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HOW WERE KEMALIST NATIONALISMAND LAICISM ORIGINALLY

FORMULATED AS AN IDEOLOGY?

YÖRÜK BAHÇELİ

UNDERGRADUATE DISSERTATION

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

ROYAL HOLLOWAY, UNIVERSITY OF LONDON

SUPERVISED BY PROFESSOR SANDRA HALPERIN

MARCH 2014

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ABSTRACT

This dissertation addresses a debate concerning the nature of

Kemalism. The debate has gained importance because of current plans

to re-write the Turkish constitution. This dissertation argues that

Kemalists did not initially seek to develop an ideology, but were

animated by pragmatism: the need to protect the new state against

existential threats. Through the reforms and policies of the Atatürk

era during 1923-35, nationalism was created through a series of

policies that aimed to forge the Turkish nation through their

ideological implications. Laicism was promoted through a series of

policies that allowed for the consolidation of the nation-state by

making way for association with the nation as opposed to with the

ummah.

The dissertation applies a framework of ideology, that

following Althusser (1972) and Van Dijk (1998), viewing ideology as

representations of our imaginary relationship to the real world. In

a chronological study, it first looks at the series of policies that

constructed Kemalist nationalism. For each policy, I analyze how it

built on its predecessor, and how it contributed to constructing

Kemalist nationalist ideology, using theoretical works that analyze

the ideological implications of the institutions in question. Using

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the same structure, I then analyze the series of policies that

constructed Kemalist laicism in the same structure, to explore the

assumption that the purpose of Kemalist laicism was to consolidate

Kemalist nationalism. The study makes use of original policy

documents as well as secondary sources that have analyzed the

policies and provide a historical background for them.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. INTRODUCTION 4

A. RATIONALE 4

B. THE NATURE OF KEMALISM: THE LITERATURE 4

C. METHODOLOGY 6

D. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 8

E. CHAPTER OUTLINE 10

2. NATIONALISM 11

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A. GRECO-TURKISH POPULATION EXCHANGE 11

B. 1924 CONSTITUTION 12

C. REACTIONS TO THE SHEIKH SAID REBELLION 15

D. LANGUAGE REFORM 17

E. TURKISH HISTORY THESIS 19

F. CONCLUSION 20

3. LAICISM 21

A. ABOLITION OF THE CALIPHATE 21

B. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE PRESIDENCY OF RELIGIOUS 22

AFFAIRS

C. UNIFICATION OF EDUCATION 24

D. CHANGE OF HEADGEAR AND DRESS 25

E. CLOSURE OF TEKKES AND ZAVIYES 26

F. ABOLITION OF THE SHARIAH COURTS AND THE NEW 27

CIVIL CODE

G. WOMEN’S ENFRANCHISEMENT 29

H. CONCLUSION 30

4. IMPLICATIONS OF STUDY 31

5. WORKS CITED 32

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTIONTHE RATIONALE

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Kemalism, Turkey’s state ideology, is an important reason why

rewriting the constitution has been proposed since 2011. If

Kemalism1 is removed from the constitution, this will change the way

the state defines itself, as affiliation with a specific ideology

will be terminated2. The Justice and Development Party (AKP) and

Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) have proposed the removal in order

to guarantee an ideologically-neutral state. Therefore, I want to

make sense of the way in which Kemalism constitutes an ideology, at a

time when the role Kemalism will play in Turkey’s new constitution

is debated.

Nationalism and laicism are the two principles subject to

criticism in the current constitution. The two principles underlie

the problems Islamists and Kurdish nationalists have had with the

Turkish state (Posch, 2007; Dağı, 2011). The principles of

republicanism, revolutionism, populism and statism are rarely the

1“Kemalism” refers to the presence of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and the principles of his rule in the constitution. Although Atatürk is mentioned throughout the constitution, two particularly important instances that reflect the presence of Atatürk throughout the document are:

1. Preamble: “The nationalism, principles, reforms and civilizationism of Atatürk and that sacred religious feelings shall absolutely not beinvolved in state affairs and politics as required by the principle of secularism”

2. Article 2: “The Republic of Turkey is… loyal to the nationalism of Atatürk” (Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi, 1982).

2 There is an implicit assumption in Turkish political discourse that a state remains ideologically neutral only when it adheres to democracy and democracy only (Dağı, 2011).

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focus of contemporary criticism and will therefore be left out of

this study.

THE NATURE OF KEMALISM: THE LITERATURE

The debate on Kemalism revolves around two positions: those

who see it as a pragmatic set of policies and those who argue that

it was born initially as an ideology. Neither side of the debate has

produced careful analysis of how Kemalist ideology was originally

formulated by the policies and reforms of the Atatürk era.

Firstly, those who have concluded that it was purely pragmatic

maintain that Kemalism has no ideological basis. Dumont (1984: 41)

argues that Kemalism is not an original, comprehensive ideology, but

a continuation of the Ottoman reforms and Young Turks revolution of

the previous century, as well as nineteenth century international

ideological movements. Şahinler (1996: 127-8, 86-94) adds that the

purpose of Kemalist reforms was to ensure the sovereignty of the

people, and therefore that any measure necessary was taken in a top

down manner, for the sake of the people, despite the people. He

presents laicism as a pragmatic move against fundamentalist

religious manipulation against the new republic. Kili (1980: 389)

argues that the purpose of nationalism was state building and

preserving national unity. Duverger (1961) argues that the

authoritarianism practiced by the regime was pragmatic in order to

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preserve the revolution. Although I agree with their pragmatic

reading of Kemalism, by limiting their analysis to whether policies

were necessary or not, they fail to look further at how the reforms

changed social meaning and therefore constructed an ideology. Thus,

I want to build onto their work by investigating this.

The second group argues that Kemalism was primarily born as an

ideology. Altan (1992) established the ‘second republic’ movement,

arguing that Kemalism was a project of ideological imposition. Kaya

(2007a; 2007b), Parla and Davison (2008: 67) argue that while

nationalism furthered state corporatism, Kemalist laicism was an

authoritarian imposition of positivism through a nationalized Islam.

For Tunçay (1981, cited in Yavuz, 2006), this positivism was

dogmatic or radical, as referred to by Taşpınar (2012). However,

dismissing Kemalism as a readily-born ideology causes the group to

interpret Kemalist reforms as the outplay of that readily-born

ideology. This prevents this group from analyzing how Kemalism was

built as an original ideology.

