Health equity in a globalised world: toward constraining global greed?

A s i a n B i o e t h i c s R e v i e w D e c e m b e r 2 0 1 3 Vo l u m e 5 , I s s u e 4

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Health Equity in a Globalised World: Towards Constraining Global Greed?

Al l en Andrew AlvArez

“Corporate greed” has recently been denounced in several protest demonstra-tions in different parts of the world.1 In those demonstrations, corporations are called to put an end to their being too selfish and greedy for profit and to start caring for the interests of others, especially the many who are poor and unemployed. While such protest movements seem to attract less support in Asian countries than in their Western counterparts,2 this does not mean that people there are necessarily indifferent to denouncing “greed”. There is even a familiar quote attributed to Lao Tzu that says that there is no greater disaster than greed (or lavish desires). This may be a different kind of greed than what global protesters are denouncing. But even if people have different conceptions of what should be considered greed and how to denounce it, we could at least agree that we should not only be concerned about our own interests. In certain ways, it may also be beneficial for us to consider how others are faring. For example, we could conceive of the world of being more peaceful and stable if there is less global health inequity as we currently have. Many of the world’s poorest have a life expectancy at birth of less than 50 years in contrast to the global life expectancy at birth of 66.75 years. Ideally, much of the poverty suffered by many in the world could be remedied through ways that will not burden the world’s affluent population. But in the real world, many still avoidably fall below the world’s life expectancy average while theoretical and practical obstacles to motivating effective global action to solve the problem remains. In this article, I explore the plausibility of motivating rich countries to assist poor countries by appealing to the idea of rational constraint: is global resource transfer a rational thing to do from the point of view of any prospective donor? This is done by sketching the implications of David Gauthier’s3 view of rational constraint (to maximising

a r t i c l e s

3 1 6 – 3 3 0 A s i a n B i o e t h i c s R e v i e w D e c e m b e r 2 0 1 3 Vo l u m e 5 , I s s u e 4

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H e a l t h E q u i t y i n a G l o b a l i s e d Wo r l d A l l e n A n d r e w A l v a r e z

self-interest) to relations between nations. I argue that it is rational for rich countries to transfer a small portion of their wealth for health-targeted assis-tance to poor countries since: (1) assisting the poor is not burdensome to them; (2) such action is in accordance with the emerging global norms that regulate international relations despite the absence of mechanisms that are expected to enforce such norms; and (3) assisting the poor is the prudent thing to do because it sets the stage for enabling and motivating mutual assistance. Although there are other forms of mutual assistance in the area of defence, infrastructure building, technology transfer, etc., I focus on health-targeted assistance because of the strategic value of establishing enabling con-ditions for recipients to reciprocate such assistance in the future. Although duty-based accounts of morally motivating global transfers for the sake of the poor are more common, including accounts of negative duty not to cause harm on others, the duty to compensate for the harm caused on others as part of this negative duty,4 I set aside these duty-based accounts to focus on rational advantage as another approach to motivate health-targeted global resource transfers from rich to poor counties. I do this to suggest that Kantian, duty-based reasons for rich countries to assist poor countries are not the only reasons we could use to justify the need to assist the poor. Prudence is another reason for constraining maximisation of rational self-interest. The benefits that arise from engaging in mutual assistance as a rational strategy to promote mutual advantage and reciprocity make it a prudent act. Although rationality of cooperation may seem to appeal only to lower- and middle-income countries, in view of their relative political and economic disadvan-tage, it should ideally appeal to rich and powerful countries as well since even these countries cannot be sure if they will remain as affluent and as powerful always. Is it not prudent for the rich and powerful to transfer their surplus wealth to assist other countries who might be enabled and motivated to help them in the future? If it is not burdensome for the rich and powerful to assist poor countries and if global norms are emerging to regulate relations between nations, then there seems to be no reason for them not to constrain maximisation of self-interest. Thus, the most prudent action for them to take is to engage in relations that encourage cooperation, such as assistance to countries in need.

Is Global Resource Transfer from Rich to Poor Countries Too Burdensome?

