Contributed Paper

Impact of a Community-Based Payment forEnvironmental Services Intervention on ForestUse in Menabe, MadagascarMATTHEW SOMMERVILLE,∗§ E.J. MILNER-GULLAND,∗ MICHAEL RAHAJAHARISON,†AND JULIA P.G. JONES‡∗Department of Life Sciences, Imperial College-London, Silwood Park, Ascot SL5 7 PY, United Kingdom†Ny Havana, Morondava, Madagascar‡School of the Environment & Natural Resources, Bangor University, Bangor, Gwynedd LL57 2UW, Wales, United Kingdom

Abstract: Despite the growing interest in conservation approaches that include payments for environmental

services (PES), few evaluations of the influence of such interventions on behaviors of individuals have been

conducted. We used self-reported changes in six legal and illegal forest-use behaviors to investigate the way

in which a PES for biodiversity conservation intervention in Menabe, Madagascar, influenced behavior.Individuals (n = 864) from eight intervention communities and five control communities answered questions

on their forest-use behaviors before and after the intervention began, as well as on their reasons for changing

and their attitudes to various institutions. The payments had little impact on individuals’ reported decisions

to change behaviors, but it had a strong impact on individuals’ attitudes. Payments appeared to legitimize

monitoring of behaviors by the implementing nongovernmental organization (NGO), but did not act as a

behavioral driver in their own right. Although there were no clear differences between changes in behaviors

in the intervention and control communities, the intervention did influence motivations for change. Fear

of local forest associations and the implementing NGO were strong motivators for changing behavior in

communities with the PES intervention, whereas fear of the national government was the main reason given

for change in control communities. Behavioral changes were most stable where fear of local organizations

motivated the change. Our results highlight the interactions between different incentives people face when

making behavioral decisions and the importance of considering the full range of incentives when designing

community-based PES interventions.

Keywords: motivation, biodiversity conservation, monitoring, attitudes, incentives

Impacto del Pago Comunitario por Intervencion de Servicios Ambientales sobre Uso del Bosque en Menabe,Madagascar

Resumen: No obstante el creciente interes en los enfoques de conservacion que incluyen pagos por servicios

ambientales (PSA), se han realizado pocas evaluaciones de la influencia de tales intervenciones sobre los

individuos. Utilizamos cambios auto reportados en seis conductas legales e ilegales de uso del bosque para

investigar la manera en que un PSA para la conservacion de biodiversidad influyo en la conducta en

Menabe, Madagascar. Individuos (n = 864) de ocho comunidades con intervencion y cinco comunidades

control respondieron preguntas sobre su conducta antes y despues de que comenzara la intervencion, ası

como las razones del cambio y sus actitudes ante varias instituciones. Los pagos tuvieron poco impacto sobre

las decisiones de cambio de actitudes de los individuos, pero tuvieron un fuerte impacto sobre las actitudes

de los individuos. Los pagos aparentemente legitimizaron el monitoreo de conductas por la organizacion no

§email mattmsommerville@gmail.comPaper submitted May 5, 2009; revised manuscript accepted January 15, 2010.

1488Conservation Biology, Volume 24, No. 6, 1488–1498C©2010 Society for Conservation BiologyDOI: 10.1111/j.1523-1739.2010.01526.x

Sommerville et al. 1489

gubernamental (ONG) que los implemento, pero no actuaron como un factor conductual por sı solos. Aunque

no hubo diferencias claras entre los cambios de conducta en las comunidades control y con intervencion,la intervencion influyo en las motivaciones para cambiar. El temor a las asociaciones forestales locales y a

la ONG fueron motivos fuertes para el cambio de conducta en las comunidades con intervencion de PSA,mientras que el temor al gobierno nacional fue la razon principal del cambio en las comunidades control.Los cambios conductuales fueron mas estables donde el temor a las organizaciones locales fue el motivo

del cambio. Nuestros resultados resaltan las interacciones entre diferentes incentivos que la gente enfrenta

cuando toma decisiones conductuales, ası como la importancia de considerar todo el rango de incentivos

cuando se disenan intervenciones de PSA basados en comunidades.

Palabras Clave: actitudes, conservacion de la biodiversidad, incentivos, monitoreo, motivacion

Introduction

Payments for environmental services (PES) are receivingincreased attention in natural resource management prac-tice and theory (e.g., Ferraro 2001; Pagiola 2002; Engel etal. 2008). PES schemes transfer economic value to indi-viduals or communities contingent on the supply of well-defined environmental services, with the aim of maintain-ing or increasing the supply of those services (Wunder2007). Although PES for biodiversity conservation is wellestablished in American and European agroenvironmentschemes (de Koning et al. 2007), there is less under-standing of the efficacy of PES in supplying biodiversityservices in developing countries despite a growing bodyof case studies (Landell-Mills & Porras 2002; Engel et al.2008).