There is a literature that does not take a position on the

debate but looks at the formulation and implications of Kemalist

policies. The literature varies as to the extent to which Kemalism

is seen as a readily-born of an ideology. For Giritli (1984),

Kemalism is an ideology because it proposes a solution by

reformulating lifestyle according to popular sovereignty. It is both

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idealistic and pragmatic, based on reason and science. Mardin (1971:

208-9) argues that the Kemalist revolution was a revolution in

values that aimed to destroy prevailing social norms in order to

establish its own ideology “by taking up a non-existent hypothetical

entity, the Turkish nation” and breathing life into it. However,

Mardin fails to identify a definition or framework of ideology,

which limits his analysis. Aydın and Keyman (2004: 3) look at

Kemalism as a discourse of nation-building that is both an

epistemological and normative procedure in its promotion of rational

knowledge and morality in equating the national will with the

general will, but do not investigate how this was accomplished

ideologically. Similarly, Göle (1997: 50-52) claims that the

adoption of a positivist ideology lead to the transmission of elite

cultural codes and life-styles, or “habitus” to the people. What

needs to be further investigated is how the implemented reforms lead

to change in “habitus”. Lewis (1968) and Akural (1984) present

detailed studies of the policies and their implications in terms of

the construction of nationalism and laicism; however they do not

relate their analysis to the concept of ideology. Thus, although

they look at the way Kemalism was formulated, their work needs to be

furthered onto a more comprehensive conception of how different

policies were implemented in order to originally formulate a regime

ideology. By developing a definition of ideology, I will develop a

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channel through which I can analyze Kemalist policies and identify

how they originally formulated Kemalist nationalism and laicism as

ideology.

THE METHODOLOGY

I will look at Kemalist nationalism and laicism between 1923 and

1935, conducting textual analysis of policy documents where

relevant, and secondary sources that analyze these policies

historically and politically. The study will be chronological in

order to track the process through which these policies formulated

an ideology:

Table 1: Study of reforms and policies that constructed Kemalist

nationalism:

Reform/PolicyGreco-Turkish Population Exchange

(30 January 1923)1924 Constitution

(20 April 1924)Reactions to the Sheikh Said Rebellion

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(February-March 1925)Language Reform

(1 November 1928-12 July 1932)Turkish History Thesis

(1930)

Table 2: Study of reforms and policies that constructed Kemalist

laicism:

Reform/PolicyAbolition of Caliphate

(3 March 1924)Establishment of the Presidency of

Religious Affairs

(3 March 1924)Unification of Education

(3 March 1924)Change of Headgear and Dress

(25 November 1925)Closure of Tekkes and Zaviyes

(30 November 1925)Abolition of Shariah Courts and the

Implementation of the New Civil Code

(8 April 1924-4 October 1926)Women’s Enfrenchisement

(3 April 1930 – 5 December 1934)

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THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Answer:

1. Kemalists did not initially seek to develop an ideology.

Kemalist nationalism and laicism were animated by pragmatism:

the need to protect the new state against existential threats.

Through the reforms and policies of the Atatürk era,

nationalism was created in order to forge national unity and

secure the independence of the newly created state, while

laicism was promoted to allow for the consolidation of the

nation-state as a means of imposing the acceptance of the

sovereignty of the nation as opposed to the sovereignty of

God.

2. However, by 1935, Kemalist nationalism and laicism began to be

identified as part of the state ideology by Kemalists

themselves. This was officially accomplished when they were

added to the constitution in 1937.

The statements in this answer rely on the following assumptions:

Statement 1:

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1. According to the point of view of Kemalists, tam bağımsızlık3

was the only means for the protection and preservation of

the state.

2. National unity was necessary for tam bağımsızlık.

3. Secularist policies supported national unity by altering

identification with the ummah4 to that with the nation.

Statement 2:

1. Kemalism was not understood conceptually as an ideology till

1935, when it was stated in the Republican People’s Party’s

fourth general convention programme that “the principles

pursued by the party are the principles of Kemalism”

(Meydan, 2012).

2. Had Kemalism been seen as an ideology by Kemalists from the

start

a. the Kadro movement would have never emerged with the

aim of placing the Turkish revolution within an

ideological framework (Aydemir, 1932: 1).

3 Meaning “complete independence” (Özbudun, 1981:88), tam bağımsızlık refers toself-sufficiency and complete freedom from interference with the autonomy of the Turkish state in finance, politics, economics, judiciary, military, culture, and other fields (Aksoy, 1990:112). I use it in Turkish as any English translation fails to capture its full meaning.

4 Ummah refers to the community of Muslim believers (Van Nieuwenhuijze, 1959: 5).

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b. it would have been introduced into the Constitution

before 1937.

In constructing my argument, I use the following definitions:

Ideology: is the imaginary relationship of individuals to the

real world, which is constituted by formulating different

representations of how people perceive these relationships

(Althusser, 1969:162). Through external, observable discourse,

representations are put forth by individual groups in order to

serve some purpose, coherent with their interests. Through

state apparatuses, this external state discourse is

transformed into the form of internal, non-observable

consciousness. Consciousness acts as an internal mechanism

that guides the actions of subjects. Eventually, these

representations become “socially shared, general beliefs”.

These beliefs provide a base from which attitudes in more

specific domains are derived (Van Dijk, 1998: 5, 32, 62).

Nationalism: The nation is an “imagined political community”

(Anderson, 1983: 6) invented where it does not exist (Gellner,

1964:169). Nationalism provides “well elaborated statements

and diagnoses regarding the structure and organization of the

past, the present and the future of an entire society”

(Malesevic, 2006: 309). This imagined construct must be

“inherently limited” and must have “finite…boundaries, beyond

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which lie other nations” (Anderson, 1983: 6-7). The construct

is limited as the nation relies on the construction of

otherness in order to give itself an identity. Thus, the

nation exists only insofar as it is somehow distinct from

other nations. Otherness is constructed through applying

principles that allow individuals to be classified between

“them” and “us” (Staszak, 2008: 2).

Laicism: As Kemalists did not remove religion from the state

and implement a strict sense of separation, it is more

appropriate to call their approach to religion “laicism” as

opposed to “secularism”. Kemalist laicism refers to the

separation of Islam from some aspects of governance “within an

overall and overarching integrated relationship of state

control” (Davison, 2003: 344, 366).

Pragmatism: is when decisions are evaluated looking at

practical interests and necessities, rejecting any form of

universally principled criteria to drive action (LaFolette,

2000: 408-9).

CHAPTER OUTLINE

Chapter 2: Nationalism

Analyzing the policies in Table 1, I conclude that Kemalist

nationalism was constructed through reforms that lead to an

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understanding and embracement of Turkish national existence as

opposed to the Muslim ummah and religious sovereignty.