One likely disincentive for the rich to assist anyone is the cost assistance it would likely entail. It does not seem rational for the rich to assist anyone


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when such assistance requires reduction of wealth, especially in the case of rich countries. Gopal Sreenivasan5 argues that this is not the case if we con-sider how minimal the cost would be. The minimum obligation he proposes is both light enough for the rich (i.e. not “too demanding”) and effective enough to significantly make a difference in improving the well-being of the poor. Unlike the usual Rawlsian approach of starting with ideal theory, Sreenivasan begins with non-ideal theory that would anticipate ideal theory. I set aside the details of the discussion about how best to formulate a non-ideal theory in relation ideal theory.6 Instead, I go directly to presenting the practical aspects of Sreenivasan’s anticipatory non-ideal theory which requires that the G7 nations make a health-targeted transfer of one per cent of their GDP to poor nations. The proposed amount of one per cent of GDP is four times bigger than the current development assistance commitments of the G7 nations — which is 0.22 per cent of their GDP.7 This means that the proposal will only involve a 0.78 per cent addition to the current develop-ment commitments of G7 nations. But this 0.78 per cent is enough to fund a per capita package of USD144 (real dollar figure) for primary healthcare, basic nutrition, and education for 1.26 billion of the world’s bottom quintile.8 The USD144 per capita amounts to 432 dollars when converted to inter-national PPP (Purchasing Power Parity) values. It is plausible, based on current data, that this amount could increase the life expectancy of beneficiaries by 10 years.9 This gain of 10 years life expectancy is more than modest. There-fore it is not susceptible to objections that the amount is too small and not enough to qualify as a minimum obligation.10 In fact, the amount is com-parable to what is spent by high achievers.11 Health-targeted resource transfer is also not susceptible to alternative priorities objection since being healthy, as an enabling condition, is so basic to be pitted against other measures of well-being.12 The proposed amount is also relatively small compared to the total GDP of G7 nations such that it is not susceptible to objections that it is too demanding.13

One doable way to remedy global poverty is by fulfilling the minimum obligation of transferring one per cent of rich nations’ GDP to improve health in poor nations. Addressing the problem of global health inequity this way is a minimum and doable requirement for achieving global justice. It is not a coincidence that by addressing the problem of global health inequity, we also address global poverty. This is because socioeconomic conditions are key determinants of health. Since health inequity and ill health limit the opportunities available to the global poor, these prevent them from getting out of poverty. Thus, achieving global health equity also establishes one crucial enabling condition for the global poor.

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Will Global Resource Transfer Work in the Absence of a Central Global Enforcement Mechanism?

Sreenivasan’s view could draw support from Cohen and Sabel’s14 arguments against the global political realist claim that observance of duties between countries is not possible without a global enforcement mechanism. The possibility of global enforcement is afforded by “conditions of global politics”. Lack of global enforcement mechanism is used to argue against duties and rights across national borders in the context of debate about whether global justice is possible. For a rational constraint account of the need to assist poor countries, lack of global enforcement mechanisms could also mean having insufficient global political infrastructure to facilitate prudent rational action between states. If such an argument of lack of global enforcement mechanism, that poses more difficulties for justifying global duties, could be overcome, then it could also make the case for a rational constraint account plausible. Cohen and Sabel argue that conditions of global politics generate procedural and substantive norms beyond nation-state borders because political morality can be sensitive to the “different cases or types of relation” for which it is formulated. Let us set aside details of Cohen and Sabel’s discussion on alternative normative conceptions relevant to norms of justice that apply beyond the state and their critique of Thomas Nagel’s defence of strong statism.15 Instead let us focus on “conditions of global politics” and how these conditions generate new norms that create duties across national borders.16 For a rational con-straint account of motivating global assistance, these new norms also enable stability in international relations that reinforces cooperation and reciprocity. The relevant conditions17 of contemporary global politics include the following:

(1) The global economy is present in the lives of virtually all nations because communication, transportation costs, trade, trade dependence and move-

ments of capital across the globe have created global economic integration.(2) Rule-making, rule elaboration and rule application in various areas of

economic and social life are taking place in global settings.(3) The rules made in global settings affect the conduct and welfare of individuals, firms and states.(4) The making of national rules proceeds subject to rules, standards and

principles established in global settings.(5) Global settings are the focus of a transnational politics of movements and

organisations.


