The Incidence of Civil War Outbreak: Balancing Greed and Grievances

PRIAD Policy Paper December 2012

The Incidence of Civil War Outbreak Balancing Greed and Grievances

José Luengo-Cabrera

Abstract

This paper assesses the relative explanatory power of the greed and grievance theses in

accounting for the incidence of civil war outbreak. It will primarily explore the recent

attribution of the greed theorem as the most salient causal factor and question its policy

appeal. Through a case study of approaches to conflict incidence in the African

continent, it will attempt to highlight the interpretative biases that have led to the overt

endorsement of the greed approach and demonstrate how nuanced interpretations can

balance the causal validity of grievances.

PRIAD Policy Paper October 2012

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“The attraction of the greed thesis is the statistical analysis and social science methodology in which it was steeped, which had the effect of

simplifying the complexity of conflicts confronting policymakers.”

M. Berdal (2005:689)

Introduction

Given the reality that civil wars have become the

most destructive and prevalent form of conflict, a

burgeoning empirical literature has endeavoured to

deconstruct their complex dynamics and offer a

comprehensive framework of analysis for

understanding them. A primordial concern has been

to gain a greater insight into the factors that make

societies more susceptible to conflict by investigating

and unravelling the causal triggers of civil war

outbreak. Whilst much of the traditional literature

had been focused on the conflict-inducing role of

“relative deprivation” (Gurr 1970) and the violent

collective mobilisation of groups as a function of

political repression (Tilly 1978), a predominantly

quantitative empirical literature guided by rational

choice theory has emerged to account for the role

that economic opportunities play in influencing the

incidence of conflict outbreak (Grossman 1995;

Collier & Hoeffler 1998; De Soysa 2000; Ross 2004).

The seminal papers by Collier & Hoeffler (1998,

2000, 2004) sparked a highly contentious debate by

proposing a simplified model of conflict outbreak

that conceptually juxtaposed two “contrasting

motivations for rebellion” (Collier & Hoeffler

2000:1). Whilst grievance alludes to the idea that

conflict is the result of societal discontent and the

desire to redress structural injustices through violent

collective action, greed relates to the opportunities for

economic predation derived from initiating and

participating in conflict. Based on data from 1960 to

1999, the Collier & Hoeffler (CH) model employed

statistical analysis to quantify the relative explanatory

power of these two underlying causal categories.

Their econometric results suggested that the greed

model outperformed the grievance model in

determining the risk of conflict onset. Their empirical

allegation essentially degraded the validity of

grievance as a determinant of conflict and advocated

a shift in the pendulum of causality towards the

economic end of the spectrum. As a result, a

reductionist approach to conflict has been proposed

asserting that the financial viability of rebellion is the

predominant determinant of civil war outbreak

(Collier 1999, Collier & Hoeffler 2004; Collier et al.

2009). Criticisms of this deduction have however

arisen and whilst some have found that grievances

have a greater explanatory power (Reynal-Querol

2002; Regan & Norton 2005) others have questioned

the methodological validity and interpretation of the

statistical proxies used by CH (Nathan 2005; Keen

2008). Subsequent academic works have therefore

stressed the need to apply a more integrative

“political economy” approach to the study of civil

war by arguing that a more balanced and multifaceted

analysis on the causes of conflict outbreak should be

adopted so as to tailor policy responses accordingly

(Ballentine & Sherman 2003; Arnson & Zartman

2005).


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The premise of this paper is to argue that although

useful in simplifying the complexity of civil war onset,

the polarized greed/grievance approach is limited by

its capacity to account for the intertwined dynamics

of conflict. This paper will primarily explore the

recent attribution of the greed theorem as the most

salient factor in accounting for the cross-country

incidence of conflict outbreak and question its policy

appeal. Through a case study of approaches to

conflict incidence in the African continent, it will

attempt to highlight the interpretative biases that have

led to the overt endorsement of the greed approach

and demonstrate how nuanced interpretations can

balance the causal validity of grievances. As a result,

the paper will seek to demonstrate the advantages of

adopting a political economy approach to conflict and

argue that “Good Governance” should strongly be

considered in the equations of causality. The paper

will conclude with evaluative policy remarks.