Chapter 3: Laicism

Under the assumption that laicism was implemented to uphold Kemalist

nationalism, I analyze the reforms outlined in Table 2 and conclude

that Kemalist laicism was constructed by repositioning the role of

religion in society.

Chapter 4: Implications of Study

I comment briefly on the implications of my answer for the current

constitution.

CHAPTER 2: NATIONALISM

According to the definition of nationalism presented, to

analyze nationalism must mean analyzing how the nation is invented,

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and its boundaries constructed. This will be my aim in analyzing the

formulation of Kemalist nationalism.

THE GRECO-TURKISH POPULATION EXCHANGE

The Turkish War of Independence (1919-23), mainly fought between

Greece and Turkey, lead to a refugee crisis (Hirschon, 2003: 6) as

de facto changes took place in the ethnic compositions of both

countries. Following armistice, these changes were institutionalized

legally. Throughout the Ottoman Empire, a Greek population had

existed in Turkey while a Turkish population existed in Greece.

Although the Greeks in Turkey belonged to the Greek Orthodox Church,

they spoke Turkish and served in Ottoman armies. Similarly, the

Turks in Greece belonged to the religion of Islam, but spoke Greek.

However, with the war, “ethnic, religious and national divisions”

were as strained as ever. Loyalties were no longer determined by

residence, but by new national designations dependent on ethnic

origin (Stuckey, 2009: 5, 22).

Meanwhile, the departing Christians had formed a major part of

Ottoman bureaucracy and controlled a large portion of the economy

(Hirschon, 2003: 18). For the Kemalists, this was dangerous as it

would have been rather peculiar for the new regime to leave

significant power hubs in the hands of disassociated communities, in

addition to the safety implications of post-war residence. This is

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why separation appeared to be “the most beneficial course of action”

(Stuckey, 2009: 20). The exchange would be of “Turkish nationals of

the Greek Orthodox religion established in Turkish territory, and of

Greek nationals of the Muslim religion established in Greek

territory” (League of Nations, 1923).

The exchange was the first instance in which the Turkish nation

was systematically defined, drawing firm boundaries between the

“self” and “other”. Interestingly, these boundaries were constructed

along the lines of religion rather than ethnicity. This point is

proven by the fact that Karamanlis, who were native speakers of and

ethnically Turkish, but of Christian faith, were sent to Greece

(Akturk, 2009: 896-7). Thus, the exchange differentiated between

citizens as “Muslims” and “Greeks”, permitting Muslims to stay and

requiring Greeks to leave Turkey (League of Nations, 1923). This showed

that belongingness was for Muslims, and Greeks were outsiders

(Alpan, 2012: 215). This point is further strengthened by the fact

that Muslims in Greece were implicitly considered as belonging to

Turkey. Thus, as the Turkish nation began its process of

consolidation, the “multi-ethnic Muslim millet5” was embedded at the

root of its unofficial definition (Akturk, 2009: 896).

5 Millet: recognized religious communities during the Ottoman Empire (Stamatapoulous, 2006: 253).

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At this point, Turkish nationhood was not ethnic in character.

However, as Bulaç (2008) points out, the exclusion of non-Muslims

from the definition of Turkish nationhood set ground for future

Turkification policies. Homogenizing the religious composition of

the population, the distinction between self and other based on

religion was practically eliminated when Turkey’s population was

left almost entirely Muslim (Stuckey, 2009: 27). As identity is

based on otherness, this was a significant blow to future Muslim

identity (Bulaç, 2008). Thus, it would be possible to fabricate a

new, national, Turkish identity that was distinct from the Muslim

millet identity.

THE 1924 CONSTITUTION

The new Constitution, enacted in 1924, furthered the

boundaries constructed by the Greco-Turkish population exchange,

which identified who an outsider was, by defining who exactly the

insider, the “Turk” was.

The previous 1921 Constitution, adopted during the War of

Independence, was a minimal framework for governing the affairs of a

parliament that sought to secure independence rather than

consolidate a regime. Thus, the articles of the Ottoman Constitution

of 1876 that did not contradict the 1921 Constitution were

maintained by the provisional government in Ankara. Following the

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declaration of the Republic on 29 October 1923, it was only natural

that the interim constitution was replaced with a thorough one

(Akın, 2006: 3-4). As this is a study of the formulation of

nationalism, I will focus my discussion on Article 88 which set out

to define the “Turk”.

We must ask why it was “Turkishness” that was chosen to define

the insider. During the Ottoman Empire, the most widely spoken

language was Turkish (Kışlalı, 1997: 234). As they were the dominant

nation within the Empire, it was probably easiest to forge a

homogenous, unified identity around the Turks (Polat, 2011: 136;

Oran, 1988: 219). This had also been the approach of the Committee

of Union and Progress, further strengthening Turkish dominance

during the last years of the Empire (Polat, 2011: 133; Hanioğlu,

2013). Thus Turkishness was the most coherent source of unity that

could forge a new national identity.

According to the article:

The people of Turkey, regardless of their religion and race

would, in terms of citizenship, be considered Turkish.

Thus, the aim was to create a sense of nationhood following the

proclamation of the republic. (Şit, 2008: 71). The definition did

not reflect socio-historical reality, but “was designed to function

as a basis for legitimacy for the new republic” (Köker, 2010: 54) by

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fabricating the national identity of the ‘Turk’ (Polat, 2011: 140).

In the transformation from a multi-ethnic state to a nation state,

the association of a motherland6 with the concept of a well-defined

nation was a necessity for this allowed the Anatolian society to

embrace the political structure of the state (Özgişi, 2009: 89, 92)

by believing that the Turkish nation truly existed. This could only

be achieved by actually formulating the nation, bound together

homogenously (Oran, 1988: 207).

From the article, we conclude that:

1. There are various races ethnicities living in Turkey

2. The term ‘Turk’ is inclusive of them all

However, upon closer analysis, the introduction of the concept

of “per citizenship” differentiated between “Turks as such” and

“Turks per citizenship”. This shows that the regime was

uncomfortable with the availability of Turkishness as a status to

all inhabitants, irrespective of ethnic and religious origin (Yeğen,

2008: 4). Looking at later practices and statements, the discomfort

with non-Muslim ethnicities was that it was unlikely for them to see

6 For Kemalists, motherland, or vatan in Turkish refers to the borders within which the Turks live, maintaining their history and the traces that demonstrate it (Seferoğlu and Başbuğ, 1985: 4). Thus, the concept of motherland is material in the sense that it encompasses the land resided on, while it is moral in the sense thatit conveys a sense of belongingness and ownership, as well as cultural elements (Yazgan, 2007: 2).