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(6) Supranational rule-making bodies are expected to continue to exist with their decisions expected to be taken into account in making national

decisions and pursuing national goals.(7) Global rule-making bodies are capable of encouraging cooperative conduct

among states by “providing incentives and permitting the imposition of sanctions …” Withdrawing from the jurisdiction of these global rule-making bodies may be costly to member states so there is always an incentive to remain under it. This is the case even “when rule-making and

applying bodies lack their own independent power to impose sanctions through coercion” as in the case of rule-making bodies within the state.

These conditions do not require relegating the norms that arise from supranational interactions between states as pre-political and as distinct from those generated within the boundaries of the state;18 rather, these conditions makes possible the emergence of international rules and the international norms they imply. These international rules could be expected to regulate relations between states despite the different way they have been created com-pared to rules created to regulate relations within the state. If global resource transfers are not necessarily burdensome to rich countries and if it can be done without having a central global enforcement authority, are there rational incentives for the rich to do this?

Could Global Resource Transfer be Also Rational for a Prospective Donor?

Gauthier stated in his book Morals by Agreement that he sought to defend the idea of morality as a rational constraint on the pursuit of individual interest.19 Setting aside the determination of whether Gauthier succeeds in his project or not,20 one general idea that could be derived from his theory is that morality involves the negative requirement to constrain the pursuit of individual interest. This could be contrasted with the positive requirement associated with the popular altruistic notion of morality, i.e., sacrificially transferring a part of one’s resources to others. The negative requirement of constraint in maximising individual “interest” gives way for a more efficient strategy than straightforward maximisation of one’s aims in the course of interacting with others. This strategy involves agreeing with others to mutually constrain their own unilateral pursuit of individual interests in favour of their common interests. While the constraint may make each individual seem worse off than without it — if seen in isolation from others — each would actually “gain more from the constraint of the other or others”.21

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When entering a cooperative venture with others, it would be rational to choose a cooperative scheme among all available alternatives if and only if “the greatest or maximum concession it requires, is as small as possible, or a minimum, that is, is no greater than the maximum relative concession required by every other outcome”.22 This principle is called minimax relative concession. If represented in a rough and simplified way, this principle requires that when presented with a choice between all possible cooperative schemes A, B and C in view of their outcomes, where A requires maximum relative concession (maxc) equivalent to 8,23 B requires maxc = 10, and C requires maxc = 11, the rational choice would be A as we can see in Diagram 1.24 Scheme A should be chosen since the respective maximum relative concessions of the other schemes B and C are greater than the maxc of A by 2 and 3, respectively. The relative concession required in A “is no greater than the maximum rela-tive concession required by every other outcome”, in this case B and C. Since scheme A requires the mini mum of the max imum concessions compared to those required in schemes B and C, it offers minimax relative concession and thus should be chosen.

Diagram 1

Although one could be naturally disposed to avoiding any concessions to others in favour of unconstrained pursuit of individual interest, disposition to constrained maximisation25 is the ideal characteristic of rational behaviour. This is because although “constrained maximizers sometimes lose by being disposed to compliance … in the mistaken expectation of reciprocity from others who instead benefit at their expense”, in the end “… the net advantage that constrained maximizers reap from co-operation exceeds the exploitative benefits that others may expect”.26 It is therefore “irrational to admit appeals to interest against compliance with … duties founded on mutual advantage”.27

The cooperative interaction with others is made possible by what Nozick has called the “Lockean proviso”.28 This proviso is reformulated by Gauthier as a constraint on appropriation of land or other goods previously in common


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use. One might rightfully appropriate these goods for her own exclusive use provided

the effect of such appropriation was to leave other persons at least as well off as before. The appropriator betters herself without worsening the situation of others … ‘enough, and as good’ … any opportunity that an individual may rightfully exercise must leave, if not similar, then equally advantageous opportunities for others.29

This proviso has force only when the purpose of the cooperative venture is mutual advantage and when reciprocity from other individuals is assumed. If being prudent means deciding to take a course of action that produces more gains and avoids more harms than alternative actions, then mutual constraint of individual interest is prudent action. It is also rational in the sense that it is an efficient strategy to take if one seeks to be better off in interacting with others. Gauthier locates the “moral” in impartiality of mutual constraint.30 Since this mutual constraint is also rational, Gauthier thus derives morality from rational constraint on the pursuit of individual interest.

