Human – a praying animal. Spirituality as consequence of brain evolution.

By Thomas Klibengajtis PhD

Rationality and the clash of religions

Despite the appearances to the contrary we live in times of religious struggles. By “religion”

(=rel0), however, not necessary a belief in a God or gods is meant, but every world-view,

which:

(a) claims to explain everything in the world and in human existence,

(b) gives meaning to the life of its adherers,

(c) confers a special dignity on their existence,

(d) is disposed to proselytize,

(e) regards its opponents as somehow inferior,

(f) can be fully understood only from inside,

(g) provides some cultic elements (liturgy, sacred books, martyrs etc.).

The criteria of rel0

are met by „secular religions” (=relsec

), “esoteric religions” (=relesot

) and

“traditional religions” (=reltrad

). The somehow self-contradictory term relsec

designates all

world-views which invoke a higher cause, being explicitly not God, in order to fulfill their

mission as described above (Eric Voegelin). The task of the higher cause can be fulfilled by

different substrates: by revolution, as in the case of French Revolution (Claude Lefort), by

proletariat, as in the case of Marxism (Leszek Kolakowski; Sam G. MacFarland), by

nation/race, as in the case of Nazism (Stanley Stowers; Michael Ley; Claus-Ekkehart Bärsch),

and by scientific naturalism as promoted by Richard Dawkins, Daniel C. Dennett, Carl Sagan

et al (Karl W. Giberson 2008, 43-46).1 However not only rel

sec meet the criteria of rel

0. These

criteria are both met by relesot

and reltrad

. While relesot

emphasize the individual spiritual

experience and are mainly not interested in providing rational explanation for different beliefs

(Sutcliff), reltrad

, especially the Western theism, claim that at least some part of their doctrine

is rational, yet not entirely accessible by the mere ratio. Western theism, by which the

1 Scientific naturalism as represented by Dawkins and consorts certainly meets the criteria (a) to (f) described above. Dawkins (2004) meets at least the criteria (a) to (c) when he writes: “My objection to supernatural beliefs

is precisely that they miserably fail to do justice to the sublime grandeur of the real world. They represent a

narrowing-down from reality, an impoverishment of what the real world has to offer.” By calling anyone who

rejects evolution “ignorant, stupid and insane” (1989) he meets the criterion (e). Other proponents of natscien

employ a quasi religious language as described by Giberson (2008, 174-182) which strikes odd as to people who

call themselves rationalists. Interestingly enough Dawkins, Dennett and other proponents of natscien belong to a

proselytizing movement of “the brights” (Giberson, 44) whose main ideas such as a naturalistic worldview can

be traced back to the times of preceding the French Revolution. Even if cultic elements of “the brights” are not

mentioned on the movement’s page (http://the-brights.net) they probably exist.

2

Abrahamic kinds of religion, i.e. Judaism, Islam and Christianity are meant, shows the full

range of different attitudes towards rationality. In case of Christianity the view ranges from “I

believe because it’s absurd” (credo quia absurdum)2 – a statement ascribed to Tertulian - and

the concept of Thomas Aquinas, according to which “every intellectual act depends on God”3,

who is, as Christians believe, rational Himself.4 Probably the strongest emphasis on

irrationality in religion, understood as prevalence of God’s transcendence inaccessible to

human mind, can be found in Orthodoxy and in Calvinism.5 The strongest emphasis on

rationality, on the other hand, seems to be present in Roman-Catholicism.6 Notwithstanding

the inter-religious and inter-confessional differences reltrad

claim that rationality, considered as

participation in God’s wisdom in which all rationality is embedded, forms an essential part of

every religion. While relsec

purport an “exclusive rationalism”, because it excludes God, reltrad

maintain an “inclusive rationalism”, in which God is contained. Besides these differences

mentioned rationality forms a common ground where reltrad

and relsec

, including scientific

naturalism, can enter into dialog.

Scientific naturalism as the paradigm of today

Contemporary problem with connecting such issues as God, brain, prayer and

evolution results not only from the popular, yet incorrect, claim that religion lacks rationality

and therefore no common ground with science can be established. It results also from the

perspective of scientific naturalism - the scientific paradigm of today. According to scientific

naturalism world’s normal causal processes as processes of matter are only accessible by the

2 A sentence wrongly ascribed to Tertulian († 220). In regard to the real Flesh of the risen Christ he in fact wrote

“it’s believable because it’s improper” (credibile es, quia ineptum est) (De carne Christi 5,4). 3 Aquinas, Summa theologica, Prima secundae, Q. 109, 1 c: “Actio intellectus cujuscumque creati dependet a

Deo, quoad duo: primo inquantum habet ab eo perfectionem qua agit, id est lumen; secundo inquantum movetur

ab eo.“ 12 q. 109. 1 c 4 Tertullian, De anim. 16. 5 While Calvin argues from the incapability of human mind which, although endowed with a “sense of Deity” by

nature, fails to recognize God’s salvation due to the fall (Calvin 1964a), Orthodoxy argues from God’s ineffable

transcendence and holiness which is incomprehensible to human mind. Although both approaches seem similar

their consequences are quite different. According to Calvin a believer has to accept God’s irrational choice

including predestination and reprobation which stays irrational for him to the end (Calvin 1964b). According to

Orthodoxy a believer should enter the mystic way which surmounts the rational approach and results in

contemplation in which all differences between rational and irrational will be abolished as comprehended quasi

from God’s perspective (Vladimir Lossky 2005, 7-9). 6 The relation between reason and faith was one of the main subjects of the First Vatican Council (1869-70). The

Dogmatic Constitution on Catholic Faith Dei Filius from 24. April 1870 asserts that “there can never be any real

disagreement between faith and reason, since it is the same God who reveals the mysteries and infuses faith, and

who has endowed the human mind with the light of reason” (Chap. IV, 5) and “not only can faith and reason

never be at odds with one another but they mutually support each other” (Chap. IV, 10). Nevertheless “the

reason is never rendered capable of penetrating [the] mysteries [of faith] in the way in which [the faith]

penetrates those truths which form its proper object” (Chap. IV, 4).

3

means of science. Consequently they are never interrupted by any supernatural cause and thus

no nonsensory experience is possible (Griffin 2002, 361-362).

Paradigms, however, are not always convincing due to their intrinsic consistency.

They rather exert influence due to the fact that they are paradigms. A view becomes a

paradigm only then if it is accepted by the majority as a common sense opinion or as an

opinion in accordance with science. Consequently science, though believed to be the absolute

truth, is also a social construct. If scientists declare reality to be the object of science they in

fact mean something which is considered by the majority of the scientific community as real.

