Gies_KristopherK_PhD.pdf - University of Guelph Atrium

AMATEUR SOLDIERING IN INDUSTRIAL BRITAIN:

THE EARLY TERRITORIAL FORCE IN GLASGOW, 1908-1914

A Thesis

Presented to

The Faculty of Graduate Studies

of

The University of Guelph

by

KRISTOPHERK. GIES

In partial fulfilment of requirements

for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

September, 2010

© Kristopher K. Gies, 2010

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ABSTRACT

AMATEUR SOLDIERING IN INDUSTRIAL BRITAIN: THE EARLY TERRITORIAL FORCE IN GLASGOW, 1908-1914

This thesis is an investigation of the Territorial Force from its inception in 1908 to the

outbreak of the First World War in 1914. Through using the industrial centre of Glasgow,

Scotland as an example, this study details the multifaceted social and institutional links that

welded local society to the amateur soldiering movement. Particular attention is directed towards

to the experience of part-time soldiers in the Anglo-Boer War and subsequent reform efforts,

Territorial terms of service, the role of local government and civic groups, labour/employer

relations, public health considerations, and the place of uniformed youth movements. This builds

upon and complements the substantial body of knowledge produced by scholars such as

Cunningham, Spiers, and Beckett, who have adopted a wider British-based perspective in their

works. In particular, through a local approach it is argued that despite the expectations of

wholesale reform following the Anglo-Boer War, strong continuities existed between the early

Territorial Force and its predecessor, the Victorian-era Volunteer Force. Through an examination

of how the early Territorial Force operated on a local level, this notion can largely be attributed to

the practical limitations of part-time soldiering on a voluntary basis, but also in that many aspects

of the Territorial scheme were co-opted from preexisting Volunteer relationships and institutions.

In explaining this continuity, this study explores the ideological foundations for army reform in

the early-twentieth century. The architect of the Territorial Force, Richard Burdon Haldane

envisioned a 'nation-in-arms'—the preserved British tradition of voluntary military service

sustained through an intersecting of military and civilian interests. Although previous historians

have argued that Haldane was unsuccessful in promoting this concept, study argues otherwise—

Kristopher K. Gies University of Guelph, 2010

Advisor: Professor Graeme Morton

that although never achieving his ideal, a nation-in-arms was already in existence prior to the

concept's articulation, and was only enhanced by the continued ties with the amateur soldiering

movement.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to thank a host of individuals and organizations, without their respective contributions this study would not have been possible. My family and loved ones for their encouragement and undying support over the years. My advisor Professor Graeme Morton for his timely wisdom and patient guidance throughout the evolution of this project. In addition, thanks to my committee members Dr. Kevin James and Dr. Linda Mahood of the University of Guelph and Dr. John Laband of Wilfrid Laurier University for offering their particular insights and expertise. Additional thanks to Dr. Catriona Macdonald of Glasgow Caledonian University for her rigorous, constructive critique as my external examiner. A debt of gratitude goes to Mr. Raymond O'Brien also of Glasgow Caledonian University for his retrieving key documents when they were lost an ocean away, and to Mr. Douglas Stewart and the Ritchie family for their hospitality. Special thanks to the University of Guelph History Department, the Centre for Scottish Studies, the Scottish Studies Foundation, the St. Andrews Society of Montreal, the Watson family, and the Strathmartine Trust for their various financial support throughout my doctoral programme. Lastly, the innumerable individuals who through their friendship and advice have had a positive impact on me, both as a scholar and as a person.

i

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES iii

LIST OF FIGURES iv

INTRODUCTION 1

CHAPTER 1 - The Volunteer Force and the Crisis of the Anglo-Boer War 25 The Volunteer Experience in South Africa: A Necessary Experiment An Effective Home Defence? Postwar Scrutiny and Early Efforts at Reform

CHAPTER 2 - Glasgow and Haldane's Reforms 77 The Formulation of Reform Criticisms & Compromise Immediate Peril? Advocates for British Conscription Launching the Territorial Scheme

CHAPTER 3 - The Territorial Experience 130 The Social Foundations of the Amateur Soldiering Movement in Glasgow Terms of Service - Training and Drill Obligations Annual Camps - Old & New Income and Efficiency - A Balancing Act Part-time Soldiering as Conduit to Health

CHAPTER 4 - The Elites 184 The Territorial Force and Glasgow Civic Government The Labour Aristocracy - the Glasgow Trades Council and Scottish Trades Union Congress Private Employers - the Gatekeepers to Reform

CHAPTER 5 - Youth and the Nation-in-Arms 232 Schools & Universities: The Officer Training Corps The Boys' Brigade

CONCLUSION - The Challenge of War 282 Glasgow's Territorials and the Great War The Early Territorial Force in Glasgow - A 'Nation-in-Arms'?

BIBLIOGRAPHY 298

APPENDICES 327

vi

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1 - Percentage of Establishment (Other Ranks, October 1) 12

Table 2 - Percentage of Territorial Infantry attending at least 8 days camp training 146 (other ranks)

Table 3 - Absent Camp with Leave (Other Ranks- Infantry) as Percentage of Total 153 Strength (last day of camp training)

Table 4 - Absent Camp without Leave (Other Ranks - Infantry) as Percentage of Total 153 Strength (last day of camp training)

Survey of physical soundness of Glasgow Rifle Volunteer Corps (1905) 164

Officer Statement of Strength (percentage of establishment, October 1) 250

\

Table 5 -

Table 6 -

iii

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure l-"Support the Territorial Force" 14

Figure 2 - Historic Location of Glasgow TF Infantry Battalion Headquarters 124

iv

Introduction

It is for the City of Glasgow to allow each company to strike its roots into some part of the community.

The Glasgow Territorial Force Association, 19131

This thesis is an examination of the early Territorial Force in Scotland from its inception

in 1908 up to the outbreak of war in 1914. Using the population and industrial centre of

Glasgow as its example, this study provides a detailed analysis of the social, economic

and ideological influences that affected the articulation of military reforms, their

implementation, and the day-to-day operations of the Territorial scheme in the city. It

argues that the early years of the Territorial Force can be best described in terms of

commonalities with the Volunteers it replaced. This was the product of not only practical

constraints, but also a limited militarism that was expressed in various ways throughout

local society.

The decade preceding the First World War was a time that promised great

transformation within the British Army. In these years, politicians and military leaders

wrangled with the matter of establishing a defence structure that would not only protect

Britain's imperial possessions, but also ensure the integrity of her shores. Security

concerns in these years were sparked by both heightened international tensions—in

particular rising German power—and uncertainties stemming from the army's

1 The Territorial Force Association of the County of the City of Glasgow [hereafter Glasgow County Association], Voluntary Service: The Case for the Territorial Force (Glasgow: The Territorial Force Association of the County of the City of Glasgow, 1913), 12.

1

Introduction

performance in the Anglo-Boer War. Unavoidably, significant attention was directed

towards reassessing the role and capabilities of the nation's part-time soldiers, the largest

pool of which being the Victorian-era Volunteer Force. This predecessor to the Territorial

Force was formed under a similar set of uncertainties following the Crimean conflict.

Invasion fears of the late-1850s were stoked by military deficiencies exposed by the war,

alongside renewed French militarism under Napoleon III.2 The resulting public outcry

over Britain's perceived vulnerability led to Volunteer corps being formed in 1859 with

the expressed purpose of safeguarding the British mainland from possible foreign

aggression. As will be discussed, in Scotland this movement first took root in Glasgow.

Although the perceived threat of foreign invasion failed to materialize, the Volunteer

Force functioned as a powerful social outlet and an expression of Victorian middle class

values. Through this particular form of 'patriotic recreation'—men by enlisting with

their local battalion found, amidst their duties, male camaraderie, excursions in the form

of annual camps, and various other activities in which to participate. However, though

considered part of Britain's military establishment with numbers exceeding 200,000 men

by 1899, the Volunteers were untested in battle and for most of its history the corps were

widely perceived as more of a social outlet than a capable body of soldiers.

The Anglo-Boer War (1899-1902) served as the trial-by-fire for the Volunteers,

for although their participation was limited, it marked the first time that they were

2 War Scares of the period were sparked by Napoleon Ill's rise to power, the development of steam-powered ships and their potential threat to naval superiority, and the Army's performance in Crimea. See: J.P. Parry, "The Impact of Napoleon III on British Politics, 1851-1880," Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, Sixth Series 11 (2001); Michael J. Salevouris, 'Riflemen form': The War Scare of1859-1860 (New York: Garland, 1982).

2

Introduction

allowed into an active combat role. Politicians and military commanders widely credited

the patriotic initiative of these men, yet post-war commissions highlighted a litany of

defects and shortcomings plaguing the Volunteers. Indeed, the experience of war acted to

confirm longstanding criticisms directed towards them, while contemporary invasion

fears further prompted subsequent reform efforts. Ultimately, the auxiliary forces were

reorganized in 1908 under the direction of Secretary of State for War Richard Burdon

Haldane. The Volunteers were disbanded and replaced by the Territorial Force; it is the

early history of this body that this study takes as its focus.

Since the 1970s, the history of amateur soldiering in Britain has been comprised

of a handful of core works. Those of particular importance to this study have been

written by Hugh Cunningham, Ian Beckett, Edward Spiers, Peter Dennis, and K.W.

Mitchinson. Cunningham's 1975 The Volunteer Force: A Social and Political History

1859-1908 stands as a quintessential work on the Volunteers, serving as the first modern

history of this pool of amateur soldiers and is often cited in related histories. He

examines among other aspects, the creation of Volunteer units, their class and

occupational composition, and how they were perceived by British society. These themes

are expanded upon in Ian Beckett's 1982 Riflemen Form, which acknowledging the

limited scope of Cunningham's work, offers a more extensive account.4 Many of the

social, economic, and political forces described in Riflemen Form are later included in

3 Hugh Cunningham, The Volunteer Force: A Social and Political History, 1859-1908 (London: Croom Helm, 1975). 4 Ian F.W. Beckett, Riflemen Form: A Study of the Rifle Volunteer Movement, 1859-1908 (Aldershot: The Ogilby Trusts, 1982).

3

Introduction

Beckett's 1991 The Amateur Military Tradition, which discusses the various

manifestations of part-time soldiering in Britain from the period 1558-1945.5

Despite this scholarship, the Territorial Force (TF) has been thinly treated by

historians. Cunningham and Beckett to varying degrees touch upon its early history, and

K.W. Mitchinson's Defending Albion (2005) discusses the TF's place in home defence

considerations prior to and during the First World War.6 The political struggle associated

with the drawing-up and implementation of the Territorial Force is treated most

extensively by Edward Spiers' 1980 biographical account Haldane: An Army Reformer?

However, this only forms one aspect in Spier's wider account of Haldane's tenure in the

War Office, which also discusses matters such as the creation of General Staff and reform

of the regular army. Peter Dennis' 1982 The Territorial Army serves as the first study that

exclusively focuses on the TF, discussing its creation and history up to 1940.8 Yet these

examples reveal a persistent issue in the historiography of amateur soldiering in Britain;

that while studies of this topic are relatively few, standalone studies of the Territorial

Force are represented even less. This is further complicated in scholarship regarding the

crucial years between 1908—when the Territorial Force was inaugurated—and the

outbreak of war in 1914. This initial period is in general treated very briefly, and aside

from Spiers' biography of Haldane, is consigned to single chapters or sections of

chapters. In recent years, there have been steps taken to fill this gap in scholarship,

5 Ian F.W. Beckett, The Amateur Military Tradition 1558-1945 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1991).

6 K.W. Mitchinson, Defending Albion: Britain's Home Army, 1908-1919 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005). 7 Edward M. Spiers, Haldane: an Army Reformer (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1980). 8 Peter Dennis, The Territorial Army, 1906-1940 (Woodbridge: The Boydell Press, 1987).

4

Introduction

though fraught with their own limitations. For example, K.W. Mitchinson's most recent

contribution, England's Last Hope: The Territorial Force, 1908-1914 (2008), explicitly

focuses on this period, is more a history of material and logistical considerations.9 While

delving into subjects such as supplies, equipment, and training facilities in extensive

detail, the wider social and cultural forces that continued to impact part-time soldiering in

these years go relatively unexplored.

An additional gap in the current historiography lies in perspective. As most

studies into the British part-time soldier are broadly-based in nature, while providing a

strong account of proceedings at a national level, they do not provide a detailed

examination as to the local conditions and dynamics that determined the success of

Haldane's programme. Questions such as how Haldane's policies were enacted on the

ground, or simply, the position held by the Territorial Force in local society have gone

unexplored, leaving the interested reader with only a partial understanding as to military

reform in this period.

Yet this is a situation that presents a unique set of opportunities. While Dennis

acknowledges the limitations inherent in a work that is national in scope, he also notes

that an abundance of source material makes possible avenues of research into more

localized studies. This point of view is important, as according to Dennis the Territorial

Force was "a local organization, subject to local conditions and community support that

9 K.W. Mitchinson, England's Last Hope: The Territorial Force, 1908-1914 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008).

5

varied throughout the country."10 Beckett also remarks as to how "purely local factors

could also be of considerable account.. . ."n This serves as a reiteration of Cunningham's

12

belief in how the Volunteer Force—"an essentially local force"—must be researched.

Such observations have not been held solely by modern-day historians, but were also

expressed by those tasked with the implementation of the Territorial scheme. The

Territorial Force Advisory Committee was established in 1908 to provide guidance to

local authorities in such efforts. The effectiveness of this central body proved limited,

given the wide variance of conditions from locality to locality. Ultimately it was

dissolved, as it was acknowledged that purely local efforts would determine the success

or failure of the TF.13 This path however, has largely been unexplored by historians. Ian

S. Wood's 1999 account of Edinburgh Territorial battalions includes only a few

introductory pages on conditions prior to hostilities. This is a trait shared amongst other

local histories of the early Territorial Force. Helen McCartney's 2005 research into the

Liverpool Territorials is for the most part a wartime account, though it does offer an

insightful chapter into the wider prewar conditions in Lancashire.14 Glasgow has not

been neglected in this regard as Alec Weir's popular history of the 9th Highland Light

10 Dennis, 1. 11 Beckett, The Amateur Military Tradition, 218. 12 Cunningham, 4. 13 Territorial Force Advisory Council, March 14, 1914, War Office and Successors: Registered Files (General Series), W032/9698, The National Archives, Kew [hereafter TNA], 14 Ian S. Wood, '"Be Strong and of Good Courage': the Royal Scots' Territorial Battalions from 1908 to Gallipoli" in Catriona M.M. Macdonald and E.W. McFarland, Scotland and the Great War (East Linton: Tuckwell Press, 1999), 103-124; Helen B. McCartney, Citizen Soldiers. The Liverpool Territorials in the First World War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

Introduction

Infantry has a similar wartime emphasis.15 As a result of this near exclusive focus on the

years 1914-1918, although a local perspective can provide an avenue towards a greater

understanding of the conditions under which Territorial units operated prior to the war

(and by extension a greater appreciation for their wartime service), the opportunity to do

so has been missed.

This study aims to add to this existing body of literature, and in doing so provide

greater insight as to how reform was implemented—its methods, successes, and

shortcomings. In adopting a local focus, it is possible to develop a more nuanced view of

this process than what has been offered in previous, more broadly-based works. While

Mitchinson discusses the material intricacies of the early Territorial Force, this study does

the same in terms of personal, class, and institutional relationships, detailing how the

wider forces previously discussed by Cunningham, Dennis, and Beckett play out on-the-

ground. This also acts to fill another longstanding gap in the scholarship, in that wider

British-based studies have tended to focus on the English experience. Aside from a brief

mention in Wood's chapter in Scotland and the Great War, virtually nothing has been

written as to how the Territorial Force was established north of the border.

The true value of this study lies in how the early TF should be perceived by

historians, particularly in terms of whether it was the beginning of a new approach

towards the matter of home defence, or rather an extension of long-held patterns and

institutions. In his Riflemen Form Beckett describes the activities of, and problems

15 Alec Weir, Come On Highlanders! Glasgow Territorials in the Great War (Stroud: Sutton, 2005). 7

Introduction

facing, these part-time soldiers being much the same as had been known hitherto.16 This

tantalizing notion has not been explored in the years since it was written, yet it forms the

central theme of this work. Despite the at-times heated rhetoric of national peril, an

examination of the early Territorial Force in Glasgow reveals a strong, multilayered

continuity between old and new. As it pertains to this study, continuity is a term that has

a number of meanings—the endurance of martial traditions, the allures and obstacles of

part-time military service, but perhaps most of all it represented the enduring essential

nature of amateur soldiering, the way it was practiced and the social and institutional

links that sustained the movement through the 1908 reforms. Moreover, it reflected the

inherent limitations associated with placing part-time soldiers on a similar footing as

professionals.

The phenomenon owes itself to the everyday concerns that faced ordinary

Glaswegians during this period. While the language of wholesale reform had imbued the

post-Anglo-Boer War rhetoric of army planners, politicians, and interested parties, this

was mutually exclusive from issues of pay, holiday time, job security, and the smooth

operation of business enterprises—factors of greater importance to the men who filled

Territorial ranks. Moreover, the continuation of pre-existing patterns and relationships

can also be attributed to the pervasiveness of the amateur soldiering movement in the

city. Given the deep continuities they formed, an examination of the early Territorial

Force as a matter of necessity includes discussion into the late Volunteers. Despite their

small numbers vis-a-vis the population as a whole, the Volunteer legacy was widely

16 Beckett, Riflemen Form, 252. 8

Introduction

felt—in the schools, the shop floors, the council chambers, and in the boardrooms. This

was particularly so considering the very nature of Haldane's reforms in practice; as will

be shown this amounted to improved organizational structures built upon the foundations

of pre-existing institutions and relationships.

The theme of continuity as explored in this dissertation also reveals an ideological

undercurrent that has largely gone unexplored in military-centered studies. Historians

have been unanimous in describing the Territorial Force as being based on what they term

as a 'nation-in-arms.' The notion of a national army manned by citizens of the state—as

opposed to volunteer or even mercenary armies—originally stemmed from the levee en

masse of Revolutionary France. Throughout the nineteenth century this was refined by

other powers, namely Germany, which likely influenced Haldane's views as he studied

and travelled extensively there.17 The nation-in-arms, as applied to Haldane, departed

from Continental ideals in that rather than through compulsion, he believed that an army

of citizen-soldiers could be raised while retaining the British tradition of voluntary

service. This was to be achieved through fostering a shared sense of patriotic duty

amongst the populace by forging links between military and civilian institutions in each 1 Q

locality throughout Britain.

This study challenges the assertion by scholars that Haldane's reforms failed to

produce a viable nation-in-arms, arguing that a limited form of this was well in existence,

and was only maintained and enhanced by the Territorial Force. This was evident not 17 Spiers, Haldane: An Army Reformer, 29, 33. 18 Richard Burdon Haldane, Second Memorandum, February 1, 1906, Haldane Papers, ms6108A(i), ff.51, National Library of Scotland, Edinburgh [hereafter NLS].

Introduction

only through the composition of local administrative bodies, but also in that many aspects

of Haldane's scheme were to varying degrees co-opted from existing convergences of

military and civilian spheres. As will be discussed in later chapters, in Glasgow this was

sustained by more than and overlapping of individual and institutional affiliations, but

rather built upon a culture of active citizenship; amateur soldiering was but one way in

which a shared, entrenched sense of civic duty was expressed. In sum, this suggests a

reciprocal process—continuity stemming from a limited militarism in Glasgow society,

which in turn was nurtured by a largely unaltered culture of amateur soldiering in the city.

The major context of this study is established industry and urbanization. As by

the early-twentieth century there existed a preponderance of artisans in the wider amateur

soldiering movement. With about seventy per cent of the city's total workforce engaged

in industry, Glasgow provides ample contextual material.19 Since the mid-nineteenth

century, the city's economic identity had been based on its industrial and commercial

strength, particularly in exports. Building upon local innovations, steam power, marine

and heavy engineering were staple industries, accounting for nearly twenty percent of

90

industrial employment by 1911. With massive investments in capital, Glasgow grew

into a major port. An emphasis on transport was felt on land as well—by 1914 the city

19 Graeme Morton and R.J. Morris, "Civil Society, Governance and Nation, 1832-1914," in The New Penguin History of Scotland: From the Earliest Times to the Present Day, eds., R.A. Houston and W.W.J. Knox (London: Penguin, 2001), 400. 20 Richard Rodger, "Employment, Wages and Poverty in the Scottish Cities, 1840-1914," in The Victorian City: A Reader in British Urban History, 1820-1914, eds., R.J. Morris and Richard Rodger (London: Longman, 1993), 90. 21 Andrew Gibb, Glasgow: The Making of a City (London: Croom Helm, 1983), Gibb, 118.

10

Introduction

was the foremost centre of locomotive production in Europe.22 These in turn were linked

to a host of affiliated trades.23 Manufacturing in the city produced goods in a variety of

areas including chemicals, printing, tobacco, and textiles.24 The flow of products and raw

materials to and from Glasgow led to a thriving warehouse sector. The consequential

availability of work (both regular and casual labour) enticed many from throughout

Scotland and elsewhere in the British Isles, in particular Ireland. Richard H. Trainor

states that Glasgow experienced "an especially rapid version of urban expansion during

9 <

the subsequent pre-World War I decades." With employment opportunities offered by

its well-established industrial base, as well as improvements in sanitation and decreasing

infant mortality, the city's population swelled. In 1861, shortly after the creation of the

Volunteer Force, Glasgow's population was nearly 400,000. At the turn of the century

that number had increased to over 760,000. By the onset of the First World War the city

had already eclipsed one million people.27 Consequently, both city boundaries and the

reach of municipal services grew exponentially.28 These numbers also allowed the local

Territorial Association—by 1910 exceeding 9,000 men—to be one of the largest in the

United Kingdom. This is reflected in figures from 1908-1913, which indicate that on

average recruitment from the rank-and-file ('other ranks') was higher than almost all

22 Ibid., 116. 23 John Butt, "The Industries of Glasgow," in Glasgow: Volume II: 1830-1912, eds. W. Hamish Fraser and Irene Maver (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1996), 96-140. 24 Richard Rodger, "The Labour Force," in Glasgow: Volume II: 1830-1912, 182; Gibb, 116. 25 Richard H. Trainor, "The Elite," in Glasgow: Volume II: 1830-1912, 230. 26 T.M. Devine, The Scottish Nation, 1700-2007 (London: Penguin, 2006), 328. 27 Charles Withers, "The Demographic History of the City, 1831-1911," in Glasgow: Volume II: 1830-1912, 158. 28 Irene Maver, "Glasgow's Civic Government," in Glasgow: Volume 11: 1830-1912, 441.

11

Introduction

large districts.

Table 1 - Percentage of Establishment (Other Ranks, October 1) ,29

Association 1908 1909 1910 1911 1912 1913 Average Glasgow 60.2 92.1 90.7 88.2 83.6 74.5

51.6 89.4 85.9 80.5 78.8 73

62.3 85.9 87.8 88.5 83.7 76 .6

67.2 90.2 87.7 85.3 84 .6 75.2

48.1 82.9 82.2 80.1 84.5 74.1

51.8 85.5 80.7 78.4 75.7 73

81.55

76.53

80.8

81.7

75 .32

74 .18

Edinburgh East Lancashire West Lancashire London (City)

London (County)

Lowland District UK Totals

61.3 89.5 87.7 84.8 82.1 76.2

62.4 86.3 85.4 84.3 83.5 78.5

80.26

80.06

This strength in numbers owed in part to a long tradition of voluntary military service

which dated back to the Napoleonic Wars. It is from these various factors—a deep

culture of amateur soldiering, an economy centered in commerce and industry, and large

population—that Glasgow serves as a useful example for a study of this nature.

Despite the promise of a location such as Glasgow, there are some limitations.

One persistent problem that has weighed on this study lie in the available source

material—the part-time commitment of these men to the cause of home defence is

reflected in an inconsistent paper trail. Potentially useful records such as muster rolls,

attestation forms, and recruitment posters are nonexistent. This even extends to the

29 United Kingdom, Annual Returns of the Territorial Force (London: HMSO, 1908); United Kingdom, Annual Returns of the Territorial Force (London: HMSO, 1909); United Kingdom, Annual Returns of the Territorial Force (London: HMSO, 1910); United Kingdom, Annual Returns of the Territorial Force (London: HMSO, 1911); United Kingdom, Annual Returns of the Territorial Force (London: HMSO, 1912); United Kingdom, Annual Returns of the Territorial Force (London: HMSO, 1913) [Hereafter, compiled data from these volumes will be cited 1908-1913, etc.].

12

Introduction

administrative minutes of the Glasgow Territorial Association, as the records of arguably

the two most crucial years of its infancy—1908 and 1914—have gone missing. The time

period in question also presents its own pitfalls, in particular the disappointing lack of

material pertaining to the years 1908-1914 in published histories of regiments and

battalions, of which a substantial body exists.30 Despite the multitude of such works, the

period of Haldane's reforms is treated only in passing, if at all. Rather, these books are

predominantly narratives of campaigns and battles, heroic figures and rolls of honour. In

such works, the formation and early history of the Territorial Force is overlooked, while

the Anglo-Boer War and the First World War are treated at length. Indeed, to most

historians—professional and amateur alike—the First World War has understandably cast

a long shadow. This lack of attention is also present in more recent scholarship

pertaining to Scottish Military History. Diana Henderson's seminal work on the

Highland soldier largely overlooks the early Territorial Force, and while Stephen Wood

remarks as to the comparative strength of Scottish military recruits vis-a-vis England and •y i

Wales, he too pays little attention to these citizen-soldiers.

Nonetheless, even in their limited role, these men actively contributed to the

Scottish martial tradition. Indeed, according to John MacKenzie, by the turn of the

century society as a whole was "pervaded with the military ethos," of which the

30 It is too numerous to cite all. However, Glasgow's Mitchell Library contains a comprehensive index of Scottish regimental histories in its collections. See: G. Anderson and D. McMenemy, 'Wha Daur Meddle Wi Me': A bibliography of Scottish military history in the Mitchell Library (Glasgow: Glasgow Social Sciences Department, Glasgow City Libraries, 1991). 31 Diana M Henderson, Highland Soldier: a Social Study of the Highland Regiments: 1820-1920 (Edinburgh: John Donald, 1989); Stephen Wood, The Scottish Soldier (Manchester: Archive Publications, 1987).

13

Introduction

Volunteers were an expression.32 Lowland Scots' acceptance and eventual co-opting of

Highland militarism contributed to a self-image of being active players in British imperial

• • • 33

expansion, a view to which amateur soldiers such as the Volunteers readily identified.

Reform in 1908 did not weaken such sentiments.

Figure 1- "Support the Territorial Force,<34

32 John M. MacKenzie, Popular Imperialism and the Military, 1850-1950 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1992), 87. 33 Heather Streets, "Identity in the Highland Regiments in the Nineteenth Century: Soldier, Region, Nation" in Steve Murdoch, Andrew Mackillop, eds., Fighting for Identity: Scottish Military Experience c.1550-1900 (Leiden: Koninklijke Brill NV, 2002), 214; T.M. Devine, The Scottish Nation, 1700-2007 (London: Penguin, 2006), 290. 34 Glasgow County Association, 9-10. From the caption: "Gentlemen from London: - 'I wish you would let me poison that wretched Terrier of yours; he will never be anything of a Watch-dog, and I can sell you a beautiful Pomeranian, who can do all sorts of tricks.' Sandy: - 'I'm thinkin' there's some life in the auld dog yet.'"

14

Introduction

In a 1913 recruiting pamphlet published by the Glasgow Territorial Association, a

cartoon depicts the Scottish fighting spirit, directly inferring that these amateur soldiers

were imbued with the same set of qualities as professional soldiers. Unfortunately, their

place in the wider military history has been only sparsely acknowledged in subsequent

scholarship. This study overcomes this gap by piecing-together of material such as

personal papers, government records, administrative minutes and surviving publications

contained in the holdings of various repositories. Those of importance include the

National Library of Scotland, Glasgow's Mitchell Library, the Royal Highland Fusiliers

Museum, the Scottish War Museum, the National Archives at Kew, the National Army

Museum in London, and the National Archives of Scotland.

Although other branches of service are mentioned, this study places an emphasis

on local infantry battalions—in particular the Highland Light Infantry (HLI), the Scottish

Rifles (SR) and their previous incarnations as Volunteer units. Representing the greatest

proportion of men in the early Territorial Force, newspaper coverage centers on their

activities. Further, given their size, it should not come as surprising that the majority of

surviving records are derived from these units. To provide the necessary local

perspective, Glasgow Volunteer and Territorial publications, County Association records

and newspapers such as the Glasgow Herald and The Scotsman are turned to. These are

invaluable in producing a rich body of material with which an analysis of the Territorial

Force in Glasgow can be constructed. To assist in explaining local peculiarities,

additional works from other areas such as Edinburgh are also used. Through these

sources, and despite the inherent challenges associated with the research of amateur 15

Introduction

soldiering, this study examines Glasgow Volunteers during the Anglo-Boer War, the

ensuing debates over military efficiency, the formulation and passage of Haldane's

reforms, the experience of the Territorial soldier, the role of local elites in Haldane's

scheme, and the place of youth in the nation-in-arms.

The first two chapters cover well-trodden ground and feature a lesser local

emphasis than the remainder of the study, yet are important in establishing the context in

which the early Territorial Force in Glasgow can be examined. Chapter One's discussion

of the Volunteer experience in the Anglo-Boer War and the subsequent postwar anxieties

help in developing an appreciation for the continuities that will be later examined. This

conflict is significant in that it was the first time these part-time soldiers engaged in

active duty. The unprecedented opportunity to serve outside their home defence

mandate was reflected in the creation of units such as London's City Imperial Volunteers,

and in areas such as Glasgow, the Volunteer service companies. Contemporary accounts

indicate that the city consistently fulfilled successive requests for willing Volunteers to

serve abroad. Of greater significance is that on account of their service, the war

ultimately served as a means through which the Volunteers' combat worth could be

assessed. Such considerations formed part of subsequent debates as to Britain's home

defence capabilities, which were the product of the unsatisfactory campaign against the

Boers and subsequent invasion fears. It was in this climate of uncertainty that two

postwar Royal Commissions were tasked with reflecting upon the campaign in South

Africa, but also to ascertain the place of the Volunteers in home defence considerations.

These bodies produced an inconclusive, if not unflattering opinion of the Volunteer 16

Introduction

Force—at best requiring months of full-time training in the event of war, and at worst

completely incapable of meeting Continental troops in battle. The subsequent drive for

military efficiency was evident in reform efforts by successive Conservative war

ministers—William St. John Brodrick (1900-1903) and in particular his successor Hugh

Oakeley Arnold-Forster (1903-1905). The vision of reform held by Arnold-Forster

centered on creating a more efficient Force through rationalizing what he viewed as a

bloated, ineffective reserve. Ultimately, his efforts were stymied by those most directly

affected—the Volunteers themselves. In response to what they saw as threats to their

cherished institution, they proved a formidable political force whose lobbying hindered

Arnold-Forster's reform agenda. His failures in the War Office reflected the reality that

any restructuring would have to be accomplished with the support of the Volunteers, and

only undertaken in a manner suitable to them. Through their pressure, one can discern

the early foundations for the continuities with the past, as opposed to wholesale reform,

which characterized the early Territorial Force.

Further setting the stage for comparative analyses found in this study, Chapter

Two focuses on the formulation and early implementation of Haldane's reforms.

Through an examination of sources such as memoranda and parliamentary addresses, one

can discern the evolution of Haldane's vision from an ideal to an end product that in

many regards resembled its predecessor. The Territorial Force as originally conceived

was to act as a true reserve for the regular army, liable for both home defence and

overseas service, and formed on the voluntary principle. It would be sustained through

the development of links between the military and society. This was to be most visibly 17

Introduction

expressed through the County Associations—partially-elected bodies tasked with

administering the TF in each locality. While his scheme offered the benefits of a clearer

organizational structure than had existed hitherto, matters of perception had to be

overcome. Memories of Arnold-Forster's failed bid for reform weighed in Haldane's

own efforts, evident in concerns as to the nature and feasibility of his plans. In this

regard, the opinions of Glasgow Volunteers largely mirrored those held elsewhere and

shed light on the issues that they considered of greatest importance, such as the reliability

of the Volunteers and doubts over placing higher efficiency standards on an at-times fluid

industrial workforce. To placate critics, Haldane adopted a strategy of consultation and

compromise; through this, the Territorial and Reserve Forces Act became law in August

1907. The remainder of the chapter shifts towards a local perspective, examining the

initial implementation of these reforms, including the formation of the Glasgow County

Association as well as efforts to clarify Territorial terms of service amongst sceptical area

Volunteers. On the inauguration of the Territorial Force on April 1 1908, it had been

acknowledged amongst Volunteers who opted to transfer that the nature of service was

not unfamiliar to that to which they had been accustomed—a phenomenon that is further

explored in the next chapter.

The political concessions which Haldane would make in order to secure his Act's

passage is one instance in which theory was at odds with practice, a theme present in

Chapter Three. Adopting a comparative approach, this chapter further tests the notion of

sweeping reform by examining the experience of the average Territorial in matters of

terms of service, drill and training, and the practical difficulties associated with attempts 18

Introduction

to render these amateur soldiers efficient. A central concern to Volunteers on the eve of

the Territorial Force's creation was questions over the anticipated severity of new terms

of service. Given the language of sweeping change leading up to Haldane's reforms,

such reservations were not entirely without merit. However, by comparing both

Volunteer and Territorial regulations, only minor modifications are evident, with the

essential nature of service in the TF remaining the same as its forebear. This is

particularly so in the conduct of annual camps. When viewed alongside those prior to

1908, Glasgow Territorial camps, in a number of ways, fulfilled a similar set of

expectations—preparing men for the cause of home defence as well as offering valuable

recreation. The availability of exercise and social opportunities away from congested

industrial centres was a powerful attraction. However, despite efforts to encourage men

to meet the terms of their enlistment, they were constrained by practical limitations

imposed by the economic realities of industrial centres such as Glasgow. It was from

these considerations that one can see how the part-time military service was at its core a

balancing act, one in which civilian concerns weighed foremost.

The chapter concludes with a discussion of health and physical well-being, and

how this influenced the Territorial experience. This section highlights a contemporary

issue that has gone unacknowledged in previous studies—that in a military/strategic

sense, poor public health in urban centres such as Glasgow was cause for concern, and

reform debates were at times couched in terms of how the amateur soldiering movement

could be a vehicle in which a healthier populace could be achieved. This is evident not

only in the rhetoric and actions of army planners and politicians, but also in Territorial 19

Introduction

terms of service and, after 1908, an emphasis on physical activity and vigour. In all, the

matter of health and amateur soldiering demonstrates how a nation-in-arms provided a

means through which positive societal change could be exacted. However, the

intersecting of military and civilian spheres is of greater utility in explaining how

continuity prevailed, as emphasized in the discussion of Glasgow elites.

Chapter Four marks a transition from evaluating the practical limits of wholesale

reform, to the cultural and institutional foundations of amateur soldiering in Glasgow that

continued to shape and sustain the movement beyond 1908. In particular, this chapter

examines the stance of local elites—city government, organized labour, and

businessmen—as regards the Territorial scheme, and efforts to incorporate these groups

as active participants within it. Previous works have tended to focus on the negative—

why elites, particularly employers, were an obstacle to Territorial recruitment and

retention. The example of Glasgow, however, provides a more nuanced view, detailing

not only potential causes for hostility towards the early Territorial Force, but also and

more importantly factors underpinning cooperation and support. The structure of the

County Associations all but ensured that civic government would take a significant role

in administering and supporting the city's corps. This was most apparent in the place

afforded Lord Provosts, who as association presidents were visible advocates for the

cause of home defence. In the examination of both organized labour and private

employers, a shared tradition of participation in the Volunteer Force is also evident and

builds upon the notion of continuity which linked old and new. The nation-in-arms

concept is further demonstrated in the inclusion of these groups in the County 20

Introduction

Associations as well as initiatives to garner the support of sceptical contemporaries. Elite

support was reinforced by cultural peculiarities of the area, such as a Scottish tradition of

participation in local affairs, and, compared to elsewhere in the United Kingdom, the lack

of instances in which strike actions were quelled through military force. These

considerations were built upon by individual motivations, including a desire for

workplace discipline and personal allegiances to part-time soldiering. Notions of

citizenship are an additionally powerful factor. Catriona Macdonald's study of Scottish

students from 1884-1948 considers citizenship to be among other things, an "active

participation of an individual in, or the active identification of an individual with, a

•7 c

particular community." The presence of Glasgow elites in both the Volunteers and later

the Territorials can be seen as an expression of citizenship through their fulfilling

expected civic duties. In all, this chapter suggests that while concerns such as the

maintenance of regular business operations or threats to labour agitation are important to

understanding the early Territorial Force, the ways in which elite groups could support

amateur soldiering should not go discounted for they help explain why men continued to

devote their time to this movement. Indeed, the shared history of these elements within

Glasgow society help build upon not only the notion of continuity, but also how this was

underpinned by a certain understanding of a nation-in-arms which had been in existence

prior to what is considered to be Haldane's articulation of the concept. This older vision

was the outcome of an intersecting of military and civilian interests that extended to

35 Catriona M.M. Macdonald, '"To Form Citizens': Scottish Students, Governance and Politics, 1884-1948" History of Education 38, no.3 (May 2009): 383.

21

Introduction

future generations, the focus of the next chapter.

Chapter Five's focus on uniformed youth organizations is valuable in further

evaluating the nature of militarism in Glasgow, and both the nation-in-arms and

continuities that developed from this. In particular, an examination of the Officer

Training Corps (OTC) and Boys' Brigade (BB) demonstrates how concerns unrelated to

home defence or military preparedness (e.g. physical improvement, juvenile delinquency)

combined with contemporary militarism laid the foundations at the local level for the

very movements that Haldane later envisioned as a means of producing future

Territorials—officers and rank-and-file alike.

The Officer Training Corps (OTC) was created due to the lack of qualified

officers as identified by the 1904 Norfolk Commission. Based in the public schools and

universities it offered the institutional framework for the future development of Territorial

officers. As this chapter will argue, the Glasgow-based Boys' Brigade was viewed as a

means of producing enlisted men for the Territorial Force. These two examples not only

help in providing a complete account of the early Territorial Force, but also assist in

explaining the social and cultural origins of a nation-in-arms in Glasgow.

In both examples, a strong relationship with the early Territorial Force was the

product of longstanding ties with the city's Volunteers. In the case of the OTC,

Volunteers were actively involved in its predecessor institutions, school cadet corps and

university rifle corps. The BB was founded by Volunteers and adopted methods of drill

and training not unlike that used by the city's rifle corps. As will be shown in this

chapter, continuities stemmed beyond amateur soldiering ties—institutions were formed 22

Introduction

as military solutions to civilian concerns. Beyond these organizational ties lie ideological

considerations. In particular, while other factors such as religious fervour were

paramount, these were influenced by the same notions of active citizenship that

motivated local elites. Indeed, ideals of duty to nation and empire were impressed upon

these boys, evident not least in the rhetoric of distinguished individuals. It is through this

overarching culture of civic participation that lends further weight in explaining why

these groups were viewed as an ideal feeder for the Territorial Force.

The final chapter discusses the multifaceted role undertaken by the Territorial

Force with the outbreak of war in 1914. Drawing minor parallels to the Volunteer

experience fifteen years prior, the Territorial Force was not viewed as a means of

expansion by military leaders; for a host of reasons, it was relegated in favour of

Kitchener's New Armies. For the men of the TF, the journey to the frontlines was instead

a gradual process, beginning with their taking on of their primary home defence role and

later being transferred overseas as losses began to mount. Despite the existence of a

competing body in the New Armies, the influence of amateur soldiering was nonetheless

felt. Using the examples of the 15-17th Highland Light Infantry, this study comes to a

close describing how even if the official structures were not fully utilized, the social and

institutional links which sustained the early Territorial Force could in themselves serve as

a means of fulfilling the obligations of citizenship, allowing men to take up arms.

Considered as a whole, an examination of the early Territorial Force speaks to the

resilience of the intricate social and organizational links which bound industrial urban

societies such as Glasgow, providing an expression of civic identity. Because of this 23

Introduction

interconnectedness the period 1908-1914 should be viewed not as a new beginning or a

complete divorce from the past, but rather part of a greater continuity. The endurance of

Victorian-era approaches to amateur soldiering is particularly telling in light of the

Volunteer experience in the Anglo-Boer War and subsequent calls for sweeping

reforms—themes to which this study now turns.

24

Chapter 1 - The Volunteer Force and the Crisis of the Anglo-Boer War

Like too many other British institutions, the Volunteers, as they exist, are the result of an accident.

Hugh Oakeley Arnold-Forster, 19061

Introduction

The starting point of this study focuses on perceptions of the Volunteer experience in the

Anglo-Boer War, with an emphasis on Glasgow and the city's corps. While this conflict

and its impact on subsequent reform efforts have been addressed by historians, an

examination of both is important to set the scene for later chapters.2 The notion of

continuity in the very practice of amateur soldiering can be best tested in light of the

outcry and perceived sense of crisis over military efficiency which followed the events in

South Africa, opinions that to a significant extent centered on the Volunteer Force

The Anglo-Boer War was a watershed moment in the history of the Volunteer

Force. During this conflict, Britain's largest body of part-time soldiers was first

subjected to the trials of active duty. Prior to this point, the Volunteers were virtually

untested in battle—the emphasis on home defence combined with a less than favourable

reputation amongst army leaders ensured that they were not party to Britain's late-

nineteenth century imperial adventures. Yet, the strains of an unexpectedly protracted

1 Hugh Oakeley Arnold-Forster, The Army in 1906: a Policy and a Vindication, (London: John Murray, 1906), 211. 2 For example, see: Stephen M. Miller, Volunteers on the Veld: Britain's Citizen-Soldiers and the South African War, 1899-1902 (Norman, OK: The University of Oklahoma Press, 2007); Beckett, The Amateur Military Tradition, 198-223.

The Volunteer Force and the Crisis of the Anglo-Boer War

war produced a situation hitherto unknown to these auxiliary soldiers; not only were they

to fulfill their intended purpose of defending the British homeland against foreign threats,

from early 1900 onward the need for men in South Africa had also resulted in the

unprecedented requests for Volunteers to take up service overseas.

At the local level, the industrial centre of Glasgow was well-suited for these

challenges. While a well-established Volunteer tradition made Glasgow a promising

source for willing men, as suggested in various public displays that took place in these

years, the war also spurred a popular patriotism that permeated local society. Combined,

these factors meant that the repeated calls throughout the war for reinforcements from the

city's Volunteer Force would be consistently met. Indeed, in later reassessments of the

war effort, the initiative of Glasgow's corps was singled out as the model for other

locales to follow. The enthusiasm that marked the early phases of the Anglo-Boer War

forms parallels with those witnessed during the initial months of the First World War,

and masks the comparative lack of interest of the general public towards part-time

soldiering in the peaceful interim years. It also contrasts the suspicions of this type of

military service that coalesced in the wake of the events in South Africa.

The ebb and flow of national sentiment would prove to be of great significance to

the Volunteer movement. The optimism that characterized the outbreak of war in 1899

eventually turned into biting criticisms towards the government and military planners as

the expected quick victory failed to materialize. What was initially viewed as a relatively

painless effort to assert British dominance in South Africa became a drawn-out struggle



against a determined foe—one which drew soldiers from throughout the Empire, and was

only effectively settled with the use of heavy-handed force against the entire Boer

population.4 The length of the war, and the means by which Britain ultimately achieved

victory stirred anxieties at home over the nation's ability to defend itself, especially in

light of intensifying great power rivalries. In other words, the question which sprang

forth was if fighting a rag-tag body of farmers on the veld required the resources of the

entire British Empire, what were Britain's prospects to be in a conflict against

Continental powers? In response to such unease, the Elgin Commission of 1903-1904

was formed, charged with identifying the army's shortcomings during the prosecution of

the war, and offering recommendations as to how any defects could be corrected.

Part-time soldiers such as the Volunteers did not escape criticism, and their

wartime experience would form part of a wider debate over the value of these men in

Britain's home defence structure. A focus on the Volunteers' role in that conflict is

valuable in that it served as the first opportunity to evaluate their true worth as soldiers.

Though lauded for their patriotism and service to the nation, the overall lack of battle

readiness of Volunteer corps was repeatedly cited; the latter was a continual refrain of a

concurrent investigation, the Norfolk Commission, which was created in order to

ascertain deficiencies in home defence structures and offer recommendations as to how

they could be rectified. In particular it was tasked with evaluating the current state of

4 Andre Wessels, "Afrikaners at War," in The Anglo-Boer War: Direction, Experience and Image, ed. John Gooch (London: Frank Cass, 2000), 101-102. For a recent historiography of the application of total war in South Africa, see: Bill Nasson, "Waging Total War in South Africa: Some Centenary Writings on the Anglo-Boer War, 1899-1902," The Journal of Military History 66, no.2 (July 2002): 813-828.

27


those responsible for protecting Britain's shores—the Militia and the Volunteers.5 These

Commissions and the period following their establishment were marked by measures to

foster greater confidence in the Volunteer Force's capabilities. Despite the general

themes of reform and uncertainty suggested by the Royal Commissions, the issue of

improving the Volunteers failed to draw the nation's attention. Rather, subsequent

discussions were overwhelmingly the domain of politicians, army officials, and those

affected by any such measures; in other words, the general public largely abstained from

these debates. The drive for reform was directed by successive Conservative Secretaries

of State for War—St. John Brodrick and Hugh Oakley Arnold-Forster; in that regard,

attempts at change were directed from the top down. Yet, their effect was limited.

Producing a more efficient auxiliary force was met with resistance, largely stemming

from the Volunteers' political lobbying. Their suspicion regarding any changes in the

status quo resulted in the matter being left to the Liberal Party, which would come to

power in late 1905. In all, the reaction to the Anglo-Boer War and the subsequent reform

efforts of Brodrick and Arnold-Forster sets the stage for an analysis of contemporary

concerns over Volunteer efficiency brought to the fore by the Royal Commissions. While

in themselves a potential catalyst for change, they were ultimately conditioned by

those—in Glasgow and elsewhere—who were the very targets of reform. Although it is

likely arguable that reforms would have ultimately been achieved, this process was

accelerated by the experience and legacy of the Anglo-Boer War.

5 United Kingdom, Report of the Royal Commission on the Militia and Volunteers: presented to both Houses of Parliament by command of His Majesty (London: HMSO, 1904).

