapter 4. Research methodology

4.1 Type of analysis

The thesis adopts a qualitative case study analysis of the BCLP, which consists of two

components. First, a document analysis of items relevant to the project and second,

a series of semi-‐structured interviews with key informants. Additionally, as

presented above, a rigorous analysis of the existing literature on the topic was also

undertaken. The literature and case study elements, particularly the interviewing

process, were complementary in the qualitative analysis of the thesis. Conducting

the analysis in this way was key to answering the research question as a result of a

triangulation process. This triangulation element was crucial in ensuring that one

data source qualified another and therefore reinforced and validated the findings

(Gillham, 2005).

4.2 Case selection

The empirical basis of this thesis focused on a single case study of public housing

renewal in an Australian context. Flyvbjerg (2006) provides solid argumentation that

the method of case study analysis is undervalued for the wrong reasons. He argues

that case studies provide concrete, context-‐dependent knowledge that is crucial and

more valuable to human learning, than simply pursuing predictive theories

(Flyvbjerg, 2006). Furthermore, seeking to “generalise” outcomes of an empirical

case study is a futile pursuit and overvalued in scientific theory testing; instead case

studies supplement alternative methods and provide a “force of example”

(Flyvbjerg, 2006, p. 228). Finally, the assumption that case studies contain greater

bias is also incorrect. Case studies contain “no greater bias toward verification of of

the researcher’s preconceived notions than other methods of inquiry” (Flyvbjerg,

2006, p. 237). In fact, case studies are more likely to hold a bias towards falsification

of preconceived notions.

In selecting a case study for analysis the selection process followed the reasoning of

Flyvbjerg. It also took an information-‐oriented selection approach in order to

46

maximise the utility of information of a single case (Flyvbjerg, 2006). To this end the

BLCP was chosen on the expectation of the information it would provide. In its status

as a pathfinder project, namely as “the first large renewal project to feature use of a

Public Private Partnership (PPP), whereby a special purpose PPP company,

composed of a number of existing legal entities, would be formed to manage all

aspects of the project for a 30 year term” (Coates, Kavanagh, Judd, & Unsworth,

2008, p. 5). It was deemed that it would supplement the analytical framework that

was developed in Chapter 3 and provide an ideal “force of example”. Ultimately, this

would provide an excellent informational source for looking at tenant participation

within a PPP and neoliberal arena and from which to assess preconceived notions as

embodied in the hypothesis. Furthermore, the stated commitment that tenant

participation “was given a particular priority in Bonnyrigg” was also a good fit for the

parameters of the thesis (Coates et al., 2008, p. 5). The approach taken by the BLCP

was intended to be tested, with the “lessons learnt informing the Living

Communities approach and future Housing NSW renewal projects” (Coates et al.,

2008, p. 5). In the same light, this thesis takes an approach to exploring whether

outcomes could be gleaned from the BLCP and provide context-‐dependent

knowledge and learning for future renewal projects.

4.3 Data collection

4.3.1 Document analysis

The document analysis consisted of identifying key official and unofficial documents

pertaining to the BCLP since its commencement. The documents identified included:

-‐ The Bonnyrigg Living Communities Baseline Survey (Stubbs, Randolph, &

Judd, 2005)

-‐ Bonnyrigg Living Communities Public Private Partnership project – Summary

of Contracts (Housing NSW, 2010)

-‐ Phase 1: Bonnyrigg Community Engagement Feedback (Stubbs, 2007a)

-‐ Phase 2: Bonnyrigg Community Engagement Feedback (Stubbs, 2007b)

47

-‐ Preferred Project Report: Bonnyrigg Living Communities (Urbis, 2008a)

-‐ Living Communities Project for Bonnyrigg – Summary Report 2005 (Murray,

Shore, & Sarkissian, 2005)

-‐ Bonnyrigg Living Communities Project -‐ Section 5 Services Manual: 5.4

Community Renewal Services Plan (Bonnyrigg Partnerships, 2008)

-‐ Telling the Story: Community Engagement in Bonnyrigg (Coates et al., 2008)

-‐ Review of Community Renewal and Engagement in Bonnyrigg -‐ Audit

(Cultural Perspectives Pty Ltd, 2007)

-‐ Bonnyrigg Living Communities Project – Social Impact Assessment (Stubbs,

2007c)

-‐ Bonnyrigg Masterplan (Urbis, 2008b)

-‐ Newleaf Bonnyrigg: Concept Plan Modifications -‐ Section 75W Application to

Modify MP06_0046 (Urbis, 2011)

-‐ Newleaf Communities website content and newsletters

These were primarily internet-‐sourced, publicly available documents or provided by

key informants who had permission to forward additional relevant documents that

were not available for general public access. Any non-‐academic data was considered

to be relevant to this stage of the analysis as it represented functional, working

evidence of the BLCP.

4.3.2 Semi-‐structured interviews

The second component entailed a series of 14 semi-‐structured interviews with key

informants. It was believed that in conducting interviews with key informants in this

manner it would lead to the collection of considerable empirical, practical and

firsthand data, as well as the opportunity to validate data that had been drawn from

the aforementioned document analysis (Sofaer, 2002). Furthermore, the semi-‐

structured approach would allow for an explorative angle to be utilised during

interviews, for the possibility of asking additional questions and to redirect the focus

if the need arose (Spannow, 1997).

48

The development of the interview questions started at an early stage during the

initial literature research. The gradual compilation and subtraction of questions

considered to be relevant (or subsequently not) were recorded in order to develop a

comprehensive list and to begin the organisation process so as to structure the

interview in a sequence and with a range of pertinent questions (Gillham, 2005). This

process highlighted where questions overlapped and could be amalgamated or

where it was possible to group similarly focused questions together. Most

importantly it resulted in a clear narrative sequence, which ensured that questions

followed logically and built upon each other. As a maximum of five questions were

intended to guide each interview, narrowing down to the most important questions

was essential. Particular focus was placed on establishing a set of five standard

questions that could be asked to each of the key informants, despite their various

levels of experience and professional backgrounds.

In developing the format and wording of the questions an initial technical interview

guide was prepared to state the questions in their theoretical format and technical

jargon. Once the final five questions were determined a functional interview guide

was developed that rephrased them into more accessible language in order to

ensure the set questions were able to be understood by the range of key informants.

The rephrasing process, focused on whether the questions were “sayable” and

“clear” (Gillham, 2005, p. 21). This process was assisted by feedback from

organisations contacted that suggested various changes to the wording of questions.

Particularly, in the case of the tenant interviews, a completely new interview guide

was created consisting of the same five questions but in further refined language.

All interviews were conducted via Skype, some recorded and others not, and written

notes were taken throughout each interview. The length varied between 30 minutes

and an hour. Interviews were not transcribed. The nature and style of the interviews

took a relaxed approach, with the five questions not always being explicitly asked.

Instead, interviewees were allowed to “tell their own story”, while probing and

clarification techniques were occasionally employed where necessary in order to

ensure the topics of the set questions were covered. Interviewees provided

49

examples where relevant. All interviewees were asked if they were happy to be

identified or wished to remain anonymous, although no key informants were

identified when directly quoting in the findings and analysis section. This was

considered to be necessary for consistency, as all interviews were not recorded it

would avoid misquoting individuals. Additionally, interviewees were also offered the

opportunity to be provided a copy of the audio or notes recorded.