Greed Versus Grievance

The contemporary civil war literature has been

dominated by an academic contest over the

explanatory salience of the two broad and

encompassing causal categories of greed and

grievance. Collier & Hoeffler (1999) interpret greed as

“loot-seeking”, where the propensity for individuals

to participate in conflict is a function of the

availability of lootable economic assets. Grievance is

interpreted as “justice-seeking” whereby collective

political violence is motivated by an endeavour to

redress injustices. The empirical results emanating

from the works of CH have arguably shifted the

analytical focus from grievance to greed. The

assertion is that the statistical evidence points to the

fact that economic factors are the main drivers of

conflict. They posit that the combination of

abundantly lootable primary commodities, low

education levels and a high proportion of young

unemployed men in declining economies drastically

increases the risks of conflict outbreak. This has led

to an essential analytical transition whereby the

traditional consideration of conflict as a result of

scarcity and a reaction to deprivation has been replaced

by an assertion of conflict as a result of abundance

and an attraction to the opportunities for economic

plunder. As such, whilst civil war has historically been

conceptualized as engendering human suffering and

economic destruction, it has been posited that civil

wars can also create an “alternative system of profit,

power and even protection” (Keen 1998:11) to the

extent that conflicts can engender conflict

entrepreneurs seeking to exploit opportunities for

self-enrichment. Consequentially, some groups can

arguably benefit from conflict and may have an avid

interest in the “initiation, perpetuation and renewal of

conflict” (Collier 1999:14).

This paradigm shift in the causal interpretation of

conflict outbreak can be attributed to the

employment of economic theory and quantitative

methods of analysis. Rational choice theory has been

utilised to model “rebel behaviour” such that rebel

movements are perceived to be viable only under an

environment of credible economic incentives to

participate in conflict. Overcoming the problem of

collective action (Olson 1965) has constituted a

fundamental question for conflict analysts and

although economists have acknowledged that shared

grievances may be essential for rebel cohesion, it

arguably suffers from the “free-rider” problem that


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dampens the prospects for coordinated collective

mobilization.

Because grievance assuagement through rebellion can

be considered a public good, when the rewards to

participation are based on mere promises to redress

injustices, potential recruits may have insufficient

incentives to uphold the costs and risks associated

with participation when these can be borne by others.

As a result, when the benefits of participation in

rebellion are not confined to those who participate in

it, collective mobilization is likely to be low. This

essentially limits the potential size and military

capacity of grievance-motivated rebel movements

when potential recruits are capable of identifying

time-consistency problems associated with their

viability to deliver justice (Collier 1999). As such,

although social capital in the form of shared

grievances may have the potential to generate

collective action, because justice redressing may only

be achieved through military victory, the small-scale

nature of grievance-motivated rebellions will

undermine their capacity to be effective in their

justice-seeking endeavours. Most importantly, this

will tend to be exacerbated in the highly fractionalized

countries in which conflict outbreak tends to be most

prevalent and where rebel movements may be

confined to numerically small ethnic groups. If

justice and relief of grievances can only be achieved

through fighting, it is posited that only rebel groups

with access to economic resources are capable of

overcoming the problem of collective action.

Economists have therefore asserted that the

conditions that make rebellions financially viable

ultimately increase the probability of civil war

outbreak.

As argued by Collier (1999), the grievances emanating

from socio-political discontent merely serve the

functional purpose of a self-promoting narrative for

the cohesion and recruitment prospects of rebel

movements. Only when the benefits to rebel

participation can be internalized through the

provision of selective payments can rebellions

become militarily viable. As a result, the economic

resourcefulness of rebellions will tend to increase the

likelihood for collective mobilization because

economic rents can be extracted to reward

participants and finance the military costs of

rebellion.