Particular challenges apply to implementing PES in de-veloping countries. For example, PES interventions inpoor countries are often tasked with the social objectiveof addressing poverty as well as ensuring environmen-tal service provision (Bulte et al. 2008). Although someselection criteria for PES may favor the poor, such as tar-geting those who live at forest–agriculture boundaries,other criteria, such as having formal land tenure, maybe biased against the poor. On the whole PES is highlyunlikely to act at a scale sufficient to alleviate povertyin developing countries (Pagiola et al. 2005; Wunder2008). Additionally, in developing countries biodiversityservices are often provided on land owned by the gov-ernment on which communities have customary rights,which makes identification of who to pay difficult (e.g.,Hardner & Rice 2002). Furthermore, many of the driversof environmental-service degradation may be illegal (e.g.,bushmeat hunting, timber harvesting, agricultural expan-sion), and PES projects do not in general pay individualsto obey the law. At the same time, resource use often iscentral to local culture and livelihoods and thus may notbe easily substituted.

Payment for environmental services is based on the as-sumption that payments to service providers will changebehavior in a way that will improve service provisioncompared with what would have occurred in the ab-sence of an intervention (Sommerville et al. 2009). Landmanagers can only be considered service providers if they

have control over service provision. A variety of actionscan be taken to maintain or improve service provision,including changing resource use behaviors, monitoringland to reduce external threats, and restoring biodiver-sity services on degraded land. Different approaches toconservation may need to be considered if land managersare unable to directly influence service provision. Thereare a variety of additional factors related to the individualcharacteristics of service providers and users and theirrelationship that influence whether PES is an appropri-ate conservation tool, including the security of funding,whether payment amounts are based on existing marketsor on one-off negotiations, and whether the providers andusers are individuals, communities, or loosely definedgroups (Sommerville et al. 2010).

Where PES is appropriate, payments are not the onlyincentive from the intervention that acts on individuals’decisions. Management interventions, including thosebased on the PES paradigm, are multidimensional, incor-porating both positive and negative incentives within alarger sociopolitical framework (Koontz 2001). Few re-searchers have examined how specific components ofconservation interventions influence individuals’ behav-iors relative to the wider context of the other incentivesthat affect their decisions (Borgerhoff-Mulder et al. 2007).This is particularly important in the case of community-based PES in developing countries, where a complex setof incentives, including payments, outreach, the legalframework, and regional and national monitoring, influ-ence decisions to engage in activities.

We sought to assess how a PES intervention for biodi-versity conservation in the Menabe region of Madagascarhas affected local behavior. In particular, we addressedthe following questions: What is the relative importanceof payments compared with other conservation interven-tions in affecting individual resource management behav-iors and attitudes? What factors influence whether or notindividuals have stopped behaviors, and is there a differ-ence between communities that have participated andthose that have not participated in the PES intervention?How do individuals’ reasons for stopping behaviors relateto their desire to return to the behaviors?

We based our analysis on self-reports from individ-uals on whether they changed their involvement in a

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range of resource-use behaviors, their stated desire to re-turn to these behaviors, and their reported reasons forstopping.

Methods

Case Study

The 100,000-ha dry deciduous forests of the centralMenabe represent one of Madagascar’s highest conser-vation priorities (Kremen et al. 2008). Conservation anddevelopment organizations have worked in the regionsince the early 1980s (Cabalazar 1996). Since 2000, Dur-rell Wildlife Conservation Trust (Durrell) has been activein the region and has focused on community-based con-servation, conservation education, and population moni-toring of flagship species.

Following the national movement toward community-based conservation in Madagascar (Antona et al. 2004),Durrell facilitated the transfer of management respon-sibility of government forest to local forest associations.These community-managed forests are split into multiuseand strictly protected areas that will ultimately act asa buffer zone for the new Central Menabe ProtectedArea (Supporting Information) (P. Raonintsoa personalcommunication). Where land is formally titled, identi-fying those holding land tenure is important for iden-tifying service providers. In locations where few peo-ple have formal tenure and communities have estab-lished customary management rights to land, however,community-based PES interventions may be appropriate(Engel & Palmer 2008). In some cases, PES interventionscan help facilitate transfer of legal property rights to indi-viduals or communities (Rosales 2003), although therehas also been some concern that the prospects of aPES could lead to property-rights conflicts by individu-als or communities aiming to access benefits from theintervention (Wendland et al. 2010). Such conflict is un-likely in the Menabe because the customary boundariesof each community forest were established well beforethe PES began and the goal of the PES is to incentivizecommunities to implement their existing managementplans.