4.4 Participant selection

The key informants interviewed for this thesis included (see Appendix 2 for details):

-‐ Six academics and researchers from the University of New South Wales

(UNSW) and the University of Western Sydney (UWS)

-‐ Three employees from the NSW Land & Housing Corporation (Housing NSW)

-‐ Two external consultants from Sarkissian Associates Pty Ltd

-‐ One employee from Fairfield City Council (FCC)

-‐ One employee from Shelter NSW

-‐ One current long term private residents couple living on the Newleaf

Bonnyrigg estate. They are also members of the Bonnyrigg Private Owners

Group (BPOG)

-‐ One academic from Swinburne University (Note: provided written feedback)

Additional individuals and organisations were contacted and interviews requested

but were not interviewed due to limited time availability at the time of request or

non-‐response to the interview request. These included the private developer, Becton

Property Group Limited; the Private Management Company (PMC), Newleaf

Communities; the tenancy services provider, St George Community Housing;

members of the Bonnyrigg Community Reference Group and members of the

Bonnyrigg Tenant Group (via Newleaf Communities); local community organisation,

Fairfield Migrant Resource Centre (FMRC); and various additional individuals from

UNSW, FCC and Housing NSW.

50

The task of selecting the key informants followed a mixed approach. In order to

maximise the data collection process and ensure accuracy and relevance of the data,

it was decided that only individuals who had firsthand involvement with the BLCP

were to be targeted. This facilitated the decision to target current and former

practitioners, including policy makers at the local and state level, state and local

government personnel, local community organisations, the private management

consortium, tenant groups and academics.

Firstly, key informants were identified by who the literature indicated were relevant

to the renewal project. Repeated studies and evaluation reviews illuminated the

types of individuals and organisations centrally involved at various levels of

responsibility and across a range of activities. Similar academic and evaluative

studies on the project were sought out and scoped for the kinds of key informants

targeted. In some cases lists of individuals were available through this avenue, which

assisted in guiding the selection process.7 Secondly, the snowballing technique

proved constructive as each interviewee was asked to provide recommendations of

who they believed to be additional key informants. This was particularly valuable

from the point of view that more often than not individuals already contacted or

identified would be recommended. This ensured that the right key informants were

being targeted.

Important to note is that all academics interviewed had previous or current direct

involvement in professional capacities to the BCLP, in addition to the academic

research they had undertaken and published. The kind of professional involvement

they exhibited included, amongst others, forming part of evaluation teams for

government or privately funded audits and reviews and working on community

engagement related tasks (i.e. developing consultation procedures and guidelines).

In this sense, while these academics were approached due to their research

background relating to the BCLP, it was in the knowledge that they were

7 For example, the Review of Community Renewal and Engagement in Bonnyrigg -‐ Audit carried out by Cultural Perspectives (2007) detailed a list of key informants associated with the BLCP, which were interviewed as part of the qualitative data collection process.

51

professionally active in the renewal process and could hence credibly inform the

thesis.

4.5 Method of analysis

Given the susceptibility of qualitative data and case-‐specific material to subjectivity,

analysing it presents one of the biggest challenges (Sofaer, 2002). It is vital that

qualitative data be treated carefully and not used to make generic statements and

assumptions that may not be applicable to cases or populations outside of the

present study.

To alleviate this threat and transform the data collected from the document analysis

and the semi-‐structured interviews to a workable state, all data was coded according

to thematic categories designed to appropriately evaluate the data and to assist in

the analysis of the research focus (Richards, 2005). The rationale for this was to

effectively sort the data and present it clearly, as well as to assist in recognising

patterns or gaps in the findings. This thesis used a mixture of topic and analytical

coding to allocate data to an appropriate theme category and to distinguish between

data that requires interpretation and reflection that may lead to theory

“emergence” and affirmation (Richards, 2005, p. 88).

As outlined in Chapter 3, a participatory framework was established by adapting

various existing models. The adoption of Cairncross et al.’s (1994) variables for

tenant participation (structures, organisation and tactics) informed the topic-‐coding

phase and constituted the coding themes for this stage of the thesis.

Subsequently analytical-‐coding took place during the analysis phase and allowed for

a reconsideration of the data in different contexts that were identified within each

variable. This resulted in the data being coded by what have been termed tenant

participation “indicators”. An example of this may be a tenant meeting which is an

indicator of the structures variable. The data was analysed looking for the same set

of indicators across both stages of the BLCP. The same indicators were mostly, but

not always, identified in both stages.

52

Chapter 5. Case study: Bonnyrigg Living Communities Project (BLCP)

5.1 An overview of the BLCP

The BLCP was announced by the NSW State Labor Government in December 2004,

with further details released by the newly appointed Housing Minister, Joe Tripodi,

on February 3, 2005 (Noonan, 2005). At the outset the project was earmarked as a

physical and social renewal of the former ‘Radburn’8 low-‐density estate located in

Sydney’s South West (see Figure 3), approximately 40 kilometres from the Sydney

CBD. It was to be Australia’s first social housing PPP (Noonan, 2005). The physical

renewal consisted of the replacement of 833 existing, poorly maintained social

housing units over a site area of approximately 80 hectares with 2330 new homes

(Housing NSW, 2013). This would include a tenure mix of 699 social housing9 homes

and 1531 private residences. The estate would ultimately consist of a mix of 30%

social housing and 70% owner-‐occupied (private) housing. The original plan

accommodated the extra 134 dwellings at an off site location to ensure the original

stock of 833 social housing dwellings would be maintained, this later changed

following the lodgment of a Development Application (DA) in December 2011 to

increase the onsite housing stock to 2500. The social renewal, on the other hand,

would focus on regeneration of the community in order to improve the lives of the

residents on the estate (Noonan, 2005).

8 The term ‘Radburn’ design originated from the design of the town of Radburn in New Jersey, USA by Clarence Stein and Henry Wright in 1928 (Woodward, 1997). Its design was intended to encourage interaction between neighbours by constructing houses that opened onto communal spaces and pathways that sprawled throughout the neighbourhood. It is considered a failure of urban design due to the characteristic cul-‐de-‐sacs, alleyways and high fences that led to unsafe living conditions, reinforced social problems and isolation with many of the open communal spaces remaining underutilised (Woodward, 1997). 9 It is important to note that even though the dwellings are referred to as “social housing” they actually fall in the category of “public housing”. The reference to social housing is due to the nature of the PPP arrangement, which stipulates St George Community Housing as the tenancy services management provider but the rights and responsibilities of Bonnyrigg tenants as public housing tenants remain.

53

Figure 3. BLCP estate prior to the renewal

Source: Urbis (2008b)

Following an extensive bidding process that incorporated an initial Expression of

Interest (EOI) request, followed by a Request for Detailed Proposals (RDP) by the

three shortlisted EOIs, one of which declined the opportunity, Bonnyrigg

Partnerships (or Newleaf Communities, as it is now known) was selected by Housing

NSW to undertake the $733 million renewal of Bonnyrigg (Housing NSW, 2013).

Newleaf Communities comprises the Becton Property Group Limited, Westpac

Banking Corporation Limited, St George Community Housing Association and the

Spotless Group. Newleaf Communities is responsible for the following aspects of the

project: finance, design and construction of all new homes and tenancy and facilities

management services for the social housing on the estate (Housing NSW, 2010). The

construction phase of the project is expected to take around 13 to 14 years and the

last of the 18 stages (see Figure 4) of the physical renewal is due for completion in

2021.

54

Figure 4. BLCP Staging Map

Source: Newleaf Communities (2013a)

As of October 2007, management of all public housing was transferred to Newleaf

Communities, with tenancy management being sub-‐contracted to St George

Community Housing (Housing NSW, 2013).

Currently, Stage 1 (June 2010), Stage 2 (July 2011) and Stage 3 (May 2013) have been

completed. The first stage included the completion of 39 social and 67 private

dwellings, a new park, sporting facilities and local roads. Unit prices ranged from

$330,000 to $535,000. Stage 2 added 40 social housing and 64 private dwellings.

Stage 3 consisted of 75 social and 84 private homes (Newleaf Communities, 2013d).

The relocation of 88 tenants for Stages 4 and 5 has been completed, with

commencement of Stage 4 envisaged to start as soon as possible. This has stalled

following the receivership status of Becton Property Group Limited. The Partnership

Agreement (PA) however allows for the Project Company (PC) to appoint a new

development partner to oversee ongoing construction (Newleaf Communities,

2013c). All other services are experiencing business as usual.