The findings from the CH model are indicative of the

idea that rebellions may be motivated primarily by

economic agendas and that the incidence of conflict

outbreak is heightened when rebellions are financially

feasible. With the assertion that lootable resources

such as alluvial diamonds, timber and narcotics have

played a fundamental role in contemporary civil

conflicts in Angola, Cambodia and Colombia, many

of the recent policy implementations have been

orientated towards undermining the income-

generating opportunities of rebel movements, one

example being the curtailment of trade in “conflict

goods”. The United Nations Security Council

(UNSC), for example, implemented trade embargos

on the exports of diamonds in Sierra Leone and

Liberia in an attempt to dismantle the “conflict

diamond” industry. Such actions, as argued by

Ballentine & Nitzschke (2003), have been guided by

the endorsement of the greed thesis by the policy

community. Berdal (2005) asserts that this appraisal is

due to the policy appeal of viewing civil wars as

greed-driven given that it deals with divisible and


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tangible economic assets such as natural resources

and financial transactions as opposed to the more

elusive and subjective sources of grievance. This

sheds light on the fact that there has been an

imbalanced policy focus on the economic dimension

of conflict onset with a general disregard to the role

played by other socio-political factors that equally

intervene in the dynamics of civil war outbreak.

Conflicts in the African continent have often been

posited as case-study examples to assert the relevance

of greed in precipitating or perpetuating conflict.

Often characterized by low income levels, political

instability and abundance of natural resources, many

African countries seem to fit perfectly into the greed

paradigm of conflict onset. The endorsement of the

greed thesis must however be tempered as it derives

from interpretative biases of statistical correlations.

Although conceivable, the hypotheses derived from

the greed framework do not fully eliminate the

plausibility of grievance-inspired interpretations. The

following case study on the incidence of civil war in

the African continent seeks to justify this.

Incidence of Civil War in Africa

Since the advent of decolonization, conflict has been

an endemic reality in Africa. About 40% of Sub-

Saharan Africa is said to have experienced at least one

period of civil war between 1960-1999 (Elbadawi &

Sambanis 2000) and from 1989 to 2000, it was the

region with the second highest average number of

armed conflicts as shown in Table 1. CH (2002) offer

a comparative evaluation of the structural factors that

are believed to influence the incidence of civil war in

Africa.

Table 1 Number of Armed Conflicts by Region, 1989–2000

Source: Adapted from Wallensteen & Sollenberg (2001: 632)

They find that average per capita income was $2,000

for Africa compared to $3,625 in other developing

countries whilst the average annual growth rate of

gross domestic product (GDP) was at 0.5% for Africa

relative to 2% for the other cohort from 1965-1999.

CH argue that the significantly lower average per

capita income and rate of growth in Africa are

proximate indicators for the low costs of organizing

rebellion; the former relating to the low foregone

income borne by potential rebels and the latter to

bleak income prospects that facilitate rebel

recruitment. Although these proxies are used to

measure opportunities for rebellion - particularly by

how they reflect the financial and military weakness

of governments (see Fearon & Laitin 2003), an

alternative interpretation is that low income and poor

growth can generate severe societal frustrations such

that we cannot reject the possible validity of

grievances in motivating and generating rebellions.

CH (2002) demonstrate that the mean ratio of

primary commodity exports to GDP was slightly

lower in Africa (17%) than in the other developing

regions (19%). Although low in relative terms,

Elbadawi & Sambanis (2000) argue that since the

relation between natural resources and conflict

incidence is quadratic, what matters is the dispersion


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rather than the mean measure of dependence. As

such, they find that the “standard deviation of

African countries’ resource dependence is 46%

smaller” than non-African countries, indicating that

more African countries are “closer to the peak of

natural resource dependence” (2000:253) and

therefore at a greater risk of conflict. Whilst we can

interpret Africa’s resource dependence through the

assertion that it is a good proxy for the availability of

lootable resources, it can also be viewed through the

lens of the “resource curse” and how grievances can

be generated as a result of the unequal distribution of

resource benefits and the economic distortions that

emanate from the rent-seeking behaviour induced by

resource-dependence (Sachs & Warner 2001).

Other alleged indicators of civil war onset are the

levels of ethnic fractionalization and dominance.