Hence the area of scientific interest, i.e. “the paradigmatic reality”, is defined by a social

agreement. This “paradigmatic reality”, however, is also established by a current founding

policy on the part of the state or private investors. Some projects are funded because they are

believed to be useful. Others are rejected because they are inconsistent with the ruling

paradigm. Consequently the funding policy as a part of social agreement draws a sharp line

between sense and nonsense in science and retards thus any scientific progress. The issue how

many angels can dance of the point of a needle, often quoted as an example of a nonsensical

medieval study, seems quite reasonable from a particular metaphysical perspective which can

be followed by a scientific approach. Let us assume the existence of angels. Let us further

assume that everything in the universe, including angels, exists as energy, which, at present

can be only partly measured by our devices. Since, according to physics, any energy can be

converted into matter and/or movement, the issue of dancing angels seems less nonsensical

(Sandberg 2000).7 Since, however, the first proposition of the argumentation above, as

metaphysical, is inconsistent with the paradigm of scientific naturalism, someone who might

dare to work on the dancing-angels-issue will at least face the objection of petitio principi

since s/he builds an argumentation on a proposition which s/he cannot prove.

Scientific naturalism, even if it rejects metaphysics, is also embedded in a particular

metaphysics. This metaphysics is materialism (Griffin 2002, 365-357), which defines the

boundaries of reality in its own way. Scientific paradigms are not eternal, they also can

change. This happens primarily due to a shift in metaphysics after which a shift in science

follows. We owe our contemporary scientific interest in biofeedback, alternative medicine,

body-mind-brain issues and many ecological questions like animal self-awareness or plant

intelligence to the metaphysical shift which took place in the West in the late 1960s and

resulted in the New Age two decades later. Due to the fact that some people sensed and/or

experienced that reality is much more than the scientific paradigm of their parents generation

7 Significantly the note about Sandberg’s paper can be found in the German Bild der Wissenschaft Plus in the

column: Research Nobody Needs to Know (Forschung, die die Welt nicht braucht) (Sandberg 2001, 50).

4

allowed, they started to develop new methods and devices in order to prove their metaphysical

approach. Thomas Kuhn describes the paradigmatic process as a shift from normal science

(=paradigma), via crisis and revolution, to new normal science (= paradigm

b)

(Kuhn 1969). As

science Kuhn regards small groups of research workers who carry forward one line of inquiry.

This disciplinarity matrix, as Kuhn calls it, provides paradigm-as-set-of-shared-values which

again is intimately linked to paradigm-as-achievement (Kuhn 1969; Ian Hacking 1983, 10-

11). Consequently paradigm forms the beginning, the method and partially the result of the

research. Since, however, the result becomes an achievement only due to the acceptance of

the academic peers, which occurs mostly if no ruling paradigm is violated, the question comes

up whether science is not a mere social construct.

Philosophical background of scientific naturalism: the legacy of Descartes

Before a new metaphysical shift can finally result in a new scientific paradigm, the

philosophical background of scientific naturalism (natscien

) will be exposed. Natscien

was

formed by the dualistic rationalism and idealism (=ratioideal

), on the one hand, and the

monistic materialism and reductionism (=matred

), on the other hand. Both developments

originated in the Cartesian split of reality into “the extended thing” (res extensa), i.e.

“matter”, and “the thinking thing” (res cogitans), i.e. “mind”. René Descartes (1596-1650)

sought for the unquestionable certitude of knowledge and existence which could resist any

skepticism. According to him this certitude cannot be found in the exterior world due to the

possibility of misperception, but within the mental processes of the thinking subject. Hence

even if we doubt about everything, we cannot doubt the same process of doubting. This means

that by questioning any possible content of thought as unreal the self-awareness of the

questioning individual still remains. For this reason we can say “I think therefore I am”

(cogito ergo sum) and recognize ourselves as a “thinking thing” (res cogitans). After having

proved the existence of anything at all, Descartes proceeds to the evidence of the exterior

world which results from the existence of God (Descartes, 1987, 31-39). Since we doubt, we

recognize ourselves as imperfect. Consequently we have a native notion (idea innata) of

something more perfect (smp

) than ourselves. Smp

must be real, since even the imperfect

doubting subject exists. Consequently smp

, as more perfect, has to exist, too. Otherwise it

would be less perfect than the imperfect, yet existing, doubting subject. Smp

is God. Since God

is perfect He has also to be good, because the notion of perfection includes the notion of

goodness. Even if we can be only sure of the contents of our mind, at least some of them have

5

to be true. This happens for that reason that God as perfect, good and veracious and as such

He would not place entirely false notions into human minds.

One of the notions placed by God is the notion of extensiveness, considered by

Descartes as the most universal and abstract feature of all bodies. Since everything beyond the

thinking subject (res cogitans) is extended (res extensa) reality can be split up into two

realms: the realm of res cogitans, i.e. realm of mind, and the realm of res extensa, i.e. realm

of matter (Röd 1999, 73). In this way modern dualism was born. Since, however, this concept

attributed body to the one realm and mind or spirit to another, human, as consisting of mind

and body, ceased to be a considered as a unity. Against the Platonic dualism which solved the

problem of two realms (i.e. of the noetic and sensual cosmos) by means of participation,

modern dualism claimed a juxtaposition of matter (res extensa) and mind (res cogitans).

Consequently the post-Cartesian philosophical development focused either on matter or mind.

In the genuine Cartesian system the problem of knowledge about the exterior world was

solved by the claim that God gave us the notion of it. Notwithstanding this solution most post-

Cartesian philosophers rejected God as the epistemological link between the inner and the

outer world. This approach, however, caused a clash between the inner and the outer

experience, empiricism and rationalism, experiment and theory, science and religion.

This process can be shown on the example of French philosophy which significantly

contributed to the further development of the philosophy of science. In the era preceding

French Revolution French philosophy, similar to the French society, belonged either to a

reformist or a revolutionary party (Röd, 1984, 163). The reformist party consisting of Charles

Louis de Secondat, and, Baron de La Brède et de Montesquieu (1689-1755), François Marie

Voltaire (1694-1778) and Denis Diderot (1713-1784) focused on the realm of res cogitans

and opted for a religion of reason. The revolutionary party, on the other hand, consisting of

Julien Offray de La Mettrie (1709-1751) and Paul Henri Thiry d’Holbach (1723-1789)

followed the Cartesian path of rex extensa and claimed a mere materialism. In regard to the

mind-matter-issue Voltaire claimed that we simply don’t know what the relation between

spirit and matter is (Röd 1984, 176). Diderot went a step further and proceeded in regard to

the matter-spirit-issue from agnosticism to the negation of any link between the res extensa

and res cogitans. He purported that any teleology is anthropomorphic. Consequently in

science we are only allowed to ask how and not why. Since by asking for meaning which

means by arguing from the perspective of res cogitans in the world of res extensa we slip into

anthropomorphism (Röd 1984, 190). Contrary to Voltaire and Diderot the revolutionary party

saw no need of linking mind with matter, since only the latter exists. La Mettrie declared that

6

an immaterial soul cannot work on the body (Röd, 1984, 216). Consequently he considered

the soul as a function of the material brain process. He also connected metaphysical

materialism with epistemological reductionism and declared the contents of mind as reducible

to sensations. According to La Mettrie thinking is only the facility of organized matter.

