Hermeneuticsand the

capabilitiesapproach: a

thickheuristic toolfor a thinnormativestandard ofwell-being

This is a

post-peer-

review,

pre-

published

version of

the

article

published

in

South African Journal ofPhilosophy 2014, 33(4):

487–500

The pre-

publicatio

n

publisher

version is

available

online at:

http://

www.tandfo

nline.com/

doi/abs/

10.1080/02

580136.201

4.976751#.

VNi78Swa1z

U

Ernst

Wolff

Department

of

Philosophy

,

University

of

Pretoria,

Pretoria

CEMS,

École des

Hautes

Études en

Sciences

Sociales,

CNRS

Abstract This paper arguesfor the way inwhich thehermeneutics ofhuman actio n (inparticular thetechnical dimensionof action) and thecapabilitiesapproach are to becoordinated injudgementsregarding the happylife or well-being.To ensure that thishypothesis is notonlyphilosophicallyplausible butpracticallyreasonable, I applyit throughout topractical examples,namely practicesrelated to thearrangement ofspace. I argue thatjudgement regardinghappiness or well-being requires twodistinct forms ofreflection: (1) ahermeneutics (herederived fromRicœur) that can dojustice to thethickness (inGeertz’s sense) ofhuman living and(2) a thin standard(in Walzer’s sense)of universal humanfunctional

capabilities, bywhich to point outwhich insufficientconditions foraction underminehuman well-being(here presentedaccording toNussbaum’s versionof the capabilitiesapproach). Thesetwo forms ofreflection, it willbe argued, aretheoreticallycompatible, yetremain – inpractice – intension.Recognition of thistension has toaccompanyresponsiblejudgement.

This article was completedpartially during my time asguest researcher with Prof.Axel Honneth at the GoetheUniversity, Frankfurt, in2013/14. I hereby express mygratitude to the Alexandervon Humboldt Foundation forthe grant, which made thisresearch visit possible. Iwould also like to thank LuceThoumin, the reviewers andthe guest editors for valuablecommentary on the article.

1. IntroductionIf there issomething likehappiness – orwell-being, as Iprefer totranslate

Aristotle’seudaimonia inorder to avoidthe idea of anephemeral,emotive state ofmind – then itis not to befound in theform oftheoreticalconclusions,supported bysoundargumentation,but in the formof a life livedwell in theworld. Theconcern fromwhich mycontributionstems is notthis inevitabledistinctness,but rather thequestion of howto relate theparticularpractice thattheorising itselfis to otherdomains of humanlife. For is thereflectivesuspension ofaction not apossible firststep by which to

engage inpractice inter aliato improve one’sown and others’well-being?This paper

could bedescribed as anessay inpracticalphilosophy: init I will makeexplicit thepractical valueof mytheoreticalwork. For sometime now I havebeen interestedin how peopleengageunderstandinglywith theirworld. Inparticular, Ihave exploredthe technicaldimension ofthis engagementthrough ahermeneutics ofthe technicaldimension ofaction, inspiredby the laterwork of PaulRicœur (seeWolff 2006,2012a, 2013; and

pp. 489–492below). Thisbeing the case,the concern canbe formulated asfollows: how canthe theoreticalwork of aphilosophicalhermeneuticistimprove thequality of real-lifeinterventions inpeople’shappiness orwell-being?12 Iinvite thereader toconsider thefeatures ofhuman life inproduced spacesas a test case:how could ahermeneutics of

1 2 Drawing partially on

the same hermeneutics ofthe technicity ofaction, I havecontributed to anattempt to indicate therelevance thereof in thedomain of mobiletelephony and healthservices (Murray & Wolffunpublished). In thatpaper another route ofargumentation isexplored, but itsconclusions could beread as complementary tothose reached here.

the technicityof action informdecisionsrelating to theconstruction andadjustment ofspace, forinstance in thepractices ofurban design,architecture andinterior design(of hospitals,schools,factories,office spaces,homes, etc.)?I will argue

that ‘beingwell’ is aspecies ofpracticalunderstanding ofone’s own and ofothers’ qualityof living withincertainenvironments,whereenvironments arenot onlysocially andsymbolically,but alsotechnicallyshaped. Thesubstantivisedadverb ‘well-being’ is

appliedreflectively asone’sinterpretationof someone’squality ofbeing. Beingwell canplausibly bepresented as aform ofunderstandingonly if themutualimplication ofunderstandingand everydayhuman existenceis given dueattention:existence is thecondition underwhich humanbeings learn andexerciseunderstanding(in this senseunderstandingdepends onexistence), buthuman existenceis always shapedby the fact thatit is engaging‘understandingly’ in the world(and in thissenseunderstanding

qualifies formsof existence).3

The quality ofexisting-understanding(which can bejudged worthy orunworthy ofwell-being) thusdepends to alarge degree onthe quality ofpeople’sactions. Insofaras that is the3 In accordance with one

of the basic tenets ofHeideggerianhermeneutics. Space doesnot allow me to developthe importantqualifications, relatedfor instance to infancyor to radical passivity.

I here use‘understanding’ for thetacit, pre-predicativeaspect of humanexistence as ahermeneutic event;‘interpretation’ refersto the reflective,predicativespecialisation of thehuman hermeneuticexistence (see Wolff2013 on this distinctionin the context of ahermeneutics of thetechnicity of action).Often in action both areinvolved at the sametime in a relation ofmutual implication. Forthis reason it willsuffice when I use‘interpretation’ in theremainder of thisarticle to refer toboth.

case, it depends(1) on the rangeof capabilitiesof the agent and(2) on theenvironment inwhich the agentis confrontedwith means ofenforcing orobstructing hisor hercapabilities.The range ofsuch contextualconditions variesbetween thepoles of:• enablementto engage in theenvironment • oppressionby means ofrigorousdiscipline. Corresponding

with these isthe range ofinteractionsallowed for bythe environment,ranging betweenthe poles of: • being-at-home in a place• forcedadaptation to aspace.

Underlyingthese ranges ofpossibilities isthe questionregarding those(practical,understanding)capabilities thedeficiency ofwhich makes amoral appeal toothers.Nussbaum’scapabilitiesapproachprovides us witha perspective onthe normativelyminimalrequirements forbeing wellwithin a place.I suggest thatthe (ideally)descriptivelyneutralhermeneutic ofthe technicityof action andaspects from thenormativeorientation ofthe capabilitiesapproach couldreinforce eachother: theevaluativepotential of thenormative theory

will supplementthe descriptivetheory and theinterpretationaland heuristicpotential of thedescriptivetheory willimprove thenormativetheory’sengagement withpractice. Theentireenterpriserelies on thecentrality ofthe human beingas active, asagent.