The associations that manage community forests aremade up of local members, who must pay an annual feeand are given the right to use the multiuse forest. Boardsof these local associations are responsible for monitor-ing their forest, liaising with Durrell and the nationalforest service, and distributing permits for activities inthe multiuse forest. Each community has a local forest-management document that defines permit fees, prohib-ited behaviors, and punishments.

Despite the existence of these management transfers,few communities have implemented their management

plans (Antona et al. 2004). To create incentives for ac-tive management of community forests in the Menabe, in2003 Durrell implemented annual payments to commu-nities on the basis of the state of biodiversity and threatindicators within protected forest and forest-governanceindicators. These payments fulfill the criteria for PES de-fined by Wunder (2007) because they represent volun-tary transactions between at least one buyer or user (Dur-rell) and at least one seller or provider (communities)contingent on provision of a well-defined service (thequality of biodiversity conservation in the forest as mea-sured by the abundance of species of interest, scarcity ofthreats, and presence of good governance). Individualscan choose their level of participation by becoming asso-ciation members, actively participating in management,or using the in-kind incentives. Although the scheme isnot voluntary at the individual level, communities decidewhether to participate. Thus, the intervention can beconsidered a PES at the community level.

Payments are contingent on the state of the strictlyprotected forest (the number and abundance of speciesof interest) and on actions that affect the system (forestgovernance indicators and monitored threats), which arescored during an annual assessment carried out by Dur-rell in collaboration with community members. Thereare a number of forest-use activities that can affect a com-munity’s payment, either by altering habitat or posingthreats to species. These include clearing forest for graz-ing, agriculture, or paths, selective cutting of trees fortimber, accessing honey, and hunting of lemurs. The le-gality of each of these forest-use behaviors differs undernational laws, although if individuals are caught engagingin activities inside the strictly protected forest they couldface local and national fines or even prison sentences(Table 1).

Positive indicators from the state of the system andforest governance are scored alongside the negativeindicators of threat to create an aggregate score foreach community. The scores are subsequently adjustedproportional to the size of each forest to reflect thegreater amount of biodiversity services provided by largerforests. A particularly unique component of the Menabesystem is that the payment levels for each communityare relative to how well the other communities in thescheme perform. This reflects the assumption that com-petition among communities will act as a positive in-centive (J. Durbin personal communication). At presentapproximately US$8500 is distributed between the 10participating communities annually. Payment amountsand scores are announced in each community throughan annual “forest party” sponsored by Durrell. Pay-ments are distributed to the communities via the localforest associations and each community has a differ-ent procedure for sharing the benefits with the widercommunity.

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Table 1. Description of the legality of the six behaviors that were tracked and the extent of national enforcement and likely consequence of beingcaught.

Reports ofengaging in

behavior (%)a

Realisticnational Realistic Subsistence non-

Behavior Legality enforcement consequence importance Profitability Durrell Durrell

Agricultural expansion illegal limited fine and prison high high 76 69Lemur hunting illegal none fine low low 13 5Canoe building subsistence

use legallimited fine low high 17 8

Tenrec collection seasonallylegal

none none medium medium 62 53

Honey collection legal, butcollectionmethod isillegal

none none medium medium 58 45

Tuber collection legal none none high low 77b nan = 388 n = 182

aPercentage of the male population who have ever engaged in each activity from Durrell and non-Durrell communities.bSample size for tubers is larger (n = 628) because women are also involved in collecting them.

Data Collection

INTERVIEWS

We carried out interviews between December 2007 andApril 2008. Authors M.S. and M.R. had been working inthe area since March 2007. A member of the team trans-lated interviews from French to Malagasy and anothermember translated back to French to confirm meaning(Bernard 2002). We pilot tested and revised the struc-tured interviews in one community. These initial inter-views were not used in the sample. Four local research as-sistants performed the interviews and M.S., M.R., and J.J.(all proficient in conversational Malagasy) were presentduring the interviews.

Individuals from eight communities receiving pay-ments (n = 651) and five communities that did not re-ceive payments (n = 213) participated in the interviews,which addressed forest-use behaviors in the past andpresent and future desire to use the forest (Supporting In-formation). Questions focused on six behaviors (agricul-tural expansion, timber harvesting, collection of honeyand tubers, and hunting of tenrecs [Tenrec ecaudatus,Echinops telfairi, Setifer setosus] and lemurs [Propithe-

cus verreauxi, Eulemur fulvus, Lepilemur ruficauda-

tus]). Few individuals reported starting the behaviorsrather than stopping them since 2000, so only factorsinfluencing the decision to stop each behavior were in-cluded in statistical analyses.

