Good Copt, Bad Copt: Competing Narratives on Coptic Identity in Egypt in the United States

YV O N N E HA D D A D A N D JO S H U A DO N O V A N

Good Copt, Bad Copt: Competing Narrativeson Coptic Identity in Egypt and the

United States

A B S T R A C T

This study analyses the relationship between the Coptic communityin the United States and Egyptian Copts regarding the status of Copticcitizenship in the Egyptian state. The conception of citizenship forthe Coptic Christian minority has been debated since the formation ofthe modern nation-state and has acquired greater relevance after therevolution that brought the Muslim Brotherhood to power. One primarynarrative of citizenship is promoted by the Egyptian Church. It recognisesthat, while Copts may not feel like equal citizens, they are devoted to theirhomeland. They try to promote greater equality through civil discourse,opposing foreign intervention and seeking to foster positive relationswith Egypt’s Muslims. While many Diaspora Copts echo the message ofthe Egyptian Church, a minority of activist Copts have challenged thatnarrative. Inculcated with ideas of Islamophobia and neoconservatism,they tend to dismiss hopes of national unity and focus rather on incidentsof persecution. These diaspora activist groups continue to challenge theCoptic Church. Their policies have influenced American foreign policyand have broader implications for Muslim–Christian relations in Egypt.

Keywords: Copt, Arab Spring, Egypt, Muslim Brotherhood, diaspora,Shenouda

Studies in World Christianity 19.3 (2013): 208–232DOI: 10.3366/swc.2013.0058# Edinburgh University Presswww.euppublishing.com/swc

INTRODUCTION

On 11 September 2012, eleven years after the attacks on the World TradeCenter, the Pentagon and Pennsylvania, a promotional trailer for the film‘Innocence of Muslims’ was posted on YouTube and immediately wentviral. It was blamed for violent demonstrations all over the Muslim worldand for the terrorist attacks on the American Consulate in Benghazi thattook the life of US ambassador Chris Stevens and three other employeesof the State Department. The video depicted the Prophet Muhammad asa bloodthirsty murderer who kills indiscriminately and issues arbitrarycommands to serve his own selfish needs. He is portrayed as promiscuousand driven by lust, assuring his followers that as the Prophet he can havewhomever he pleases. At the same time, the trailer called into questionthe Prophet’s masculinity as two of his female companions chase himaround his tent beating him with their shoes.1 The inflammatory natureof this video sparked protests in countries around the world, includingEgypt, where demonstrators attempted to breach the well-fortifiedAmerican Embassy. This created a dangerous situation not only forAmericans abroad, but also for Christian minorities in the Middle East.

The fact that the video was created by a Coptic Christian from California,Nakoula Basseley Nakoula, once again focused attention in Egypt onDiaspora Copts. The offensive nature of the film was denounced by CopticChristians in Egypt, as well as by the officials of the Coptic Church in theUnited States, who strongly condemned it and stressed that Mr Nakoulawas not affiliated with them. Bishop Serapion of the Coptic OrthodoxDiocese in Los Angeles held a joint press conference with Muslim leaderscalling for greater peace and co-operation between Copts and Muslims.This crisis highlighted the clash over the representation of the true ‘voiceof the Copts’ in diaspora that has been going on since the 1980s. Itdemonstrated once again a clear divide between the official message of theChurch in both Egypt and the US, on the one hand, and some Copticactivists in diaspora, on the other. As the video demonstrates, the actions ofthe few in diaspora can have real consequences for Copts in Egypt.

With the revocation of the Asia Exclusion Act in 1965, immigrationfrom the Arab World to the United States resumed after decades ofrestrictions.2 Far from being homogeneous, these immigrants were notedfor their religious, ethnic and cultural differences, which represent the oftoverlooked diversity of the Middle East. Much attention has been paid tothe Muslim Arabs in the West, particularly in the wake of 11 September.3

This study will provide a brief historical overview of the emigration ofEgyptian Copts to the United States, including the transplanting of the

Good Copt, Bad Copt 209

Coptic Orthodox faith, the building of its institutions and thedevelopment of independent Coptic activist organisations that lobby fortheir co-religionists in Egypt in an American environment of free speechand political engagement.

In 2011, the Arab world erupted in a series of public uprisingsdemanding democratic reforms which dramatically changed the politicallandscape of the Middle East. Along with Egypt’s Muslims, CopticChristians became engaged as citizens and began raising their voicesseeking a more democratic and egalitarian society. Many have beenable to work co-operatively with Muslims and have made great stridesin advancing peaceful Christian–Muslim dialogue, even during thesetumultuous times. However, a few of the activists in diaspora have seizedthis time of fear and uncertainty to criticise Islam and denigrate Muslims.In the process, they have heightened tensions in Egypt. Unfortunately,such attacks by diaspora Copts are not new. As the events of the ArabSpring are by no means settled history, this paper will focus primarily onthe period prior to the election of President Morsi. We will argue that the‘plight of Copts’ in Egypt has often been used by special interest groupsin the United States to advance political agendas that appear at times tohave little to do with improving the situation of Coptic Christians in Egypt.Diaspora Coptic activists have often aligned themselves with Americanindividuals and institutions which undermine co-operation betweenChristians and Muslims (including Robert Spencer and Pamela Geller).While the activists may only represent a tiny minority, they have becomeimportant actors and very effective lobbyists.

It is important to stress the fact that, just like their counterparts in theMiddle East, Coptic Christians in diaspora are very diverse, representing awide assortment of political views and cultural backgrounds and offeringan array of opinions on affairs in the Middle East. The relationship betweenthe diaspora as a whole and the Egyptian Church is still strong. However,this is not and has not been the case for the small, yet influential activistminority of diaspora Copts that has been condemned several timesby Coptic Christians in Egypt for misrepresenting their views andfundamentally doing more harm than good. This growing divergencebetween Coptic Christians in Egypt and the small number of Copticactivists in diaspora has manifested itself in a number of major ways,including opinions regarding the domestic politics of Egypt, Americanintervention in the Middle East and in Egyptian affairs and even thenature of Islam and the possibility of Muslims and Christians coexistingpeacefully with one another.

210 ST U D I E S IN WO R L D CH R I S T I A N I T Y

To the starkly different views on Coptic identity held by some diasporaactivists we attribute two major trends in American culture with whichmany Copts in Egypt may not be comfortable. The first is a growing fearof Muslims in America which has been well documented by a number ofscholars4 and is shared by some diaspora Coptic activists in the UnitedStates. The other trend is neoconservatism, which argues that the UnitedStates must ‘establish and sustain a world order that . . . encourages othernations . . . to mold their own social, political and economic institutionsalong lines that are at least not repugnant to (if not actually congruentwith) American values’.5 In many cases, this philosophy carries with itan impetus for foreign intervention. Accordingly, since the Arab Springsome neoconservatives have suggested that the United States shouldintervene in Egypt, ostensibly to protect Coptic Christians.

Finally, many Coptic Christians in Egypt do experience seriouschallenges, particularly in the political turmoil of the post-Arab Springworld. Churches have been closed by the government, burned byextremists, and, as a recent Pew study noted, both de jure and de factodiscrimination against Christians has increased sharply.6 However, theselegitimate problems have long been exploited by a small but vocal groupof diaspora activists whose perspectives have been moulded by the trendsof neoconservatism and Islamophobia in America. The picture painted bythese few individuals is not only incongruent with the views of the CopticChurch as well as with those of most Coptic Christians in Egypt and inthe diaspora, but it also fails to capture accurately the complex pictureof Coptic–Muslim relations in Egypt.