2. The hermeneutic circle of technical agent, means and usage, or:the hermeneutical ‘thickness’ ofengagement in technical environments

One of thegreatest lessonsof twentieth-century

hermeneutics isthatunderstanding isnot onlysomething thathappens whenpeople readtexts(Schleiermacherand earlier), oreven when theyconsciouslystrive to gainintellectualaccess to socialphenomena(Dilthey), butunderstandinghappens all ofthe time in thelife of allhuman beings(Heidegger) (seeRicœur 1986: pp.83–111; Grondin2006: pp. 14–42).Understanding ispart of the veryfibre of humanexistence. It isa much largerphenomenon thana mentalactivity ofconsciousthinking – thelatter is only aderived form of

understanding.Understanding ismost of the timeand mostoriginallysituated on thepre-reflectivelevel of humansituatedness andinteraction withthesurroundings.The largest partof thedisclosure ofintelligibilityhappens in anon-thematisedmanner – mostoften we simplybathe inintelligibilitythanks to theunderstandingquality of ourexistence, as weact out ourlives.If all

understandingthus depends onthe complexnetwork ofexperiences andactions thatweaves dailyexistence, thenthe study ofhuman technicity in

particular focuseson the aspect ofunderstandingthat happenswhen:(1) the human

being astechnicalagent (withoutclaiming thatagency is onlytechnical)

(2) engageswith technicalmeans (withoutclaiming thattheenvironment isonlytechnical)

(3) by beingaffected byone’ssurroundingsand by acting(withoutclaiming thatall action istechnical).

Thehermeneutics ofhuman technicityis not anexhaustive studyof the events ofunderstanding:it merelyfocuses on thetechnical aspect

and takes otheraspects ofunderstanding –such as thesocial or thesymbolic aspects– into accountas they areneeded. Drawingprincipally fromPaul Ricœur’sphenomenologicalhermeneutics ofnarratives andtexts, anaccount ofunderstanding inhuman technicitymay be developedas follows.4

4 In order to launch thecurrent argument I givea schematic summary hereof what has been workedout in detail elsewhere(see Wolff 2006, 2012a;Murray & Wolffunpublished). Note alsothat in order tohighlight thehermeneutic aspect ofthis project, Ricœur’santhropology of thecapable human being (cf.Ricœur 1990) will bereferred to only briefly (but cf. Wolff 2011:ch. 9; 2013; Wolffforthcoming).

2.1 The human being as technical agentTechnicalunderstandingremainsunintelligibleif the personwho engagesthrough actionwith anenvironment isnot consideredpart of thetechnicalsystem. Thisdoesn’t mean atall that thehuman being isreduced to ordegraded to akind oftechnicalartefact, to acog in themachine (asargued in Wolff2010, 2012b).What it doesmean is thatwithout thehuman being –and inparticular thehuman body thathas over timeacquired skillsthat it can

deploy in anarray ofsituations –there would beno technicalevents andcertainly nounderstanding oftechnology. Thisaspect of thehuman being hasbeen presentedunder differentnames throughouthistory: bodilytechnics(techniques ducorps), habitus orhexis. Thesebodily technicsare acquiredthroughout lifesince babyhoodand are oftentaken forgranted, forexample walking(into abuilding),sitting (on apark bench),holding (a doorknob), turning(a tap), pushing(to open awindow),speaking, butalsocoordinating

vision andhearing,persevering,waiting (for atraffic light),resisting andcomposure.Bodily technicscan form onlythrough aprocess oflearning orhabituation ofone’s body (whatit is capable ofand what not,and what notyet) to itselfand to typicalobjects andmaterialqualities (heat,texture, weight,form, etc.). Allbodily technicshave a socialdimension and adimension ofindividual,personal style(as argued inWolff 2013: pp.52–53). There is no

interpretationof theconstructedenvironment as atechnical

environment thatdoes not depend,directly orindirectly, onan agent thathas acquiredbodily technics– that is,capabilities anddispositions toact in certainways whenconfronted withcertainfeatures, eventsand artefacts ofthe arrangedenvironment.5 Itis through thecombination of ahabitus of actionand its routineor improviseddeployment thatone understandsor interpretsany organisedspace as a place.The bodilytechnics are theincarnateprejudices (inthe Gadamerian

5 Even interpretation ofrepresentations ofplaces, for example whenone reads a building’splan or a map, isderivative of the bodilyacquaintedness that onehas with the world.

sense) withwhich weapproach ourenvironment andwhich predisposeus to act inintelligibleways and todisclose thepotential of theplace for us. Wedispose of sucha ‘vocabulary’of typicalactions that wespontaneouslyconnect with oneanother onprovocation bythe demands of aparticularsituation. Bythese habituatedactions webecome familiarwith differentkinds ofenvironments.‘Dwelling’ isacquaintednesswith any spatialcontext throughthe bodilytechnics. Theygive access to asignificantnumber of thepossibilitiesfor action in a

place and to asignificantfamiliarity withthe limits ofone’spossibilities inthat place.Place is spacein which onedwells.6

2.2 The means by which and among which agents actThe technicalmeans is also asocial and evena symbolicreality – alltechnicalsystems arealways socio-technicalsystems. One maygive account ofthis fact bydistinguishing

6 Which is not to beromanticised into a cosybeing-at-homestraightaway – see thediscussion of adaptationlater in the article.Arguably, the standardreferences for thephilosophical history of‘place’ and for aphenomenology of spaceand place are Casey(1997 and 1993,respectively).

between the(instrumental)logistics and(social)strategy oftechnical events(cf. Debray2000: pp. 126–127) or, in more‘technical’parlance,betweenartefactualhardware andorganisationalsoftware (Rip1995: p. 17). Alibrary, forinstance, is notonly a buildingthat housesshelves andbooks, but alsoanorganisationalstructure, whichdescribes how itis supposed torun andaccording towhich it isapproximatelyrun in practice(in the case ofa functioninglibrary).Against thebackground ofthis

interwovennessof the socialand thetechnical insocio-technicalsystems, adecisivecharacteristicof the technicalmeans can beidentified. Itis the autonomyof technicalmeans. As longas we restrictour perspectiveto the technicalmeans,independent fromthe event of itsusage, it is‘autonomous’, inother words ithas in principlelost its linkswith the contextof: • the inventorand producer

• the originalhistorical,social andculturalsituation ofits inventionand production

• the person(s)for whom it

was originallycreated.7

This entailsthat, abstractedordecontextualisedfrom thefunctioningsocio-technicalsystem, thetechnical meansor environmenthas no meaningin itself. Itcan reacquiremeaning only bybeingrecontextualised, that is, bybeingreintegrated ina framework ofuse, albeit onethat could be adifferent kindof project fromthe oneoriginallyintended. If wedo not take theautonomy of thetechnicalartefactseriously, we7 These characteristics of ‘autonomy’ are directly borrowed from Ricœur’s theory of textual autonomy (cf. Ricœur 1986: pp.124–125).

will make themistake ofthinking thatthe real meaningor use of atechnicalartefact, suchas a building ora city landscapeof roads, is tobe found in theintention of itsarchitect, or inthe originalconditions foritsconstruction, orin the intentionof the personwho commissionedit, and thatthis is theexhaustivecontent of themeaning of theseplaces. In thisway a plethoraof de factointerpretationsof these spaceswill get lost.However, thismyriad of realinterpretationsof spaces becomevisible only inthe concreteevents ofinterpretation,

that is, in theevents by whichthey arereappropriatedandrecontextualised.Yet, this does

not imply thatany technicalartefact can bemade to have anymeaningwhatsoever.Technical meansrather tend toopen up enlargedpossibilities ofaction in someregards andnarrow downothers.8 Thisdoes notdetermine itsuse, and evenless itsinterpretationby all futureusers. Forexample, thesystem of trainsin a city makestransport

8 This double effect ofamplification andreduction of humanactional capabilities bythe technical means hasbeen described by DonIhde (1979: pp. 38, 48;1990: p. 78).

through the cityeasier, butobliges peopleto moveexclusively fromone station toanother. Thatdoes not preventsomeone fromusing a train asa place to makemusic to makeextra money(rather than asa means oftransport). Oragain, thetechnical systemthat safeguardsthe integrity ofa country’sbordersfacilitatesentry for someby means oflegal documents,ports of entry,etc., and makesit difficult forother‘meritorious’individuals toenter, but inneither case canthis systemdetermine theuses that peoplewill make of theentry gained.