55

The BLCP has three core objectives. These are (Stubbs et al., 2005):

1. Providing better services and creating opportunities;

2. Building a stronger community; and

3. Renewal of houses and public areas.

These objectives make explicit the dual physical and social renewal dimensions of

the project, documented in the Community Renewal Plan and the Physical

Redevelopment Plan.

The BLCP is considered “the pathfinder project for the Living Communities Program”,

Housing NSW’s strategic renewal program (Cultural Perspectives Pty Ltd, 2007, p. 3).

According to Cultural Perspectives’ (2007) audit of BLCP’s community engagement

and renewal approach, as the first project to place community as central to the

decision making and planning renewal process, it is envisaged that it will provide a

precedent for similar community engagement and renewal projects in the future,

particularly in the PPP context.

5.2 The Bonnyrigg community

Prior to the renewal project, the Bonnyrigg community and the immediate region

exhibited a variety of important elements that require brief consideration. These are

crucial to understanding the dynamics of tenant participation in the renewal process.

First of all, in a demographic sense the area is highly culturally and linguistically

diverse. The Bonnyrigg Living Communities Baseline Study (Stubbs et al., 2005)

indicated that 43% of residents surveyed did not speak English (or didn’t speak it

well) in comparison to the remainder of the Sydney Statistical Division (SSD), which

reported a figure of 4.4%. The range of dominant languages used in the home

demonstrated the extent of cultural diversity: English (30.3%), Vietnamese (26.4%),

Khmer (7.0%), Arabic (6.4%), Chinese (5.6%) and Spanish (4%) (Stubbs et al., 2005). A

high proportion of tenants were also born overseas. At the time of the Baseline

Study (Stubbs et al., 2005) the average age was relatively young, but since the

56

renewal project began this has reportedly changed quite dramatically with many of

the younger tenants opting to move away from the area.

Similarly, the area demonstrates poor socio-‐economic indicators, with a high

number of vulnerable people (e.g. disabled, humanitarian migrants and refugees,

low-‐income families, aged residents and indigenous families) residing in the locality

(Stubbs, 2007c). Lower levels of formal education and qualifications were also

common. Across NSW it was one of the most disadvantaged areas on the

Disadvantage Index (lowest 0.5%) and was highly materially disadvantaged (Stubbs,

2007c).

However, the area was fortunate to have excellent access to employment, transport

and services infrastructure, and the greater region was earmarked as a priority for

significant further development in these categories (NSW Department of Planning &

Infrastructure, 2005). A key finding, and one to bear in mind for the analysis of this

study, is that the Baseline Study revealed that more than three-‐quarters of tenant

respondents felt either ‘positive’ or ‘very positive’ about the status of the

community prior to the renewal (Stubbs et al., 2005).

Chapter 6. Tenant participation in the BLCP

There are three components to the findings and analysis of this thesis. The first is the

presentation of what the data, when applied to the model, reveals about the extent

of tenant influence in the BLCP. While the second considers the findings from the

first component with respect to Clegg’s (1989) concept of power. Arnstein (1969) is

also returned to and touched upon in passing. Finally, the third component considers

tenant participation influence within the context of the PPP model and neoliberal-‐

led renewal.

As a point of clarification, before delving into the case study, use of the term

“tenants” when discussing the BLCP collectively pertains to both public and private

residents on the estate and not just those living in public housing dwellings. While

57

there is an obvious distinction, and as individual groups they have their own

participatory mechanisms, which will be identified, it is beyond the scope of this

paper to separate them as individual units of analysis.

6.1 The methods of tenant participation and their influence

From the earliest stages of the renewal process, tenant participation was earmarked

as being of central importance to the success of the project. The Bonnyrigg Living

Communities Baseline Survey (Stubbs et al., 2005, p. 13), identified as one of its key

findings that “much is likely to depend upon the extent to which the community can

continue to be involved in shaping the future direction of their area, as well as

managing and accommodating the differences that are already evident between the

needs and aspirations of individual households as planning for the renewal of

Bonnyrigg progress.” This created an expectation that tenant participation would be

viewed as a key component of the project and admirably it is a message that has

been consistent right throughout, albeit perhaps to varying degrees overtime.

To provide a brief picture of the evolution of tenant participation in the BLCP the

document analysis and key informant interviews revealed two distinct periods within

the project to date that are demonstrative of how the process has unfolded. These

have been identified as Planning Renewal and Activating Renewal.

The first period, Planning Renewal, largely constituted the extensive and excellent

work as reiterated by nearly all key informants, initially carried out by Housing NSW

and Fairfield City Council, alongside contracted consultants and experts. The

sentiments of one key informant characterized this collective recognition by others,

that following the initial announcement there was:

“nearly 12 months of absolutely fantastic consultation […] the committees,

training. It was marvelous” (Key Informant #1, 2013).

This included the design, management and delivery of all aspects of tenant

58

participation, followed by the gradual transition to Bonnyrigg Partnerships, again

working alongside contracted consultants. This ran from the announcement of the

project in December 2004 through to the transition to Bonnyrigg Partnerships in

October 2007, a period of almost 3 years. To highlight some key participation

mechanism, this period saw large-‐scale consultations, information sessions, a

plethora of small-‐scale events and innovative capacity building exercises that

characterised the tenant participation methods. The establishment of a Community

Information Centre that was open five days a week provided an ongoing presence

and interface with the community. A number of tenant bodies were also integrated

into the process, including the Bonnyrigg Community Reference Group (BCRG), the

Bonnyrigg Private Owners Group (BPOG) and the Bonnyrigg Public Tenants Group

(BPTG).

The second period, Activating Renewal, has been the domain of the private

consortium, namely Newleaf Communities, as the public management face of the

consortium. This period began with the transfer in October 2007 and has included

the completion of construction of Stages 1-‐3, up to the present day. Due to the

limited data in this period it is difficult to fully discern what tenant participation

mechanisms have actually occurred but the documents surveyed (i.e. the

Community Renewal Services Plan) revealed prospective plans for a range of

methods. Whether or not these have been implemented is sometimes difficult to

determine without the individuals or documentation to confirm it. Again to highlight

some of the significant mechanisms, the tenant participation methods appear to

have gradually changed into a business-‐as-‐usual dynamic and are tending towards

the use of community development undertakings, such as establishing regular social

networks and activities. Consultations with various groups, when relevant and

required (e.g. in the case of a DA), have been identified as continuing, and a series of

capacity building activities have also been developed for tenants. The onsite Newleaf

Communities office established in the latter stages of the Planning Renewal phase

also continues as a fulltime undertaking. In regards to tenant bodies, the BCRG, the

BPTG and the BPOG have all continued. An Independent Tenant Advocate is

59

functioning with a different model to the previous stage, with a sole focus on issues

of tenant management.

Throughout both periods, ongoing provision and access to information for tenants

about a broad range of aspects relating to the renewal was consistent and

considered to be plentiful. This was provided in written, visual/interactive and verbal

mediums, such as newsletters, mail outs, websites, public notice boards or

complaints call services. Authorities, and at times the BCRG, also utilized local media.

Additionally, to account for the diversity of languages in the Bonnyrigg community it

was recognised very early on that there was a need to ensure all tenant participation

mechanisms were delivered in multiple languages. As a result, this has been ongoing

and consistent.

Since its inception, the BLCP has been extremely proactive in how it pursues its

tenant participation agenda. Overseen by Housing NSW the project has built a

reputation for taking a proactive and committed line to incorporating tenant

participation and community engagement mechanisms and has reportedly engaged

over 4,000 people in consultations between December 2004 and October 2007 alone

(Housing NSW, 2013). This is well recognised and was acknowledged by most key

informants. Particularly in the early stages of the project the desire and intention,

led by Housing NSW, to engage tenants was strongly evident.

At the same time, there was however an acknowledgement that this has waned as

time has passed and, as early as the initial involvement of the private consortium, it

was suggested that the commitment to making tenant participation influential visibly

declined:

“The thing [tenant engagement] started to fall apart a little bit after the

developer was chosen” (Key Informant #1, 2013).