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themselves as part of and become assimilated into the “community of

language of ideal” of the Kemalists. For example, the Republican

People’s Party’s 1923 programme required the acceptance of “Turkish

citizenship and culture” for membership (İnce, 2012: 41-42).

Furthermore, in 1931, regarding Jewish and Christian minorities,

Party Secretary Recep Peker stated that they are “absolutely Turkish

insofar as they belong to our community of language and ideal”

(Peker, 1931 cited in İnce, 2012: 42). Then, Turkishness should be

considered in light of Ataturk’s infamous saying: “How fortunate is

the one who says I am Turkish” (Meydan, 2011), as Turkishness was

manifested by the adoption of Turkish culture (Feyzioğlu, 1984: 6).

Thus, although there were differences in de facto treatment of

citizens based on ethnicity, the fact that this had no

constitutional basis, and was not institutionalized in the

definition of ‘Turk’ (Şehirli, 2000) shows that once the state ideal

of Turkish culture was internalized, it was idealized that the

differences in treatment would be eradicated.

By prescribing both obligations and rights, citizenship

interpolates the identities of individuals (Turner, 1997: 5-6).

This affects the imaginary relationships of citizens to their

conditions of existence, both in their relations with one another,

and the dimension within which they live (Althusser, 1972: 163). We

need to analyze how one imagines oneself in connection with a nation

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(Frosh, 2001: 62), as for citizenship to be real rather than

abstract, it cannot only be that the individual possesses objective

rights, but must also develop a sense of belonging. Thus,

“citizenship itself is constituted…as a set of…relationships in

which individual subjects and their communities are reciprocally

entwined” (Frosh, 2001: 62-3, 70). Article 88 of the Constitution

developed nationalist ideology by destroying the prevailing millet

system. By removing religion as a factor that officially determined

citizenship or differentiated between citizens, Islam was officially

deposed of as a factor that defined subjects (Mumcu, 1986). This

cleared the way for the consolidation of a homogenous nation (Bulaç,

2008) by narrowing and institutionalizing the identity of

belongingness from the Muslim to the Turk.

REACTIONS TO THE SHEIKH SAID REBELLION

The 1924 Constitution defined the insider. The reactions to

the Sheikh Said Rebellion determined how potential insiders would be

transformed into actual insiders using the Turkish language as a tool

of assimilation. Although the religious and nationalist motives that

drove the Sheikh Said Rebellion were interwoven (Olson, 1989: 145),

I will focus on how the rebellion triggered change in Kemalist

nationalism.

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“The Sheikh Said rebellion can be… interpreted as a reaction

to the end of the Ottoman millet” and its replacement by a secular

national identity (Akyol, 2006: 56). The rebellion showed that the

greatest challenge towards the new conception of “Turkish” identity

would not come from non-Muslim minorities, but from Kurds, a Muslim

ethnic minority. Disintegrated from the rest of the Ottoman Empire,

Kurds were unaccustomed to central authority. Thus, it was

problematic when Kurdish feudal chiefs faced a central government

that consolidated its power by the day (Oran, 1988: 209-10; 216).

According to Sheikh Said, the Kemalists had acted in opposition

to the Quran by denying Allah and his prophet, as manifested in the

abolition of the caliphate. Therefore, the republican regime was

illegitimate, and its demolishment a religious duty (Meydan, 2010:

339). Said started to gather forces and conducted acts of robbery.

As he was countered by the gendarmes, the events quickly escalated

into full-scale rebellion. The rebellion, which lasted from February

to June 1925, consisted of a series of battles. Suppressed by large

scale military operation, the rebellion was a serious threat.

Finally, Sheikh Said was hung on 29 June (Olson, 2000: 107-8, 125,

74).

The rebellion “enabled the Turkish government to articulate a

much more strident nationalist discourse” (Olson, 2000: 69) in which

the regime realized that “language… may be the firmest barrier…

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against national unity” (Kemal, 1878 cited in Mango, 1999: 4). As a

result, a policy of gradual Turkification and assimilation was

initiated. The Orient Reform Law, which demanded a

1. Ban on the public use of the Kurdish language in areas

with multi-ethnic populations

2. The deportation of “risky” families to Western Turkey

(Çağaptay, 2006: 22)

assumed that Kurdish identity was maintained by the Kurdish

language. By teaching Kurdish women Turkish, the policy aimed to

assimilate upcoming Kurdish generations by changing their native

language to Turkish (Meriç, 2011: 15). The suppression of non-

Turkic languages would create a memory-less mass assimilated into

Turkish culture (Üngör, 2008: 33). One particular reflection of the

new, assimilationist character of Kemalist nationalism was a change

in the way Kurds were dealt with by the education system.

“Kurdistan” was no longer used as a geographical term, and was

deleted from all geography books and “Kurds” were no longer

mentioned as a distinct ethnicity. A great change had occurred in

the nature of Kemalist nationalism. Before, Turkishness was more

inclusive; however, following the rebellion, it became more forceful

in character as Kurds were compelled to accept it (Akyol, 2006: 54,

69, 75). Turkishness now became a norm that would be strived towards

rather than an identity that would be attained upon desire. Thus,

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although nationalist ideology may have remained the same in ideal in

defining nationhood in terms of culture, its manner of

implementation was radicalized (Koç, 2013: 164).

“Concrete identity” emerges when groups base their “consciousness

of unity” upon a certain characteristic, which provides them with

“formative and normative impulses” that enable them to reproduce

their group identity (Assmann and Czaplichka, 1995: 128). When

languages are peculiar to specific groups, as the case with Kurdish,

identity may be upheld and group belongingness determined by them.

Thus, the Kemalists concluded that the Kurdish language was the

source of concretion of Kurdish identity. Understanding that

language may be used as a tool to manipulate identity for evoking

resemblance and similarity through introduction and adoption (Pool,

1979: 6-11), Turkish identity would be adopted and developed as more

and more Kurds adopted Turkish as their native language, seeing

themselves as resembling Turks. Thus, following this interpretation,

Kemalist nationalism underwent change following the Sheikh Said

Rebellion as the Turkish language became a tool of identity

construction, through its employment to eliminate the consciousness

of Kurdish identity by blocking the path, the Kurdish language,

through which Kurds were able to reproduce their identity.

LANGUAGE REFORM

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The two-part language reform was another manifestation of the

radicalized manner of policy implementation. The relationship

between language and identity are equally important here. While

Kurdish consciousness was dealt with by targeting the Kurdish

language, Turkish identity was to be concreted through the Turkish

language. The reform was achieved in two steps: firstly, through the

implementation of the Turkish Alphabet, and secondly, through the

linguistic reform implemented by the Turkish Language Association.