Africa was found to have the highest degree of ethnic

fractionalization (61%) but its degree of ethnic

dominance was at a “low” 40% relative to the other

developing regions with a figure of 57% (Collier &

Hoeffler 2002). A high degree of ethnic

fractionalization is indicative of the possibility that it

constitutes a hurdle for collective mobilization and

thus a hindering factor for rebel coordination. Ethnic

dominance is said to increase the probability of

minority exploitation so that the relatively low levels

of ethnic dominance in Africa should in principle

temper its risk of conflict.

Collier & Hoeffler (2002) find that Africa had a

slightly higher incidence of conflict relative to other

developing regions. As explored, whether this

incidence is attributable to greed or grievances is

subject to the interpretation of the proxy variables.

Nonetheless, CH find that “the relationships found

globally in the CH model apply equally to Africa”

(2002:20). This leads them to the assertion that

Africa’s economic structure matters more in

determining the continent’s proneness to conflict

than its socio-demographic characteristics. If we are

to follow CH’s preferred interpretation, an interim

assessment would be that the variables that are

claimed to be related to the opportunities for

rebellion have a greater statistical explanatory power

than the grievance proxies in determining civil war

outbreak in Africa. A crucial caveat however

emanates from the fact that this is the result of

statistical analysis. CH’s regressions provide

probabilistic correlations using data that not only fail

to account for the transmission mechanisms that link

cause with effect but also bias the statistical validity of

tangibly measurable greed variables against the

elusively quantifiable variables of grievances. It is

therefore imperative to gain a more nuanced insight

into the relative weight of these explanatory

dimensions by looking at historically informed case

studies that allow us to explore the dynamics of

causality.

Balancing Greed and Grievances

The conflict in Sierra Leone has become a

paradigmatic case of “Africa’s diamond wars”.1 It has

recurrently been utilized to justify the relevance of

economic agendas in conflict and how rebels are

motivated by the avidity to plunder profitable

resources. Charles Cater (2003) explores this case and

warns against the potentially misleading assumptions

and excessive reliance on the one-dimensional prism

1 Blaine, Harden, “Africa’s Diamond Wars”, The New York Times, April 6th, 2000


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of economic opportunism. However, a historically

informed socio-economic analysis sheds light on the

equally important role played by grievances in

motivating rebellions. In accordance with Reno’s

(2000) analysis of “shadow states”, Stevens’

kleptocratic regime promoted networks of patronage

that generated a mass diversion of state economic

resources. Government mismanagement led to the

collapse of state institutions and deterioration of

public infrastructure accompanied by negative

economic growth and unemployment. This created

the dire circumstances that arguably motivated the

Revolutionary United Front (RUF) to take up arms

against the government. The RUF was allegedly

motivated by its resentment towards the political

regime as Sankoh advocated the goal of overthrowing

“Sierra Leone’s corrupt rulers and liberate the

country’s derelict peasantry and dispossessed”

(quoted in Gberie 2005:6). In addition, the

deteriorating state capabilities also made the

exploitation of the diamond resources by rebels

logistically viable. With a large pool of uneducated

and marginalized young men, rebel recruitment was

enhanced and diamond rents provided opportunities

to finance the costs of rebellion. Sierra Leone

therefore illustrates a case in point where the

polarizing approach to causality has limitations. It is

arguably a conflict where rebellion was motivated by

grievance and “anger at lack of good government and

educational opportunities” (Keen 2000:35) but

sustained by the opportunities provided by the

exploitation of alluvial diamonds.

This particular case study not only serves to revise the

polarized greed-grievance dimension and favour a

more integrative approach to conflict causality but

also sheds light on the necessity to focus on the role

played by the quality of governance in influencing the

incidence of conflicts. An important limitation with

the CH model is related to how its rational choice

paradigm places too much focus on rebel-centric

approaches to conflict onset without sufficient

attention to how the actions of governments can

trigger violent conflict.