THE TRANSPLANTING OF COPTIC ORTHODOX CHRISTIANITY

TO NORTH AMERICA

The Coptic Orthodox Church of Egypt is the largest Christian communityin the Arab world,7 with an estimated population of eight to twelvemillion.8 According to tradition, the Coptic Church was founded in AD68 by St Mark, the early apostle and author of the Gospel according toMark.9 It officially split from Byzantine and Roman Christianity afterthe Christological dispute at the Council of Chalcedon in 451. Throughits isolation, the Church developed a strong bond with its Egyptianhomeland which continues to this day.10 In 1954, under the leadership ofPope Yusab II, the Coptic Church with special encouragement fromGamal Abdul Nasser began to re-establish ties with other ChristianChurches, including the World Council of Churches (WCC).11 The Popecommissioned three delegates to attend the second assembly of the


WCC in Evanston, Illinois.12 Among them was Father Makari al-Suryani,who became a permanent representative for the Coptic Church at theWCC and served on several committees, including the influential CentralCommittee. He was later elevated to the rank of the episcopate by PopeCyril (or Kyrillos) VI, becoming known as His Grace Bishop Samuel.Unlike most bishops at the time, he did not oversee a diocese, but wasappointed bishop of public, social and ecumenical services.13

Bishop Samuel’s position in the World Council of Churchesnecessitated several trips to the United States in the 1960s, duringwhich he became aware of a number of small enclaves of immigrantCoptic Christians meeting in cities across the United States. Many wereamong the Arab students recruited at the onset of the Cold War by theUnited States to study at American universities. The hope was that theywould return to the Middle East and promote American values andinterests.14 However, many Copts decided to settle in the United Stateswith new-found families or jobs. In 1964, Pope Cyril VI commissioneda priest, Fr Marcos, to serve the Coptic community in North America. Asthe Coptic diaspora continued to grow exponentially, it became clear thatone priest could not serve all of the new communities. To compensate forthis, Bishop Samuel made annual visits to many of these groups, leadingworship services and encouraging them in their spiritual growth anddevelopment. Several of the oldest Coptic Churches in the United Statescredit their founding to the efforts of Bishop Samuel.

One such church is St Mark’s Church in Natick, Massachusetts. In1963, Bishop Samuel performed what was probably the first Copticliturgy in the United States for a group of Coptic students in Boston,encouraging them to continue meeting together. The group later foundedone of the earliest Coptic Churches in New England.15 Shortly after,Bishop Samuel visited groups of students in Troy, Michigan, Saint Paul,Minnesota, and Cleveland, Ohio. He used his influence with Yusab II’ssuccessors, Popes Cyril VI and Shenouda III, in order to garnerpermanent priests for the nascent North American churches. Thesecongregations became the first official Coptic Churches in the UnitedStates and continue to house large and vibrant communities.16

In the following decades, Coptic emigration from Egypt to the UnitedStates continued unabated. The new immigrants not only joined existingCoptic communities, but also spread out to establish new areas ofCoptic settlement. When Pope Shenouda III succeeded Pope Cyril VI in1971, he actively sought to develop diaspora communities. During hisfour-decade tenure, Coptic diaspora communities greatly expanded.


The Pope oversaw the construction of over a hundred additional parishesand appointed dozens of priests to serve the ever-expanding communitiesoutside of Egypt.17 A prime example is the Coptic Church in Texas. Whatbegan as a few small Coptic communities consisting of a few families inNorthern Texas and Houston quickly grew into several large churches,one of which now boasts over three hundred families.18 To oversee thegrowing number of churches in the South, Pope Shenouda established thefirst Coptic diocese in the United States in 1993. As of 2012, the CopticOrthodox Diocese of the Southern United States had thirty-nine priestsserving thirty-two churches and twenty-six Coptic communities in elevendifferent states.19

As of the writing of this article, there were approximately 145 Copticchurches in the United States20 incorporated into two dioceses (thesecond based in Los Angeles) and one archdiocese, which is based in NewJersey. These churches are located in thirty-nine states, as far north asMichigan, as far south as Texas, and on both the East and the West coasts.Because religion is not reported on immigration papers, it is virtuallyimpossible to determine precisely the number of Coptic Egyptianimmigrants in the United States, but estimates range from 200,000to 700,000.21 As Egyptians continue to experience turmoil in the post-Arab Spring world, it is expected that the number of Coptic immigrantsto the United States may continue to increase, which will likely providenew impetus for building more churches.

As Coptic Christians began to settle permanently in Westerndemocracies, they began to engage in the democratic process byestablishing social and political organisations to address their needs asa diaspora community, to serve as advocates for the Christian communitiesin Egypt and to promote more knowledge about the history of the CopticChurch. Until recently, Western scholars have paid little attention toEgypt’s Christians. But Nelly Van Doorn-Harder noted a recent influxin interdisciplinary scholarship on Coptic affairs, including historicalanalysis of Copts in Egypt from Paul Sedra, Vivian Ibrahim’s researchon Coptic relations with the Egyptian state in the early twentieth centuryand even ethnographic studies on diaspora Copts by Ghada Botros andNora Stene.22

In a study of mahjar (or diaspora) Copts, Magdi Khalil noted that inaddition to establishing churches, Coptic Christians formed three types oforganisations: human rights groups, organisations for Coptic studies andorganisations that provide social services. Our concern is with the first ofthese. Some organisations, such as the International Coptic Federation


(founded in 1997), embody all three of Khalil’s categories. Among theorganisation’s stated goals was a pledge to ‘defend Coptic human rightsin Egypt before all international forums according to the EgyptianConstitution and the International Convention on Human Rights issuedby the United Nations’. However it is equally clear that the Federationwas also concerned with things besides Coptic persecution, includingassisting new Coptic immigrants and supporting the establishment of aninstitute of Coptic Studies and a cultural centre.23 In serving all threeof the possible purposes of Coptic organisations that Khalil laid out, theICF maintained a balanced approach.

Examples of these diaspora organisations abound in the UnitedStates, but not all follow a balanced model. A small number of AmericanCopts have entered into the political arena and created organisationswhich emphasise Coptic persecution to the point that their conceptionsof Coptic citizenship in Egypt and of relations between Copts andthe Muslim state have diverged from more balanced narratives producedby Copts living in Egypt. As Peter Makari writes in his seminal work onCoptic–Muslim relations, ‘harmonious relations do exist but are routinely

Coptic Churches in the United States

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Number of Churches and Coptic Communities per state

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Figure 1 Distribution of Coptic churches in the United States.


overlooked – to the detriment of a more complete understandingof reality’.24 Ultimately, these divergent views on Christian–Muslimrelations stem from different conceptions of Coptic identity and historyas Christian citizens living in a Muslim state.