Everything non-Turkish would be discarded in order to return to the

pre-Islamic state of the language (Cuceloglu and Slobin, 1980: 300).

Firstly, Arabic scripture was abandoned for the New Turkish

Alphabet on 1 November 1928. The new alphabet was a modified version

of the Latin alphabet with the six additional letters: ö, ü, ç, ğ

and ş, added to suit the phonetic requirements of Turkish. Secondly,

the content of language was to be reformed. The Turkish Language

Association, established on 12 July 1932 aimed to reform Turkish by

gathering unofficial vocabulary used by laypeople and purifying the

Turkish language by removing foreign influences (Oran, 1988: 197,

202). Thus, Turkish would attain a unique character, consolidating

its individuality (Sencer, 1982: 120).

Turks had only adopted Arabic scripture following their

conversion to Islam (Demirci, 2011: 255). During the Ottoman Empire,

in addition to the use of Arabic scripture, the Turkish language

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acquired an excessive range of Persian and Arabic vocabulary as

awareness of Turkish identity was supplanted more and more with

Muslim identity (Lewis, 1999: 5). What resulted was the Ottoman

language: a combination of Arabic, Persian, and Turkish (Hanioğlu,

2010: 34). However, the Arabic alphabet was simply inappropriate for

Turkish as it was inadequate in conveying several forms and sounds,

resulting in a spelling and pronunciation gap (Lewis, 1961: 425-6).

Furthermore, the Ottoman language was not spoken unanimously,

but was separated into three levels: eloquent Turkish, spoken by the

elites, middle Turkish, spoken by merchants, and rough Turkish,

spoken by laypeople. Speakers of rough Turkish had no competency in

eloquent Turkish, which was only available to those who had

knowledge of Persian and Arabic. During the last years of the

Empire, despite linguistic reformation, discrepancy still existed

between the language of the elites and laypeople (Hanioğlu, 2010:

37). Thus, linguistic reform would homogenize identity not only in

cultural terms, but also in class terms. This was seen as a

necessity in order to consolidate a nation that was truly unified

(Oran, 1988: 207).

Further to these practical reasons, linguistic reform allowed

the Kemalists to forge the mental association of Turks with their

nation rather than the ummah. According to Atatürk, the Turkish

nation had to “free its language from the yoke of foreign tongues”

28

(Çolak, 2004: 75). To understand from whom the Turkish language was

freed, we must recall that the Arabic language constituted “major

bonds of kinship” across the Muslim world (Chejne, 1965: 448). Thus,

targeting the influence of Arabic on Turkish was an excellent method

of differentiating between the Muslim and Turk, and pulling the Turk

out of the realm of Islam to exist as an independent entity

(Giritli, 1988: 31). Thus, linguistic reform forged a “sharp

dividing line” between the Ottoman past and national future of the

Turks, especially as the close association of future generations

with their Ottoman past was prevented by the language barrier

created (Tachau, 1964: 194-5).

The two-part language reform formulated a language that would

become the primary definitive element of the newly consolidated

nation (Oran, 1988: 203). Although it is not possible to deny the

practical reasons that drove the reform, it was a marvellous

opportunity to develop nationalist ideology. This time, the whole

population was mentally interpolated, as opposed to just a minority

as the Kurds. From the perspective of linguistic relativity,

“different languages…impart different cognitive skills” leading to

different manners of thinking (Boroditsky, 2011: 63). Thus,

attempting to reform the language was an integral method of changing

the way the “Turk” would think.

29

THE TURKISH HISTORY THESIS

Following linguistic reform, the Turkish History Thesis was the

second step to creating national identity through mental

interpolation. Presented in the school textbook Outline of Turkish History

in 1930, the aim of the thesis was to characterize Turks as the true

owners of Anatolia (Akman, 2011: 84).

The thesis presented the Turks as an ancient race with a long

history beyond the Ottoman Empire by Turkifying pre-Islamic Anatolia

(Gür, 2007, 48). Thus, “Turkish history was not confined to Ottoman

history”, as prior to the Ottoman Empire, the Turks had established

other states in Central Asia. Furthermore, Turkish was presented as

the mother tongue of past Anatolian civilizations (Çağaptay, 2006:

51, 53), leading to the perception that they were founded by Turks.

Thus, a motherland ideology, whereby Turks became the true owners of

Anatolia, was forged (Kılıç, 2007: 6; Gür, 2007: 48). The thesis

would also weaken mental connection and sense of belongingness to

the Ottoman Empire. As the perception of today is based on the past

(Assman, 2008: 57), this continuity between the newly created

Turkish nation and the past was necessary. Both aims meant that the

role of Islam in Turkish identity would be minimized, attempting to

30

solidify Turkish identity in terms of nationhood rather than

religion.

History7 is the creation of truths and suspension of values,

which set a universal framework from which individuals can derive

personal, pluralistic memories (Assmann, 2008: 61). These

derivations lead to the emergence of a collective memory in which

“past events are selected, reconstructed… and modified… with

political meaning” (Said, 2002: 251). Thus, history has the ability

to “correct” collective memory for political purposes. The Kemalists

used history to suppress Ottoman identity derived from Ottoman

history, while elevating a pre-Ottoman, Turkic identity in a

functional way aiming for the consolidation of national unity on

Turkic lines rather than Islamic ones, as the people would conceive

Turkishness as the bond that has always held the Anatolian folk

together, rather than Islam. For this to be possible, providing a

context for the newly forged nation was a necessity. This was

accomplished by portraying Anatolia as the “motherland” of the

Turks, its autochthonous inhabitants (Çağaptay, 2006: 50, 53).

CONCLUSION

7 History refers to the active production of narratives of the past (Breisach, 2007: 3).

31

This chapter tracked the step-by-step formulation of Kemalist

nationalism. Firstly, the outsider, then the potential insider was

defined. Then, the method of transforming potential insiders into

actual insiders was identified as the Turkish language. Finally,

history was employed alongside language as a means of identity

concretion through mental interpolation. The next chapter will

analyse how Kemalist laicism was formulated in order to support

Kemalist nationalism.

32

CHAPTER 3: LAICISM

Kemalist laicism aimed to terminate association with the

ummah. This was necessary in order to consolidate a nation-state

(Oran, 1988: 192) based on Turkish identity as opposed to Muslim

identity, clearing the way for popular sovereignty. As this is a

temporal understanding of sovereignty, it would not have been

possible to implement it where religion, a divine form of authority,

was sovereign. Thus, the conservative, Ottoman understanding of

religion and its derivative social practices were delegitimized by

the Kemalists.