28


The Volunteer Experience in South Africa: A Necessary Experiment

The Volunteer Force at the outset of the Anglo-Boer War held an ambiguous place in

British society. Although naturally affected by socioeconomic changes which took place

in the decades since its inception—the most prominent of which being an increasing

working class participation—the Volunteers nonetheless retained decades-old

characteristics. Their place in Britain's home defence arrangement was enshrined in the

1863 Volunteer Act, which instituted limited government grants to the nation's corps.6

The enthusiasm of middle-class men to join the Volunteer rank-and-file gradually gave

way after these initial years, so that by the turn of the century, artisans had long

comprised the bulk of the Volunteer Force. According to Cunningham and later Beckett,

the closest source of such data approaching the time period of this study comes from the

1904 Norfolk Commission, which indicates that 'Artisans' comprised 35.5% of the rank-

and-file. 7 Drills, shooting competitions, and annual camps were conducted with

regularity, and for decades the Volunteers were a common feature in route marches and

public displays—events which linked the civilian and military spheres. This

phenomenon was also evident in the variety of social outlets offered through service,

6 Cunningham, 26-27. At its outset, the Volunteer Force was conceived as a temporary measure. Although the Act marked the permanent establishment of the Volunteers through government funding, Ian Beckett argues that "the seeds of permanency were already becoming evident by the close of 1859." See: Beckett, Riflemen Form, 34. 7 Hard numerical evidence of the social composition of the Volunteer Force is very scarce. According to Cunningham, the closest source of such data approaching the time period of this study comes from the 1904 Norfolk Commission (Cunningham, 57), which indicates that 'Artisans' comprised 35.5% of the rank-and-file, while 'Factory Hands' (12.9%), 'Clerks' (9.6), and 'Town Labourers' (8.6) form the next greatest percentage of men (Beckett, Riflemen Form, 83). While available records for Glasgow are nonexistent, Chapter Three later suggests that the city's Volunteers represented an intensified example of this wider demographic trend.

29


including banquets, concerts and balls.8 Through these activities the Volunteer Force was

by this period an established part of late-Victorian civic life, a fact that was reinforced by

the numerical strength of the movement. Indeed, these men were a visible expression of

the Scottish martial tradition, and according to Henderson their movement "became an

important part of Scottish social life in the second half of the nineteenth century."9

Available figures suggest that at best by 1900 Volunteer enrolment had achieved a

state of equilibrium. During the preceding decade, the Force's overall numbers remained

fairly constant. The total strength of the Scottish Volunteer corps in the 1890s ranged

from a low of 49,000 (1892) to its highest at 51,205 (1896).10 The UK-wide figures

suggest a similar pattern, with a low of 221,048 in 1890 and a high of 236,059 also in

1896.11 To the thousands of men who took up arms on a part-time basis, they were part

of a movement that bridged the rigid class barriers that defined late-Victorian society.

According to Beckett, "the Volunteer Movement was a cohesive factor in that it tended to

draw the differing classes which composed its strength together."12 At its most basic

level, this is evidenced in the largely working class rank-and-file, led by a middle class

8 Excellent examples can be found in the 1905 book Glasgow Men and Women, a diary of sketches from everyday life in the city. This volume includes scenes from a 'Volunteer Bazaar,' an evening ball - 'A Gathering of the 1st L.R.V.,' and 'A Regimental Soiree.' See: A.S. Boyd, Glasgow Men and Women, their Children and some Strangers within their Gates (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1905). 9 Henderson, 31. 10 James Moncrieff Grierson, Records of the Scottish Volunteer Force, 1859-1908 (London: William Blackwood & Sons, 1909), 367. To an extent this coincides with UK-wide figures provided by Cunningham, which indicate a steady increase during that decade. See: Cunningham, 105. In both instances the Anglo-Boer War marked a dramatic growth in Volunteer strength. 11 G.S. Clarke, "Territorial Forces. Volunteers, Yeomanry, &c." (April 3, 1906), Committee of Imperial Defence: Miscellaneous Correspondence and Memoranda, CAB 17/18: 13, TNA. 12 Beckett, Riflemen Form, 118. This sentiment is periodically acknowledged in Parliamentary debates. For example, by the late 1870s, proposals to expand the Volunteer movement to Ireland was argued as beneficial, as it would "draw the different classes together in Ireland much in the same way" as in Britain. Hansard Parliamentary Debates, 3d ser., vol. 245 (1879), col. 1907.

30


pool of officers. While patriotism was important in the formation and continued

existence of the movement, amateur soldiering as a social outlet was an equally (if not

more) powerful factor. Such civilian considerations, combined with the part-time level of

participation amongst its members, and most importantly the simple fact that they had yet

to see combat, played to the perception that it acted as a means for one to look the part of

a soldier, yet not truly serve as one.13 Such was the state of affairs in the Volunteer Force

upon the commencement of hostilities in South Africa in October 1899.

That month witnessed the collapse of the uneasy truce with the Boer Republics

that had been in place since 1881. This was caused by the failure to resolve disputes over

the rights of foreign settlers in Boer-administered lands, particularly in the Transvaal,

where substantial mineral resources had been discovered. There, the Uitlanders

(foreigners lured by the area's mining potential) comprised the majority of white settlers,

but were denied basic civil rights. Britain's indignation over the treatment of Uitlanders

only masked the true casus belli—in this case, Britain's desire to consolidate its

ascendancy in South Africa.14 To place pressure upon the Boer leadership, Britain

reinforced its garrisons in South Africa. The Boers responded by issuing an ultimatum

demanding the withdrawal of troops from frontier regions and the removal of

13 For instance, to his fellow parliamentarians, one MP Colonel stated that on the grounds of its unwieldy nature and lack of a clear function, "The Volunteer force is, rather unfairly, included in the calculations made as to our military forces." See: Hansard, 4th ser., vol. 55 (1898), col. 1026. 14 The causes for war are much more complex than the overview provided in this study. For more detailed recent treatments of this contentious topic, see: Iain R. Smith, The Origins of the South African War 1899-1902 (London: Longman, 1996); Denis Judd and Keith Surridge, The Boer War (London: John Murray, 2002), 17-54. In a sense, concern over these settlers draws strong parallels to Britain's rationale for war in 1914—that is, to protect Belgium from German atrocities.

31


reinforcements. With its inevitable rejection, open conflict had become unavoidable.15

The initiation of hostilities would in three months' time lead to the Volunteer Force being

called to fight. However, on account of prevailing military opinion as to military might

vis-a-vis the Boers, these developments were, for the time being, of little direct concern

to the Volunteers.

On the British home front, the declaration of war was marked by an upwelling of

patriotic fervour. With war fever spreading the nation, the military drew widespread

attention. This was a period of great patriotic passions and Britons were keen on building

upon the imperial triumphs that characterized much of the Victorian era.16 This optimism

was reflected in the continual stream of newspaper accounts detailing mobilization efforts

to a news-hungry public. Major Scottish newspapers such as the Glasgow Herald and

The Scotsman were adamantly pro-war.17 Indeed, the press was "quick to arouse public

demand for news of the fight against the rebellious Boers."18 The war was immediately

couched in terms of not only maintaining British suzerainty, but also as a noble

endeavour—to dispense justice of behalf of the Queen's subjects victimized by Boer

greed and arrogance.19 Appealing to the public's sense of national superiority, the Boers

15 Edward M. Spiers, The Army and Society 1815-1914. (New York: Longman, 1980), 237. 16 Robert H. MacDonald, The language of empire: myths and metaphors ofpopular imperialism, 1880-1918 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1994), 83. Indeed, it has been more recently argued that "the Victorian army.. .was in fact instrumental in shaping late Victorian British popular culture.. .a more aggressively imperial state." See: Heather Streets, Martial races: the military, race and masculinity in British imperial culture, 1857-1914 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004), 117. 17 Stewart J. Brown, '"Echoes of Midlothian': Scottish Liberalism and the South African War, 1899-1902" Scottish Historical Review LXXI, no. 1-2 (April, October, 1992): 169. 18 Phillip Knightley, The First Casualty: The War Correspondent as Hero and Myth-Maker from the Crimea to Iraq. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004), 68. 19 The Times, October 12, 1899.

32


were maligned as an alien, uncivilized race responsible for having sparked the conflict.20

Given increasing European rivalries, particularly Boer overtures to Germany, these

perceived injustices were seen as all the more dire, as failing to act in South Africa could

encourage Britain's great power rivals.

On the whole, it was reported that during the first weeks of October 1899 spirits

were high, as mobilization efforts were described by the Times as being carried out with

"great energy and promptitude," while the Scotsman noted "a good deal of bustle and

excitement."21 Scottish units, like those hailing from elsewhere in the United Kingdom,

departed to great public enthusiasm.22 This was reflected in Glasgow, as its citizens

made efforts to demonstrate their approval of military action in South Africa. As 'The

Transvaal Crisis' descended into open conflict local leaders and civic groups such as the

Free Presbytery and Glasgow Trades House promptly adopted stances in support of the

government.23 This approval was also exhibited in the form of monetary support for

soldiers' families. For example, in October 1899 the Glasgow Corporation's Watching

and Lighting Committee pledged one shilling per month to the wives of employees who

took up service in the army.24 That same month the Lord Provost of Glasgow also

20 Miller, Volunteers on the Veld, 39. Even war correspondents en route to Cape Colony were brimming with optimism; See R.J. Wilkinson-Latham, From our Special Correspondent: Victorian War Correspondents and their Campaigns. (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1979), 249. 21 The Times, October 12, 1899; The Scotsman, October 7, 1899. 22 Edward M. Spiers, "The Scottish Soldier in the Anglo-Boer War," in The Anglo-Boer War: Direction, Experience and Image, ed., John Gooch (London: Frank Cass, 2000), 153. Spiers argues that a sense of Imperial mission fuelled this initial support for the war, a sentiment that was only furthered with the shock defeats during the Black Week of 1899. However, notable pro-Boer sentiment existed within Scottish political circles—in particular the Liberal Party—leading to substantial infighting which in turn led to Conservative gains in this traditional Liberal stronghold. See: Brown, 171. 23 The Scotsman, October 4, 1899; October 12, 1899. 24 Ibid., October 17, 1899.

33


contributed to aid efforts, donating £12,000 to the Lord Mayor of London's relief

9S

committee for Transvaal refugees. By November, various other segments of

Glaswegian society, including artists, collieries, and local railway companies, also gave 9 (\

to relief funds. These groups could surely afford to do so, for open hostilities brought

an economic boom in the form of "lucrative military contracts, jobs and higher wages" to

the city and the West of Scotland as a whole.

As existing soldiers made their preparations, their ranks were swelled with new

faces. The Scotsman remarked that "recruiting proceeds apace," even although many

were being turned away as either unfit or too young.28 Yet, public enthusiasm was most

pronounced in city celebrations as local battalions embarked for service. The Glasgow

departure of the 2nd battalion Scottish Rifles was greeted by an enthusiastic public.

According to one correspondent:

All along the route, from the barracks to the docks, the streets were densely packed, and the troops made a slow and somewhat straggling passage. So great was the crush at many points that soldiers and civilians were inextricably mixed, and the police, who seemed to be out in too small a force were powerless to keep order ... several women and girls were rescued in a fainting condition.29

The march also featured the playing of 'Scotland the Brave,' the waving of union jacks,

and even an invasion of sorts by more daring citizens as they scaled the Maryhill

Barracks' walls to gain a glimpse of their heroes. There, "the noise became so great that

25 Ibid., October 31, 1899. 26 Ibid., November 17, 1899. 27 Brown, 163. 28 The Scotsman, October 21, 1899. 29 Ibid., October 24, 1899.

34


the strains of the bands were entirely drowned."30 These celebrations were the result of

what Spiers describes as "passions evoked by the war in a way that had never been

possible in previous imperial conflicts."31 Yet, this should not come as unexpected, given

the (aforementioned) heightened popular esteem for the army which was achieved in part

through empire-building. Only war could provide a vehicle through which these passions

could be expressed.

At this early juncture, many amongst the nation's largest body of part-time

soldiers—the Volunteers—were eager to serve abroad. For example, in Edinburgh, an

"extensively signed" petition was circulated amongst the Duke of Edinburgh's

Volunteers requesting active service in South Africa.32 Elsewhere, the London Scottish

and the Queen's Westminsters had also offered their services.33 For the Volunteer Force,

its ultimate involvement in the war effort would be a watershed moment, as for the first

time in its nearly forty-year history its members would participate in active duty.34 Yet,

the upwelling of patriotism did not necessarily translate into massive numbers of men

who took up arms. Of the 17,559 officers and 430,876 men of the British forces in total

who served in South Africa during the war, 589 and 19,161 (or three and four per cent,

respectively) represented those from the Volunteer Force. Nonetheless, despite that

30 Ibid. 31 Edward M. Spiers, The Scottish Soldier and Empire, 1854-1902. (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2006), 189. 32 The Scotsman, October 7, 1899. 33 Halik Kochanski, "Wolseley and the South African War," in The Anglo-Boer War, 66; Beckett, Riflemen Form, 211. 34 Cunningham, 127. There were isolated instances of Volunteers offering their services in prior imperial conflicts, though not accepted. 35 United Kingdom, Minutes of Evidence taken before the Royal Commission on the War in South Africa, Vol.1 (London: HMSO, 1903), #5476 [Note: For citation purposes, with the exception of appendices, entry

35


such figures would be cited by the Volunteer Force's detractors after the war, the

experience of those who did take up arms was important, and can be seen as an

inspiration of sorts for later reforms which envisioned the Volunteers becoming less of a

home defence force and more of a bona fide second line.

The early months of the Anglo-Boer War were a frustrating time for Volunteers

eager to prove their worth to the nation. While all of Scotland's regiments had been

ordered to South Africa, willing Volunteers found it difficult to join their compatriots.

That they were offered no encouragement to do so reflected widely shared beliefs within

the military leadership as to their utility. This stemmed first of all from an optimistic

view that in no way would reserves be required to ensure victory.37 Secondly, and of

greater importance, the Volunteer terms of service only called for them to serve at

home.38 This was a key characteristic of the Volunteer Force, as its mandate was

singularly one of home defence. Lastly, evidenced in the multitude of social and

recreational avenues available to those who enrolled, there was the longstanding

perception of the Force by military commanders as not being a serious military pursuit.39

As such, the government made no plans for their deployment abroad.40 The Secretary for

State for War Lord Landsdowne, in an October speech in Manchester, stated that the War

numbers are used instead of page references. This is so not only because it is more precise, but also it is the format used in Commission indices.]; United Kingdom, Minutes of Evidence taken before the Royal Commission on the War in South Africa, Vol.4 (London: HMSO, 1903), 98 (Appendix #5). 36 The Scotsman, October 14, 1899. 37 Beckett, The Amateur Military Tradition, 200. 38 Kochanski, 66; Cunningham, 128. 39 Beckett, Riflemen Form, 96. 40 Minutes of Evidence ... War in South Africa, Vol.1, #7636-7637.

36


Office recognized the position held by the Volunteers in the nation's defence.41 Later

that month, when asked if willing members of the Volunteer Force would be allowed to

serve, Undersecretary of State for War George Wyndham replied that by law Volunteers

could not be used outside the United Kingdom, and that if so compelled, they were

welcome to enlist in the regular army. He concluded by stating that "there does not

appear to be any immediate prospect that their services will be required."42

This confidence would be challenged with the infamous 'Black Week' of

December 1899. The 9-15th of that month witnessed a series of humiliating defeats

inflicted upon the British army by their Boer adversaries. The glowing optimism that

accompanied the early phases of the war was dashed by a rapid succession of Boer

victories at Stormberg, Magersfontein, and Colenso. At Stormberg, communications

failures led to 25 killed, 110 wounded and 561 captured. The march of Lord Methuen's

force towards Kimberley was stalled at Magersfontein. There, 947 British were killed,

wounded or missing. The Times described Methuen's failure there as "the most serious

event that the war has yet produced."43 It later determined that the battle "gravely

compromised the military situation."44 The Black Week reached its conclusion with the

failed assault at Colenso (143 killed, 742 wounded, 221 captured), which was reported as

a "serious reverse."45 In this span of several days, the notion that a collection of farmers

would be easily defeated was swept aside. While some accused the British press of

41 The Scotsman, October 11, 1899. 42 Ibid., October 27, 1899. 43 The Times, December 14, 1899. 44 Ibid., December 18, 1899. 45 Stephen M. Miller, "In Support of the 'Imperial Mission'? Volunteering for the South African War, 1899-1902," The Journal of Military History 69, no. 3 (2005): 692; The Times, December 16, 1899.

37


sensationalizing these losses, and thus magnifying their significance, the unanticipated

number of casualties at this early stage could not be as easily dismissed.46 From such

losses, the official stance against allowing amateur soldiers to join the war effort was

altered. After Magersfontein, The Times declared that "it is necessary to call up the

whole of the available Reserves in this country, and to turn the Militia and Volunteers to

account."47

The sense of alarm, political pressures, and the simple need for increased numbers

resulted in the official acquiescence to Volunteer offers of service, namely through a

series of special army orders that relaxed regulations which hitherto prohibited the

Volunteers from overseas duty.48 This initially materialized in the form of London's

special City Imperial Volunteers (CIV) regiment, and the later Volunteer service

companies which were formed throughout the whole of Britain. That there was no single

way of drawing reserves from the Volunteer Force reflected this improvised response

from the War Office, which in turn would be cause for concern in the subsequent years.

Authorized on December 15, the CIV were the first to take up arms, and stood as the only

all-Volunteer regiment to serve in the war. Of greater importance to the rest of Britain

was the additional government decree calling for the creation of service companies

comprised of 110 rank-and-file, along with one captain and three subalterns. Unlike the

46 Wilkinson-Latham, 263; Edward M. Spiers, The Late Victorian Army, 1868-1902. (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1992), 309; Minutes of Evidence ... War in South Africa, Vol.4, 377-378 (Appendix #55). 47 The Times, December 14, 1899. 48 Of particular importance were the special army orders: "Formation of 'The City of London Imperial Volunteers'" and "Volunteer Companies for Service in South Africa" (both dated January 2, 1900). Minutes of Evidence ... War in South Africa, Vol.4, Appendix #14, 154.

38


CIV, which was a standalone Volunteer regiment, these companies would be drawn from

Volunteer corps in each locality to be attached to their respective line battalion. In

addition, reserve companies were to be raised and maintained.49

Throughout Britain, early word of the decision to allow auxiliary forces to take up

active duty was met with great public approval. The Scotsman reported that despite no

official notice regarding conditions of service for these companies having been received,

local regiments witnessed "a steady stream of applicants ... for active service abroad, or,

failing that, garrison duty."50 Weeks later in Glasgow, Colonel R.C. Mackenzie, at the

annual gathering of the 1st Volunteer Battalion Highland Light Infantry (VBHLI),

optimistically proclaimed that: "The greatest day which the Volunteers had ever known

was the one on which it was announced that they would be allowed to serve with the

regular army."51 The enthusiasm for joining the service companies was shared elsewhere

as the initial call for men from the Volunteer ranks was met with overwhelming

numbers.52

Official War Office instructions of January 1900 confirmed reports weeks earlier.

It was established that two Glasgow service companies were to be created, a total of 226

49 The Scotsman, December 20, 1899. While Volunteer service companies were being created, the official order permitting their formation was not issued until 2 January 1900. United Kingdom, Report of His Majesty's Commissioners Appointed to Inquire into the Military Preparations and other Matters Connected with the War in South Africa. (London: HMSO, 1903), 67. The actual order can be found in the Commission's appendix volume. See: Minutes of Evidence ... War in South Africa, Vol.4, Appendix #14, 154 50 The Scotsman, December 20, 1899. 51 Glasgow Herald, December 29, 1899. Per a Special Army Order, these service companies would take up active duty as part of regular army regiments. This was evidenced in pay, whereby "each Volunteer will receive from date of enlistment, pay and allowances of his rank as an infantryman of the Regular Forces." See: Minutes of Evidence ... War in South Africa, Vol.4, Appendix #14, 154 52 Miller, Volunteers on the Veld, 58.

39


men derived from battalions associated with the Scottish Rifles (SR) and the Highland

Light Infantry (HLI). Along the same pattern, two reserve 'waiting' companies were also

to be formed. Enthusiasm towards the opportunity to serve at that early stage was noted

in that "the number who have volunteered is far in excess of the War Office demands."

A letter to the Glasgow Herald stated that by virtue of the city's longstanding tradition of

Volunteer soldiering, "the few hundreds which are asked for could be got many times

over."54 Volunteer wartime participation was attributed to a varied set of motives,

including patriotism, the pursuit of adventure and the unknown, peer pressure, and

economic motives such as employment.55 Such forces to varying degrees continued to

factor in participation in the Volunteer—and later Territorial—Force, although the

adventure concomitant with front-line duty would obviously not be achieved in

peacetime. A similar set of social and economic factors were inescapable components of

the general amateur soldering experience, and will be explored later in this study.

A week later (December 29), it was revealed that selecting potential active duty

soldiers from amongst interested Volunteers would be a more rigorous process than was

anticipated. Indeed, army qualifications proved a formidable obstacle: overseas service

for Volunteers was restricted to unmarried men 20-35 years of age with at least two years

53 Glasgow Herald, December 21, 1899. This information was made available to the press at this early date, even though the official War Office order would not be issued until January 2, 1900. Further, the total of 226 is roughly double that authorized by the special army order (116 for each line battalion). This is likely so as to reflect the two Regular battalions in Glasgow. 54 Ibid., January 3, 1900. 55 Spiers, Scottish Soldier and Empire, 183.

40


of efficiency, and who demonstrated good physique and marksmanship.56 Given the

perennial difficulties plaguing the Volunteer Force, namely absenteeism at drills and

camp, along with substandard physical health (matters that will be treated in chapter

three), it is certain that such conditions weeded-out more than a few potential soldiers.

Further, the numerical limits imposed by the War Office on the service battalions also

allowed commanding officers to deny willing, though undesirable, men.57

Those Glasgow Volunteers who had fulfilled requirements and were selected for

overseas duty were ordered to relinquish their civilian occupations. The men destined for

the waiting companies would not have to do the same until called upon.58 As the

Glasgow Herald reported: "The men, a number of whom have already seen foreign

service in regiments of the line, are the very pick of the Glasgow volunteers so far as

physique is concerned."59 As they were officially in active service, those sent abroad

were entitled to soldier's pay of one shilling, four pence, while reservists earned six

pence a day.60 The first contingent of service Volunteers left Glasgow on January 16 for

nearby Hamilton, having been entertained to dinner the night before by their

commanding officers. Their sending-off was described as "very hearty" by "crowds of

people."61 This marked a general pattern of civic enthusiasm towards Scotland's citizen-

56 Glasgow Herald, December 29, 1899. Physical measurements were the same as in the Regular Army. The Times July 11, 1900. Unmarried men were preferred given potential costs, in particular separation allowances and widows' pensions. Minutes of Evidence ... War in South Africa, Vol.1, #7438. 37 Miller, Volunteers on the Veld, 79. 58 The Scotsman, January 11, 1900. 59 Glasgow Herald, January 17, 1900. 60 Ibid., January 10, 1900. The rate of soldiers pay is suggested in a House of Commons debate, whereby the pay discrepancy between British and colonial troops was noted. Hansard, 4th ser., vol. 80 (1900), col. 1267. 61 Glasgow Herald, January 17, 1900.

41


soldiers embarking for South Africa, which suggests that local patriotism during the war

extended beyond the regular army, encompassing the whole of the British forces

irrespective of background—even those branches that had garnered a less-than-

favourable reputation prior to hostilities.

While riflemen, by virtue of their numbers, garnered the greatest attention,

detachments from Volunteer medical and engineering corps (called under separate army

orders) actively participated in the war effort as well, also enjoying public support for

their efforts. Volunteer cyclist companies were called to form in January 1901, one of

which was comprised of men from Scottish battalions.62 Local medics were also allowed

to enlist as part of the Royal Army Medical Corps.63 The February 1900 departure from

Glasgow of the city's last detachment of Volunteers—the service section of the Lanark

Royal Engineers—proved a moment of great fanfare, as they were treated to an

enthusiastic send-off from their fellow citizens.64

After the winter of 1900, events for the Volunteers followed a less rapid pace than

had been experienced in the wake of the Black Week. Once large numbers of Volunteers

had begun to arrive in South Africa, the conflict was already changing form, from

conventional fighting to guerrilla warfare.65 Those men of Volunteer service companies

who arrived early enough took part in operations against the Boers in Bloemfontein and

Ladysmith, both in February 1900.66 Despite these advances, the pressures of pacifying

62 Grierson, 93. 63 Glasgow Herald, February 16, 1900. 64 Ibid., February 26, 1900. 65 Miller, Volunteers on the Veld, 96-7. 66 Ibid., 102.

42


the countryside against a determined and mobile foe were apparent. With large stretches

of undefended land, railways, supply columns and outposts continued to be vulnerable to

fn

surprise Boer assaults. Indeed, the need for men to take on the more mundane (though

important) duties associated with quelling the enemy, such as manning blockhouses and

guarding convoys led to further calls for men from amongst the Volunteer corps. As

early as April 1900, it was clear that more troops were required and notices were issued

throughout the country calling up reservists. The city's enthusiasm for the war effort

continued in later drafts (though as will be highlighted in postwar Commissions, this was

by no means universal throughout the United Kingdom). For the second draft, forty of

Glasgow's Volunteers were thus brought into active service, while anti-war meetings that

spring were violently broken up by 'jingo mobs.' After the summer of 1900, the British

had taken all major South African population centres and proceeded to stamp out

remaining Boer resistance. Additional calls were made in the winter of 1901, as

replacements were needed for those returning home.69 It is to be noted that "many men

who had served in the service companies of the first call.. .rejoined the third call

companies."70 As late as March 1902, Scottish Volunteer units were being sent to South

Africa.71 It was by this point that much of their duties were associated with Kitchener's 67 Judd and Surridge, 187. 68 The Scotsman, April 12, 1900; Brown, 168. According to Spiers, 'pro-Boer' sentiment was spurred by a number of factors: while anti-imperialism was one motivation, the majority of those in Scotland opposed to the conflict were so because they considered it as being "avoidable, and therefore unjust, immoral and potentially costly, diverting resources from social reforms at home." Spiers, Scottish Soldier and Empire, 159. 69 The Scotsman, January 17, 1901; March 7, 1901. In the former, confidence is expressed towards ability to find men. 70 Grierson, 94. 71 Spiers, "The Scottish Soldier in the Anglo-Boer War," 162.

43


'scorched earth' policy of destroying farms, homesteads and livestock. Nonetheless, as

one Glasgow Volunteer officer would later attest, "there was no difficulty in getting fit

men to do the work."72

At home, despite a growing war-weariness which was felt throughout Britain as

the conflict dragged on, the support of both civilians and those Volunteers who stayed

behind had continued unabated, and was of a similar nature to that experienced

throughout Scotland.73 A fundraising drive by local Volunteer battalions in Glasgow in

March 1900 had raised over £583 for various charities, including war funds for local

regulars, the Red Cross, and the Soldiers' and Sailors' Families Association.74 Parades

were the most conspicuous wartime expression of patriotism and solidarity, though this

sentiment was also felt in other celebrations organized by local leaders. In January 1900

the City Corporation approved a motion to hold a public meeting during which those

from Volunteer service companies would "receive from parties who might be chosen

expressions of the city's gratification at the public spirit they had shown."75 Their return

from duty was well-received, with the Glasgow magistrates in one instance holding a

large reception for those who had returned from South Africa. In public speeches the

selfless patriotism of these individuals was particularly lauded. Lord Provost Samuel

72 United Kingdom, Minutes of Evidence taken before the Royal Commission on the Militia and Volunteers, Vol.1 (London: HMSO, 1904), #11017. 73 Miller, Volunteers on the Veld, 148; Spiers, Scottish Soldier and Empire, 163. According to Spiers, the return of the Volunteer units, compared to regulars, "was completely different. Units did not merely march to depots past crowded streets and displays of flags and bunting, but they also dispersed in sections or smaller groups back to the own communities, so that the scenes of welcome, patriotic celebrations and rousing speeches rippled across the country" (189). 74 Glasgow Herald, March 3, 1900. 75 The Scotsman, January 5, 1900. 76 Ibid., May 23, 1901.

44


Chisholm described the Volunteers as "strong, manly citizens, interested in the welfare of

the city and country."77 Similarly, the Reverend Dr. Blair of St John's Edinburgh,

presiding over a church parade in Glasgow, described the conflict as the way by which

God himself spoke to the nation. Blair singled out "the bravery and endurance of the

Volunteer forces" as evidence of His divine knowledge.78 Colonel Rutherford, at the

annual gathering of the Third Lanarkshire Volunteers in January 1902, stated that through

their service in South Africa, the Volunteers "had brought this on themselves. Years ago

they wanted to be soldiers; and to-day they were not only soldiers, but they had proved

it."79 That spring, at an Edinburgh dinner celebrating Scotland's leading Volunteer

marksmen, Colonel Cranston argued that the Volunteers "who forty years ago were

laughed at by the public, the Press, and the Army, had willingly and well filled the places

of their Army comrades who had fallen."80 These events and speeches, along with the

wartime expressions of solidarity, serve as testament to the degree of local support given

to their citizen-soldiers for the services they were seen as rendering on behalf of the

nation and empire.

77 Ibid., December 7, 1901. As later written in a biographical account of the Lord Provost, "The city's acknowledgment of the patriotism of the Volunteers for the front, the numerous meetings, general and sectional, in connection therewith, to give them a send off, and to give those returning a welcome home, made no slight demand upon the Lord Provost's time." George Eyre-Todd, Who's Who in Glasgow: A biographical dictionary of nearly five hundred living Glasgow citizens and of notable citizens who have died since 1st January, 1907, (Glasgow: Gowans & Gray Limited, 1909), under "Who's Who in Glasgow in 1909," http://gdl.cdlr.strath.ac.uk/eyrwho/eyrwho0414.htm (accessed May 3, 2010). 78 The Scotsman, May 27, 1901. 79 Ibid., January 7, 1902. 80 Ibid., April 21, 1902.

45

http://gdl.cdlr.strath.ac.uk/eyrwho/eyrwho0414.htm


After the peace had been secured, Scotland's Volunteers were greeted warmly in

vast numbers by their countrymen, evidenced in celebrations marking their return.81

These celebrations were of the same nature as those that took place during the war,

characterized by parades, receptions, and speeches applauding their service to King and

Empire.82 The reception enjoyed by these men stood in stark contrast to the earlier

widely-held assumption of the Volunteers' inability to effectively take on an active

combat role. Those who arrived after the initial call for service companies earned

"largely positive reports from the front despite encountering some scepticism at first."

Indeed, contemporary sources suggest that the city's Volunteers had executed their duties

in South Africa sufficiently well.84 A 1903 pamphlet, The British Volunteers in South

Africa: What they did and how they did it features praise for Volunteer units during the

war—including those from Glasgow. One commanding officer remarked as to the

quality of men in his column who had belonged the First Lanarkshire Rifle Volunteers:

81 Spiers, Scottish Soldier and Empire, 196. 82 Ibid., 203-4. According to Spiers: "As in the war, civic dignitaries greeted these Volunteers, who often followed pipe bands through crowded streets, bedecked with flags and bunting, to formal receptions, civic lunches and the presentation of medals in subsequent ceremonies." 83 Spiers, Scottish Soldier and Empire, 184. 84 Some caution must be used in front-line reports, as "the 'war news' became peppered with hyperboles, contradictions, and chauvinistic bias. With so many rivals in the field, some reporters sacrificed accuracy for speed." Further compounding reliability of these reports was that battles were hard to observe on account of advances in weapons technology, namely, long-range rifles and smokeless powder. When information could not be gathered by the correspondents themselves, it was often obtained second-hand. See: Spiers, War and Society, 238-9. Indeed, while some reporters adhered to accuracy as best they could, others "were incompetent and wrote nonsense" (Knightley, 80). Yet, from postwar hearings, it is safe to ascertain that the Glasgow Volunteers, like service companies elsewhere, fulfilled their roles in a competent manner. According to the Elgin Commission "Sir Howard Vincent stated that he had visited every column employed on active duty, and had received uniformly good reports of the Volunteers." See: Report of His Majesty's Commissioners ... the War in South Africa, 68.

46


This detachment has marched over 1,200 miles during this time; nothing could have been better than the way the hardest marching and arduous outpost duties were carried out [his emphasis] ... I never wish to have better troops under my Of command.

While this pamphlet was hagiographic in nature, as will be shown, such sentiments are

reiterated in key postwar Commissions. However, the war and the circumstances of its

prosecution nonetheless led to serious reflection as to the overall state of the British

Army. This proved a topic of considerable public interest, well before the final truce was

signed. Though victory was ultimately achieved, the Anglo-Boer War provoked a belief

that a nation of Britain's might should not have had to endure a protracted war against a

people commanding much less in terms of both men and resources. As early as spring

1900 reservations about the existing military structure were being expressed in

Parliament. One parliamentarian stated that amending legislation to allow the

Volunteers to be called to active duty would have been unnecessary had the Army "been

in a state of efficiency, as it ought to have been."86 In another debate, it was argued that

"the Regulars in this country now are immature and inefficient, otherwise they would be

out in South Africa and not at home."87

85 The British Volunteers in South Africa. What they did and How they did it: Extracts from the orders of the general officers, colonels commanding the regular battalions, under whom they served. (Westminster: Vacher & Sons, 1903). 86 Hansard, 4th ser., vol. 86 (1900), col. 949. The proposed Volunteer Bill of that year sought to revise law enabling Volunteers to be called out in the event of great national emergency, rather than only if Britain were invaded. See: Beckett, Riflemen Form, 220-221. 87 Hansard, 4th ser., vol. 78 (1900), col. 1325.

47


The dissatisfaction with the overall conduct of the war was also seen in the British

press, particularly following the Black Week.88 Gradually within the pages of the

nation's major newspapers emerged the acknowledgment of fundamental weaknesses in

the military status quo. A notable example of this is the recurrence of newspaper articles

focusing on the 'lessons of the war.' According to one commentator in the Times, one of

the first errors in British strategy centered on perceptions; in particular that:

The 'handful of farmers' whom we at first proposed, with a light heart and inadequate forces, to defeat with comparative ease and rapidity, have turned out to be a nation ... with extraordinary endurance in the field and amazing powers of adaptation and mobility.89

Decades of victories against native peoples had resulted in an overconfident and

complacent British army command. Aside from a near-reckless sense of optimism,

among the numerous indictments directed towards the War Office during the conflict

were inadequate transport, inexperience with modern weaponry, "antiquated tactics,"

inefficient training, and—as the Volunteer experience had already highlighted—no

mechanism in place for the rapid expansion of the army.90 The litany of defects in the

British army, combined with the ad hoc means by which remedies were attempted, led to

an overall unease as to Britain's ability to wage war closer to home against an established

88 Spiers, Scottish Soldier and Empire, 163-4. As Knightley writes, losses incurred as the result of officer blundering were not published. Although casualties noted, often their extent was downplayed (Knightley, 76) 89 The Times, January 2, 1900. 90 Ibid., December 25, 1899; December 28, 1899; January 1, 1900; January 25, 1900; April 18, 1900; February 28, 1901.

48


power. Such criticisms were not overwhelming in the immediate aftermath of the Black

Week, but gathered back and accumulated as a decisive victory grew ever elusive.

An Effective Home Defence? Postwar Scrutiny and Early Efforts at Reform

In light of increasing international tensions, the years immediately following the Anglo-

Boer War were marked by debates over how best to reform an army considered by many

as bearing a multitude of deficiencies. Indeed, as Searle remarks "the most direct

'lesson' inculcated by the South African War.. .was the urgent need for an overhaul of

War Office and Army."91 While divided as to how it would be implemented, the

consensus amongst interested parties from the end of the war in 1902 up until the 1907

passage of the Territorial and Reserve Forces Act was that reform was necessary. As part

of Britain's defence structure, part-time soldiers such as the Volunteer Force were not

exempt from this public scrutiny. Although contemporary accounts were testament to

their patriotic service, the Volunteer experience in South Africa also highlighted

fundamental weaknesses (inadequate preparation/training, hesitancy towards overseas

service, etc.) that would dominate the issue of army reform in these years. These were

noted during the war by individual observers, and later confirmed by the Elgin and

Norfolk Commissions, whose findings weighed most heavily on the future direction of

the Volunteer Force. Despite the local nature of the movement, and that though Glasgow

91 Geoffrey Searle, '"National Efficiency' and the 'Lessons' of the War," in The Impact of the South African War, eds. David Omissi and Andrew S. Thompson (New York: Palgrave, 2002), 199.

49


Volunteers contributed their observations and opinions, the subsequent drive for reform

was largely directed—and challenged—in Westminster.

The conduct of the war and the ensuing public anxiety over the state of the British

Army led to the Royal Commission on the War in South Africa.92 Headed by former

Viceroy of India Lord Elgin, the Commission questioned 114 witnesses in two phases,

the first between October and December 1902, while the second set of hearings took

qo

place from February to June 1903. Both regular and auxiliary officers were called to

testify before the Commission; however the primary focus of this body was the regular

army. A variety of issues related to the preparations and conduct of the war were

examined, including transport and communications, equipment, manpower and

efficiency. Following the extensive hearings, the Elgin Commission issued its final

report in the summer of 1903. It confirmed many of the problems decried by individual

observers during the war. Supported by two large volumes of evidence and testimonies,

the final report criticized the army's preparedness for a prolonged conflict. More

specifically, the report condemned "the standard of staff efficiency, and the equipment,

training, and leadership of the front-line forces."94 Despite the number of faults

92 John Gooch, "Adversarial Attitudes; Servicemen, Politicians and Strategic Policy, 1899-1914," in Government and the Armed Forces in Britain, 1856-1990, ed. Paul Smith (London: The Hambledon Press, 1996), 55. 93 Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, s.v. "Bruce, Victor Alexander, ninth earl of Elgin and thirteenth earl of Kincardine (1849-1917)"; Miller, Volunteers on the Veld, 165; Report of His Majesty's Commissioners ... War in South Africa, 3. According to the Elgin Commission Report "the Commission sat on 55 days to take evidence.. .altogether answers to 22,200 questions." 94 Edward M. Spiers, Haldane: an Army Reformer. (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1980), 2.

50


identified, individual officers and their men were shielded from blame; rather culpability

was placed on the government for its lack of planning.95

As concurrent investigations specifically focused on Britain's auxiliary forces, the

Elgin Commission opted not to delve deeply into their role in the war. However, during

its proceedings, a number of witnesses testified as to the quality of men derived from

Volunteer service companies. Acknowledging their "superior class," Major-General Sir

Reginald Pole-Carew believed the Volunteers to be more adaptable than their

counterparts in the Regular army. As he stated in his testimony

With class, as you know perfectly well, you get better education, and therefore higher intelligence.. .That is what really forms the superiority of the Volunteers in this country to the Regular soldier; that they are superior with regard to intelligence ... I think they are really easier to deal with after a little active service and training. They probably improve much quicker than the British soldier.96

Indeed, the adaptability of the Volunteers was a recurring observation: that only after

being placed with regulars were they able to gain the experience necessary to be assigned

to duties of their own. The ambition of those Volunteers who were willing to serve did

not come under scrutiny, but rather was singled out for praise. For example, when asked

of troop morale in hospitals Sir Arthur Conan Doyle was especially impressed by the

spirit of the Volunteers, which he believed "was higher even than that of the Regulars.

95 Miller, Volunteers on the Veld, 165; While pointing out the myriad problems affecting the British Army, this Commission offered no solutions for such. See: David French, The British Way in Warfare 1688-2000. (London: UnwinHyman 1990), 160. 96 Minutes of Evidence... War in South Africa, Vol.2, #16587, 16592.

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07

They seemed really keen to get back to their work, to get fit, and get back to the front."

Yet, while senior officers and observers gave due credit to these men, the number of

weaknesses long associated with the Volunteer movement were confirmed through its

involvement in the war. These concerns served to call into question the future reliability

of the Volunteer Force and its ability to properly execute its home defence function.

The glowing accounts of bravery and selflessness found in the British press

concealed what would become an overall lack of enthusiasm within the Volunteer

movement towards overseas service. While Glasgow found little difficulty in finding

Volunteers willing to go overseas, this was a pattern not shared elsewhere. Comparing

the Volunteers with the Militia, one commentator noted:

While whole battalions of Militia accepted service abroad, Volunteer battalions in some cases could not provide more than ten men, and there is not a single Volunteer infantry unit service in South Africa which existed as such before the war.98

This was confirmed by the Elgin Commission in their assessment of Volunteer service

companies. It found that as a whole the first wave of service companies were rapidly

filled, but there was greater resistance in the second and third calls for men.99 The

Commission in its report noted that in the later drafts "it was found to be impossible ... to

97 Ibid., #20594. Doyle was an ardent supporter of the British war effort, having been a doctor in a volunteer-staffed hospital in London, but most importantly through his writing; for example, he was granted knighthood for his 1902 book The War in South Africa: its Cause and Conduct. See: Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, s.v. "Doyle, Sir Arthur Ignatius Conan (1859-1930)"; Arthur Conan Doyle, The War in South Africa: its Cause and Conduct (New York: McClure, Phillips & Co., 1902). 98 The Times, May 28, 1900. 99 Cunningham, 128.

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obtain at all an adequate number."100 By their estimates, while roughly 10,500 men

answered the first call, 2,413 responded to the final in the autumn of 1901.101 This may

have reflected as much a lack of Volunteers fit for service as a decline in war fever.

The qualifications of service were a substantial barrier to Volunteers interested in

fighting overseas. As previously stated, those who wished to enlist in the service

battalions were required to not only be within a defined age range, they were also to be

proficient shots and of an acceptable physique. In all, these stringent qualifications in

terms of training and physical health barred all but a fraction of Volunteers from active

duty in South Africa. For example, of the 20,929 men throughout the United Kingdom

who came forward with the first call "some 3,528 were rejected as medically unfit and a

further 2,222 through failing to satisfy efficiency standards."102 In addition to these

standards, other factors at play dampened efforts at maintaining initially strong numbers.

Some observers viewed the Volunteers' role in home defence as a major factor behind the

lack of numbers. Though an invasion scare of that year boosted Volunteer recruitment,

100 Report of His Majesty's Commissioners... War in South Africa, 67. 101 Ibid., While exact figures vary depending on the source, the overall pattern of exponential decline is the same. 102 Beckett, Riflemen Form, 214; Hansard, 4th ser., vol. 143 (1905), col. 1578. The issue of poor health was noticed in the regular army as well and forms a repeated theme in Elgin Commission testimony. Yet it is suggested that the spectre of poor health also affected the regular army. Kelly-Kenny agreed with the question posed that recruits "now come from a class who have not had the advantage, as a rule, of good food in their childhood, of careful bringing up, careful nursing and doctoring, and so on" (Minutes of Evidence... War in South Africa, Vol.1, #4898). Major-General H.C. Borrett believed that although his men did not come from the slums, they are affected by upbringings in more unhealthy places (factory towns, etc.) and as such are of weaker constitution than their officers who come from "more healthy surroundings" {Minutes of Evidence... War in South Africa, Vol.1, #5431-5432). In Parliament a report by the Inspector General of Recruiting for the Army for the year 1901 was cited, stating that rejections within the regular army on physical grounds ran 29 percent. Although it was inferred that the actual number was higher, for "none of these figures, therefore, show the numbers of those who were rejected by the sergeants as being obviously unfit" See Hansard, 4th ser., vol. 124 (1903), cols. 1332-1333.

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their commitment to protecting the realm proper was not universally applauded.103 Of the

more critical assessments, the Earl of Wemyss described those Volunteers who did not

opt to go to war, as having "sheltered themselves behind it [home defence], and shirked

their duty to the nation."104 This opinion, though harsh considering that many of these

men had to take their civilian occupations, careers, and families into account, was not

unfounded. In the years immediately following the conflict, the low turnout for overseas

service within an otherwise substantial Volunteer Force was assessed by the Committee

for Imperial Defence (CID).

The CID was created in December 1902 as part of institutional restructuring

aimed at establishing a greater degree of professionalism within the military. Its purpose

was to assess the defensive needs of both nation and empire, and to formulate appropriate

policy.105 To clarify the role that the Volunteers would take in home defence, the

Committee turned to the experience of auxiliaries during the war. Its subsequent

evaluation of their role in South Africa did not aid advocates of the Volunteer Force.

While its estimates revealed that the overall number of Volunteers increased during the

South African War, only a small fraction of these men opted to serve overseas. CID

figures show that aside from the initial call for men to fill service companies, the required

numbers failed to materialize. Although there were no fewer than 277,000 men in the

Volunteer Force at the first call for active service (January 1900), at most only four

103 Beckett, Amateur Military Tradition, 205; It has been noted that the interest in the Volunteer Force reached a pitch not seen since the post-Crimean War invasion scares. See: Anne Summers, "Militarism in Britain before the Great War," History Workshop 2 (Autumn, 1976): 106. 104 The Times, December 27, 1901. 105 Spiers, Haldane, 2-3; Dennis, 5.

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percent of them opted (and were selected) to fight overseas. From the period August 1,

1900 to December 31, 1901 this number willing to fight in South Africa was reduced by

half. Towards the end of the war—January 1 to May 31, 1902, 2,525 out of a total pool

of 268,550—less than one percent of the Volunteer Force—was active in South Africa.106

Issues of pay and conditions of service aside, these numbers nonetheless proved worrying

for those who envisioned the Volunteers as forming a reserve from which the regular

army could draw in future conflagrations.

Compounding the problem of numbers were deficiencies in army structures, in

particular inconsistency in how Volunteers engaged in active service. The experience in

war highlighted the fact that in the event of a large-scale conflict, Britain had no clear

mechanism by which to raise an army. A Volunteer could fight abroad by joining the

active service companies or the Imperial Yeomanry, which also came into being in the

wake of the 'Black Week,' or by abandoning part-time status and enlisting in the regular

army.107 Lieutenant-General Sir W.G. Nicholson, remarked that "an army hastily

1 08

improvised in this way obviously labours under many disadvantages."

Another issue was that even if the prospective Volunteer was eligible for active

duty, there was the possibility of a lack of support, if not outright resistance, on the part 106 G.S. Clarke, "Appendix (B) - 'Numbers of Volunteers who served in South Africa during the War'" (April 3, 1906), CAB 17/18, Committee of Imperial Defence: Miscellaneous Correspondence and Memoranda, TNA. 107 Cunningham, 128-129. The Imperial Yeomanry was formed during the Anglo-Boer War to supplement the regular army. They were mounted units differentiated from the regular Yeomanry in that the latter (like the Volunteers) was unable to serve abroad. While existing Yeomanry were allowed to join this new body, on account of a lack of interest, recruiting was opened to volunteers (including Volunteers). See Judd and Surridge, 71-73. For a detailed treatment of the Imperial Yeomanry in Glasgow see: E.W. McFarland, '"Empire-Enlarging Genius': Scottish Imperial Yeomanry Volunteers in the Boer War" War in History 13 (2006): 299-328. 108 Minutes of Evidence... War in South Africa, Vol.2, #18245.