COMPETING CONCEPTIONS OF COPTIC IDENTITY THROUGHOUT HISTORY

Coptic identity – the manner in which Copts view themselves ascitizens – has been debated both in Egypt and in the diaspora foryears.25 Paul Sedra posits ‘two principal strains of thought on [Copts’]status in Egyptian society’. The first is the ‘persecution strand’, whichdepicts Copts as ‘distinct from Muslims not merely in religion, but inhistory, culture, and often race’ and sees them as a minority sufferingunder great persecution at the hands of Muslims.26 Proponents of thisline of thinking include organisations such as the Voice of the Copts – adiaspora organisation which ‘fights the spread of Islamic supremacyand Sharia throughout the Western world . . . by drawing attention to thesuffering Coptic Christians in Egypt.’27 In light of the fact that Coptshave been subject to instances of discrimination and have beenvictims of instances of violence since the 1970s, it is easy to believethat organisations like the Voice of the Copts speak for all Copts both indiaspora and in Egypt. Indeed, there have been several instances ofchurches being bombed and burned by Muslim extremists, and reportsof sectarian clashes erupting in Egypt.28 However, as the Egyptiannewspaper al-Ahram noted at the time of the Egyptian presidentialelection in 2011, Copts are not a politically monolithic group but are‘economically, politically and socially diverse’.29

The other primary narrative that Sedra identifies is the ‘national unitydiscourse’ which opposes characterising Copts as a minority, seeingthem rather as ‘so fully and harmoniously integrated into Egyptian societyas to be indistinguishable from Muslims’. In the words of Pope ShenoudaIII, who advocated this view, Egyptians are ‘sons of a single homeland’.30

Indeed, even in the wake of the chaos of the Arab Spring, reports cameout of instances of national unity. Western media reported that duringthe revolution, Muslims protected Christian churches and Christiansprotected Muslims while they were performing their daily prayers. Fortheir part, many Muslims joined in solidarity with Copts to protestagainst the violence that occurred later in Maspero.31

These two master narratives when working in tandem can provide abalance that expresses concerns for the safety and rights of the Copticcommunity in Egypt, while simultaneously fostering positive relations


between Egypt’s Christians and Muslims. This manifested itself in aco-operative relationship between the Coptic Pope and President Nasser.

After a tense relationship with Sadat, which ended in the Pope’s exile,Pope Shenouda III returned to Cairo and developed a mutually beneficialrelationship with President Mubarak. On the one hand, Shenoudaembraced the rhetoric of national unity, negotiated with the governmentbehind the scenes over Coptic rights and avoided public confrontations.For his part, Mubarak provided permits for church construction andhelped to safeguard Coptic communities.32 This special relationshipcontinued even into the final days of Mubarak’s presidency when PopeShenouda III went on state television to express support for the Presidentand, in the name of national unity, urged protesters to end the anti-Mubarak protests.33

These two master narratives have coexisted both in Egypt and in theDiaspora for decades. In a study of Coptic historiography, Ghada Botrosnoted that ‘the historical narrative of the Coptic Church is selective,interpretative, and pertains to the needs of the present’.34 For instance,Coptic scholar Aziz Atiya advanced the national unity narrative relyingon history, arguing that Copts were treated better by Arab Muslim leadersthan by Byzantine Christians.35 Yet the persecution narrative is alsoimportant because it acknowledges the continued struggles of Egypt’sChristians and insists that more must be done to guarantee true equality.But equally important is the national unity discourse, which serves as aconstant reminder that Egypt’s Copts are loyal to their homeland anddesire to live and work peacefully alongside their Muslim neighbours.

However, as early as the 1970s, some diaspora organisations began toplace greater emphasis on the ‘persecution’ narrative. One of the earliestdiaspora Copts to do this was Shawky Karas, who founded the AmericanCoptic Association in 1972. He later published a book entitled Strangersin Their Land, which lamented Egypt’s fall ‘under the Moslem yoke fromwhich she has never been able to free herself’.36 He specifically accusedEgyptian President Anwar al-Sadat of damaging relations between Coptsand Muslims.37 Unsurprisingly, in 1981 when President Sadat visitedthe United States for peace talks with Israel, he was met by protests fromCopts affiliated with the American Coptic Association. Along with theCanadian Coptic Association, the ACA took out a full-page advertisementin the Washington Post, purporting to speak for all Copts in Diasporaby beginning the letter with ‘We, the Egyptians of the United Statesand Canada’ accuse the President of lacking ‘courage in handling thesystematic assaults launched by Muslim fanatics against the Christians


of Egypt.’ The advertisement noted that they were ‘disturbed’ to seeSadat ‘unconcerned with the Christian minority of Egypt’. After listingunspecified allegations of persecution (including a charge that ‘childrenhave been thrown off balconies’), they asked Sadat to put an end to‘state-sponsored fundamentalism’.38

However, Karas was not speaking for all Copts. Two days prior to theACA advertisement, twenty-six Coptic churches in the United Statesand Canada took out their own full-page advertisement saying that theclergy and congregations of the Coptic Christian Orthodox Church‘welcome President Sadat to the United States of America and pray . . . forthe success of his peace mission for the Middle East’.39 Despite the goodwishes of diaspora churches, the diaspora organisations had a loudpolitical voice that could not be ignored. After continued protests, thechurches in the United States and Canada felt compelled to take out asecond full-page advertisement maintaining that they were the ‘only voiceembodying the whole Church in North America’ and that they ‘stronglydenounce any false claims coming from persons or organizations,especially . . . the “American Coptic Association” ’. Additionally, theyquoted an outraged Pope Shenouda, who said, ‘The Coptic OrthodoxChurch was harmed by the behavior that took place by . . . the [AmericanCoptic] Association . . . The Church strongly objects to the behavior,writings, and harassment by this Association against our nation . . .’ Theyconcluded by emphasising the ‘national unity’ discourse, saying that‘the Copts are united with their Moslem brothers for the security, peace,welfare and progress of Egypt.’40

Despite the attempts of the Church to brush aside the ‘persecution’discourse, the damage had already been done. When Sadat returned toEgypt, he accused the Pope of inciting the Coptic community in theUnited States to create the disparaging advertisement in the WashingtonPost and to organise anti-Sadat demonstrations. Shortly after thediaspora’s scathing critiques, Sadat severed the uneasy relationshipbetween the President and the Pope by exiling Pope Shenouda to asmall desert monastery. Further, ostensibly to crackdown against persons‘fomenting sectarian strife’, Sadat revoked his previous decree recognisingShenouda as Pope.41 Under Sadat, the Copts of Egypt became morevulnerable, subject to the whims of Sadat, whom they considered anautocratic ruler. By1981 Sadat had jailed eight bishops, twenty-fourpriests and twenty-four lay Coptic leaders.42

Sadat replaced Shenouda III by an appointed Council of five Copticleaders charged with overseeing Church affairs. The head of the Council


was Bishop Samuel, the man who pioneered the establishment of theearliest Coptic Churches in the United States. Bishop Samuel defendedSadat’s broad crackdown as a ‘very courageous act’ that ‘will help theChristians of Egypt’.43 The New York Times quoted the Bishop as saying,‘I could say I’m pleased with the measures [Sadat] took for security.’44

The two master narratives continued to clash in the 1990s. In 1997the Washington Post published a piece entitled, ‘Egypt’s EndangeredChristians: After violent attacks, ancient Coptic minority fears it hasbecome the target of Islamic militants.’45 A few weeks later, the Postpublished a concise rebuttal by Egyptian Ambassador Ahmed Maherel-Sayed, who noted that terrorists kill Christians and Muslims alike.He also said that ‘to claim that the government seems to consider Coptssecond-class citizens is groundless and provocative. Christians in Egypthave always enjoyed equal rights . . . along with their Muslim brethren.’46

The persecution discourse has been heightened even further with theproliferation of even more diaspora organisations like Karas’s, includingthe Voice of the Copts,47 National American Coptic Assembly48 and theCoptic Assembly of America.49 Coptic organisations in diaspora havebeen very effective in raising awareness about the plight of Copts andmobilising Copts to speak out against violence in Egypt. In fact, Coptshave protested in the United States to demand the Egyptian governmenthold people responsible for crimes committed against Coptic Christians.50

NEO-IMPERIALISM OR PROTECTING EGYPT’S COPTS?