We asked open-ended and closed questions to ascer-tain whether and why individuals had continued to en-gage in or changed specific behaviors. The activities ofDurrell were not mentioned explicitly in this part of theinterview to avoid introducing bias. We also asked about

respondent’s knowledge of rules, participation in com-munity activities, attitudes toward conservation organi-zations, and their perception of conservation and gov-ernment interventions in the region. Individuals reportedwealth in terms of relative size of fields (small, average,or large) and sufficiency of production for family needs(not enough, enough, and more than enough) for threetypes of agricultural land (wet rice fields, riverbank beanfields, and slash and burn corn or peanut fields).

We performed closed ranking exercises in communi-ties participating in the PES on the perceived effect ofconservation-related activities in changing the respon-dents’ forest-use behavior (Durrell monitoring, govern-ment monitoring, community monitoring, environmentaloutreach, and Durrell payments). Individuals then sepa-rately ranked how four activities that are specifically im-plemented by Durrell alone (monitoring, environmentaloutreach, payments, and parties) affected their behav-ioral choices. We also performed semistructured inter-views with key informants, including the presidents ofeach community association, two to three members ofeach local forest patrol, and with 11 individuals who hadbeen imprisoned for agricultural expansion.

TRIANGULATION OF SELF-REPORTS

Self-reports have a long history in the criminal-justice lit-erature. Generally, they are useful for discerning behav-iors within a population (Thornberry & Krohn 2000),although criticism of self-reports due to the possibility offalsification and recall errors remains (Kirk 2006). Thereare several methods that can be used to validate results ofself-reports, including a comparison of self-reports with

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official criminal records and use of key informants (Hin-delang et al. 1979). We attempted to validate the behav-ioral self-reports by asking three to four key informantsin each community about the actions of all the individu-als who we interviewed. When all key informants wereconsistent in their description of an individual’s behav-ior, it was compared with the individual’s self-report. Ofthe 575 records with agreement between key informantsand self-reports that behaviors had been carried out in thepast, there was 78% agreement between self-reports andkey informant views on whether there had been behav-ioral change. These results are consistent with similar self-report studies of delinquent behaviors that used directobservation for validation (Bernard et al. 1984). Therewas underreporting of having participated in behaviorsand overreporting of stopping behaviors. Yet given theimperfect knowledge of key informants, there is no clearevidence that key-informant responses represented thetrue accounts. We have no reason to believe responsesto motivational questions were consistently biased.

Analysis

ANALYSIS OF BEHAVIORAL CHANGE

All analyses were performed in R2.7 (packages: tree,lme4, ROCR; R Development Core Team 2005.). Closed-rank data were analyzed with the nonparametric Kruskal-Wallis rank test followed by multiple comparisons with aBonferroni correction.

PREDICTORS OF BEHAVIORAL CHANGE

We used generalized linear mixed-effects models withcommunity as a random effect and a binomial link func-tion, to model effects of intervention and socioeco-nomic characteristics on reports of stopping behavior(Supporting Information). For comparisons among allcommunities, we incorporated all explanatory variablesin the full model without interactions. Regression treeswere used to select a subset of variables where mod-els were overparameterized due to low sample sizes(lemur hunting and canoe building). We used a back-ward stepwise procedure for model simplification. Dur-ing model simplification, we compressed factor levelsthat did not significantly differ from one another. Thefinal minimum adequate models were reached when re-moving the least significant variable resulted in a signifi-cantly worse model, when compared with the previousmodel in an analysis of variance (ANOVA). We based ourdecision to include the random effect in the final modelon whether the minimum adequate mixed effect modelperformed better than a generalized linear model withoutthe random effect in a log-likelihood test (Crawley 2007).When we included random effects, we used a variancecomponents analysis to describe the importance of the

random effect within the final model. We assessed the sig-nificance of fixed effects by comparing the Wald statisticof each fixed effect with the chi-square distribution. Thediscrimination ability of the final models was representedby the area under the curve (AUC) of a receiver operatingcharacteristic (ROC) curve. We considered that modelswith AUC > 0.7 had reasonable discrimination ability,although the utility of particular AUC values is contextdependent (Pearce & Ferrier 2000).