Governance, Repressive Marginalization and

Conflict

The interpretation of the CH model is premised on

the idea that rebellions are the result of the attraction

to the opportunities for economic predation. This has

therefore generated a one-sided approach whereby

conflict is viewed through the prism of rebel

economic avidity. The case of pre-secession Sudan

however highlights that insurgency is the result of a

reaction to the opportunism by which governments

oppress and marginalize populations. Ylönen argues

that the principal motivation for insurgencies in

Sudan is a consequence of Khartoum’s oppressive

policies that “have resulted in culturally and regionally

imposed political marginalization” (2008:128). He

argues that Sudan reflects the reality of many African

countries that are characterized by patrimonial states

with highly concentrated power at the hands of

particular ethnic groups. As such, it is the resulting

governmental predation over regionally concentrated

economic resources and nepotistic distribution of

their rents that allegedly explains the historically

recurrent violent insurgencies in the southern regions

of Sudan. What this essentially demonstrates is that

there is an interrelated dynamic between greed and

grievance as rebellions can be formed out of the


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grievances generated by the greedy behaviour of

governmental elites. Most importantly, Sudan

demonstrates the important role played by inequality

and oppression in triggering conflicts, a reality

obscured by CH’s statistical results indicating that

they have no significant effect on conflict outbreak

(see Stewart 2008).

The Political Economy of Civil War

The criticism that emerges from the revisionist

literature is that the quantitative research that has

supported the greed thesis is limited by its capacity to

explain the causal process by which civil wars are

triggered. A primary concern is that statistical analysis

provides probabilistic correlations of civil war

incidence using data that arguably biases the validity

of greed variables given the difficulty to quantify

grievances. Most importantly, statistical significance

does not imply substantive significance in the sense

that correlations emanating from cross-country data

do not explain the factual and procedural causal

mechanisms that are required to gain the sound

understanding of conflict incidence required to

implement effective policies.

What emanates from the literature on the political

economy of conflict is an evident rebalancing towards

the importance of grievances and an asserted dynamic

interaction between greed and grievance. The primary

idea is that social capital in the form of ethnic

belonging can make civil war viable despite the

absence of economic opportunities for predation as

examined in the cases explored by Ballentine &

Sherman (2003). In Kosovo, it has been asserted that

the main trigger of collective political violence

resulted from the systematic exclusion of ethnic

minorities from political power. In Nepal, the Maoist

insurgency, despite having no access to sources of

financing, is claimed to have emerged from the

grievances resulting from “extreme levels of

landlessness” and the “burdens of the bonded labour

system upon the lower castes” (Ballentine & Sherman

2003:261). These cases shed light on the idea that

grievances deriving from deliberate exclusion and

repression can suffice in generating collective violent

mobilization. The underlying caveat however relates

to the idea that under given instances, attributing

causality to either the greed or grievance dimension

can be limiting given that we are dealing with

complex anthropogenic phenomena that ultimately

require an integrated framework of analysis.

An integrative approach to studying conflict onset

derives its utility from the realization that multiple

causal factors may be at work in initiating civil

conflicts. In Bougainville, the grievances emanating

from the inequitable share of the profits from the

Panguna copper mine is said to have been a

prominent factor in the formation of the Bougainville

Revolutionary Army (BRA) (Ballentine & Nitschke

2003b). This illustrates how the politics of inequitable

distribution of economic resources by a greedy elite

can generate the societal grievances that trigger civil

war; a phenomenon that also serves to explain the

Aceh conflict in Indonesia. Charles Cater argues that

despite the relative value of explaining civil war onset

through the dichotomised framework, a revamped

political economy approach offers a more realistic

picture of contemporary armed conflicts by

examining the “interrelationship between economic

and political causes” (2003:20). He uses the cases of


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Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of Congo

(DRC) to warn against the excessive reliance on

reductionist accounts and argues that they cannot be

“adequately explained by the uniform logic” of

resource predation (2005:29). He asserts that the

primary motive for the formation of rebel militias in

Sierra Leone and the DRC was the result of the

grievances generated from decades of misrule and

corruption by a parasitic state elite as well as by the

nepotistic exploitation of natural resources. The rebel

avidity for the expropriation of diamonds is argued to

be a consequence of the decay of the state apparatus

and the necessity to finance a rebellion to overthrow

the incumbent governments.