55


of their employer. By this period the employer was a central figure in maintaining the

Force's strength. While some supported the initiative of their part-time soldiers, others

refused to let their men join. At its most extreme, a Volunteer risked losing his

employment.109 In one such Scottish example, an unnamed Edinburgh bank was cited as

informing its workers that if they took up active service "their connection with it [the

bank] ceases for ever."110 Though the nation was at war, the longstanding tensions

between Volunteer Service, and duties associated with one's employment were ever-

present. Efforts to persuade able Volunteers to engage in active duty were frustrated as

some employers refused to guarantee jobs upon their return from service. One Volunteer

officer expressed concern over his men having to choose between their military duties

and civilian occupations. To him, regulations adopted in the winter of 1902 calling for

greater attendance in the annual training camp had a detrimental effect in that "employers

are already calling on their men to resign."111 This pressure was passed on to their

workers, who in turn resisted measures calling for lengthier training periods. The lack of

guarantees from Glasgow employers was later noted in a speech at the annual meeting of

the West of Scotland Branch of the Soldiers' and Sailors' Families Association. In his

May 1902 speech, the chairman:

Expressed the hope that as far as possible the situations of Volunteers and reservists at the war would be kept open for them, and that where private

109 Cunningham, 76. 110 The Scotsman, January 11, 1900. 111 The Times, February 3, 1902.

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employers were unable to do this the Government should use its utmost exertions 112 to provide them with employment when they returned home.

Even if a man obtained facilities (a contemporary term generally meaning leave

from work) from his employer for overseas service, matters of pay continued to weigh

upon his decision to join the Volunteers. According to Major-General H.C. Borrett and

Sir Howard Vincent, an influential MP by virtue of his status as a Volunteer officer, the

declining trend in men willing to join service companies was partly explained by the

comparatively lower wages vis-a-vis other branches of the army.113 While noting the

effect waning war fever had on Volunteer enthusiasm, Vincent also acknowledged that

"The Yeomanry were getting 5s. a day without qualifications, and the Service companies

were getting Is. a day with a very high qualification."114 Borrett stated that because of

the differences in pay, he "found a great many of the Yeomen who went out were old

Volunteers."115 The overall effect of employer pressure and low pay was that although

many were indeed eager to serve abroad in Volunteer service companies, this willingness

was curtailed by everyday financial considerations.

As the case of 1902 regulations show, the lack of employer support for increased

drills and training highlighted another problem exposed by the war—Volunteer

112 The Scotsman, May 2, 1901. This problem would persist into the early years of the Territorial Force, a subject that will be further discussed in Chapters Three and Four. 113 "The climax of his [Vincent's] military career came between 1884 and 1904 when he was colonel-commandant of the Queen's Westminster volunteers." Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, s.v. "Vincent, Sir (Charles Edward) Howard (1849-1908)." 114 Report of His Majesty's Commissioners... War in South Africa, p.67. In his interview, regarding the decline in numbers willing to serve overseas, Vincent remarked "I think the great war fever has passed its meridian. In all voluntary systems you must use the popular arts." Minutes of Evidence... War in South Africa, Vol.1, #5562. 115 Minutes of Evidence... War in South Africa, Vol.1, #5401.

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inefficiency. The problem of few Volunteers opting for duty in South Africa was

coupled by a wholesale deficiency in their preparedness.116 While many amongst the

Volunteers and their commanding officers believed themselves to be up to standard,

others, particularly within the War Office, did not share such optimistic assessments.

One writer described the Volunteers as part of "a sufficiently numerous and varied

collection of forces inefficient and ill-organized in varying degrees."117 Another

commentator pondered the wisdom of clinging "to the notion that the great object of

Imperial defence can be effected by undisciplined, half-trained volunteers."118

As early as February 1900 the government enacted measures aimed at boosting

the efficiency of Volunteers both home and abroad: this was done through encouraging

Volunteers to recruit beyond their establishment, as well as setting forth the intention that

annual camp be taken for an entire month. Not surprisingly, the latter was met with

hostility from employers. As a consequence, the expectation of a month's attendance

was scaled back to a fortnight.119 Providing greater financial incentives and setting camp

for a time of the year more favourable to employers led to most Volunteer units taking

part at these exercises. Out of a total 216 infantry battalions, 179 were able to camp for

two weeks, while a minority completed the full 28 days.

In May 1900 a bill was introduced in the House of Lords aimed at giving the

Secretary of State the ability to call the Volunteers in the event of great national

116 Cunningham, 129. 117 The Times, November 9, 1900. 118 Ibid., June 6, 1902. The matter of training will be explored in Chapter Three. 119 Cunningham, 129. 120 Beckett, Amateur Military Tradition, 206.

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emergency. This proposed legislation which became law under the Volunteer Act passed

in August of that year, albeit modified in that Volunteers could only fulfill garrison duty

121

in specified locations in Britain. The suspicion that the 1900 regulations would extend

beyond the duration of the war were fuelled by orders announced in March 1901. These

called for Volunteer battalions to undergo a fortnight's camp, with a greater funds given

to those who complied. As this appeared similar in nature to what had already existed

(service companies, fortnight camp, etc.) little criticism came of it. Volunteer ire would

be stoked, however, with the 'Christmas Card' order in council in December applying

more stringent camp regulations to the Volunteer Force; in essence making such

exercises mandatory. Criticism from the Volunteers resulted in revised camp

regulations in May 1902. Nonetheless, the immediate effect of these altered guidelines

was a decline in new Volunteers. That year saw the Force's worst year of recruiting.123

Ultimately, such government initiatives ultimately did not address concerns

surrounding the Volunteers. The result of this was that many of the same officers who

praised active duty Volunteers in the 1903 Elgin Commission also harboured deep

reservations over their value in future conflicts. Commander of the Fifth Division South

African Field Force, Lieutenant-General Sir Charles Warren could not ascertain the

overall quality of the Volunteers as soldiers during the war, but noted that while some 121 Cunningham, 130; Beckett, Amateur Military Tradition, 206; Hansard, 4th ser., vol. 86 (1900), cols. 925-965; Hansard, 4th ser., vol. 87 (1900), cols. 223-226. 122 Cunningham, 131. 123 Beckett, Amateur Military Tradition, 207. Compared to the year before, which the Volunteer Force fell roughly 53,000 short of establishment, 1902 saw this number climb to nearly 77,000. Another measure is in total numbers: in 1901 the Force reached an all-time high of 288,476; the following year this figure dropped by about 20,000 and another 15,000 a year after that. See: G.S. Clarke, "Appendix (I)" (1906), CID.


were "most excellent," others "were useless."124 Much of the blame was directed at the

overall lack of training afforded the Volunteer Force, even for those in active service

companies. Major-General W.H. Mackinnon decried the haste in which many of these

men were sent to South Africa, stating that it was "an awful hardship for a hundred

Volunteers, perhaps straight from their desks in some city, to be sent right up to the

front."125

Field Marshal Earl Roberts, who would become the most prominent advocate of

compulsory service, described the difficulties associated with the partial training afforded

auxiliaries. While he praised the system in which Volunteer service battalions were

raised as "a great success," and how these soldiers "very soon became excellent

soldiers,"126 he also considered it dangerous to continue "to depend upon troops who

were not thoroughly disciplined and properly trained."127 Lieutenant-General Sir Thomas

Kelly-Kenny, Sixth Division Commander, stated that the Volunteer Force, in its current

state was to a great extent "a paper force," whose training was "deficient," and its officers

"not sufficiently trained."128

When pressed by the Commission, Methuen echoed Roberts in stating: "I think

unless the Volunteers are brought up to a good state of efficiency we shall make a great

10Q

mistake in putting great confidence in them." Vincent believed that given the state of

the Volunteers is "not such that you would call out the Volunteers to-morrow morning to 124 Minutes of Evidence... War in South Africa, Vol.2, #15702. 125 Ibid., #7413. 126 Ibid., #13244-13246. 127 Ibid., #13146. 128 Ibid., #4868-4869. 129 Ibid., #14391, 14393.

60


resist the invasion of any foreign nation ... there is no possibility of its being wanted as a

whole, or in considerable numbers, without weeks of preparation."130 These accounts

formed part of a wider assessment of the Volunteer Force and its battle-readiness. While

praise was directed towards the Volunteers who took up active service in South Africa, it

was also acknowledged that they could not be expected to be immediately capable of

fulfilling the duties required of them; in the instances when they proved efficient soldiers,

it was generally achieved after a period of more intense training or sharing tasks with the

regular army.

Although the Elgin Commission did present the government a daunting challenge

in its examination of poor planning and execution in Britain's war effort, more pointed

criticisms of the Volunteers were not pursued.131 This was likely so, given not only their

limited participation in the war, but also the Royal Commission on the Militia and

Volunteers Commission was underway before Elgin disbanded. As such, any discussion

of the Volunteers in South Africa was more of an aside in the wider examination of

Britain's prosecution of the war. The single reform suggested by the Commission was

the creation of a centralized Volunteer staff within the War Office.132 Though it was

acknowledged that the Volunteer Force, like the rest of the army, suffered from

deficiencies, those before the Elgin Commission did note localities whose example could

be followed in future reforms. Here, Glasgow's patriotism and vibrant Volunteer

tradition stood out. Citing Glasgow as the home of "tactical societies and a thoroughly

130 Minutes of Evidence... War in South Africa, Vol.1, #5644. 131 Miller, Volunteers on the Veld, 165. 132 Ibid., 166.

61


good system," Methuen believed that it was possible that the Volunteers elsewhere could

be improved.133 Mackinnon also believed it was "very applicable" that the city could be

a model for army expansion, producing active service Volunteer battalions along the lines

of London's CIV.134

While the Elgin Commission's reservations towards the Volunteers were

relatively subdued, the same cannot be said for the opinions presented before another

royal inquiry, the Norfolk Commission. The Royal Commission on the Militia and

Volunteers was convened in the spring of 1903 under the direction of the Duke of

Norfolk. Like Elgin, the Norfolk Commission was organized amidst the sense of

insecurity that came in the wake of the war in South Africa.135 Its focus however,

differed from the earlier investigation in that it set out to evaluate the current state of the

Militia and Volunteers solely from the perspective of home defence. Under this mandate,

this second Commission was tasked with determining the minimum standard of

efficiency, terms of service, and a coherent scheme in which these auxiliary forces would

operate.136 From May 1903 until February 1904, it took testimony from 134 witnesses.

The bulk of testimony came from Volunteer and Militia officers. Additional opinion

came from senior army officials (John French commander 1st Army Corps, Ian Hamilton,

Quartermaster General of the Forces; Earl Roberts, Commander in Chief) as well as

representatives of private business (examples include E. Alexander Duff, General

133 Minutes of Evidence... War in South Africa, Vol.2, #14400-14401. 134 Minutes of Evidence... War in South Africa, Vol. 1, #7503. 135 Miller, Volunteers on the Veld, 163; I.F.W. Beckett, The Victorians at War (London: Hambledon & London, 2003), 240. 136 Beckett, Amateur Military Tradition, 208.

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Manager of Lloyd's Bank and R. Woodman Burbidge, General Manager of Harrod's

Stores). Unlike the Elgin Commission, this body did not focus exclusively on military

performance in South Africa, but there existed some overlap between the two

Commissions in that Norfolk drew testimony from officers who had previously sat before

Elgin.137 In gauging the performance of Volunteers in South Africa, the sentiment

remained the same as given to the earlier Commission—that while there existed a

learning curve in adjusting to the life of a full-time soldier, the initiative of the Volunteers

compensated for their lack of training. However, taking into consideration the state of

the Volunteers in the event they were required to defend the nation's shores, the findings

of this body were much more critical. The pages of the Norfolk report, released later that

summer, contained a litany of indictments of the Volunteer Force. From top to bottom,

serious defects were identified. In terms of organization, there existed "no divisional

organization, nor are any arrangements made for the command and staffs of the large

masses of Volunteers" in the event of defending London.138 Further, an assessment of

recruiting figures revealed great variances between battalion establishments and actual

strengths. In Major-General Sir A. Turner's testimony, the Volunteers were cited as

being "very much below its strength"—short by roughly 90,000 men and 2,200

officers.139 Lieutenant-General Sir W.G. Nicholson, reported that the estimated efficient

strength of the Volunteer Force for 1901 was in a deficit of roughly 100,000.140 On

account of the minimal requirements needed to obtain a Volunteer Commission, Officers

137 Miller, Volunteers on the Veld, 168. 138 Report of the Royal Commission on the Militia and Volunteers, 7. 139 Minutes of Evidence... the Militia and Volunteers, Vol.1, #3698-9. 140 Ibid., #132.

63


were as a whole ill-prepared to adequately execute their duties.141 Indeed, it was found

that they possessed "neither the theoretical knowledge nor the practical skill in the

handling of troops which would make them competent instructors in peace or leaders in

war."142 The report also found that as for the rank-and-file "the training of the Volunteers

is carried on under considerable difficulties as to both time and space."143 In particular,

this was the result of a dearth of proper facilities, as well as the unavoidable discrepancies

in quality from unit to unit. Lieutenant-General Sir Ian Hamilton confirmed shortfalls of

accessible ranges for Volunteers to hone their shooting skills.144 This was further

compounded by a lack of reliable equipment. For instance, Field-Marshal Viscount

Wolseley informed the Commission that "the guns we condemned as useless were

handed over to the Militia and Volunteers."145

Without a correcting of these fundamental problems, senior officers discounted

the capabilities of the Volunteers if pressed into action. Roberts stated that the status quo

was not "enough, or anything like enough."146 As such, he believed that in the event of

invasion "unless the troops were fairly trained and well in hand they would find

themselves in difficulties. The advantage under such circumstances would be on the side

of the invaders."147 Hamilton was in agreement as to the readiness of the Volunteers

141 Report of the Royal Commission on the Militia and Volunteers, 8. 142 Ibid., 9. 143 Ibid., 7. 144 Minutes of Evidence... the Militia and Volunteers, Vol.1, #1409. 145 Ibid., #1554. 146 Ibid., #900. 147 Ibid., #978. Roberts later in his testimony stated that even with greater training it would not "be safe to leave the defence of the country to them [Volunteers] without the assistance of Regular troops. The enemy would bring the very pick of their men who had been a long time in the reserve. It would be a tremendous trial." (#1062)

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were the country to fall under attack: "I certainly would not pretend for one moment that

the Volunteers as they are at present are fit to fight the picked troops of any continental

power."148 Wolseley too felt that the Volunteers were little match for an invading force;

"If you imagine that you could trust them without Regular Troops to fight the best troops

of France it would be madness; it would be quite suicidal for the country to imagine that

for a moment."149 The Volunteers were not dismissed outright, but it was estimated that

a substantial period of time devoted to training was necessary in fostering Volunteer

battle-readiness. Kelly-Kenny stated that in the event of war the Volunteers would

require a year of training (two for officers) to be able to take up their home defence

role.150 Hamilton was slightly more sanguine, believing that if placed under the same

expectations of regular soldiers, the Volunteers "would make very decent Infantry in five

or six months."151

Of the dozens of men called to testify before the Commission, three represented

Glasgow Volunteer units—Colonel R.C. Mackenzie (First VBHLI), Colonel Alexander

Brown Grant (First Lanarkshire RGA Volunteers), and Colonel Duncan Campbell (First

Lanarkshire R.E. Volunteers). Their particular insights as to the state of the city's corps

laid bare the strengths—and pitfalls—of the movement as a whole. Grant believed that

148 Ibid., #1159. For instance, he believed that even with an enthusiastic approach it would take a Volunteer "five years he should be able to hold his own with a regular soldier of the Prussian Line." (#1414) 149 Ibid., #1473. When asked as to his dismissing the notion of auxiliaries alone repelling an invasion, he replied that this was the case "unless it is supported largely by Regular Troops, or unless you could persuade your enemy to be kind enough to adopt the same plan." (#1474) He also stated that as while he had "the highest opinion of them...If you think you are going to fight the regular soldiers of France with our Volunteers you are depending on a rotten reed." (#1658). 150 Ibid., #408. 151 Ibid., #1182. Expressing the same time-scale, Hamilton asserted that even with good officers they could not achieve such a standard earlier, as "they are raw together." (#1208)

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his corps was "as efficient at the present moment as the existing organization and

armament permits of."152 Still, he acknowledged the inherent limitations of training,

speaking of the difficulty in getting all of his men to camp: "you cannot get more time

out of the men ... that is just the great weakness of the Volunteer movement at the present

moment, that you cannot compel the men. You have nothing really but a moral power

over them."153 Yet, he insisted that the root of the problem was in equipment, that until

the Volunteers were armed like the regulars "you cannot expect any further efficiency

from the Volunteer Force, that I am quite clear about."154 With the inherent self-interest

in possible increased government funding for Volunteers set to one side, this was a

serious problem for these local commanders. Grant echoed Woseley as he too

complained as to the quality of artillery guns155 He informed the Commission that "it has

a bad effect on the corps for the men to be constantly sponging out and ramming home at

guns they know to be obsolete; besides, when the batteries march through the streets of

Glasgow with old guns which the people know are utterly useless they are sneered at."156

Grant's colleague Campbell also lamented the lack of supplies, "particularly in picks and

shovels that are deficient."157 While his men received as much ammunition as Rifle

1 SR

Volunteers the "amount of course, for competitions, is not nearly enough." The battle-

readiness of the Volunteers was another recurring question, and was an issue on which

152 Ibid., #10692. 153 Ibid., #10717. 154 Ibid., #10869. 155 Ibid., #10677. 156 Ibid., #10704. 157 Ibid., #11636. 158 Ibid., #11662.

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they were at odds with the generals. When asked as to the battle readiness of his corps,

Grant stated "I cannot say that I think they would be fit to take the field now, but in a

very short time, say a fortnight, I could get them ready to take the field. I have a great

many men who are perfectly capable of doing it, men who went out to South Africa and

all came back to me working as drivers and Number Ones."159 Posed a similar question,

Mackenzie thought that after a few months' training, his men would be ready for any

situation.160 In his assessment: "I do not say that they are so good as regular soldiers, but

I think they would acquit themselves fairly well." 161

While the movement had its defenders, the collective opinion of the Norfolk

Commission was that given the status quo, neither the Militia nor Volunteers could be

trusted to immediately fulfill the nation's home defence needs. In its own estimation, it

agreed with the high-ranking officials, declaring that the Volunteer Force "is not

qualified to take the field against a regular army."162 It surmised that if matters remained

unchanged it would take three ill-trained, ill-equipped Volunteers to equal one

Continental soldier.163 The Commission recommended that in order to rectify this

problem, a system of compulsory service should be instituted, insofar "as possible the

159 Ibid., #10697. 160 Ibid., #11019. 161 Ibid., #10883. Much of his opinion was formed by the experience of his men who served in South Africa. Of action seen "They saw the whole of marching from Aliway north to the Vaal River, and then they were at the hunt when Prinsloo was taken - they were in all that work; and then they were at Wepener, and were backwards and forwards through the Orange Free State, and they took it better than any of the regular companies." (#11013); "They had a lot of hard fighting when Prinsloo was taken...they were sent on that night to seize a position in the middle of the pass that was disputed." (#11014) 162 Report of the Royal Commission on the Militia and Volunteers, 9. 163 Beckett, Amateur Military Tradition, 209.

67


whole able-bodied male population shall be trained to arms."164 As it ran against British

tradition, the suggestion of compulsion by high-ranking officials risked controversy.165

The political fallout of the Norfolk Report was minimized however, by the ambitions of

successive secretaries —St. John Brodrick and Hugh Oakeley Arnold-Forster, who

instead turned to their own means of addressing the 'Volunteer Question.'166 Indeed, one

such explanation behind the more pointed findings of this body may be that the

Commission was a tool to give greater credence to their visions of reform.

As the party in power, the Conservative approach to reforming the Volunteer

Force aimed to accomplish two things: increase its battle readiness, and to accomplish

1 ftl

this at a lower cost. During his tenure as Secretary of State for War, Brodrick (1901-

1903) was not seen as an advocate of the Volunteers. Through regulations made during

the war, notably his November 1901 orders, Brodrick "made it quite clear that he wanted

an efficient Force, if necessary with smaller numbers; indeed, he would almost certainly

164 Report of the Royal Commission on the Militia and Volunteers, 15. 165 Searle, '"National Efficiency'," 202. 166Their position was afforded by the Conservative victory in the 'Khaki Election' of 1900, marked notably by deep divisions within the Liberal Party. Even in the Liberal stronghold of Scotland, infighting between imperialists and Boer sympathizers led to a string of Conservative victories there. See: Paul Readman, "The Conservative Party, Patriotism, and British Politics: The Case of the General Election of 1900," The Journal of British Studies AO, no. 1 (January 2001): 140; Brown, 171. 167 This is evident in St. John Brodrick's discussions as to reductions. Regarding the Volunteers, he noted the opinion of the Norfolk Commission, stating that given the inefficient state of the Volunteer Force and their large peacetime establishment that "What enemy are they going to take the field against? Are they to shoot down the people of Whitechapel?" He went on to ask his colleagues that "is not the lesson correct.. .that you should concentrate, and reduce your force, which is notoriously redundant and that you should increase the quality of that which you retain?" Hansard, 4th ser., vol. 139 (1904), cols. 1385-1386. Brodrick's successor, Hugh Oakeley Arnold-Forster remarked in his memoir that economic considerations were paramount, as in the period following the Anglo-Boer War "the demand for economy was even greater than that for increased efficiency." Hugh Oakeley Arnold-Forster, The Right Honourable Hugh Oakeley Arnold-Forster, a Memoir (London: Edwin Arnold, 1910), 232.

68


have welcomed the latter."168 However, the proposed requirement of annual camp

attendance drew persistent criticism from the Volunteers.169 Amidst the unease over the

nation's defences, declining recruitment figures throughout the British army after the war

(possibly the result of war weariness, disenchantment fuelled by postwar Commissions,

and so on) had also acted against Brodrick by calling into question his ability to respond

to the criticisms of the Elgin report.170 The Norfolk Commission deflected concern for

the time being, giving the impression that the issue as to the Volunteers' status was being

acted upon. As their investigation was underway, Brodrick, his efforts at reform abortive

and reputation tarnished through the findings of the Elgin Commission, was transferred to

the India Office, and was replaced by Arnold-Forster.171

Previously working with the Admiralty, the West Belfast politician Arnold-

Forster came to the War Office with his own plans in mind. Similar to Brodrick's

proposals of May 1900, Arnold-Forster envisioned a two-tiered Army—a long-service

army for overseas conflicts, and a short-service army to be used as a reserve.172 He had

little patience for the Volunteers in this scheme, and held the unflattering belief that they

were more a liability than military asset.173 Even prior to his taking up duties at the War

Office, Arnold-Forster observed deficiencies in Volunteer efficiency. On the eve of the

168 Cunningham, 131. 169 Lowell J. Satre, "St. John Brodrick and Army Reform, 1901-1903," The Journal of British Studies 15, no. 2 (Spring, 1976): 131. 170 Beckett, Amateur Military Tradition, 208. 171 Satre, 136. For biographical information see: Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, s.v. "Forster, Hugh Oakeley Arnold- (1855-1909)." 172 Per his later recollection, a long service army as originally suggested would serve "as a peace garrison in tropical or subtropical countries," while the short service army was "to supplement this foreign peace garrison.. .By the adoption of short service along can any reduction of expenditure be ensured." See: Arnold-Forster, The Right Honourable Hugh Oakeley Arnold-Forster, 238. 173 Cunningham, 133.

69


Anglo-Boer War, he wrote that auxiliaries such as the Volunteers were "necessarily

unaccustomed to war and in a state of what may be called, without offence, inferior

discipline."174 Questions of efficiency aside, postwar financial considerations played an

integral role in Arnold-Forster's proposals; as he later wrote: "The impossibility of

increasing the Army Estimates was admitted as a cardinal doctrine on both sides of the

House of Commons."175 Given both his judgment, as well as the prevailing political

climate, it was not unexpected that Arnold-Forster, much like his predecessor, would

1 7 f\

seek to reduce both numbers and cost of the Volunteer Force. In doing so, not only

would there be no increase in expenditures, but the savings created in such cuts could be

ploughed back into remaining corps.177

In November 1903, Arnold-Forster proposed a massive reduction in Volunteers,

from 346,000 to 200,000. Furthermore, he aimed to divide the Force between those

willing to achieve high efficiency and those not. This did not receive immediate

approval; rather, his own advisors were against these plans, advocating patience until the

Norfolk Commission had submitted its final report. Cabinet, too, proved only lukewarm

towards his scheme, acknowledging the political opposition faced by any proposed

changes towards the Volunteers. With hindsight, their rationale would prove to

foreshadow subsequent developments. Undeterred, the Secretary of State pressed on,

174 Hugh Oakley Arnold-Forster, Army Letters 1897-98 (London: Edward Arnold, 1898), 41. 175 Arnold-Forster, The Army in 1906, 217. 176 Indeed, as will be discussed in the following chapter, an element of postwar anxieties centered on government expenditure, with such concerns transcending party lines. Searle, '"National Efficiency'," 203-205. 177 Beckett, Amateur Military Tradition, 210. 178 Cunningham, 134.

70


presenting his proposals to Parliament in July 1904. Though dropping his idea of

maintaining different classes of Volunteers in the same units, citing "deference to the

strong opposition that was shown to it," hostility towards his plan was beginning to

materialize.179 A recent convert to the Liberal Party, Winston Churchill, was joined by a

handful of MPs in opposition to Arnold-Forster's agenda. Nonetheless Parliament's

summer recess stifling negative sentiment for the time being, Arnold-Forster drew up

more precise plans as to how his vision of reform would be accomplished.180

In January 1905, Arnold-Forster proposed to Cabinet the further reduction of the

Volunteers from 242,000 to 180,000. In addition, there would be the expectation of

greater attendance at fortnight-long camps, with financial penalties imposed on those

units failing to comply. If carried out, his plan it was argued would reduce annual net

costs by at least £300,000. These ideas were present in his later Army Estimates that

March. There, he informed the Commons: "I have proposed that we should take steps, so

far as we can, to eliminate from the Volunteers the inefficient."181 As he told his fellow

MPs, discernible benefits could be achieved through such a course of action:

If we limit ourselves to a force of 200,000 Volunteers I am convinced we shall have in any part of the country which may be threatened an ample and sufficient

179 Arnold-Forster, The Army in 1906, 226. Arnold-Forster held firm in the opinion that his plan would simply codify what had long been in existence anyways, that "The division of the Volunteers into two classes has always existed in fact"—those who are able and willing to make themselves available to perform their duties—and those "though willing, are not able, by reason of their occupations, to devote much time to military instruction, or to pledge themselves in any way likely to interfere with their daily work" (226-227, 282). 180 Cunningham, 135. 181 Hansard, 4th ser., vol. 143 (1905), col. 1579. Speaking as to matters of training and efficiency, he proclaimed: "If it be true that we can rely upon putting into the field against a foreign army troops which have had only the training of the Volunteers, all I can say is that every other country in the world is making a mistake except ourselves." (Hansard, 4th ser., vol. 143 (1905), col. 1576)

71


became increasingly clear: if roused to action, the lobbying powers of the Volunteers 1 Of

were too formidable for MPs to dismiss.

By that April, with an indifferent Cabinet and opposition in Parliament, most

notably from forty Volunteer MPs (many of whom were fellow Conservatives), Arnold-

Forster backtracked on his goal of cost-reduction, conceding that money saved through 1 Jlfi

fewer Volunteers would be invested in achieving greater efficiency in the Force. In

doing so, the Secretary of State sacrificed one key component of his reforms—

economy—to preserve the other—reducing the Volunteer Force. Though he would

continue to pursue the latter, Arnold-Forster was met with ever increasing resistance from

military leaders, politicians, and the Volunteers themselves.

Facing insurmountable pressure, he ultimately abandoned reduction plans in

November 1905, calling instead for increased expenditures for the Volunteer Force.187

By the last days of his Secretaryship, Arnold-Forster had given up all key aspects of his

vision of reform. Commenting in 1906, George Beatson, a high-ranking Glasgow

Volunteer—and later Territorial—officer summarized the fundamental flaw in Arnold-

Forster's strategy:

It cannot be denied that this plan of Mr. Arnold-Forster's has been unfavourably received. Apart from the fact that the proposal to reduce the number of

185 The Scotsman, April 6, 1905. 186 Cunningham, 136. 187 Though he had succumbed to political pressures, Arnold-Forster insisted that the bulk of his opposition did not come from the Volunteers. "No sooner was it announced in 1904 that the Army Council proposed to inquire into the efficiency of the Volunteers in common with the rest of the Army, than a violent opposition to any reform was instituted in the House of Commons, and in certain sections of the Press. At no time did the opposition come from the bulk of the Volunteer Force." (Arnold-Forster, The Army in 1906, 233)

80


Volunteers was a blunder of the gravest kind, and deeply wounded the national pride and sentiment throughout the length and breadth of the land, the whole scheme created a want of confidence in the public mind. No fault could be found with the principle underlying it of having our military forces trained to the utmost efficiency possible, but is most fatal defect was that it would serve only to produce what might be an efficient but would certainly be too small an army for the country's imperial needs ... In short, Mr. Arnold-Forster aimed at quality and

1 88 ignored quantity [his emphasis].

In attempting to subject the Volunteers to a similar set of expectations as regular soldiers,

the Secretary of State had drawn the ire of the very men whose movement he sought to

improve. Consequently, they wielded an "acute political awareness" to preserve their

movement.189 Indeed, the Volunteers as a political entity would continue to have an

immediate and lasting effect on reform debates.

Concluding Remarks

The Volunteer Force at the turn of the century was on the cusp of significant change. The

Anglo-Boer War was the first occasion in which the Force would be expected to not only

fulfill the duties that underpinned its creation half a century prior, but also to take on a

hitherto unexpected role as a reserve for the regular army. Glasgow's Volunteers as well

as many of their counterparts elsewhere enthusiastically responded to the request to fill

service companies to fight the Boers. Their initiative was bolstered through local

support, which was manifest in a variety of ways. However, the broad public support for

these men concealed the harsh realities of mobilizing part-time soldiers for active duty.

188 George Thomas Beatson, MD, CB, Imperial Defence: The advisability of appointing a Minister of Imperial Defence, and the Necessity of a Central Body of Control for the Volunteers. (Glasgow: Alexander Macdougall, 1906), 8. 189 Cunningham, 139.

81


force to repel any such raid, and an enormously improved efficiency on the part of the Volunteers by such a reduction of men and the additional expenditure of

1 00 money on those remaining in the force.

The Volunteers, whose opposition became increasingly powerful, decried Arnold-

Forster's scheme, in particular his proposed troop cuts. Their reaction to the Secretary of

State's proposals can be shown in a circular published by the Institute of Commanding

Officers of Volunteers. In an introductory letter, Colonel Stanley G. Bird claimed that

Arnold-Forster was "misinformed" in the assumption that the Volunteers were neither

needed for home defence, nor reliable for overseas service. Furthermore, he cited

uncertainty over the future of the Force as being the underlying cause behind the lack of

qualified officers.183 Contained in his letter were excerpts from The Spectator that also

decried the Secretary of State's programme of reform. One such opinion, penned by an

anonymous 'Volunteer Field Officer' argued that "all recent attempts to make the

Volunteers more 'efficient'—i.e., to make greater demands on their time—have resulted

only in driving out of the ranks the busiest, hence the superior, men."184 While

supporters of Arnold-Forster's scheme, or at least those who wished to give it a chance,

attributed such criticisms to "misconception and misunderstanding," its effect nonetheless

182 Hansard, 4th ser., vol. 143 (1905), cols. 1583-1584. He also stated that he was unconvinced that "are in such imminent danger of invasion that it is necessary to keep 630,000 men in time of peace to repel an invasion which I honestly believe will never take place. (Hansard, 4th ser., vol. 143 (1905), col. 1583) The Secretary of State held firm in the faith that this would be well-received by the Volunteers. In a July 1905 speech, he told Parliament that "the only possible ground on which we can ask the Volunteers to consent to any reduction is to give them something in exchange which they will value and which the country will also value; and this is what I propose. They are proposals that, if carried into effect, will enormously increase the efficiency of the Volunteers, and will meet definitely the difficulties of the Volunteer officers and men. But they will cost money." (Hansard, 4th ser., vol. 149 (1905), col. 635) 183 Letter from Stanley Bird, March 29, 1905, TERRITORIAL ARMY: War Office and successors: Registered Files (General Series), W032/6562, TNA. 184 Ibid.


While given credit for their work overseas, the overall conduct of the war led to the

Government re-evaluating the state of the entire military, in doing so marking a reversal

of years of benign neglect vis-a-vis the Volunteers. Individual writers and official bodies

such as the Elgin and Norfolk Commissions were more or less in agreement that the

Volunteer Force was beset with deficiencies relating to its manpower and efficiency.

These concerns, raised doubt as to Volunteers' value as a home defence force and its

utility in future conflicts. While Glasgow's Volunteer commanders were confident that if

given sufficient full-time training their men could take the field against any foe, high-

ranking Army officials were less sanguine in their respective assessments. The problems

associated with the Volunteer Force were not new by any measure; the war only acted to

expose these deficiencies and spark efforts to remedy them. Brodrick and Arnold-Forster

both sought to rationalize the auxiliary forces, but to no avail as the political pressure of

the Volunteers proved too great an obstacle.190 With the end of Conservative government

in 1905 following the resignation of Arthur Balfour and the subsequent Liberal

ascendency (first by minority government, then by electoral victory), the issue of

improving the Volunteer Force remained incomplete. The Liberal Secretary of State who

replaced Arnold-Forster was tasked with enacting change amidst tensions and the ill-will

left behind from his predecessor's tenure in office. One result was that the localities

played a greater role in the development of reform. As Glasgow was an important

Volunteer centre, it would come to factor heavily in these subsequent efforts. A local

190 As one historian writes, Brodrick and Arnold-Forster "had learned that it was considerably easier to develop plans for army reorganization than to see those plans carried to conclusion." Bryce Poe II, "British Army Reforms, 1902-1914," Military Affairs 31, no. 3 (Autumn 1967): 134.

75


approach will detail the various concerns and criticisms held by these men 'on the

ground' in the ultimate build-up to—and implementation of—reform.

It must be emphasized that although the rhetoric of change would persist within

political and military arenas, calls for wholesale reform were inevitably met and

tempered by the realities of part-time soldiering in early twentieth century Britain.

Indeed, as the next chapter will highlight, despite grand ideals, political constraints

ensured that continuity reigned. This theme of continuity will form a common thread

throughout this study, as on a number of levels—terms of service, motivations and

obstacles to service, and a host of personal and organizational ties to amateur

soldiering—would endure, forming the foundation of its successor institution.

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Chapter 2 - Glasgow and Haldane's Reforms

It's a heavy piece of work... the greatest army bill for 2 centuries.

Richard Burdon Haldane, 19071

Introduction

The process by which the 1907 Territorial and Reserve Forces Act was devised, made

law, and implemented in early 1908 is the focus of this chapter. Specifically, this chapter

will highlight the legislative basis for the continuity which characterized the early

Territorial Force. With the fall of the Conservative government in late 1905 (and

confirmed in the general election of January 1906), the issue of military reform remained

unsettled. Although Arnold-Forster's wider ambitions had largely failed, he nonetheless

introduced a limited number of improvements in the Volunteer Force, the most notable of

these being their use in national emergencies—not simply in the event of invasion—and

financial penalties for camp non-attendance.2 However, his ultimate aim of rationalizing

the Force through cutting both expenditure and manpower eluded him, in no small part

because of the outcry generated from the Volunteers themselves: the notion of having

their numbers curtailed was an unpalatable one. This was especially so, considering that

since its beginnings the wider strength and success of the movement was gauged in terms

of enrolment figures. To propose something that ran so contrary to tradition—even in the

name of efficiency—was to face unavoidable opposition.

1 Haldane to his Mother, July 31, 1907, Haldane Papers, MS5978, f.43, NLS. 2 Cunningham, 139.

77

Glasgow & Haldane's Reforms

Here, the roots of continuity can be traced. Given the amount of ill-will that had

developed during Arnold-Forster's tenure in the War Office, his successor would face

formidable challenges in order to realize their vision of reform.3 The incoming Secretary

of State for War, Richard Burdon Haldane, offered more comprehensive plans than his

immediate predecessors—including a two-line army structure, local administration of

part-time soldiers, and a concrete mobilization scheme—all of which were underpinned

by a unity of military and civilian interests. Nonetheless, the proposed reforms faced

opposition and criticism on a number of fronts, much of which again emanated from the

Volunteers. Yet through a process of consultation and compromise, he was ultimately

successful in placating such hostility and instituting reform of the British auxiliary forces.

Additionally, Haldane was fortunate in that on account of election defeats, there were

significantly fewer Volunteers in Parliament to oppose his agenda—this figure was

reduced by nearly half, with the majority of those remaining being members of the

Liberal Party.4 Despite these favourable circumstances, the notion of wholesale reform

as the end product must be approached with caution. Instead, it is more apt to suggest

that continuity was enshrined in the final legislation.

As this chapter proceeds, the importance of perceptions on the ground—as

opposed to those from high office—is clear. The opinion expressed by Glasgow's part-

time soldiers during this period centered on matters such as the fears of severe terms of

3 As Haldane states, as a result of his predecessor's style of leadership "the state of things at the War Office was bordering on chaos. No one had any clear idea of what his duty was, and there was no plan in existence." Richard Burdon Haldane, Draft Autobiography, Haldane Papers, ms6919, 30, NLS. 4 Beckett, Riflemen Form, 240,251.

78


service, the loss of battalions, and an overall concern over the future of their cherished

movement. On account of Glasgow being an important Volunteer centre, Haldane made

notable efforts to alleviate the misgivings of the city's corps. He did this through both

personal appearances as well as enlisting local leaders to promote his plan. The mark of

the Volunteer movement however remained discernible, and is revealed through this

study's local approach. Here, the opinions and concerns of Glasgow's Volunteers—are

valuable in that they shed light into how Haldane's creation came to differ only slightly

from the institutions that it replaced. In that regard, it can be argued that reform was

carried out largely on their terms—both in Glasgow and elsewhere. While this alone

does not offer a great divergence from existing studies, the outcome of these discussions

sets the stage for the remainder of this study, which details the multilayered continuities

and the cultural foundations that defined amateur soldiering in this period.

The Formulation of Reform

When he obtained the seals of office in December 1905, the Liberal MP and Scotsman

Haldane was tasked with addressing the expectations held by both his party and the

nation.5 Because the Liberals had repeatedly criticized the previous government for

increasing expenditure, Haldane was expected to follow through with party rhetoric and

trim costs to pre-Anglo-Boer War levels—a similar stance to his immediate predecessors

5 Although an election did not take place until a month later, Campbell-Bannerman formed an interim minority government to replace that of Conservative Balfour, who had resigned.

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who had also sought greater economies.6 Army spending had already decreased from

expenditures incurred during the conflict, yet it was a key plank in the Campbell-

Bannerman agenda to sustain this budgetary trend. This was desired for a number of

reasons—most notably to facilitate a lessening of international tensions and to allow the

enacting of domestic social reforms.7 A parallel concern was the continued unease over

the nation's defences which the previous government failed to completely resolve. In

light of this second issue, Haldane set out to re-examine the role and nature of the army.

While Brodrick and Arnold-Forster approached reform with clear programmes already in

mind, Haldane approached the matter with greater flexibility, acknowledging his

inexperience in army affairs.8 Haldane was by no means a military man, his public life

hitherto had focused on the practice of law as well as matters of education, particularly

university reform.9 To remedy his lack of firsthand military knowledge, he surrounded

6 Spiers, Haldane: An Army Reformer, 48. Peter Dennis states that this was the only notable party obligation faced by Haldane. See: Dennis, 6. John Gooch argues likewise, that on account of party considerations, economy was one of Haldane's "guiding principles." See: John Gooch, "Haldane and the 'National Army,'" in Politicians and Defence: Studies in the Formulation of British Defence Policy, eds. Ian Frederick William Beckett, and John Gooch (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1983), 74. 7 Geoffrey Russell Searle, A New England?: Peace and War 1886-1918 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 392. In terms of wider political ambitions, the Liberal foray into social reforms was driven to placate radical and labour-leaning constituents. See David Powell, British Politics, 1910-1935: The Crisis of the Party System (London: Routledge, 2004), 31. 8 In his words "I knew little of military affairs, and of Army organisation I was wholly ignorant. But from the beginning the work fascinated me." Richard Burdon Haldane, Richard Burdon Haldane. An Autobiography (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1929), 183. However, this claim is to an extent disingenuous. According to John Gooch he served as a member on a committee "on smokeless propellants in May 1900, and.. .had harangued the electors of East Lothian on the necessity for reform of the War Office on the grounds that it was at present on a highly unbusinesslike footing." However, Gooch also acknowledges that Haldane "had no specific preconceived ideas about an ideal of military organisation.. .and could adopt the useful post of the disinterested outsider who would weigh up the rival claims of the experts before reaching his decision." See: John Gooch, "Haldane and the 'National Army'," 71. 9 Sir Frederick Maurice, Haldane 1856-1915. The Life of Viscount Haldane of Cloan (London: Faber & Faber, 1937), 77. Indeed, aside from law, universities and higher learning were a lifelong passion of

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himself with advisors who would not only provide critical feedback, but also aid in

winning political support. According to Dennis, "Haldane made sure that, unlike Arnold-

Forster, he kept his military advisers informed and where possible carried them with

him."10 This is a point made by Haldane in his autobiography, where he gives credit to

several career military men who "co-operated in advising" him.11 Further, his subsequent

programme was influenced by committees tasked with assessing the nature and severity

of foreign threats.

Shortly after his appointment, Haldane returned to his Perthshire family estate to

deliberate on reforms. Aided by his Military Secretary, Colonel G.F. Ellison, the

Secretary of State examined ways in which he could combine economy and efficiency.12

The underpinnings of his reforms were later spelled out and defined in six secret

memoranda written between January and November 1906. His initial vision for a

reformed auxiliary force was that of what historians term a 'nation-in-arms.' This

concept borrowed upon existing European sentiment.13 Rather than Continental-style

compulsion, the military and civil society would be linked through a system of voluntary

service. Here, it is through institutions such as schools and local administrative bodies

Haldane. This was evident in his efforts in the expansion of higher learning in the United Kingdom, as well as serving as chancellor or rector at a number of universities. 10 Dermis, 7. 11 Haldane, An Autobiography, 189. 12 In Haldane's recollections, Gerald Ellison "proved to be all and more than all I had hope for...He had been trained in part in German military surroundings, and had studied military history and organisation copiously" (Ibid., 184). While cost-saving certainly factored into Haldane's Territorial scheme, as will be shown, much of the ensuing debates and discussions centered on matters of administration and efficiency/readiness. 13 Colmar Von Der Goltz, The Nation in Arms, trans. Philip A. Ashworth (London: W.H. Allen & Co., 1887)

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that such ties—and thus a truly national, distinctly British army—would be fostered. In

such a system, the army would consist of two lines—a 'Striking' Force and a 'Territorial'

Force—the latter administered not through the regular army, but rather under a local,

more coherent structure of County Associations.14 Through the combined efforts of

military and civilian members, these bodies would be responsible for the raising,

supplying, and administering the Territorial Force in their respective jurisdictions. This

concept of local oversight and connections borrowed heavily from earlier reforms, in

particular, Edward Cardwell's efforts in the 1870s.15

For front-line service abroad would be the Striking Force, made up of regulars

with support from the Militia and Yeomanry.16 The Territorial Force would be in essence

a recast Volunteer Force, but envisioned as taking on a much greater role than hitherto.

Haldane stressed that:

The difference between the Territorial Army and the existing Volunteers will be very marked.. .The Territorial Army will exist for an entirely different purpose,

14 Second Memorandum, Februrary 1, 1906, Haldane Papers ms6108A(l), ff.51, NLS. 15 Indeed, Haldane referred to Cardwell's reforms in the formulation of his scheme. His third memorandum (March 23, 1906) explicitly cites Cardwell's localization efforts. Viscount Edward Cardwell served as Secretary of State for War from 1868-1874. Under a series of sweeping reforms, Cardwell sought to modernise the Army following the Crimean War. Under the 1872 Localization Act he called for each line regiment to be linked to territorial districts. More efficient recruiting, the fostering of local patriotism, and improving life for soldiers were objectives of this act. See: Harald E. Raugh, The Victorians at War, 1815-1914: An Encyclopedia of British Military History (Oxford: ABC-CLIO, 2004), 83; Alan Ramsay Skelley, The Victorian Army at Home: The recruitment and terms and conditions of the British regular, 1859-1899 (London: Croom Helm, 1977), 253; David French, Military Identities: The Regimental System, the British Army, & the British People c.1870-2000, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 15; Spiers, The Late Victorian Army, 1868-1902, 19; A detailed account of Cardwell's tenure as War Minister can be found in Arvel B. Erickson, Edward T. Cardwell: Peelite (Philadelphia: The American Philosophical Society, 1959). 16 Haldane believed that although unlikely, the invasion of France by 'Central Powers', were it to lead to the occupation of cities along the English Channel such as Dunkirk, Calais, Boulogne, would be a substantial threat to Britain. To prepare for this, in his words "we should have an Expeditionary Force sufficient in size and also in rapidity of mobilizing power to be able to go to the assistance of the French Army" (Haldane, An Autobiography, 187).

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and in numbers, in organization and conditions of service will be unlike any force we now possess.17

Haldane's statement could not be dismissed as exaggeration. The experience of the

Anglo-Boer War, in particular the ad hoc means of raising sufficient numbers to fight in

that conflict, can be felt in his proposals. The Territorial Force would differ from the

Volunteers in that instead of being limited to a home defence role, it would be liable for

overseas service, and employed whenever large numbers were necessary defence—a

1 o

bona fide second line liable for service abroad.

Earlier conclusions made by the Committee of Imperial Defence (CID) played a

significant role in shaping Haldane's scheme. The CID's 1903 report assessed the

probability of large-scale invasion of the British Isles by a hostile European power.

Given the concerns emanating from the Army's performance during the Anglo-Boer War,

one of the first tasks faced by the CID was to determine the nature of this threat.

Diplomatic overtures with France and Russia shifted the CID's emphasis towards

possible hostilities with Germany.19 Among the Committee's papers lay a translated

German newspaper article which stated that the development of a strong navy was crucial

to defending that nation's interests, but in terms of invading Britain, "any thought of such

17 Richard Burdon Haldane, Fourth Memorandum, April 25, 1906, Haldane Papers, ms6108A(l), ff.51, NLS. 18 Second Memorandum, Februrary 1, 1906, Haldane Papers; Spiers, Haldane: an Army Reformer, 98. 19 As Kennedy argues, the wider British concern with Germany lay in the rise of the latter's clout, which was perceived as infringing upon British interests. This was further compounded by uncertainties over the Empire sparked by the Anglo-Boer War. See: Paul M. Kennedy, The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism 1860-1914 (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1980), 466.