Some allege that diaspora Copts have been ignored by the Americanpolitical establishment as an insignificant and ineffectual lobby group.51

However, this assessment is seriously questioned by Egyptians whodepict diaspora Copts as a powerful, wealthy group who undermineEgyptian interests, pointing to a small diaspora Coptic organisation andaccusing all Copts in Egypt of sharing similar sentiments. They note thatdiaspora Copts collaborated in promoting the International ReligiousFreedom Act, which Congress debated and ultimately passed in 1998.52

The bill called for the establishment of an independent United StatesCommission for International Religious Freedom, as well as anAmbassador at Large for International Religious Freedom within theState Department and a Special Advisor within the National SecurityCouncil. These would be tasked with monitoring instances of religiouspersecution around the world. The most controversial provision in thebill allows countries to be designated as ‘Countries of Particular Concern’.According to the law, the President (via the Secretary of State) must


acknowledge countries that have tolerated or engaged in ‘particularlysevere’ violations of religious freedom. The Act defines ‘particularlysevere’ as violations that are ‘systematic, ongoing and egregious’. Thepresident is then required to take at least one of the actions specifiedin the law (for example, sanctions, trade restrictions, and the like) aimedat pressuring the given ‘Country of Particular Concern’ to change its lawsand policies regarding religious freedom.53

A debate ensued among Coptic Christians in the US as it became clearthat this bill could be utilised as an instrument of American foreignpolicy to pressure Egypt. It also pitted the activist diaspora Copts againstEgypt’s Copts, who have long been sceptical of any form of Westernintervention in national affairs, particularly in the name of ‘protectingChristian minorities’. The hostility towards such claims is grounded inthe history of colonial arrangements imposed on the Ottoman empire byEuropean governments, granting special economic privileges to Christianminorities, as well as the fact that Europe often justified militaryintervention at various times in Middle Eastern affairs by claiming a rightto ‘intervene on behalf of [their] coreligionists’. This was especially usedwhen France intervened in Lebanon and Syria ‘on behalf of’ MaroniteCatholic Christians and Russia intervened ‘on behalf of’ Greek OrthodoxChristians’.54 Thus for many Egyptians, the idea of the United Stateswithholding aid or imposing sanctions on behalf of Egypt’s Christianssmacks of neo-imperialism. It was seen by many in Egypt as a newincarnation of Western attempts to eradicate Islamic values.55

Coptic Christians in Egypt were aware that such interference wouldrender them vulnerable to accusations of collaborating with foreigngovernments against the interests of the state. They wanted to make itabundantly clear that if the United States ultimately did interfere inEgyptian affairs or sanction the Egyptian government in the name of‘ending Coptic persecution’, such action was not taken on behalf of Coptsin Egypt. According to the Arab Organization for Human Rights, ‘Copts[in Egypt] are the first to reject [US] protection.’56 The Legal Researchand Resource Center for Human Rights accused the bill’s proponents ofputting American interests above doing what would be best for Egypt’sCopts. According to the Center, ‘[only] the Copts as Egyptian citizensliving with Muslims inside one nation, as one family can solve thoseproblems in their own special ways, as family members inside onehouse.’57Pope Shenouda III himself argued that there was no widespreadpersecution of Copts and expressed opposition to the bill. On 28 March1998, the Council of Churches of New York City put out a statement


reaffirming this, accusing lobbying groups of misrepresenting thesituation of Copts in Egypt.58 Several Copts feared a potential backlashagainst Coptic Christians. Prominent Coptic thinker Rafik Habib arguedthat ‘if Congress takes any action . . . and Muslim people find someproblems because of the Copts, then the killing of Copts could be anordinary thing . . . [The Act] makes the problem worse.’59

To be sure, there were many American Copts who agreed with theirPope. However, some diaspora organisations actively lobbied for thebill, including Karas’s American Coptic Association, who demanded that‘Egypt stop destroying its Christians’.60 After seeing American mediapublish criticisms of the bill (including Pope Shenouda’s objection), somediaspora Copts in various organisations published a series of op-eds indefence of the bill. One claimed that Pope Shenouda was simply beingpressured into misrepresenting the state of Coptic Christians in Egypt.Another claimed that the Council of Churches had been manipulated,and denied that the anti-persecution campaign was conspiring withconservative Christians. Michael Meunier, Director of the InternationalCoptic Federation, wrote a final piece alleging that the Egyptiangovernment was persecuting Coptic Christians. He claimed thatEgyptian Christians supported diaspora lobbyists and supported theefforts of the United States Congress to get involved. Further, he accusedthe Washington Times of de-emphasising his persecution discourse,suggesting that the paper may have ‘fallen under the pressure of theEgyptian government’.61

In his 2001 examination of the role of technology in the success ofCoptic diaspora lobbying efforts, Paul Rowe noted, ‘The Coptic lobby iselectronically savvy and well connected.’62 This has enabled the activiststo make their case effectively to members of Congress. Additional supportwas provided by the growing number of lobbyists on the Christian Rightsuch as Ralph Reed’s Christian Coalition. Consequently the bill passed inan overwhelmingly bipartisan vote and was signed into law by PresidentClinton. The vote was 98 to 0 in the Senate63 and 375 to 41 in the Houseof Representatives.64 A careful review of the history surrounding thebill’s passage will reveal that, despite the vote count, the bill was hotlycontested in Congress. Members of both parties raised concerns, and eventhe Under Secretary of State Stuart Eizenstat testified against the bill,warning that it would ‘wreak havoc with our foreign policy and becounter-productive in protecting the very groups we are seeking toprotect’.65 However, when it was time to vote, the opposition did notprevail. The ‘persecution’ discourse had won a major victory.


Copts in Egypt felt very differently. The interest in Egypt shown bythe United States Committee on International Religious Freedom(USCIRF) has continued to be a source of consternation to many Coptsin Egypt. In 2000, several prominent Coptic Christians in Egypt criticisedthe USCIRF after the commission sent a delegation to meet withEgyptians. Coptic Member of Parliament and prominent businessmanMounir Fakhri Abdel-Nour accused the delegation of ‘outright foreignintervention’ and demanded they ‘desist from tampering in Egypt’sdomestic affairs’. Pope Shenouda refused to meet with the delegation, anda source close to him claimed that the Pope had denounced the visit asa ‘totally unacceptable act’. Mounir Azmi, a member of the CopticCommunity Council, noted that while Egyptian Copts faced problems,outside intervention would be unhelpful and unwelcome.66 Concernedover the implications that the Act had on Coptic–Muslim relations inEgypt, influential Coptic thinker Samir Morcos condemned the Act asanother ‘episode in the long chain of repeated history. It confirms that thestrike against national unity is one of the goals of the West’s strategy overthe course of past centuries, ever since the West found its way to us.’67

FROM VOICELESS VICTIMS TO EMPOWERED ACTIVISTS

Coptic activism in diaspora has continued to grow in size and influence,and the USCIRF has continued to emphasise the ‘persecution’ discourseover the ‘national unity’ discourse. In 2002, the USCIRF added Egyptto its ‘watchlist’ countries. The criteria for such a designation relate toany country that, in the judgement of the Commission, ‘require[s] closemonitoring . . . of negative trends that could develop into severeviolations of religious freedom’68 in an attempt to help prevent ordiminish violations. Egypt has been on this list since 2002. In the wake ofthe chaos of the Arab Spring, the USCIRF officially recommended thatthe State Department label Egypt a ‘Country of Particular Concern’ andtake appropriate actions to sanction the Egyptian transitional governmentuntil it deems that Coptic persecution has been ‘sufficiently abated.’69