A look at the Newleaf Communities website, however, does claim that this stated

aim of tenant participation continues in order for it to be able to pursue construction

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of homes on the estate and lodge a DA. The website says that prior to submitting

such a request it “holds community consultations which showcase information about

each particular stage to be built” (Newleaf Communities, 2013b). Community

members are encouraged to attend, voice concerns or support and provide

feedback. Appropriate times are arranged for consultations, including multiple

sessions, in order to work around availability of residents. Following consultations,

feedback is assessed and, where appropriate, action is taken. However, a key

informant suggested that this is not the case when it comes to stage planning, the

individual claimed that tenants were given an initial opportunity to review the plans

at first release, then the second opportunity was once the DA had been lodged and if

change was desired by tenants:

“it’s a matter then of a legal process through council with objections […] and

most people are of the opinion, ‘well that’s too hard’ […] it’s already a

forgone conclusion” (Key Informant #1, 2013).

It is clear that there has been a very extensive process of tenant participation and

good variety has complemented this; this is not debatable. In this regard, the BLCP

has been highly successful and the evidence is there to support it. However, in light

of the data collected, and returning to the key research question, does this translate

to influence in decision making for tenants?

6.2 Findings of the tenant participation model

Within the framework developed and outlined previously, the data collected from

the document analysis and interviews was allocated according to the parameters

and indicators of the model. To this end, the data presented in Figure 5 revealed the

following illustration of tenant participation in the BLCP, broken down by each

variable.

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Figure 5. Influence of tenant participation in the BLCP, by variables

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The key finding highlighted by the distribution in the model demonstrates that

tenants are not sufficiently provided with the mechanisms to be influential in an

assured, consistent and lasting manner in the decision making process. This supports

the stated hypothesis that the structures, organisation and tactics at the disposal of

tenants in the BLCP fail to give them influence in decision making. This key finding is

supported by three sub-‐findings. One, while the tenant participation approaches

have been consistent they have barely gone beyond the dialogue rung of the model

and at best, can be considered as a degree of tokenism. The majority of indicators sit

in the providing information, seeking information and listening rungs. Two, for both

periods of the renewal process the tenant participation mechanisms have not

altered sufficiently to demonstrate that at certain times tenants had more influence

than others. In fact, where the data is available, it suggests the types of participation

mechanisms have diminished and with that, influence. Three, the kinds of

approaches that have constituted tenant participation in the BLCP have fallen within

the structures and organisation indicators, while tactics have been completely

absent.

Initially, this kind of outcome may seem surprising when considered in relation to

the contextual background provided earlier and the acknowledgement that the BLCP

has proven to be successful in its approach to tenant participation. This remains true

and is not the contention here, but with regards to real and concrete decision

making influence, the BLCP approach appears to have not exhibited this. The

offering of tenant participation approaches have resulted in tenants not being

guaranteed any degree of influence in the process.

It must be noted again however, as is addressed in the limitations section of this

study, the gaps in available data for the Activating Renewal stage are considered to

be problematic in concluding the findings and analysis. It should be taken into

account that this is a significant factor in the empirical analysis.

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6.2.1 The first sub-‐finding

Focusing on the first sub-‐finding, the model indicates that the strongest indicator of

tenant participation is that of bodies, situated at the level of dialogue. In the data,

bodies include the BCRG, the BPTG, the BPOG and the BTAG. While dialogue

incorporates negotiation between tenant representatives and groups, and implies a

desire to come to mutual agreement on negotiated topics, it provides no guarantee

that tenants (in this case, those representing tenants) will have their voice included

in final decision making. In fact, in such instances the authority has the final say and

ability to override.

The BCRG may be viewed as potentially climbing a rung to joint management as it is

in theory meant to accommodate a majority membership of tenants and thus has

the potential to use voting power in tenants’ favour. However, this potential is

currently not exercised as confirmed by a key informant recently involved in the

BLCP and thus it remains at the dialogue rung. It is important to note that the Terms

of Reference (TOR) for the BCRG have been proposed for a review, and this

potentially could change.

Yet, in reality the BCRG, the body identified by key informants as the most

important, essentially had no real authority to influence decision making. In the

majority of key informant interviews the BCRG was not stressed as a body that

allowed tenants to have any influence beyond providing:

“an opportunity for residents to have a voice” (Key Informant #2, 2013).

Only in one case was it identified as being influential. It is however worth

consideration as a forum for discussion, consultation and representation between

Housing NSW, FCC and tenants. According to the Community Renewal Services Plan,

the purpose of the BCRG is to “provide a point of reference for DOH and FCC as they

plan for implementation of the [BLCP]” and at the time of the management transfer

Newleaf Communities intended to continue to use it as a “primary source of advice

and direction for the project” (Bonnyrigg Partnerships, 2008, p. 29).

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There is little evidence to suggest that it goes beyond this, and a recent Bonnyrigg

Community Newsletter shed the most light on the current status of the BCRG,

stating, “the CRG discusses issues that may have been raised at the Bonnyrigg Public

Tenants Group of Bonnyrigg Private Owner’s Group, and map out ways of possible

resolution” (Newleaf Communities, 2012).

Additionally, the current embodiment of the BCRG and the BPTG is questionable in

its membership representation. The BCRG was open to all tenants at the time of its

inception, alongside other key stakeholders, although after a period this was closed

and further appointments had to be approved by existing members, which in itself is

quite restrictive but perhaps can be put down to what was deemed a practical

amount of members (Coates et al., 2008). Meanwhile, the current members of the

BPTG are described as:

“essentially the CRG. Pretty much the same people, pretty much have all

been living there for 25 years” (Key Informant #3, 2013).

These are the kinds of individuals who are always going to be involved regardless. In

this sense, it is failing to act as a representative body for tenants. A further key

informant stated that:

“they tap into other things. Like they’ll come to our crime and safety

committee and things like that now. Rather than it being about Bonnyrigg,

they operate a bit more like other NGOs in the area…rather than having a

specific Bonnyrigg group” (Key Informant #2, 2013).

Essentially the public tenants of the BLCP have never had, and certainly currently, do

not appear to have the institutional mechanisms in place that allow them to be

influential in decision making beyond token dialogue.

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A second indicator of note identified as being an example of non-‐influence, is

consultation. This again, according to the model is considered to be a token

expression of tenant participation, with authorities asking for the tenants views in

order to be considered in planning prior to reaching decisions. Tenants are given

sufficient time to formulate and express views, but no assurance that these will be

reflected in decision making. In regards to consultation, it was acknowledged by all

key informants that in the BLCP there was heavy investment and resourcing by way

of human capital and time that went into the Planning Renewal stage. The

consultation process was considered extensive and in comparison to prior renewal

projects in NSW it was a vast improvement.

In the Planning Renewal stage, the intention of the consultation process, inclusive of

events like the “Speak Out” sessions and “Our Bonnyrigg Dream”, was to inform the

brief for the Request for Detailed Proposals by the listed consortium candidates:

“[Housing NSW] wrote all this stuff into the contract […] They [the

consortium] were bound to meet the same standards” (Key Informant #4,

2013).

Meaning, bidding consortia were “being invited to consider community needs and

preferences expressed through the consultations in developing their detailed

proposals” (Coates et al., 2008, p. 12). While positive in its inference it does not

transcribe to definitive influence. This was left to the discretion of the bidding

consortia, which, while chosen on its previous “track record” of tenant engagement,

has been evaluated as not doing:

“it as well as [Housing NSW…], they don’t do it to the same standard, but

they do it to an OK standard, an acceptable standard […] Not as serious

minded about it […] I don’t think they do it quite as well, but they do a pretty

good job” (Key Informant #4, 2013).

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The essence of consultation in this model is a matter of tokenism. It does allow voice

and it does demonstrate a genuine proactive intervention but it does not translate

to definite influence, particularly in the context of a PPP model where attitudes of

stakeholders very greatly.