It is preciselybecausetechnical meanscan have thisdoublefacilitation–obstructioneffect on humanaction thatdesignersattempt tomanipulate theirqualities.However, typicalof such designefforts is thetrade-offbetween desiredand undesiredeffects.Positive aspectsof design canhave negativeeffects – air-conditioningmakes it easierto work in astable andcomfortableoffice climate,but can only doso at theexpense ofcutting workersoff from thenatural externalclimate andcirculatinghealth hazards.

Conversely,negative aspectsof design canhave positiveeffects – denseurban habitationmakes peoplefeel caged in,but makes iteasier toestablish asystem of publictransport.

2.3 Events of interpretation by actingTechnical meanshave meaningonly in theevent of beingconfronted witha person whoacts on them,uses themthrough thedeployment ofbodily technics(among others),places them in anew project, andrecontextualisesthem. For theartefact ‘piano’to become amusicalinstrument, Ihave to use itas a musical

instrument (andnot for instancemerely as ashelf on whichto place flowervases). That is,I have to playthe piano. One‘plays’ anyartefact whenone uses it as a‘this or that’,within a certainproject (cf.Heidegger 1993:§§32–33;Breitling 2002).For this reason,I also ‘play’the piano in abroader sensewhen I placeflower vases onit, but then Iplay it as aflower shelf todecorate myliving room, notas a musicalinstrument.Using somethingas something is,then, the act oftechnologicalinterpretation.9

9 A piano that merelystands in a remote corner, with no thought given to its use year after year, is in the state of

Whether thishappens throughroutinised usageor as part of aconsciouslyplanned projectmay be importantin practice,10

but neitherexcludes theother as adefiningcondition fortheinterpretativeinteraction withartefacts or theenvironment. Atits minimallevel – forinstance, beingin an air-conditioned shop– one may beunaware of thefact that one’srelation to theenvironment istechnologicallymediated and theunderstandingboils down tonothing more

‘autonomy’.10 On this distinction, see the coordination of ‘primary technicity’ and ‘secondary technicity’ in Wolff (2012b, 2013).

than ‘findingoneself’ in thisor that way,11

for example inthe slightlyimprovedambiance ofcooled air.Usage asunderstandingdoes notnecessarilyimply consciousadoption in aproject.Furthermore,

the event ofunderstanding oftechnicalartefacts, likethat of anythingelse, depends onthe way in whichthe interpreterconsciously orunconsciouslystructures therelation betweenthe detail to beinterpreted and

11 For this reason ‘findingoneself’ is to be considered integral to the technicity of action (e.g. in usage), even if,taken in isolation, it isnot an action. On the significance of such experiences of ‘finding oneself’ see Heidegger onSich-befinden (1993: pp. 142, 340).

the context inwhich it is tobe interpreted.Thus, any partof the technicalaspect of placecould besituated on ascale ofcontexts thatfit into eachother: forinstance, fromthe small scaleof one’spersonal use ofa window, to thebuilding, to thecity, to thecountry and tothe world (cf.Ropohl 2009: pp.107–117) and anyone of thesejuxtaposed toother windows,buildings,cities, etc.,and thussituated withina constellationof differentspaces that formthe differenthorizons withinwhich artefactsare interpretedin a particularpractical

context.Orientation in aplace meansknowing to apracticallyrelevant degreeyour way aroundin a world ofspaces (which issignificantlyshaped byartefacts).Thus far I have

mostlyrestricted myview toindividualagents. However,nobodyinterprets byhimself orherself: Ialways act as amember of agroup or team(for example,celebratingtogether in awedding venue),or of a mass ofagents (such asdriving in peak-hour traffic ina big city), orat least as anagent that hasacquiredspecific actingabilities

partiallythrough socialprocesses oflearning. Inother words,interpretationthrough actionis to a highdegree co-interpretation,either becauseone acts incoordinationwith others orbecause one’sway of actinginterpretinglyhas been formedby culturallyspecificprocesses. Howdoes one getpermission toenter someone’shome? In thepart of theworld where Ilive this couldentail differentthings. (1) Twogenerations agoin a suburb: goto the house andknock on thedoor. (2) Todayin a suburb: youcannot knock onthe door becausethe security

fences bars onefrom access tothe premises;phone and makean appointmentto have the dooropened for you.(3) Rural areasof the formerVenda homelandtwo decades ago:don’t knock (doyou want tobreak down thedoor?!), thereare no phones,so stand on thepavement andcall out agreeting. All ofthese aresociallyacquiredtechnicalcustoms;contingent waysof gettingaccess to afriend’s houseof which thedoor, in allthree cases, maywork exactly inthe same way.(Purelytechnicallyspeaking, allthree strategiesmight work in

all threecontexts, albeitwith differentdegrees ofefficiency.)Just as therecontextualising usage oftechnical meansis thus sociallysituated, it isequally andsimultaneouslysituated (thatis, formed) bythe technicalmilieu. From this, it

should be clearthat technicalunderstanding isonly one of anumber ofpossiblesimultaneouslyvalidunderstandingsof technicalmeans andevents. Ipropose thatthere are threesuchunderstandingsof technicalsystems: (1) The technical

understandingof technical

means, thatis, theunderstandingby which theinternalcoherence ofelements,materials,qualities,movements,etc., in theirautonomousform isinterpreted.This is, forinstance, howthe engineerunderstandsthe drawingsof askyscraper orhow a townplannerdesigns a newdevelopment.Although thisform ofunderstandingof technicalmeans mayenhance one’sability to usecertaintechnicalartefacts, orsometimes evenbe the onlyway in whichone could gain

suchcapability(for instance,using a map tofind your wayaround anunfamiliarcity), veryoften this isnot requiredto make use ofan object in atechnicalmanner (apatient may beable to reston a hospitalbed withoutknowing theinstitution’slaundry-cleaninginfrastructure).

(2) Understanding throughusage, that isthe consciousorunconscious,intentional orunintentionalintegration ofmeans withinagents’ flowof action.This is asociallyinformed

understandingthat dependson thecontingenciesof the agentand context ofusage and, ofcourse, on thebodilytechnics.