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an undertaking lay far from the thoughts of Germany."20 Then Prime Minister Arthur

Balfour concluded in a memorandum to the CID that invasion was "impracticable" and

that it should "cause us ... no new anxiety."21 If attacked, the only threats to the British

mainland would take the form of limited raids. This clearly bolstered those adhering to

the 'Blue Water' theory, which argued that Britain's naval supremacy would pre-empt

any invasion attempts.22 The dominance of Blue Water thought within the highest levels

of government shaped attempts at reforming the auxiliary forces. Arnold-Forster used

the CID to justify his proposed cuts in Volunteer strength, citing the lack of necessity for

sustained numbers for home defence. Haldane on the other hand, saw this as reason to

maintain troop levels rather than to push higher efficiency standards. In his initial plan

for restructuring the army, Haldane felt that existing numbers were sufficient, as only in

the event of prolonged war would the Territorial Force be required, either as a reserve or

home defence force. In any case, the CID's findings lessened the political pressure to

immediately bolster the nation's defences.

Haldane had developed a structure that given contemporary geopolitical trends,

was able to meet the nation's defensive requirements should it be called upon. As the

navy would continue as the primary means of protecting the nation's interests, this

system was also designed to placate concerns as to excessive military expenditure in a

20 "The Feasibility of Oversea [sic] Invasion" (April 1903), Committee of Imperial Defence: Home Defence Memoranda (A Series), CAB3, TNA. 21 Balfour Memorandum, November 11, 1903, April 1903, Committee of Imperial Defence: Home Defence Memoranda (A Series), CAB3, TNA. 22 Mitchinson, Defending Albion, 1.

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time of peace—shown in the hard caps on spending in Haldane's later Army Estimates—

as well as Britain's susceptibility to attack. As he explained in July 1906:

We do not propose to increase by a penny the expenditure on the Auxiliary Forces, which has already grown to portentous dimensions, and I hope that there is room for economy. But we want to get out of the three or four millions spent on the Auxiliary Forces something very substantial in this form which will enable us to diminish the cost of the Regulars, something to bring the Army nearer to the people, to make the people more content with the Army than they are at the present time.23

In sum, the scheme allowed for the rapid expansion of the army, while taking into

account the need to repel limited raids; all of which could be accomplished at a lower

cost than previously. The latter was a deliberate political ploy by the Secretary of State.24

His ceiling of £28 million, set in his first memorandum (January 1, 1906) was the product

of political considerations, for it was a lower estimate than that offered by Arnold-Forster

in 1905. The desire to preserve economy was reflected in that this level of expenditure

remained more or less constant up to the outbreak of war in 1914.25

Criticisms & Compromise

Though comprehensive in nature, the prospect of sweeping reform as outlined in

Haldane's initial vision of reform would ultimately be reduced by political forces. While

Haldane's designs for the Expeditionary Force drew little criticism, the same could not be

23 Hansard, 4th ser., vol. 160 (1906), col. 1117. 24 Poe II, 135. 25 Richard Burdon Haldane, First Memorandum, January 1, 1906, Haldane Papers, ms6108A(i), ff.51, NLS; Ian Packer, Liberal Government and Politics, 1905-15 (New York: Palgrave, 2006), 38; David French, The British Way in Warfare, 161. Further evidence is in a 1911 written answer to Parliament by Haldane, confirming this cap on expenditures. Hansard, 5th ser., vol. 23 (1911), col. 371w.

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said for his plans for the auxiliary forces: reform, as his predecessors' experience could

attest, was a process fraught with significant challenges. Most notable of these was the

political clout of the Volunteers.26 As noted in retrospect by Haldane:

These heterogeneous corps had histories and traditions and people who had been associated with and were devotedly attached to them. To break with tradition and weld their substance into something quite novel was likely to be a very serious undertaking. It proved to be so.27

In addition to preserving cherished traditions, the key sticking points as pertaining to

these part-time soldiers were the issues of local administration as well as obligatory

overseas service. As home defence was from the beginning the express purpose of the

Volunteer Force, there continued to exist hostility towards placing the men under altered

terms of enlistment. Haldane, on the other hand, also faced criticisms from Conservative

politicians and like-minded military leaders who raised doubt as to the value of the

Volunteers as a second line. The Volunteers themselves claimed their reliability,

especially when Arnold-Forster's cuts were proposed, and once in office, Haldane proved

receptive to their argument. Also offering substantial resistance to this programme of

reform were conscriptionist groups who, viewing the auxiliaries' flaws as part of a

systemic failing in voluntary service, advocated universal conscription along European

lines. In all, it was readily apparent to Haldane that significant political hurdles stood in

the way of comprehensive reform of the auxiliary forces.

26 Dennis, 6. 27 Haldane, An Autobiography, 192. Sir Frederick Maurice offers a similar assessment in his biography of the Secretary of State, stating "any scheme of reform which affected these [auxiliaries] would certainly meet many vested interests, old traditions, and old prejudices" (Maurice, 204).

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To win over needed support, Haldane employed a strategy of consultation with

the groups and interests most affected by his scheme. A first step in carrying this out had

materialized in the creation of what would be called 'the Duma.' Led by Lord Esher, a

man active in military affairs, this was an advisory committee comprised of

representatives of the Yeomanry, Militia, and Volunteers.28 In forming this body,

Haldane hoped he could carry out reform by consensus amongst the auxiliaries.

Unfortunately, this tactic failed. The Esher committee met eleven times between May 17

and June 15, 1906. Its final meeting "adjourned asking for further knowledge of the

Mobilization Scheme, an indication of the amount of money available to the new Force,

and an opinion of the work it had already done."29 Although it did not release any

reports, the Esher committee was useful in detailing the functions of County

Associations, a central component of Haldane's reforms.30 As Haldane expressed to

Parliament in July 1906:

On the question of the County Associations they [the Esher Committee] have undertaken the laborious task of advising the War Office as to the best means of carrying this object out. Their present view is that you can do a great deal by bringing in a number of representatives of the new county and borough councils, representatives of the commanding officers of the Auxiliary Forces, and representatives of the general officer commanding the Regular troops in the district; and then there are the county people themselves.3

28 Esher proved a valuable ally given his political clout, particularly in military matters. Following the Anglo-Boer War, he chaired a committee on War Office reform, sat as a permanent member on the CID, and was President of the London Territorial Association. See: Mitchinson, Defending Albion, 213 (n.13); John Pitcairn Mackintosh, The British Cabinet, 3rd ed. (London: Routledge Kegan & Paul, 1981), 244, 279. For Esher's own thoughts on the matter, see: Reginald Baliol Brett Esher, To-day and to-tomorrow, and other essays (London: J. Murray, 1910), 18-34. 29 Cunningham, 142. 30 Maurice, 206. 31 Hansard, 4th ser., vol. 160 (1906), col. 1116.

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Yet, the notion of county associations was but one component of Haldane's scheme, a

package of changes that together was perceived as a threat to Volunteer traditions. To

lessen potential hostility towards reform as a whole, strategy shifted from consensus to

legislation and individual negotiation. One of the most conspicuous means by which

Haldane sought to directly appeal to the parties most affected by his scheme was through

public speeches and appearances. In this regard, the Volunteer strongholds of Glasgow

and Liverpool stand out as notable examples. Speaking in Glasgow before the Fourth

Volunteer Battalion (VB) Scottish Rifles at their annual gathering in January 1907,

Haldane, with the excuse that his "master" had not given him permission to do so, "dared

not" divulge information as to reforms. Yet, he did express the belief that reorganization

was necessary and that the status quo could not stand. "What was good enough for fifty

years ago is not good enough for to-day."32 To reassure his audience, Haldane promised

that the Volunteers would be represented and consulted in the institution of any scheme.

He concluded by lauding their initiative, acknowledging that "for the sake of the nation

there are few duties which you would esteem as too heavy to take upon yourselves."33

Three days later in Liverpool, Haldane repeated many of the same points before

the Eighth (Scottish) VB, King's Liverpool Regiment. At the city's Philharmonic Hall,

he acknowledged their having been "a little left out in the cold" in military

considerations. Yet he expressed confidence that "the time would inevitably come ...

when the nation would call upon the Volunteers to undertake greater responsibility, and

32 Glasgow Herald, January 12, 1907. 33 Ibid.


fulfill more difficult functions than hitherto."34 As to his future designs for the Volunteer

movement, the Secretary of State remained coy, but did reveal that reorganization would

involve a two-line model—"The British Army in its first line might consist only of

professional soldiers, but it also needed a second line of non-professional soldiers, who,

nevertheless, were just as keen in the spirit of soldiering."35 Addressing the regiment,

Haldane consciously appealed to their pride, arguing that "he did not believe that the

Volunteers would shrink from the greater responsibility which they would in time to

come be inevitably called upon to undertake."36 While promoting their value in Britain's

defence requirements, Haldane placed them within the context of established Blue Water

principles, by describing Britain's navy as "insurance"—"our real guarantee against

invasion."37 Almost certainly referring to his vision of incorporating the talents and

labour of all Britons to the cause of home defence, the Secretary of State also warned that

"without a national effort it seems almost hopeless to withdraw things from the confusion

in which they had been in days gone past."38 In addition to these cities, the Secretary of

State made appearances before Volunteer corps in Manchester, Sheffield, and London.

This tedious circuit of dinners and public lectures—which Haldane himself described as

having "somewhat bored the country" were undertaken "for the purpose of conferring

with Volunteer commanding officers."39 Through this communication Haldane tried to

34 Ibid., January 15, 1907. 35 The Times, January 15, 1907. 36 Ibid. 37 Glasgow Herald, January 15, 1907. 38 Ibid. 39 Hansard, 4th ser., vol. 169 (1907), col. 1296. The contents of this speech can also be found in Richard Burdon Haldane, Army Reform and other addresses (London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1907), 94-158.

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establish close personal ties with these influential men, thereby diffusing the "opposition

which his scheme had originally evoked."40 After concluding his goodwill campaign,

Haldane began to publicly unveil the particulars of his reforms. This was anticipated in a

February 21, 1907 column in The Times, in which it was ascertained that his upcoming

proposals would certainly provide abundant material for criticism and comment.41

Two days later, The Times published an outline of Haldane's plan. Regarding the

auxiliary forces, it was stated that "investigation has shown that it is beyond question that

the existing organization of these forces is such as to make it impossible to use them with

full advantage to the nation."42 At the reading of the Army and Supply Estimates before

Parliament on February 25, the Secretary of State used the occasion to describe his

Territorial scheme, elaborating further as to the justifications for such reforms. There he

emphasized that the War Office was primarily tasked with the challenge of reform.

Citing the example of the South African War, described by him as "the terrible waste of

public money, and the still worse lesson—the terrible waste of valuable lives," Haldane

stated that a more rationalized system was necessary.43 In the ensuing speech, he

highlighted the problems plaguing the British Army. He believed that much of the

underlying problems in military organization stemmed from an insistence on a three-line

system, comprised of professional regulars, semi-professionals such as the Militia and

Yeomanry, and the amateur Volunteers. Haldane argued that under the current structure:

40 Hansard, 4th ser., vol. 169 (1907), col. 1296; Spiers, Haldane: An Army Reformer, 108. 4lThe Times, February 21, 1907. 42 Ibid., February 23, 1907. 43 Hansard, 4th ser., vol. 169 (1907), col. 1284.

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Each has been starved by the others. Our first line is full of gaps; our second line is decadent because it is not possible to find men and money sufficient; and the third line is totally disorganised because the military talent has flowed so largely into the other lines. Instead of having a homogeneous organisation we have got a confused mass of troops coming under these three heads, but with no place in a definite military scheme.44

In the same February 1907 speech he continued to elaborate on this lack of a coherent

structure in the auxiliary forces, deeming the Volunteers to having been "probably the

most confused thing we have in the British constitution." In support of this assertion,

Haldane noted that the average Volunteer could be "paid in twenty-two different ways."45

Upon noting the structural deficiencies in the army, Haldane proceeded to detail

his vision of reform, including a streamlined two-line system—the second line comprised

of Yeomanry, Militia, and Volunteers, a divisional command structure, improved

artillery, revised terms of service, and administration on a county basis. The purpose of

the second line—the Territorial Force—was to undertake peacetime instruction, repel

raids in the event of war, and act as a reserve for overseas service. The last function—

that of a reserve—was altered from the original intent in that it would exist on a purely

voluntary basis. Yet the Secretary of State was firm in the belief that the Force would

"serve for that expansion and that support of which the Norfolk and the Elgin

Commissions said so much."46 Haldane argued that the main advantages of his scheme

were that:

44 Hansard, 4th ser., vol. 169 (1907), col. 1286. 45 Hansard, 4th ser., vol. 169 (1907), col. 1293. 46 Hansard, 4th ser., vol. 169 (1907), col. 1303.

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They are, in the first place, the definition of functions. To that we attach the utmost importance. Each army and each line will have its functions in the great national organisation. The second important thing will be readiness for mobilisation. We may reasonably hope to be free from any more South African experiences.47

He noted that in enacting his reform scheme, sacrifices would be required, especially

from those in the auxiliary forces who would be required to "give up many traditions, to

remould themselves and to be prepared for war as completely and thoroughly as the first

line."48 Sacrifices of this sort would not be made in vain, as it was argued that these were

necessary in order "to put ourselves in a position of fighting efficiency."49 However, his

colleagues were aware the political difficulties such proposals faced. Sir Howard

Vincent, leader of the Volunteer contingent within Parliament, praised the Secretary of

State's approach to reform as "perfectly marvellous", but warned changes

... affecting the second line would require the greatest care and attention ... There was always a danger in abolishing old names and old institutions. Whether the country would take to the old things under a new name he did not know.50

As shown in the opinions of contemporary Glaswegians, these reservations were not

limited to interested politicians, but widely held throughout the Volunteer movement.

The February 26, 1907 editorial in the Glasgow Herald focused on Haldane's

speech. It expressed confidence that "the scheme will make the nation stronger for war,"

47 Hansard, 4th ser., vol. 169 (1907), col. 1326. 48 Hansard, 4th ser., vol. 169 (1907), col. 1286. 49 Hansard, 4th ser., vol. 169 (1907), col. 1283. 50 Hansard, 4th ser., vol. 169 (1907), col. 1345.

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and that the Volunteers would not "lose one per cent" of manpower.51 The editorial

posited that because they were consulted beforehand "there is reason to believe," that

Volunteer colonels would overwhelmingly support the scheme.52 Further, regardless of

its final incarnation, it was positive that the Secretary of State's bill would bring about "a

solid remainder of definite, ponderable improvement of the defensive forces of the nation

in the shape of a Volunteer force furnished with the means of making a Second Army."53

The piece concluded that from that point on, the onus would fall upon Haldane's critics to

prove that in the end, Britain's defences would be weaker than before. As revealed in the

subsequent days and months, this would be a task some would not shy away from.

That next day, the Glasgow Herald published an extensive article featuring the

opinions of local Volunteer commanding officers. When put before them, Haldane's

Territorial scheme did elicit some praise. The initial reactions by the men most affected

by these reforms was that it provided greater clarity than had earlier proposals. Colonel

Alexander Brown Grant of the First Lanarkshire Royal Garrison Artillery Volunteers

noted that:

Mr. Haldane's description of our unpreparedness for rapid mobilisation was not only instructive, but true. Instead of having three lines without proper organization and administration, the new scheme provided for two lines, each with definite functions ... if the nation would back up Mr Haldane the country would ultimately have a force better prepared for war than hitherto.54

51 Glasgow Herald, February 26, 1907. 52 Ibid. "Ibid. 54 Ibid., February 27, 1907.

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Sir John Ure Primrose (former Lord Provost and Lord-Lieutenant of Glasgow, at the time

a Deputy-Lieutenant), while acknowledging that any plans for reform would undoubtedly

be met with criticism, was pleased to find that Haldane's designs were marked by "a

definiteness of perception and an acquaintance with the difficulties of the position

which... had never been equalled by any Minister who had struggled with this

problem."55 Similarly, Colonel Fred Smith, commander of the Fourth Scottish Rifles

deemed the proposals "so far as the Volunteers were concerned ... the most

comprehensive that had yet been put forward."56 Colonel J. Drummond Young (Second

VB Highland Light Infantry (ret.)) informed the Glasgow Herald that "the scheme is

undoubtedly one of the most far-reaching, comprehensive, and statesmanlike that has

been brought forward by any Secretary of State since the Crimean War."57 In his

opinion, Haldane's vision of a two-lined army was "exactly what is required ... the

varied conditions under which the existing units serve are complicated, unworkable, and

ridiculous."58

Much of the opinion centered upon practical issues, such as finances,

administration, and training. It was in such matters that further praise was directed. One

component of Haldane's reforms lay in day-to-day funding of the auxiliaries. Under his

programme, Volunteer assets, both monetary and physical, would be transferred to the

hands of local Associations; in turn these bodies would remove the financial

55 Ibid. 56 Ibid. 57 Ibid., February 28, 1907. 58 Ibid.

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responsibilities that were normally the burden of commanding officers.59 The Secretary

of State remarked at the need for such changes, focusing on the detrimental effect on

Volunteer efficiency, as well as an officer's personal wealth.

The unfortunate commanding officer of the Volunteer battalion is an even greater patriot than is popularly supposed. He risks not only his life, but his fortune. If he wants a drill hall for his corps and borrows money to enable him to build, the Commissioners lend him money, but make him personally liable.. .We propose to remove the financial liability from these commanding officers and set them free to do their work of commanding and training their corps.60

Volunteer finances were dependent on the number of men enrolled in a particular

battalion. To avoid personal debts, Volunteer officers were often forced to retain men

otherwise unfit for service, simply to maintain capitation grants—"which is practically a

premium on the enlistment of inefficients."61 When asked of how the Associations would

be funded, Haldane replied that "it is intended that the money paid by the Army Council

to a County Association, taken together with arms or other supplies in kind, shall be

sufficient to cover the necessary equipment and maintenance of the Territorial Force in

its area."62 In relieving commanders of monetary liabilities, in theory they would have

the freedom to admit only men they saw as capable. This proposal had immediate appeal

amongst local Volunteer officers. Colonel James Smith Park (First Lanarkshire Royal

Engineers) noted that "the first thing to appeal to commanding officers was that Mr.

59 While only funding was very broadly suggested in Parliamentary discussions, further details were determined and confirmed after the bill's passage. See: "Transfer of Yeomanry and Volunteer Property" (1908), War Office and successors: Registered Files (General Series), WO 32/6549, TNA; Hansard, 4th ser., vol. 171 (1907), cols. 422-423). 60 Hansard, 4th ser., vol. 169 (1907), col. 1294. 61 Hansard, 4th ser., vol. 169 (1907), col. 1293. 62 Hansard, 4th ser., vol. 173 (1907), col. 1054.

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Haldane proposed to take over the approved debts of the corps."63 Colonel Hendry

(Brigade-Major VBHLI) also applauded the removal of financial responsibilities, which

he viewed as long being "a crying evil."64 Primose agreed, arguing that "it was

preposterous that a Volunteer officer engaging in unselfish duties ... [would] still be

financially liable."65 While this aspect of reform was well-received, criticism was

directed at the bodies controlling the funds; the division of command and administration

via the "new piece of machinery"—the County Associations—did not garner similar

approval.

From the earliest iterations of the County Associations in Haldane's program of

reform, these bodies were generally not well-received. Their proposed composition—and

the extent to which they marked a departure from Volunteer traditions—were a major

point of contention. According to Haldane in a July 1906 speech:

We find that we are constantly maltreating the Volunteers for want of local knowledge, and we felt it to be absolutely essential that they should have some power of organisation in the counties and of controlling their own affairs. If that be so, it seems to us that the best way is to form some kind of association in the counties.66

Yet, the main concern of Volunteer commanding officers was that under the proposed

County Associations, much of their traditional powers would be transferred into an entity

comprised primarily of civilians. While under the existing system these men were liable

63 Glasgow Herald, February 27, 1907. 64 Ibid., February 28, 1907. 65 Ibid., February 27, 1907. 66 Haldane, Army Reform and Other Addresses, 89.

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for the expenses of those under their command, they had also enjoyed a large degree of

freedom as to how their corps would be administered.67 Personal control was the

continued pull of nineteenth-century ideas of individualism from which the modern

Volunteer movement materialized, and was a tradition that Volunteer officers were

reluctant to discard. Their opposition to this aspect of Haldane's scheme was felt in

meetings with Volunteer colonels in September 1906, where they expressed their

adamant opposition to the proposed County Associations.68

Whereas he publicly continued to proclaim the need for close collaboration of

military and civilian interests, the Secretary of State reeled from the Volunteers

obstinacy.69 Despite the protests of his closest advisors, Haldane revised the role

afforded civilians in these bodies, ultimately through "minimising their elective nature ...

and increasing the number of co-opted military members."70 Volunteer commanding

officers would form over half of the membership in any given Association. Further, the

Army Council would wield significant influence in the nomination of these men. The

remaining members were to be comprised of representatives of local government and

concerned parties.71 Through reducing public participation, Haldane sacrificed an

important element of his envisioned nation-in-arms. Even with these concessions, the

suspicion over civilian influence in the day-to-day administration of County Associations

persisted into 1907.

67 Spiers, Haldane: An Army Reformer, 102. 68 Cunningham, 142. 69 Spiers, Haldane: An Army Reformer, 103; Gooch, "Haldane and the National Army," 79. 70 Dennis, 12. 71 Mitchinson, England's Last Hope, 9.

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Upon Haldane's public unveiling of his scheme in February, local Volunteer

attention centered upon the place afforded to Lord-Lieutenants. Haldane justified their

establishment as heads of Associations as "we desire to turn him a little from his present

magisterial to his old military functions."72 Class considerations weighed heavily in this

plan; because these leading men were "the link with the landowners of the county" their

taking on this position of leadership was seen as greatly assisting in the procurement of

ranges and training facilities, as well as in fostering public support for the Territorial

Force.73 As mentioned by Cunningham, "if the Territorial Force was to be the nation in

arms, there was no question in Haldane's mind but that it should be under its 'natural

leaders.'"74 In addition to civilians as heads of Associations, they would be accompanied

by representatives of labour and employers as Haldane recognized the importance in

establishing a "close relationship with the artisan classes as well as the employing classes

in the working out of this scheme."75 As will be discussed in Chapter Four, there was an

inherent practical value in the Secretary of State's vision of an inclusive administrative

body that included heads of local government and labour/employer interests. While their

makeup would vary from locality to locality, the function of County Associations would

be consistent throughout the country, in that:

The duty of the County Associations will be to look after the business side of the second-line troops of the county, and they will have, in addition to the lord

72 Hansard, 4th ser., vol. 169 (1907), col. 1304. 73 Hansard, 4th ser., vol. 169 (1907), col. 1305. 74 Cunningham, 146. 75 Hansard, 4th ser., vol. 169 (1907), col. 1305.

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lieutenant as president, business men as chairman and secretary, who will carefully deal with, all matters delegated to them by the Army Council.

A number of Volunteer commanding officers interviewed by the Glasgow Herald saw

potential in such bodies. For example, Colonel Grant approved of this aspect of

Haldane's scheme, as it "practically meant Home Rule for the Volunteers."77 Yet, local

opinion continued to view the elective nature of County Associations as a potential

source of trouble. John Ure Primrose warned that "If the proposed county military

associations were to be composed of popularly elected members, local prejudice as to

expenditure might be a difficult factor to deal with."78 An unnamed Edinburgh officer

"holding important rank" offered a more pointed opinion, arguing that "Lord-Lieutenants

are and will probably remain mere county figureheads, having little or no knowledge of

military affairs, and probably little in touch with the social side of the great Army

problem."79 The end result, as envisioned by Colonel Hendry would be a failed system

of administration, involving "the resignation of many Lord-Lieutenants and Deputy Lord-

Lieutenants who knew that they could not aid in work of that kind."80

Amidst strong reservations held towards even partial civilian administration, local

commanding officers held out hope that the Associations could still be successful if, as

Grant pointed out, it is "carried out on proper principles."81 While he does not go into

detail about what these principles entailed, the opinions of his colleagues suggest Grant's

76 Hansard, 4th ser., vol. 169 (1907), col. 1306. 77 Glasgow Herald, 27 February 27, 1907. 78 Ibid. 79 Ibid. 80 Ibid., February 28, 1907. 81 Ibid., February 27, 1907.

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implied message. According to Colonel Smith, "the decentralisation proposed in the

formation of County Associations should work all right provided care was taken that they

were composed of the proper representatives."82 Colonel Park was in agreement, calling

for the Associations to be run by "the proper men"—presumably, Volunteer commanding

officers rather than Lord-Lieutenants.83 As shown in the printed opinions of Glasgow

Volunteer officers, the creation of local Associations alone did not arouse great

controversy, but rather the civilian influence in military matters that stemmed from

Haldane's vision of a nation-in-arms was a central focus of concern. It is suggested

through these interviews that Volunteer commanding officers saw the potential in County

Associations provided they did not relinquish much of their previous authority. Given

the dual martial/civilian identity of these part-time soldiers, the resistance to even limited

civilian administration is ironic, but can be explained in the context of the Volunteer

movement's tradition of independence. Indeed, this issue revealed the perceived

lobbying power of the Volunteers, as Haldane believed it necessary to sacrifice the most

novel features of his reforms in order to secure sufficient political support.

The fear of a great departure from accustomed patterns can also be felt in

Haldane's proposed terms of service for this new force. In accordance with the Secretary

of State's proposals, Territorials would enlist for a period of four years. If an individual

was unable to honour this obligation, they would be required to give three months'

82 Ibid. 83 Ibid.

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notice, and be subject to a £5 fine.84 The heavy penalties for non-fulfillment of service

drew broad consternation. In the House of Commons, Howard Vincent expressed his

reservations, particularly in that:

As about 80 per cent of the Volunteers consisted of artisans who had to change their place of habitation sometimes at a few days' notice, it was a serious matter for them to be called upon to pay the heavy fine proposed in order to be released from their obligations. 5

Glasgow Volunteer officers also questioned the wisdom of such heavy-handed measures.

Grant did not approve of the financial penalty, nor could see how it could be enforced.

Hendry too believed that such a sum was unrealistic. Noting the city's staple industry of

shipbuilding, Park argued that £5 was a "serious thing" for many of his men: "For

example, in Glasgow they had frequent cases of men leaving the Clyde to proceed to

Belfast, where they could not complete their service."86 Emphasizing that "the

Volunteer must first earn his living", Colonel Young considered the proposed fines and

pondered:

Could anything be more absurd? ... In my old regiment the majority of the rank and file consisted of shipbuilders, engineers, etc.—first-rate material from which to draw for Volunteer service, but when a time of depression arrives in the industries of the Clyde many of these young men have to seek employment on the Tyne, or the Tees, or the Thames, and their engagements must be cancelled.87

84 Hansard, 4th ser., vol. 169 (1907), col. 1300. 85 Hansard, 4th ser., vol. 169 (1907), col. 1371. 86 Glasgow Herald, February 27, 1907. 87 Ibid., February 28, 1907.

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Later in 1907, to alleviate fears it would be argued that because the £5 was at the

colonel's discretion, the penalty was not "cast-iron."88 In all, these officers, like their

colleagues elsewhere, feared that such punitive measures would, rather than increase

efficiency, only serve as an obstacle limiting future enlistments.

The concern over penalties stemmed from the belief that Haldane's proposed

training regulations would be too severe for the average Territorial to fulfill. To deliver

an efficient Force, Haldane called for a "period of annual training, [in which] the men

will go into camp ... The camp will be for a period of fifteen days wherever that is

possible."89 In a later statement by the Secretary of State: "the Government asked the

manhood of the nation to come forward for home defence and to give as much time to

training as the men could spare."90 Yet, considering the detrimental effect on livelihoods,

a fortnight of camp was seen as unworkable for the majority of part-time soldiers. An

anonymous Edinburgh officer noted that under such a scheme "the apprentice was the

only man who could afford to bind himself to go to camp and do the hundred-and-one

things asked of him."91 Though not every man would be able to attend for the full period,

their presence was to be strongly encouraged nonetheless.92 Further, Haldane anticipated

that in the event of war, "the second line should be mobilised in its units, and be

88 Ibid., November 14, 1907. 89 Hansard, 4th ser., vol. 169 (1907), col. 1301. 90 Hansard, 4th ser., vol. 175 (1907), col. 701. 91 Glasgow Herald, February 27, 1907. 92 Hansard, 4th ser., vol. 169 (1907), col. 1301. In his words "Many of them will not be able to give so long a time, many will not be able to give more than eight days, but we will take them, rather than not have them, for that period." Ibid.

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embodied for war training for six months."93 In doing so, Haldane suggested that in this

situation the Territorial Force would voluntarily take on a role as a second line—to

provide for the support and expansion of the Expeditionary Force.94 He wagered that

following this period of intensified training,

... not only would they be enormously more efficient... but that they would be ready, finding themselves in their units, to say—"We wish to go abroad and take our part in the theatre of war, to fight in the interests of the nation and for the defence of the Empire.95

The Secretary of State optimistically predicted that from one-sixth to one-quarter of the

Force would accept the greater obligations.96 Much like his proposed fines for non-

completion of service, the proposed terms by which Territorials were to abide also drew

criticisms. Within Parliament there existed pointed objections to Haldane's mobilisation

scheme, mainly relating to the delay in bringing the TF to war readiness. Lord Weymss,

himself a former Volunteer officer, challenged the feasibility of such terms, daring:

.. .any one to say that with the training proposed the Territorial Army will be fit to contend with the picked troops it might have to meet in battle. Then the idea that an enemy would give us six months notice before commencing hostilities is ridiculous.97

In another parliamentarian's view "the enemy could not be persuaded to play the game

according to rules laid down, it could not be postulated that there should be six months'

93 Ibid. 94 Cunningham, 143. 95 Hansard, 4th ser., vol. 169 (1907), col. 1301. 96 Cunningham, 143. 97 Hansard, 4th ser., vol. 171 (1907), col. 1214.

103


notice and a large amount of warning before war broke out."98 Viscount Hardringe

warned that "With due deference to Mr. Haldane ... you cannot make a soldier in six

months, but you can lose a country in that time."99 Howard Vincent, citing the

difficulties faced by Volunteers during the South African War, warned that "to call these

men away from their workshops and factories for six months upon mobilisation would

stifle the whole trade of the country."100 The Glasgow Volunteers also cast doubt on the

practicality of extending the period of training. Hendry questioned whether or not "a

nation which declared war against us [would] be likely to wait six months until we were

ready."101 An unnamed Volunteer similarly mused in the Glasgow press "are we to have

six months' notice of an enemy's attack?"102 Following a spate of objections to the use

of the Territorials as a bona fide second line, Haldane revised the function of the Force in

the first reading of his Bill in March, insisting on a home defence role. Focusing on

service at home ran contrary to the full intentions of his scheme.103 The likely cause for

his moving away from a core component of his envisioned reforms was the "awareness of

the political difficulty of making Volunteers available for service overseas."104 Yet, the

Secretary of State's ideal of using the Territorials as a second-line was not wholly

abandoned, in that the provision for six months' training was retained. In his

98 Hansard, 4th ser., vol. 175 (1907), col. 1149. 99 Hansard, 4th ser., vol. 171 (1907), col. 1230. 100 Hansard, 4th ser., vol. 169 (1907), col. 1372. Vincent later uses the example of Sheffield miners as an example of how these regulations would be detrimental to industry, particularly those of importance in a war economy {Hansard, 4th ser., vol. 175 (1907), col. 771). 101 Glasgow Herald, February 27, 1907. 102 Ibid., March 30,1907. 103 Dennis, 13. 104 Cunningham, 144.

104


autobiography, Haldane continued in his belief that "a second line is obviously required

for expansion as well as for home defence."105 The controversial period of training only

had logic if the Force were to be used in such a capacity, as opposed to solely defending

Britain's shores. Though this suggests some confusion as to its true purpose, the

emphasis on home defence was evident in the very methods in which the early Territorial

Force trained—a focus of the next chapter.

Immediate Peril? Advocates for British Conscription

Much of the serious reservations about Haldane's proposed reforms reflected in part a

pre-existing lack of faith that military readiness and efficiency could be achieved under a

system of voluntary service. The call for the establishment of universal military service

proved an important element in reform debates and had taken shape in the years prior to

Haldane taking office. Despite assurances from the upper echelon of policymakers that

naval power assured Britain's security as well as diplomatic gains such as the entente

cordiale with France three years prior, 1907 witnessed new-found fears of invasion.106

Much of this unease was the product of a campaign by the National Service League

(NSL), the most conspicuous conscriptionist organization during this period.107 The NSL

was founded in 1902, "when the strategic argument between the 'Blue Water' and 'Bolt

105 Haldane, An Autobiography, 192. 106 Cunningham, 147; Mitchinson, Defending Albion, 4. 107 R.J.Q. Adams and Philip P. Poirier, The Conscription Controversy in Great Britain, 1900-18 (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1987), 10.

105


from the Blue' schools was at its height."108 The League had unequivocally sided with

the latter, believing the British homeland to be vulnerable to unexpected invasion from

hostile European powers. The League's main objective was to defend Britain and her

Empire by creating a defence apparatus strong enough as to render attack improbable.

Blue Water theorists meanwhile held firm in their assessment that Britain had more than

sufficient numbers to deal with the odd raid. The NSL argued to the contrary, that such

thought smacked of dangerous complacency. George Shee, then Secretary of the NSL,

testified before the Norfolk Commission. He argued that based on his conversations with

European military commanders, there existed a distinct possibility that Britain could be

invaded by a force of 150,000.109

The remedy promoted by the League and like-minded individuals was the

establishment of compulsory service. This took the form of drill in schools and military

service for young men.110 In a 1905 memorandum to the CID, leading conscriptionist

Lord Roberts argued that:

The only way by which, in my opinion, a remedy can be found for our present unpreparedness for war is by the adoption of some system of Universal Military Training, beginning with boys at school, and ending with several consecutive

108 Dennis, 17. 109 Minutes of Evidence... the Militia and Volunteers, Vol.1, #6814-6815. Shee was a catalyst in the creation of the NSL. His 1901 work The Briton's First Duty cited the possibility of Britain or her imperial possessions coming under attack due to an overstretching of the Army. See: Anne Summers "Edwardian Militarism," in Patriotism: History and Politics v.l: The Making and Unmaking of British National Identity, ed. Raphael Samuel (London: Routledge, 1989), 243. An early articulation of the NSL's platform can be found in a published lecture by Shee. See: George F. Shee, The Advantages of Compulsory Service

for Home Defence. Together with a consideration of some of the objections which may be urged against it. (London: National Service League, 1902). 110 Adams and Poirier, 10.

106


months' drill and rifle practice, at an age when, as young men, they would be capable of taking their share in the Defence of the Empire.111

Through such a method, the NSL believed a large, effective home army could be

119

raised. They rejected voluntary enlistment as an adequate means of increasing

manpower, as it allowed the unpatriotic to escape their civic duty. Not only would

national service (for political reasons, the NSL consciously avoided the term

'conscription') effectively safeguard the nation, it would also aid in fostering British

unity and its "welfare ahead of party, class and sectarian interests."113 According to

Roberts, universal service would "have the effect of inculcating a spirit of patriotism

throughout the nation, and bringing home to every man the necessity for his being

personally prepared ... to defend these Islands."114 In this regard, the NSL's platform

appeared strikingly similar to Haldane's nation-in-arms concept, whereby military

institutions could help cultivate a sense of civic duty and national pride. Yet, although

parallels could be found in terms of moral and social influence, the means by which they

could be achieved put Haldane and his compulsionist detractors at odds.

111 "I. Memorandum for the Consideration of the Committee. II. Note on the Necessity for adopting a System of Universal training, by Field-Marshal Earl Roberts" (November 3, 1905), Haldane Papers, ms6108A(i), ff.20, NLS. In 1905 Roberts replaced the Duke of Wellington as NSL President. See: Hew Strachan, "Liberalism and Conscription, 1789-1919," in The British Army: Manpower and Society into the Twenty-First Century, ed. Hew Strachan (London: Routledge, 1999), 4. 112 National Service League policy document, February 16, 1906, Ellison Papers, NAM 1987-04-35 - 174, National Army Museum, London. In addition to domestic groups such as the NSL, even Britain's new ally France advocated compulsory service. Haldane tells of French President Clemenceau attempts to persuade Campbell-Bannerman and Asquith to such ends. Haldane, An Autobiography, 195. 113 Dennis, 18. 114 "Memorandum for the Consideration of the Committee" (November 3, 1905), Haldane Papers.

107


These core ideas were present in much of the literature distributed by the National

Service League, a fully-articulated example being an April 1907 manifesto criticizing

Haldane's scheme. The NSL stated that they were "glad to feel that in many important

points we are in entire agreement with Haldane's proposals," particularly in that the

creation of a national army with a clear, rational organization was necessary.115

Although recognizing the "great ability, the earnestness, and the single-mindedness" in

which Haldane had pursued reform, the NSL saw flaws in his plan.116 The League

claimed that under a voluntary system those not enlisted could continue to avoid service:

"while "every willing man, every patriotic man, of whatever rank or class" is asked to

contribute to home defence, "the man who will go free is the loafer and shirker."117 The

NSL's letter continued to criticize the proposed terms of service, stating their refusal to

accept:

the idea that a certain number of isolated drills in the year, and eight, or even fifteen, days in camp, will give the country a force which will be within measurable distance of being equal, either to meeting foreign troops in defence of

115 National Service League - letter to the Press on the Haldane Territorial Army scheme, April 3, 1907, Lord Frederick Roberts Papers, WO 105/45, TNA; Adams and Poirier, 31. This reflects the generally friendly/polite terms in which Haldane and Roberts operated under. One such example, writing to Haldane, Roberts told the Secretary of State: "I said in the house of lords exactly what I think of your scheme - better - far better than any scheme that has been put before the country hitherto. I know the difficulties you have to contend, and I thoroughly appreciate all you have been able to do - You and I both desire to see the army recognized by the people of this country as a part of their national life - We only differ as to the means by which that object can be attained." See: Roberts to Haldane, June 27, 1907, Haldane Papers, ms5907, f. 171, NLS. Another example lay in an earlier letter from Roberts to Haldane, whereby he provided the aforementioned NSL pamphlet with a note stating "although you may not be able to subscribe to every word of it, I trust that it will as a whole meet with your approval" (National Service League policy document, February 16, 1906, Ellison Papers). 116 National Service League - letter to the Press on the Haldane Territorial Army scheme, April 3, 1907, Lord Frederick Roberts Papers. 117 Ibid.

108


these islands, or to supplying efficient reinforcements for the Regular Army when 110

employed on a great war abroad.

Further, "it will not be in any sense an army until six months after the emergency has

arisen which it is intended to meet."119 Training on a volunteer basis would not be

sufficient in producing forces capable of fighting picked foreign troops, either in an

invasion or during raids. Strikingly similar to the opinions of the Volunteer officers was

the NSL's stance regarding Territorials entering six months' training in the event of

national crisis. In the League's opinion "an army which requires six months before it can

190

act is not an army, it is simply an armed crowd."

Criticisms in hand, the NSL proposed a solution to these perceived flaws. They

suggested Haldane's six months' of training precede any crisis, and "that it should be

made compulsory on all able-bodied males of the military age."121 For the subsequent

three years, the men should be liable "for service for Home Defence," as well as

undertaking annual courses lasting a fortnight. Following this period, "all liability to

service should cease."122 While the NSL was in agreement with Haldane that national

spirit, if given the opportunity, would address any manpower issues, they argued that

"what the national spirit cannot do is to improvise trained soldiers, or to turn raw levies

into efficient troops at short notice."123 In sum, the League argued that given the

weaknesses in Haldane's reforms, his "proposed 'National Army' will be neither national 118 Ibid. 119 Ibid. 120 Ibid. 121 Ibid. Italics are my emphasis. 122 Ibid. 123 Ibid.

109


nor an army."124 Were the Secretary of State to fail in implementing the NSL's

recommendations, they argued lasting reform was "at best but a make-believe," and that

without compulsory service "no satisfactory military system is possible ... we shall

simply go on floundering from one hopeless scheme to another, and when the crisis

comes the country will be found unprepared."125 As newspaper articles reveal, the

National Service League's message held significant weight amongst Volunteer officers,

as their opinions closely reflected many of the League's talking points. In the eyes of

many of these men, compulsion was not only preferred, but should form a necessary

component of any reforms.

Colonel Hugh D.D. Chalmers of the 2nd VBHLI was reported as having been "in

favour of universal compulsory training, but next to that he thought Mr. Haldane's

scheme was the best that had been proposed, especially from the Volunteer point of

view."126 More pointed opinions were on offer from Chalmers' colleagues. Colonel

Grant expressed his belief in the overall concept of Haldane's scheme, but believed this

was the time in which the nation had to decide either for voluntary or compulsory

service.127 Colonel Hendry stated that "It is a good enough scheme if there is some

compulsion to back it up, but under compulsory service you could have a much better

scheme." He believed that as it stood reforms would be detrimental to recruiting, as more

would be asked of the Volunteers. "But the man who spent his time watching football

124 Ibid. 125 Ibid. 126 Glasgow Herald, February 27, 1907. 127 Ibid.

110


matches did not care how much more the Volunteers did; it might be a good thing if they

could make such an individual pay for standing idly by and allowing others to look after

his country's defences."128 Colonel Young harboured a similar lack of faith of voluntary

service, in that "it is the loyal and patriotic youth who is taxed both in his time and his

money, so that the disloyal and unpatriotic may go free."129 Primrose did not think the

problem of military inefficiency would be solved until some measure of compulsion "not

too onerous to destroy a man's commercial or professional progress" was instituted. He

rhetorically pondered if "in Imperial matters should there not be an obligation on every

citizen to qualify himself for the defence of his country?"130 This was an opinion,

however, not held amongst all Glasgow Volunteer officers. In an earlier 1906 pamphlet,

George Beatson commented on the viability of part-time soldiers drawn from a system of

voluntary service. He argued that if given adequate support, the Volunteers were a good

answer to conscription. Rather than ineffective, his opinion, based on decades of

experience in the movement, was that they were "one of the most valuable forces this

country possesses" not only as a fighting force but as "an educative influence [his

emphasis]."131

Despite the voices calling for compulsory service, these were not in sufficient

numbers throughout the United Kingdom to influence policy. An ardent supporter of

128 Ibid. 129 Ibid., February 28, 1907. 130 Ibid., February 27, 1907. 131 Beatson, 19-20. Beatson was not without his own criticisms of Haldane's scheme, however. In a May 1907 speech, he decried the expectation that the Territorial Force would be liable for overseas service. See: Glasgow Herald, May 20, 1907. This requirement would be struck off in the negotiations leading to the passage of the Territorial and Reserve Forces Act, and Beatson would prove an active member in the Glasgow Territorial Association.

I l l


traditional voluntary service, Haldane rejected the NSL's jingoism and calls for what

amounted to conscription. "Compulsion is remote from our mind, and I trust it will

always be so. Nor do we wish to encourage anything like excessive military spirit."132 To

defend his stance, the Secretary of State cited previous CID findings. Using accepted

Blue Water principles, he criticized compulsionists' disregard of the Navy, stating "I do

not think they had grasped either the importance of the naval doctrine of commanding the

sea, or what it implied."133 He further argued that conscription was unnecessary, given

Britain's geographic situation. "The insular position of Britain, combined with her naval

strength, removed any need to imitate Continental countries."134 Haldane's opinions

more closely reflected that of a nation, that although fearful of the possibility of invasion,

was equally uncomfortable with establishing any form of conscription.135 Yet, the NSL

was far from a spent force; as the TF encountered challenges throughout its infancy

(many of which stemmed directly from legacies associated with the Volunteers), the

League would exploit these to argue that a system based on voluntary service was

inadequate in meeting the nation's defence needs.

While historians such as Summers note that areas such as the "Celtic Fringe

remained cool" to the National Service League, this did not mean that NSL agitation did

not take place there.136 Between 1910 and 1913, it sought to bolster its support amongst

the working class. This can be seen in Glasgow, with a representative for the NSL

132 Hansard, 4th ser., vol. 169 (1907), col. 1301. 133 Haldane, An Autobiography, 195. 134 Spiers, Haldane: An Army Reformer, 164. 135 Beckett, Amateur Military Tradition, 219. 136 Summers, "Militarism in Britain," 113.

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1 "37

appearing before the Glasgow Trades Council inl 913. However, despite the continued

agitation by the National Service League, the years leading up to the First World War

were marked by a continued adherence to voluntary service. In 1908 the Committee of

Imperial Defence re-examined that nation's defence needs, reaffirming the improbability

of invasion.138 Six years later, a mandatory service bill was defeated in Parliament on its

second reading in March 1914.139 The conscriptionist argument was further attacked by

the findings of CID, which in their reassessment concluded that there continued to be

little probability of mass invasion.140 As such, though not entirely unpopular, the weight

of both military and public opinion in support of universal service was never enough to

bring about the NSL's aim of peacetime conscription.

Launching the Territorial Scheme

Contemporary local sources such as newspapers and printed pamphlets suggest that the

opinions expressed by interested Glaswegians reflected nationwide attitudes towards

Haldane's scheme—and help to explain why in the end his reforms were in many ways

difficult to distinguish from what they were designed to replace. While the

rationalization of command structures and duties elicited widespread praise, some

believed that on a number of fronts—training requirements and mobilization plans, for

137 Minutes of the Glasgow Trades Council, April 9, 1913, Mitchell Library. 138 "Report of the Sub-Committee Appointed by the Prime Minister to Reconsider the Question of Oversea Attack" (October 22, 1908), Committee of Imperial Defence: Home Defence Memoranda (A Series), CAB3, TNA. 139 Denis Hayes, Conscription Conflict. The Conflict of Ideas in the Struggle for and against Military Conscription in Britain between 1901 and 1939 (London: Sheppard Press, 1949), 184. 140 "Attack on the British Isles from Overseas" (May 9, 1914), Committee of Imperial Defence: Home Defence Memoranda (A Series), CAB3, TNA.


example—Haldane's reforms were fundamentally inadequate, with the Territorial Force

doomed to suffering the same lack of efficiency as its Volunteer predecessor.

Nonetheless, the benefits of his scheme were evident, and, combined with fortunate

circumstances, would ultimately outweigh the opinions of detractors.