We used chi-square and Fisher tests to examine com-bined primary and secondary reasons for stopping be-haviors and to compare Durrell and non-Durrell com-munities. We placed open responses on why individualshad stopped behaviors into broad categories of personalor social reasons, reasons related to fear, and biogeo-graphic reasons related to the abundance and distribu-tion of a species (Supporting Information). We used amixed-effects modeling approach to examine specificallywhether the reasons individuals stopped a behavior influ-enced their inclination to return to this behavior.

Results

Influence of Payments on Behaviors and Attitudes

The intervention activities carried out in the communi-ties had significantly different effects on individuals’ re-ported decisions to reduce their forest-use behaviors (K= 977.75, df=4, p < 0.001, Fig. 1a). Durrell’s monitoringand environmental outreach and local monitoring rankedhigher than government monitoring and payments intheir effect on individuals’ behaviors. Of the interven-tions specific to Durrell, monitoring had the greatest ef-fect on reported reduction in forest-use behaviors andwas followed in order of importance by environmentaloutreach, payments, and parties (K = 427.1, df=3, p <

0.001, Fig. 1b). The effect of these activities on local at-titudes was precisely the opposite; parties produced themost positive attitudes, and payments improved attitudessecond most (K = 403.0, df=3, p < 0.001).

Correlates of Behavior Change and Reasons for Change

Agricultural expansion and tuber collection were themost frequently cited forest uses, reflecting their impor-tance for subsistence livelihoods (Fig. 2). Canoe construc-tion and lemur hunting were the least common behaviors,as expected due to the specialized skills required, the eth-nic aversion to lemur hunting for the Tandroy, and thelimited need for canoes for those living far from largewater bodies.

Individuals in both Durrell and non-Durrell commu-nities reported reductions in their forest-use behav-iors since 2000 when Durrell interventions began. Themost-reduced behaviors were agricultural expansion andlemur hunting, which reflects the severe consequences

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Figure 1. Influence of each intervention activity on

(a) individuals’ forest-use behaviors in Durrell

intervention communities (n = 664) and (b)

individuals’ forest-use behaviors and attitudes in

Durrell intervention communities. Indexes are based

on the sum of ranks 1–5 in (a) and 1–4 in (b), where

1 is the largest impact. In (b) only Durrell activities

are presented, while (a) also includes government and

local activities. Horizontal lines with asterisks above

represent a significant difference between the reported

influence of two intervention activities on behaviors

or attitudes (∗p < 0.05; ∗∗p < 0.01 from

nonparametric post hoc multiple contrasts).

of being caught and the clear legal status of these be-haviors. Predictably, age was positively associated withchanged forest behaviors because these activities are par-ticularly physically challenging. Those heavily reliant onforest use during the rainy season were less likely to stopagricultural expansion, canoe building, and tenrec andhoney collection (Table 2). The other fixed effects ofbehavioral change were either inconsistent in their di-rection across behaviors or were only correlated withisolated behaviors. For all behaviors, community as a ran-dom effect explained a large portion of the variance,highlighting the differences between communities.

In responses to open questions, payments were notmentioned as a primary reason for any specific behav-ioral change. Instead, fear was the most prevalent rea-son for reported reductions, particularly for agriculturalexpansion and lemur hunting, two illegal activities thathave severe potential consequences (Fig. 3a). A reduc-

Figure 2. The percentage of individuals stopping

behaviors since 2000 in Durrell and non-Durrell

intervention communities. Horizontal line in each

bar demarcates the proportion of individuals who

reported stopping a behavior but who would like to

start again. Individuals in non-Durrell intervention

communities were not surveyed regarding tuber

collection. Sample sizes are on top of bars.

tion in tuber collection was least driven by fear and mostdriven by social or personal motivations, such as gettingolder. Reduction in tenrec collection was strongly mo-tivated by biogeographic factors. Individuals commonlycommented that tenrecs had become increasingly diffi-cult to locate.

These broad-scale factors influencing the decision tostop engaging in behaviors were similar between Durrelland non-Durrell communities. Nevertheless, when theresponses were divided into fear of local, national, andinternational institutions, the fear of the local forest asso-ciation and of Durrell instituting fines and punishmentspredominated in Durrell communities, rather than thefear of not receiving payments (Fig. 3b).

Stability of Behavioral Change

Despite the reported changes in behavior, the majorityof people interviewed expressed a desire to return toeach activity, and this desire was strongly related to thereasons individuals changed their behaviors. Individualswho changed for social reasons were less likely to wantto return to the behaviors than those who changed outof fear (Table 3). Upon further examination of fear as areason, individuals whose fear originated from local insti-tutions were less likely to want to return to the behavior.Community as a random effect was significant in each ofthese analyses, which suggests that the strength of theresponse varied among communities.