(3) A symbolicunderstandingthat disclosesthe referencethat technicalmeans andevents have tosocial norms,aestheticpreferences,culturaltraditions,legalrequirements,etc.12

12 I support my claimsregarding these threedimensions of theunderstanding involvedin human–meansinteractions from thepreceding exposition inhermeneutics. However,it is not trivial tonote that the threeforms of reference echothe three majorcategories of excellencein design as taught inarchitectural theorysince Vitruvius. Hiscategories of firmness(firmitas), commodity(utilitas) and delight(venustas) can be said to

In a myriad ofways the agent’scomplex ofcapabilities isthen pittedagainst theparticularitiesof a specificcontext – thatis, against thethings thatconstitute thatcontext. Thisevent is theoriginal sourceof the threefoldunderstanding inthe technicalengagement withone’senvironment.Ultimately,through thedeployment ofone’scapabilities inaction and thethreefoldunderstanding,the very basisof the

represent the sought-after excellence in thefacilitation of people’sunderstanding ofinteraction with thebuilt environment. Farfrom being a merehistorical curiosity,the importance of thesethree categories ofexcellence for current

possibility ofan understandingexistence isinterpreted.What isinterpreted, ordisclosedthrough thetechnicalactivity, is the(at least)implicit answerto thequestions: Whoam I as agent (as Ireveal myself in thisparticular context)?What am I capable of(in interaction withthese means and withother co-agents)?When one startsto consider whatis implied inthese questionsand their mostlyimplicit, lived-through answers,the list isremarkably long:(1) one’s

personalidentity (yoursocial rolesof age,gender,[sub]culture,etc.)

(2) one’stypicalappropriationof certainkinds ofsituations andmilieus (thatis, yourgeneralorientation inthe world)

(3) what oneconsiderspossible andimpossible(personalprojects anddesires)

(4) the latteralso draws onwhat haspreviouslybeen acquiredand thusinvolves inpart thenarrative ofhistoricaldeployment ofpossibilitiesand in thiswayreactivatesthe archive ofpersonalidentity

(5) one’s moralagency (forexample, the

capacity toregularly faceup tochallengingsituations byvirtuousaction)

(6) but also,important forthe currentcontext, beingat home orbeing well ina place.

All of thesehuman realitiesare formed andinformed in oneway or another(albeit notexhaustively) bythe interpretiveinteractionbetween thehuman being andhis or herenvironment.Given that sucha substantialpart of humanexistence isaffected byone’s competenceand means ofinteraction withthe livingenvironment, thequality of thisinteraction

impacts on thequality of one’slife in general.This series of

human realitiesthat areimplicated inthe hermeneuticspiral showsthat such ahermeneutictheory isconcerned withgiving anaccount of thefull richness,or ’thickness’(in the sense ofGeertz 2000) ofhumaninterpretingexistence,instead ofreducing it to a‘thin’description ofabstract,supratemporalgeneralities.Every theorygeneralises, butthe effort ofhermeneutics isdirected atsafeguarding theparticularitiesof humanenmeshment andengagement in

reality as faras possible.Hermeneutics isa constantreminder andcall to opennessto people’sdaily,contingentlyinterpreting andstrategic actionin a multi-layered andfaceted contextofinterpretation.‘Well-being’ isan aspect ofthis thickness ofhuman engagementwith the world,and to this Inow turn.

3. ‘Well-being’ and the ambiguous condition of its assessment

The notion of‘thickness’ asdeployed in theinterpretativesciences evokesthe difficulttask ofinterpretationin the face of

ambiguity,irreduciblecomplexity orevenindeterminacy ofthe phenomenathat areexamined. Theall-too-shortrendering aboveof thehermeneuticconstitution ofhuman beings(with specialreference totheir spatialsituation)should at leasthave mapped outthe centralissues involvedin an attempt todo justice tothis thickness.The attributionof the qualityof well-ness tothe hermeneuticbeings that weas humans areshould be as‘thick’ an issueas ourhermeneuticexistenceitself. Beforewe get to someof the

difficultiesassociated withwell-being as athick notion,let me firstclarify thespecific use ofthe notion‘well-being’ or‘happiness’ thatI propose forcurrentpurposes.13 The abstract

noun ‘well-being’substantialisesan adverbialquality that canbe attributed tothe event ofpeople’sexistence. Inthe terms of myhermeneutics ofthe technicityof action, theadverbialqualificationencapsulated in‘well-being’ canbe attributed tothe interpretingexistence ofhuman beings asthey interactwith others,with the meansat their

disposal, and inthe environmentsconstructedaround them.This term seemsappropriate (asAristotlealready claimedfor eudaimonia)not for smallincidents orepisodes, butrather forlonger stretchesof the story ofsomebody’s life;it wouldproperly qualifythat longstretch of life,even if therewere incidents

spatialinfrastructurecreation isexplicitlyrecognised(under thenames of builtquality,functionalityand impact) bythe DesignQualityIndicator,developed andmanaged by the

BritishConstructionIndustryCouncil(n.d.). Inthis way, myexposition ofthe dimensionsofunderstandinginvolved inour relationto the meansof spatialcreationalready hintsat thenormativeconsiderationsdiscussed inthe lastsection ofthis paper(pp. 488–489).

13 For other perspectives onecould consult, for instance, the invaluable overview on Quality of Life studies by Sirgyet al (2006).

or episodes thatwere not toopleasant offulfilling (butwithout beingdownrightcatastrophic).‘Well-being’could thus besaid to be theconclusion to orsummary of apositive assessmentof someone’s life, withrespect to theperson’s way ofexistinginterpretingly, withothers, in a particularsocial, symbolic, butalso technical context.This assessmentdepends ondistinguishingthe quality of aparticular lifefrom mereperpetuation ofthe biologicalexistence of aspecimen of theHomo sapiensspecies: ‘well-being’ refers toa sufficientdegree offlourishing andnot merely tothe perseverance

in existence.13

The absence of‘well-being’,whatever itsdimensions in aspecifichistoricalcontext may be,is likely toprovoke sympathyand pity inonlookers, butsometimes alsodisgust, shame,indignation andother negativefeelings, all ofwhich inform theethical overtoneof the notion‘well-being’. Inassessing thequality ofpeople’srelation totheirenvironment –their well-beingin space – asimilar ethicalovertone isreflected incertain uses ofthe well-known13 On the possible ways by which to fillin the detail of the happy life, see Smith’s catalogue of views on the good life in Sirgy et al. (2006: p. 356).