After it became clear that the State Department was not going to followthe advice of the USCIRF, the commission criticised the Obamaadministration in its 2012 report, saying that ‘the flexibility provided inIRFA [International Religious Freedom Act] has been underutilized’.70

In addition to the USCIRF’s recommendation, several diasporaorganisations have demanded that President Obama intervene on behalfof Copts. The National American Coptic Assembly posted on theirwebsite ‘an appeal for immediate intervention from the international


community to protect Egyptian Copts’.71 President Obama has beenspecifically pressured by diaspora activists since the beginning of his firstterm. The Voice of the Copts wrote in 2009, ‘Mr. Obama, you became thepresident of the most powerful country of the world, look after thoseCopts who are living as strangers in their own country.’72 PresidentObama has not intervened militarily or through economic sanctions assome activist groups may have wanted; he has, however, been sensitiveto the violence against Copts. For instance, after an outbreak of violenceat Maspero in 2011 that resulted in the deaths of several protesters, heissued a statement similar to Pope Shenouda’s in which he condemnedthe violence and called for ‘restraint on both sides’.73

Beyond the White House, Coptic interest groups have also pressuredindividual members of Congress to speak out, particularly in stateswhere there is a preponderance of Coptic Churches and activist groups.For instance, New Jersey is home to the Coptic Orthodox Archdioceseof North America and fourteen Coptic churches,74 the American CopticAssociation and the Coptic Lawyers Association. On 3 January 2011 theCoptic Lawyers Association sent a letter to the New Jersey Congressionaldelegation asking them to take action in response to the growing violenceagainst Copts in Egypt, insisting that Congress ‘must engage in a concreteand constant effort to demand greater accountability from the Egyptiangovernment’.75 The organisation reminded the New Jersey delegationthat there are a number of Copts living in New Jersey (implying that theyare a powerful constituency that should be listened to).76

Evidence shows that the diaspora activists’ lobbying is often effective.For example, as the result of intense lobbying efforts, New Jerseypoliticians have been very vocal about the plight of Coptic Christians. On25 January 2011, Senator Menendez (Democrat, New Jersey) introduceda resolution to condemn the New Year’s Day attack on a Coptic Church inAlexandria, and urged the Government of Egypt to investigate fully andprosecute the perpetrators. The resolution also called on PresidentObama and Secretary of State Clinton to assist Egypt in bringing theperpetrators to justice.77 Additionally, the United States Commission onSecurity and Cooperation in Europe has held at least three Congressionalhearings explicitly on Coptic persecution from 2011 to 2012 under thechairmanship of Rep. Chris Smith of New Jersey.78 The CopticAssociation of America supported another Congressional resolutionwhich garnered thirty-eight co-sponsors (all but one of whom had aCoptic Church in either their district or home state).79 It called on theEgyptian Government to respect human rights, including freedom


of religion and expression, and urged the President and the Secretary ofState to place human rights and religious freedom in Egypt very high onthe agenda during meetings with Egyptian officials.80

Coptic activism was able to persuade the New Jersey state legislature – abody that generally does not deal with foreign affairs – to adopt anatypical resolution condemning the religious persecution of CopticChristians in Egypt. The resolution cited several attacks against EgyptianCopts, tying the violence not only to Egyptian police, but also ‘MuslimWorshippers’.81 Of the twelve sponsors and co-sponsors in the Assembly,all but one of them had a Coptic church in the county that theyrepresented. All three state senators that sponsored or co-sponsored theresolution had Coptic churches in counties that they at least partiallyrepresented.82 It is unclear how much contact individual churcheshad with their respective legislators, but this resolution demonstratesthat New Jersey legislators felt it politically advantageous to condemnEgypt – and even individual Muslims – for violence perpetrated againstCopts.

THE COPTIC DIASPORA AND ISLAMOPHOBIA

In addition to their respective stances on United States intervention, oneof the starkest differences between Copts in Egypt and many diasporaorganisations in the West is their portrayal of Muslims. Several groupsengage in what can only be described as promoting blatant Islamophobia.The National American Coptic Assembly, based in the United States,is led by Coptic lawyer Morris Sadek. On his blog Sadek claims that‘Islam is a combination of Paganism, worship of the moon god Allah andEbionism’ and that the word ‘islam’ itself was not taken from the Arabicword ‘salam’ (which means peace), but rather comes from ‘istislam’,meaning surrender or die. The site also claims that Muslims couldpossibly take over the United States.83 On 9 June 2012, Sadek joinedTerry Jones (the Florida pastor notorious for publicly burning a Qur’an)to protest against the Obama administration’s handling of Islam.84

Michael Mounir’s organisation, the US Copts Association, warns ina piece written by Robert Spencer that ‘stealth Jihad makes inroads inAustralia’ and accuses Muslims in the West of becoming more aggressiveall the time in asking for concessions to Islamic law and practice.Similar endorsements feature prominently on other Coptic activistwebsites.85

Many diaspora Coptic activists have also engaged in the contentiousdebates over the Israeli–Palestinian conflict; however, unlike most Copts


in Egypt who sympathise with the plight of the Palestinians, they oftendenigrate the Palestinians and support Zionism. For example, among theopinion pieces on the Voice of the Copts website is an inflammatorypiece entitled, ‘The Nazi Palestinolatry’. The author called the PLO ‘one ofthe worst ideological criminals of the twentieth century’ and madeseveral comparisons between Palestinians and Nazis. Among them is theargument that the Palestinian refusal to recognise the Balfour declarationis on a par with the Nazi denial of the Versailles Treaty. Further, theauthor claims that ‘Palestinianism’ is not a national identity, but rather ‘anideological construct developed as a criminal agenda since the PLO wasestablished in 1964’.86

In addition to the controversial opinion pieces, the President of theorganisation, Ashraf Rameleh, recently joined the board of ‘Stop theIslamization of Nations’, an organisation headed by the highlycontroversial conservative Zionist Pamela Geller, who is noted forpromoting Islamophobia.87 In the autumn of 2012, Pamela Gellerprovoked outrage among American Muslims by posting signs inAmerican subway systems in New York and Washington DC that read,‘In any war between the civilized man and the savage, support thecivilized man. Support Israel, defeat Jihad.’ Further reinforcing its ties toGeller, the Voice of the Copts posted an interview with Geller by an Israelinews organisation called Arutz Shiva. They also posted a picture ofGeller posing near one of the signs, with a caption that read, ‘PamelaGeller: American Hero’.88

The American Center for Law and Justice, a conservative Christianlobbying organisation led by American Zionist Jay Sekulow, alsoemphasises the persecution of Coptic Christians, noting that they are aminority that is treated as second-class citizens. They quoted a CopticChristian who blames the persecution of Copts on the billions of dollarsin military aid the US has given Egypt since 1979. The implicitrecommendation of this statement is very similar to the recommendationmade by the USCIRF, which seeks United States withdrawal of aid andimposition of sanctions on the Egyptian government for human rightsviolations. Along with numerous heart-wrenching stories allegingpersecution of Copts are appeals for readers to donate money to theorganisation. The money raised goes to a myriad of conservative politicalcauses, including fighting against abortion and President Obama’sAffordable Care Act, as well as strong support for Israel.89

This antagonistic atmosphere is not representative of the actionsand statements made by many Copts in Egypt in the initial turmoil of the


Arab Spring. Interfaith co-operation was on display as Muhammad Badie,the head of the Muslim Brotherhood, visited the ailing Pope Shenouda topray for his health. And despite some Salafi fatwas purporting thatChristians are kafirs, or ‘infidels’, the Brotherhood offered condolencesto the Coptic community upon the Pope’s passing.90 During MuhammadMorsi’s year-long term in office, opposition to the Brotherhood’s rulegrew in all non-Islamist segments of society – including among CopticChristians. Both the State Department and the Pew Research Center havedocumented instances of violence against Coptic Christians, as well asgovernmental obstacles to religious freedom.91 Unsurprisingly, a ZogbyPoll released in 2013 found that over four out of five Christians in Egyptfelt that they were worse off than they were five years before. Shortlybefore his ousting, 64 per cent of Copts believed that Morsi’s election wasa setback, and 92 per cent were not confident about the Muslim Brother’sleadership.