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1494 Conservation Impacts of PES Intervention

Table 2. Summary of the final, simplified, mixed-effects models for whether an individual has stopped engaging in behaviors.a

Agricultural Lemur Canoe Tenrec HoneyExplanatory variablesb expansion hunting building collection collection

Age + +++ +++Married −−Land next to forest −Rainy season forest use − −− −−− −−−Wealth of corn/peanut fields + + −Knowledge of Durrell activities +Korao ethnic group −Sakalava ethnic group ++ +Random effect: community (%)c 59 99 65 61 47AUCd 0.813 0.973 0.855 0.852 0.845n 432 62 82 362 325

aPositive and negative signs reflect the impact of the explanatory variables on the changed behavior, with positive signs meaning individualswere more likely to stop the behavior. Significance is expressed through the number of plus and minus signs: + or −: p < 0.05; ++ or −−:p <

0.01; +++ or −−−: p < 0.001. All variables symbols (plus or minus signs) were in the minimum adequate model for that behavior.bSee Supporting Information for a full list of variables tested.cPercentage of variance explained by the random effect is presented under the random effect.dDiscrimination index that measures the predictive power of the model on the basis of probability that the predictions and the outcomes are in

agreement with values >0.7 representing a reasonable fit.

Discussion

Roles of Payment Size and Distribution

Payment to the communities for meeting biodiversityand governance indicators influenced the behavior of in-dividuals only weakly. This limited impact may be par-tially attributed to the small size of payments and theircommunity-based distribution. The payment, when di-vided among the entire community, was generally not

significant at the individual level. Each community re-ceived between US$200 and US$2000, and the benefitswere distributed among 40–500 individuals. In most casesthis amount of payment would not offset the high oppor-tunity costs experienced by many households and thuswould not motivate behavioral change. Nevertheless, thepayment amount appears sufficient to motivate the com-munity associations and therefore ensures the existenceof a local monitoring regime. Thus, the payments may be

Figure 3. Reasons individuals stopped forest-use behaviors for (a) all reasons and (b) fear only. Horizontal bars

with an asterisk (∗) represent p < 0.05 for chi-square tests between Durrell and non-Durrell communities within

each behavior.

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Table 3. Summaries of logistic mixed-effects models to describe howthe desire to return to a behavior or not is related to the generalreasons people stopped forest-use behaviors (n = 908) and thespecific reasons related to fear that individuals stopped forest-usebehaviors (n = 382).a

Reason for changed behavior Estimate SE z

Generalbiogeography 0.250 0.206 1.21fear 0.719∗∗∗ 0.192 3.75social −0.676∗∗∗ 0.194 3.48random effect: community (%)b 20

Specific related to fearfear of local community −0.640∗ 0.291 2.19fear of government and Durrell 1.288∗∗∗ 0.224 5.75fear of the forest −1.513∗∗∗ 0.379 3.75random effect: community (%)b 22

aSignificance: ∗p < 0.05; ∗∗∗p < 0.001.bPercentage of the variance explained by the random effect.

acting as a positive incentive for the association membersto impose traditional command and control incentives orsocial pressure on the rest of the community, althoughsome benefits of the payments undoubtedly trickle downto individuals and appear to result in positive attitudestoward monitoring. It is possible that if higher paymentswere instituted, and distributed effectively, these dynam-ics could change to the point at which individuals’ ac-tions might become primarily motivated by the paymentsrather than by the actions of the community associationsand Durrell’s monitoring.

The role of the distribution of payments is reflected inthe impact of the annual party sponsored by Durrell onbehaviors and attitudes. This party, at which paymentlevels are announced, had the largest positive impacton local attitudes, despite the fact that the party costswere lower than the payments. Although payments areprone to being controlled by subgroups in the commu-nity, parties create local value and thus strongly influenceattitudes because individuals cannot be excluded (nonex-cludable), and the “use” of a party by one individual doesnot diminish the availability of the benefit for others (non-rival) (Sommerville et al. 2009).

Roles of Legality and Regulation

The coexistence of illegal and regulated behaviors in PESschemes complicates the understanding of how paymentamount and distribution influence behaviors. Illegalitylikely heightens the motivational power of fear and mon-itoring and thus reduces the necessary payment size. Italso muddies relations among government, NGOs, andindividuals with respect to laws because payments maybe seen as implicitly recognizing a right to engage in anactivity.