distinctionbetween (mere)space and spacein which one iswell, called‘place’.If we now turn

from the termattributed tothe events ofits attribution,the thickness ofwell-being comesto the fore evenmore clearly. Weall know thatthe assessmentof ‘well-being’could be made bysomebody of (1)his or her ownlife, or (2) ofthe life ofsomeone else.Furthermore, inboth cases, thisassessment can(i) be carriedout on theprereflectivelevel, as non-explicit, lived-out assessment,or (ii) it couldbe explicitly,consciouslyformulated. Oneof the biggestchallenges in

attributing‘well-being’ tosomeone’s lifeis to coordinatethe internal andexternalassessment (1and 2) and alsothe implicit andexplicitassessment (iand ii) ofsomebody’s life.There are amyriad ofreasons for thisbeing sodifficult. Iwill highlightonly two thatare intimatelylinked to thestructure ofinterpretingaction explainedabove (and stillrestricted to mycentral questionof ahermeneutics ofthe technicityof actionapplied tospace):(1) The range

of a person’scapabilities(what a personcan do or how

a person canlive) dependson twofactors: theinternalacquisition(or lack ofacquisition)of bodilyskills and theexternalenvironmentthat allows orprohibitssomeone fromusing them.Given thatboth theinternalskills and theexternalenvironmentare changingandhistoricallycontingent,and given thatthe realphenomenon ofa human actionis only theproduct of theencounter ofthese two(what I havecalled‘playing’),the lack ofability to act

in such a wayas to call upthe assessmentof well-beingcan bedifferentlyevaluateddepending onone’sperspective:either it isan inadequacyof the agent(internalperspective),or it is ashortcoming oftheenvironment(externalperspective),or it is both;a lack ofwell-beingwith respectto howsomebodydwells couldbe consideredto be due toeither adeficiency inthe know-howof the personor todeficienciesin theenvironment,or both.

(2) Bodilytechnics,acquiredthrough socialand technicaldisciplining,render peoplecapable ofmaximising thepossibilitiesof actionwithin aparticularcontext.However, theacquisition ofthis abilityto actefficiently isnecessarilyambiguous: itcould be seen(i) asenablement toengage withtheenvironment,or (ii) asoppression bymeans ofrigorousdiscipline. If‘dwelling’encapsulatesthe way inwhich someonehabituallylives in afamiliar

place, thenthis ambiguitycould equallybe expressedas thatbetween (a)being ormaking oneselfat home in aplace and (b)forcedadaptation toanenvironment.

Thus, just asthere arecomplexities andambiguities inproposing athick renderingof people’ssituation intheir livingspace, so thereareuncertaintiesinvolved inassessing thewell-being of aperson or agroup. It is ofutmostimportance tonote that thesetwo forms ofuncertaintyresult from thefiniteness ofour human

condition andcannot be resolved ata theoretical level.The veryhermeneuticapproach bywhich one maywant to dojustice to thethickness ofhuman existencereveals theuncertainty andambiguity thatso oftencharacterise thethoughtfulattribution ofthisqualification,‘well-being’.One neverthelesshas to workone’s waythrough thisdifficulty; itcannot beavoided, it canonly be faced andresponded to inpractice. If astudy such asthe current onehas any valuefor actingagents, then itwould beaccompanying thepractical task

of assessingpeople’s well-being andintervening intheir ability toimprove theirwell-being underthese conditionsof uncertainty.My underlying

wager is that inthe ethicaldilemmas impliedin theseuncertainties,greaterhermeneuticattentivenessmay well farebetter in aidingpeople torespond inappropriate waysto practicalsituations, thanwhatever formsof thought thatdo not allow fortheseuncertainties toappear. Astenacity inattentiveness, ahermeneuticapproach wouldhelp not only inaccurate description,but also in

heuristic sensitivity.14

However, thisdeclaration ofconviction willremain mere goodintention whenit is notconfronted withthe very realconditions underwhich decisionsabout well-beinghave to be made.In practice, onecannot dwellforever on everysingle case andoften one cannotgo back toimprove what hasbeen done; oneoften cannotavoid thinkingabout people ingeneral (ratherthan aboutspecificindividuals);likewise, manyinterventionscan only bedesigned for theaverage person14 The heuristic potential

of a hermeneutics ofhuman technicity has beenproposed briefly inMurray & Wolff(unpublished) inconnection withprospectiveresponsibility.

rather than fora specificindividual. These

considerabledifficultiesassociated withthe evaluationof a person’swell-being ingeneral, and hisor her well-being insofar asit concerns thespatialexistence ofthat person, area concern foranybody workingin the domain ofthe creation ofspace:architects,decorators,urbanists, etc.What kind ofreflection onthe stakes ofintervening inthe well-beingof others wouldbe of value tosuch people?Supposing thatsuchprofessionalsall act in goodfaith, what theywould ideally

need is anormativestandard thatwould haveuniversalvalidity (or asclose to this aspossible) inorder to helpthem assess thewell-being ofpeople’s livesand to makebenevolentinterventions(measuredagainst suchcriteria). Yetsuch a universalstandard wouldat the same timehave to be ableto accommodatetheparticularitiesandcontingencies ofeach individualperson’sinterpretingencounter withthe world. Or,to state theprinciple in theterms of theprecedingdiscussion:because thecapabilities to

act form a majorpart ofinterpretationin people’slives, but notall capabilitiesbear testimonyto well-being,one needs asophisticatedway ofdistinguishingthosecapabilities toact and thosespatialarrangementsthat contributeto well-beingfrom those thatdon’t, and thenin such a waythat creators ofspace impose aslittle aspossible theirown, particularculturalprejudices onthe existence ofothers. How dowe deal withthese twotheoreticallycontradictorydesiderata?

4. Basic functional capabilities as ‘thin’ normative standard for well-being

In what followsI will notattempt to resolvethis ambiguity.It is simplypart of ourhuman conditionthat will alwaysmake theassessment ofwell-being asomewhat riskyenterprise.Rather, I willargue that thisrisk can be metresponsibly withthe help of myhermeneutics oftechnology incombination withMarthaNussbaum’saccount of theso-called‘capabilitiesapproach’.15

15 My decision to useNussbaum’s versionrather than Sen’s isprincipally motivated by

True, hers is atheory ofjustice, but itoffers aguideline thatcould help us inreflecting onissues of well-being, alsoregardingtechnical actionand place. Justas she proposesthe‘capabilitiesapproach’ as apartial theory ofthe good(Nussbaum 2000:p. 76), I willrecontextualiseher thought witha view to apartial theory ofwell-being.16 Itwill be partial in

her more explicitdevelopment of thenormatively relevantcapabilities. For astudy on theirrespective views on thecentral notion ofcapability see Lessmann(2007). A valuableoverview of thecapability approaches isClark (2006).

16 For another attemptat using the capability approach for studies of well-being (drawing more on Sen) see Deneulin & McGregor (2010).

the sense thatit meets therequirementspelled out atthe end of theprevioussection: itmakes a claim touniversalvalidity for theminimumrequirements ofjustice (cf.Nussbaum 2006:pp. 70–75) orwell-being andleaves open thequestion as tothe full scopewith which thenotion of well-being is filledby particularactors. In order to

draw thebenefits of thistheory,Nussbaum’sconcept ofcapabilities has tobe clarifiedfirst. From theoutset oneshould acceptthat humanbeings changeand thereforethey seem to

have no clearessence. Despitethe tendency ofglobalisation tohomogenisecultures, itremains highlyproblematic tojudge the valuesof others fromone’s ownstandpoint (thisis the snare ofa colonisinglogic). However,according toNussbaum, it ispossible toidentify a broadcross-culturalconsensusconcerning thevalue of humanbeings that,althoughchanging indetail overtime, can at anygiven time beconsidered to befairly context-independent –and this isinteresting tous. Thecapabilities areexpressions ofthis likelyconsensus.