ABOLITION OF THE CALIPHATE

Historically, caliphs are successors to Mohammed in ruling the

Islamic state. During the Ottoman Empire, the Ottoman Sultan, as

caliph, was the symbolic monarch of the worldwide Islamic ummah.

Although he lacked spiritual power, obliged to wage war against

unbelievers and punish heretics, he was seen as a protector of

religion (Arnold, 1924: 199, 197, 171). Thus, abolishing the

Caliphate meant that the identification of Turkey with the greater

Islamic world was terminated on an official level.

33

Earlier on, before the proclamation of the Turkish Republic,

on 1 November, 1922, the Caliphate was turned into a spiritual

institution rid of all temporal authority (Ardıç, 2012: 274). This

was already a drastic change, as the caliph, as head of the Ottoman

state, was the highest temporal authority. Without doubt, the

caliphate was the greatest symbol remaining from the Ottoman Empire;

abolishing it meant that a major tie with the Ottoman Empire had

been broken (İlsever, 2000: 39; The Economist, 1924). This abolition

paved the way for replacing the semi-theocratic Ottoman system with

a secular one (Aydemir, 2013: 167).

According to the official argument presented by Atatürk, the

Caliphate had always been a purely political, rather than spiritual

institution, as caliph meant ‘head of state’ (Atatürk, 1984: 439).

Thus, through Atatürk’s discursive technique (Ardıç, 2012: 279) the

previous temporal authority of Islam was reduced to the mere

necessity of a theocratic political system. Ottoman Sultans, as

caliphs, had legitimized their rule by claiming to represent God

(Toprak, 1981: 1-2; Eligur, 2010: 37). This was clearly manifested

in the fact that his identification as “protector of the Muslim

religion” came before sovereignty over Ottoman subjects (Boğaziçi

University, 2005). However, the abolition separated religious authority

and political authority (Oran, 1988: 189), and political power was

no longer legitimized religiously (İlsever, 2000: 38). Inevitably,

34

changing the state’s form of legitimization had immediate

ideological implications, as this would lead to a change in the

“truth criteria” (Van Dijk, 1998: 105) that people used to evaluate

political power. This meant that Islam had begun to be

depoliticized, and politics de-Islamisized (Atatürk, 1984: 437).

ESTABLISHMENT OF THE PRESIDENCY OF RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS

The abolition of the Caliphate delegitimized religious

sovereignty. The abolition of the Ministry of Foundations8 furthered

this delegitimization in the realm of state domains. Thus, official

and legal practices would be justified by the decision-making

mechanism of the people rather than divine laws (Gözaydın, 2006: 7),

as there was no longer an office that practiced religious

custodianship over the Grand National Assembly. The Ministry of

Foundations had been ranked second place to the Prime Ministry

(Karaman, 2008: 284), meaning that religious affairs were the most

important ones following leadership of the government, enjoying a

higher degree of political power than all other ministries. The

Minister of Foundations had taken over the role of the Sheikh-ul

Islam9 of the Ottoman Empire (Ekinci, 2009). 8 Foundations were an Islamic institution during the Ottoman Empire that ensured public services that served religious and welfare purposes on a charity basis (Var, 1981: 1-2).

9 During the Ottoman Empire, the Sheikh-ul Islam was the highest authority in terms of religion and law. Representing the religious side of the Sultan, he was able to direct fatwas and assess whether

35

However, unlike its predecessor, the Presidency of Religious

Affairs was not a ministry, and was founded as an administrative,

rather than spiritual institution (Adanalı, 2008: 235). Removed from

the realm of and subordinated to government (Kodamanoğlu, 1991:

645), a divide was created between the affairs of the people and

Islam (Karaman, 2008: 284). Thus, religion became a separate domain

of life, which no longer ‘permeated and dominated’, but became

secondary to the state (Sunier et. al. 2011: 12). This was clearly

outlined in the purpose of the Presidency, which was to:

Direct all requirements and implications concerning beliefs

and prayers of the religion of Islam and to run religious

establishments (Adanalı, 2008: 232).

Thus, Islam was officially acknowledged to consist only of “belief”

and “prayer”, invalidating its temporal and political powers

completely. This meant that religion was to remain as a purely

private matter that would be regulated by the Presidency. Religion

would be transformed into a “subsystem among others”, as opposed to

its previous position as a “master institution infusing society as a

whole” (Adamson, 2013: 483).

laws complied with sharia. Furthermore, he was effectively in control of the judiciary, as judges were responsible to him (Akgündüz, 2008).

36

This privatization of Islam would modernize society (Gözaydın,

2006: 2), as traditional Islam was seen as a “medieval fetter” on

religious expression. Turkifying Islam alongside privatizing it, the

Kemalists sought to rationalize Islam, as religion expressed in

native language would simply be more available to the people. This

availability was coherent with the desire to reflect Islam as a

rational and natural religion rather than a mystical one. This is

best exemplified by the translation of the Quran into Turkish. The

aim was to annihilate the ‘unreasonable traditional associates’ of

Islam by making it comprehensible to the people (Berkes, 1998: 485,

486, 494, 483; Zümrüt, 2004: 12). This was portrayed as ‘real Islam’

(Öztürk, 2003: 84) as opposed to the former practices, which were

labelled superstitious (Kayadibi, 2000) and delegitimized. This was

a move to break the sovereignty of religion and replace it with that

of the people, for the translation of the Quran into Turkish meant

that the people were no longer compelled to rely on clerics for

minimal access to the primary religious text (Zümrüt, 2004: 14).

Furthermore, personally understanding the religious text gave people

a chance to interpret and reflect on religion personally. This is

clearly another way in which religion was privatized, for the

individual was liberated from the constraints imposed through

domination by a religious class (Mardin, 1981: 213).

37

Religion, as a coherent value system, is a significant

benchmark “for evaluation, justification and legitimation” (Van

Dijk, 1998: 70). Thus, as the Kemalists attempted to transform this

value system from its traditional understanding to a nationalized

Islam, the former understanding of “total religion” (Adamson, 2013:

483) would become delegitimized by individuals’ mental processes,

abandoned for an understanding that held religion as a private

affair.

UNIFICATION OF EDUCATION

A further step towards the privatization of religion, the

unification of education went further than the previous two reforms

by directly targeting the means of acquiring knowledge10 through a

complete re-structuring of the manner of education. During the last

years of the Ottoman Empire, three types of schooling had emerged.