Rationality as a Mechanism for Enforcing Compliance

Gauthier’s theory of morality is contractarian in that it continues (but with some departures) from the social contract tradition that started with Thomas Hobbes. Hobbes argued that men are naturally disposed to seek their own interest, thus a Sovereign was necessary to force compliance.31 Gauthier departs from this Hobbesian view of the necessity of a central enforcing authority to ensure and/or force compliance among contractors and to ensure that they will keep their promises to stick to the terms of agreements they make.32 Upon demonstrating that persons who are rational will not choose to be Straightforward Maximisers (SMs), as Hobbes would have thought, Gauthier defended the view that their rational capacity would actually enable persons to be Constrained Maximisers (CMs), i.e., “in strategic contexts, the disposition to make constrained choices, rather than straightforwardly maxi-mizing choices, is utility-maximizing … it is not the choice itself, but the maximizing character of the disposition in virtue of which it is choiceworthy, that is the key to our argument”.33

Applying Gauthier’s Theory to Relations between Nations

Gauthier discussed the implications of some aspects of his theory — parti-cularly differences in initial acquisition — to “relationships between peoples or

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nations”.34 He explicitly referred to nations as “personae of the international order”, implying that interaction between nations could be viewed as if these nations were individuals.35 As shown in Diagram 2, this interaction seems to suggest that the interacting nations are a collective of individuals, if not collective individuals. The same interaction between collectives exists in the interaction between generations such that we could also think of the possi-bility of interaction between present and future generations.36

Diagram 2

Gauthier explicitly rejects the egalitarian view that requires the more developed nations “to make sacrifices for the benefit of less developed”.37 He is quite agnostic about the empirical bases for obligating rich nations to aid poor nations. Nevertheless, he seems to suggest that the interaction between nations could also be “rational” and involve constraints to maximise interests, among other things. In Morals by Agreement, he argues that:

If nations are to interact in a rational, fair, non-exploitative way, then it is necessary to determine whether their past relationships involve violations of the proviso [Lockean proviso] which require both compensation and an adjustment in existing de facto rights. It is necessary also to determine whether the present modes of interaction benefit each nation in ways equivalent to the benefits afforded to others. Until we are able to answer these questions, not of course with precision but with some reasonably assured approximation, then we are in no position to evaluate the present international order, however much certain facts or alleged facts may arouse our feelings. In the world of purple and green people the inequalities are justified. In our world they may or may not be; we do not know.38

Despite such seeming lack of empirical bases, the suggestion that the same rationality applies to nations in their interaction with each other could be enough to sketch how we could begin developing a Gauthier-inspired view of global justice. If Gauthier is correct in refuting the Hobbesian idea of the


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need for a sovereign or a central enforcing authority to ensure compliance — since individuals have the rational capacity to be CMs, then global political realist scepticism — the commonplace view that global justice is not possible without a global enforcing authority — may also be refuted.39 Like rational individuals, it would be prudent for sovereign nations to adopt the strategy of CMs and cooperate with other sovereign nations for the global common good. But rational constraint applies only if the relation is characterised by mutual benefit or reciprocity. This mutual benefit seems to be absent in the case of rich nations transferring resources to aid poor nations. One possible solution to this problem is to apply a kind of reasoning similar to the one used by Gauthier to justify applying rational constraint for the sake of future generations. Gauthier justifies constraints on the part of the present genera-tion for the sake of future generations such that “each generation offers its successor the same agreement that it accepted from its predecessor”.40 Such justification is, to Gauthier, a “clear account of justice between generations”. Recall that Gauthier argued that if we wrongly think that since the lives of future generations do not overlap with ours,41 we would also wrongly conclude that constraint on our part now will not lead to mutual benefits between present and future generations. But since the fact is that

… generations of humankind do not march on and off the stage of life in a body, with but one generation on stage at any time. Each person interacts with others both older and younger than himself, and enters thereby into a continuous thread of interaction extending from the most remote human past to the farthest future of our kind. Mutually beneficial co-operation directly involves persons of different but overlapping genera-tions, but this creates indirect co-operative links extending throughout history.42

As we can see in Diagrams 3 and 4, the rationality of our cooperative con-cession to future generations is justified by the quasi-reciprocity created by the concessions of past generations from which we benefited from. This same quasi-reciprocity exists between rich and poor nations despite the seeming lack of mutuality of the relation if we consider the future potential capability of poor nations to reciprocate concession to their past benefactors. After all, the individuals that comprise nations are also not fixed and static as there is always a flow of migration from one nation to another, from poor to rich nation and even vice versa. The potential capability of poor nations could likely result from their being assisted at present by rich nations through health-targeted resource transfer, as Sreenivasan proposes. If this similarity holds, as we can see in Diagram 5, the same overlap that exists between