The winter and spring of 1907 was the period when the proposed reforms faced

their greatest criticism. In this manner, at the first reading of the Secretary of State's

Territorial and Reserve Forces Bill its passage was far from guaranteed. Yet, as the

legislative process progressed, what appeared to be significant opposition at the Bill's

introduction had greatly receded. For the most part, debates over its merits consisted of

relatively trivial matters (for example, what the new Force would be called141), or

attempts from affected parties to secure concessions.142 By its third reading in June,

without any debate it easily passed with a vote of 286-63, with most Conservatives

abstaining.143 Compared to Haldane's initial vision of the Territorial Force as a true

second line, the final product—emphasizing home defence with optional overseas

service—was indeed watered-down. According to the Act:

Any part of the Territorial Force shall be liable to serve in any part of the United Kingdom, but no part of the Territorial Force shall be carried or ordered to go out of the United Kingdom ... [As for overseas service] A person shall not be compelled ... or be subjected to such liability as aforesaid, except by his own

144 consent.

141 Hansard, 4th ser., vol. 174 (1907), cols. 1484-1487. 142 Cunningham, 145. 143 Hansard, 4th ser., vol. 176 (1907), cols. 578-579. 144 United Kingdom, Regulations for the Territorial Force and for County Associations 1908 (London: HMSO, 1908), 112-113 (Territorial and Reserve Forces Act).

114


Compromises such as these may to a large extent explain its smoother than expected

passage.

The ease with which the Territorial and Reserve Forces Act came into being can

be attributed to a number of factors. First of all, despite criticisms in the previous months

from Volunteer officers, Haldane successfully diffused the bulk of their opposition

through both consultation and concessions. His speaking tour in early 1907 proved

effective in alleviating concerns and misconceptions as to his ultimate aims. Concessions

in matters such as the composition of County Associations, and an emphasis on home

defence with optional overseas service assured the Volunteers that the changes laid

before them would not be as extensive as feared. The second development that aided the

Bill's swift passage was the rapid decline of auxiliary force influence in Parliament. The

previous election had witnessed the defeat of most Volunteer MPs, and of those who

remained, the majority of this caucus were Liberals.145 With this dramatically altered

composition, even if they wished to, these MPs could not mount a successful opposition

to Haldane's reforms, though according to Spiers, Haldane had nonetheless overestimated

their real influence.146 The inability of compulsionists such as the NSL to alter the Bill to

their liking was the third major factor. Though vocal, they were fractured, as many

influential men favouring universal service wished to give Haldane's brainchild a chance

before fully dismissing voluntary service. For example, writing to Lord Kitchener, Esher

145 Spiers, Haldane: an Army Reformer, 110. Through Beckett's analysis of Volunteer MPs in the latter nineteenth century, it is suggested that by this time the majority of these men were Conservatives. Beckett, Riflemen Form, 159. 146 Spiers, Haldane: an Army Reformer, 110-111.

115


intimated that "Mr. Haldane may find in his County Associations, the solution of

expansion under a system of Voluntary service, but if he fails, then there is his alternative

[of] compulsory training."147 Lastly, party opposition was negated through further

concessions. In the case of the Conservatives, who shared a desire to reform the

auxiliaries, their tacit approval was secured through the retaining of the Militia as a

separate force.148 Labour politicians, concerned over the militarizing of the nation's

youth, sought and secured constraints over how Association funds would be spent for

Cadet Corps.149 Through these measures, the Liberals were successful in persuading both

Conservatives and Labour not to impede Haldane's legislation.

With royal assent given on August 2, 1907 some of the most sweeping changes in

Britain's defence apparatus became a certainty. On April 1, 1908, the Volunteers and

Yeomanry would cease to exist, being folded into the new Territorial Force, while the

Militia would endure as a 'Special Reserve.' For the Secretary of State, however,

political victory was bittersweet. In order to secure the Act's passage he had to sacrifice

core elements of his vision of reform. By reducing the elective component of County

Association membership, Haldane's vision of active civilian/military collaboration

through these bodies was crippled. The retention of the militia weakened the concept of a

147 Esher to Kitchener, August 16, 1906, Kitchener Papers, PR030/57, TNA. 148 Spiers, Haldane: an Army Reformer, 110. The 'Special Reserve' as it came to be called, was a recast Militia—"its substance was converted into third regular battalions, organised for the purpose of training and providing drafts to meet the wastage of war in the first and second regular battalions of their regiments." Richard Burdon Haldane, Before the War (London: Cassell, 1920), 166-167. In essence, this was beneficial to the passing of Haldane's legislation, for it resolved the matter of how the Expeditionary Force could be replenished in the event of protracted war. See: John Gooch, "Haldane and the 'National Army'," 80. 149 Spiers, Haldane: an Army Reformer, 113. The cadet corps and related youth groups will be treated in detail in Chapter Five.

116


true two-line system. Further, as it was originally part of projected Territorial

enlistments, the militia's continued existence rendered Haldane's "manpower targets

unachievable irrespective of how many volunteers or yeomen chose to transfer" to the

Territorials.150 As it would be manned on a voluntary basis, there was no guarantee that

the requisite numbers—the scheme's measure of success—would materialize. At an even

more fundamental level, Haldane's attempt to 'be all things to all people' led to

confusion over the Territorial Force's true purpose. Whether in the name of home

defence, a reserve to the Expeditionary Force, or a synthesis of the two, this was an issue

not settled until after the outbreak of war in 1914.151 Nevertheless, it must be emphasized

that in restructuring the auxiliary services, the Secretary of State succeeded where his

immediate predecessors had not. Through separating command from administration,

establishing a clear organizational structure and a means of expansion, and improving

conditions of pay, Haldane remoulded an ossified, inefficient system, placing it on a

sounder, more rationalized footing.152 This was the product of his sustained efforts to

inform, appease and convince affected groups that the Territorial Force was a real and

lasting solution. Such was the opinion of Esher, who noted at the time that Haldane's

1 "energy and power of work are wonderful."

150 Beckett, Amateur Military Tradition, 217. 151 Dennis, 14. 152 Spiers, Haldane: An Army Reformer, 114. Well after the bill's passage Haldane continued to tout the benefits of his scheme. In a March 1908 speech in Carlisle, Haldane posed the question to his audience: "supposing at the time of the Anglo-Boer War in 1899 the new Territorial scheme had been in operation, What would have happened? They would have been able to send out 40,000 men in a very short space of time. These men would, in fact, have been ready before the transports" (Glasgow Herald, March 21, 1908). 153 Esher to Kitchener, August 16, 1906, Kitchener Papers.

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Writing to his mother days after the ratification of the Territorial and Reserve

Forces Act, Haldane proclaimed that "the business of the new organization is getting into

full swing."154 It was during this period that he took to the task of ensuring his reforms

would be carried out as expected. Immediate attention was directed towards the creation

of County Associations, which were to be formed throughout the coming autumn and

winter.155 Given their place as heads of these bodies, winning over the support of Lord-

Lieutenants took priority. While the Army Council wielded the final say, their high

position facilitated the support of suitably qualified men in their respective communities.

The Secretary of State quickly took to the task of recruiting these local leaders, issuing

invitations, drawing up guidelines for establishing Associations, and forming an advisory

committee under the supervision of Lord Esher.156 Yet despite the tireless promotion of

his scheme, initial reaction to staffing the Associations was lukewarm. To local

observers, qualms were materializing over the high place afforded Lord-Lieutenants. In a

letter penned by an anonymous Glasgow Volunteer, the belief was expressed that while

the scheme should be:

Given a fair chance of fruition, and that it will not be doomed to certain failure like the proposals of Secretaries Brodrick and Arnold-Forster ... Mr Haldane has erred in asking the Lords-Lieutenant to undertake a task which, in most cases, must be quite beyond their own experience or capacity.157

154 Haldane to his Mother, August 10, 1907, Haldane Papers, ms5978, f.59, NLS. 155 Hansard, 4th ser., vol. 180 (1907), col. 1296. 156 The Times, September 16, 1907; Spiers, Haldane: an Army Reformer, 161. 157 Glasgow Herald, October 15, 1907.

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To further alleviate the concerns of local leaders, Haldane met privately with a collection

of nine Lord-Lieutenants and a host of officers at Blair Castle, residence of the Duke of

Atholl. Much like his speaking tour earlier that year, this meeting demonstrated the

importance of personal contact in the execution of reform. At Blair Castle, he explained

the rationale underpinning the creation of the Territorial Army, details of the scheme, and

means by which his plan shall come to fruition.158 Describing the meeting, an editorial in

the Glasgow Herald stated that through Haldane's tireless advocacy, if the Territorial

scheme does not flourish "it will not be for want of pains taken by its inventor."159 Given

the number of influential men who chose to meet that September with the Secretary of

State, there was good reason for the editor to view the Territorial Force as a "splendid

field for the patriotic activity of our county gentlemen.. .We have no doubt whatever that

in every county and city the right men will be got to manage the Army."160 The

enthusiasm produced by this meeting compelled Haldane to organize three more such

gatherings. One of these, under the auspices of Lord Rosebery, addressed the Lowland

Lord-Lieutenants, including Glasgow's.161 While these meetings alone bore fruit,

overwhelming acceptance of the scheme was ensured thanks to royal assistance. The

King, Haldane claimed in his autobiography, had strongly supported him in his army

reforms.162 This was evident on October 26, when Edward VII summoned the Lord-

Lieutenants of England, Scotland and Wales to Buckingham Palace. There he "exhorted

158 The Times, September 16, 1907. 159 Glasgow Herald, September 16,1907. 160 Ibid. 161 Spiers, Haldane: An Army Reformer, 162; Glasgow Herald, November 14, 1907. 162 Haldane, An Autobiography, 245-246.

119


them to throw their local influence behind the County Associations."163 Indeed, to the

Secretary of State's benefit, the King was a reliable ally. Correspondence between

Haldane and Edward's private secretary Lord Knollys shows that in the lead up to this

meeting, concerted efforts were made to formulate a clear message to the Lord-

Lieutenants.164 In Haldane's assessment, "King Edward rendered a great service by this

act, which did a good deal to popularise the new Territorial Force and the County

Associations with the public."165 His personal appeal on behalf of the Territorial scheme

was crucial to its gaining a footing throughout Britain. Royal endorsement not only

legitimized reforms in a far more conspicuous manner than ratification in Parliament, but

also ensured elite participation.166 To this end, the application of social pressure via

personal contacts—first with the Secretary of State and later with the King himself—

encouraged Lord-Lieutenants cultivate the support of men of high rank in their respective

locales. This was a pattern that played out in cities and towns throughout the country,

Glasgow being no exception.

The formation of the Glasgow County Association was initiated on November 13,

1907 by the Lord Provost of Glasgow, Sir William Bilsland, well-regarded for his baking

163 Spiers, Haldane: an Army Reformer, 162. Such activities reflected the King's deep personal interest in military affairs. See: John Gooch, "Adversarial Attitudes," 59. This support on the part of the lord-lieutenants will form a key role in defining the reach of the 'nation-in-arms.' As will be shown in chapter four, the role of local government has been hitherto unexplored, yet was important in linking military and civilian spheres. 164 Knollys to Haldane, October 20, 1907; October 23, 1907; October 24, 1907, Haldane Papers, ms.5907, ff.240, 242, 244-245, NLS. 165 Draft Autobiography, Haldane Papers, 116. 166 Spiers, Haldane: an Army Reformer, 162.

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1 f\l

enterprise, and had served in city government since 1886. A related article in the

Glasgow Herald took note of the summons, and stressing the concept of country rivalry

declared "we want as many citizen soldiers of the very best as possible."168 The

following day, the newspaper revealed a broad list of politicians and commanding

officers supportive of the Lord Provost's overture.169 Bilsland, at the Secretary of State's

behest, "felt it his duty" to take his place as head of the County Association and hoped

others would follow suit. In his ensuing speech, he outlined the duties with which the

Association would be charged, and emphasized that the Army Council would take the

necessary steps to ensure appropriate funding.170 Following his talk, a series of

resolutions was unanimously adopted, pertaining to matters including the official name of

the Association (Territorial Force Association of the County of the City of Glasgow) and

in what manner its membership would be derived. The committee agreed that the

Association would be comprised of thirty-two members, at least half of whom would be

military men appointed by the Army Council. Five members were to be recommended

by the City Corporation, eight representing employers and "workmen of the county,"

while one was to be nominated from the University of Glasgow.171 An unnamed

Volunteer later opined that if properly represented this civilian component "might be able

to give inestimable services and help in furthering the scheme in many ways."172

Through the acceptance of these resolutions, the foundation of the Glasgow Territorial 167 Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, s.v. "Bilsland, Sir William, first baronet (1847-1921)." 168 Glasgow Herald, November 13, 1907. 169 Ibid., November 14, 1907. 170 The Scotsman, November 14, 1907. 171 Glasgow Herald, November 14, 1907. 172 Ibid., November 25, 1907. As Chapter Four will show, he had good reason for such confidence.

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Association was laid, with its formal incorporation occurring on December 31, 1907.173

Its first official meeting took place on January 9, 1908. Of the military members, there

was an overwhelming Volunteer presence. Six city councillors and one university

professor also took their respective seats. Representatives of labour and employers were

named at the second meeting a month later.174

Combined, these men would be tasked with civil and financial administration,

with all other matters remaining the responsibility of the General Officer Commander in

Chief; both were under the direction of the Army Council and in particular the Director-

General of the Territorial Force.175 The forces administered by the Glasgow Association

fell under the Number Two (Lowland) District of the Scottish Command. As later

described in a recruiting pamphlet the forces constituting the district were "a small self-

1 7 ft

contained army comprising all arms of service." This was a significant departure from

Volunteer patterns, in that the 1908 reforms established a clear chain of command and

communication which mirrored that of the regular army - structure replaced

improvisation. Within this system, the importance of Glasgow in the Territorial Force

was evident in that it was not only the largest Association in its district, but the largest in

Scotland as a whole.177

173 The Scotsman, November 14, 1907. 174 Glasgow Herald, February 19, 1908. The significance of these representatives will also be explored in Chapter Four. 175 Regulations for the Territorial Force and for County Associations 1908, 203. 176 Glasgow County Association, Voluntary Service, 4. 177 The Territorial Force Association of the City of Edinburgh, The Territorial Army: What it is and why you should join it. (Edinburgh: The Territorial Force Association of the City of Edinburgh, 1909), 24.

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Despite a clearly-laid structure being implemented, as the transition date

approached, uncertainties persisted over the exact details of the scheme and how the final

reforms would be enacted. The most notable of these were concerns over the fate of

existing Volunteer battalions and how new terms of service would be received by current

Volunteers. Because of the lack of clarity as to what would later be expected of them, it

was reported that by November many of Glasgow's part-time soldiers were opting to

leave the service than face the challenges that new obligations would impose.178 To

counteract the detrimental effect of this uncertainty, local leaders—like Haldane had done

earlier to win their support—used personal appearances to alleviate any misgivings.179

An example of this occurring in Glasgow was the Lord Provost's attendance at a yearly

Volunteer gala. At the annual gathering of the Second VBHLI, while he felt unqualified

to speak at length as to details surrounding the transition from volunteer to territorial

force, Bilsland stated his faith in the usefulness of the Association in fostering greater

connections with the civilian sphere.180 In a speech that centered on local support and

encouragement, he expressed the hope they would enlist as Territorials. Bilsland

informed the volunteers present that the new terms of service were not in any way more

178 The Scotsman, November 25, 1907. The matter of terms of service will be treated in detail in Chapter Three. 179 It must be noted that alongside personal appearances, a variety of pamphlets were published in order to provide a concise means of conveying the notable aspects of the new scheme. These include: G. Dixon and G. Brimley Bowes, The Territorial Force. Abstract of Conditions of Service (Infantry) (London: Hugh Rees, 1908); F.F. Rynd, The Territorial Army Scheme. (London: William Clowes & Sons, 1908). 180 Glasgow Herald, December 28, 1907.

123


onerous than before, and it was "for their commercial experience, for their ordinary

business experience, that they were asked to join the Association."181

Despite his best efforts, the Lord Provost could do little to address fears stemming

from a lack of information from the Army Council. Aside from the revised terms of

service, the most conspicuous matter was that of proposed troop reductions. The

Scotsman published an article entitled "Fear of Reduction in Glasgow" which focused on

local Volunteer concerns that their cherished battalions would be branded as redundant in

the new scheme. Expected guidelines suggested that a Territorial battalion would range

at about one thousand men, divided into eight companies. This presented a problem to

the Volunteers of Glasgow estimated to provide at least 1,500 more than required, as

according to the report "it is well known that the Glasgow battalions are highly efficient,

and generally well over that figure." Further, "some of the Glasgow regiments have

companies running up to fifteen in number."182 In such circumstances, barring flexibility

from the Army Council, or enough Volunteers rejecting the new terms of service,

reductions were likely. It was expected that one battalion would be forced to disband.183

If this was unavoidable, The Scotsman predicted "the public and Volunteer outcry will be

tremendous."184 By late January 1908, it was anticipated that Glasgow would be forced

into a reduction of 1,400 men and 100 officers with the Highland Light Infantry being the

181 Ibid. 182 The Scotsman, November 25, 1907. 183 Ibid., November 14, 1907. 184 Ibid., November 25, 1907.

124


likely target of cuts (from seven to six battalions).185 Fearing that reductions would not

only destroy traditions but also hurt later recruiting efforts, a deputation from the

Glasgow Territorial Association met with planners in London. This group stated their

case, arguing that given its large population and strong Volunteer following, the city

could accommodate extra battalions. This move proved successful, for one month before

the Territorial Force came into being, it was revealed that anticipated battalion cuts would

not materialize. "The agitation for the retention in the Territorial Army of the existing

number of Volunteer battalions in Glasgow has succeeded in its purpose."186 Lobbying

had produced results of "great satisfaction to the citizens generally and particularly to

Volunteers."187 With this important matter settled, the overall attitude amongst the city's

part-time soldiers was eager anticipation, as soon they would embark on what they saw as

a new era in their long and celebrated military history.

On the eve the launching the Territorial Force, the mood in Glasgow was

optimistic. Prospects for enlistment grew as misconceptions were removed through

sustained efforts to educate and encourage: "Volunteers who were inclined to take a

gloomy view of the future have wisely reconsidered their attitude."188 Contemporary

estimates predicted that upon its coming into being, Glasgow's Territorial Force would

be well-manned. On April 1, 1908, the passing of the Volunteers and the birth of its

185 Glasgow Herald, January 29, 1908. A later article suggested that the 2nd VBHLI would be the likely victim of such cuts. 186 Ibid., February 27, 1908. 187 Ibid., February 20, 1908; February 27, 1908. 188 Ibid., March 21, 1908.

125


Territorial successor were celebrated in the local press. Nevertheless, while interest in

the new Force was strong in this period, a number of challenges were to come.

Concluding Remarks

In all, Haldane's accomplishment should not be understated; he took an antiquated,

stagnant army structure and placed it on a sounder footing than what was in place under

his immediate predecessors. Memories of South Africa ever present, his two-line concept

could be seen as a response to Norfolk commission criticisms that the auxiliaries were

both unable to take the field against regulars and that they were a poor reserve.189

Haldane's Territorial scheme not only addressed matters of battle-readiness, but also

provided a clearer means of expansion that had existed prior. During the debates and

discussions that led to the ratification of the Territorial and Reserve Forces Bill, Haldane

faced a number of criticisms from politicians, military men, and other interested parties.

While praise was directed at the clarity of military organization, doubts existed over the

efficiency of a recast Volunteer Force administered by partially-elected County

Associations, mockingly referred to by Arnold-Forster as a "county council Army."190 In

order to steer the passage of his legislation, the Secretary of State relied on an arsenal of

personal appearances and consultation, as well as timely compromises. In doing so, he

was forced into discarding key elements of his original vision of a nation-in-arms to

garner wider political support. Through examining local Glaswegian opinion, it can be

189 Beckett, Amateur Military Tradition, 214. 190 Hansard, 4th ser., vol. 175 (1907), col. 762.

126


ascertained that the city's Volunteers harboured many of the same praise and reservations

as their contemporaries elsewhere. Yet, through the personal contact from the Secretary

of State and the Lord-Provost, the mechanisms of reform were quickly put into motion.

As the Territorial Force came into being, it would face many challenges stemming from

confusion over the Force's proper role, as well as from long-standing problems yet to be

addressed. However, for the time being this new era would be ushered in by the very

Volunteers that the scheme sought to replace. Through their political pressure, the local

Associations were largely run by those who formerly served as Volunteer officers.

Administration aside, on the eve of the Force's birth, deep reservations came to the fore,

as shown in an April 1, 1908 article published by the Glasgow Evening Times. Covering

a Volunteer demonstration at Whitehall in London, it was reported that the proceedings:

Took the form of a mock funeral, two men carrying a coffin, symbolical of the demise of the Volunteer forces, and, escorted by about 50 men of the 5th West Middlesex Volunteer Corps, some in uniform and several with rifles, set out of the headquarters of the Regiment at St John's Wood at midnight and marched to the Duke of Cambridge Statue in Whitehall... Their ranks had been considerably swelled by curious onlookers en route, and by the time the halt was made their numbers had been more than doubled ... At the statue the men formed up, and the coffin bore the following inscription: "In memory of the Volunteer Forces, Killed by Act of Parliament, 31st March, 1908, after 50 years' faithful service. Missed, but not wanted." It was laid down at the foot of the statue, and a wreath was placed upon it.191

That day, Britain's auxiliary forces witnessed a historic transformation: in the case of the

Volunteers, on that day they, along with the Yeomanry were recast as the Territorial

Force. In Glasgow, potential reductions in troop strength were avoided through the

191 Glasgow Evening Times, April 1, 1908. 127


political efforts of local leaders. Aside from cuts in the number of companies, the city's

Volunteers would enter a new phase in their history fully intact. Because of this, there

was a sense—albeit reserved—of optimism as the new system of home defence came into

being. Writing to the regiment in January 1908, J.A. Roxburgh, commanding officer of

the 1st Lanark Rifle Volunteers, appealed to his men to "give their whole-hearted support

to the Scheme."192 The Highland Light Infantry Chronicle later that April expressed

satisfaction (though with some misinterpretation of the Territorial Force's purpose) that

despite the "great change in the Army," the regiment's linked Volunteer battalions will

"take their place in the newly constituted Second Line."193 This sense of relief was not

borne out of short-term considerations. As will be detailed in the next chapter, the

Glasgow Territorial Association was the fortunate inheritor of a well-entrenched tradition

of amateur soldiering. Because each local Volunteer unit continued to live on under the

Territorial banner, the new Force could claim pedigree dating back to the very origins of

the modern Volunteer movement. This pedigree came at a price, however, as many of

the problems and limitations that had been wrangled over earlier continued to play a

central role in how Haldane's creation would be put into effect. The practical needs of

the majority of part-time soldiers relating to finances and leisure shaped both policy and

practice. The outcome of these considerations was that in a number of ways the

Territorial Force in its early years largely resembled the Volunteers that it was created to

replace, evidenced in not only financial matters, but also manifest in other areas such as

192 "To the Regiment," First Lanark Rifles Gazette 3, no. 4 (January 1908): 193. 193 Highland Light Infantry Chronicle VIII, no. 2 (April 1908): 1.

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in training obligations and the form and function of annual camps. In sum, the contrast

between these men and regular soldiers would remain as distinct as it had been prior to

1908, and attempts at a greater professionalization would be fraught with the same set of

inherent limitations. Reform did offer unique opportunities, however, to break from the

past. For example, the experience of the Anglo-Boer War drew new attention to the

physical wellbeing of Britain's men, and these related public welfare considerations can

be seen in the period's reform debates. It is through such multifaceted themes that the

experience of the average Glasgow Territorial will be examined.

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Chapter 3 - The Territorial Experience

The Camp training is really the practical part of our work, and as I believe that the majority of the men are keen to become as good soldiers as they possibly can, I ask them to try and arrange their holidays in such a way as to allow them to be with us for the full period, and so increase not only their own fighting efficiency but also that of the whole

Battalion.

Lieutenant-Colonel R. Jeffray Douglas, 19131

Introduction

At a practical level, the experience of the average Glasgow Territorial differed only

slightly from those who had belonged to the city's Volunteer corps. This fact manifested

itself as regards to training, terms of service, and the challenges associated with balancing

one's martial obligations alongside those of everyday employment. Applying a local

perspective provides greater detail as to the nature of this continuity. Previous works

have tended to view both Volunteer and Territorial Force training as compartmentalized

from one another, if viewed at all.2 Yet in an analysis of both annual camps and drill

requirements, it is possible to see that rather than forming a disjunction between old and

new, the 1908 reforms acted to standardize what had already been a long-held approach

to rendering part-time soldiers efficient.

Additionally, this focus on the local introduces expressions of a pre-existing

nation-in-arms mindset which can be found in the social aspects of an amateur soldier's

1 "To the Battalion," Fifth Scottish Rifles Gazette 1, no. 5 (January 1913): 160. 2 For example, Mitchinson's examination of early Territorial camps (his chapter entitled 'Camping and Recruiting") pays scant attention to their relationship to those undertaken in the Volunteer era. Mitchinson, England's Last Hope, 53-84. Beckett only briefly discusses the practical difficulties linked to Territorial training, but does not link these to earlier precedent. Beckett, Amateur Military Tradition, 219.

130

The Territorial Experience

training. The presence of community groups as well as the opportunities for recreation

speaks to an intermingling of the civilian and martial spheres. While most practical

aspects of the early Territorial Force such as training and terms of service can be best

characterized in terms of its continuity, there existed some departures from the past.

Indeed, the final section of this chapter discusses the concern over physical health—both

within the military and of the nation at-large—that formed one facet of the wider

discussion of reform. Conscious plans for the military to be used as a vehicle for

improving public health plays to the notion of a nation-in-arms. Clearly, initiatives in one

sphere of British society were viewed as potentially having a positive effect in another.

An examination of both regulations and activities shows that the drive for a younger,

healthier pool of part-time soldiers formed a distinctive break from Volunteer-era

standards.

To set the stage for the rest of the chapter, it is important to reflect upon the

beginnings of the modern Volunteer movement in Glasgow. From this it is possible

discern the enduring socioeconomic character of what would come to be the early

Territorial Force there. Specifically, the continuities discussed in this chapter can largely

be explained in terms of the very background of the men who dedicated their spare time

to the cause of home defence.

The Social Foundations of the Amateur Soldiering Movement in Glasgow

The Territorial Force in Glasgow was the proud inheritor of a well-entrenched culture of

amateur soldering, evidenced in the longstanding history of volunteering there. In 131


Scotland, the modern Volunteer movement first took root in Glasgow, and as the history

of part-time soldering in the city suggests, was inspired by earlier precedent. In response

to perceived French threats, a May 2, 1859 letter entitled "Pro Bono Patriae" was

published in the Glasgow Herald, which called for the creation of a local volunteer corps;

the following day an advertisement penned by A.K. Murray appeared in the newspaper

asking for men interested in such an undertaking to act. From this came a meeting on

May 4 wherein two hundred expressed their willingness to join.3 This marked the

beginning of a process in which through the initiative of private individuals and civic

groups, a vibrant amateur soldiering subculture developed in Glasgow.4

Roughly sixty years later, the city's Territorial Force represented a continuation of

this tradition. Of the seven Territorial battalions linked with former rifle Volunteer corps,

five could trace their origins to 1859 with another a year after that. For example, under

the strong support of Clyde shipbuilding and engineering firms the Second Volunteer

Battalion Highland Light Infantry (VBHLI) was founded in December 1859.5 This

eventually became the Sixth Highland Light Infantry (HLI) in 1908, which—suggesting

its continued composition—retained the moniker 'Clyde Artisans.' The Seventh HLI's

story is less straightforward, instead highlighting the processes of amalgamations,

disbanding and renumbering that continues to shape the British Army to this day.6 The

Fifth Scottish Rifles were descended from the 1st Lanarkshire Rifles, created in the wake

3 Grierson, 15. 4 Out of the 47 rifle corps consisting primarily of skilled workers, 17 were directly affiliated with a particular employer (see Appendix A). This phenomenon will be examined in greater detail in Chapter Four. 5 Ibid., 262. 6 Ibid., 265. Its forebear, the 3rd VBHLI, prior to 1873 had existed as two separate corps.

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of a July 1859 drill meeting in the Glasgow Academy playground.7 The Eighth Scottish

Rifles' ancestor, the Fourth Volunteer Battalion Scottish Rifles (1860) enjoyed the

distinction of being the first consolidated battalion formed from the various Lanarkshire

corps. Of the city's rifle Volunteers, the youngest battalion came into being in 1868,

"when it was thought desirable, having in view the numerous natives of the Highlands

resident in Glasgow, to form a separate battalion" for these men.8 This would eventually

become the Ninth HLI, known as the 'Glasgow Highlanders.'

While much of the part-time soldiering subculture in Glasgow traces its roots to

1859, in one particular case, the founding members of one corps participated in part-time

soldering since the late 1700s. The Third Lanarkshire Volunteer Rifles (after 1908, the

Seventh Scottish Rifles), more remembered today for their long defunct football club,

also enjoyed the claim of being the heirs to the 'Old Guard' of Glasgow. The Old Guard

represented the remnants of the embryonic Volunteer movement of the late-eighteenth

and early-nineteenth centuries—the Glasgow Light Horse (1796), the 1803 Volunteers,

and the Sharpshooters (1819).9 Such groups formed part of a wider response to the

7 Ibid. 220. 8 Ibid., 37. While the surrounding Lowland areas provided the bulk of Glasgow's workforce, Highland emigrants also contributed to the labour pool, a process that had begun as early as the seventeenth century and intensifying into the nineteenth. See: Butt, "The Industries of Glasgow," 97; Eric Richards, A History of the Highland Clearances: Emigration, protest, reasons (London: Croom Helm, 1985), 95, 181. Though in many cases, this was only temporary, the number of Highlanders residing in Glasgow was reflected in the city's numerous Highland societies. See: Charles Withers, "The Demographic History of the City, 1831-1911," 151. This suggests that the creation of a Volunteer battalion was concomitant with this wider pattern of Highland cultural preservation, especially so given the concentration of Highlanders in certain areas of the city. See: Irene Maver, Glasgow (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2000), 84. 9 Maver writes that the formation of the earliest Volunteer units was part of a reactionary trend to the revolutionary politics of these years. See: Maver, Glasgow, 60. Ian Beckett provides further information as to Volunteer corps in the 1820s and 1830s. See Beckett, Amateur Military Tradition, 155-156. By 1820, radical sentiment, especially amongst the city's textile workers, sparked new tensions. In response to

133


Napoleonic Wars and the inherent threat of invasion and social disorder. Armed and

clothed at their own expense, they were absorbed into the 3rd Lanarkshire Rifle

Volunteers in early I860.10

The story of local Volunteer battalions reveals the strength of the amateur

soldiering movement in the city of Glasgow. Not only did its residents enthusiastically

take up the call to defend their homeland (insofar as they were the first in Scotland to do

so), they could also claim a long and distinguished link to earlier initiatives. Because the

subsequent Volunteer units were uniformly transformed into Territorial battalions, the

latter in turn bore this century-old lineage. More importantly, this longevity suggests that

Glasgow was a city that had a disposition favourable to this limited form of military

service. In the years immediately preceding Haldane's reforms, contemporaries regarded

"Glasgow, with its nine battalions ... a strong centre of Volunteer enthusiasm."11 This

sentiment remained the same immediately prior to the inauguration of the Territorial

Force, as it was noted by contemporaries in March 1908 that the "Scottish Command in

the past has always been a fruitful ground for voluntary service, and it will be found that

over the changes more acute feeling has been aroused north of the Tweed than in any

other part of the Kingdom."12 Indeed, as shown in Figure 2, the Territorial Force in

Glasgow had a wide reach, with the respective headquarters of infantry battalions well-

potential civil disturbances, the later "Glasgow Sharpshooters" were formed. It was kept up until 1824 "when all danger being past it was finally disbanded." See: David Howie, History of the Is' Lanark Rifle Volunteers. With a List of Officers, Prize Winners, Men present at Royal Reviews, etc. (Glasgow: David Robertson & Co., 1887), 15; Maver, Glasgow, 65-66. 10 Grierson, 5. 11 The Scotsman, December 8, 1906. 12 The Times, March 16, 1908.

134


distributed throughout the city.

13 Figure 2 - Historic Location of Glasgow TF Infantry Battalion Headquarters

Although only one battalion was located south of the River Clyde, the others were

evenly-spread east to west; had they been concentrated in Glasgow's west end, it would

have suggested a greater middle-class participation. However, the distribution of these

13 The location of each battalion's headquarters is approximate. For reference, points are placed on map of modern-day Glasgow. John George Bartholomew, Survey Atlas of Scotland (Edinburgh: Edinburgh Geographical Institute under the patronage of the Royal Scottish Geographical Society, 1912); The Territorial Year Book and Directory 1909 (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1909); The Territorial Year Book and Directory 1910 (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1910); Google Maps, http://maps.google.com [accessed August 18, 2010].

135

http://maps.google.com


headquarters shows an accessibility to working-class men, even imbuing a local identity

to each unit. For example, although its offices were located near Glasgow Green, the

Ninth HLI had ties with particular neighbourhoods; while drawing four companies from

the area's Highland residents, the Ninth recruited another four from the districts of

Hillhead, Whiteinch, Queen's Park, and the Highland stronghold of Partick.14 As will be

shown, the strength of the amateur soldiering movement in Glasgow extended beyond

geography, and had stemmed from a host of additional influences.

Much like the claim to a long history of voluntary service, the city was also the

heir of a longstanding reliance on the working class to man its local corps. As will be

explored throughout this study, one notable feature of the amateur soldiering movement

in the 'Second City of the Empire' was that although its appeal was felt throughout the

social spectrum, its strength lay in the participation of working-class men. Although

concrete Glasgow figures for the period 1908-1914 are unavailable, this socioeconomic

profile is strongly inferred through a combination of the aforementioned Norfolk

Commission figures, the pre-existing character of city Volunteer units, and contemporary

anecdotal evidence. While the way in which Glasgow's Volunteer corps formed was

similar to elsewhere, their composition reflected distinctive socioeconomic realities. In

particular, Glasgow bucked the general trend in that with waning middle-class interest,

working-class dominance in the Force began roughly a decade after its founding, and

14 Walter Richards, His Majesty's Territorial Army: A Descriptive Account of the Yeomanry, Artillery, Engineers, and Infantry with the Army Service and Medical Corps, Comprising "The King's Imperial Army of the Second Line", Vol //(London: Virtue & Co., 1910), 39.

136


endured as the century went on.15

Instead, by examining the makeup of early volunteer units, given it was a city

guided by industry, strong working-class participation can be seen as taking place from

the start. For example, an examination of Grierson's 1907 Records of the Scottish

Volunteer Force shows that of the 67 rifle corps hailing from the city in 1860, 47—or 70

per cent—came from segments of Glaswegian society normally considered artisan or

skilled working class. They included companies comprised of warehousemen, calico

printers, brewers, masons, and employees of shipbuilding firms.16 This stands in contrast

to Edinburgh, where according to one historian "by 1868 there were eight artisan

companies, whose 712 men together made up 37 per cent of the effective strength of the

Edinburgh Rifle Volunteer Brigade."17 The composition of these corps strongly suggests

that skilled worker dominance in Glasgow occurred much sooner—and to a greater

extent—than the earliest scholarly estimates. Put another way, from the outset of

1 8

volunteering in the city, artisans had strength in numbers.

As heavy industry and manufacturing were central to the local economy, this

pattern of recruitment within the nascent Volunteer Force should not come as surprising.

Yet, it stands to be emphasized that this was a presence that existed earlier, and in

stronger numbers, than in Britain as a whole. While Beckett states that this pattern is

15 Cunningham, 2. By his figures, Cunningham states that by 1904 "at least 70 per cent of the rank-and-file was recruited from the working class" (33). He also suggests that middle class interest faded as notions of enhanced social prestige failed to materialize (60). 16 See Appendix A, 'Class composition of original (1859/1860) Glasgow Volunteer Rifle Corps.' 17 Robert Q. Gray, The Labour Aristocracy in Victorian Edinburgh (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976), 103. 18 Beckett, Riflemen Form, 73. Beckett argues that "as early as 1862" it was apparent that the Volunteers were becoming a predominately working class organization.

137


similar to other urban areas throughout the United Kingdom, the class composition of

Glasgow Volunteer corps is important to understanding how amateur soldiering was

pursued in the city. As the century carried on, the Volunteer Force in Glasgow paralleled

the industrial shop floor; it was a movement defined by its being manned by skilled

labourers and in many cases led by their employers.19 In ascertaining the socioeconomic

make-up of amateur soldiering in the city, statistical evidence is for the most part non-

existent.20 Nonetheless, anecdotal claims by Glasgow Volunteer officers speak of

continuity as to the backgrounds of the rank-and-file. Colonel A.B. Grant (First

Lanarkshire RGA Volunteers) stated in 1904 that his men "are drawn from every class,

principally artisans and skilled labourers; 70 per cent, as I have said in my notes, are

artisans and skilled labourers."21 Colonel R.C. Mackenzie (First VBHLI) echoed this

assessment, claiming that his unit was comprised of "mostly artisans and young men

employed in works of one kind and another; a few shopkeepers."22 These accounts

coincide with the estimates of the Norfolk Commission, which stated that working-class

occupations comprised the majority (81.3%, 'artisans' the greatest single category at

35.5%) of the rank-and-file.23 Such figures were later confirmed by Haldane in a 1906

speech, where he stated that "at the present time of those who enlist in the Volunteer

19 Ibid., 67-68. 20 Obtaining hard statistical evidence in the study of the late Volunteer Force is a daunting—and persistent—problem. Volunteer records are particularly difficult to obtain—enrolment lists are largely nonexistent, and if they are found are usually incomplete. Government lack of interest also compounds this problem for historians, as it was not until the Norfolk Commission that numerical analysis of the composition of the Volunteer Force was carried out. 21 Minutes of Evidence... the Militia and Volunteers, Vol.1. (London: H.M. Stationary Office, 1904), #10694. 22 Ibid., #10922. 23 Beckett, Riflemen Form, 83.

138


corps 80 per cent are artisans."24

By the inauguration of the Territorial Force in 1908, this deeply-entrenched

working-class character would continue to factor heavily in how local administrators

would apply military reform in the area. In particular, practical matters held a prominent

place in recruiting and retention efforts by the city Association. It is important to keep

this in mind, as throughout the period covered by this study, politicians, businessmen,

local authorities and the Territorials themselves would struggle to reconcile military

duties with concerns defined by the rank-and-file's everyday lives out of uniform.

Terms of Service - Training and Drill Obligations

Because the Territorial Force was ultimately designated for home defence, for the average

Territorial, the extent of their military experience in the years preceding the First World

War centred on training for an event of national emergency. This entailed a set number of

drills as well as the annual camp. Yet, the ability to fulfill training obligations alongside

occupational and personal commitments remained a challenge for many of these men. As

discussed in Chapter Two, a cause of worry for the city's Volunteers on the eve of the

Territorial Force's creation was uncertainty over what terms of service would materialize.

The rhetoric leading up to Haldane's reforms—largely focused on the inefficiency and

unprepared state of the auxiliary forces—had strongly implied that any subsequent

changes would result in stricter terms of service, which, to the Volunteers feared would

mean increased training obligations. In January 1908, the First Lanark Rifles Gazette

24 Haldane, Army Reform and Other Addresses, 112. 139


noted that "it is probably the hope of every member now serving that the new conditions

will be such as will enable him to continue, in the Regiment, to give such voluntary

service to the country as the conditions of his employment will permit."25 While stating

regulations were not yet finalized, in February Haldane assured that "the conditions of

efficiency under the new system do not differ to any great extent from those which

Oft

applied to the Volunteers, and are not more onerous but are more elastic in their nature."

While prominent men such as Haldane and (at the local level) the Lord Provost of

Glasgow worked to dispel uncertainties as to what would be required of part-time

soldiers in the future, apprehensions nonetheless lingered. Questions revolved around

how stringent these terms would become, considering the impetus for a more efficient

force, and whether these could be reasonably met. The Earl of Mount-Edgcumbe's

complaints in 1908 sum up this problem. To his fellow Lords, he expressed concerns

over recruiting in Plymouth, as "I should find it very difficult to explain to a man exactly

the number of drills he would be called upon to attend in time of peace, exactly the

amount of allowance he would have for camp, what uniform he would have to wear, or

the name of his corps."27 Meanwhile in Glasgow, similar concerns were evident, with an

unnamed Volunteer officer noting in February 1908 that "the actual conditions of training

are not yet issued, and the delay in this matter has allowed some of the enthusiasm to

cool.. .In its place there has arisen a feeling of suspicion that these conditions are to be

25 First Lanark Rifles Gazette 3, no.4 (January 1908): 186. 26 Hansard, 4th ser., vol. 183 (1908), col. 1399. 27 Hansard 4th ser., vol. 184 (1908), col. 571.

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very severe."28 Yet, in comparing the standards imposed on these part-time soldiers

before and after 1908, it is clear that continuity prevailed.

The system of training to which the Volunteers had become accustomed was one

that developed over the previous half-century. Since the Volunteer Force's inception, the

number of drills a Volunteer was to perform in a given year generally increased. The

1863 regulations called for a recruit to perform at thirty drills in their first year, while

others were only required to undertake nine. In the following decades, there existed a

discernible pattern whereby Volunteers as part of their terms of service were expected to

devote more of their time to military drill and training. By 1881, a recruit was obliged to

complete sixty drills in their first two years.29 The 1901 regulations specified that new

riflemen would undergo "forty attendances of not less than one hour each," in addition to

at least ten hours of company training, while artillery were liable to a total of 60

attendances.30 As the Volunteer Force was by its nature, a decentralized movement, these

guidelines often differed from how they were actually carried out. Nonetheless, one

historian has argued that on account of the leisurely, even amusing nature of drills, in

most respects, Volunteers tended to fulfill or even exceed these standards. One

unnamed Glasgow 'Lieutenant' commented on the relaxed pace of training under the old

regimen as evidence of the failings of voluntary service:

28 Glasgow Herald, February 25, 1908. 29 Cunningham, 110. 30 United Kingdom, Volunteer Regulations respecting the Conditions of Efficiency for Officers and Volunteers (London: HMSO, 1901), 5. 31 Cunningham, 110-111.

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It was clear to the average man from the beginning that enlistment in the Territorial Army was not lightly to be undertaken, and that the hitherto happy-go-lucky-marking-up system of making oneself efficient was a thing of the past . . . The Territorial Army must be trained, and the man who enlists must be prepared for hard work ... Not 50 per cent of the Volunteer Force ever took their duties seriously. The remainder either had not the time or the inclination to do justice to the movement.32

Assuming that the new terms of service would necessitate a more disciplined force, the

writer expressed his pessimism, concluding that under the current state of affairs within

the Volunteer Force, "Mr. Haldane's scheme will fail through lack of numbers."33

By late February 1908, it had become clearer what would be expected of the

Territorial Force. The Glasgow Herald observed that "the Volunteers are anxiously

awaiting precise particulars of the duties they will be called upon under the Territorial

Army," and stated that it "may be advantageous" to recall prior War Office memoranda

outlining the general principles of training.34 An 'elastic' system dependent on the talents

of local commanders would be put in place to accommodate local peculiarities and

conditions. Peacetime training, it was hoped, would produce capable officers that would

in turn instruct "the rank-and-file at first individually and then in small tactical units."35

As for the rank-and-file, it was proposed that in addition to annual camp and musketry

training, they would carry out forty recruit attendances (ideally prior to annual camp), the

number of which reduced to ten in subsequent years. The Glasgow Herald, noting the set

32 Glasgow Herald, February 24, 1908. 33 Ibid. 34 Ibid., February 21, 1908. The Herald was likely referring to tracts published in early 1908 for the purpose of informing sceptical Volunteers. For example, see: United Kingdom, H.M. Stationary Office, Training of the Territorial Force. (Provisional.) (London: HMSO, 1908). 35 Glasgow Herald, February 21,1908.

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of provisional rules issued by the War Office, continued to offer a glimpse as to what was

quickly taking form. It was expected that while peacetime training would not produce a

Territorial of the same calibre as a regular soldier, efficiency—that is, completing the set

drill requirements—would nonetheless be secured through the prescribed regimen.36 It

was further indicated that annual camp attendance was required, and would be for periods

of no less than eight days, nor greater than fifteen.

After the Territorial reforms were instituted in April 1908, the new terms of

service were indeed structured in a similar manner to those hitherto. The training scheme

put forth consisted of three components: drills, musketry, and annual camp. In the first

year of their enlistment, one was required to complete a minimum number of drills, with

a lesser amount in subsequent years; this was an arrangement already well-known to the

Volunteers.38 While the level of training expected in the initial year may have been seen

as strict, ensuing years were comparatively lighter. The actual figure continued to vary

depending on the type of service—for example, while the infantry was expected to

undertake forty drills in the first year and ten thereafter, for the artillery and Royal Army

-3Q

Medical Corps, it was forty-five and twenty, and thirty and fifteen, respectively. As

defined in these guidelines "a drill will consist of one hour's actual instruction," and "any

number of drills up to 3 may be performed in one day."40 One departure from Volunteer

regulations was that under the new system recruits were only expected to complete that 36 Ibid. February 27, 1908. 37 Training of the Territorial Force, 7. 38 United Kingdom, Regulations for the Territorial Force and for County Associations 1908 (London: HMSO, 1908), 44, Appendix 6. 39 Ibid., Appendix 6. 40 Ibid., 45.

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required first-year men. Prior to 1908, newcomers were liable for company training in

addition to that required of those designated for men in their first year. Aside from sitting

courses for promotion, officers' training was, on the whole, identical to that of the rank-

and-file. The regulations had also confirmed that men would be encouraged to complete

these drills as early as possible, preferably prior to annual camp.41 The belief was that if

a Territorial had done so, he would be best prepared to take full advantage "of the more

extended training during camp and admit of a progressive system of training being

adhered to."42

As reported by the Glasgow Herald, there was a sense of relief upon the final

publication of the conditions of training, as they proved "much less rigorous than

Volunteers feared they would be ... the changes are really so slight that one is surprised

the information has been withheld so long."43 As contemporary accounts attest, the

Volunteers were by and large in agreement. Because early Territorial recruitment in

Glasgow largely consisted of former Volunteers reenlisting, it can also be surmised that

they did not feel the new terms of service to be as burdensome as initially feared. In a

May 1908 report, it was observed that "the regulations as to camp and other duties do not

seem to have proved stumbling blocks to any appreciable number of men."44 This was

evidenced in that Glasgow drew men at a rate similar to the UK average.45 Considering

the strong recruitment figures at the outset of the Territorial scheme—driven largely by

41 Ibid, 43. 42 Ibid., 45. 43 Glasgow Herald, March 3, 1908. 44 Ibid., May 23, 1908. 45 See Table 1.

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Volunteers accepting the new terms of service—the question remains: to what extent

were requirements a serious departure from expectations? On a practical level most of

the changes were either cosmetic in nature, or reflected the desire to establish some

standardization within the auxiliary services throughout Britain. The most striking

similarities between Volunteer and Territorial training were most apparent in the conduct

of annual camp.