Nussbaum speaksof ‘basicfunctional orcentralcapabilities’.These areconceived of aspossibilities todo something andnot as needsthat have to befulfilled. Abasic functionalcapability is acomposite of:(1) basic

capabilities(‘equipment’;for example, ahealthy body)

(2) thedevelopment ofsuch basiccapabilitiesto internalcapabilities(that is,developedstates of theperson thatare conditionsfor theexercise offunctions,often throughexternalsupport and/oreducation)

(3) internalcapabilitiescombined withsuitableexternalconditions toform combined,basic orcentral humanfunctionalcapabilities.

Although thebasic functionalcapabilitiesrepresent awider range ofcapabilitiesthan thetechnicalability of theskilled body,the structure ofboth are inessence thesame. Bothconsist of:(1) having the

right thing touse (forinstance,healthy legs,or in theabsence ofhealthy legs,perhapshealthy arms)

(2) having itdeveloped tobe used (for

example, forwalking, or inthe absence ofhealthy legs,arms that arecapable ofactivating andsteering awheelchair)

(3) having theconditionsthat favourits use (suchas anaccessibleentry tobuilding, or awheelchair anda wheelchairramp for thoseof impairedmovement).

In order torealise theintegration ofthe capabilitiesapproach in thehermeneutics ofaction, thecoordinationbetween the twoframeworks ofreflection hasto beclarified.17 17 In accordance with the

demarcation of thecurrent paper, I willnot explore the relationbetween Nussbaum’snotion of capability and

(1) Both ofthese ways ofthinking areintimatelyconcerned withhuman capabilityand elucidateit by takingintoconsiderationthe history ofgradualhabituation ofthe personthat forms theacquireddispositionand capacityto do things

that of Ricœur in thelast phase of hisoeuvre. Ricœur’s work oncapability has beenneglected more oftenthan not in the debatesregarding thecapabilitiesapproach(es). Aninteresting exception isDeneulin et al. (2006),which contains an essayby Ricœur. In Ricœur’swork, Nussbaum fi guresonly as the author of TheFragility of Goodness (cf.Ricœur 1990: pp. 284–287). His discussion of‘social capabilities’draws on Sen (Ricoeur2004: pp. 225–231). Tomy knowledge, Nussbaum’sonly study on Ricœur isNussbaum (2002). On therelation betweencapability and fragilityin Ricœur, see Savage(2013).

(bodilytechnics, inthe one case,basiccapabilities,in the other),for examplespatialorientationandutilisation.

(2) Accordingto both views,capabilitiesare deployedin contexts, inother words,they arecombinedinteraction of(embodied)know-how as itis activatedinconfrontationwith a varietyof differentlystructuredsituations (inthis article,in particularplaces astechnologically, but alsosocially andsymbolicallyformed). Thequalities ofthe specific

spatialorganisationenable or makedifficultcertainactions in it.

(3) Once thesesimilaritiesof perspectivehave beenidentified, itfollowslogically thatthe quality ofthe capabilitydepends inboth theorieson both thepreconfiguredcapability andthefacilitationfor itsdeployment bythe givens ofthe context.

(4) Thisinteraction ofa ‘capable’,‘skilled’ or‘habituated’agent with aparticularsetting isalways of sucha nature thatthe technicalusage entailsalso social

and symbolicunderstandingthat in turnfeeds back tothe capableagent.

(5) For boththehermeneuticand thefunctionalcapabilityconceptionthis self-interpretativeloop passesthrough theevents ofinteractionwith othersand things.Thedesignation‘well-being’appliesprecisely tothis loop –first, in theway in whichone (mostlyimplicitly)interpretsone’s ownwell-being,but second, itis also theterminus or‘object’ of anexternal

assessmentconcerningsomeone else’swell-being.

However, atthis culminatingpoint the twovisions on humancapabilitydiffer – adifference thatwill prove to bedecisive to thecurrentargument: theone elucidatesthis self-interpretationalloop primarilyfrom ahermeneutic anddescriptiveperspective bywhich thevariety ofcapabilities andtheir modes ofexistence areplaced inrelief; theother offers anormativeperspective bywhich todenounce oranticipate thelack ofcapabilities.

This last pointneedselaboration.Consider the 10combined orcentralfunctionalcapabilitiesidentified byNussbaum (2006:pp. 76–78, citedand somewhatcircumscribed): (1) Life(2) Bodily health(3) Bodily

integrity (4) Opportunity

and abilityto developand usesenses,imagination,and thought

(5) Expression ofemotions

(6) Practicalreason(planningone’s life,forming anidea of thegood)

(7) Affiliation(i)Live with

and towardsothers

(ii) ‘Having the

socialbases ofself-respect andnon-humiliation’

(8) Concern forother species

(9) Play,recreationand rest

(10) Controlover one’senvironment(i)Political(i

i)Material.

As a partialtheory ofjustice,Nussbaum’s claimis ‘substantive’or ‘positive’:it is part ofany justdispensationthat peoplewould dispose ofthesecapabilities asfar as ishumanlypossible.However,Nussbaum alsoinsists thatwhen somebody isconsistently

prevented fromexercising anyone of thesecapabilities, wewould havereason tosuspect that theperson issuffering from alack of well-being. In severecases it meansthat violence iscommittedagainst thehuman value ofthat person. The‘negative’ orprivative notionof ‘absence’ or‘lack’18 holds akey tounderstandingwhy Nussbaum’stheory remainsonly a partialtheory ofjustice (orwell-being):despite arguingfor asubstantivetheory ofjustice, this

18 She writes about a ‘basic social minimum’ or again of ‘the threshold level of each capability’ (Nussbaum 2006: pp. 70–71).

capabilityapproach remainssubtended by adeontologicallogic of whichmost of the workis done by meansof negation (the‘no’ toinjustice or the‘minimal levelof justice’).The substantivepart of hertheory thusremains fairlymodest, althoughcertainly nottrivial. Becauseof this specificway in which hercapabilitiesapproach is alimitedsubstantivetheory, one mayrightfullycharacterise itas a ‘thin’theory.19 We cannow turn to theway in which Isubscribe to

19 Early on, Nussbaum herself characterisedher theory as a ‘thick vague theory of the good’ (Nussbaum 1992: p. 214).

this ‘thin’theory.