But their conflict is not with Egypt’s Muslims, as some diasporaactivists would have people believe. Copts who take issue with Morsi doso, not out of animus toward his fellow Muslims, but rather out oflegitimate frustration at the troubling developments which arose duringhis tenure. The same poll revealed that overwhelming majorities of Coptsfound Presidents Nasser and Sadat and Egyptian satirist Bassem Youssefto be credible. Copts also found some current Muslim politicians,including Ahmed Shafiq, Hamdeen Subhi, Mohamed El Baradei andothers, more credible than the population at large did, despite theirdiffering religious views.92 Without ignoring systemic issues that exist inEgyptian society, evidence shows that Egypt’s Copts are far moreconcerned about living peacefully alongside their Muslim neighboursthan they are about denigrating and misrepresenting their faith.

CONCLUSION

For decades, Egypt’s Copts have engaged in a debate over theirplace and role in Egyptian society. This debate hinged on theirfundamental identity. Would they continue to see themselves as apersecuted minority – with a history and culture distinct from MuslimEgyptians – or as a part of a united Egypt, placing their Egyptiannationality over their sectarian identity? This debate is unlikely ever to befully resolved, and Egypt’s Copts are likely to feel their identity in fluxfor years to come. However, the same debate has taken a very differentcourse among the Copts living in diaspora. As early as the 1970s, theseCopts have tended to emphasise persecution (whether exaggerated


or not) over Pope Shenouda’s calls for ‘national unity’. Over time,this emphasis grew louder and louder. Coptic organisations in diasporasee themselves not as members of a united Egypt, but rather asmembers of a heavily persecuted minority class. They now lobby Westerngovernments to pay attention to their plight and even encourage Westernintervention on their behalf – an idea that is wholly anathema to manyCopts living in Egypt. Nevertheless, neoconservative policy makers areable to use figures from the Coptic diaspora to push an agenda thatdoes not advance the cause of peaceful coexistence sought by Egypt’sChristians.

As for Islamophobia, it is important to remember that while diasporaactivists may encourage and even engage in insensitive rhetoriccharacterising Muslims as blood-thirsty persecutors who worship afalse god, many Egyptian Copts do not hold these views. In fact, theinsults being hurled at Muslims by activist diaspora Copts and theirsupporters are, by default, being hurled at the neighbours, co-workersand friends of Egyptian Copts. Many Copts in Egypt do not see allMuslims as terrorists trying to take over the West by means of a ‘stealthjihad’, but rather see them as their fellow citizens who mourned withthem over the death of their spiritual leader and who stood with them toprotest violent attacks that led to the deaths of innocent Copts andMuslims. There is an undeniable gulf between the thinking of EgyptianCopts and a small but vocal minority of Coptic activists in diaspora.To understand fully the complexities of Christian–Muslim relations inEgypt, one must look beyond the statements made by these activists inthe West and must recognise that the situation in Egypt is far moremultifaceted than the ‘persecution discourse’ emphasised particularlystrongly in the West.

Dr Yvonne Haddad is a Professor of the History of Islam and Christian–Muslim Relations at Georgetown University’s Center for Muslim–Christian Understanding. She has published numerous articles andbooks on her current research interests, which include Muslims in theWest and the experiences of Arab Christians in the twentieth century.Email: [email protected]

Joshua Donovan received his Bachelor’s Degree in History andGovernment from Georgetown University and is pursuing a Master’sDegree in Social Sciences and History at the University of Chicago. Hisresearch interests include US foreign relations in the Middle East andinterfaith nationalism in the Middle East. Email: [email protected]


NOTES

1 ‘The Innocence of Muslims Trailer,’ Youtube, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=

mjoa3QazVy8 (accessed 3 November 2012).

2 See Yvonne Haddad, Becoming American? The Forging of Arab and Muslim Identity in

Pluralist America (Waco, TX: Baylor University Press, 2011).

3 For examples of scholarship, see Haddad, Becoming American?; Jocelyne Cesari, ed.,

Muslims in the West after 9/11: Religion, Politics, and Law (New York: Routledge, 2010);

and (with collections of interviews with American Muslims living in post-9/11 America)

Geneive Abdo, Mecca and Main Street: Muslim Life in America after 9/11 (New York:

Oxford University Press, 2006).

4 For an example, see: John L. Esposito and Ibrahim Kalin, Islamophobia: The Challenge

of Pluralism in the 21st century (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), or Nathan Lean,

The Islamophobia Industry: How the Right Manufactures Fear of Muslims (London: Pluto

Press, 2012).

5 Irving Kristol, Neoconservatism: The Autobiography of an Idea (New York: Simon &

Schuster, 1995), 90.

6 Brian J. Grim et al, ‘Arab Spring Adds to Global Restrictions on Religion’, Pew Forum

on Religion and Public Life, June 2013, http://www.pewforum.org/uploadedFiles/Topics/

Issues/Government/RestrictionsIV-web.pdf (accessed 22 June 2013).

7 Betty Jane Bailey and J. Martin Bailey, Who Are the Christians in the Middle East?

(Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans, 2010), 79.

8 ‘July–December 2010 International Religious Freedom Report: Egypt’ (United States

Department of State’s Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor), 13 September

2011, http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/2010_5/168262.htm (accessed 11 July 2012).

9 Medhat Ibrahim, ‘History of the Coptic Church Part IV: St. Mark, the Apostle

and Beholder of God’, ‘Coptic Orthodox Patriarchate’, http://www.suscopts.org/pdf/

copticchurch/hx4.pdf (accessed 11 July 2012).

10 Though the Coptic Church maintains that its position was misinterpreted, the

Council accused the Copts of being ‘Monophysites’ – that is the belief that Christ had

only one nature, rather than having both a human and a divine nature. For more

information see Aziz S. Atiya, The Copts and Christian Civilization (Salt Lake City:

University of Utah Press, 1979), 8–10, or http://www.coptic.net/EncyclopediaCoptica/

(accessed 11 July 2012).

11 For more information on Copts during the Nasser regime, see Milad Hanna, Na‘am

.. Aqbat ..Lakin Misriyin (Cairo: Maktabat Madbuli, 1980); al-Antoni Antonious, Wataniyat

al-Kanisa al-Qubtiya wa Tarikhuha (Cairo: Dar al-Tiba‘a al-Qawmiya, 1995), 447–83.

12 http://www.oikoumene.org/en/who-are-we/background/history/assemblies.html;

see also ‘Coptic Orthodox Church’, 1 January 2006, http://www.oikoumene.org/en/

member-churches/regions/middle-east/egypt/coptic-orthodox-church.html (accessed

31 May 2012).

13 See ‘Samuel’ and ‘Yusab II’, The Coptic Encyclopedia, vol. 7 (1991), http://

ccdl.libraries.claremont.edu/cdm/singleitem/collection/cce/id/1702/rec/10 (accessed 31

May 2012).