Annual Camps - Old & New

Aside from the series of drills, a mainstay in the amateur soldier's year continued to be

the requirement to attend annual camp. At these yearly events, part-time soldiering, for a

limited period, was transformed into a full-time commitment. Because of the nature of

this transformation, camps were not only the closest many of these men would come to

actual combat, but also proved the most contentious issue in the early years of the Force.

Both Volunteer and Territorial camps were an intensified reflection of each Force's core

characteristics. Through engaging in operations that simulated the very circumstances

that would test a home defence army, they were a valuable opportunity for these amateur

soldiers to hone their skills. While foreign threats were considered a matter that required

serious preparation, the activity at these camps also centered on aspects of leisure and

recreation. Indeed, such was the dual nature of this movement, that while designed to

ensure the security of Britain's shores, it also came to be seen as a compelling social

outlet. Each of these aspects associated with annual camp reveal an enduring character

rooted in the Volunteer era and extending beyond the 1908 reforms. It is this enduring 145


nature that further demonstrates that reform in practice ran contrary to the ideal of

wholesale reform.

As explored in the previous chapter, much of the hesitation amongst Volunteers

towards reform stemmed from sporadic information in the weeks following the

November 1907 passage of the Territorial and Reserve Forces Act. Although the core

questions surrounding terms of service had largely been answered prior to April 1, 1908,

during the lead-up to and initial months of the Territorial Force, qualms persisted over the

intensity and duration of camp activities. News outlets, although largely a force of calm,

at times fuelled these anxieties. For example, The Scotsman espoused the belief that after

"initial difficulties have been overcome, it is not unlikely that there will be a general

tightening up and increase of stringency with a view to the realisation of that blessed

word 'efficiency.'"46 Yet, as the Volunteers-turned-Territorials would find out, the

essential nature of their annual training remained largely unaltered. This was a continuity

that stemmed in part from the practical limitations associated with part-time military

service.

In terms of location and season, camp practices remained the same. In the years

between the Anglo-Boer War and 1908, Glasgow's corps for the most part held their

camps in three locations—the army installations at Stobs (Hawick, Scottish Borders),

Gailes (Irvine, Ayrshire) and Barry (Carnoustie, Angus). There, they often joined their

counterparts from other regions of Scotland to take part in exercises. From the 1908

season on, apart from those corps who did not train in the field (and therefore could

46 The Scotsman, February 29, 1908. 146


engage in 'camp' activities "at any convenient season of the year"), Territorial camps

were conducted between May 1 and September 30, with the rationale continuing to be to

take advantage of favourable weather.47 In terms of location, Glasgow's Territorial Force

in its early years consistently made Ayrshire its annual summer home. The bulk of the

city's Territorial units camped in the familiar Volunteer grounds at Gailes, or in nearby

locales including Troon and Lochgreen.

As stated in the 1901 Volunteer Regulations, "The training of Volunteer Corps in AO

peace will be governed by what they were required to do in war." This was evident in

the form and function of annual camps both before and after the 1908 reforms. Testifying

before the Norfolk Commission, Colonel Mackenzie deemed camps to be "of the greatest

value." Aside from making the men feel more like soldiers "It has another great

advantage in a Volunteer corps, and that is that you can make the instruction more

progressive than you can drilling at home."49 Prior to the Haldane reforms, camp lasted

eight days, and comprised drills, marches, mock battles, social events and receptions.

Officers as well as the rank-and-file underwent inspections by senior officers. From 1908

on, as a matter of policy, Territorial camps were designed to allow for training of a more

advanced, 'progressive' nature than carried out in regular drills undertaken throughout the

year.50 Specifically, this meant that not only was training more sophisticated, but it was

also of an increased intensity. Indeed, this 'progressive' identifier periodically appeared

47 Regulations for the Territorial Force, 46. 48 Volunteer Regulations, 9. 49 Minutes of Evidence ... the Militia and Volunteers, Vol.1, #10911, 10913. 50 Regulations for the Territorial Force, 47.

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in newspaper descriptions of camps, suggesting the central importance of camps in the

training of these men.51

The continued effort to pursue this aim is most evident in the activity of greatest

prominence at camps—the mock battles, also known as 'sham-fights.' A comparison of

sham-fights at both Volunteer and Territorial camps reveals not only an unaltered—nearly

exclusive—emphasis on home defence, it also further underlines the reality that

Haldane's ideal of the Territorial Force as a true second line would not materialize. At

one such camp in 1903, various VBHLI battalions engaged in a sham-fight that entailed

the repelling of an invading army.52 Another example is during the 1905 Barry camp,

which was highlighted by movements associated with the invasion of the country by a

hostile power:

A force ('Blue'), consisting of 1st V.B. Highland Light Infantry and four companies of 3d Battalion.. .received intimation that a hostile fleet had arrived off the coast with the intention of landing an invading force. A force represented by the remaining companies of the 3rd V.B. Highland Light Infantry had already landed with the purpose of covering the debarkation, and the order to the commander of the 'Blue' force was to crush the covering party.53

Other sham-fights entailed attacks on entrenched positions, the taking of strategic points,

night raids, and defending convoys.54 In addition, these exercises often took on a

character that reflected the supposed threat from Britain's European rivals. The 1903

51 The Scotsman, July 20, 1914. Discussing the Scottish Rifles Brigade camp of 1914: "The work is to be of progressive character, leading from company exercises to field manoeuvres." 52 The Scotsman, July 23, 1903. 53 Ibid., July 26, 1905. 54 Ibid., July 18, 1905; First Lanark Rifles Gazette 3, no.2 (February 1906), 151; First Lanark Rifles Gazette 3, no.3 (January 1907), 213-214.

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Stobs camp concluded with a mock campaign, the scenario involving a "Southern Army

having invaded Scotland."55 The two forces were designated 'Scottish' and 'French,'

perhaps reflecting international relations prior to the Anglo-French entente a year later.56

For the early Territorial Force, mock battles remained the most prominent activity

at annual camp. An example of these operations is a 1908 sham-fight, where a 'red' force

was to seize a bridge and entrench themselves, while their 'blue' opponents were to

retake it in a night attack. The 'red' force consisted of umpires "whose duty it was to

locate, if possible, by sound in the darkness the approach of the Rifles."57 On the eve of

the First World War, the essential nature of this activity remained unchanged. The 1914

camp included a sham-fight in which "the general idea was that the Brown Force

(Ireland) had declared war on the White Force (Scotland)."58 As the 'Scottish' force

mobilized from its capital in Glasgow, the 'Irish' (named perhaps on account of

geography) army landed men at Troon. The River Irvine was the demarcation line, as

while the latter was to secure a crossing over the river, their opponents were ordered to

delay this offensive. As before, these sham-fights were designed to simulate the most

likely scenarios in which the Territorials would operate under, should their services be

called upon. These centered on circumstances involving the meeting and repelling of

invaders.

One departure suggested in camp accounts regards technological innovations. Of

55 The Scotsman, August 1, 1903. 56 Ibid. 57 Ibid., July 31, 1908. 58 Ibid., July 29, 1914.

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those conducted in the years 1908-1914, the 1913 season stands as particularly unique, as

it employed early aircraft. Mitchinson's recent study of amateur soldiering during this

period highlights the contemporary difficulty in obtaining suitable equipment and

facilities.59 Yet, the nascent use of aeroplanes suggests a conscious effort to keep

Britain's part-time soldiers versed in what they may face in the event of being invaded.

At the camp that year, such craft were called upon for "scouting and observation

purposes," as well as in the training of men in how they should meet the enemy, for

example:

Instruction was given as to how to assist friendly and to escape the vigilance of hostile aircraft.. .By the end of the first week all ranks had learned to lie prone in the open or to crouch beside a hedge, resisting manfully the natural inclination to look up and watch the evolutions of the inquisitive biplane.60

The value of this new military technology was readily apparent at the related sham-fights.

With clear skies, it was remarked that information of troop positions and movements

were obtained "with a rapidity which in some of the roads of the country traversed by the

troops would have been impossible for a motor car to emulate."61 The novelty of these

vehicles was not restricted to men in uniform, as the public at-large were allowed to view

the craft in their hangar. In groups of twelve at a time, civilians were accompanied by

non-commissioned officers, who "explained the points about the aeroplane which could

59 Mitchinson, England's Last Hope, 53-84. 60 Glasgow Herald, August 9, 1913. 61 Ibid., July 26, 1913.

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most easily be understood by the uninitiated in the art of flying."62 Even when the

aircraft was not in use, they provided "a new interest and variety to the daily routine" of

camp.63 On a more practical level, their use introduced Glasgow's Territorials to the

changing face of armed conflict.64

Another prominent example of continuity in the conduct of annual camps lay

outside purely military matters, reflecting the movement's civilian dimension. Though

the business of training was of utmost importance, there nonetheless existed strong

elements of leisure and masculine recreation that characterized much of the movement

and transcended the 1908 reforms. As the majority of men in the late-Volunteer and early-

Territorial Force were of a skilled working-class background, the opportunity for

recreation away from congested urban centres had been part of the established allure of

this form of soldiering.65 The presence of such varied activities reminds the observer that

amateur service in early-twentieth century Britain was as much (or even more so) a social

outlet as it was a military commitment.66

Weather was a daily feature within newspaper reports of annual camps, as it

dictated the course of scheduled activities: in the event of inclement conditions, drills

62 Ibid., July 28, 1913. 63 Ibid., August 9, 1913. 64 To note, the activities at camp extended beyond riflemen. For example, as attached engineer corps now camped alongside their infantry counterparts, greater attention was paid towards the former's duties and contributions. Brigade signallers practiced communicating via flag and heliograph (Ibid., July 18, 1912). Air Line Company work entailed establishing and maintaining telephone connections, while their Wireless counterparts busied themselves with constructing stations. The Field engineers engaged in activities such as demolitions, building pontoon bridges, and driving (The Scotsman, July 22, 1914). 65 Douglas A. Reid "Playing and praying," in The Cambridge Urban History of Britain: Volume III, 1840-1950, ed. Martin Daunton (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 766. 66 Beckett, Riflemen Form, 117. Like Reid, Beckett argues that the "tremendous opportunities of recreation and companionship" was a powerful lure in attracting rank-and-file to the Volunteer movement.

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were postponed or cancelled outright. At the 1903 gathering at Stobs, continued rain

resulted in an "enforced off-day." While aspiring officers sat promotion examinations,

the men "kept their tents or paid a visit to the recreation marquees or canteens,

and.. .passed the time with singing, etc., while various bands discoursed music from their

canvas shelters."67 Camps additionally offered a means of entertainment and spectacle

for the general public. The 1905 proceedings at Barry featured large crowds of visitors,

coming by way of "numerous special trains being run from Dundee, Arbroath, and other

/ro

centres." Hundreds watched sporting competitions including tug-of-war, football, and

cricket. According to one account at Stobs in 1907:

The Sports in the Afternoon, always an enjoyable function, were specially [sic] so then, perfect weather, the presence of so many of the fair sex, and the general good sportsmanship all going to make the afternoon one of the best of its kind we have had.69

Given their popularity amongst the men, social and athletic pursuits remained a

hallmark characteristic of the Territorial camp routine. At the commanding officer's

discretion 'easy days' were allowed, especially following extended periods of work in the

7 0

field. Sports were a time-honoured part of camp proceedings, with bragging rights and

awards bestowed upon successful competitors. The Ninth HLI, a battalion priding itself

on high physical standards, were the first recipient of a challenge shield presented by the

United Free Church Guild. This award was "held by the battalion gaining first or second 67 The Scotsman, July 29, 1903. 68 Ibid., July 27, 1905. 69 "Stobs Camp, 1907 (Illustrated)," First Lanark Rifles Gazette 3, no. 4 (January 1907): 216-217. 70 The Scotsman, July 23, 1908.

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place in most of the competitions."71 As indicated in one account, the value of such

activities was not lost on either the men or their spectators:

One of the important events at Camp, apart from the real hard work, is the Regimental Sports.. .A large and distinguished crowd assembled.. .and the proceedings were brightened by the presence of many gaily attired ladies, whose good looks aroused the admiration and naturally also the envy of the other battalions.72

Musical events such as galas and torchlight tattoos featuring brass bands and pipers of the

territorial battalions were also held to entertain soldier and civilian alike.73 Much like the

airplane viewing, the spectacle provided by such events consistently drew interest from

relatives, townsfolk, and other visitors.

Another way in which the civilian and military worlds continued to intertwine lay

in the efforts of religious organizations. Church and civic groups had an established

presence at camp, and offered welcome services to Territorials. The United Free Church

Guild and Young Men's Christian Association (YMCA) set up marquees that "were

largely taken advantage of by the men for writing, and reading, and for 'sing-songs.'"74

Further, "both the occasional concerts and specially religious services are evidently

appreciated by the men."75 Regimental church parades held under the "respective

chaplains" were an additional feature.76 As reported in 1912, these social outlets also

71 Glasgow Herald, August 2, 1913. 72 Fifth Scottish Rifles Gazette 1, no.l (January 1909): 45. 73 Glasgow Herald, July 18, 1912; August 9, 1913; "Life at Lochgreen, 1909 (Illustrated)," Fifth Scottish Rifles Gazette 1, no. 2 (January 1910): 46. 74 The Scotsman, August 15, 1908. 75 Ibid., July 24, 1908. 76 Ibid., July 20, 1908.

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included refreshments in tea tents, noted as being "well patronised" by both visitors and

the rank-and-file.77 At a broader level, the activities of such organizations depict the

continued expression and fostering of middle-class respectability (e.g. literacy, sobriety)

upon the largely working-class amateur soldier. That is, the social dynamics that shaped

the Victorian-era Volunteer movement continued to influence the early years of the

Territorial Force. Yet, it stands to be emphasized that the availability of such leisure

activities was a major allure to service as a part-time soldier. For these men, most of

whom were working-class, the ability to pursue sports, engage with community groups,

and escape from crowded, polluted urban areas such as Glasgow could be seen as

paramount to a commitment to the cause of home defence.

The recreational component of life at both late-Volunteer and early-Territorial

camps belies the fact that amidst the drills and sham-fights, injuries did—and continued

to—occur. Casualties were of limited incurrence, and were of a nature one might expect

of the Volunteers/Territorials. Bearer companies put their skills into practice, not only

constructing field kitchens and dressing stations featuring "straw beds with hot water and

medical comports" for inspection, but also providing aid to the wounded. The

concluding portions of the 1903 Stobs camp, for example, saw "several cases of sprains

and minor ailments treated." In that same account, it was reported that a few days

earlier a sergeant's camp ended prematurely, as he found himself on the receiving end of

a horse's kick. At Stobs two years later, the only reported casualty in an operation

77 Ibid., July 24, 1908, August 15, 1908; Glasgow Herald, July 18, 1912. 78 The Scotsman, August 1, 1903.

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involving five thousand men was "a case of a sprained ankle."79 In another instance,

during the sermon following camp church parade, the summer heat resulted in numerous

casualties; ironically, the Medical Corps was "specially troubled with their men falling

out."80 Many of these injuries were likely a normal consequence of large groups of men

engaging in coordinated military exercises, yet as will be explored later in this chapter,

the overall physical state of these men may also have been a contributing factor. After

the 1908 reforms camp injuries continued to be few in number "considering the

opportunities which camps afford to those unused to them for making new discoverings

illustrating the intractability and even malevolence of inanimate objects."81 Nonetheless,

such mishaps did occur and tested the skills of Royal Ambulance Medical Corpsmen.

One individual who found himself at camp hospital—an "old gentleman, who is an ex-

colour-sergeant and an honorary member of the Fifth HLI was seized by cramp while

swimming in about seven feet of water in Irvine Bay."82 Like the infantry, mock battles

too served as opportunities for medicals to hone their craft. In one case, the RAMC

"erected at various points four emergency dressing stations to cope with any accident that

might crop up."

An additional continuity between old and new, despite the rhetoric of change and

efficiency, pertains to the very requirement of camp. In the last decade of the Volunteer

Force's existence, camp attendance was strongly encouraged: "by 1902 it was becoming

79 Ibid., July 27, 1905. 80 "Stobs Camp, 1907 (Illustrated)," First Lanark Rifles Gazette 3, no. 4 (January 1907): 212. 81 Ibid., August 2, 1913. 82 Ibid., July 18, 1912. 83 Ibid., July 26, 1913.

155


something of an obligation to attend."84 From the battalion handbook of the Fifth

VBHLI, it was stated that:

Every Volunteer should endeavour to attend Camp. The Regiment did extremely well last year with regard to the numbers attending Camp, and the Commanding Officer confidently hopes that the high reputation of the Regiment in this respect will be maintained and even improved upon this year.85

Yet, this was an obligation that nonetheless lacked a distinct element of compulsion. The

primary means of encouraging the completion of drill and camp attendance in the

Volunteer era was through capitation grants; fewer numbers resulted in less government

assistance for a particular corps. For the Territorial Force, annual camp participation was

explicitly stated as compulsory under pain of financial penalty. This marked a noticeable

departure from the Volunteer era, in which attendance was strongly encouraged, but

difficult to enforce. Under the 1908 regulations, officers and men were to carry out

annual camp "for a period of not less than 8, or more than 15 days ... and may be called

out once or oftener for this purpose."86 In practice, this meant that although it was highly

desirable that men make themselves available for a fortnight under canvas, they had to at

least be present for half that period.87 Compulsion (and the threat of fines) aside, if the

eight days serves as a benchmark, the new rules can be seen as differing little from those

that the Volunteers were already accustomed to. This is reflected in the following table,

84 Cunningham, 110. 85 Glasgow Highlanders (5th V.B.H.L.I.), Orders and Diary of Drills, 1905 (Glasgow: Glasgow Highlanders (5th V.B.H.L.I.), 1905), 18. 86 Regulations for the Territorial Force, 46. 87 "Our Annual Gathering," Fifth Scottish Rifles Gazette 1, no.5 (January 1913): 177.

156


which shows that the majority of Glasgow Territorial enlisted men from the period 1910-

1913—no less than 84.8 percent—were present for at least the minimum period, numbers

that more or less mirror those nationwide.

Table 2 - Percentage of Territorial Infantry attending 88 at least 8 days camp training (other ranks)*

1910 1911 1912 1913

Glasgow 90 85 84.8 90.6 UK Totals 90.2 86.6 85.9 88.2

* Numbers attending fewer than 8 days not tallied in 1908-09.

Such figures suggest that, in practice, the new terms of service (at least those pertaining

to camp training) were not as burdensome as initially suspected.

Income and Efficiency - A Balancing Act

As this analysis has shown, compared to those undertaken by Volunteer predecessors, in

terms of both conduct and objectives, Territorial camps changed little. The required

number of drills were essentially the same, and when compared to those prior to 1908,

Territorial camps in their various aspects were largely indistinguishable. The general

relief of enlistees was expressed by a Glasgow officer immediately after the first

Territorial camp season in 1908:

88 Annual Returns of the Territorial Force (1910-1913). 157


The men were frightened, partly by the Press, regarding the awful obligations the Territorials were undertaking. But the men found that there was really nothing which they had not experienced before; they were not any more rigorously dealt with, so long as they behaved themselves, and the behaviour was excellent; we had not a single court-martial.. ..there was really very little difference between the camp and previous ones.. .1 talked to a number of the men, and they did not seem to think the work was harder or the discipline more severe than that to which they had been accustomed.89

While a Territorial could easily accommodate the number of drills required of him, there

still persisted more serious implications to one's devoting a fortnight to annual camp.

The general continuity of these annual exercises before and after Haldane's reforms was

shaped and defined by more practical concerns faced by the average Territorial enlistee,

the most conspicuous of which involved personal finances and vacation time. Much like

the expected routine of drill and sham-fights, the effort in reconciling career and soldierly

commitments during the camp period carried over from the Volunteer era, and remained

so in the early years of the Territorial Force. Prior to April 1, 1908, the 'question of

camps' weighed heavily. The Scotsman reported in January 1908 that in London

preliminary interest in the TF suffered as a soldier unable to "fix the date of his summer

holiday must run the risk of being non-efficient, and incurring the financial penalty that

non-efficiency will involve."90 Although it was asserted that "training is arranged to suit

employments," finding a balance between military effectiveness and occupational

realities proved problematic.91

89 The Scotsman, August 15, 1908. 90 Ibid., January 28, 1908. 91 The Times, April 1, 1908.

158


Territorials enlisted under terms that provided little in the way of adequate

monetary compensation. While pay at camps was increased to rates afforded to regular

soldiers, this tended to be paltry in comparison to wages earned on workshop floors.

Whereas areas such as Edinburgh had the more well-to-do in its Territorial movement,

Glasgow's working-class nature meant that in many cases its part-time soldiers' finances

were much more precarious—a decline in wages, albeit temporarily, was to the severe

detriment of the men and their families. In the House of Lords, the Earl of Mount

Edgcumbe expressed the belief that transfers from the Volunteer force were limited on

account of "compulsory camp with an insufficient allowance, especially in the case of

married men who are not non-commissioned officers."92 One city employer remarked

that even with army pay for the duration at camp, it would still "mean a considerable loss

to them. I am doubtful if they would care to go."93 Five years into the Territorial

scheme, this problem continued to persist. In 1913 the Glasgow Herald expressed the

hope in that the War Office would "at least remove the disability of young men who

cannot afford to join the Territorial Force because they have to pay for their annual

training in loss of wages."94 At its most extreme, camp attendance could result in

outright dismissal from one's employ. Writing to the Glasgow Herald in 1908, 'Another

Officer' worried that "at present they [the men] do not care to risk the loss of their

employment by asking the necessary facilities."95 So great was this fear amongst

92 Hansard, 4th ser., vol. 189 (1908), col. 1058. 93 Glasgow Herald, March 7, 1907. 94 Ibid., August 2, 1913. 95 Ibid., February 26, 1908.

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Territorials that a 1912 Glasgow Herald report on the Scottish Rifles' prospects for

recruiting noted:

The knowledge that claims will be dealt with by officers who thoroughly understand the position in which civilians are placed regarding their employment should go far to convince men who can show reasonable cause that their applications for leave will be sympathetically considered.96

Notwithstanding, it was clear that the average Territorial could face a significant financial

burden in pursuit of fulfilling their terms of service. Further, the notion of spending the

entirety of one's yearly vacation at camp proved unappealing to those with families or

other interests.97 According to The Scotsman: "for the many whose tastes incline

towards soldierly accomplishments, the greatest deterrent is the obligation to attend

98

camp, and the possible consequent loss of annual holiday and even employment." The

rhetoric of the 'patriotic' man who volunteered his time in contrast to the 'shirker' played

to both advocates of increasing allowances in the current system, and those who

continued to promote universal military service. The solution offered was the previously-

stated allowance that if necessary, eight rather than fifteen days under canvas was

permissible. However, this was not without its flaws. Though allowing for an

abbreviated annual camp aided camp attendance figures, it also led to the fear that such

compromises would produce inefficient Territorials, a concern that persisted up to the

First World War. The Glasgow Herald summarized the essential problem in 1913:

96 Ibid., March 14, 1912. 97 Mitchinson, England s Last Hope, 72. 98 The Scotsman, July 1, 1908.

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The time allotted is of course all too short, and yet an unduly large proportion of the men cannot stay for the whole fortnight. They have to leave camp just when they are becoming used to the routine and beginning to profit by the regulation instruction... So long as service for home defence rests on a voluntary basis, and the volunteers for the service receive no adequate allowance for loss of wages, recruiting must be hampered and the number of those who can do a full fortnight's training in camp must be limited."

Indeed, as will be discussed in an examination of recruitment in the early years of the

Territorial scheme in Glasgow, in the coming years administrators would seek

government concessions to not only help promote full camp attendance, but to aid in

larger efforts of recruitment and retention. While maintaining enlistment figures was a

priority, so too was ensuring that Territorials met their training obligations.

If individual officers were relieved of any financial liabilities, monetary

considerations still weighed on Territorial Associations, as matters of efficiency

continued to affect incoming government grants.100 In the matter of enforcing these

terms of service, Territorial regulations called for more stringent penalties, and as we

have examined, proved one of the more controversial issues in the build-up to reform.

Using the Fifth VBHLI as an example, one can see strong variances between old and

new. Under the old system, failure to reach a state of efficiency resulted in the offending

Volunteer being "called upon to pay the amount of the Government Grant to the

Regiment."101 In this case, they were liable to pay the capitation grant that would have

gone to the corps otherwise. Further, as shown in the Company Orders for 'E' Company,

99 Glasgow Herald, July 19, 1913. 100 Regulations for the Territorial Force, 93. 101 The Glasgow Highlanders (5th V.B.H.L.I.), Orders and Diary of Drills, 14.

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Fifth VBHLI, those deemed inefficient by June 2 (likely set as a date prior to annual

camp), forfeited all claim to prizes won in competitions.102 Haldane's reforms made men

liable for a maximum of £5 if found to have not fulfilled the obligatory training

regimen.103 Whereas Territorials were subject to military law in certain instances, courts

of summary jurisdiction (i.e. civil courts) presided over most offences, including matters

of inefficiency.104 The threat of bringing non-compliant part-time soldiers before the local

sheriff's court and imposing monetary fines was one which the Glasgow Territorial

Association followed through. A host of reasons were given in each respective defence,

but mostly to no avail. While prosecutions in Glasgow were rarely covered in local

newspapers in the period 1908-1914, November 1911 stands out as an exception, with

three straight days of trial coverage in print. These cases offer insight as to the personal

and economic reasons for one not fulfilling training obligations. Many of the defences

offered were of varying, even humorous merit. One man claimed that his prosecution

was the first occasion that he had not made himself efficient in six years of service. A

private of the Fifth HLI claimed that his absence was because he was married on July 14,

a day before the start of camp, while another unsuccessful case was that of a youth who

"explained that on his parents finding out he had enrolled they told him he had no right to

join, and sent back his rifle."105

As suggested in this chapter, employment and monetary concerns factored in the

102 The Glasgow Highlanders (5th V.B.H.L.I.), 'E' (Queen's Park) Company, Orders, Squad and Prize Lists, 1905 (Glasgow: Carson & Nicol, 1905), 3. 103 Regulations for the Territorial Force, 116 (Territorial and Reserve Forces Act). 104 Regulations for the Territorial Force, 28. 105 Glasgow Herald, November 24, 1911.

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experience of some men. One stated that he was "financially unable to go to camp. He

was told, he said, that he would receive pay from his employer during the time he was at

camp. Otherwise he would not have joined the Territorials."106 From this, it is assumed

that the employer did not honour this commitment. In another instance, a labourer

pleaded that he was prepared to attend camp. However he "received an offer of work

during the holiday week. As he had been idle for some time, his pressing circumstances

compelled him to accept the labour rather than go to camp."107 Similarly, one fined

Territorial argued that his being at camp would result in leaving his wife and four

children "without any meal."108 A ship's fireman claimed that he did not attend camp as

on account of his not completing the required number of drills prior to the annual

exercises he did not qualify for camp pay. Given his weekly wage of 23 s per week, a

fortnight with no income would have been too great a burden.109

Generally, though such excuses were made, the question repeatedly asked by the

sheriff presiding was whether or not each individual had requested leave from their

commanding officer. Anderson stated in one prosecution that "if the respondent

explained his circumstances to one of the officers of his company, and if his story was

found to be correct, he would have obtained leave."110 Indeed, as figures show, local

commanding officers were not averse to granting leave.

106 Glasgow Herald, November 22, 1911; November 24, 1911. 107 Ibid., November 24, 1911. 108 Ibid., November 22, 1911. 109 Ibid., November 23, 1911. 1 ,0 Ibid.

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Table 3 - Absent Camp with Leave (Other Ranks- Infantry) as Percentage of Total Strength (last day of camp training) 111

1910 1911 1912 1913 Average

Glasgow 6.6 9.5 10 6.5 8.15 UK Totals 7.7 10.6 11.5 9.5 9.83

In Table 3 it is shown that throughout the years 1910-1913, the rate of permitted absences

ran slightly less than the nationwide average. This suggests that not only were financial

considerations important to members of the Force during this period, it also shows that

commanding officers and administrators were willing to use existing mechanisms to

assist their men, many of whom were participants in the fluid industrial workforce of

Glasgow. Because of the flexibility accorded by officers, their men did not always have

to struggle in reconciling work and Territorial commitments, thus helping maintain levels

of strength. However, the lesser proportion of men absent with leave in relation to the

nationwide average may be explained in that there was a noticeably greater rate of those

absent without obtaining authorization to do so, as indicated in the following table.

Table 4 - Absent Camp without Leave (Other Ranks - Infantry) as Percentage 112 of Total Strength (last day of camp training)

1910 1911 1912 1913 Average

Glasgow 3.14 5.32 5.0 2.44 3.98 UK Totals 2.0 2.73 2.5 2.1 2.33

111 Annual Returns of the Territorial Force (1910-1913). 112 Ibid.

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The majority of punishments imposed for non-efficiency consisted of fines of £1,

with an additional ten shillings for expenses.113 It was argued by T.A. Harvie Anderson

(Secretary of the Glasgow Association) inl911 that these sums were necessary, for "the

loss to the Territorial Association by three men not becoming efficient was 24s per

man."114 This did not apply to all: in instances where a man could successfully make his

case on compassionate grounds, or when extenuating circumstances prevailed,

reprimands rather than fines were issued. In one such case, a private serving in the Sixth

HLI was unable to attend camp on account of being at sea (he was a crewman aboard a

ship). Another man avoided fines as a result of his physician testifying that illness

prevented his fulfilling the annual training obligation.115 Although the threat of hefty

fines loomed, the actual rate of Glasgow Territorials failing to meet their obligations

represented only a small portion of the city's overall Force. For example, enlisted men

who failed to attend camp in the years 1910-1913 without acquiring leave was around

five percent at its height. However, this should not be seen as entirely optimistic, as this

figure was nearly double that of the UK as a whole. Given the fluid nature of the early-

twentieth century industrial workforce, these findings may not appear as out of the

ordinary—with areas such as Glasgow particularly vulnerable to economic downturns,

the men that worked in the area's shipyards, mills and factories moved to where work

could be found: Territorial commitments were a secondary priority.

113 For example, it was reported that in one day of hearings, out of twenty-five cases, all but one were imposed "a uniform fine of 20s, with an additional 10s to cover expenses." Glasgow Herald, November 22, 1911. 114 Ibid., November 22, 1911. 115 Ibid., November 23, 1911.

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Even so, official sanctions were not an automatic consequence, suggesting that the

reported prosecution figures are not an accurate barometer as to Territorial efficiency.

For instance, the administrative records of the Glasgow Territorial Association detailing

men prosecuted for inefficiency in 1911 (year ending October), reveal the rarity with

which officials took such recourse. A total of 1,009 men (mostly from the HLI

battalions) were deemed unqualified, 189 had already been prosecuted for non-attendance

at Camp, while another 159 were recommended by their commanding officers for

prosecution.116 That year, only 42 were found guilty and fined.117 Out of a total

establishment of 8,819 (by October 31)118, those subjected to formal punishment for both

non-attendance at camp or for general inefficiency amounted to under three percent. As

the camp figures suggest, the actual rate of men not fulfilling their terms of service was

most likely higher, though on account of rules granting commanding officers latitude on

compassionate grounds, in many instances waivers rather than penalties were given. This

may in large part explain the lack of newspaper coverage of Glasgow Territorial

prosecutions.

The application of such fines was also relatively low on account of the difficulties

associated with manoeuvring through the courts.119 A notable example of the limitations

116 "Statement showing number of men unqualified in the various corps for the years ending 31st October 1911, and the number recommended for prosecution" (1911), Minutes of Glasgow Territorial Forces Association, MD10/4, National Archives of Scotland, Edinburgh [hereafter NAS]. 117 "Statement showing number of men prosecuted for having failed to complete prescribed training for the year ended 31st October, 1911, and the result of the cases" (1911), Minutes of Glasgow Territorial Forces Association, MD10/4, NAS. 118 "Comparative statement of strength for years 1908-1912 (other ranks only)" (1911), Minutes of Glasgow Territorial Forces Association, MD10/4, NAS. 119 This is a point also made by Mitchinson. See: Mitchinson, England s Last Hope, 66-68.

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in prosecuting soldiers involves a July 1912 case involving a Territorial who failed to

attend the required number of drills. Stranraer man Hugh Comrie Todd was deemed an

inefficient on the grounds he attended only one drill between November 1, 1910 and

October 31, 1911. Todd did not request leave during this period, although he obtained a

medical certificate "certifying that he was unfit to attend camp."120 Along with this

document, he petitioned for discharge "as he had for business reasons to leave Glasgow

permanently for Stranraer."121 Because he was not formally excused from drills, Todd

was found guilty and was fined £1, with an additional 10s in expenses added (the

alternative being three days' imprisonment). While the Solicitor-General "did not think

anyone could attack that conviction," given the facts surrounding the case, technicalities

would force a different outcome on appeal.122 On Todd's behalf, it was argued that he

indeed underwent training, albeit in Paisley, and that it was not with a different unit;

therefore, official leave was not required. Although the Solicitor-General claimed that

Todd failed to follow Territorial regulations and receive proper authorization, it was

found that this point had not been fully proven. Further, evidence that would have

secured a conviction were obtained after the original trial had ended; indeed "the

regulations had been put in after the case was closed."123 Not only was the conviction

quashed, the Glasgow County Association was also to pay Todd ten guineas expenses.

The presiding judge, Lord Salvesen stated that "he regretted very much that they had to

120 Glasgow Herald, July 19, 1912. 121 Ibid. 122 Ibid. 123 Ibid.


quash the conviction upon a technical ground," but insisted proper rules of procedure

must be maintained.124 As the circumstances surrounding Hugh Comrie Todd's trial and

appeal highlight, the application of military regulations in a civilian courtroom could

pose problems. When considering the matter of heavy financial penalties with the aim of

improving efficiency, it is fair to conclude that given the relatively low rate of men facing

fines, along with the at-times problematic use of civilian courts to enforce terms of

service, this notable aspect of Haldane's reforms was so little used as to render it

uncontroversial. Put another way, practice proved at-odds with theory. This was a

situation not unknown to commanding officers. Before the Norfolk Commission,

Colonel Grant stated that most Glasgow corps did not prosecute non-efficients, and

neither did he.125 He cited the reason for not doing so, being that recruiting would be

hampered.126 In this light, Grant's statement mentioned in Chapter One held true years

later—"you cannot compel the men. You have nothing really but a moral power over

them."127

Aside from the threat of fines, more positive tactics were used. In addition to

taking advantage of rules granting individual commanders' latitude in granting

exemptions to their men, Territorial administrators as well as company commanders

employed a variety of means to encourage and improve efficiency amongst their men.

One such example is found in the battalion newsletter of the Fifth Scottish Rifles. The

124 Ibid. 125 Minutes of Evidence...Militia and Volunteers, Vol.1, 10818-10819. 126 Ibid., #10943. 127 Ibid., #10717.

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Fifth Scottish Rifles Gazette highlights the annual competition for 'Colonel McCall's

Shield'—a prize awarded to the company displaying the greatest measure of efficiency in

several categories. These included: number of men performing drills in April of that year,

those taking and successfully passing firing courses, rifles returned by October 31, total

number present at camp, and recruits since April 1. This was a contest that had existed

109,

prior to Haldane's reforms, under virtually the same criteria. To continue to

acknowledge those men who had displayed a longstanding dedication to the movement,

the Volunteer Long Service medal was phased out and replaced with the Territorial

Efficiency Medal. To receive this award, one had to have completed twelve years' of

service with a minimum of twelve training sessions. Service in the Volunteers counted

towards fulfilling this condition.129 The use of financial penalties alongside opportunities

for public acknowledgement reveals a concerted effort to ensure that the training offered

through camp and drills were well-utilized. However, as these instances reveal, there was

an inherent limitation to these measures—the use of the judicial system was at-times

problematic, while more positive measures amounted to appeals to individual or unit

pride. This should not come as surprising, as given the continued use of service on a

voluntary basis, the level of commitment would always vary in light of practical or

personal concerns. This reality in itself forms a strong continuity. Yet, while most 128 For example, see: "Result of the Competition for Colonel M'Call's Shield," Fifth Scottish Rifles Gazette 2, no. 1 (January 1914): 36; "Result of the Competition for Colonel M'Call's Shield," First Lanark Rifles Gazette 3, no. 2 (February 1906): 104. The main difference in the competition from Volunteer to Territorial regimes is a changing of dates. In this case, drill and firing efficiency standards were gauged by how much was completed prior to June 11; this is likely so per expectations that this training be done prior to annual camp. 129 J.M.A. Tamplin, The Territorial Force Efficiency Medal 1908-1921 and the Territorial Efficiency Medal 1922-1930 (London: Spink, 1985), 2.

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aspects of part-time service remained constant, this was not universal. A strong example

of a conscious departure from established norms was in how the Territorial Force was

cast in terms of its potential in improving military efficiency through fostering good

physical health.

Part-time Soldiering as Conduit to Health

On one level, the continued attention paid towards sports and outdoor excursions was

intended to attract young working-class men, whose numbers the part-time movement

depended upon. This demographic, though likely not having the individual means to do

so, were nonetheless eager to pursue such opportunities. Upon an examination of

territorial regulations, the rhetoric of interested politicians in the build up to the 1908

reforms, and commentary on Territorial activities, one gains a sense that there existed a

conscious initiative to produce not only fitter soldiers, but also to use reform as a vehicle

to improve the wider public health in Britain.

The issue of the nation's physical condition was a matter of increasing public

interest in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century. While adult death rates were

steadily on the wane since the mid-1800s, Britain's overcrowded urban centres, of which

Glasgow was regarded as the worst, continued to be a haven of infectious disease; in such

settings, tuberculosis was particularly persistent—and lethal.130 Further, the turn of the

130 F.B. Smith, The People's Health 1830-1910 (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1979), 196; Maver, Glasgow, 170, 176; Thomas Dormandy, The White Death. A History of Tuberculosis (New York: New York University Press, 2000), 78-79; Richard Rodger, Housing in Urban Britain, 1780-1914: Class, Capitalism and Construction (London: Macmillan, 1989), 37.

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century marked a high point in infant mortality rates throughout Britain with industrial

areas above national averages.131 Despite positive strides resulting from the growth of

the medical profession and public sanitation measures, and the reduction of infectious

disease, it was apparent that the nation's health—particularly in urban areas—continued

to deteriorate.132 This was pronounced in young people. The Royal Commission on

Physical Training in Scotland (1903), which held its hearings in Glasgow, examined the

means by which the health of Scottish children and adolescents could be improved

through a programme of physical education. Citing Edinburgh as an example, the

Commission found that on account of food and living conditions, children in lowland

Scotland had poorer health than the rest of the nation.133 Such circumstances were

especially pronounced in Glasgow, as cited in the testimony of Robert Wilson Bruce,

member of the city's Faculty of Physicians and Surgeons, and Medical Officer to the

Glasgow School Board. He stated that in the homes he had been obliged to inspect

"dirty, disorderly, and ill-ventilated rooms are common."134 Bruce continued to testify

that he was "of the opinion that country children are physically superior to urban

children."135

To contemporary observers, these problems were unavoidably reflected in the

quality of men entering the armed services in that period. By 1898 the greatest

131 Smith, 65-67, 69. Maver cites a rate of infant mortality whereby "one in five slum babies never saw the end of their first year" (Maver, Glasgow, 176). 132 Anne Hardy, Health and Medicine in Britain since I860 (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 46. 133 United Kingdom, Report of the Royal Commission on Physical Training (Scotland) Vol.1, Report and Appendix (Edinburgh: HMSO, 1903), 25. 134 United Kingdom, Report of the Royal Commission on Physical Training (Scotland) Vol.2, Minutes of Evidence and Index (Edinburgh: HMSO, 1903), #13777. 135 Ibid.

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proportion of rejections from the British Army stemmed from "defective physical

development (in height, weight, and chest measurements)."136 The Director-General of

the Army Medical Service cited the impoverished lives of the working class, from which

the regular army was drawn. It has been estimated that from 1893-1902, one in three

recruits was turned away on account of poor health.137 While the Earl of Dunraven

lamented the "fact that the Army does not attract men up to anything like the physical and

moral average of the nation," others believed its dilemma to be symptomatic of the entire

population.138 This problem was particularly felt during the Anglo-Boer War. A

correspondent writing for The Lancet, drew sharp distinctions in a series of articles

focusing on the physique attributes of the belligerents. Paying particular attention to the

"stronger, healthier, and bigger" Boers, the writer described their British counterparts as

"a sorry spectacle" in comparison.139 The writer went on to comment on the sickening

effect of industrial society. Inferring that the number would be few, it was suggested the

reader "take his stand in a crowded street in the centre of Glasgow and note how many

men will pass him whose backs are straight, who have expanded chests and healthy

complexions."140 Although Britain emerged victorious in that conflict, the fitness of its

army was a matter of concern in subsequent years, and would in part shape the reform

debate.

136 Jeanne L. Brand, Doctors and the State: The British Medical Profession and Government Action in Public Health, 1870-1912 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1965), 138. 137 Ibid.; Rodger, Housing in Urban Britain, 54-55. Using Manchester as his example, Rodger notes that only 18 percent of recruits were up to standard. 138 Hansard, 4th ser., vol. 95 (1901), col. 1378. 139 "The Physique of the Boers," The Lancet 155, no. 3989 (February 10, 1900): 411. 140 Ibid.

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The physique of the Volunteers was among the many issues brought under

scrutiny by the Elgin Commission (1903-1904). The opinion of officers interviewed was

that the physical condition of the men varied greatly. While a majority of commanders

held similar opinions to that of Sir H.J.T. Hildyard, who deemed the health of serving

soldiers "excellent, and left nothing to be desired," others offered more nuanced

assessments.141 A pattern that is revealed was that while the first groups of soldiers were

in good health, subsequent calls for men yielded those who were less capable

physically.142 Lord Methuen described the regulars as "very fair" while a later draft was

"absolutely wretched."143 The variable level of fitness was generally made evident

during long marches. While some officers described their men as marching

"uncommonly well,"144 others noted that the troops were initially unfit for long marches,

a matter that was only rectified with time and practice.145 For example, Sir Redvers

Buller remarked that only after conditioning were his Volunteers able to satisfactorily

march.146 The Norfolk Commission found that "an appreciable number of Volunteers

classed as efficient are physically unfit for service in a mobile army." This was

particularly troubling as their report reminded the reader that "the standard of medical

fitness, and the medical examinations, are less stringent for the Volunteers than for the

Regular and Militia Forces."147 This conclusion ran contrary to the earlier testimony of

141 Minutes of Evidence ...War in South Africa, Vol.2 (London: H.M. Stationary Office, 1903), #15972. 142 Ibid., #16808, 19146. 143 Ibid., #14228-30. 144 Ibid., #17564. 145 Ibid., #17129. 146 Ibid., #15492-3. 147 Report of the Royal Commission on the Militia and Volunteers, 7.

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one Glasgow commander, who asserted that the heart, lungs, and eyesight of the men

were "tested thoroughly," and that the inspecting medical officer was "very particular."148

At the same time as these postwar commissions, other, more critical opinions

were offered within interested circles. Surgeon-Colonel (ret.) Francis H. Welch, writing

in The Lancet expressed the belief that "the causes which determine the physical and

moral decay of humanity and the conditions which are illustrated in the recruiting offices

are already apparent."149 He declared in a later analysis of fitness and reasons for

rejection on medical grounds, that unless the "unwholesome circumstances of town life"

are countered, "immature lads" will continue to be subjected to "army conditions which

by clear experience we know no small number of them to be incapable of meeting."150

Parliamentary debates painted a similar picture, as according to the Earl of Meath:

Out of five men who enlist, only two remain effective soldiers after two years, and that the men who slipped through the officers tests, and afterwards had to be turned out of the Army, were 'Miserable, anasmic specimens of humanity, fit to do no proper man's work in any position of life.'151

The level of fitness was seen as so poor that "a large number of men" were rejected

outright by recruiting sergeants.

As pertains to the Volunteers, one MP opined "What was the good of numbers,

148 Minutes of Evidence... Militia and Volunteers, Vol.1, #10847-10849. 149 Francis H. Welch, "The National Health and Army Recruiting Statistics," The Lancet 161, no. 4145 (February 7, 1903): 398. 150 Francis H. Welch, "The National Health and Army Recruiting Statistics," The Lancet 161, no. 4149 (March 7, 1903): 685. 151 Hansard, 4th ser., vol. 124 (1903), col. 1334. 152 Hansard, 4th ser., vol. 124 (1903), col. 1350.

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when many of the Volunteers were physically unfit, and many of them could not find

time to carry out their duties."153 It was because of such sentiments that then-Secretary of

State for War Arnold-Forster sought evidence supporting his programme of reform.

Focusing on issues of health and to determine the level of unfitness, he conducted an

assessment in 1905 of the various Volunteer battalions.154 Through this, he aimed to

demonstrate the inefficiency of the Volunteers, lending weight to his belief that through

removing redundant men, the force would be a more capable fighting force.

Table 5 - Survey ofphysical soundness of Glasgow Rifle Volunteer Corps (1905) 155

Battalion Strength Number Fit A B C D E Total Unfit 1 st Lanarkshire 1125 432 2 2

4th Scottish Rifles 865 274 144 25 26 31 150 3rd Lanarkshire 913 240 44

1st VBHLI 1013 671 4 4 2nd VBHLI 889 414 61 148 3rd VBHLI 1124 948 130 2 40 4 149 5th VBHLI 1265 1141 82 82

Total (Glasgow VRC) 7194 4120 417 25 30 71 8 579 UK Totals (VRC) 180903 119538 2333 1139 9052 1438 514 23886

Fitness % - 57% (Glasgow); 66% (UK)

His survey categorized soldiers according to five criteria: a) "comes up to the physical

equivalent of 19 of age, and is under 45"; b) not below standard set in Volunteer

Regulations; c) "of sound constitution, and free from organic disease"; d) "possesses a

sufficient number of sound teeth for efficient mastication; and e) "has no defects which

153 Hansard, 4th ser., vol. 139 (1904), col. 1424. 154 Cunningham, 137. 155 Proposed Reduction of Volunteers, 1905, War Office and successors: Registered Files (General Series), W032/6377, TNA.

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are likely to interfere with marching or active exertion."156 If Glasgow is used as an

example of the level of health in an industrial centre, its findings are revealing.

Comparing the city's rifle volunteers to the nationwide average for riflemen, the former's

level of fitness is roughly ten percent lower. These figures suggest that contemporary

accounts are correct, and that environmental and socioeconomic factors play a role in

determining the quality of recruits. This effect was particularly felt in Glasgow, cited in a

House of Lords debate as a clear example of a place where for the working class "the

conditions of life are hardest."157 Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, with a tone of

scepticism towards the survey, commented on its results. "The Volunteers are probably

as good as their neighbours, and mostly young men of spirit, and yet we are told that 40

per cent are unfit for their duties. A statement like that almost answers itself."158 While

Arnold-Forster's initiative was ultimately met with strong opposition, the recognition that

public health and military health were closely linked continued to form a part of reform

debates.