Firstly, mahalle schools provided religious education that was

supervised by foundations (Demirtaş, 2007: 175). Secondly, Ottoman

state schools ran a Westernized curriculum that focused on

scientific education. Finally, missionary schools offered non-Muslim

minorities education based on alternative religious content

(Küçüktepe, 2004: 6; Agoston and Masters, 2009: 386-7). These three

10 Education is an epistemological issue as schooling is an arena where knowledge-claims are “presented, analyzed, evaluated, and transmitted” (Siegel, 2004: 129), leading to the formation of knowledge.

38

distinct methods of education inevitably raised three distinct types

of personas (Arslan, 2008). Following the reform, all schools were

placed under the authority of the Ministry of Education (İlsever,

2000: 29) .The ideological function of the prospective education

system was highlighted by the government itself as early as 1922. A

new education system would be designed in order to transmit the

values of national culture to young generations, aiming to formulate

the desired changes in the actions of future society (Küçüktepe,

2004: 6). Thus, following the Kemalists, we must conceptualize how

education drives a change in culture.

Schools are a critical state apparatus that reproduce the

fundamental relations of society by legitimizing state ideology

(Apple, 1995: 12-4). This legitimation sustains ideology, and

therefore the system. Targeting children allows them to develop a

value system coherent with this ideology, adapting to their role as

citizens (Wentzel and Looney, 2008: 382). Thus, education is an

integral way of changing how society will function in the future by

changing the way future generations will behave. The school,

especially where a national curriculum is in place (Apple, 1993:

231) is greatly capable of this task due to the ideological hegemony

enjoyed by the state (Apple, 1995: 16) which allows it to present

its own vision of legitimate knowledge while excluding alternatives

(Apple, 1993: 222).

39

In Turkey, this would allow for the assimilation of the

ethically heterogeneous (Alpay, 2012) people into a homogenous

persona that embraced the new political system (Yılmaz, 2011: 63),

and unified in terms of both thought and feeling (İlsever, 2000:

30). This would be achieved by formulating knowledge independent of

religion, as the new education system shifted “truth criteria” away

from religion towards science (Van Dijk, 1998: 110; Aycan, 2005:

138). This would allow for a break away from association with the

ummah in order to consolidate association with the nation

(Küçüktepe, 2004: 16; Adem, 2000: 8). This aim was only strengthened

by the fact that non-Muslim minorities no longer had the authority

to separate their learning processes on grounds of religion (Yılmaz,

2011: 63). Thus, the secular-religious and Muslim-non-Muslim

dichotomies present in society would be demolished (Winter, 1984:

186).

CHANGE OF HEADGEAR AND DRESS

The unification of education tried to break away from the Ottoman

Empire by targeting the people’s way of thinking. The change in

headgear and dress added to this mental break visually by changing

people’s appearances. According to Atatürk: “it was necessary to

abolish the fez… an emblem of ignorance, negligence, fanaticism and

hatred of progress and civilization, (Atatürk, 1925 cited in Lewis,

40

1968: 268). Thus, as the fez was targeted as a symbol, we must

understand what it symbolized.

During the Ottoman Empire, Muslims used clothing as a means of

expressing belongingness to the ummah, differentiating themselves

from non-Muslim (Lewis, 1968: 267; Lewis, 1959: 89). Thus, following

the reform, people no longer visually presented themselves as

Muslims. Furthermore, they would present themselves as Turks, as the

fez was not only removed, but also replaced with the adoption of the

hat, referred to as the “headgear of the Turk” (İlsever, 2000: 81).

The choice of the hat, a predominantly Christian headgear (Allen,

1968: 86) strengthens the blow the reform posed to religious

identification. By embracing the symbol of the “other”, religious

identification was destroyed in the visual realm. The hat was

constructed as the group-identification symbol (Van Dijk, 1998: 26;

123) that expressed the fact that the Turks no longer identified

themselves with their respective religious communities. Thus, the

Turks set themselves apart from Ottoman Muslims in a visual sense

(Nereid, 2011: 720; 724). Although the reform may appear

superficial, our mental manipulation of the world, enacted in

thoughts and feelings inevitably makes use of physical symbols

(Austin, 1977: 307). This is why clothes are such a strong means of

identity construction (Nereid, 2011: 707).

CLOSURE OF TEKKES AND ZAVİYES

41

If religion was de-institutionalized officially for the sake

of privatization, this was also to be done in the unofficial realm

(İlsever, 2000: 67). The closure of the tekkes and zaviyes would free

the people from the unofficial, yet institutionalized constraints

posed by the tariqahs11 (Eligur, 2010: 47).

Both tekkes and zaviyes were unofficial, religious convents during

the Ottoman Empire where members of tariqahs would be educated

(Akhavi, 1980: 19; Oda TV, 2010). The closure of the tekkes and zaviyes

should be seen as a continuation of the unification of education

(İlsever, 2000: 70). The tariqahs distanced followers from the

temporal world by focusing on preparation for the afterlife in their

religious teachings (Avcı, 1990). This was clearly against the

national identity the Kemalists aimed to forge by unifying

education, as since the ummah is unified by its common religious

belief in a “divine plan of salvation” (Houstma, 1987: 125-6),

nations are at odds with its transnational character (Ashour, 2012).

Every tariqah claimed its own truth, imposing it on followers

(İlsever, 2000: 67; Aydoğan, 2014). This was fundamentally against

the conception of a homogenous nation, which, according to the

Kemalists, should believe in one truth (İlsever, 2000: 67). As

demonstrated by the unified education system, knowledge was to be

11 Tariqahs are Islamic schools and orders.

42

nationalized along Kemalist lines. Thus, the Kemalists could not

allow for the pluralism formed by the alternative truths defended by

different tariqahs (Yavuz, 2005: 75). The otherworldly ethics taught

at the tekkes and zaviyes could not contradict the national ethic

taught in the schools, if the unification of education was to

achieve its purpose.

Following the reform, religion was ever more dominated by the

state, not only in the official sense, but also in the unofficial

public realm, Therefore, the unitary conception of religion would

not only prevail officially, but started to make its way into the

private lives of citizens.

ABOLITION OF THE SHARIAH COURTS AND THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NEW

TURKISH CIVIL CODE

The closure of the tekkes and zaviyes began to impose the

privatized notion of religion into the unofficial domain. This was

furthered by organizing the conduct of citizens in their private

lives by targeting their daily practices through legal laicization.

The sharia courts, which practiced Islamic jurisdiction, where

abolished on 8 April 1924. This was followed by the replacement of

sharia with the Turkish Civil Code on 4 October 1926. “Traditional

Ottoman polity [had been]… Islamized by recognizing the Sharia… as

the sacred law of Muslims” (Berkes, 1998: 9). Thus, qadis, or judges

43

issued rulings according to Islamic law (Ekinci, 2010: 10). The

principle was maintained by the reformed Ottoman legal system and

the installation of the Ottoman civil code majalla, which had

attempted to codify Sharia law (The Oxford Dictionary of Islam, 2014).