14 Haddad, Becoming American, 4.

15 http://www.stmarkboston.org/St.-Mark-Natick-MA/st-marks-coptic-orthodox-

church-natick-ma.html (accessed 3 January 2013).


16 ‘Our History’, http://www.stmarkmi.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=

article&id=75&Itemid=92; http://www.stmarymn.org/about-us; Ahdy Mansour, ‘The Story

of the Coptic Orthodox Church in Cleveland, Ohio,’ http://www.stmarkcoccleveland.

org/index.php?option=com_content&view=category&layout=blog&id=38&Itemid=191

(accessed 3 January 2013).

17 http://www.stmark.toronto.on.coptorthodox.ca/copts.asp (accessed 3 January 2013).

18 See: http://www.stphilopateerdallas.org/About.php?Item=Home; http://www.

saintmarkhouston.org/church; and ‘Clergy’ at http://www.stphilopateerdallas.org/About.

php?Item=Home (accessed 3 January 2013).

19 ‘About the Diocese’, Coptic Orthodox Diocese of the Southern United States, http://

suscopts.org/diocese/about/ (accessed 10 August 2012).

20 Seventy-eight fall under the jurisdiction of the archdiocese: http://nacopts.org/

index.php?option=com_mtree&task=listcats&cat_id=42&Itemid=70; thirty-nine under

the jurisdiction of the Diocese of the Southern United States (excluding Coptic

communities): http://suscopts.org/diocese/churches; twenty-eight under the jurisdiction

of the Diocese of Los Angeles, Southern California and Hawaii: http://www.lacopts.org/

our-diocese/parishes/directory (all accessed 3 January 2013).

21 http://web.archive.org/web/20070220180014/http://www.copts.com/english/Copts

Diaspora.aspx (accessed 3 January 2013).

22 Nelly Van Doorn-Harder, ‘Finding a Platform: Studying Copts in the 19th and 20th

Centuries’, International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 42 (2010), 479–82.

23 Magdi Khalil, Aqbat al-Mahjar Dierasa Midaniya Hawl Humum al-Watan wa

al-Muwatana (Cairo: Dar al-Khayal, 1999), 63–4.

24 Peter Makari, Conflict and Cooperation: Christian–Muslim Relations in Contemporary

Egypt (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2007).

25 Ghali Shukri, al-Aqbat fi Watan Mutaghayir (Cairo: Dar al-Shuruq, 1991); Abu Sayf

Yousef, al-Aqbat wa-al-Qawmiya al-‘Arabiya (Beirut: Markaz Dirasat al-Wahda al-‘Arabiya,

1987); ‘Abd al-Latif al-Minawi, al-Aqbat: al-Kanisa am al-Watan, Qissat al-Baba Shenuda

al-Thalith (Cairo: Dar al-Shabab al-‘Arabi li-al-Nashr wa-al-Tiba‘a, 1992).

26 Paul Sedra, ‘Class cleavages and ethnic conflict: Coptic Christian communities in

modern Egyptian politics,’ Islam and Christian–Muslim Relations 10:2 (1999), 221.

27 ‘Mission Statement’, Voice of the Copts, http://www.voiceofthecopts.org/index.php/

mission (accessed 28 July 2012).

28 For example: Hani Hamdi, ‘Sunday Press Review 2: Egyptian Opinion on

Alexandria Church Bombing’, Arab West Report, 3 January 2011, http://www.arabwestreport.

info/year-2011/week-1/27-sunday-press-review-2-egyptian-opinion-alexandria-church-

bombing; ‘Statement of Heads and Representatives of Christian Churches in Egypt’,

Arab West Report, 1 March 2011, http://www.arabwestreport.info/year-2011/week-9/16-

statement-heads-and-representatives-christian-churches-egypt; Abdel Monem Sayed,

‘Twelve killed in sectarian violence as 190 sent to courts martial’, Arab West Report,

9 May 2011, http://www.arabwestreport.info/year-2011/week-19/12-twelve-killed-

sectarian-violence-190-sent-courts-martial (accessed 20 June 2012).

29 Sameh Fawzi, ‘Reaching out to Egypt’s Copts’, al-Ahram 1097, 10–16 May 2012,

http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2012/1097/eg9.htm (accessed 29 June 2012).

30 Paul Sedra, ‘Class cleavages and ethnic conflict’, 221.

31 ‘Images of solidarity as Christians join hands to protect Muslims as they pray during

Cairo protests’, Daily Mail (UK), 3 February 2011, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/


article-1353330/Egypt-protests-Christians-join-hands-protect-Muslims-pray-Cairo-

protests. html; ‘Coptic protesters resist call to end sit-in, convert turns herself in’,

Arab West Report, 12 May 2011, http://www.arabwestreport.info/year-2011/week-19/47-

coptic-protesters-resist-call-end-sit-convert-turns-herself (accessed 24 June 2012).

32 ‘Coptic protesters resist call to end sit-in, convert turns herself in’.

33 ‘State TV: Pope Shenouda calls for an end to protests’, Egypt Indepndent, 5 February

2011, http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/state-tv-pope-shenouda-calls-end-protests

(accessed 15 June 2012).

33 ‘Pope Shenouda supports Mubarak’, Ahram online, 6 February 2011, http://english.

ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/5097/Egypt/Politics-/Pope-Shenouda-III-supports-

Mubarak,-Egyptian-state.aspx (accessed 15 June 2012).

34 Ghada Botros, ‘Religious Identity as an Historical Narrative: Coptic Orthodox

Immigrant Churches and the Representation of History’, Journal of Historical Sociology

19:2 (2006), 177.

35 Atiya, The Copts and Christian Civilization, 27–8.

36 Shawky F. Karas, The Copts since the Arab Invasion: Strangers in their Land

(Jersey City: American Coptic Association, 1985), 7.

37 Khalil, Aqbat al-Mahjar, 65–6.

38 ‘Open letter to President Sadat of Egypt’, Washington Post, 5 August 1981, A20.

39 ‘Welcome President Sadat to the United States of America’, New York Times,

3 August 1981, B3.

40 ‘The Christian Orthodox Church’, New York Times, 8 August 1981, A12.

41 David B. Ottaway, ‘Egyptian Copts support ousted Patriarch’, Washington Post,

7 September 1981, A39.

42 Milad Hanna, Aqbat al-Qarn al-‘Ishrin: Sasa wa-Ruhban Wara’ al-Qudban (Cairo:

Kitab al-Ahali, 1997), 64.

43 Ibid.

44 William E. Farrell, ‘Egypt Copts wary after Sadat move’, New York Times, 7

September 1981, A3.

45 John Lancaster, ‘Egypt’s endangered Christians; after violent attacks, ancient Coptic

minority fears it has become the target of Islamic militants’, Washington Post, 18 March

1997, A12.

46 Ahmed Maher el-Sayed, ‘Together in Egypt’, Washington Post, 11 April 1997, A26.

47 http://www.voiceofthecopts.org (accessed 3 January 2013).

48 http://nacopts1.blogspot.com/ (accessed 3 January 2013).

49 http://www.copticassembly.com (accessed 3 January 2013).

50 Pamela Constable, ‘Coptic Christians protest outside White House against violence

in Egypt’, Washington Post, 19 October 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/

coptic-christians-protest-outside-white-house-against-abuses-in-egypt/2011/10/19/gIQAx

RvByL_story.html (accessed 3 January 2013).

51 Mojubaole Olutunke Okome, ‘The antinomies of globalization: some consequences

of contemporary African immigration to the United States of America’, Irınkerindo: a

journal of African migration, 2002. Available at http://www.africamigration.com/archive_

01/m_okome_globalization_02.htm (accessed 24 July 2012).