In the ensuing discussion over the future direction of amateur soldiering, both

compulsionists as well as those committed to preserving a voluntary service considered

the capacity for improving the nation's health offered by their respective agendas. The

NSL had long been a critic of the status quo's shortcomings and drew comparisons with

the likely future enemies of Britain. The Duke of Wellington, then league president,

stated in a 1903 report that "statistics show an undoubted tendency to deterioration in the

156 Ibid. 157 Hansard, 4th ser., vol. 124 (1903), col. 1356. 158 Hansard, 4th ser., vol. 144 (1905), col. 251.

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physique of recruits and in the health and stamina of our army as compared with that of

Germany."159 Assessing Britain's military capabilities vis-a-vis the Germans, Henry

Hughes Wilson (later Field Marshal Wilson) took into account the nation's health, and

offered a pessimistic observation. In the margins of his 1906 memorandum to Earl

Roberts, Wilson summed up the situation: "So far as can be judged our young men are

steadily deteriorating and [the] Germans are steadily improving." He further noted that

"Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman said 12,000,000 on the borders of starvation. Not a

good class to breed from ... Compulsory service, good food and exercise tends to

physical improvement."160 Considering his service under Lord Roberts, Wilson's pro-

conscription stance should not come as alarming. Other proponents of universal service

also couched their rhetoric in terms of improving public health. Viscount Milner held

that "vastly improved physique" could be attained through compulsion.161 He believed

the majority of world powers used such a system on account of not only "the military

strength of a nation, but also to a consciousness of its value as a means of physical and

moral education."162 Indeed, the matter of health was a core element of the National

Service League's platform. Along with safeguarding Britain's shores, the league argued

that universal service would "improve the moral and physical condition of the nation and

thereby increase its industrial efficiency."163

159 "The Health of the Army" The Lancet 162, no. 4170 (August 1, 1903): 327. 160 Wilson to Roberts, November 11,1907, War Office: Lord Frederick Roberts Papers, W0105/45, TNA. 161 Hansard, 4th ser., vol. 160 (1906), col. 688. 162 Hansard, 4th ser., vol. 160 (1906), col. 687. 163 National Service League policy document, February 16, 1906, Ellison Papers. In a 1911 tract, Earl Roberts reiterates the potential for improving the "moral and physical qualities of the people" through compulsory service. See: Earl Roberts, Fallacies and facts: an answer to "compulsory service " (London:

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While the fifth chapter of this study will discuss in greater depth Haldane's vision

of the nation's youth within his programme of reform, it must be noted that in this regard,

he held a similar belief which drew upon well-established cultural precedent; that through

fostering a sense of national duty amongst the youth—a component of such duty being

increased physical instruction—public (and by extension the military's) health would

improve.164 Although its ultimate effectiveness is difficult to ascertain, after the 1908

inauguration of the Territorial Force, one can see in practice a conscious effort to produce

fitter soldiers. Noticeable differences could already be seen in recruitment standards.

While the old Volunteers simply sought men meeting a determined height, the 1908

Territorial regulations marked a departure from such broadly-defined qualifications,

instead calling for men to meet not only height but also additional requirements. As of

1908, recruits were subject to detailed height/weight/chest standards-for instance, 20

year-olds who stood five foot nine inches in height were to weigh at least 1201b.165 In

comparison, the 1905 Fifth VBHLI orders handbook provides merely a minimum height

requirement of five foot seven inches (or 5'6" for 'lads').166 Age requirements were also

i f i n

altered: while the Volunteers sought those 17-40, Territorial recruitment was 17-35.

Through an examination of physical standards, it can be seen that the Territorial Army

Murray, 1911), 42. 164 The notion tying military service and good health continued well after the initiation of Haldane's reforms. A recruiting pamphlet published by the Glasgow County Association linked preparatory physical education for Territorial service to improved health amongst the city's adolescents. See: Glasgow County Association, Voluntary Service, 14. Likewise, a later Glasgow Herald editorial stated that an improving 'physical efficiency' of Territorial recruits "would be secured on a wider basis by introducing compulsory physical training in schools." See: Glasgow Herald, July 31, 1913. 165 Regulations for the Territorial Force, 182-183 (Appendix 5). 166 The Glasgow Highlanders (5th V.B.H.L.I.), Orders and Diary of Drills, 8. 167 Regulations for the Territorial Force, 17.

178


departed from its Volunteer forebear not only through (in some respects) stricter terms of

service, but also requiring a healthier, younger Force. In other words, with more secure

funding given to County Associations, commanding officers could now be more

discerning as to who they recruited.

Additionally, a Territorial's training obligations were touted as an avenue to

physical well-being. Camp was portrayed as an opportunity to exercise in the

countryside. The Edinburgh County Association vividly described the benefits of this

annual training; after a fortnight in the open air, "they seem to be different men. Their

brown faces, the new spring and vigour in their limbs.. .they are returning to their daily

work refreshed in mind and body."168 Battalion publications reveal a similar (even

appealing in terms of recruitment) imagery. In describing camp morale amongst the 5th

Scottish Rifles, one writer stated that "each morning we left our tented homes, marched

for the and met our foes, and each afternoon marched back, feeling in health, in spirits,

and last but not least, in appetite."169 From the standpoint of improving health, camps

were an important tool. Indeed, for the men who filled the Territorial ranks, annual camp

provided a holiday excursion otherwise beyond their means.170

The matter of promoting good physical health had another impetus: the

connection between bodily and social improvement. The physical aspects of

168 The Territorial Force Association of the City of Edinburgh, The Territorial Army, 14. 169 "Wallacefield," Fifth Scottish Rifles Gazette 2, no. 1 (January 1914): 26. 170 Susan Barton, Working class organisations and popular tourism, 1840-1970 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005), 98. This is confirmed in a firsthand account from a Territorial recruit on the eve of the First World War, who joined in order to "simply in order to get a holiday down at Campbeltown," in addition to his friends joining alongside him. See: Ian MacDougall, Voices from War: and some labour struggles: personal recollections of war in our century by Scottish men and women (Edinburgh: The Mercat Press, 1995), 99.

179


Volunteering—drills, camps, and rifle shooting—were seen by Victorians as an

acceptable means by which, even in the industrial era, the "physical character of the

nation" could be maintained.171 As seen in conscriptionist rhetoric, the belief that fitness

was closely linked to moral wellbeing continued to prevail. Other historians have shown

that the virtues of the Volunteer movement found immediate parallels with the late

Victorian 'cult of athleticism' as well as the belief in Muscular Christianity (both topics

that will be revisited in Chapter Five).172 To this end, we can see another facet of the

continued promotion of middle-class values upon a largely working-class organization.

By contemporary accounts, even from an early date the Territorial scheme was

seen as successful in producing fitter part-time soldiers. In a July 1908 speech to his

fellow peers, Lord Lucas stated that:

The reports we have in all tend to show that the Territorial Army, from a physical point of view, is far more efficient than the Volunteer Force was before. This transformation has acted as a purge upon the force. Speaking broadly, we have been able to keep the most efficient men, while the men who are not efficient and who did not intend to make themselves more efficient than they could possibly help, have been got rid of. The class of men who are coming in are of a most excellent standard and quality.. .although smaller in numbers, the Territorial force is a far finer force in physique and general efficiency than the force which it has superseded. The medically unfit to whom reference has been made, are the men to a great extent who have been weeded out by this process of transformation, and the men now coming in are being subjected to a far more rigorous medical examination than ever before. In other ways, there is an enormous improvement

1 in the Territorial Force.

171 Cunningham, 113. 172 Beckett, Amateur Military Tradition, 199. As these beliefs were created and based in Britain's schools, these two viewpoints will be examined in Chapter Five. 173 Hansard, 4th ser., vol. 192 (1908), col. 1040.

180


In its coverage of the city's battalions the Glasgow Herald noted a conscious effort to

promote and meet a high standard of bodily health amongst their men—an effort that did

not exist prior to the 1908 reforms. The 'splendid physique' of men of the Sixth HLI was

noted as apparent in their notable sports victories (tug-of-war, athletics, etc.).174 Yet, their

accomplishments were overshadowed by the reputation afforded to their counterparts in

the Ninth HLI—who according to the newspaper were widely known to "reject

candidates who do not conform to the physical requirements which have given the

regiment so high a reputation."175 This reflects the ideal presented by the Glasgow

County Association, whereby it was stated that the man who makes himself available to

the cause of home defence "has an ample margin of bodily health, physical activity and

moral courage."176 Through conflicts and invasion fears came a heightened awareness of

the physical shortcomings of Britain's soldiers—both regulars and amateurs. Observers

were firm in their belief that the military's poor health vis-a-vis other powers was the

product of urban living in early-twentieth century Britain. Through such indictments,

Glasgow can be seen as a prime example of the debilitating effects of the urban

environment during these years—a city characteristically blighted by overcrowded

tenement housing, improving, but still inadequate sanitation, and massive industrial

pollution. The working class of the city, whom the early Territorial Force relied upon,

were drawn from these very conditions.

174 The Glasgow Herald, March 21, 1912. 175 Ibid. 176 Glasgow County Association, Voluntary Service, 5.

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Concluding Remarks

The unique challenges posed by the social makeup and part-time service of the Volunteer

Force carried over into the Territorial era. This effect was magnified in Glasgow, given

the deep, longstanding worker participation within the movement there. The particular

concerns of this demographic had an unavoidably integral role in the shaping and

application of Haldane's scheme. On account of the Territorial Force being comprised

largely of working-class men, who themselves were either unwilling or unable to take

reduced wages (or vacations) for protracted periods, the potential for wholesale change or

a drastic professionalization was illusory. Were the Territorial scheme to press too much

for greater commitment, the early Force could have completely faltered through lack of

interest. As a result, the fundamentals of training and annual camps proved nearly

identical in character to those of the Volunteers which they replaced. Stricter penalties

seemed to act more as a scare tactic than one that could be regularly employed. In short,

the desire for a stronger means of home defence was a weak competitor to the everyday

needs of good pay and stable employment. This, more than any other factor shaped

Haldane's reforms once they were put into practice: the impossibility of efforts to place

part-time soldiers on the same footing as regulars. Lastly, the emphasis on part-time

soldiers and their physiques reflects the view amongst policymakers that the problems of

sickliness and physical inefficiency were directly linked to contemporary industrial

living. Because the Territorial Force encompassed both military and civilian worlds,

reform could be used to directly bring about an improvement in public health; in a nation-182


in-arms healthier Territorials were by default healthier citizens.

Working-class concerns clearly played an important role in the formulation of the

early Territorial Force. The other, and perhaps greater side of the equation lay in local

elites—government, trade unions, and business/industry—and how these groups

approached its development. As the next chapter will examine, forging a structure that

also accommodated their particular agendas was critical to the success of the scheme. As

their power lay in the ability to create an atmosphere conducive to voluntary service,

local elites functioned as the 'gatekeepers' to reform. Yet, a detailed examination of elite

groups will highlight the continued legacy of the extent amateur soldiering movement in

Glasgow and the wider intersecting of military and civilian interests that this represented.

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Chapter 4 - The Elites

We can train an Army fit to resist invasion without resorting to some kind of compulsory service, and that is the only alternative if the Territorial Army fails. The Volunteers know this, employers of labour, whose co-operation in this matter is essential to the fulfilment

of the obligations imposed upon men willing to join, also know.

Glasgow Herald, 19081

Introduction

As seen in the previous chapter, Glasgow's Territorial Force was built upon a well-

established culture of part-time military service. Differing from trends described in wider

British-based studies, from the beginnings of the modern Volunteer movement there in

the late-1850s, it was the city's working class that dominated membership rolls. The

demographic make-up of local corps was one continuity that persisted after the

inauguration of the 1908 reforms. Men also continued to devote their free time to the

cause of home defence for a host of reasons, including the social and recreational outlets

that were offered through enlistment. However, the limitations of reform are revealed in

the practical concerns of income, leisure time and job security. While creating a more

efficient force was paramount, as inferred in post-Anglo-Boer War debates, it was feared

that more stringent terms of service would have a detrimental effect on recruiting. Not

surprising then, the essential nature of Territorial drill and training deviated only slightly

from what the Volunteers had been accustomed to before the Haldane reforms. These

individual considerations are of importance, but the ability for local elites—the focus of

1 Glasgow Herald, April 1, 1908. 184

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this chapter—to create an environment favourable to part-time soldering is equally

significant.

This study has touched upon Haldane's concept of a nation-in-arms—the notion

that Britain's defensive needs could be met through integrating civilian life with

voluntary military service. By examining the relationship of local elites—city

government, organized labour, and private business—to the early Territorial Force in

Glasgow, the value of incorporating military interests alongside those of the civilian

sphere is evident. An examination of elite groups highlights not only the potentially broad

reach of this nation-in-arms, but also how this was largely the result of pre-existing

structures and relationships being channelled into the CountyAssociations, the bodies

created to administer the Force in each locality. The focus of this chapter marks a

departure from prior research on amateur soldiering in Britain during this

period.2Previous studies have consideredthese groupsin a limited fashion, tending to

mention how business and labour alike were hostile towards Haldane's scheme, rather

than the extent to which they could be of assistance. A local approach, however,

provides a more detailed and nuanced view as to their motivations for support (or lack

thereof), which itself was a product of a host of legislative, social and political forces that

connected Glasgow's elites to the city's Territorial Force. Whereas other works have

overlooked these connections as a factor in the operation of the early Territorial scheme,

2 The place of elites has been treated sporadically in existing literature. For example, aside from defining the leadership role of Lords Provost (as examined in detail in this chapter), local government goes untreated. In addition, the motivations and concerns of organized labour are similarly treated, not going beyond a general acknowledgement of organized labour's hostility towards Haldane's scheme. For example, see: Dennis, 16; Beckett, Amateur Military Tradition, 220.

185

The Elites

the example of Glasgow reveals that the inclusion of these groups in the

CountyAssociation was important in fostering broad-based support for the Territorial

Force. The peculiarities of each representative elite also contributed to maintaining the

city's lasting tradition of amateur soldiering. Yet, a vibrant local culture of civic

participation and the resulting institutional and personal relationships that welded

amateur soldiers to their communities were of the utmost significance. The Territorial

scheme in Glasgow would not be created from scratch, but rather built upon pre-existing

relationships that for decades had sustained the Volunteer movement. Such bonds further

suggest that in the city, a nation-in-armsof sorts had been in place prior to Haldane's

definition of the term.

The Territorial Force and Glasgow Civic Government

In terms of evaluating the level of participation of local government in the amateur

soldiering movement, available evidence from city administrative minutes reveals that in

the years preceding Haldane's reforms, the city corporation took only sporadic interest.

While this study suggests that through a host of civic events the Volunteers enjoyed

support from city leaders during the Anglo-Boer War in the form of parades, receptions

and benevolent funds, subsequent years were a different matter altogether, marked by a

benign disinterest. In city corporation minutes, the Volunteers are mentioned in only a

handful of instances. Of these, the greatest attention centres on arrangements made in

preparation for a 1905 royal review in Edinburgh. To help cover the expenses of local

Volunteer units taking part, the city provided a substantial £750 grant. In addition, it was 186

The Elites

agreed that a public holiday be declared to commemorate this event. During less festive

times, attention was given only to the extent that the superintendent of parks was allowed

to grant the Volunteer corps the use of open space for drill practice "...as may reasonably

be given without damage to the parks."4 Although only a few examples, they reveal a

pattern of involvement that characterized the official relationship between Glasgow city

government and its part-time soldiers during the period between the Anglo-Boer War and

the 1908 reforms. Though major events warranted support from magistrates, the more

mundane activities of training and drill received only as much support so as to not make

it a burden upon city resources. This should not come as a surprise, as the previous

chapter has shown that from its inception the Volunteer Force in Glasgow (as well as

elsewhere) was a grassroots organization. As evidenced in the creation of local rifle

battalions and the issue of officer finances in the build-up to reform, it was driven by

private initiative without the extensive official government support that characterized the

Territorial era. Although by this period Volunteer expenses were in part alleviated by War

Office funds, the essential nature of the movement even in its latter years remained

largely intact.

With the passage of the 1907 Territorial and Reserve Forces Act and through

Haldane's tireless promotion of the scheme in the ensuing months, there came a

fundamental change in how local governments approached their part-time soldiers. After

3Minutes of the Corporation of Glasgow, April-November 1905, (Glasgow: Robert Anderson, 1905), 2159, 2434, 2563. * Minutes of the Corporation of Glasgow, November 1903-April 1904 (Glasgow: Robert Anderson, 1904), 472; Minutes of the Corporation of Glasgow, April-November 1905, 1115.

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April 1, 1908, the Glasgow city corporation, by virtue of a combination of official ties

and overlapping social and professional relationships, proved a reliable supporter of the

local Territorial Association. The deeper bonds that were forged between the two

organizations can be viewed as the desired product of Haldane's nation-in-arms ideal.

Yet, as can be seen through the biographical accounts of Glasgow's Lords Provost during

this period, the city's Volunteer tradition played an equally important role in the rapid

development of strong relations between local government and early Territorial corps.

The resulting support on the part of city leaders was manifest in a variety of forms, most

notably in participation within the CountyAssociation, the funding of its activities, and

the granting of facilities to Territorials in the corporation's employ.

By design, the new structure enabled the Glasgow CountyAssociationto count on

the city's patronage. As part of the reforms underpinning the creation of the Territorial

Army, Lord-Lieutenants were designated as Presidents of their respective Territorial

Associations. In short, the men who sat as heads of local governments were the very

same presiding over the administration of the part-time soldiers in their respective

localities. As mentioned in Chapter Two, this was a pivotal position in Haldane's wider

ambition of bringing military and civilian spheres into a closer dialogue, and can be seen

in the earliest articulations of his reforms. His second memorandum of February 1906

outlined the role of these men in the future CountyAssociations, pointing out the special

place accorded these men as the local administrators of his scheme.5 He elaborated

further in an address to the Territorial Army Committee in May of that year, that in:

5Second Memorandum, February 1, 1906, Haldane Papers. 188

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the old days the Lords-Lieutenant of the Counties, who represented the Crown for military purposes, were people of great power, and contributed largely to the support and expansion of the Army...But the Lord-Lieutenant, who was the key of the whole position, is dead as a door-nail as a governing functionary.6

Haldane placed blame on the increasing power of County councils for this receding of the

Lord-Lieutenants' influence in local military affairs. But the Secretary of State for War

held firm in the belief that these traditional powers could yet be revived to the benefit of

his Territorial Force. "The Lords-Lieutenant surrounded by these Committees or

Associations might become again real functionaries in an organization which would be,

in fact, a new kind of local government." As Presidents of CountyAssociations, these

men would "be in a position to assist recruiting for the Regular Army, and to encourage

the formation of Cadet Corps and of Rifle Clubs amongst the civilian population at

o

large." Throughout Britain, Lord-Lieutenants were "charged with the raising and

administration of the Territorial units," and in that capacity could use their influence to

foster enthusiasm for military service on a voluntary basis.9 Although this was the most

conspicuous facet of Haldane's envisioned nation-in-arms, not all were immediately

reassured of its viability. In parliament, Conservative and NSL member Lord Netwon,

unconvinced by the Secretary of State's optimism, remarked: "what power of peaceful 6Ibid. According to Spiers, until 1871 the office of lord-lieutenant was key in the local military administration. "Throughout most of the century they undertook specific military responsibilities within their counties. They appointed officers to commissions in the local Militia, accepted administrative responsibility for the local Volunteer forces, and, in the event of an emergency, would have taken command of all forces." From 1871, the War Office administered the Volunteers. See: Spiers, The Late Victorian Army, 159-160. 7Second Memorandum, Februrary 1, 1906, Haldane Papers. 8Ibid. 9Draft Autobiography, Haldane Papers, 115-116.

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persuasion does a Lord-Lieutenant possess? How can he or anybody else on the proposed

Associations induce an unwilling man to enter the Territorial Army?"10The Liberal MP

Sir Charles Dilke commented:

Those of us who have had experience of Lords-Lieutenant have some doubt as to their ability in military matters. There is one Lord-Lieutenant at this moment whose only military exploit was driving his motor car through a unit of the Regular Army; and when the Commanding Officer spoke to him he said that it was impossible for him to stop the car, and that that was only the second time he had done it!11

Despite the doubts of parliamentarians suspicious of this particular aspect of Haldane's

programme of reform, there was an inherent practical value inherent in his placing these

local men of distinction as heads of CountyAssociations. In presenting his 1907 Army

Estimates, the Secretary of State remarked that:

It is not merely for the old technical and constitutional reason that the lord lieutenant is the military representative of the Crown in the County...it is that we feel that he is the link with the landowners of the County, and it is from the landowners we hope to get much help and great saving to the public in our new organisation.12

The placing of these men—who Haldane describes in terms of historical precedent—in a

position of influence over the Associations speaks to continuity, albeit forced. It was

10Hansard, 4th ser., vol. 176 (1907), col. 1290; Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, s.v. "Legh, Thomas Wodehouse, second Baron Newton (1857-1942)." uHansard, 4th ser., vol. 172 (1907), col. 122. In his later political career, Dilke took a keen interest in military matters and had hoped to be appointed as Secretary of State for War, the position Haldane had been offered instead. More recent accounts of his life include: Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, s.v. "Dilke, Sir Charles Wentworth, second baronet (1843-1911)"; David Nicholls, The lost prime minister: a life of Sir Charles Dilke (London: Hambledon Press, 1995). nHansard, 4th ser., vol. 169 (1907), col. 1304.

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hoped that such men, in their dual roles as AssociationPresidents and Lord-Lieutenants,

would actively use their influence to promote the Territorial Force in their respective

counties. When applied to Glasgow, that responsibility fell upon the Lord Provosts.

Through their high status, these men were afforded an influence that was widely felt

throughout the city. The Lord Provost was selected from peers in the Town Council for a

three-year term. Upon taking office, he was also considered Lord Lieutenant of the

County of the City. By the turn of the century, the Lord Provost was:

ex officio a member of all the Committees of the Council.. .by courtesy entitled to a seat on all the principal boards at which the Town Council is represented...there is scarcely a society or institution in Glasgow...which does not consider it has a

13 claim on his services, patronage and assistance.

From the perspective of the Territorial Force, this influence was especially important in

terms of securing the support of private employers—a crucial segment of local society as

will be discussed later in this chapter. In this regard, the scheme in Glasgow met

particularly fortunate circumstances in that there existed a culture in which businessmen

participated heavily in city politics. "They were anxious to serve the city and considered

their election a great personal honour."14Further, as Maver cites, party politics were not a

major factor in local municipal affairs. 15This civic culture may stem from what R.J.

Morris describes as a part of Scottish values that placed a "higher regard for community

l3James Bell and James Paton, Glasgow: Its Municipal Organization and Administration. (Glasgow: James MacLehose and Sons, 1896), 71. The dual role afforded these men stems from County reform in 1889, which allowed Glasgow to obtain 'County of the city' status in 1893. See Maver, "Glasgow's Civic Government," 467. 14Bernard Aspinwall "Glasgow trams and American politics, 1894-1914," Scottish Historical Review 56, no. 161-162(1977): 75. 15Maver, "Glasgow's Civic Government," 442.

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and locality as a basis for action than the English."16 This pattern of active involvement

in local affairs ensured that "prior to 1914 the Corporation was overwhelmingly

17

dominated by businessmen."

The result of this established culture of civic service was that the Lord-

Lieutenants of Glasgow in the years 1908-1914 were in their respective rights not only

political leaders, but also men who had deep ties with the city's business and industrial

elite; indeed, this was a social sphere in which they were active members. As shown in

the professional lives of Glasgow's leaders, the rationale behind Haldane's administrative

structures becomes even clearer. The Lord-Lieutenants during these years were key

figures on account of not only their political successes, but also through a combination of

civic endeavours and, most importantly, their standing in the local business community.

Sir William Bilsland, Lord-Lieutenant at the time of Haldane's drawing up and

promotion of his Territorial reforms (1905-1908), was head of Bilsland Brothers, a

baking company that distributed its products throughout Scotland. In civic affairs, he

was a member of the Merchants' House, the Chamber of Commerce, and a number of 18 church and philanthropic groups. Archibald Macinnes Shaw, holding office from 1908-

i 6 R . J . Morris, "Victorian Values in Scotland and England," in Victorian Values. A Joint Symposium of the Royal Society of Edinburgh and the British Academy, December 1990, ed. T.C. Smout (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), 41. 17Irene Maver, "Glasgow's Municipal Workers and Industrial Strife," in Roots of Red Clydeside 1910-1914?Labour Unrest and Industrial Relations in West Scotland eds. William Kenefick and Arthur Mclvor (Edinburgh: John Donald, 1996), 216. 18Eyre-Todd, 15-16. Also of note was that Bilsland was an innovator in his trade, for his firm was the first in UK to adopt mechanized baking methods. See: Anthony Slaven and Sydney Checkland, eds., Dictionary of Scottish Business Biography, 1860-1960: Volume 2. Processing, Distribution, Services. (Aberdeen University Press, 1990), 3, 20; Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, s.v. "Bilsland, Sir William, first baronet (1847-1921)."

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1911, was an industrialist by profession, having inherited his father's business. He was

sole partner of Shaw &Macinnes, at Firhill Ironworks, which also included the Scotstoun

Foundry. His standing amongst his peers was evident in his serving as President of the

Scottish Employers' Federation of Iron and Steel Founders'Associations.19 Sir Daniel

Macaulay Stevenson, Lord-Lieutenant from 1911-1914, was an accomplished

20

businessman in the coal exporting trade. This strong background in business is of

significance, as a continual worry to those seeking vibrant a part-time soldiering

movement was the presence ofdisinterested or even hostile employers. The high status

afforded Lord-Lieutenants within the CountyAssociations can be seen as a conscious

effort on the part of Haldane to counteract this formidable obstacle to his scheme's

success.In the case of Glasgow, the city's Lord-Lieutenants during these years were men

of high standing amongst their peers, and by virtue of their position could promote 21

reform to a key, yet traditionally sceptical audience.

The relationship between the heads of Glasgow's city government and the local

Territorial Association was further buoyed by the respective personal backgrounds of the

Lord-Lieutenants of this period. In particular, while the rank-and-file of the Volunteer

19Eyre-Todd, 189. 20Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, s.v. "Stevenson, Sir Daniel Macaulay, baronet (1851-1944)."Despite his anti-militarist stance, Stevenson (especially in the First World War) "loyally played the played the part of civic figurehead, especially in the city's recruitment drive for the armed forces." 21 It is to be said that the overlapping memberships and allegiances of these men was a regular phenomenon. According to Martin Daunton "It was common for members of the elite to cross the boundaries between local government, philanthropy and business or professional Associations. They could also mingle in the neutral world of choral societies, music festival, the Volunteers, the court of the university, golf club or Masons." See: Martin Daunton, "Introduction," in The Cambridge Urban History of Britain: Volume III, 1840-1950, ed. Martin Daunton (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 43.

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Force in Glasgow was comprised of skilled workers, their officers tended to be men of

higher social class. For instance, the First Lanark Rifles claimed both Lord Kelvin and

22

future Prime Minister Henry Campbell-Bannerman as members. In this light, it should

not be unexpected that at some point the city's leading politicianswould also belong to

the Volunteers. The one example of such in the early years of the Territorial Force,

Archibald Macinnes Shaw served as Lieutenant-Colonel in the First Lanarkshire Garrison

artillery Volunteers, with whom he had "29 years' service, holding the V.D. and Long 23

Service Medal."" After 1908 Shaw was honorary colonel of the Fourth Lowland

(Howitzer) Brigade Royal Field Artillery.

In his capacity as President of the CountyAssociation, the Lord-Lieutenant was

required to fulfill a number of duties. He presided over monthly meetings, and as its

most prominent official, he acted as an ambassador for the city's Territorial Force, both

within the community and to other locales. As shown in Chapter Two, William Bilsland

responded favourably to the King's plea for assistance, and acted to alleviate concerns

amongst Glasgow's Volunteers. His replacement, Macinnes Shaw, carried out similar

duties, most of which centered on recruiting efforts. In one instance, in 1909 the Lord-

Lieutenant instructed the CountyAssociation to insert an "appeal by him in the various

newspapers."24Over a year later he was again asked to issue a personal appeal for

22David Martin, The Fifth Battalion the Cameronians (Scottish Rifles) 1914-1919 (Glasgow: Jackson, Son & Co., 1936), xvi. 23Eyre-Todd, 189. 24Minutes of Glasgow Territorial Forces Association: Recruiting, Clothing, Ranges and Horses (1908-1912), March 23, 1909, MD10/15, NAS. The appeal was issued March 13.

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25 recruits. In another instance, it was suggested that a circular bearing the Lord-

Lieutenant's signature be issued to existing Territorials "asking them to use their

26

influence to obtain recruits for the Territorial Force." With the intention of arousing

interest in the Force by way of a royal review, Shaw was tasked with contacting both his

counterpart in Edinburgh as well as the Secretary of State for War to enquire as to the

possibility of such an event taking place.27 The matter of setting up this event to

maintain, if not build upon numbers, was again forwarded by the CountyAssociation,

who "unanimously agreed to recommend that the Lord Provost be requested to approach 28

the proper authorities regarding the matter." Within the city limits, the Lord-Lieutenant

was also valuable in the planning and execution of recruiting marches. Plans for a 1910

route march throughout the city required his approval, not only in his capacity as 29

AssociationPresident, but also as head of local government. A year earlier, the

CountyAssociation'srecruiting committee "unanimously agreed.. .to convey to the Lord-

Lieutenant the thanks of the Association for the great assistance he had given in making

the arrangements and for the trouble which he had taken" in having organized a similar . 30

event.

Aside from the Lord-Lieutenant's role as head of the CountyAssociation, the city

corporation's assistance was also apparent through its financial assistance. Although its 25Ibid, December 27, 1910. 26Minutes of Glasgow Territorial Forces Association, April 25, 1913, MD10/6, NAS. 27Minutes of Glasgow Territorial Forces Association: Recruiting, Clothing, Ranges and Horses, January 24, 1909; February 25, 1909, NAS. 28Minutes of Glasgow Territorial Forces Association, March 21, 1911, MD10/4, NAS. 29Minutes of Glasgow Territorial Forces Association: Recruiting, Clothing, Ranges and Horses, January 25, 1910, NAS. 30Ibid., March 23, 1909.

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support did exist prior to Haldane's reforms, this was intensified after April 1908. The

machinery of local government was a powerful ally, for on account of the sophistication

31

of its administrative structures, the city could marshal significant resources. Like

Archibald Macinnes Shaw's initiatives, corporation support was directed towards

recruitment, retention, and improvement. For the 1910 royal review in Edinburgh, the

City "unanimously resolved to.. .defray the cost of the colours for the Glasgow 32

regiments." The emphasis within the Territorial Force towards sports and physical

fitness was evidenced in the city government's support for such gatherings. In that same

year, the city corporation sponsored an annual challenge trophy "among the various 33

Territorial Corps under the administration" of the Glasgow Territorial Association. To

foster an expanded knowledge of military science, at the Association's behest, the Head

Librarian ordered forty-seven volumes on the subject to be held at the city's Mitchell

Library.34

While these measures indicate a genuine interest in the Territorial Force's success

in Glasgow, the most prominent means of furthering the cause of home defence was in

the corporation's policy towards its workers. With a mature, highly developed

infrastructure that encompassed a variety of public services, the city corporation was a 31 Irene Maver, "A (North) British end-view: the comparative experience of municipal employees and services in Glasgow (1800-1950)," in Municipal Services and Employees in the Modern City, eds. Michele Dagenais, Irene Maver and Pierre-Yves Saunier (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003), 177. 32Minutes of the Corporation of Glasgow, April 1909-November 1909 (Glasgow: Robert Anderson, 1909),1473. 33Minutes of the Corporation of Glasgow, November 1909-April 1910 (Glasgow: Robert Anderson, 1910), 1131. At a May 21, 1910 meeting, design proposals were evaluated, with the successful entry by silversmiths Messrs. W & R Sorley(1545). 34Minutes of the Corporation of Glasgow, May 1908-November 1908 (Glasgow: Robert Anderson, 1908), 2545.

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major employer in this period.35 Less than two months into the new system, the city

resolved that certain accommodations be granted to such men. It further agreed "to be

added to the list of representative employers of labour in the city who have agreed to

give, to their employees who are members of the Territorial Force, facilities for fulfilling

36

the requirements of the Force." This commitment entailed continued payment of wages

for men at camp, the protection of holidays and the basic guarantee of employment. An

example of this policy being put into practice is the 1913 case of employees taking part in

the yearly exercises. Referring to the May 22, 1908 minute, the City Librarian reported 37

that "two of his assistants had spent the whole of their fortnight's holiday in camp."

After consideration, it was recommended that these two assistants be granted an extra

holiday of one week. Through these facilities, it was clear that the city corporation was a

supportive employer for its citizen-soldiers. By virtue of the size of its workforce, such a

commitment can be seen as a powerful endorsement for the Territorial scheme—one

which as will be shown—other employers to varying degrees emulated.

Lastly, interested parties from within the local government apparatus aided in the

CountyAssociation'sefforts to build up its establishment figures. Specifically, this

entailed the encouragement of recruits from among city workers. The Glasgow

Tramways department was the most notable example of this form of active promotion. 35Maver, "Glasgow's Municipal Workers and Industrial Strife," 214. As Maver also writes, in the period 1833-1912 "the municipal bureaucracy expanded to cater for the extensive range of services available to Glaswegians - from the great utilities of water, gas and electricity, through police and public health provision, to recreational facilities like parks, libraries and art galleries." Maver, "Glasgow's Civic Government," 441. 36Minutes of the Corporation of Glasgow, May 1908-November 1908, 1546. 31Minutes of the Corporation of Glasgow, April 1913-November 1913 (Glasgow: Robert Anderson, 1913), 2239.

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The city's flagship transportation unit was created in 1894, and served as a symbol for

late Victorian municipal development.38By 1909 the city boasted an extensive network of

cars and track—a system eclipsed only by that of London. It was an efficient operation

and boasted yearly surpluses.39 With a staff in excess of 5,000 employees, it was also a

potential pool of willing entrants into the Territorial Force. The pivotal figure in bringing

these men into uniform was department manager James Dalrymple. A world-renowned

expert on civic transportation, Dalrymple was committed to the cause of home defence in

Glasgow, as evidenced in him being a former member of the First Lanark Rifle

Volunteers.40 His enthusiasm for part-time soldiering continued after the 1908 reforms, as

through his efforts a number of his traffic staff were enrolled into the Force. The process

by which this occurred is revealed in the minutes of the CountyAssociation's recruiting

committee. At a January 1909 meeting, a letter from Dalyrmple was read before the

Recruiting Committee stating that he was willing to grant leave for Camp to 400 of his

traffic staff, provided "special arrangements can be made for the men attending drills at

hours which would be convenient for their work."41 Upon invitation, he appeared at that

meeting and (likely from his Volunteer experience) offered suggestions as to what corps

would be cooperative to such an agreement. With the prospect of a large number of men

38 William Smart, "Glasgow and its Municipal Industries," The Quarterly Journal of Economics 9, no. 2 (January 1895): 190-191. For further information on the growth of the Tramways Department, see: The Corporation of the City of Glasgow, Handbook on the Municipal Enterprises (Glasgow: Robert Anderson, 1904), 125-130. 39The profits of the Corporation's Tramways Department was even viewed—albeit tentatively so—as a means by which tax rates could be subsidized. Maver, "Glasgow's Civic Government," 475. 40Eyre Todd, under "Who's Who in Glasgow in 1909," http://gdl.cdlr.strath.ac.uk/eyrwho/eyrwho0502.htm (accessed May 3, 2010); Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, s.v. "Dalrymple, James (1859-1934)"; Maver, "Glasgow Municipal Workers and Industrial Strife," 225. 41Minutes of Glasgow Territorial Forces Association, January 21, 1909, MD10/2, NAS.

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http://gdl.cdlr.strath.ac.uk/eyrwho/eyrwho0502.htm

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joining the Force, the committee without delay contacted the commanding officers of five

battalions to "ascertain if they could undertake to give the facilities required."42 After

further consultation, it was agreed that the following arrangement be intimated to Mr.

Dalrymple:

In place of the arrangements formerly made for tramway men joining certain corps that the 4th Scottish Rifles and 4th H.L.I, should be given the opportunity of forming special companies for tramway men and that any men who wish to join other corps should be allowed to do so.43

The addition of these men was certainly a boost to recruitment efforts, a main concern to

Territorial administrators throughout this period. As will be discussed at the conclusion

of this study, the culture of amateur soldiering established within the Tramways

Department would be later expressed in the First World War, as part of a wider

movement of creating 'Pals' battalions within Kitchener's New Army, and Tramway men

would ultimately form their own unit for active duty overseas.44Although Dalrymple's

personal experience likely played an important role in encouraging his workers to serve

in the Territorial Force, an examination of private employers later in this chapter will

show that workplace paternalism may have been an even more powerful motivating

factor.

42Minutes of Glasgow Territorial Forces Association: Recruiting, Clothing, Ranges and Horses, January 21, 1909, NAS. 43Minutes of Glasgow Territorial Forces Association: Recruiting, Clothing, Ranges and Horses, February 25, 1909; March 2, 1909, NAS. 44 Peter Simpkins, Kitchener's Army: The Raising of the New Armies, 1914-16 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1988), 78.

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In sum, through this multifaceted support, Haldane's nation-in-arms, as applied to

local government, can arguably be considered successful. Although substantial obstacles

existed in the early years of the Territorial Force, by formalizing the role of the Lord-

Lieutenant as President of the CountyAssociation, his reforms ensured that city

government would adopt a more active role in the growth and maintenance of amateur

soldiering in the area. Aside from the personal efforts of the Lord-Lieutenant, this

interest took the form of financial outlays, employee accommodations, and assistance in

recruitment. However, these would only be of limited effect were the Territorial Force

considered in an unflattering light by the organizations representing worker interests. As

the next section will show, peculiarities in the Scottish labour movement and its

Glaswegian membership resulted in the tacit approval of part-time soldiering.

The Labour Aristocracy - the Glasgow Trades Council and Scottish Trades Union Congress

This section examines the relationship between the early Territorial Force in Glasgow

and the city's trade union movement, in particular the Glasgow Trades Council (GTC)

and the Scottish Trades Union Congress (STUC).45 As this chapter focuses on the elites

in local society and their attitude towards the Territorial scheme, it is important to

ascertain the stance held by what can be regarded as Glasgow's labour 'elite': trade

unions and councils. Given a history of domestic tensions between labourists and

military institutions as will be discussed, this is especially relevant given the city's

45 Angela Tuckett, The Scottish Trades Union Congress: The First 80 Years, 1897-1977, (Edinburgh: Mainstream Publishing Company, 1986).

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importance to Scottish organized labour.46As indicated in the introduction of this study,

the working-class character of Glaswegian society was the product of the area's

economy, long based on shipbuilding, and the foundries and factories of the Clyde

region.47 Consequently, the make-up of the city's part-time corps reflected this reality,

dominated by artisans and skilled workers—a pattern that extended up to and beyond the

1908 reforms. In the previous chapter, the particular considerations of the men who

joined the city's early Territorial Force were examined, highlighting the appeal to—and

constraints placed upon—their service by virtue of their economic status. On account of

the practical issues that weighed on part-time soldiers, ascertaining the stance of the

bodies tasked with representing many of the men in their day-to-day enterprises is of

relevance to this study as a whole. An examination of available records such as

administrative minutes and newspapers reveals that although there existed instances of

disagreement amongst local trade unionists towards the Territorial Force, pre-existing ties

to the Volunteer Force again play their part, leading to a view that can best be described

as tacit approval. This is largely the result of a continual dominance of skilled workers

in both the amateur soldering and the leadership of labour movements in Glasgow. This

arrangement speaks to the two major themes of this study—continuity, here shown in

terms of demographics, and an aspect of a nation-in-arms, insofar as civilian labour

46 W. Knox, "The Political and Workplace Culture of The Scottish Working Class, 1832-1914," in People and Society in Scotland II, 1830-1914,eds. W. Hamish Fraser and R.J. Morris (Edinburgh: John Donald, 1990), 152. 47 For example, per Treble's figures, manufacturing accounted for 49% of the occupied male workforce in the Strathclyde region in 1881. By 1911, this figure remained constant at 48%. See: J.H. Treble, "The Occupied Male Labour Force" in People and Society in Scotland II, 1830-1914,eds. W. Hamish Fraser and R.J. Morris (Edinburgh: John Donald, 1990), 195-6.

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interests were represented in the county associations.

Of benefit to the Territorial scheme in Glasgow were the opinions held by the

labour movement in Scotland vis-a-vis their English contemporaries. By the early

twentieth century, the trade union movement in the north largely fell under the umbrella

of the Scottish Trades Union Congress, formed in March 1897 as an independent body to

the British Trades Union Congress (TUC). The former was created in large part due to

the TUC's refusal to admit trades councils (a courtesy only extended to trade unions) in

48

annual meetings. Scottish delegates, citing the increasing cooperation of employer

groups' and the inflexibility of the TUC in response to this threat, sought a means by

which organized labour in Scotland—inclusive of both trade unions and councils—could

form a united, federated body.49 Any notion of an irreconcilable rift must be used with

caution, however, as although the two Congresses remain independent of one another to

this day, from the STUC's foundation there was a substantial amount of overlapping

allegiances. Joining the STUC did not necessarily mean a fracture from the wider British

labour movement, and many continued "without disruption" their affiliation with the

48Tuckett, 21. Unger describes Trade Councils of the period as being more radical than national union executives. As such, more conservative union leaders sought to ban trade councils from the TUC general congress. See: David Charles Unger, The Roots of Red Clydeside: Economic and Social Relations and Working Class Politics in the West of Scotland, 1900-1919 (Ann Arbor: University Microfilms International, 1980), 271. 49Tuckett, 18-19; Arthur J. Mclvor, Organised Capital: Employers' Associations and industrial relations in northern England, 1880-1939 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 67. Mclvor states that employer groups "experienced significant growth over the 1890-1914 period." Further, "The railway companies, coalowners, engineering companies and shipbuilders on Clydeside all developed sophisticated victimization procedures before World War One, coordinated by their employers' Associations." See: Arthur Mclvor and Hugh Patterson, "Combating the Left: Victimisation and Anti-Labour Activities on Clydeside, 1900-1939," in Militant Workers: Labour and Class Conflict on the Clyde 1900-1950. Essays in Honour of Harry McShane (1891-1988), eds. Robert Duncan and Arthur Mcivor(Edinburgh: John Donald, 1992), 132.

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TUC while joining the newer Scottish federation.50 During the initial decades of its

existence, the STUC was an advocate of a variety of issues of importance to the working-

class it represented, including wages, job security, worker health and safety, and housing.

To promote its agenda, the STUC was also active in local and national politics,

particularly in support of Labour candidates for parliament. Though the STUC was

disregarded in British politics (with the Labour Party and TUC exercising the greatest

influence amongst workers' groups), and not encompassing all organized labour in

Scotland, it nonetheless claimed a significant number of affiliates.51 By the inauguration

of the Territorial scheme in 1908, the STUC was in a weakened state, owing to declining

economic fortunes, particularly in the Clydeside industries. But the heavy influence of

Glasgow on the STUC should not be understated—"Even by 1914 over 58 percent of all

52

delegates to the STUC general congress came from this area."

Closer to home, the Glasgow Trades Council (GTC) was the most prominent

labour organization in the city. It was founded in 1858 with the aim of improving the

condition of Glasgow's working class. By the turn of the century, the GTC, along with

trade councils across Scotland, involved itself in political advocacy and the greater

50James Craigen, "The Scottish T.U.C.—Scotland's Assembly of Labour," in Forward! Labour Politics in Scotland 1888-1988,eds. Ian Donnachie, Christopher Harvie and Ian S. Wood (Edinburgh: Polygon, 1989), 130. Another reason for the emergence of separate labour entities lay in politics, with the liberal-leaning TUC suspicious of what would eventually become an ILP-influenced STUC leadership. 51Craigen, 131.Craigen cites cost and distance as compelling reasons why many small unions did not join the TUC. 52 Arthur Mclvor and William Kenefick, "Introduction," in Roots of Red Clydeside 1910-1914? Labour Unrest and Industrial Relations in West Scotland,eds. William Kenefick and Arthur Mclvor (Edinburgh: John Donald, 1996), 36.

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53

unionization of Clydeside trades. It provided an important venue for addressing social,

industrial and political matters affecting the city's skilled workforce.54 By the

earlytwentieth century, the Trades Council was comprised of "over one hundred unions,

most of them small...The combined membership of these unions was close to one

hundred thousand."55 Consequently, the GTC was been regarded during this period as

one of the strongest trades council in Britain during this period, as "over 400 delegates

met weekly, from all trades in the Clyde area, to discuss local and national affairs."56

The GTC shared many of the same objectives as the wider body, including unionization

of unskilled workers, investigations into the cost of living, and of course, the support of 57 striking members. Indeed, the Trades Council's period of greatest activity coincided

58

with the initial years of the Territorial scheme, a period of high unemployment.

However, while sharing a common objective in promoting worker interests, these two

bodies differed politically. Whereas the STUC leaned more towards the radical

53 William Kenefick, Red Scotland! The Rise and Fall of the Radical Left, c. 1872-1932 (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2007) 10-11; J.J.Smyth, Labour in Glasgow, 1896-1936. Socialism, Suffrage, Sectarianism (East Linton, Scotland: Tuckwell Press, 2000), 6-7. 54Craigen, 131. "Unger, 272. 56 Mclvor and Kenefick, "Introduction," 21. Robert Middlemas describes the GTC as "probably the most powerful in 1906." Robert Keith Middlemas, TheClydesiders: A Left Wing Struggle for a Parliamentary Power (London: Hutchinson & Co., 1965), 42. 57Unger, 271. For an example of efforts to unionize various trades, the representation of Clyde dockworkers in 1911, see William Kenefick "A Struggle for Control: The Importance of the Great Unrest at Glasgow Harbour, 1911 to 1912," in Roots of Red Clydeside 1910-1914? Labour Unrest and Industrial Relations in West Scotland,sds. William Kenefick and Arthur Mclvor (Edinburgh: John Donald, 1996), 129-152. Interest in the unskilled was not universally held within the Scottish labour movement. Knox comments that "the slum dweller, the unskilled and the poor were ignored, as they were incapable of attaining the status of respectability. Forward praised itself for note being read in the slums of Glasgow." This further demonstrates an overall emphasis on the artisan class rather than unskilled labour. See: W. Knox, "The Political and Workplace Culture of the Scottish Working Class, 1832-1914," 153. 58Middlemass, 51

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Independent Labour (ILP)-supporting STUC, Scottish trades councils were "dominated

as they were by a Presbyterian, politically liberal, artisan elite."59 This, however, was not

a barrier to the area's Irish, Catholic workers, who were accepted as readily as their

Scottish, Protestant neighbours.60 While the STUC acted to give voice to the wider labour

movement, the GTC's position in Scotland's industrial centre enabled it to wield a real

sway in worker affairs.