Holbach, another materialist, drew theological conclusions from La Mettrie’s philosophical

views and claimed that “to worship God means to worship the own brain’s fiction”. He

considered everything as matter to which mechanic regularities ruling physics, biology and

even society can be attributed (Röd, 1984, 229). These materialistic views, albeit developed in

the 18th century, sound very modern even today. In opposition to materialism another

philosophical path called spiritualism developed. Maine de Biran (1766-1824), one of its

advocates, focused entirely on the res cogitans and claimed that only the inner experience is

related to facts (Röd, 1989, 281). Consequently he had severe problems to answer the

question whether the spiritual and supra-individual reality really exists or whether it should be

considered as a sum of psychological and physiological phenomena (Röd, 1989, 283). The

answer to the latter question is not irrelevant to the philosophy of science. If we assume that

only an individual experience exist, we cannot presuppose any universal or generally binding

truth, rule or formula. German idealists had also to face this problem of empirism and solved

in their own way. Kant claimed that the categories of our mind are universal. Fichte placed

the individual I within the Absolute I. Schelling embedded the individual human experience

within the Absolute (Klibengajtis 2008, 15-20). In order to prove the existence of the outer

world German idealism had to employ very sophisticated metaphysical constructions. This

degree of complexity couldn’t work for science and a new paradigm shift, called positivism,

occurred. Most scientists preferred this perspective elaborated by Auguste Comte (1798-

1857). He declared that positive science has to be (1) empirical, (2) value-free, (3) able to

make prognoses based on laws of induction and (4) able to make these prognoses work in a

rational praxis (Röd, 1989, 28). Although positivism originated in the 1820s, its legacy lasts

until now. Positivism followed the 18th

century materialism and focused on the res extensa.

German idealism, on the other hand, concentrated on res cogitans and made by this way a

significant contribution to the development of psychology. Despite numerous attempts to

establish a new metaphysical paradigm which could mediate between the realm of res

extensa, i.e. science and the realm of res cogitans, i.e. mind, psyche and spirituality, such as

the synthetic philosophy of Herbert Spencer (1820-1903), neokantianism, vitalism, analytical

philosophy and deconstructionism, we still live in a conflict between res extensa and res

cogitans. Consequently any attempts of a uniform view on matter and spirit seem suspicious.

7

Possible solutions of the spirit-matter-dualism

At present two possible, however, deficient solutions of the spirit-matter-issue are

employed. First of them, which reminds the medieval double-truth-doctrine, claims that the

realm of science and the realm of spirit have to exist separately as two, independent,

juxtaposed units. They act in accordance with their inner rules or hermeneutics which are

consistent within the own system. Consequently human can deal with both realms either as

believer or as a scientist. The concept of the double truth appeared for the first time in the late

13th century when Latin Averroists, such as Siger of Brabant (1240-1284) and Boetius of

Dacia (died before 1284) claimed that some arguments can be true on the grounds of

philosophy but wrong on the grounds of theology. This concept was condemned as heretical

by Étienne Tempier, the bishop of Paris, in 1277 (Schulthess and Imbach 2002, 199-202).

Among the arguments produced against the double-truth-doctrine was the claim that nobody

can live in a permanent intellectual conflict which results from holding something to be true

and false at the same time (Flasch 1989 and Wippel 1977). The same objection pertains to the

contemporary spirit-matter-issue. On the one hand no believer can be forced to reject his

scientific views; on the other hand, no scientist can accept the putative irrationality of

religion.

Besides the contemporary double-truth-theory there is also a second solution of the

spirit-matter-issue. It consists in reductionism according to which all phenomena of spirit are

simply products of the body. This thesis was purported among others by Carl Vogt (1817-

1895), a German vulgar materialist, who claimed that thoughts are likely in the same relation

to brain, as bile to liver and urine to the kidneys (Röd, 1989, 131). This reductionist view

deprives the individual spiritual experience of any transcendence, objectivity and normativity.

Consequently religion becomes restricted to the individual brain. Since, however, the latter

decays with death, religion appears to be an illusion and consolation of the living.

A new possible solution of the sprit-body-issue is not reductionism but “inclusionism”

which considers matter and spirit as two sides of one reality. Since the very term inclusionism

is related to a theological concept of universal reconciliation, the term panpsychism or

monism seems more appropriate. Panentheism which claims that God is present within the

world without being exhausted by the latter (Cobb, 1983, 423) is such an inclusionistic

approach. Panentheism considers world as God’s body, self-expression or subsystem in which

some aspects of God’s plenty appear to us as matter. From this perspective some bodily

actions measurable by the means of EEG, ERP and neuroimaging studies, which appear in a

8

religious context, such as meditation, refer not only to the neural processes of the brain but

also a spiritual external reality. From this perspective the question whether the world was

made by God or by evolution seems irrelevant. Since God and evolution don’t belong to two

antagonist realms, we can claim that the world is guided by God by means of the evolution.

Human uniqueness revisited

The issue of human uniqueness mirrors the development of religion and philosophy.

The religious doctrine according to which human was created by God or gods more diligently

than animals resulted in the philosophical concept of rational soul. According to this opinion

only humans possess a rational soul contrary to animals which are endowed with simple souls.

From the times of Enlightenment the rational soul started to be identified with rationality in

terms of res cogitans. Consequently such effects of rationality as: (a) intelligence, (b)

language (esp. symbolism and syntax), (c) culture (organization and tool making), (d) self-

awareness including awareness of the thoughts of others and deception, and (e) empathy were

regarded for a long time as unique human. In the course of an increasing acceptance of the

theory of evolution humans condescended to regard themselves as animals, but as rational

ones. In this way the ancient definition of human as a rational animal obtained again its

validity. Animals were believed to behave entirely different to humans, since only to humans

rationality in terms of (a) to (e) could be attributed. However according to the recent research

none of the cognitive faculties listed above can be longer considered as unique human.