52 Makari, Conflict and Cooperation, 170–2.

53 Ibid., 7–9.


54 William L. Cleveland and Martin Bunton, A History of the Modern Middle East

(Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 2009), 59, 76, 130.

55 Hani Labib, Azmat al-Himaya al-Diniya (Cairo: Dar al-Shuruq, 2000).

56 Nevine Khalil, ‘Storm in a teacup?’ al-Ahram, 21–27 May 1998, http://

weekly.ahram.org.eg/1998/378/eg10.htm (accessed 30 July 2012).

57 ‘Church report denies persecution of Copts’, Arab West Report, 26 July 2008, http://

www.arabwestreport.info/year-1998/week-14/11-church-report-denies-persecution-copts


58 ‘Church report denies persecution of Copts’, Arab West Report, 26 July 2008, http://

www.arabwestreport.info/year-1998/week-14/11-church-report-denies-persecution-copts


59 Richard Engel, ‘Egypt denies persecuting Christians – cites U.S. Church group’s

support in opposing religious freedom bill’, Washington Times, 8 April 1998.

60 Khaled Elgindy, ‘Diaspora troublemakers: Is the organized Coptic community

in the US doing more harm than good?’ 4 February1999, http://kcm.co.kr/Egypt/

%C4%DF%C6%BD/expats.html (accessed 30 July 2012).

61 Helmy Guirguis, ‘The Egyptian Government persecutes Coptic Christians’,

Washington Times, B2, 12 April 1998, B2; Keith Roderick, ‘The Egyptian Government

persecutes Coptic Christians’, Washington Times, 12 April 1998, B2.; Michael Meunier,

‘The Egyptian Government persecutes Coptic Christians’, Washington Times, 12 April

1998, B2.

62 Paul S. Rowe, ‘Four Guys and a Fax Machine? Diasporas, New Information

Technologies, and the Internationalization of Religion in Egypt’, Journal of Church and

State 43:1 (Winter 2001), 90.

63 http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm?

congress=105&session=2&vote=00310 (accessed 3 January 2013).

64 http://www.govtrack.us/congress/votes/105–1998/h155 (accessed 3 January 2013).

65 ‘H.R. 2431, Freedom from Religious Persecution Act markup’ (House of

Representatives Committee on International Relations, 105th Congress, session 2), 25

March 1998, http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/intlrel/hfa50472.000/hfa50472_

0f.htm (accessed 12 August 2012).

66 Omayma Abdel-Latif, ‘US commission faces closed doors’, al-Ahram 526, 22–28

March 2001, http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2001/526/eg1.htm (accessed 12 August 2012).

67 Makari, Conflict and Cooperation, 172–3.

68 ‘Annual Report 2011’ (United States Commission on International Religious

Freedom), 8, http://www.uscirf.gov/images/book%20with%20cover%20for%20web.pdf


69 Ibid., 49

70 ‘Annual Report 2012’ (United States Commission on International Religious

Freedom), March 2012 (covering 1 April 2011–29 February 2012), 5, http://www.uscirf.

gov/images/Annual%20Report%20of%20USCIRF%202012(2).pdf

71 Voice of the Copts (National American Coptic Association), 11 October 2011,

http://nacopts1.blogspot.com/2011/10/appeal-for-immediate-intervention-from.html


72 ‘Copts between Mubarak and Obama’, Voice of the Copts, 24 May 2009, http://

www.voiceofthecopts.org/index.php/categories/op-eds/565–479copts-between-mubarak-

and-obama (accessed 30 July 2012).


73 http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/10/10/statement-press-secretary-

violence-egypt (accessed 13 August 2012).

74 http://nacopts.org/index.php?option=com_mtree&task=listcats&cat_id=64&

Itemid=70 (accessed 3 January 2013).

75 http://copticlawyers.com/Files/New_Years_Eve_Letter.PDF, page 3 (accessed 3

August 2012).

76 Ibid., page 1.

77 Full text of S. Res. 22: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-112sres22ats/pdf/

BILLS-112sres22ats.pdf (accessed 4 January 2013).

78 One hearing was held in 2012; two were held in 2011: http://www.csce.gov/

index.cfm?FuseAction=ContentRecords.Home&ContentType=H,B&Year=2012; http://

www.csce.gov/index.cfm?FuseAction=ContentRecords.Home&ContentType=H,B&Year=

2011 (both accessed 14 August 2012).

79 The full text of the resolution lists co-sponsors and their corresponding

Congressional Districts. Diocese websites contain lists of all recognised Coptic

churches. The following site indicates which Congressional district each church was

located in: http://www.house.gov/htbin/findrep (accessed 3 January 2013).

80 Text of bill, 111th Congress (2009–2011), H.Res. 200.IH, http://ssl.capwiz.com/

copticassembly/webreturn/?url=http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c111:H.RES.200


81 See http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/2010/Bills/AJR/69_I1.HTM (text of the Assembly

Joint Resolution) and http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/2010/Bills/SJR/64_I1.HTM (text of the

Senate Joint Resolution; both accessed 3 January 2013).

82 The Archdiocese website (cited previously) contains a list of churches and their

addresses. To determine which district the given church’s municipality is in or the

districts that cover the county of the given church, see http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/

districts/districtnumbers.asp.

83 ‘The Threat of Islam is real’ (National American Coptic Assembly), 28 June 2012,

http://nacopts1.blogspot.com/2012/06/threat-of-islam-is-real.html (accessed 7 July 2012).

84 ‘Stand Up America Now with Dr. Terry Jones . . .’ (National American Coptic

Assembly), 4 June 2012., http://nacopts1.blogspot.com/2012/06/stand-up-america-now-

with-dr-terry.html (accessed 7 July 2012).

85 Robert Spencer, ‘Stealth Jihad makes inroads in Australia’ (US Copts Association),

6 December 2011, http://www.copts.com/english/?p=2992 (accessed 20 July 2012).

86 Giulio Meotti, ‘The Nazi Palestinolatry’, Voice of the Copts, 3 June 2012, http://

www.voiceofthecopts.org/index.php/categories/op-eds/8311-the-nazi-palestinolatry


87 ‘Swiss leader, media watchdog, Coptic activist join board of Stop Islamization of

Nations (SION)’, SIOE, 23 January 2012, http://sioeeu.wordpress.com/2012/01/23/swiss-

leader-media-watchdog-coptic-activist-join-board-of-stop-islamization-of-nations-sion/


88 Fern Sidman, ‘Arutz Shiva speaks to Pamela Geller’, Voice of the Copts, 12 October

2012. (accessed 2 November 2012).

89 Jay Sekulow, ‘Egypt: Christians face growing dangers’, ACLJ, 19 December 2011,

http://aclj.org/middle-east-turmoil/egypt-christians-face-growing-dangers (accessed 31

July 2012).


90 ‘Brotherhood leader visits Pope Shenouda; Wishes him good health’, IkhwanWeb,

8 March 2012, http://www.ikhwanweb.com/article.php?id=29759&ref=search.php;

‘Muslim Brotherhood, Freedom and Justice Party Offer Condolences to Egypt’s

Copts over Death of Pope Shenouda III’, IkhwanWeb, 17 March 2012, http://

www.ikhwanweb.com/article.php?id=29784&ref=search.php (accessed 29 June 2012).

91 Grim et al, ‘Arab Spring Adds to Global Restrictions on Religion’.

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Good Copt, Bad Copt: Competing Narratives on Coptic Identity in Egypt in the United States

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