In the case of the Menabe, the PES was proposed byDurrell in part because the government did not have

the capacity to enforce resource management laws. If anorganization without legal enforcement authority spear-heads a PES, the ability to withhold payments can cre-ate a third-party authority to monitor and enforce rules.Nevertheless, these PES schemes still require some gov-ernment support to adequately address external threats.For example, in two cases in the Menabe where commu-nity members encountered large-scale regional threats intheir forest (commercial logging and large-scale canoeexploitation), the associations complained they lackedjurisdiction and capacity to deal with these violations lo-cally. Despite reporting the incidents to authorities, thecases were unresolved more than a year later. This un-derscores the importance of ensuring that the serviceproviders can enforce their property rights through lo-cal institutions or through relationships with regional ornational bodies (Engel & Palmer 2008). Thus, althoughone of the practical purposes of nongovernmental PESsystems in developing countries may be to attempt to cir-cumvent poor governance at a regional or national level,there is still a need for engagement between administra-tive levels (Bowles & Gintis 2002).

In contrast to NGO-led PES, it may be challengingfor a central government to justify payments to serviceproviders not to break the law. Yet a potentially usefulrole for national PES schemes, rather than aiming to di-rectly motivate behavioral change, may be to sway localopinions or to compensate a subsection of the popula-tion. This occurred in Costa Rica, where a change in na-tional land-use laws restricting agricultural expansion wasmade palatable to rural people through the introductionof a PES system (Pagiola 2008). Thus, despite complica-tions, both government and NGO-led PES systems can beviable in the case of regulated or illegal behaviors. Never-theless, it is important to understand the mechanisms bywhich PES interventions motivate individuals. AlthoughPES interventions may function to influence individuals’actions or to engender good will toward an existing reg-ulatory regime, it is clear that to influence behavior thereis a need for monitoring.

Relation between Monitoring and Payments

Our results show that fear is a strong motivator for chang-ing behavior and this fear is brought on by monitoring.The probability of being caught conducting a regulatedactivity motivates behavior more than the size of the pun-ishment (Stigler 1970; Polinsky & Shavel 1979). Thus, al-though the legal consequences of being caught by thegovernment are much more severe than those posed byDurrell or the local communities, government monitoringis almost nonexistent; thus, the chance of being caught isvery low. Community forest patrol members said theywere hesitant to turn in fellow community members,but suggested they would confront individuals person-ally. There was no evidence this has occurred, however,

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and community monitoring has yet to catch local trans-gressors in the act. Hence, the high reported impact ofDurrell monitoring on forest-use behaviors is likely due totheir monitoring. Although Durrell has no legal authorityto inflict punishment, there is widespread belief in thecommunities that they have a private jail in the regionalcapital and this unintentional misinformation undoubt-edly increases the capacity of Durrell to influence localbehaviors.

Although local monitoring has advantages in terms ofpresence on the ground, its impact is limited by a lack ofincentives for local enforcement. Community membersbear a cost of monitoring their peers, which is reflected inmonitors’ hesitance to turn in fellow community mem-bers (Hechter 1984). Nevertheless, monitoring by thelocal association members still appears to affect local be-haviors due to their constant presence in the commu-nity, irrespective of whether they are actively monitoring.Overall, these findings on the importance of monitoringin motivating behavioral change may explain the mixedresults of some PES schemes with inadequate monitoring(Missrie & Nelson 2005).

Outreach and education played a role in motivating be-havioral change. The importance of environmental out-reach in influencing behaviors may be due not only toincreased knowledge of the rules, but also to develop-ment of local support and pride and subsequently non-use value for the forest, as has been observed in other in-terventions (Borgerhoff-Mulder & Coppolillo 2005). Out-reach is a critical prerequisite for successful PES and thelack of appropriate outreach and a focus on the technicalaspects of a PES project in Mexico have been blamed forthe project’s ineffectiveness (Corbera et al. 2007).

Although payments themselves do not act as the pri-mary drivers of individuals stopping behaviors in theMenabe PES system, they play an important role in in-fluencing local attitudes, particularly in terms of percep-tions of monitoring and the illegality of behaviors. It isthe presence of payments that justifies the monitoringregime to local communities. Furthermore, as communi-ties in the Menabe acquire legal control over their forests,they do not have to allow outsiders access to their forest.By placing a monitoring program within the frameworkof positive incentives, Durrell’s work has been embracedwidely in the region. Thus, payments create the positiveattitudes and trust that lay the groundwork for voluntarylocal acceptance of monitoring, which ultimately acts asthe motivational tool.