Intelligence defined as adaptation to novel situation (Macphail 1982, 4) can be found not only

in animals (Lefebvre et al. 2004), such as primates (Gibson et al., 2001), crows (Clayton and

Emery, 2005; 2008) or ants (Franks, 2008), but also in plants (Trewavas, 2008). Also

language is not unique to humans since members of all great ape species have mastered

elements of gestural or visually based symbolic communication in captive settings and have

exhibited the ability to combine symbols in a rule-like, syntactic, fashion (Gardner and

Gardner 1969; Miles 1990; Patterson and Linden 1981; Premack and Premack 1983;

Rumbaugh 1977; Savage-Rumbaugh 1986; Savage-Rumbaugh & Lewin 1994). Such

evidences of culture as organization and tool making can be discovered among certain

animals. Organization can be found among ants (Burd 2006; Franks 2008) and termites

(Harris and Sands 1965; Husseneder 1998), tool making exists among apes (Fragaszy and

Boesch Visalberghi 1989; Boesch and Boesch 1990; McGrew 1992; Whiten et al. 1999;

Gannon et al. 2001, 231) and corvids (Striedter 2005, 334; Weir et al. 2002; Hunt 1996). Self-

9

awareness (Gallop 1982; Parker et al. 1994; Parker 1996) including awareness of the thoughts

of others (theory of mind) (Premarck 1988; Premarck and Dasser 1991) and deception

(Whiten and Byrne 1988; Russon et al. 1996; Byrne and Russon 1998; Gibson et al. 2001, 83,

85) could be observed among apes. Also empathy and compassion (Boesch 1992; Povinelli et

al. 1992) exists among the latter species. Consequently all characteristics considered hitherto

as unique human are at least to some degree present among animals.

This lack of human uniqueness is not very surprising in regard to the theory of

evolution and the Christian creation story. The latter, if read metaphorically, show that

humans appear at the end of the creation process (Gen 1:26). As the Biblical tale demonstrates

human, “formed of the dust of the ground” (Gen 2:7), partly belongs to the world of animals

and partly transcends it. Human belonging to the world of animals is expressed in the story of

naming animals (Gen 2:19) which wouldn’t be comprehensible, if Adam wouldn’t carry the

names within himself, quasi as parts of himself. Also the story about looking for a help, i.e.

wife, in the animal world (Gen 2:20), shows an affinity to the latter. If the world of animals

would have been totally alien to Adam, he wouldn’t look for among animals for a wife. The

idea that the human species belongs to a bigger order which neither starts nor end with it was

for a long time present in the Western philosophy. It was known as ordo rerum, i.e. the order

of things (Schulthess and Imbach 2002, 183-187). This order contained entities in action (ens

in actu), matter (corpus), living entities (vivens), animated entities (animal), humans (homo),

spiritual entities and God. The gradation of all the entities mentioned depended on their

nearness to God and on the fact, how far they realized their godlikeness (similitude divina

recepta in rebus) (Schulthess and Imbach 2002, 186). Consequently until the Enlightenment

humans considered themselves much closer to animals than in the post-Cartesian times when

they found themselves beyond any order. Theory of evolution provides a biological

embedment which ranks humans among other living beings. This view doesn’t necessarily

contradict the theological embedment of ordo rerum. According to the panentheistic approach

a divine act hasn’t be (1) supernatural, (2) exterior and (3) immediate in order to be divine.

Thus there is no compelling reason to reject the idea that God created humans from within by

means of the evolution. Human uniqueness, however, consists in the sense of transcendence

enabled by the development of the prefrontal cortex unique among animals.

10

History of brain evolution

History of evolution is a history of brain development. During the evolution a

significant increase of endocranial volume against body weight took place, both in fossil and

in recent species. Based on the fact of a positive correlation between the brain size and the

body size, since a larger body requires more requires more neural circuitry which makes a

certain amount of sense, the question was raised what might be the ratio between the body

size and the brain size. Huxley (Huxley 1932) produces an equation between measured

parameters (such as brain size) and body size which is: y = Bxk. x is the body size of an

animal, B and k are constants either measured empirically or produced theoretically from

some model of the expected relationship (Sellers 1999). These assumptions make an

allometric equation for any group of animals possible. The equation obtained empirically by

Jerison (Jerison 1973), based on raw data concerning B and k of vertebrates from Quiring

(Quiring 1950), is Ebrain = 0.12 Mbody2/3

(Sellers 1999). Ebrain is the expected mass of the brain

(in grams) for a mammal with a body mass Mbody (also in grams). The encephalization

quotient (EQ) is defined as the ratio of the actual mass of the brain (Mbrain) to the expected

mass of the brain given the body size (Sellers 1999; Eccles 1989, 81-84). Thus the equation

for the EQ is: EQ = .8

Consequently different EQs for both fossil and recent species

could be developed. The exemplary encephalization quotient of some mammal fossil species

is: 0,3 for basal insectivores; 0,5 for advances insectivores, 1,0 for prosimians (Eccles 1989,

85; Jerison 1973), 1.87 respectively 2.449 for Australopithecus afarensis, 2,16 resp. 2,79 for

Australopithecus africanus, 2.50 resp. 3.22 for paranthropus boisei, 2.50 resp. 3.24 for

paranthropus robustus, 3.34 resp. 4.40 for homo erectus, 3.38 resp. 4.31 for homo habilis

(Aiello and Dean 1990). The different EQs for some recent species are: 1.14 resp. 1.61 for

gorilla gorilla, 2.28 resp. 3.01 for pan troglodytes (chimpanzees), 1.80 resp. 2.36 for pongo

pygmaeus and 6.28 resp. 8.07 for homo sapiens (Sellers 1999; Aiello and Dean 1990).

Due to the fact that the EQ values of the most species rose over time (Sellers 1999;

Conroy 1990; Jerison 1973) and the human brain size increased extremely during the last 2

million years (Schäfer et al. 2008; Tobias 2008; Glissen 2008) we can state that in regard to

the brain development the species homo sapiens can be considered as the climax of evolution.

The latter claim can be demonstrated not only from the EQ value, but also from the

8 Although Ebrain obtained by Martin (Martin 1984) is a different one, i.e. Ebrain = 0.059Mbody

0.76 (Aiello and Dean

1990), the upper EQ equation remains valid. 9 The first EQ is given according to Martin (Martin 1984) the second according to Jerison (Jerison 1973) (Aiello

and Dean 1990).