Additionally, a second key informant inferred that the “Speak Out” and “Our

Bonnyrigg Dream” consultations were further undermined due to the fact that

Housing NSW was in control of both the initial consultations and the construction of

the brief for the RDP that were undertaken parallel to each other. The inference was

that the RDP brief was a done deal and the outcomes of the consultations were only

included minimally. This is supported by tenants views as expressed in the Phase 2

Bonnyrigg Community Engagement Feedback Report, where they expressed that the

consultation process outcomes were not reflected in the plans and “that many of the

things the community has expressed a desire for throughout consultations have not

been accommodated for (e.g. lockable garages for all homes). Some feel that the

homes will be built for a low price and it does not matter what the community

prefers” (Stubbs, 2007b, p. 39). In essence, the economic model items were played

off against the “visionary” preferences identified by tenants and thus their influence

was quite limited. This again occurred in the Section 75W variation lodged by

Newleaf Communities in 2011, which sought to increase the onsite housing stock,

and thus the density. This was the view of one key informant in relation to this

particular scenario:

“I think the consultation around that was very poor and unfortunately those

changes meant that the trust […] in the community, you know, has

potentially diminished […] it reduced street frontage, it reduced open space,

it reduced a lot of the things the community were asking for in the initial DA

[…] Economic factors were driving it, were driving those decisions. Not

necessarily social outcomes […] there was little community consultation.

Look they made an effort, but in my opinion, compared to what happened

previously, you know it was fairly tokenistic” (Key Informant #2, 2013).

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A further example of this was referred to by five key informants who questioned

why a 30-‐70 public-‐private tenure mix was chosen for the renewal despite the

Bonnyrigg Living Communities Baseline survey revealing that 80% of respondents

desired at least 50% public housing post renewal, while 8% wanted only 30% public

housing (Stubbs et al., 2005).

What this demonstrates in accordance with the model, and similar to dialogue, is

that consultation does not sufficiently allow for tenants to be influential in key

decisions. Although this thesis acknowledges the strengths of the consultation

process that occurred in the BLCP, it can be demonstrated that the mechanisms at

this level have failed to deliver.

6.2.2 The second sub-‐finding

The second sub-‐finding indicates that overtime the types of tenant participation

mechanisms have altered little and as such, the level of influence of tenants is

unlikely to have changed. In fact, there is evidence to suggest that the mechanisms

in place have become even less meaningful, or that those proposed by Newleaf

Communities post-‐transfer have not come to fruition:

“There was slippage from [the early stages] to the Department, and then real

slippage from the Department to Becton essentially, or Bonnyrigg

Partnerships. And somewhere along there, the assumption that you really

had a say, slipped off. It just slipped away. So that the notion that you could

have influence definitely slipped away, and you know the men in suits took

over” (Key Informant #5, 2013).

In conjunction with the above model, a quick survey of the identified list of

indicators (see Appendix 3), and the participatory activities and services that took

place within each indicator, highlight that there are many similarities in what has

occurred in both stages. The obvious similarity is that all indicators have remained

the same across time, aside from the absence of information sessions in the

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Activating Renewal stage. As the model demonstrates, and was alluded to in the

previous finding, the types of indicators that have been present in BLCP tenant

participation lead only to a tokenistic level of tenant influence. The highest rungs of

consultation and dialogue attest to this. Moreover the intensity of indicators that sit

at the providing information, seeking information and listening rungs are not

considered participation but as Cairncross et al. (1994) determined, these should be

viewed as prerequisites and the minimum. This continuity of indicators may have

been considered a positive thing if they were at the level of tenant power, but as

they are not it highlights that the lack of influence tenants have has been reinforced

over time.

Where there is a difference over time, the model seeks to indicate that the influence

of tenants has been further diluted. Primarily, the absence of information sessions in

the Activating Renewal stage infers that tenants are receiving less information and

vital feedback about the renewal process than in previous years. While information

sessions only occupy the lowest three rungs of the ladder, in the context of what the

data reveals in this empirical analysis it is given quite a bit of relative weight. Albeit it

is worth acknowledging that a possible explanation for the absence of information

sessions in the Activating Renewal stage could be negated by the potential that they

may have been incorporated into the small-‐scale events or that more information is

distributed through the newsletters, website or other similar channels. Although,

two key informants noted an obvious decline in the information that is

communicated to tenants, particularly of key concern is the current receivership

status of Becton Property Group and the uncertainty surrounding further

development:

“The bankruptcy has created what’s know in the business as ‘planning flight’

so people now don’t know what’s happening, will this ever get developed […]

they just don’t know. And that, something like a bankruptcy is terribly

destabilising for people […] just that sense of nobody really being in charge,

nothing really…I mean they heard about it, they read about it in the news

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paper before they were informed that Becton had gone bankrupt” (Key

Informant #5, 2013).

This is just one example. A significant overall reduction in activities and services that

are geared towards providing opportunities for influence has occurred between the

two stages. The consultation, small-‐scale events and written tools, in particular, have

all diminished in their frequency and number. While to some degree this may have

been expected after the initial design and planning phase of the project, the extent is

perhaps surprising given that they were met with such enthusiasm and positive

acknowledgement in the Planning Renewal phase. This kind of reduction in

informative activities and services is likely to mean less overall access to information

for many tenants. Four key informants currently involved in the BLCP confirmed that

there has been a scaling back of activities and services offered by Newleaf

Communities. The consensus amongst these four key informants was that although

for a while post-‐transfer the plethora of small-‐scale social events continued, they

were often perceived as not being focused or adding value to a broader strategy:

“They [Newleaf Communities] funded lots and lots of little stuff, really quite

niche things. And maybe that was the right thing to [do] in terms of, you

know, community members had an interest in X Y and Z, and so they just

provided funds to help those community members do those things […]

Everything from knitting clubs which might only involve one or two of them,

to things which are more substantive […] But whether there was a broader

strategy behind all those things […] perhaps was a little less clear” (Key


The underlying suggestion that knitting clubs do little to facilitate a broad flow of

information, let alone increase influence for tenants, embodies this.

6.2.3 The third sub-‐finding

The final of the three sub-‐findings reveals that of the approaches that have

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constituted tenant participation in the BLCP, tactics have been completely absent. As

outlined previously, tactics refer to the types of strategies that tenants are able to

capitalise on to leverage their position. This is done through the structures,

processes or organizational capacity at their disposal, or alternatively through

external factors or the powerlessness and weaknesses of authorities or other actors.

It relies on the ability of tenants to present a strong argument. The complete

absence of this in the BLCP has hindered tenant participation’s influence.

While this particular variable could be viewed as facilitating negative empowerment

of tenants vis-‐à-‐vis the interests of authorities, it is perhaps the one that is best able

to visibly demonstrate the level of influence that tenants acquire. Thus in this regard

it might not be something that is always actively promoted in the tenant

participation mechanisms of a renewal process, but it is a reflection of how effective

other mechanisms are at creating opportunities for tenants to strategise, and also a

reflection of the kind of leeway that is afforded tenants in their ability to influence.

The BLCP has failed in both regards. As a prominent example, the almost complete

lack of protest in any shape or form is a curious feature of the BLCP. It is unnecessary

to state again how the participatory indicators have been individually insufficient but

this has rendered virtually null the ability for tenants to leverage them to their own

advantage. The consultations and information provision that occurred were vital

elements but alone were not of value for tenants. One example is that of street-‐level

events such as small workshops, barbeques and information stalls, which were

provided to allow tenants to “raise issues and ask questions and enable the project

team to dispel the inevitable rumours” (Coates et al., 2008, p. 12). To this end,

whether intentional or not, the kinds of participatory mechanisms through which

opposition could perhaps materialise, contributed to a framing and mitigation, and

eventual compliance amongst tenants. Key informants also noted the restriction of

external avenues for voicing concerns, such as speaking to the media, which was not

looked at favourably. Exemplifying this, tenants who spoke to a local paper early on

in the process were in the “bad books” according to anecdotal evidence from one

key informant:

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“…you know, contact with the media. All that sort of thing. It was all very

much frowned upon. A lot of it was handled via the Community Reference

Group, and they did the best they could” (Key Informant #1, 2013).