The Role of Governance

The CH model popularized a framework of analysing

conflicts through the perspective of “agency” where

motivations for rebellion are the driving forces of

conflict onset. However, a crucial criticism that

emerges from this framework is the absence of an

“institutional component” (De Soysa 2002:399)

epitomised by the role played by “structure” in the

form of the state. There has been a general

acceptance of the idea that “weak states” facilitate the

viability of insurgencies (Fearon & Laitin 2003). Poor

governance hinges on the functioning of an economy

that breeds corruption and mismanagement of

economic resources that in turn generate societal

grievances and motivate greedy insurgencies as

demonstrated by the cases of Sierra Leone and the

DRC. “Good governance” is therefore posited as a

conflict-averting factor that can potentially explain

why civil war erupted in Angola and not in Botswana

given that Botswana, as opposed to Angola, has been

characterized by a history of stable democratic

politics and equitable distribution of its diamond

revenue. Additionally, government repression can be

seen as playing a conflict-inducing role as it is

responsible for creating the structural grievances that

motivate repressed groups to rebel. In Sri Lanka, for

example, the repressive and discriminative “Sinhala-

only” policies of the central government led to the

radicalisation of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam

(LTTE) that capitalized on its diaspora community to

finance its militant and ethno-separatist agenda. The

underlying idea is that the structural environment

created by the actions of the governing state matter in

the study of conflict onset. The cases above

demonstrate how weak states can create the

opportune environment for greedy rebels to

expropriate economic resources and how repressive

states can be the principal perpetrators of grievances

capable of sparking insurgencies through the

radicalisation of politically disenfranchised groups.

Conclusion This paper has sought to argue that an integrative

political economy approach to conflict onset provides

a more insightful and informative account to

understanding the causal mechanisms of civil war

than the greed/grievance causal dichotomy. The case

studies evidence the idea that causality in civil war

cannot be solely attributed to one category or the

other when civil wars are often the result of the

interplay between structural discontent and the

avidity for economic predation, particularly under an

environment of poor governance. A combined

agency-structure analysis with an emphasis on the

role of the state in triggering conflicts therefore

becomes paramount given the reality that the


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governing structure of a state often determines both

the motivation and viability of violent conflict.

The policy evaluation that emanates from the

revisionist literature is the idea that policy

interventions should be more integrative. The overt

reliance of viewing civil wars through the greed

spectrum has called for a re-evaluation of how we

understand the causes of conflict. Although heuristic,

the quantitative studies that have awarded greater

relevance to the greed approach must be tempered by

the fact that conflict outbreaks cannot be confined to

one causal category when alternative conflict triggers

are identified. As a result, policy interventions should

seek to garner a more comprehensive and holistic

nature in the search to tackle all sources of conflict

outbreak. This requires unravelling the idiosyncratic

root causes of the conflicts in question and exploring

the multiplicity of factors that trigger and prolong

them. In particular, given the policy attractiveness of

viewing conflicts through the greed prism, it is

essential to highlight the need to address the array of

grievances across social cohorts that indubitably play

an important role in triggering and sustaining

conflicts. Because policymakers often rely on the

investigations carried out by academics and policy

advisers, it is critical to ensure that studies delving

with the nature of conflict outbreak do not skew the

causal validity of conflict triggers.

When alternative hypotheses cannot be plausibly

rejected, it becomes essential to inform policymakers

on the need to adopt integrative policy strategies that

seek to address the multiplicity of factors influencing

the incidence of conflict outbreak.

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Ballentine, K. & Nitzschke, H., (2003b) “Policy Lessons from Studies in the Political Economy of Armed Conflict”, International Peace Academy Policy Report

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Cater, C., (2003) “The Political Economy of Conflict and UN Intervention: Rethinking the Critical Case of Africa”, in Karen Ballentine and Jacke Sherman (eds.) The Political Economy of Armed Conflict: Beyond Greed and Grievance, (Lynne Rienner, London)

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The Incidence of Civil War Outbreak: Balancing Greed and Grievances

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