11

neocortical development and the neocortex ratio. Since the neocortex is responsible for

sensory perception, generation of motor commands, spatial reasoning, conscious thought, and

in humans, language the increase of the neocortex ratio, i.e. the ratio of the size of the

neocortex to the rest of the brain, should give informations about information processing

capacities of a species (Dunbar 1993; Gibson 2002). Human neocortex ratio, which is 4.1

(Stephan et al. 1981), is about 50% larger than the maximum value for any other primate

species (Dunbar 1992). It seems that human brains are best endowed by nature for tasks they

have to solve. On the other hand the tasks to be solved in the history of human evolution

resulted in the specific human brain development. Before we allege the argument that prayer

is a specific human task, we might ask in what the uniqueness of human brain consists.

Uniqueness of the human brain

In accordance with Darwin who claimed that “the difference in mind between man and

the higher animals, great as it is, is certainly one of degree and not of kind” (Darwin 1871,

105), some neuroscientists claimed that mammalian species differ little in internal brain

organization, the main differences being matters of size (Preuss 2000, 1220). This emphasis

on the continuity of brain organization, however, seems to be abandoned by the modern

evolutionary biology, since it is for example acknowledged, that humans possess structures of

the hands and feet that apes lack (Aiello and Dean 1990). Furthermore, today evolutionists

regard phylogeny as primarily a matter of diversification rather than ascent or progress

(Preuss, 2000, 1221, Bowler 1996, Richards 1987, 1992). Consequently humans are not

longer regarded as the near-inevitable product of a general evolutionary progression from the

simplest to increasingly complex forms, but rather as one remarkable evolutionary outcome

among many (Preuss, 2000, 1221-1222). Since humans differ in cognitive organization from

other species, we should not be surprised that their brain organization varies as well. Human

differentness can be exhibited in many dimensions of cortical organization. We can found

strong differentness exemplified by: enlarged association cortex and enlarged cerebellum.

Medium differentness represented by changes at finer levels of brain organization and weak

differentness shown at the example of similarity in cortical areas and cerebral asymmetries in

humans and non-human primates (Preuss, 2000, 1223-1230).

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Strong differentness of human brain

(a) Enlarged association cortex

Enlargement of the cerebral cortex which includes the classical “association” regions

of the pariental, temporal and frontal lobes (Blinkov and Glezer 1968; Brodmann 1909, 1912;

Le Gros Clark 1959) accounts for most of the difference in brain volume between humans and

other primates (Stephan et al. 1981). Frontal cortex has been singled out for special attention

(Falk 1992; Semendeferi et al. 1997) and regarded as extensively modified during human

evolution due to its role in language and evidence of its involvement in theory of mind

(Fletcher et al. 1995). According to Brodmann the prefrontal cortex underwent progressive

evolution being larger in humans than in apes (Brodmann 1912). According to Blinkov and

Glezer (Blinkov and Glezer 1968) the prefrontal cortex and the frontal cortex as a whole were

enlarged in human evolution relative to posterior cortex. Although the latter opinion was

relativized by Semendeferi who starting from a different methodological approach claimed

that humans have about the same relative amount of frontal cortex as apes but still more than

monkeys (Semendeferi et al. 1997),10

we can still claim that humans, compared with monkeys

and apes, possess a relatively large amount of higher-order frontal and posterior association

complex (Preuss 2000, 1224). It can be generally stated that in humans the posterior

association complex expanded quasi at the expense of motor cortex compared with other

primates. Although the absolute amounts of cortex devoted to the primary visual area (Blikov

and Glezer 1968; Frahm et al. 1984) and the primary motor area (Blinkov and Glezer 1968)

are similar in humans and apes, humans and chimpanzees differ in the location of primary

motor cortex (Brodmanns area 4). While in humans area 4 is largely confined to the anterior

bank of the central sulcus, in chimpanzees area 4 occupies the anterior bank of the central

sulcus, the precentral gyrus, and most of the precentral sulcus as well (Preuss et al. 1997a).

Hence motor cortex probably occupies a smaller fraction of frontal cortex in humans than in

chimpanzees. Likewise, the primary visual cortex and other lower-order visual areas seem to

have been displaced posteriorly in humans compared to other primates (Tootell et al. 1996;

Ungerleider and Haxby 1994). Armstrong found that although the thalamic nuclei that project

to primary visual and auditory cortex contain similar numbers of neurons in great apes and

humans, the nuclei that project to the prefrontal, parietal, and temporal association cortex

contain approximately 2-3 times as many cells in humans as in great apes (Armstrong 1982).

10 More about the discrepancies mentioned can be found in Preuss (Preuss 2000, 1223-1224).

13

(b) Enlarged cerebellum

Evolutionary changes concern not only the forebrain but also cerebellum which was

modified in ape and human evolution. While ape cerebella are relatively large for primates of

their body size, the human cerebellum is still larger (Passingham 1975; Stephan et al. 1988).

Also the dentate nucleus, one division of the deep cerebellar nuclei, is larger relative to body

weight and hindbrain volume in humans than in apes (Matano and Hirasaki 1997). The

dentate nucleus receives projections from the lateral cerebellar cortex, and in turn to the

cerebral cortex via the thalamus. It seems that apes and humans possess a unique subdivision

of the dentate that sends outputs to the prefrontal cortex (via the thalamus) (Leiner, Leiner and

Dow 1985). These views support the opinion that the cerebellum contributes both to cognitive

and motor functions (Ivry and Baldo 1992; Leiner, Leiner and Dow 1986; Middleton and

Strick 1994; Schmahmann 1991). If Leiner and colleagues (1986) are right in arguing that the

cerebellum contributes to the routinization of complex cognitive procedures and hence to

mental agility and if the emergence of higher-order representations depends on the

routinization and consolidation of lower-order schemas, as claimed by Karmiloff-Smith

(1992), the interactions between the cerebellum and cerebral cortex could be significant in the

development of higher-order cognitive representations.

Medium differentness of human brain - the cellular and laminar cortical

organization

Humans differ from other primates in the cellular and laminar organization of the

cortex, although relatively little attention has been paid to yet to this area. Due to the

development of modern histological techniques a comparison between the cortical

organization of humans and other species became possible. One well-documented difference

in the cortical histology of macaques and humans concerns the laminar organization of the

primary visual cortex (area VI or 17) which is revealed by staining for cytochrome oxidase

(CO). In macaques and other Old World and New World monkeys, there is a distinctive,

narrow band of dense CO staining, corresponding to layer IVA, located above the main band

of dense staining in layer IVC. In humans, however, layer IVA does not stain strongly for CO

(Preuss, 2000, 1229; Horton 1984; Horton and Hedley-Whyte 1984; Wong-Riley et al. 1993;

Hendry and Carder 1993; Preuss, Qi and Kaas 1998). Humans and macaques also differ in

the biology of pyramidal cells. Humans possess more pyramidal cells in the superficial

14

cortical layers (Campbell and Morrison 1998) than do macaques. These results suggest that

there are also differences in the organization of the upper cortical layers. Maybe humans

posses classes of pyramidal cells that are absent in macaques (Campbell and Morrison 1989)

or the connectional organization of the superficial layers may be different in humans and

macaques (Hof et al. 1996; del Rio and DeFelipe 1997).