5. Hermeneutics of the technicity of action and thecapabilities approach: a thick heuristic toolfor a thin normative standard of well-being

The problem setout at thebeginning ofthis articleconcerned thequestion of thepracticalassessment ofpeople’shappiness orwell-being intheir relationto space. Inorder toaccomplish thistask, I proposedthat weintegrate thestandard ofwell-being intothe hermeneuticspiral of

interpretation,and focused onthe technicaldimension ofthis spiral.Having made thecase for theirtheoreticalcompatibility inthe previoussection, thestake is nowtheircoordination inthe assessmentof well-being inpractice the wayin which thisplays out inprofessions andpracticesrelated to thearrangement ofspace. In orderto develop thispoint, I willinsist on aninevitable tensionbetween the twovisions of humancapability, atension thatremainseffectivedespite theirtheoreticalcompatibility.20

20 Here lies the essentialdifference between myattempt to relate Ricœur

Let us approachthis question byadding twoqualificationsto Nussbaum’scapabilitiesapproach:(1) Thick and thin:

MichaelWalzer’stheorisationof therelationbetween thin

to the capabilityapproach and that ofSéverine Deneulin(2006). Her attemptconsists in using Ricœuras a ‘thickening’extension of orcomplement to thecapability approach(using Sen more thanNussbaum as reference);I insist on theimportance ofmaintaining the tensionbetween the two bodiesof thought and theimportance of keepingthe specifics (thinnessor thickness) of each inplay during the processof judgement.Furthermore, situatingthe positive fullness ofthe flourishing life inthe hermeneuticexistence, I give amarkedly ‘negative’reading of the use ofthe capabilities norm(contrary to Deneulin’s[2006: p. 28] ‘positive’insistence on the taskof expandingcapabilities).

(or minimal)and thick (ormaximal)moralities(Walzer 1994)should cautionus againstmisunderstanding what can bedone withNussbaum’stheory.Consider againher claim thather proposedlist ofcentralfunctionalcapabilitiescould draw abroad, cross-culturalconsensus andthat, as apartial theoryof justice(or, for ourpurposes,well-being),it leavesenough spacefor culturallyspecific uses.One should notsuccumb to thetemptation tothink thatthis meansthat the 10

capabilitiesrepresent thecore of allmorality or afoundationupon whichother moralsystems are,or can be,constructed.Rather, the 10capabilitiesare a‘substantialaccount of themoral minimum’and, asNussbaum’screation,remain‘necessarilyexpressive of[her] ownthickmorality’(Walzer 1994:p. 9) or, forthe sameprice,expressive ofthe thickmorality ofwhomever willbe persuadedby theargument ofthe presentarticle. Thickmorality is

not derivedfrom thinmorality; andthis thinmorality hasdifferentmeanings, andis differentlyinterpreted indifferentpracticalcontexts bypeople fromdifferentpersuasionsand culturalbackgrounds(cf. Walzer1994: p. 17).This does notproveNussbaum’sthin normativetheory to beinvalid; itmerelycautions us torespect thepragmatic natureof thedeployment ofthesestandards.Walzerconvincinglyargues thatthin moralityis constructedby people with

and out oftheirrespectivethickmoralities forthe purposes of aparticularpractical context,typically forcriticism orsolidarity(Walzer 1994:pp. 10, 16).For presentpurposes, wecouldparaphrasethis as:consideredformally, thecapabilitiesare theconsolidation(in the formatof a theory)of a likelycompromiseunderpracticalconditionssuch as thatof criticismor solidarity,and – I wouldadd – for thesake ofsimplifying anotherwiseoverwhelmingly

complexcontext. Thepoint of thecapabilitiesapproach’sthinness isnot thatfulfilment ofthe 10capabilitiesequals aflourishinglife (sincethey representonly thethresholdrequirementsfor aminimally goodlife), butthat absence orlack of abilityto exerciseany one ofthem would beable to draw acompromise ofoverlappingmoraldisapprovalfrom peoplewith otherwisedivergingforms of thickmorality (cf.Nussbaum 2000:p. 76).Denouncingsuch absence

or lack (thenegationdiscussed atthe end of theprevioussection, p.496) is thediscursivepractice thatdeontologytakes inresponse tothe demands ofa particularpracticalsituation. Ifwe accept thisreading of thecapabilitiesapproach, thenWalzer’sobservationapplies heretoo that ‘[i]nmoraldiscourse,thinness andintensity gotogetherwhereas withthicknesscomesqualification,compromise,complexity,anddisagreement’(Walzer 1994:p. 6). This

point isimportant forthe currentargument,becausepractitionersof spatialdesign willalways have tohold thenegativestandard ofcapabilitiesin mind,21 yetnever designfor peoplewhoseexistence canbe summarisedin the minimalterms ofactionencapsulatedin thisstandard. Atthe receivingend of designstands thecomplexthickness ofpeople’severyday lives– the kind ofdomain thathermeneuticsis meant to

21That is, designing for the absence of impediments to the exercise of the capabilities.

clarify. Thisis the nextpoint.

(2) Functioning:In deployingtheircapabilities,human beingsdo not exist‘in a thinway’, but ‘ina thick way’.Nussbaumacknowledgesthis fact bydistinguishingbetween (thin)functionalcapabilities andfunctioning,i.e. the(thick)practicaldeployment ofthosecapabilities.Now, thenormativity ofher approachapplies ideallyonly to thequestion ofhavingacquired thecapabilitiesand not totheirfunctioning orpractical

mobilisation.In otherwords, if thecapabilitiesapproachprovides anorm for theevaluation ofwell-being inpeople’slives, it isby evaluatingwhat they arecapable of (orexposing whatthey are notcapable of)and not byjudging theways in whichthey make useof thosecapabilities.However, thisis only ideallythe case,because therelationbetweencapabilitiesandfunctioning isquite complex(see Nussbaum2000: p. 86–96). Firstexample: inorder forpeople to

develop theirfunctioningcapabilitiesthey have todo certainthings,because it isonly by doingthings thatyou acquirethe capabilityto do them (asAristotle[2003] alreadypointed out inNicomacheanEthics 1103a30–31). Secondexample: ifsomebody neverdoes a certainthing, forinstancemaking plansand thusexercising thecapability ofpracticalreason, onewould havereason tosuspect thatthiscapability hasnever beenformed. Thecapabilityremains inconstant need

ofconfirmationin practice.In otherwords, theassessment ofwell-being interms of thethin standardofcapabilitiescan be madeonly underconditions oftheir thickdeployment inreal life (inso far aspeople areindeedcapable).