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Diagram 3

Diagram 4

Diagram 5


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present and future generations exists between the present and future genera-tions of rich and poor nations. Rational cooperation is possible even when poor nations may seem unable to reciprocate concessions right now. It would therefore be rational, strategic, or prudential for rich nations to give coopera-tive concessions to poor nations since a kind of mutuality and reciprocity also exists in their interaction. This is the case if this interaction is viewed from an extended historical perspective and in the same way Gauthier viewed interaction between generations. As we have seen in recent economic crises experienced even by relatively affluent nations,43 any nation could be vulnerable to some form of economic, environmental, or political neediness at some point in time. This could be illustrated by the outpouring of assistance that Japan has received from many countries after the 11 March 2011 earthquake devastated the eastern part of the country. The assistance not only came from its rich neighbouring countries but even from developing countries such as Vietnam, Thailand, Cambodia, Philippines, Indonesia, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh. Even if rich nations today seem secure, their future generations may require assistance from contemporary future generations of other nations in times of unforeseen need. To cooperate now in anticipation of future times of need is the rational and prudent thing to do. If sharing resources (instead of keeping them for themselves) is a form of rational constraint, then aiding needy nations may be compatible with Gauthier’s theory of morality as rational cooperation.

Conclusion

If relations between nations are in some way like relations between individuals and if there is a rational way for nations to constrain their pursuit of their national interests, then there are rational in addition to duty-based moral motivations for rich nations to extend aid to poor nations. Rational constraint includes setting aside some portion of the national wealth for the benefit of other nations who may need assistance. Among other forms of aid, it is relevant to single out health-related assistance since this kind of help relates directly to enabling citizens of recipient countries to contribute to present and future cooperative ventures between nations.

Notes1. Karimi, F. and J. Sterling (2011) Occupy Protests Spread around the World; 70 Injured Karimi, F. and J. Sterling (2011) Occupy Protests Spread around the World; 70 Injured

in Rome, CNN. Available at http://edition.cnn.com/2011/10/15/world/occupy-goes- global/ [accessed 17 October 2011].

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2. Hon, C.�. (2011) Singapore Leads Asian Reticence in Denouncing Corporate Greed, Hon, C.�. (2011) Singapore Leads Asian Reticence in Denouncing Corporate Greed, Reuters. Available at http://in.reuters.com/article/2011/10/16/idINIndia-59914720111016 [accessed 17 October 2011].

3. Gauthier, D.P. (1986) Gauthier, D.P. (1986) Morals by Agreement, Claredon Press, Oxford.4. A well-known example of such an account is Thomas Pogge’s idea of A well-known example of such an account is Thomas Pogge’s idea of causal respon- sibility for world poverty. That account argues that rich countries have the duty to

mitigate harms their economic and political activities have caused to poor countries by compensating for these through global resource transfers and reforms in global rules and institutions. See Pogge, T.W. (2008) World Poverty and Human Rights:

Cosmopolitan Responsibilities and Reforms, Polity, Cambridge.5. Sreenivasan, G. (2007) Health and Justice in our Non-Ideal World, Sreenivasan, G. (2007) Health and Justice in our Non-Ideal World, Politics, Philosophy

& Economics, 6, 218–36.6. Ibid., 220. When circumstances fail to be ideal in terms of non-compliance and Ibid., 220. When circumstances fail to be ideal in terms of non-compliance and

having well-ordered (just) institutions, partial compliance non-ideal theory of Liam Murphy is prescribed especially when others fail to do their fair share within some distributive scheme. When background conditions are not just, transitional non-ideal theory is prescribed — where individuals are “obligated to do her part either to reform existing institutions or to introduce just ones from scratch”. Both partial compliance and transitional non-ideal theories assume that ideal theory is prior to non-ideal theory: “non-ideal theory proceeds by reference to the content of an ideal theory of justice, and thereby presupposes it … before we can take any steps forward, we need to know where we are supposed to end up. Otherwise, we cannot know whether any