Weak differentness of human brain

(a) Language areas

Although humans due to their specific cognitive and psychological capacities are

expected to have developed new areal subdivision of cerebral cortex, the issue of new cortical

areas is quite divergent. On the one hand there appears to be a relationship between brain size

and number of cortical areas in mammals, such that larger brained taxa tend to have more

areas than smaller-brained forms (Allmann 1990; Brodmann 1909; Kaas 1987; Preuss and

Kaas 1998). On the other hand there is at present no good evidence that humans possess

cortical areas in addition to those found in other primates (Preuss, 2000, 1225). It has been

suggested that Broca’s area and other language-relate cortical regions are probably unique to

humans (Brodmann 1909; Crick and Jones 1993; Killackey 1995) which, however, appears

not to be correct. It seems that at least homologs of both Broca’s area and Wernicke’s area are

present in macaques and other non-human primates. Most interest has focused on Broca’s

area, which is identified with architectonic areas 44 and 45 of Brodmann (1909). While

Bordmann claimed that these areas are unique to humans, others found architectonically

similar areas in the ventral premotor region of nonhuman primates (Bonin 1944; Bucy 1944).

Recent experiments such as electrical stimulation of ventral premotor region in nonhuman

primates confirmed the latter opinion for they produces oral and laryngeal movements

(Stepniewska, Preuss and Kaas 1993). This supports the thesis that a portion of the ventral

premotor region of nonhuman primates contains cortex homologous to Broca’s area (Abbs

1986; Bonin 1944; Bucy 1944; Deacon 1992; Galaburda and Pandya 1982; Jürgens 1979;

Liebermann 1985). Also some recent studies provide additional evidence of homology of

ventral premotor cortex in nonhuman primates and Broca’s area in humans (Preuss 1995a;

Preuss, Stepniewska and Kaas 1996; Stepniewska, Preuss, and Kaas 1993). It is possible that

homologs of posterior language cortex – specifically Wernicke’s area and the inferior parietal

cortex - may also exist in nonhuman primates (Preuss, 2000, 1227; Galaburda and Pandya

1982; Eidelberg and Galaburda 1984; Leinonen et al. 1979). In case nonhuman primates

15

possess areas and connectional systems that are preadapted for language it is possible that

human-specific language functions evolved, not by the addition of new cortical areas, but by

the modification of pre-existing structures and systems, as Bonin (1944) suggested long ago.

However until we have accurate charts of cortical areas in humans and other primates, and a

very detailed mapping of the distribution of linguistic and nonlinguistic functions in the

human perisylvian cortex, we cannot reject the possibility that language is represented in

areas adjacent to, but distinct from, the areas representing nonlinguistic functions.

Nevertheless it can be currently stated that the classical language areas are not unique to

humans.

(b) Cerebral asymmetries

Similar to the issue of homologues of human language areas present in nonhuman

primates, also cerebral asymmetries appear to be not unique to humans. Due to the fact that

human left hemisphere is dominant for language and upper-limb control the hemispheres are

structurally asymmetrical. Especially the region of temporal cortex usually identified with

Wernicke’s area-the so-called planum temporale, the posterior part of the temporal lobe

buried within the sylvian fissure – is highly asymmetrical (Geschwind and Levitsky 1968;

Foundas, Leonard and Heilman 1995; LeMay and Culebras 1972). Broca’s area is also

asymmetrical especially the sulci within this area are deeper and longer on the left than on the

right (Albanese et al. 1989; Falzi et al. 1982; Foundas et al. 1996; Foundas, Leonard, and

Heilman 1995). Finally, there are reports of left-right asymmetries of pyramidal cell size and

dendritic morphology in the classical language regions (Hayes and Lewis 1995; Hutsler and

Gazzaniga 1996; Scheibel et al. 1985). Nevertheless it is reported that nonhuman primates

possess at least some of the asymmetries found in humans. Asymmetries of sylvian fissure

length (with left longer than the right) are present in Old World monkeys and apes as well as

in humans (Bradshaw and Rogers 1993). Furthermore, is apes, but not monkeys, the tip of the

sylvian fissure is usually higher on the right than on the left, as is the case in humans (LeMay

and Geschwind 1975; Yeni-Komshian and Benson 1976). There are also reports that

chimpanzees possess planum temporal asymmetries similar to those of humans (Glissen 2008;

Gannon et al. 1998; Hopkins et al. 1998). Nevertheless it is possible that there are additional

differences between apes and humans in the degree of fissural asymmetry (Yeni-Komshian

and Benson 1976) or difference in the cellular organization of language-related regions which

couldn’t have been yet examined.

16

Evolution and cerebral rise of religion

About 100 000 years ago the brain of homo sapiens developed to its present size. This

fact could suggest that at that time some specific higher brain functions were achieved which

were absent in former hominids (Tobias 2008; Hofman 2008; Joseph 1993; Dunbar 1993;

Holloway 1972).11

It is probably that this brain development mentioned resulted not only in

new skills, but also in a new form of self-awareness connected with the sense of

transcendence (Suddendorf and Corbalis 1997). Hence it is not surprising that the first

evidences of religious practices such as the use of flowers by burial could be found 80 000

years ago (Klein 2000; Eccles 1989; Hawkes 1965). The first evidences for empathy, such as

long-lasting care for injured individuals among the Neanderthals, was stated 60 000 ago

(Solecki 1971). If this chronology is not accidental it seems plausible that humans first have

achieved a cerebral possibility to discover that there is something beyond them. Afterwards

they started to develop certain rituals in order to get into contact with this reality.

Subsequently they started to care in a more diligent way for each other. This could have

happened both because of the rise of empathy, since they could sense with the other, and

because of the fear of divine punishment since ethics, in the most ancient cultures, was always

sanctified by religion.

It is not surprising that religious experience is brain-based since all human experience

is brain-based (Saver and Rabin 1997, 498). However from the fact that some experiences can

be observed within the brain doesn’t necessary follow that they are only brain products

without any relation to the outer, i.e. extra cerebral, reality. Apart from some mental diseases

nobody doubts that the neural substrates observable by the means of contemporary technology

are consistent with outer reality. However, in regard to God and religious experience things

appear more complicated. Due to scientific realism, described above, and due to the Freudian

claim that mystical experiences result from regressive and infantile neurosis (D’Aquili,

Newberg and Rause 2008, 151), any kinds of religious experience became suspicious and

classified.12

It is well known that some mental diseases such as temporal lobe epilepsy are

connected with states similar to mystical experiences (Asheim and Brodtkorb 2003; Saver and

Rabin 1997; Cirignotta et al. 1980). Nevertheless people suffering from mental disorder are

mentally ill all the time, not only during their mystical so pseudo-mystical experiences. Since

11 The absence of higher brain functions responsible for speech could be proved by endocasts for the species

Australopithecus. 12 Religious and Spiritual Problems are classified as Mental Disorder (DSM-IV) by the American Psychiatric

Association (1994).