This inevitableintrusion offunctioningthickness (inGeertz’s sense,present here inmy hermeneuticsof thetechnicity ofaction) intocapabilities asthin standard(in Walzer’ssense) hassignificantimplications forthe applicationof this

standard. Whatis assessed whensomeone, and inparticular apractitioner inthe professionsof spatialarrangement,enquires aboutthe well-beingof anotherperson? Althoughone may adoptNussbaum’s 10capabilities asstandard, onenever encountersthe baremanifestation ofthe standard(let alone thesufficientminimum requiredlevel of it).Rather, onealwaysencounters (inthe terminologyof myhermeneutics ofhumantechnicity) thecapability ofbodilytechnologies asconfronted inpractice withthe specificqualities of an

environment,that is,enveloped by andenmeshed in thethickness ofunderstandingexistence.Inevitably, thisdraws theapplication of athin standardinto the ambitof ambiguity,complexity andindeterminacytypical ofthickness: onlya thick readingof the people inquestion wouldbe able toprovide the mostplausibleassessment oftheir well-beingin terms of thisthin standard.My remarks aboutthe complexityof assessingwell-being (seepp. 492–494)should have madethis pointsufficientlyclear.Does this

apparentascendancy of

thehermeneuticalthickness ofreal people’sexistence notthen make therecourse to athin vision ofthe standardredundant? Ibelieve not. Upto now, we haveconcentrated onthe paradigmaticsituation ofpeople’s presentlivingconditions.However,practitionersmost often workunder conditionswhere thepresentcircumstances oftheir clients orthebeneficiaries oftheir work areat most onlypart of theirconsideration.Two aspects ofthe situation ofthe practitionerhave to be bornein mind: (1) Practitioners rarely, if

ever, have theluxury ofdesigning forone specificperson; in fact,they most oftendesign not onlyfor the clientor first users,but also forfuture owners,future users orthe presentbeneficiary’sfuture self. Inshort, theydesign forpeople theycannot know.22 (2) They designfor the future –22 The clarifi cation of

this matter in thetradition ofphenomenological socialtheory remainsinvaluable – see Schütz(1964) on the generalityimplied in ‘they-relations’ and Berger &Luckmann’s (1966)understanding of the‘generalised other’. Tosome extent,consideration for thegeneralised other comesinto play in the form oflegal stipulations towhich practitioners haveto abide. For currentpurposes, I simplyacknowledge this fact,while assuming that theminimum standards ofsuch stipulations tendto set the bar for well-being too low.

that is, inabstraction fromthe vicissitudesof actual usage;in short, forconditions ofuse that cannotbe known.These two facts

point out theconsiderablecomplexity ofintervening inpeople’s well-being; yet suchcomplexity mustbe reduced inorder to pursuework inpractice. Inplanning anddesignprofessionalscannot avoid theuse ofgeneralities(for point 1)and ofheuristics (forpoint 2). Inother words,point 1 callsfor design withthe average ortypical personof relevantcategories(home-owner,child, patient,

movementimpaired,spectator,pedestrian,etc.) in mind,or morespecifically, itrequireseliminatingpossibleimpediments towell-being asthe averageperson belongingto any of therelevantcategories wouldexperience it.Point 2 callsfor maintaininga thick,hermeneuticapproach, butonly as appliedheuristically tolikely futureuse of likelyusers, whicheliminates thepossibility ofaccommodatingall possibleuses (evenimagining thatthis would bepossible) whilestriving toanticipateproblems that

may arise oncein use. Inpractical terms,a designer hasto ask: giventhe diverserange oftechnicalcapabilities ofwhich peopledispose, andgiven thespatialarrangementsthat I amplanning toproduce (thatis, externalconditions ofcapabilities),what would bethe possibleeffects on theusage meaningand the symbolicmeaning ofpeoplefrequenting thisspace? Inparticular,considering thevariety ofpossiblebehaviours by afair range ofpossible users,what would bethe risks ofproducing

obstacles to therealisation ofwell-being? Andagain, for which(even unlikely)user would thekind ofenvironment thatI am planningamount to anunacceptablehindrance in theexercise oftheircapabilities? It is my

contention thata goodhermeneutics ofthe technicityof action wouldbe able tosensitisedesigners anddevelopers topossible formsof usage evenbefore it takesplace, and thatthe integrationof thefunctionalcapabilities asstandard wouldnot only providethe normativemeasure, butwould helppractitioners in

their inevitabletask of reducingthe complexityof thissituation, andto do so in aresponsible way.

6. Conclusion: qualifying considerations

Whatever theambiguities inevaluatinghappiness orwell-being maybe, it issubject tocertain minimalrequirements,and the absenceof these minimalrequirements ina person islikely to makean ethicalappeal onothers. Thehermeneutics ofthe technicityof actionprovides us withone particularlyuseful way ofanalysing thesecapabilities –useful for ourunderstanding ofwell-being in a

context that isat least as muchtechnical as itis social andsymbolic.Nevertheless, nohermeneutics canprovide thefinal, clear-cutassessment ofwell-being ofany person in aparticularplace, just asno hermeneuticsof poetics givesaccess to theultimate meaningof a poem. Myclaim is thatthe capabilitiesapproach,integrated withthe hermeneuticsof thetechnicity ofaction, can bedeveloped into aheuristic andnormative toolfor addressingthe essentiallyambiguousquestion of theassessment ofwell-being in amore responsibleway, insofar as(1) it enhances

one’ssensitivity forthe ways inwhich people mayact and react inconfrontationwith certainmilieus, and (2)it simplifiesthe process ofeliminatingnormativelyundesirableconstraints ontheir ability toact. Suchsensitivity andnormativeapplication areof essentialimportance forprocesses ofpolicy-making,design andresearch, andfor a generalorientation withrespect to theassessment ofand interventionin practicalmatters of well-being and place– even thoughsomegeneralisationis unavoidable. If this case

has been made

sufficientlythrough theprecedingarguments, itneverthelessshould bestressed thatthis is not asimple ‘happyending’: theinsistence onthe hermeneuticcomplexity ofhuman existencekeeps intact theneed forjudgement (here,with respect ofwell-being inmatters spatial)while proposingways for makingthis judgementmore thoughtfuland relevant tothe demands ofpractice. Thispoints to threeimportantaspects of myargument as awhole.First, the

openness tocomplexity andambiguity(typical of thehermeneuticvision of

capabilities)and the standardof minimalrequirements forwell-being standin atheoreticallyirresolvabletension. Assuch, theyinform thedifficult pointin practicewhere a decisionhas to be made.And only thepracticaldecision canresolve thistension.23

Second, thepresent studycan certainly bedevelopedfurther, withreference todiscipline-specific input,as eachsituation ofapplication mayrequire.However, evenso, my thickheuristic toolfor a thin23In this sense my argument remains trueto the spirit of Ricœur on practical wisdom (Ricœur 1990).

normativestandard ofwell-being willnever be able toovercome all theuncertainties ofjudgement inpractice. Inthis respect, myargument remainstrue to anentire traditionof practicalphilosophy forwhichrecognition ofthe modest levelof certaintywith which onecan theorise isnot only an actof modesty, buta demonstrationof understandingthe nature ofhuman practice(cf. Aristotle2003: 1104a7–10). That thisuncertaintyneverthelessshies away fromfatalism andfrom denying thepracticalrelevance oftheorisinghardly needs

furtherdiscussion here.Third, the

presentdiscussion hasnot resolved theproblem of thedifferencebetween aninternal and anexternalperspective inthe assessmentof well-being(see pp. 492–494). Mostlikely, theargument can bebest expanded,not by playingoff an‘internal’ focusagainst an‘external’ one,but by dealingwith what liesbetween people,that is, byexamining theimportance ofsharing,discussion,dispute,compromise (forinstance betweendesigner andstakeholders).Again, thiswould not

necessarily leadto a problem-free outcome,but it may helpto conferlegitimacy onour judgementsand decisions.

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