Additionally, key informants also identified the issue of compliance as a way in which

tactics were obsolete and something which no type of tenant participation

mechanisms were likely to alter. “Courtesy bias” exhibited by many of the refugee

tenants who had traumatised backgrounds was referred to by one key informant as

playing into the hands of authorities. In this sense it was believed that Bonnyrigg was

always going to be an easy target:

“The courtesy bias, which is what you find in looking at some Aboriginal

communities was massive in Bonnyrigg […] And it had a population of overly

polite and compliant refugees. All of those lovely Buddhists, they’re not going

to burn down your office. They’re off praying in the temple” (Key Informant

#5, 2013).

A second key informant questioned the overall motivation of the tenant

participation engagement strategy as being a vehicle for something other than giving

tenants an ability to influence:

“It’s about changing you [the tenant] and not what you have to say” (Key


This alludes to imagery of public housing tenants and the connotations of the failure

of public housing and social dysfunction as being something that needs to be fixed,

and that real tenant participation is:

“not in the interest of government and the private developer because they

don’t think tenants have anything to contribute” (Key Informant #7, 2013).

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6.3 The findings applied to Clegg’s understanding of power

These findings and analysis demonstrate how the variables of tenant participation

have resulted in tenants in the BLCP having no power in decision making as

explained by the model. This is clear in regards to both stages of the renewal.

Applying this to Clegg’s (1989, pp. 32–33) understanding of power as being a

relational dynamic dependent on “the effectiveness of strategies for achieving for

oneself a greater scope for action than for others implicated by one's strategies”, it is

clear that in the case of the BLCP tenants’ strategies have not given them power.

Arnstein’s (1969, p. 216) original assumption also supports this: “the means by which

they [have-‐not citizens] can induce significant social reform which enables them to

share in the benefits of the affluent society”. The means have not been supplied to

tenants in order to attain sufficient power that goes beyond tokenism. The

consultation sessions, tenant bodies and information sessions characteristic of the

BLCP exhibit these insufficient means.

Reinforcing this is the notion that possession of power may only be fixed if

“obligatory passage points” (structures, organisation and tactics) become fixed

(Clegg, 1989). This is evident in the case of the BLCP. The avenues through which

tenants are able to participate have continued from Planning Renewal to Activating

Renewal and have thus become reinforced. Moreover they look unlikely to change.

The prospect for the structures, organisation and tactics to remain fixed is therefore

quite likely.

However, the “rules of the game” are said to be flexible and create hope for power

to be transferred (Clegg, 1989). If temporary, the rules can be influenced by

exogenous factors or by the agents themselves. Change can occur as a result of

resistance to power being exercised through the avenues at the disposal of the

agents. Alternatively, the act of resistance may consolidate itself to an extent that it

creates a new “obligatory passage point” (“organisational outflanking”).

Nevertheless, this has not occurred in the BLCP. As demonstrated, the inability of

tenants to mobilise tactics due to the nature of the structural and organisational

mechanisms in creating compliance, and the monitoring and mitigation of rumours

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to remove exogenous potentialities has inhibited this from occurring. Essentially, the

tenants do not have the means to force a new dynamic and resist power.

In light of these outcomes, what role does the PPP and neoliberal approach play in

the overall tenant participation debate? This requires consideration as a particular

focus of this thesis.

6.4 Considering the PPP model and neoliberal-‐led renewal

Having revealed the limited influence tenants have through the analytical model at

the micro level, it is now important to consider the PPP model and neoliberal-‐led

ideology to public housing renewal. These broader, macro level concepts are worth

evaluating to determine whether there is explanatory value in them. It seeks a link in

any way to the grassroots and whether or not these concepts add another layer of

restriction or perhaps themselves shape or materialise in the tenant participation

indicators that are provided on the ground. Thus, while there are advantages of the

PPP model and neoliberal-‐led ideology (see Appendix 4), only a canvassing of the

barriers identified by key informants is applied here.

However, first of all it is worthy to note that the key informant interviews brought to

light a broad range of factors that either promote the influence of tenant

participation or act as a barrier. Unfortunately, there is not scope enough in this

study to pay sufficient attention to all of these, many of which are in line with

current literature. Thus, so as to ensure these are not completely omitted, the

valuable insights provided by key informants to the broader topic have been

compiled and listed in Appendix 4 for reference. Many of these warrant further

research and equally serious consideration at policy and practice levels.

The PPP model was considered to be a restrictive element in a number of ways.

Primarily, the ongoing saliency of the economic model in determining many of the

key decisions and design plans surrounding the renewal is essentially unavoidable.

Up to seven key informants believed that at the end of the day the optimum

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development expectations of the private consortium were given priority over the

concerns and interests of tenants and ultimately the social impact that it may have

on them. This was highlighted in the Section 75W example above which was

primarily a priority of Becton, without community backing. This creates a scenario

where in key decisions such as tenure-‐mix or housing density tenants are excluded

from the process:

“I think it’s fair to say that none of those redevelopments in Sydney have,

even though there may have been mechanisms, especially around the

Bonnyrigg estate and the ones that have come later, for what they might call

resident engagement…tenants, residents have not had a significant say about

what the project is they will be engaged about. The terms of the engagement

are about, ‘it’s a done deal, this is what’s happening and you can now be

engaged in how it happens and how to mitigate your loses or maximise your

wins’ […] so I don’t think you could say tenant participation in any way has

influenced what happens to those communities, it influences perhaps how it

happens but not what” (Key Informant #10, 2013).

The agenda in the PPP model, reconfirming previous findings is perhaps open to a

certain degree in smaller, more personal decisions, which are undoubtedly of

particular importance to tenants, but is closed when it comes to the “big” issues.

This became a significantly greater problem in the BLCP due to the type of approach

that was rolled out. While the government was acting in good faith, the process was

deemed to be slick and had the effect of narrowing what tenants can do. The fact

that tenants were funnelled to utilise certain tenant participation mechanisms

meant there was virtually no tenant-‐led activism. According to one key informant, if

the agenda of the PPP model at the strategic decision making level is going to be set

in the fashion that it is, then tenants need to be encouraged to organise outside of

the process that the model and ideology are creating barriers to this kind of action,

which is undermining tenant influence:

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“I would like to see tenants resisting those changes. So that’s part of why I

talk about the macro questions. Because for me, if you…tenants have those

big questions, and if you drag them into the consultation and you only talk

about the micro questions about their housing management, then whether

you planned it or not, and you know the government doesn’t plan it this way,

but you actually cancel out all of that opposition to those bigger macro

questions. So the danger of saying we can do these things in the PPP process

is that we forget that there’s bigger questions, policy questions that sit

outside the process” (Key Informant #11, 2013).

A further key point to touch on is the neoliberal justifications for carrying out public

housing renewal, as discussed in the literature review. The BLCP is perhaps an

example of exactly this, a community that is perceived to be dysfunctional to the

extent that it required a dramatic neoliberal renewal project. Contrastingly, a

number of key informants, as well as the Bonnyrigg Living Communities Baseline

Survey, alluded to the fact that 77% of tenants were content with the strong

coherency within the community, as well as the current condition of the estate

(Stubbs et al. 2005). Other key informants also acknowledged the strong community

dynamic but admitted that there were problems, such as crime. The question of why

to renew thus becomes a political consideration, through which this neoliberal

encroachment becomes evident. The NSW Government held a certain perception of

the Bonnyrigg estate; that it required an overhaul and the only way to alleviate the

problems were through a tenure-‐mix and a private developer:

“They kind of constructed the physical buildings, and the physical estate, but

also the social space, the tenant body, as failing. And they present the

solution to this failure of people and place as one of, you know, bring in a

private sector, introduce private housing. And the tenant participation part

is, that tenants completely rejected that idea…And in their consultations they

wanted to say ‘this is wrong’. These ideas that you have about this place and

the people that live there are both wrong. But those types of questions were

not allowed to be in the consultation agenda. And this is where I would say

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the neoliberal sort of thrust of a project like this, sort of overrides a lot of

what can happen in a community consultation space. Because the neoliberal

project needs the physical sight and the people to be dysfunctional and

falling down, otherwise there’s no rationale for redeveloping it” (Key


This illustrates how a neoliberal discourse takes key decisions, such as the why and

how of renewal, out of tenants hands leaving them with tenant participation

mechanisms that really only gives them influence at lower strategic levels, if at all.