17

mystical experiences could be also stated among mentally healthy people they cannot be a

priori regarded as pathologic or as self-deceptive.13

Religion as ritual

Definition of religion certainly exceeds the aim of this paper. However in the context

of brain functions religion will be defined as practice of rituals and prayers. Both as bodily

activities are brain-based. Ritual as involving different cultic objects, gestures and places is

considered as more physical than the prayer. The latter, even if it affects the mind, also

involves the body. Hence religion in terms of ritual and prayer is a matter of body. Religious

practice starts usually with ritual, is followed by vocal prayer, meditation and culminates in

contemplation. This development consists not only in a transition from outer to inner

experience, but also from passivity to activity. While some people are able to enter into trance

rather passively, only by listening to rhythmic music (d’Aquili and Newberg 1993),

meditation and contemplation require activity and attention and involve different brain areas.

Rhythmical music present in many rituals combined with dance and gestures activates the

vegetative and the limbic system (D’Aquili, Newberg and Rause 2008). Repetition of auditory

and visual inputs results in positive feelings (Gellhorn and Kiely 1972; 1973). Ritual gestures

which differ from the everyday gestures draw the attention of amygdala which reacts with

growing alertness often felt as fear and awe (D’Aquili and Newberg 1993a). These emotions

lead probably to the definition of sacrum as tremendum et fascinosum, i.e. as object of fear

and attraction (Cilliers 2009; Otto 1917). Besides gestures also odorants used in many

religious ceremonies attract the attention of amygdala which results, depending from the kind

of the odor perceived, in a range of feelings from disgust to elation (Kandel, Schwarz and

Jessell 2000; Vernet-Maury et al. 1999). The fact that motor and sensual inputs are

“translated” into emotions indicates that the hypothalamus is involved (D’Aquili, Newberg

and Rause 2008, 122; Gellhorn and Kiely 1972; 1973; Jevning et al. 1992; Cahn and Polich

2006).

However, rituals in terms of repetitional behavior performed in a certain context (e.g.

pairing or hunting) are not unique human. They can be found also among animals (D’Aquili

and Newberg 1983, 1999). It is very probably that some motor repetition affects the

13 The tendency to interpret the neural substrates of religious experience as self-deceptive facility of the brain is

widely spread. This can be demonstrated by the German translation of the title of Newberg’s, d’Aquili’s and

Rause’s book (2001). While the original title “Why God Won’t Go Away. Brain Science and the Biology of

Belief” suggests a realistic approach, the German title “The invented God. How belief originates within the

brain” shows an idealistic and subjectivist perspective suggesting that the brain’s content is either made up by

the individual or limited to its subjective experience.

18

hypothalamus also in animals and result in positive emotions. The main difference, however,

between human and animal rituals consists in their impact on the prefrontal cortex (PFC).

Human PFT which is among others responsible for the control of cognitive processes is not

only much larger in humans than in other animals, but also connected with the thalamus in a

particular way (Fuster 1997). In humans the PFC is connected both with limbic system and

brainstem’s Reticular Activating System (RAS) being the center of arousal and motivation.

RAS, in turn, is connected with thalamocortical raditions (TR) consisting of fibers between

thalamus and the cerebral cortex (Rodriguez, Whitson and Granger 2004). TR is much larger

in humans than in other animals and therefore it can be supposed that data received from

thalamus affect much more the human PFC than the PFC of other animals (Preuss 2006). It

can be also stated that the PFC is not only of significant importance when top-down

processing is needed, which means that we can influence our emotions due to our cognitive

possibilities (Barbas et al. 2003; Miller and Cohen 2001). It means also that due to the size of

TR a significant down-top impact on the PFC is exerted, which means that emotions exert

influence on our cognitive possibilities. Since in humans all sensations, arousals and emotions

are sooner or later subjected to the executive function of PFC, we can be really called rational

animals. Consequently the different sensual data perceived during a ritual depend strongly

from the cognitive context (D’Aquili, Newberg and Rause 2008, 127). Hencewe probably

won’t benefit from a ritual we cannot understand or accept.

Oratio, meditatio and contemplatio as kinds and degrees of prayer

Since ritual’s intellectual content plays an important role in cerebral activity, it is not

surprising that a sacred tale or scripture is an essential part of any religion. Besides religious

rituals, being also parts of social life and cultural identity, individual prayer defined as “the

elevation of the mind to God”14

developed. Christian tradition considers the vocal prayer

(oratio), meditation (meditatio) and contemplation (contemplatio) not only as different kinds,

but also as degrees of prayer (Müller 2005). While the vocal prayer being verbal expression of

prescribed or spontaneous invented texts can be described as an outward action, meditation

and contemplation are regarded as inward since they involve minimum of bodily activity.

Meditation as a form of mental prayer consists in consideration of different religious contents

such as mysteries, principles or facts. This happens in a rather active way which involves

intellect, imagination, memory and will. Contrary to meditation contemplation is rather

14 John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, III 24.

19

passive. While in meditation the contents are an intellectual or volitional way, in

contemplation they are “seen” or “felt”. The climax of prayer is the mystical union with God -

a state in which every difference between God and individual disappears. All degrees and

kinds of Christian prayer start with lectio, i. e. reading, by which an intellectual confrontation

with a religious content is meant.

Neural correlates of oratio

Since the terms oratio, meditatio and contemplatio describe different forms of

physical or mental activity, it is obvious that during the different degrees of prayer different

brain areas are involved. Speaking and reading are two components of oratio, i.e. the vocal

prayer, which by this way activates the PFC and the language areas. It seems, however,

significant whether oratio involves loud or silent speech. While audible speech activates

auditory and para-auditory as well as motor (tongue/larynx) regions, silent speech activates

the PFC and the right dorsolateral praefrontal area (Ryding et al. 1996; Crosson et al. 2001).