The secularization of the legal system restricted the

authority of Islam in individuals’ daily lives (Arat, 2010: 237).

The way of living was transformed (Lewis, 1968: 271) by changing the

way societal and private affairs were run (Aydemir, 2013: 239). The

civil code targeted Islamic customs by transforming women’s status

in society and the family more generally (Arat, 2010: 237; Aydemir,

2013: 244). Before analysis, we must understand that women’s rights

issues were an integral aspect of the opposition between laicism and

Islam (Gündüz, 2004: 117).

Polygamy was abolished, women were given an equal share in

inheritance, and their custody over children was expanded (Arat,

2010: 237). Men were no longer allowed to divorce women through the

Islamic practice of talaq, in which the man’s decision to divorce is

binding, giving women no say (Oguz, 2005: 385). Separation of

property was introduced in marriage law (Arat, 1989: 34). Women

would be allowed to work with the permission of their husbands12. 12 It has often been argued (see Arat, 2010: 238-9) that the Code only furthered women’s rights partially as it maintained many articles that maintained the superiority of men in marriage. Nonetheless, we must remember that the Civil Code granted women legal rights where they had none before.

44

Courts would stop differentiating between male and female witnesses

(Resmi Gazete, 1926 cited in Hukuki Mevzuat, 2012). Thus, the provisions

on personal law, inheritance law, property law and family law all

came to contradict Islamic law (Oguz, 2005: 384).

A civil code is the set of rules that regulate the lives of the

citizens abiding to it (İlsever, 2000: 53). The laicization of the

civil code demonstrated that the Kemalist regime sought to meet the

needs of the people, determined in a practical sense. This created a

divide between law for the people and law as demanded by God,

delegitimizing the latter (İlsever, 2000: 54). It cannot be ignored

that the laws and courts designed by the code “represent a

configuration of cultural ideas in opposition to Islamic culture”.

Thus, the values of society were to be reoriented away from Islamic

ones (Metin and Gelbal, 2008: 124).

By implementing the new Civil Code, the Kemalist regime used law

to precipitate societal change (Arat, 1989: 237). A new civil code

would reorient people’s lives away from Islamic customs, as law is

an important determinant of the terrain in which citizens may

operate (Engel, 1998: 132). This is accomplished by creating a sense

of legitimization where law becomes morally justified among

citizens, and therefore internalized (Raz, 2009: 169). Then citizens

would embrace and act in compliance with the criteria of right and

wrong based on the obligations, rights, permissions and powers

45

granted by law (Gardner, 2010: 2). Thus, law is capable of

preventing undesirable and securing desirable behaviour (Raz, 2009:

169). The aim was that the Turkish people would embrace and apply

the values of the Kemalist regime to their daily lives on their own

(Althusser, 1972: 181).

WOMEN’S ENFRANCHISEMENT

By enfranchising women, Kemalist laicism progressed to employ

women’s political rights in addition to their societal positions.

During the Ottoman Empire, women were considered citizens (Boğaziçi

University, 2005), but only men above the age of twenty-five who paid

some direct tax were entitled to vote (Kayali, 1995: 269).

Furthermore, alongside having no electoral rights, women were not

able to hold any official posts, thus having no political rights

(Sağ, 2001: 17). The reform was implemented in three steps. Firstly,

women were given the right to run for office and vote during the

1930 Municipal Elections, and the right to be elected as headmen in

villages. Finally, the same rights were granted for the 1934 General

Elections (Aydemir, 2013: 245).

Once legal equality was achieved through educational and legal

reform, political inequality, a remainder of the former Islamic

understanding, could not persist, especially recalling the symbolic

importance of women to religious conservatives (Gündüz, 2004: 117).

46

Thus, women would no longer be subjugated to any aspect of Islamic

law (Arat: 1989: 30-1). This meant maximized presence in public life

(Konan, 2011: 169), as women were not only allowed to participate in

public life, but could represent the people.

For Kemalists, the greatest right of citizenry was that to

vote (Arslan, 2013: 67). Thus, Turkish women would become citizens

in full (Sağ, 2001: 22). As citizenry is an important tool through

which “individual subjects and their communities are reciprocally

entwined” (Frosh, 2011: 70), expanding citizenry in a way that was

defeating to religious conservatives (Kandiyoti, 1991: 39) would

alter the nature of social relationships away from their Islamic

structure (Thompson, 2003: 60) as limited females status was an

important domain through which traditional Islam functioned

(Kandiyoti, 1991: 43). This is why Kemalists used women to “surpass

the Islamic discourses” (Hayatoğlu, 2013: 7) and liquidate the

“remnants of the Ottoman state” (Kandiyoti, 1991: 38). Employing the

state apparatuses (Van Dijk, 1998: 189) of voting and political

office, the Kemalists overtook a great symbol of the conservatives

in order to exert their own social order, delegitimizing

conservative religious values by taking away the space in which

these values were illustrated by replacing the subordination of

women with their presence in the political system.

CONCLUSION

47

Kemalist laicism was developed in order to support Kemalist

nationalism by targeting the role of religion in society in order to

replace identification with the ummah with that with the Turkish

nation. The policies gradually altered this role by delegitimizing

religious political power, subordinating religion to the state,

removing religion from individuals’ educational processes and

appearances, and finally laicising societal affairs through the

reformed status of women.

48

CHAPTER 4: IMPLICATIONS OF STUDY

Kemalist nationalism and laicism were formulated through the

reforms and policies of the Atatürk era. While nationalist policies

were developed in order to determine who an insider and outsider

were, and how insiders would come to associate themselves with the

Turkish nation rather than the Muslim ummah, laicist policies were

developed in order to support nationalism by reformulating the

position of religion in society in order to support the shift in

association from the ummah to the nation.

In the first chapter of this study, I proposed that the question

of how Kemalist nationalism and laicism were formulated was

important to look at while the role of Kemalism in the Turkish

constitution is being debated. Because Kemalist nationalism was

implemented under the assumption that national unity was necessary

for the protection and preservation of the state, a debate on the

role of Kemalism in the constitution today needs to focus on

analyzing the relationship between Turkey’s contemporary national

49

interests and Kemalism. However, it is beyond doubt that ideologies

are dynamic. Thus, such a study would also need to track the

evolution of Kemalism. A good place to start such a study would be

looking at how Kemalism evolved into its current form as the

official ideology of state, emplaced into the current constitution

which was written as a result of the 1980 Coup d’état (Meydan,

2012).

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