given step is a step in the right direction”. Thus, for partial compliance non-ideal theory, “we need to know what the ideal principle of justice is … and what fair shares it assigns, in order to know how the ‘compliance condition’ operates”; for transitional non-ideal theory, “we need to know what the ideal institutions are … in order to know what agents are obligated to introduce”. In contrast, Sreenivasan’s anticipatory non-ideal theory does not assume ideal theory, rather, it anticipates it: “Its prescrip-

tions anticipate the ideal requirements of justice rather than presupposing them”. This is done by making assumptions about the “minimum requirements that any plausible and complete ideal theory of justice will include”. Anticipatory non-ideal theory

defines “targets for practical action before a complete ideal has been worked out, even in outline” (p. 221). Assumptions about minimum demands of justice need not be known beforehand. It is enough that these assumptions are defensible and so “we can

be confident that steps towards these targets are steps in the right direction”.7. Ibid., 222. The GDP of G7 reported here is USD56.686 billion. Ibid., 222. The GDP of G7 reported here is USD56.686 billion.8. Ibid., 229. Ibid., 229.9. Ibid., 230. Ibid., 230.10. Ibid., 228. Ibid., 228.11. Ibid., 230. Ibid., 230.12. Ibid., 229. Ibid., 229.13. Ibid., 230. Ibid., 230.14. Cohen, J. and C. Sabel (2006) Extra Rempublicam Nulla Justitia? Cohen, J. and C. Sabel (2006) Extra Rempublicam Nulla Justitia? Philos Public Aff,

34, 147–75. Although the context of Cohen and Sabel’s arguments for conditions of global politics that generate global norms is the debate about global justice, I


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piggyback my justification of Gauthier’s rational constraint account to their argument to also argue that the same conditions of global politics allow rational motivation of

assistance between countries based on prudential considerations.15. Ibid., sections I and II. See Nagel, T. (2005) The Problem of Global Justice, Ibid., sections I and II. See Nagel, T. (2005) The Problem of Global Justice, Philos

Public Aff, 33, 113–47.16. Ibid., section III. Ibid., section III.17. Ibid., 164–5. I include here only a selected few. Ibid., 164–5. I include here only a selected few.18. Ibid., 166–75. Ibid., 166–75.19. Gauthier, Gauthier, Morals by Agreement, 2. Gauthier argues that moral duties are rationally

grounded. He proves this by showing that “reason has a practical role related to but transcending individual interest, so that principles of action that prescribe duties overriding advantage may be rationally justified”. He defends that the traditional

conception of morality is a rational constraint on the pursuit of individual interest.20. For review’s of Gauthier’s For review’s of Gauthier’s Morals by Agreement, see, for example, Harsanyi, J.C. (1987)

Morals by Agreement, David Gauthier, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986, 297 pages, Econ Philos, 3, 339–51; Campbell, R. (1988) Review: Gauthier’s Theory of Morals by Agreement, Philos Q, 38, 343–64; �i, B.-U. (1992) Rationality and the Prisoner’s Dilemma in David Gauthier’s Morals by Agreement, J Philos, 89, 484–95.

21. Gauthier, D. (1991) Rational Constraint: Some Last Words, Gauthier, D. (1991) Rational Constraint: Some Last Words, Contractarianism and Rational Choice: Essays on David Gauthier’s Morals by Agreement, ed. P. Vallentyne,

Cambridge University Press, New �ork, 323–30, 324.22. Gauthier, Gauthier, Morals by Agreement, 137.23. Number 8 here and in Diagram 1 represents the Number 8 here and in Diagram 1 represents the relative value of concessions made

by each cooperator in A and not the absolute value of these concessions. The absolute value of concessions made by each cooperator in a particular cooperative scheme may be different, nevertheless, their relative value are equal. See Gauthier, Morals by Agreement, 135–6, especially the formula representing the relative value of concessions

as a ratio [(u# – u)/(u# – u*)].24. The absolute value of concessions made by each cooperator need not be equal but The absolute value of concessions made by each cooperator need not be equal but

the relative value of each these concessions must be equal. Hence, cooperators make equal relative concessions in each of the cooperation schemes being compared in