Furthermore recent research has shown that vocal prayer is much more than reading or

recitation. In an experiment conducted by Azari et al. religious individuals were compared

with a nonreligious group during recitation versus reading of Psalm 23, a popular German

nursery rhyme, and a telephone book (Azari et al. 2001). The religious individuals reported

achieving a religious state while reciting Psalm 23, and significant activations were found in

left and right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DL-PFC), right medial parietal (precuneus), and

dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC) compared with other readings and with nonreligious

control individuals (Cahn and Polich 2006, 200). The DL-PFC plays an important role in the

integration of sensory and mnemonic information and the regulation of intellectual function

and action. It is also involved in working memory (Robertson et al. 2001). Hence it is not

surprising that a biblical text, known to the religious individuals, could activate the DL-PFC

areas. The activation of the right medial parietal (precuneus) and the dmPFC might confirm

the claim that oratio is really a step towards contemplatio. These both areas are reported to be

tonically active in a resting state when subjects are not engaged in any overt task. They are

active in a passive state such as watching a movie. Interestingly the areas mentioned yielded

increased activity during a movie sequence showing two persons interact. This could suggest

that the precuneus and the dmPFC might participate in the processing of social relations

(Jacoboni et al. 2003). From this it follows that the religious individuals might experience the

20

vocal prayer not only as watching (in Latin contemplari) something beyond them, but also as

a kind of socialization with God.

Neural correlates of meditatio

Literature dedicated to neural correlates of meditation measured by means of EEG,

ERP and neuroimaging studies considers meditatio as affecting mental events by engaging a

specific attentional set. This regulation of attention can be achieved by two opposite types of

meditation such as mindfulness and concentrative meditation. In order to describe

contemplatio the term “peak experiences” is employed (Cahn and Polich 2006, 180-181).

Since meditatio involves intellect, imagination, memory and will, it can be expected that it

activates different brain areas than oratio. This expectation is proved right by many research

data, which however, don’t differentiate when meditatio ends and contemplatio started.

Notwithstanding this fact it is clear that different forms of meditation appear to engage

different neural structures (Dunn et al. 1999; Lehmann et al. 2001; Lou et al. 1999). In order

to prove which brain areas are involved in meditatio some neuroimaging studies will be

considered. As a PET (positron emission tomography) study conducted by Lou et al. (1999)

proves across all meditation phases, i.e. in the range from oratio to contemplatio, overall

increases in bilateral hippocampus, parietal, and occipital sensory and association regions

were observed along with general decreases in orbitofrontal, dorsolateral prefrontal (DL-

PFC), anterior cingulate cortices (ACC), temporal and inferior parietal lobes, caudate,

thalamus, pons, and cerebellum. Body sensation correlated with increased parietal and

superior frontal activation, including the supplemental motor area; abstract sensation of joy

was accompanied by left parietal and superior temporal activation, including Wernicke’s area;

visual imagery produced strong occipital lobe activation, excluding Area V1; and symbolic

representation of self was associated with bilateral activation of parietal lobes (Cahn and

Polich 2006, 198). It can be generally stated that during the transition from meditatio to

contemplatio a decrease of activity in areas responsible for attention and control (PFC, DL-

PFC) occurs. Simultaneously an increase of activity in parietal and temporal lobes could be

observed (Cahn and Polich 2006, 197). The first development occurs because areas more

active in the control state include those that subserve executive attention such as the

dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. DL-PFC has been shown to specifically activate in preparation

for voluntary motor activity from which every meditatio started as involving the will. Anterior

cingulate cortex (ACC) activation in the meditation state is thought to be involved in

21

emotional circuits and executive functions such as controlling different images somehow

elaborated by the mind (Allmann 2001). The cerebellum, also involved in meditatio, can

participate in attention, motoric feedback loops, as well as prediction of future events (Allen

et al. 1997) is useful at the beginning of meditatio but becomes less active the later state.

Neural correlates of contemplatio

In order to depict the brain activity during the contemplatio research considering “the

peak experience” will be adduced, even if the Christian notion of contemplatio contains much

more than “the peak experience” itself. A single photon emission computed tomography

(SPECT) study was conducted on Tibetan Buddhist meditators in which participants report

“becoming one with” the visualized image (Newberg et al., 2001). During this experiment a

significantly greater rightward dominance of thalamic regional cerebral blood flow relative to

controls could be observed. Meditation compared with baseline was related to increased

activity in the cingulate gyrus, inferior and orbital frontal cortex, dorsolateral prefrontal

cortex, midbrain, and thalamus. In other groups of meditators (Lazar et al. 2000) meditation,

considered as the range between meditatio and contemplatio, produced activity increases in

the putamen, midbrain, pregenual anterior cingulate cortex, and the hippocampal–

parahippocampal formation, as well as areas within the frontal and parietal cortices. The

significant increased activations in cingulate cortex and prefrontal and orbitofrontal cortex

have been found in the majority of non guided meditation studies (Herzog et al., 1990;

Khushu et al. 2000; Lazar et al., 2000, 2003). Besides the importance of anterior cingulate

cortex activation as a marker of the increased attentional focus in meditative states, this

structure also appears related to feelings of love (Allman et al. 2001; Bartels and Zeki, 2000,

2004; Beauregard et al. 2009). Exactly these feelings were consistently reported by some

meditators during their meditation. Other experiments suggest a neural basis for the altered

sense of spatial awareness present in the meditative state which consists in decreasing activity

of the left superior parietal lobe in conjunction with an increase of activity in the left

dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (cf. Cohen et al., 1996; D’Esposito et al., 1998). Several

investigations have reported decreased posterior superior parietal lobe activity associated with

decreased experience of self–nonself boundaries (d’Aquili & Newberg, 1993b, 1998, 2000),

and one found decreased superior parietal lobe activation (Herzog et al., 1990). It can be

strongly suggested that the experiences of contemplatio are partly mediated through a

deafferentiation of the superior parietal lobe, which helps to generate the normal sense of

22

spatial awareness (d’Aquili & Newberg, 2000). Considering the neural correlates of

contemplatio it seems plausible that meditators on this stage really experience a new

dimension when they merge with God felt as love.

Human considered from the evolutionary perspective, especially from the brain

development, seems to be the only animal which, due to its higher order cognitive

representations and facilities located in the PFC, is able to develop a decreased experience of

self-nonself boundaries aroused in the superior parietal lobe. This experience interpreted by

religions as the union with God takes place also within the brain. It seems that in the history

of evolution a particular moment occurred when humans due to the development of the PFC

achieved self-awareness and the sense of God’s presence. From this moment religion started.

Maybe this very moment is described as creation of humans “in God’s image and likeness”

(Gen 1:26), in which human uniqueness really consists. Consequently there is no need to fear

the theory of evolution since it leads to the same conclusions as religion. Similar to the

ancient Christians who maintained that the soul is Christian by nature, we can claim that

humans are by nature religious.

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