Similarly, the issues around power imbalances in PPPs between the major

stakeholders -‐ government, the private consortium and tenants-‐ acts as an inhibitor.

The three have differing priorities in the dynamic of the renewal. The government

wants the renewal to go ahead and for costs to be covered, the private consortium

wants to complete the renewal in a cost-‐efficient manner in order to reap returns on

their investment, and the tenants want a high quality renewal that will improve their

short and long term prospects. There is a fine balance in juggling all three

expectations. Given the resourcing of any PPP relies on the private consortium for it

to initially get off the ground and to fulfil its aims, it is possible to infer that this will

ultimately dictate decision making influence and the degree to which tenant

participation is seriously engaged:

“The community engagement around that [Section 75W variation] was really

quite poor…that was driven largely by the developer, who obviously wields a

lot of influence…that was poor. There was no capacity building around that. It

was basically just trying to tick a box, to say that they consulted and get the

changes through” (Key Informant #8, 2013).

Finally, in the case of the BLCP, while the contract is extensive, complex and with a

strong emphasis on tenant participation expectations, benchmarks and performance

indicators, there is still too much potential for interpretation and laxity surrounding

77

this component of the project once management has transferred to the private

consortium. This was referred to by a number of key informants as posing a danger:

“You can write as much in a contract, particularly around the social stuff with

the intent, but what is actually translated and delivered is often open to so

much interpretation and resource tinkering. You know, it’s something you’ve

got to be so clear and robust about from the start I think” (Key Informant #9,

2013).

“Signing up to a contract and actually implementing it with the same spirit

are two different things” (Key Informant #4, 2013).

The PPP contract posed some kind of accountability mechanism but a number of key

informants conceded that Becton was a poor choice as the development partner,

because despite the promise they had shown in being involved with the Kensington

renewal in Melbourne (another tenant and community-‐focused development), they

have failed to meet expectations with regard to their commitment to tenant

participation as the project has worn on. A further example suggested that given the

current receivership of Becton Property Group and their impending replacement as a

consortium partner, the NSW Government (not specifically Housing NSW) is likely to

accept a new partner who will deliver the project on time and within budget, as

opposed to being overly concerned about commitment to the private partner to

meaningful tenant participation:

“The other thing that has to be acknowledged is, from a government point of

view, how is the government going to judge whether some new developer

should be given the job or not. And their commitment to tenant participation

is probably not going to be high on the Government’s list of priorities […] just

being realistic about it, they’re going to want to know what the dollar value is

and wether they’re going to get value for money, and whether the social

housing outcomes in terms of stock and housing are going to be good” (Key


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The nature of the risk and responsibility being transferred away from government in

a PPP means that in such situations, the private partner is able to do the bare

minimum to cover itself or to creatively push the boundaries. While at the same time

the government will be just as happy to settle knowing that as long as the major

commitments are fulfilled, others can be stretched.

This discussion of the PPP model and neoliberal-‐led strategies demonstrates there is

a convergence with the constraints experienced by tenants at a grassroots level and

the overriding macro policies and discourse that guide public housing renewals. This

is not to say that there are not elements of, or potential for, these macro level

factors to foster conditions for tenant participation to be influential. These too have

been identified by key informants, and some are put forth in the conclusion as ways

forward. Yet, the thesis findings demonstrate that the barriers imposed at these

broader conceptual levels filter into and materialise in the kinds of indicators that

exist, or don’t exist, for tenant participation to be enacted. Key examples addressed

here are the manner in which consultations are undercut by what is and is not on

the agenda for tenants to discuss, the ability for the private consortium to “manage”

their obligations to tenant participation in the contract and the discourse for

renewal, which is tightly narrated to ensure tenants do not mobilise outside of the

avenues provided for them.

Chapter 7. Conclusion

This thesis has highlighted the linkage between the number of mechanisms and tools

of tenant participation and the resulting level of decision making influence attained

by tenants. Additionally, it explores it within the context of a PPP model and a

neoliberal-‐led renewal project. These broader macro concepts are also analysed to

determine their impact on the influence of tenant participation. The formulation of a

new model for tenant participation, based on the previous works of Arnstein,

Cairncross et al. and Davies, was used to analyse and determine the level of decision

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making influence tenants have in the public housing renewal process. The use of

Clegg’s understanding of power also contributed to the analytical framework.

In order to achieve this, a case study of the Bonnyrigg Living Communities Project in

Sydney, Australia was chosen as the focus of the empirical analysis. To aid this, a

data collection process consisting of two components was carried out. The first was

a document analysis of key content pertaining to the BLCP, such as the masterplan,

social impact report, evaluative studies and other official documentation. The

second involved a series of 14 key informant interviews (and one written

submission). In considering the available research literature, the parameters,

hypothesis and variables were constructed and determined. The hypothesis sought

to explore whether the tenant participation structures, organisation and tactics had

failed to deliver tenant influence in the renewal process. This was measured over

two stages of the project, Planning Renewal and Activating Renewal.

In testing the hypothesis, the model found that the number of tenant participation

mechanisms (structures, organisation and tactics) were insufficient in increasing

tenants’ influence in decision making, or providing assured, consistent and lasting

influence. This was supported by three sub-‐findings. Firstly, that none of the

variables placed tenants higher than the negotiation rung of the model, which is

accordingly associated with a level of tokenism where tenants have the opportunity

to express views but no guarantee or power to ensure they are taken onboard.

Secondly, that overtime tenants have not attained greater influence in decision

making and in fact there are indications that this has diminished from the Planning

Renewal to Activating Renewal stage. Thirdly, that the complete absence of the

tactics variable was particularly significant in suggesting that tenants were not

provided the mechanisms or possibility to leverage the participatory structures or

organisation available to them, or external measures, to increase their level of

influence.

In applying Clegg’s understanding of power it also reinforced the model’s findings

and confirmed that tenants ability to exercise power was diminished in relation to

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other stakeholders: “the effectiveness of strategies for achieving for oneself a

greater scope for action than for others implicated by one's strategies” was seen to

be the case (Clegg, 1989). The “obligatory passage points”, or the mechanisms of

tenant participation, have become fixed in the BLCP or diminished in a way that is

detrimental to tenants’ ability to influence. Furthermore, their inability to flexibly

change the “rules of the game” through leverage of the structures and organisation

to achieve tactical “organisational outflanking” was also reconfirmed.

Finally, the broader macro concepts of the PPP model and neoliberal-‐led renewal

identified that tenants are constrained in their ability to influence the “big” issues.

This is a product of the nature of these macro level factors that pivot on the saliency

of the economic model and the neoliberal justification that public housing and its

tenants are dysfunctional and in need of repair and renewal. These converge to

downgrade the influence of tenant participation mechanisms by funnelling the types

of mechanisms that are available, reducing what is on the agenda that tenant

participation can realistically influence and the PPP contract not providing enough

enforcement and assurances for influential tenant participation. This is not to say

that the PPP model and a neoliberal-‐led renewal approach are impractical, but these

implications require consideration when they are pursued.