Correlates of Behavioral Change

The lack of difference between Durrell and non-Durrellcommunities was surprising, but it is possible that theregional presence of Durrell has had a corollary impacton the remaining communities in the Menabe. AlthoughDurrell is not actively engaged in the five interviewed

communities, Durrell activities have had wider effectsbecause of their campaigns on the radio and the visibilityof their vehicles.

There is some evidence that Durrell may have af-fected lemur hunting in the region. Knowledge of in-terventions did not affect other behaviors, but increasingawareness of the illegality of lemur hunting has beena specific focus of Durrell interventions over recentyears (F. Rakotombololona personal communication). Al-though the Durrell communities overall did not appearto have higher rates of reported reductions in behaviorsthan non-Durrell communities, anecdotal evidence fromsemistructured interviews suggests an impact on lemurhunting. During the first year of the PES intervention,the Durrell monitoring team encountered lemur traps inthe forests of Kiboy, Tsianaloky, and Anketrevo. Afterrevealing these results to the communities during the an-nual award ceremony, there have been no subsequentreports of lemur trapping (Durrell Wildlife ConservationTrust 2004–2008). Indeed, over the 120 km of transectswe carried out in four community forests in 2007–2008,only one lemur trap was encountered (M.S., unpublisheddata).

The reasons individuals gave for engaging in or stop-ping behaviors helped us understand how they re-sponded to incentives. Fear was the dominant motivatorof change for the two behaviors with the highest con-sequences, hunting lemurs and agricultural expansion.Fear played a lesser role in other behaviors. This furthersuggests the importance of laws in influencing behavioraldecisions.

The decline of tenrec hunting was strongly related toa perceived reduction in tenrec populations. Results ofprevious studies suggest that given their high fecundity,overexploitation of tenrecs is not likely (Nicoll 2003).The reports of lower tenrec harvests suggest harvestingmay in fact have a severe impact on local tenrec popula-tions. This decline may be partly due to observed illegalcollection of females and offspring during the closed sea-son (M.S., personal observation).

Social reasons for stopping behaviors, including aging,having others in the family able to do the work, or notneeding the resource anymore, were strong motivatorsof change. Nevertheless, these drivers are not easily in-fluenced by external interventions and therefore may beless important in the design of conservation programsthan consideration of the structure of incentives.

Stability of Change

Despite a large percentage of individuals reporting mov-ing away from behaviors, the reported changes do notnecessarily reflect a lasting success. Although fear ap-pears to be an effective tool at motivating individuals tostop behaviors (Witte & Allen 2000), those motivated byfear were most likely to want to return to past behaviors.

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Fear of external bodies (national government and Dur-rell) promoted a less-stable change in behavior than fearof local bodies, suggesting a potential benefit of engaginglocal communities through devolving monitoring respon-sibility and increasing local governance capacity.

Conclusions

Natural resource management projects are increasinglyincorporating PES models into their interventions, whichmakes it particularly important to understand how pay-ments influence the behavior and attitudes of individuals.Our results show the essential role monitoring plays inPES. Changes in behavior were motivated more by fearof being caught and punished due to increased monitor-ing than by a desire to increase the payment the com-munity received. Nevertheless, this does not mean pay-ments are not important. Payments played a key role inimproving attitudes toward the implementing NGO andprovided justification for monitoring. Although fear was astrong motivator for changing behaviors, it also appearedto result in relatively unstable behavioral changes. Localempowerment of community associations through thiscommunity-based PES scheme demonstrated the poten-tial to contribute to a more stable behavioral change.As PES theory and practice develop, conservation prac-titioners need to consider how payments interact withoutreach, monitoring, and other components of inter-ventions to motivate service provision.

Acknowledgments

We thank Madagascar’s Ministry of Water and Forests andDurrell Wildlife Conservation Trust’s Madagascar Team,including R. Lewis, H. Andrianandrasana, J. Durbin, and F.Rakotombolona. E.J.M.G. acknowledges support from aRoyal Society Wolfson Research Merit Award. We alsothank F. Ben, R. Ratsimbazafy, and L. Befitaky. Thiswork was funded by the Leverhulme Trust (grant F/07058/AH).

Supporting Information

A map of the region (Appendix S1), description of key fea-tures of the 13 Menabe communities (Appendix S2), theexplanatory variables used to predict changes in behav-iors in generalized linear mixed-effects models (AppendixS3), a summary of the specific reasons individuals claimedto have stopped carrying out a behavior (Appendix S4),and a table of reported positive actions Durrell carriesout in the communities (Appendix S4) are available aspart of the online article. The authors are responsible forthe content and functionality of these materials. Queries

(other than absence of the material) should be directedto the corresponding author.

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