Diagram 1.25. Constrained maximisation is the Constrained maximisation is the third of five central conceptions in Gauthier’s theory

of morals. See Gauthier, Morals by Agreement, 15 and Chapter VII. The first conception is the contrast between perfectly competitive market within which the “constraints of morality” would be useless and an imperfect market where “mutual benefit

requires individual constraint” via rational agreement to reconcile mutual benefit with individual interest. See pp. 13–5 and Chapter IV. The second conception is the principle of minimax relative concession or maximin relative benefit which “governs both the process and content of rational agreement” required in moral constraints. See p. 14. Minimax relative concession is the requirement that “the greatest conces-

sion, measured as a proportion of the conceder’s stake, be as small as possible”. Maximin relative benefit is the requirement that “the least benefit, measured again as a proportion of one’s stake, be as great as possible”. In other words, given a choice between candidate agreements (or outcomes), an agreement must be chosen if and

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only if “the greatest or maximum concession it requires, is as small as possible, or a minimum, that is, is no greater than the maximum relative concession required by every other outcome”. See p. 137 and Chapter V. The fourth conception is the Lockean proviso. See Chapter VII. The fifth conception is the Archimedean point.

See Chapter VIII.26. Gauthier, Gauthier, Morals by Agreement, 15.27. Ibid. Ibid.28. The proviso “… is not the product of rational agreement. Rather, it is a condition The proviso “… is not the product of rational agreement. Rather, it is a condition

that must be accepted by each person for such agreement to be possible”. Gauthier, Morals by Agreement, 16, especially Chapter VII. On p. 192, Gauthier notes that the term “Lockean proviso” comes from Nozick, R. (1974) Anarchy, State, and Utopia, Blackwell, Oxford, as discussed in pp. 175–82. The original version of the proviso is stated in John Locke’s Two Treatises of Government, second treatise, Chapter V, para-

graphs 27 and especially 33 where it is stated that “This appropriation of a plot of land by improving it wasn’t done at the expense of any other man, because there was still enough (and as good) left for others — more than enough for the use of the

people who weren’t yet provided for”.29. Ibid., 277–8. Ibid., 277–8.30. For example, see Gauthier, For example, see Gauthier, Rational Constraint, 324.31. See Hobbes, T., See Hobbes, T., Leviathan, Chapter 17. A sovereign is necessary in order for men

to get “out from that miserable condition of war which is necessarily consequent, as hath been shown, to the natural passions of men when there is no visible power to keep them in awe, and tie them by fear of punishment to the performance of their

covenants”.32. See Gauthier, See Gauthier, Morals by Agreement, 183. There he states that:

Hobbes may have thought that human beings were so wired, that we were straightforwardly-maximizing machines. But if he thought this, then he was surely mistaken [emphasis added]. At the core of our rational capacity is the ability to engage in self-critical reflection. The fully rational being is able to reflect on his standard of deliberation, and to change that standard in the light of reflection. Thus we suppose it possible for persons, who may initially assume that it is rational to extend straight-

forward maximization … to reflect on the implications of this extension, and to reject it in favour of constrained maximization.

33. Ibid. Ibid.34. Ibid., Chapter I�; 268–305, especially subsections 4.2 to 5.3. Ibid., Chapter I�; 268–305, especially subsections 4.2 to 5.3.35. Ibid., 280, subsection 4.2. Ibid., 280, subsection 4.2.36. Ibid., 298, subsection 6.1. Ibid., 298, subsection 6.1.37. Ibid., 287. “… it is sometimes supposed that the mere fact of inequality — and mere Ibid., 287. “… it is sometimes supposed that the mere fact of inequality — and mere

fact that some peoples are so much better off than others … is indicative of injustice. Our story should reveal the fallaciousness of this view”.

38. Ibid., 287–8. Ibid., 287–8.39. This could be another reason to reject political realism in addition to what Cohen This could be another reason to reject political realism in addition to what Cohen and Sabel argued.40. Gauthier, Gauthier, Morals by Agreement, 305. See also Chapter I�, subsections 6.1–6.3 or pp.

298–305. It is noteworthy that Gauthier employed a different line of reasoning to


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justify rich nation concessions to poor nations despite the seeming non-mutuality between the two. The employment of the line of reasoning he used for relations

between generations is my own proposal.41. Ibid., 298. Ibid., 298.42. Ibid., 299. Ibid., 299.43. For example, Iceland, Spain and Greece. For example, Iceland, Spain and Greece.

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