More broadly, this thesis does not seek to undermine the success of tenant

participation in the BLCP, nor the value of tenant participation more generally. What

it does do is provide a rethink on the evaluative analysis of how tenant participation

influence can be measured. Its findings are not necessarily advocating for tenant

control as posited by the highest rung in the model, but it is offers a rethink of what

the mechanisms used might translate to and perhaps suggests room for realistic

experimentation on the other two rungs: joint management and choice. It should be

noted again that the thesis has its limitations. The inability to interview a greater

number of tenants, and not one public housing tenant, means there are likely to be

fundamental gaps in the data. Within the context of future public and social housing

renewal projects that follow a PPP model, this thesis presents key points for

deliberation and a multitude of policy and practical outcomes and conditions to be

81

considered for tenant participation to be influential. The final section briefly

addresses and lists these considerations.

7.1 Policy and practical considerations

The following considerations are a collation of data collected from the key informant

interviews that could be transferred to renewal projects that follow a similar PPP

approach. Although, many of them could be selectively applied to renewal projects

in general. They are by no means an exhaustive list of policy and practical

possibilities, but are provided as credible considerations from individuals who have

considerable experience working in the field of public housing renewal and research.

The considerations are not context-‐dependent and have broad implications and

applicability within Australia and abroad. Moreover, they can be adapted and flexibly

implemented based on the need and environmental conditions.

General

-‐ Right to decide and be involved in the question of whether a renewal goes

ahead or not. Acknowledging that political and economic considerations

make this difficult, it should still be addressed

-‐ Early involvement of tenants in the tender process prior to a consortium

being chosen. Designating a tenants panel convened by tenants and provided

with appropriate training, that bidding consortia are required to present to

-‐ Timing is key and should not be left to the last minute. Tenants have a right

to know prior to hearing in the media if their estate is up for renewal, the

developer has gone into receivership or similar key issues

-‐ Resourcing tenant participation in the same way that occurred in the BLCP.

The commitment to ongoing capacity building for activities relevant to

decision making, strategic thinking and leadership are essential. A broad

range of mechanisms should be provided for different groups and needs

-‐ Ongoing consultation at every stage that is meaningful and not seen to

simply “tick a box” or satisfy the legal obligation. This means multiple

consultation reviews prior to the lodgement of DA, for example

82

-‐ Foster and accept criticism of the PPP and the renewal process at certain

times. Accept that tenants will show opposition and be active in expressing

that through the media or similar outlets

-‐ Do not “manage” tenant participation too tightly. It needs to be an organic

process as much as it is resourced, encouraged and activated. Tenants have

the “know how” and can contribute to this in their own way

Tenants

-‐ Tenant Charters may institutionalise and enshrine the rights of tenants

throughout the renewal process. These need to be respected and protected

by government and the consortium

-‐ Tenant Advocates focused on enhancing voice and status of tenants at a

decision making level are required to act on their behalf or promote and

empower tenants to do so themselves

-‐ Independent tenant bodies with real status and decision making or voting

power if deemed necessary. Although, this will only work if they are

representative, transparent and create a genuine link between the tenant

body and other stakeholders

Government

-‐ Impose stricter contractual expectations that seriously bind the consortium

to attain and maintain high standards and Key Performance Indicators (KPI)

that aren’t token or easily flouted

-‐ Honest conversations need to be had with tenants about the money and

governance. Tenants need to know where they stand, what is happening and

how and what they can expect to realistically influence

-‐ Right personnel who are devoted and committed to tenant participation

need to be in positions of authority as was the case in the BLCP

Private consortium

-‐ Full commitment to tenant participation of a consortium needs to be

demanded, exhibited and rigorously assessed prior to being selected

83

-‐ Expertise in the consortium should be a requirement. This includes a

diversity of NGO and CH partners to work on the tenant participation and

community development strategy, and who are giving equal standing to the

developer and financier

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Appendices

Appendix 1: Alternative models of participation

Engagement in the Policy Cycle (Warburton et al., 2007)

Wheel of Participation (Davidson, 1998)

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Changing Views on Participation (Martin, 2010)

The OECD’s framework ignores the possibility of citizen control (Arnstein’s top rung),

and does not even touch up the possibility of “Citizen Power” or the transfer of

power in any form. It stops at “Active Participation”, which according to Arnstein is

mere “Tokenism”. As in the case of Arnstein, Martín (2010) suggests that power is

key to avoiding a ‘vicious circle of participation’ where much might be invested in

participatory approaches, but with no real change or impact as a result of the lack of

transfer of power and control.

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Appendix 2: Key informants

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Appendix 3: Collated data on tenant participation indicators in the BLCP

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Appendix 4: Collated findings from key informants on barriers and promoters for tenant participation in the BLCP Barriers (in no particular order)

General

-‐ Limited agenda of what tenants could be consulted on removed “big “ issues

from consultations

-‐ Limited ability for tenants to go outside of structures and facilitate tenant-‐led

activism

-‐ No choice for tenants in whether renewal should occur or not

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-‐ Statutory barriers exist to decisions tenants can influence, but not much can

be done about this

-‐ Political motivations behind renewal were not conducive to meaningful

tenant participation

-‐ Timing of stages meant tenants were not interested until it’s their turn to be

involved. Things are likely to change during that time otherwise

-‐ Range of tenant participation options often excluded certain groups (i.e.

Aboriginals)

-‐ Reporting back on what actually occurred was not done well or is not

happening

-‐ External media contact by tenants was frowned upon limiting their ability to

object or protest

-‐ Capacity building for tenants in regards to leadership building or technical

skills development did not continue beyond initial stages

-‐ Lack of participation willingness by tenants. Many did not actually want to be

involved

-‐ Tenants had limited time to be involved

-‐ The form of consultation was considered to be a type of management in itself

-‐ Insufficient representation of tenant bodies, especially from CALD

communities. It was always the same tenants

PPP model/neoliberalism

-‐ Moral discourse as framing/treating tenants as unable to be real contributors

and the social dysfunction of estates leads to a neoliberal discourse as

rationale for renewal

-‐ Not enough honest conversations with tenants about money and governance

related to the structure of the project

-‐ Pre-‐eminence of economic model and optimum development at expense of

social considerations

-‐ Disclosure of information to tenants was restricted due to commercial in

confidence requirements limiting tenants ability to intervene in key decisions

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-‐ Personnel changes at the consortium was unsettling for tenants and the

continuity of a commitment to tenant participation

-‐ Consortium was not as supportive of tenant participation to the same level as

government

-‐ Developer always referred to legal obligations, and only willing to disclose

information it is obliged to

-‐ Integration of different partners within consortia was a challenge to its

effective functioning

-‐ Conflict of interests between private developer wants to make money,

government wanting to cover costs and tenants wanting community

development results in a power imbalance against tenants

Promoters (in no particular order)

General

-‐ Capacity building exercises provided tenants with the skills to be able to

understand plans and documents, ask questions, express views at

consultations

-‐ Use of bilingual educators assisted in empowering tenants and giving them a

chance to be involved

-‐ Use of existing cultural networks increased the facilitation of tenant

participation and encouraged involvement by those who may not have done

so

-‐ Genuine attitude and passion of government and professional staff was key

in trying to achieve change

-‐ Residents staying onsite was important in creating a default day-‐to-‐day

accountability mechanism

-‐ Tenant Advocate Service externally operated was important in assisting

tenants to have greater voice or encourage self-‐empowerment

-‐ Investment in resources for tenant participation initiatives by NSW

Government allowed for excellent initiatives in early the early

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-‐ PIAC training and mentoring provided to support CRG members helped to

increase their capacity to function in their leadership roles and interact with

different agencies/stakeholders

-‐ Internal advocating by Housing NSW staff was important in applying “soft

power” from within in to encourage tenant influence

PPP model/neoliberalism

-‐ Contract binds consortium to community engagement; contract presence

generally means consortium is accountable for ensuring stipulations are

adhered to

-‐ Motivation of increasing profits means it is in the interests of the consortium

to have strong and happy community

-‐ Onsite office by consortium was very important to maintaining a consistent

presence and point of contact for tenants to interact with

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