Organized labour in the Second City of Empire reflected the movement as a

whole in Scotland. According to Kenefick, this local, decentralized character was a

hallmark feature of organized labour in early twentieth century Scotland. While bodies

such as the Glasgow-dominated STUC represented a broad coalition of workers' groups,

much of the actual influence was exercised at the branch level by unions and trades

councils such as the GTC.01 This was widely regarded as the preferred structure of

organized labour in Scotland, as prior to 1914 there was a conscious effort to "maintain

and even extend" this traditional model of "independent trade unionism within the more

62

localized and federal Scottish structure." The movement in Glasgow, however,

remained largely the domain of the skilled workers; by 1914, trade unions had only made 59Kenefick, Red Scotland!, 14, 80. On a similar note, Craigen also discusses the political differences between the STUC and TUC (Craigen, 130). The ILP (Independent Labour Party), formed in 1893 was a socialist political party and precursor to the modern-day Labour Party. According to Checkland "Indeed the ILP had a strong place in Glasgow." See: S.G. Checkland, TheUpas Tree: Glasgow, 1875-1975 (Glasgow: University of Glasgow Press, 1976), 30. For more information regarding the formation of the ILP, see: W. Hamish Fraser, Scottish Popular Politics: From Radicalism to Labour (Edinburgh: Polygon, 2000), 150-152; David Howell, British Workers and the Independent Labour Party, 1888-1906 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1983). On its first leader KeirHardie see: Caroline Benn, KeirHardie (London: R.Cohen Books, 1997); Fred Reid, KeirHardie: the making of a socialist (London: Croom Helm, 1978). 60Kenefick, Red Scotland!, 80. 61Ibid„ 8. 62McIvor and Kenefick, "Introduction," 21.

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limited inroads to the female and unskilled labour sectors.63 This is important to an

understanding of the relationship between the amateur soldiering movement and trade

unionism, as they were dominated by the same demographic.

The first decade and a half of the twentieth century was a period of unease within

British labour relations. Economic distress in turn led to significant industrial unrest

during these years. The "rising strike propensity of the later nineteenth and early

twentieth centuries," throughout Britain was influential in the formulation of Haldane's

Territorial scheme.64 The animosity on the part of organized labour, particularly south of

the border, towards the Territorial Force was evident at an early juncture. The fear was

that it could be used towards the forceful protection of conservative, capitalist society; for

example, in the suppression of strikes.65 Indeed, the 1900s witnessed employers

responding to industrial action "in an increasingly hostile and autocratic way."66 Though

the Volunteers were never used in such a capacity, the previous century saw the

Yeomanry and Militia being periodically turned to during instances of civil disorder.

Given this historical precedent, there was reasonable suspicion that a reformed auxiliary

force could be used in a similar matter, particularly considering the period's industrial

strife. To alleviate such fears, the 1907 Territorial and Reserve Forces Act explicitly

prohibited the use of the Territorials in any domestic dispute. According to the 1908

63 Arthur Mclvor, "Were Clydeside Employers More Autocratic?," in Roots of Red Clydeside 1910-1914? Labour Unrest and Industrial Relations in West Scotland,eds. William Kenefick and Arthur Mclvor (Edinburgh: John Donald, 1996), 49. 64McIvor,Organised Capital, 115. 65Dennis, 16. 66McIvor,Organised Capital, 116.

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Territorial Regulations: "Officers and soldiers of the Territorial Force are not liable to be

67

called out in the aid of the civil power as a military body in the preservation of peace."

William Thorne, one of the first Labour MPs, asked Haldane for clarification in this

matter, with the War Minister assuring him that the Territorials could not be used in 68

strikebreaking. This sentiment was later reiterated at the local level, as shown in

promotional materials published in Scotland. In a 1909 recruitment pamphlet The

Territorial Army—What it is, And why you should join it, the Edinburgh

CountyAssociation stated emphatically that:

The Territorial Army cannot be called out as a military body to suppress riots or to preserve the peace.. .There is no obligation.. .to aid the civil power.. .When this duty is required, the Territorial soldier.. .is under no greater obligation than any other citizen.69

Despite such assertions, as Clydeside (and most of Britain, for that matter) entered

a period of widespread strike actions preceding 1914, there remained the possibility that

civil power of any sort could be used in a fashion antagonistic to workers; that the ILP

organ Forward had consistently labelled Mr. Haldane a "warlord" suggests a continued

70

suspicion to his scheme. Surprisingly, however, Glasgow Territorial Association

recruiting pamphlets do not broach the subject of strike-breaking or similar anti-labour 71 practices. From an opposite perspective, the Territorial Force garners no specific

61 Regulations for the Territorial Force, 36. 6iHansard, 4th ser., vol. 193 (1908), col. 856. 69 Territorial Forces Association of the City of Edinburgh, The Territorial Army, 14, 18. 70 Forward, January 11, 1908; February 22, 1908. 71 Most literature from the Glasgow Territorial Association (or from individuals attached to that

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mention in the radical newspaper Forward, or within STUC or GTC minutes during these

crucial years. This silence is unexpected, considering not only the number of labour

disputes during these years, but also that is starkly contrasts opinion elsewhere in Britain:

for example, the TUC denounced Haldane, referring to him as a liar. It further resolved

to express its "emphatic condemnation of any indirect or direct compulsory enlistment of

the working classes into the Territorial Forces, and also condemns the regulations which

72

permit these forces to be used in suppressing trade disputes." The lack of specific

attention paid by the area's labour elite can be seen as the product of a longstanding

approach on the part of organized labour towards part-time soldiering, which took on a

'"very rigid neutrality'"; they could not actively support a force that was part of the

industrial/capital establishment, but criticisms had to be muted, for fear of alienating their

membership, many of whom belonged to both movements.73 Much of this pattern can be

seen in Glasgow, as evidenced by the content and tone of administrative minutes of the

GTC and STUC, but additional local factors which also weighed heavily on this

neutrality.

For those active in organized labour, there was a justified suspicion of the

Territorial scheme, based on decades of industrial strife. In the three decades preceding

the First World War the military was occasionally employed against civilians.74 Soldiers

organization) instead centers on debates as to whether a system of compulsory service be instituted, arguing the inherent flaws in adopting European-style methods of raising an army. See: Glasgow County Association, Voluntary Service. 72Glasgow Herald, September 8, 1909. "Cunningham, 74-75. 74Charles Townshend, "Military Force and Civil Authority in the United Kingdom, 1914-1921," The Journal of British Studies 28, no.3 (July 1989): 263. By the late-nineteenth century "the dependence of the

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fired upon locked out miners at Featherstone in November 1887, killing two bystanders

75 and injuring another dozen. In Wales, the military was involved in the 1910 Tonypandy

76

riots, which were characterized by its exceptional violence. In all, in the period between

1869 and 1908, the military was called out to quell civil unrest on twenty-four occasions 77

in England and Wales. Despite such ominous expressions of force, the situation in

Scotland was less hostile than that experienced south of the border. Nevertheless, during 78

the TF's early years an "unprecedented industrial militancy in Britain" took place.

Scotland was no stranger to such discord. This period was marked by widespread

industrial disputes throughout the country. A downturn in trade, particularly in the staple

industries of shipbuilding and heavy engineering meant that "economic malaise on

Clydeside was much deeper than in other areas of Britain, and that between 1907 and 79

1910 unemployment on Clydeside was felt in almost every trade." Workers took action

in response to the wider forces of stagnating wages and rising prices. As mechanization

was introduced in production lines, the spectre of unemployment came upon once-secure

authorities on the army had diminished but had not disappeared" (264). 75Spiers, Army and Society, 219. 76Tonypandy saw the use of troops to quell rioting strikers. In addition to one miner killed at Tonypandy, "two strikers were shot dead at Llanelli and another two were killed by troops in Liverpool.. .Clearly, the degree of violence employed by the agents of social control was far in excess of that resorted to by the workers." See: Roger Geary, Policing Industrial Disputes, 1893 to 1985 (London: Methuen, 1986), 27 ,47. In another such instance, soldiers charged a crowd at Chesterfield with bayonets fixed. See: Anthony Babington, Military Intervention in Britain: from the Gordon Riots to the Gibraltar Incident (London: Routledge, 1990), 141. 77Spiers, Late Victorian Army, 210. 78 Glasgow Labour History Workshop, "Roots of Red Clydeside: The Labour Unrest in West Scotland, 1910-14," in Roots of Red Clydeside 1910-1914? Labour Unrest and Industrial Relations in West Scotland,eds. William Kenefick and Arthur Mclvor (Edinburgh: John Donald, 1996), 18. 79Kenefick, Red Scotland!, 89.

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80 skilled workers. Strike activity in the West of Scotland had affected a broad range of

81 major industries, leading to many thousands of lost workdays. Employers responded

with a variety of tactics, such as using non-union labour, blacklisting strikers, threatening

82

lockouts, and making full use of police protection to defend their interests. Yet, in

Scotland, the military was employed less frequently. This resulted in a reduced

apprehension of the role of local amateur soldiers and thus, less criticism of Haldane's

scheme in that regard compared to elsewhere in the United Kingdom.

Another mitigating factor lay in the membership of countyassociations. As we

have seen, creating an administrative structure that placed Lords Provost in an integral

role acted as a means of drawing local government into the scheme—a similar ploy was

employed with regard to organized labour. With the clear recognition of working-class

participation in the Volunteer Force, Haldane's nation-in-arms called for the associations

to also include as members representatives of employers and workers. In contrast to the

old system which was to a great extent directed by the private patronage of men of

business and industry, organized labour was now able to actively participate in the

Territorial Association in each locality. In the period 1908 to 1914, George Carson sat as

the Glasgow Association's representative of labour. Widely known for his capable

stewardship of both the Glasgow Trades Council and the Scottish Trades Union

80W.W. Knox, Industrial Nation: Work, Culture and Society in Scotland, 1800-Present (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1999), 146-147. 81Glasgow Labour History Workshop, "Roots of Red Clydeside: The Labour Unrest in West Scotland, 1910-14," in Militant Workers: Labour and Class Conflict on the Clyde 1900-1950. Essays in Honour of Harry McShane (1891-1988),eds. Robert Duncan and Arthur Mclvor (Edinburgh: John Donald, 1992), 82-83. 82Ibid„ 94.

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Congress, where he served as General Secretary of both, Carson was without question a

leading figure in workingman's politics of the period.83 An advocate of greater working-

class representation in politics, he is described as "the most active member" of the GTC

84

prior to the Great War. As a city councillor representing Maryhill (the site of Glasgow's

main army barracks) his political clout was further felt in local government. His ties with

the Independent Labour Party, as well as the leading bodies of organized labour in the

city, made him arguably the most important person to have placed in such a position. By

virtue of his high profile in the labour movement, Carson's very presence suggests a

conscious effort to ensure that workers' issues and concerns were to be considered in the

Association's proceedings.

Differences of opinion did exist within the GTC as to part-time soldiering. While

such details are not present in official minutes, the Glasgow Heraldr&ported that at

aMarch 31, 1909 meeting of the council, a motion was put forward condemning '"the

spirit of militarism, especially among the young.'"85 One member, Joseph Houghton, in

seconding the proposal, singled out the Territorial Force, arguing that it was

"conscription of the worst possible kind." This view was not shared by all, perhaps

reflecting liberal leanings. One of his colleagues offered a differing opinion, drawing

upon experience in the Volunteers, while another was in favour of a citizen army but

thought that the Council should "condemn the methods adopted by some employers to 83Tuckett, 68-69. The manner in which Mr. Carson is listed as a member of the County Association is revealing, as he is cited as only representing the GTC, and not the STUC. This suggests the greater influence of the former in local organized labour, or that national body representation was not appropriate in this context. 84Fraser, 128. 85Glasgow Herald, April 1, 1909.

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get recruits for the present Territorial Army."86 As will be discussed later in this chapter,

there were certain motivations on the part of employers to encourage their workers to

enlist; indeed the potential to exert pressure on their men may have cast a level of doubt

as to the voluntary element of service. Yet at this meeting, indicative of anti-militarist

sentiment in the wider labour movement, the motion unanimously passed after

discussion.

The expression of such ideals is an aside from the overall pattern evident in the

general outlook of Glasgow's organized labour establishment. Just as matters of wages

and job security factored into the average Territorial's decision to enlist, the STUC, and

even more so the GTC's respective concern was directed more towards practical issues

rather than the theoretical use of the TF—manned mostly by the very same dues-paying

members—as an aid to civil power. In the odd instance when military affairs appear in

official minutes, the continual concern lay in basic employment matters and not army-

aided strikebreaking. For example, the Trades Council decried the popularity of martial

music, as it pitted local musicians against military bands, a complaint regularly echoed at

87

STUC annual meetings. With the outbreak of war, this protectionist stance had also

extended to the victims of war. In GTC minutes, it protested the employment of Belgian

86 Ibid. 87Minutes of the Glasgow Trades Council, September 21, 1910, Mitchell Library, Glasgow.In 1911 it was resolved that "this Congress condemns the practice of Army Bands accepting engagements to the detriment of civilians. And, further, instructs the Parliamentary Committee to have the matter of Army band competition put before the House of Commons or other authorities at an early date." Scottish Trades Union Congress, Fifteenth Annual Report (Glasgow: Civic Press, 1911), 52. The following two years, a similar resolution passed, "carried by a large majority." Scottish Trades Union Congress, Sixteenth Annual Report (Glasgow: Civic Press, 1912), 70; Scottish Trades Union Congress, Seventeenth Annual Report (Glasgow: Civic Press, 1913), 81.

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refugees, resolving that:

This endeavour on the part of the employers to provide work for the Belgians was for the purpose of securing cheap labour and urged the council to protest against such action and that whatever employment might be provided for these people

88 should not be in competition with home labour.

It is also likely that the liberal political affiliations of Glasgow artisans influenced their

perceptions of reform—that rather than posing a threat to class interests, part-time

military service continued to be viewed as an acceptable form of civic participation. On

account of the long-entrenched skilled working-class composition of Glasgow's

Volunteers-turned-Territorials, labour elites were likely to have been especially muted in

any criticisms of the scheme. The artisan class that dominated organized labour in the

city also filled the ranks of the Volunteers and later the Territorial Force; to them it

served as a valuable social outlet, an expression of patriotism, and a possible avenue to

job advancement. Attacking this part-time endeavour ran the risk of alienating a vital

demographic at a time in which the labour movement sought to expand.

Private Employers - the Gatekeepers to Reform

Since the beginnings of the modern amateur soldiering movement in Britain, the overall

success of recruiting and retention was to a great degree dependent upon the attitude of

employers in each locality. The Volunteer era was marked by a particular dichotomy—

on the one hand, this was a movement founded and sustained by the initiative of

88Minutes of the Glasgow Trades Council, October 28, 1914, Mitchell Library. 213

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businessmen. In urban areas such as Glasgow, it was often individual firms that fostered

the creation of Volunteer rifle corps. Examples are numerous, and include shipbuilders

Napier & Sons (Second VBHLI), Edington& Co.'s Phoenix Ironworks, the Edinburgh

and Glasgow Railway (First VBHLI), Inglis and Wakefield's calico and printing works

(Third LRV), and Tennant's Wellpark Brewery (Fourth VBSR).89 This was a pattern

repeated throughout Britain, as "all over the country working men were entering the

Force in financial and organisational dependence on their employers."90 Consequently,

this patronage provided the avenue with which the working men dominated the Volunteer

Force. As discussed in the previous chapter, this phenomenon was especially pronounced

in Glasgow, as through private initiative and demographic realities, skilled workers filled

the Volunteer ranks from the outset. On the other hand, subsequent decades witnessed

this enthusiasm fade in light of the day-to-day concerns associated with a company's

affairs. This trend may have stemmed in large part from the very outlook of the local

business and industrial elite. The importance of artisans was felt, as even into the First

World War, Clydeside employers opted to continue labour-intensive methods, wishing to

maintain strong numbers of skilled labour.91 If supportive, employers were integral in the

fostering of part-time soldiering. Conversely they proved a formidable obstacle if it was

perceived that the movement was not a genuine means of home defence, but rather

89Grierson, 262,258,232, 235. 90Cunningham, 21. 91 Alastair Reid "Dilution, trade unionism and the state in Britain during the First World War." in Shop floor bargaining and the state. Historical and comparative perspectives, eds. Steven Tolliday and Jonathan Zeitlin (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 66.

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09

simply an avenue for recreation. Further, many businessmen came to view the

increased duties required of Volunteers to be a hindrance to the responsibilities of regular

employment; opposition tended to run parallel with training obligations. 93For example

"one of the [anonymous] largest employers of labour" in the city stated bluntly that "he

would never encourage his men to go to camp."94 This hostility towards service was a

contributing factor to men shying away from otherwise enrolling, as penalties, including

job dismissal, could be imposed by their employers.

These concerns remained unchanged with the inauguration of the Territorial

Force. At the inauguration of Haldane's reforms, a Glasgow Herald editorial stated that

"the prosperity of the Territorial Army depends.. .upon the employer of labour. It rests

with him to provide his employees with the opportunity of making themselves fit for

military service."95 While this study has described the potential loss of employment

facing men fulfilling their terms of service, employers in their own right had legitimate

concerns. The predominant complaint was that in allowing skilled workers time off to

fulfill their terms of service, businesses risked being subject to competitive disadvantage.

In the case of smaller firms, Territorial commitments could very well pose a significant

threat to regular operations.96 Four years later, this remained a concern, illustrated by Sir

92Cunningham, 75. In Parliament, one lord observed that "In a great many cases employers now look upon volunteering as only an amusement, and recreation, in which men join for their own pleasure; and, therefore, they naturally are somewhat unwilling to afford their men time." Hansard, 4th ser., vol. 4 (1892), col. 1424. 93 Beckett, Riflemen Form, 101. Indeed, although the requirements of Volunteer service had increased over the decades, this was a gradual process, as employers would not tolerate more drastic moves (130). 94Glasgow Herald, March 7, 1907. 95Ibid., April 1, 1908. 96Mitchinson, England's Last Hope, 56; Glasgow Herald, February 8, 1913.

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Henry Craik in the House of Commons. In a 1912 speech, the MP representing Glasgow

and Aberdeen Universities asked his fellow parliamentarians "what would be the feelings

of the public-spirited employer if he found his business hopelessly crippled for the

benefit of his selfish compeer?"97 Indeed, on these grounds, there were Glasgow

employers not amenable to granting facilities. In an early case (September 1908), the

O.C. Fourth Highland Light Infantry submitted a letter from W & J Bowie, Dyers and

Cleaners, stating their refusal to allow a man in their employment to attend Camp. The

Association's recruiting committee, unable to hold these circumstances against him

"agreed to grant a free discharge to the man if he could not make himself efficient."

Though it would be struck from the record a week later, perhaps to avoid estranging this

and other employers, the committee secretary was further instructed "to remove Messrs

QO

Bowie's name from the list of contractors to the Association." Another example of an

unsympathetic employer was the engineering firm Stewart & Mackenzie, who in 1912

the O.C. FourthLowland Brigade Royal Field Artillery reported as being unable to "allow

two of their employees leave to attend Annual Training in Camp."99 As the Territorial

Force was created in order to supply a more efficient, reliable part-time soldiery than

hitherto, it was necessary to address employer concerns to ensure these aims would be

met.

91 Hansard, 5th ser., vol. 35 (1912), col. 1199. 98Minutes of Glasgow Territorial Forces Association: Recruiting, Clothing, Ranges and Horses, September 29, 1908, NAS. "Minutes of Glasgow Territorial Forces Association, October 24, 1912, MD10/5, NAS.

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To this end, Haldane's concept of a nation-in-arms can be seen as a proactive

strategy, one which at an organizational level sought to includeemployers into the

everyday running of the Territorial Force in each locality. Rather than alienating

reluctant businessmen, they were to be integrated as regular participants; the initial step

being for employer representatives to join as members of CountyAssociations. This was

the product of the same rationale as concerned the previously examined local government

and organized labour—through inclusion and consultation, an atmosphere favourable to

recruiting and retention could be achieved. This strategy met fortunate circumstances.

The culture of civic duty that permeated the city's elite all but ensured that men of stature

would respond to the Association's call. Throughout the early years of the Territorial

Force in Glasgow, Thomas McArly acted as representative of employers. Making his

wealth in calico printing, McArly was retired by the time of his involvement in the

CountyAssociation. Nonetheless, he took an active interest in local affairs, including

membership in "numerous charitable institutions," and reflective of his status in the

Glaswegian business community, was President of the city's Chamber of Commerce.100

This was a body with a rich history. It was founded in 1783, and was the first

organization of its kind in Britain.101 The purpose of this body was to monitor legislation

100Eyre-Todd, 118-119. A characteristic of Victorian and Edwardian Glasgow is the philanthropic initiative of city elites. Given this general pattern McArly's pluralist activities are not unique in themselves. See: Richard H. Trainor, "The Elite," 234. 101Ronald Johnston, Clydeside Capital, 1870-1920: A Social History of Employers (East Linton: Tuckwell Press, 2000), 75. Johnston cautions that it is the first on the British mainland, with a chamber of commerce created on the Isle of Jersey fifteen years prior. For an early history of this organization see: George Stewart, Progress of Glasgow: A Sketch of the Commercial and Industrial Increase of the City during the Last Century, as Shown in the Records of the Glasgow Chamber of Commerce, and other Authentic Documents (Glasgow: John Baird, 1883).

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in parliament, and to facilitate trade abroad. By the late nineteenth century, the Chamber

of Commerce was heavily oriented towards large firms, and in 1906 membership was

extended to employers' organizations. By 1914 it enjoyed 1,200 affiliates, including

many within the top class of Glasgow business elite. In sum, the Chamber is significant

in that it "functioned as a central link in a network of capitalist influence which

102

transcended the industrial the commercial, the social and the political spheres." Given

its substantial ties with a broad range of employers, the presence of the Chamber of

Commerce in the CountyAssociation suggests that the concerns of business were not

ignored. Indeed, a pattern can be seen on the part of the Glasgow Association,

characterized by its attempts to include employers, the consideration of their particular

requirements, and actions taken in response.

With a concrete organizational and financial structure in place via the

CountyAssociation, administrators were able to employ a variety of methods in order to

foster a working dialogue with local businesses. In doing so, it was hoped that through

this process of building and maintaining broad support for the scheme, instances of

uncooperative employers would be kept to a minimum. The

CountyAssociation'sprogramme of publicizing supportive employers was one of the first

means by which it sought to accomplish this. During the first week of the new regime,

itsrecruiting committee drew attention to a poster "signed by employers of labour in

Barrow-in-Furness with reference to giving facilities to their employees who will join the

Territorial Force." It was decided that they should ascertain how such a document could 102Johnston, 79.

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be tailored to "the local circumstances of the County."103 Two weeks later, it was agreed

to recommend to the Association to approach employers and request they sign a notice

stating:

We the undersigned employers of labour in Glasgow and neighbourhood, having carefully considered the Government scheme for home defence under the title of the Territorial Army, are prepared to give all reasonable facilities to our employees who are or may become members of the force to carry out the duties required of them.

The various branches of the Service represented in Glasgow offer interesting and useful training for those engaged in all kinds of occupations and we therefore commend the Scheme to the favourable consideration of all eligible young

104 men.

This idea of a notice sent to employers appears to have had an appeal, as further

references to this are shown in the ensuing weeks.105 Its effectiveness is later suggested

in that in a year's time arrangements were made "for the re-issuing of the posters signed

by employers of labour" and for the promotion of this notice in order to obtain further

signatures.106 The recruiting committee agreed that for a period of four weeks,

advertisements would be placed in the city's newspapers asking "other employers to

107 allow their names to be added to the notice."

103Minutes of Glasgow Territorial Forces Association: Recruiting, Clothing, Ranges and Horses, April 7, 1908, NAS. 104Ibid., April 23, 1908. I05Ibid.,April 27, 1908; May 17, 1908. 106Ibid.,January 8, 1909; January 21, 1909. Unfortunately, it is unknown which employers signed this notice. 107Ibid.,January 24, 1909.

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Even with such dialogue in place, cooperation was far from guaranteed. To

assure sceptical employers that their Territorial employees were spending their camp

period at the stated function, the Association considered issuing a certificate of

attendance, concluding that such a document "would be of great advantage not only to

employers who pay their employees wages during Camp, but also to employers who

grant facilities to their men to attend Camp."108 Following a War Office request, the

Glasgow Association assessed the opinion of large employers as to a standard form for

Territorial units asking for camp leave. It was found that employers in various parts of

the County were "generally in favour of the proposal," though according to War Office

directives, use of the form was purely optional, and "not to be used when thought to be

undesirable."109

Another tactic in earning the support of employers involved direct consultation so

that particular concerns could be aired. By late 1912, with the lapsing of original 1908

enlistments on the horizon, the CountyAssociation was particularly active to prevent a

severe decline in strength. A meeting in December of that year with employer

representatives over "various questions affecting the Territorial Force" was held. It was

reported that amongst the views expressed, the most prominent issue was the annual

camp period. Employers stated that the annual Glasgow Fair Holidays was "the most

suitable time for employers allowing their men to attend Camp;" clearly so, as this was

108Minutes of Glasgow Territorial Forces Association, October 10, 1911, NAS.The original idea was from an unspecified 'large London firm' (October 3, 1911). 109Minutes of Glasgow Territorial Forces Association, November 15, 1912, NAS.

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time off they were already giving their workers!110 Further, like many of their men,

employers found the ideal fifteen days' training was from their perspective "rather

inconvenient." Despite this criticism, it was put forward that "employers should be asked

to instruct their foremen to allow Territorials leave to attend Camp whenever

possible."111 However, the effect of these opinions was evident in that 1912 camp was

held during the traditional summer holiday.112 This acquiescence to employer demands,

while suggesting a strong dialogue between business interests and the

CountyAssociation, also speaks to the power of employers in regulating the time of their

workers.

Previous studies into the early Territorial Force have generally highlighted

varying tensions between CountyAssociations and area employers.113Contemporary

Glasgow evidence suggests otherwise—that the active interaction between Association

and business generally had a positive effect on Territorial operations. Yet these efforts

were not sustained in perpetuity. At a 1910 Glasgow Association meeting, members

considered proposals calling for the establishment of Employer Associations in each

County who gave facilities—time off to fulfill their obligation, with or without pay, and

without fear of dismissal. It was concluded that "in view of the success of the measures

taken by the Association last year in approaching employers in the County it would be

u 0The Glasgow Fair Holiday traditionally took place during the last fortnight of July. 111 Ibid., December 20, 1912. A further meeting took place January 27, 1913. ulGlasgow Herald, March 19, 1912. 113 For example, see: Dennis, 27.

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inexpedient to do anything further in the meantime."114 This stance was further reiterated

in 1913, when the question was raised amongst administrators whether there was a way

in which businesses that "are in sympathy with the Territorial Force" could be publicly

recognized.115 After months of consideration, it was concluded that "in view of the large

number of employers who grant facilities, and the difficulty in preparing a complete list,

it was decided not to publish any list."116This may have been the result of a number of

considerations—a desire to not place excessive pressure on local employers, a substantial

pre-existing level of support amongst businessmen, fear of excluding those who do offer

facilities, or even a hesitancy towards alienating possible future supporters.

While Association records only give sporadic mention to specific employers,

instances of support outnumbered those of opposition, suggesting that the latter—though

always a concern— may very well have been the minority opinion. In one instance in

1909, the father of a man named 'Hanson' complained to the CountyAssociation,

believing that his son was sacked for camp attendance the previous summer. Responding

to this allegation, the Grocer Mr. James Cook denied any unfavourable treatment on

those grounds, in a letter insisting that the dismissal "had nothing to do with his going to

Camp."117 A month later, the dynamite manufacturer Nobel's Explosives, whose head

office was located in Glasgow, informed the Association's recruiting committee that they

114Minutes of Glasgow Territorial Forces Association, April 26, 1910, MD10/3, NAS 115Minutes o f Glasgow Territorial Forces Association, March 26, 1913, NAS. u6Ibid.,December 24, 1913. The advertising of supportive firms was already practiced elsewhere. One such example is the Edinburgh Association's recruiting pamphlet listing a host of banks, insurance companies, and commercial firms who were willing to offer facilities. See: Edinburgh County Association, The Territorial Army, 45-46. 117Minutes of Glasgow Territorial Forces Association: Recruiting, Clothing, Ranges and Horses, January 24, 1909, NAS.

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1 i o

had issued a notice "recommending their employees to join the Territorial Force."

Captain James C. Campbell (Fifth Scottish Rifles) provided a letter detailing a September

resolution by the West of Scotland Retail Drapers Association "signed by a large number

of well known members of the trade agreeing to give facilities to men in their

employment who join the Territorial Force." In response to this expression of support,

the Committee proposed "to advertise the resolution at the commencement of next

recruiting season."119 An October 1910 letter from the Albion Motor Car Company

informed the Association that a notice was placed in its works declaring that "certain

rates of pay" would be granted to apprentices for Camp attendance.120 Albion's

commitment was later confirmed in March 1913, when they announced that "they grant

special facilities and inducements to their men who join the Territorial Force."121

Similar evidence can also be found within the minutes of the Glasgow Chamber

of Commerce. Although isthe only mention of the Force during the period 1908-1914, it

provides a glimpse as to their attitude towards part-time soldiering in the city. At their

May 1914 meeting, a letter from the Plymouth Chamber of Commerce was read:

... stating that the Territorial Forces in that district were under their proper number and that the Chamber had been asked to assist on pressing on the public and particularly on employers the necessity of the ranks being filled and enclosing Memorandum of the methods proposed to be adopted. The Plymouth Chamber in their letter also suggested that if the Territorial Force in the Glasgow district is below its proper strength some effort might be made to improve its position. A letter dated 22nd instant was submitted from Mr. David Laidlaw expressing his

u8Ibid., February 25, 1909. U9Ibid.,September 9, 1909. 120Minutes of Glasgow Territorial Forces Association, October 26, 1910, NAS. mMinutes of Glasgow Territorial Forces Association, March 26, 1913, NAS.

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views on the subject and stating that the principal employers in Glasgow had been frequently communicated with regarding the Territorial Forces. After discussion the Meeting resolved to take no action in connection with the matter.122

This lone reference to the Territorial Force suggests that by mid-1914, through the

established dialogue within the CountyAssociationand between it and at least a

substantial portion of Glasgow's employers, no encouragement or advice from outside

entities was required for the city's employers to reconcile the initiative of their workers

with their own interests. While the efforts of the Glasgow CountyAssociation in

consulting employers appear to have had a noticeable effect, administrators may have had

the good fortune in setting up operations in already favourable circumstances. That is,

existing cultural motivations on the part of leading businessmen and industrialists may

have played a greater role in the comparatively strong employer support in Glasgow than

elsewhere.

Although their zeal for service as enlisted men had long past, professionals and

businessmen continued to take part in amateur soldiering through taking on officer

commissions. Per the Norfolk Commission's figures, 'Professionals' and 'Men in

business by their own account' constituted 29.2 and 33.5 percent of Volunteer officers

respectively.123 In Glasgow, the continued presence of these men in the movement was

the product of the vigorous public life led by city elites. Indeed, much like what it

represented for working-class men, Volunteering was also viewed as a means of

l22Glasgow Chamber of Commerce Minutes: Home Affairs Committee, May 26, 1914, Mitchell Library. l23Beckett, Riflemen Form, 83

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socializing for men of higher social status. 124This is evidenced in a glance at the

backgrounds of influential Glasgow men, showing that many had previously served as

officers in the city's Volunteer Force.Matthew Pearce Campbell, a member of the city's

Territorial Association, is one such example of this relationship. In his professional life,

he served at the head of J & W Campbell & Co., a firm regarded by contemporaries as

one of the most important businesses in the city. Its place in the dry goods trade led to

125 the firm enjoying a "premier position in the trade of Glasgow." During this period, his

company "dominated, trading on a global scale through the Clyde based distribution

126

network of imports and exports already noted in other sectors of the economy." Of

particular significance was that Campbell was active in the local Volunteer movement, 197

having risen to the rank of major in the First Lanarkshire Rifle Volunteers.

Another example is Hugh Reid, who acted as Chief Managing Director of the

North British Locomotive Company. By the inauguration of the Territorial Force, with

8000 employees, it was the largest locomotive builder in Europe. His example is

important, as the connection between his firm and amateur soldiering was established at

an early stage. According to Joseph Melling, W.N. Neilson, whose business, the North

British Railway Company would later become part of the North British Locomotive, was

an early proponent of the Volunteer Force: "Possessing a deep sense of moral duty and

124Trainor, "The Elite," 231, 246. 125Stratten and Stratten.S/raHen s Glasgow and its Environs: A Literary, Commercial, and Social Review. Past & Present; with a Description of its Leading Mercantile Houses and Commercial Enterprises (London: Stratten&Stratten Publishers, 1891), 74. 126Slaven and Checkland, 330. 127 Eyre-Todd, 35-36. It is interesting to note that he was also a director for Nobel's Explosives, a company listed as providing facilities for Territorials in its employ.

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religious mission, he became one of the foremost advocates of the 'Volunteer movement'

in Glasgow during the 1860s."128 This was significant in that he supported working men

joining the local corps. As he cites from Neilson's diaries:

The artisans must be induced to enrol themselves in the voluntary forces, and my object was to induce the masters, managers, foremen and leading men in every industry to enrol themselves as officers and encourage the workmen to come under their guidance and protection.129

Like Campbell, Reid was also a Volunteer officer. He served for twenty-five years with

the First Lanark Rifles and later the First Lanark Royal Engineers, retiring at the rank of

lieutenant-colonel. His interest in part-time soldiering continued with Haldane's reforms,

as he was "vice-chairman of the Glasgow Territorial Force Association - a position which

he retained until 1920."130 These examples indicate that the Territorial Force in Glasgow

enjoyed close connections with men of stature within the city's business community.

Though by the eve of the Territorial scheme the Volunteers had relied on

government funds, the legacy of private patronage still lingered, evidenced by the

131

preponderance of businessmen holding commissions. First and foremost, they

remained the most likely demographic to take on such positions, if only by virtue of their

having been able to afford to. Compared to their English counterparts, Scottish private

128Joseph Melling, "Scottish Industrialists and the Changing Character of Class Relations in the Clyde Region c.1880-1918.," in Capital and Class in Scotland, ed. Tony Dickson (Edinburgh: John Donald, 1982), 90. 129Ibid. 130SIaven and Checkland, 267-268. 131Ian Wood argues that similar could be said of Edinburgh, a city whose "close-knit commercial and professional world was strongly represented in its officer corps." See: Wood, '"Be Strong and of a Good Courage.'," 103.

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schools and universities were more open to those without wealth. Nonetheless, those of

affluent backgrounds had the financial latitude to undertake instruction in the newly-

instituted Officers Training Corps (a focus of the next chapter), which was created in

1908 and based in these institutions of learning. Also, nostalgia and a sense of loyalty are

key: employers, who themselves were active in the Volunteers, continued to view part-

time soldiering as a worthy pursuit and therefore promoted its virtues to their respective

workforces. As mentioned in the previous chapter, participation in the Territorial Force,

if only to impress an eager employer, may indeed have been a powerful motivation for

the average worker to enlist.

Aside from a personal desire amongst former Volunteer officers to maintain the

city's longstanding culture of amateur soldiering, there were in addition, equally

compelling motivations for allowing workers to join the Territorial Force. As suggested

through anecdotal evidence, a preponderance of officers in the city's Volunteer corps

were businessmen by profession. Their position as employers of labour raises the issue

of paternalism as a factor in support for Haldane's scheme. Paternalistic relations "had

long been an integral part of the repertoire of labour management strategies on

132

Clydeside." Under this system, employers took a personal interest in the wellbeing of

their workers. This was expressed in the provision of benefits such as housing, pensions, 133

and of importance to this study, "social and cultural space and activities." From these

measures, it was hoped that both worker efficiency and managerial prerogative would be

132McIvor, "Were Clydesideemployers more autocratic?," 56. ,33Ibid.

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enhanced. The creation of the modern Volunteer movement in 1859 was viewed as

another means through which paternalism was manifest. Throughout Britain, early

proponents of part-time soldering argued for the moral and social benefits of the

movement—that workers belonging to Volunteer corps were more efficient, obedient,

and respectable; in short, they made better employees.134 To that end, it has been argued

that the creation of Volunteer Corps in Glasgow owes more to workplace discipline than

home defence. "Far from blind to the opportunities the Volunteers provided for

135

reinforcing employer authority, firms set up their own branches." In the many

companies that were formed at employer behest, a hierarchical structure was created that

mimicked that of the shop floor—managers were often officers and foremen typically

acted as NCOs.

As 1914 approached however, paternalism was weakening throughout the West of 136

Scotland. The practice of paternalistic methods of employee control was never as

prominent in Glasgow as it was in smaller, more tight-knit communities such as nearby 137

Paisley. However, even in its decline, this was an adaptable phenomenon that continued

to factor in shop-floor relations. Despite waning enthusiasm of employers towards the

movement, its moralizing, character-building qualities must have been compelling in a 134 Beckett, Riflemen Form, 109. 135Johnston, 39; Knox, 98. l36McIvor, "Were Clydeside employers more autocratic?," 57, 60. Yet as Savage and Miles argue, the reason behind the weakening of paternalism may have lay in the limitations of the practice in Britain, in that it "rarely touched on matters of practical concern to workers...The more direct involvement in the workers' lives was minimal." See: Michael Savage and Andrew Miles, The Remaking of the British Working Class, 1840-1940 (London: Routledge, 1994), 43. 137Knox cites a number of factors hindering the development of paternalism in Glasgow. "It massive and continually shifting population, and its varied occupational structure, lacked the community stability needed to cement paternalistic relations" (108).

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period of significant labour tensions. Indeed, thereexisted firms that continued to practice

paternalistic relations. The significant number of businessmen in the Glasgow

CountyAssociation lends evidence to the continued use of this form of paternalism

linking military drill with workplace and civic discipline. Indeed, by the late-nineteenth

century, such methodsapplied especially to skilled workers—the same men who were

138

more likely than others to take up amateur soldiering. The'rational recreation' offered

through service in Territorial Force of the early twentieth century can be seen as a

counter to 'rough culture,' directing workers' leisure towards what was seen by

employers as a more acceptable pursuit. One of Albion Motor Car Company's founders,

N.O. Fulton, has been described as an employer who showed such tendencies, 139

emphasising "teamwork" and setting aside an employees' benevolent fund. Though

most evident in private industry where "the practical challenges to the authority of the

employer remained a prominent feature of Clydeside industry before 1914," this

phenomenon can also be applied to the public sector.140 It may to a large extent explain

the motivations of Tramways head James Dalrymple, whose managerial style revealed

strong paternalistic tendencies. Although his experience as a Volunteer likely factored

into his enthusiasm for the Territorial Force, it is equally probable that he viewed it as a

means of regulating the free time of his employees. The routine of Territorial service was

138Checkland,TheUpas Tree,3. 139Slavenand Checkland, 258. 140 Alan McKinlayand R.J. Morris, eds., The ILP on Clydeside, 1893-1932: from foundation to disintegration (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1991), 90.

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complementary to the "quasi-military style management" for which he was known.141

Such instances suggest that paternalism, at least as applied to encouraging service in the

Territorial Force, should not be discounted as a factor in employer support for the scheme

in its initial years.

Concluding Remarks

An examination of the relationships between the city's elite and the TerritorialForce

reveals the strength of the nation-in-arms ideal: the very design of the

CountyAssociations provided a structure in which key groups such as local government,

organized labour, and private business were able to actively participate in the

administration of the city's corps. In placing the Lord-Lieutenant as its President, the

Association benefited not only from his diverse political connections, but also from

increased assistance from the city corporation. Organized labour was afforded a voice in

Territorial matters that was unavailable in the Volunteer era. Further, the associations

formalized the traditional importance of private business in the part-time soldiering

movement. Aside from the ability to consult local military leaders, local peculiarities

were also important in seeing Haldane's reforms through their initial years. The

challenges facing trade unions and trades councils in the Edwardian period, along with

the well-rooted dominance of workingmen within Glasgow's part-time corps, ensured

that if they existed, labour criticisms of the Territorial scheme were muted. The

preponderance of businessmen in Volunteer units, combined with lingering paternalism

141Kenefick, "A struggle for control," 136. 230

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werealso contributing factors in their support. In all, these considerations helped foster a

climate favourable to service in the Territorial Force. However, this was important

insofar as it helped maintain the current strength of the corps. To ensure that future

generations would take up the cause of home defence, the nation-in-arms would have to

be applied to boys and adolescents. Much like the manner in which the Volunteer Force

permeated the various elite groups within Glasgow society, as the next chapter will show,

a similar relationship is evident between the city's youth and the part-time soldiering

movement.

231

Chapter 5 - Youth and the Nation-in-Arms

They may have another object in view, but they prepare themselves for the defence of their country.

The Earl of Meath, 19031

Introduction

The extent to which the nation-in-arms concept linked the civilian world to military

institutions was seen in the practical need for future generations of Territorials (both

officers and rank-and-file). There was thus an important place for youth within this

wider ideal. As seen in the previous chapter, Haldane's promotion of the nation-in-arms

called for a diverse range of interests to serve as active participants within the County

Associations. However, his vision was not limited to business, labour, and local

government, groups whose cooperation was nonetheless vital to current recruitment. To

ensure subsequent generations would commit to the cause of home defence, the Secretary

of State sought to provide a definite role for Britain's youth, regardless of class and

upbringing. Such notions were not uniquely Haldane's, but rather inspired by well-

established European sentiment. In Germany, importantly, Colmar Goltz's 1883 treatise,

The Nation in Arms, lauded the virtues of youth, arguing that future military strength—

and by extension that of the nation at-large—rested on promoting a population of

vigorous young men.2 Closer to home, such beliefs were expressed through an expansion

1 Report of the Royal Commission on Physical Training (Scotland), Vol.11, #8411. 2von der Goltz, 18.

232

Youth and the Nation-in-Arms

of military training for boys, owing largely to 1886 regulations allowing for the creation

of corps independent of Volunteer units. Following earlier efforts at fostering (or

reinforcing) middle-class values, the late-Victorian militarization of the nation's youth

was constructed upon an ideology that welded physical health and discipline with

religious and patriotic qualities.3 This set of beliefs is well documented and gained

further traction in the anxiety that marked the period immediately following the Anglo-

Boer War.4 Military efficiency, along with a host of other forces—militarism in schools,

desire for discipline at home and on the shop floor, social Darwinism, and concern over

the moral and religious well-being of the British male—formed the basis for the very

institutions that Haldane sought to co-opt into his wider programme of reform. Indeed, a

study from a local perspective reveals that the role of youth in the nation-in-arms was

forged not through a singular need for military efficiency, but rather built upon decades

of such societal influenceswhich extended into the Edwardian era. We also find that in

viewing the city's amateur soldiering movement, the interconnectedness of local society

during this period manifested itself in interests beyond those of businessmen, labour

unions and municipal government. The example of Glasgow shows that, to produce a

consistent supply of future Territorials,both the War Office and the city's Territorial

Association directed efforts towards institutions of learning as well as uniformed

3Summers, "Militarism in Britain," 119.In the author's assessment, "Edwardian Christianity was not particularly martial or blood-thirsty, but it espoused militarism with a seemingly uncritical enthusiasm" (120). 4Ibid., 112. Summers argues that the impetus for these beliefs was a desire amongst Edwardian Britons to bring "military standards into line with those of civil life. In the Edwardian period, it was civil society which required regeneration, and it was through, and indeed for the army that the process of renewal was to take place."

233


boys'organizations. As part of Haldane's reforms, the need for qualified officers led to

the March 1908 Army Order creating the Officer Training Corps (OTC), which was

based in the nation's public schools and universities. It was through the OTC that the

children of the well-to-do, viewed by contemporary society as more 'natural' leaders,

could take up their place in the nation-in-arms. On the other hand, youth of lower social

ranks were not neglected. Groups such The Boys' Brigade (BB), founded in 1883 by

local Volunteers and headquartered in Glasgow also contributed to the city's history of

militarism. As evidenced in its publications, the BB appealed to the children of

tradesmen, the same segment of local society that had traditionally filled the rank-and-file

of the city's Volunteer corps.5Parallels to the city's amateur soldiering movement

extended beyond class considerations; indeed, an account of both the local OTC and BB

reveals distinct elements of continuity—showing that to an extent, reform meant

recasting institutions with a longstanding Volunteer presence. Of greater importance,

however, is that through a detailed examination of theircreation, ideology and activities,

it will be shown that these groups serve as powerful examples of a merging of military

and civilian worlds—a pre-existing nation-in-arms that was understandably viewed as a

means by which future Territorials could be raised. This is evident in the creation of the

OTC and its affiliations with the TF in Glasgow.

5 John Springhall, Brian Fraser and Michael Hoare, Sure and Steadfast: A History of the Boys' Brigade, 1883 to 1983, ed. John Springhall(London: Collins, 1983), 25.

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Schools & Universities: The Officer Training Corps

As we have seen, the period following the Anglo-Boer War was a time that saw the

whole of the British Army come under scrutiny. While the readiness of the rank-and-file

has been examined in this study already, it must be stressed that some of the harshest

criticisms were directed towards their superiors. As the experience in South Africa had

markedly exposed, traditional structures had proved insufficient in supplying effective

officers in the event of a protracted conflict.6 This was a serious concern within both

regular and in particular auxiliary forces. The major postwar commissions had confirmed

these longstanding reservations. Particular objections could be found in the Norfolk

Commission's report, which deemed the qualification of officers to be "the all-important

question concerning the Volunteer Force."7 It found that in the period 1886-1904,

Volunteer officer numbers averaged roughly eighty percent of the desired

o

establishment. The deficiency of officers was compounded by a lack of quality—it was

concluded by that panel that the "majority of officers have neither the theoretical

knowledge nor practical skill in the handling of troops which would make them

competent instructors in peace or leaders in war."9 As the campaign against the Boers

had forced auxiliary officers into active duty, this was a problem that affected not merely

the Volunteers, but had the potential of hindering future war efforts for the army as a

6Spiers, Haldane: an Army Reformer, 135. 1 Report of the Royal Commission on the Militia and Volunteers, 7. 8 Ian Worthington, "Socialization, Militarization and Officer Recruiting: The Development of the Officer Training Corps," Military Affairs 43, no. 2 (April 1979): 90. 9 Norfolk Commission Report, Haldane Papers, ms6108A, ff.9, NLS.

235


whole. This inability of Volunteer corps to recruit and maintain quality officers was the

product of longstanding practical considerations. Much like issues facing their working-

class contemporaries, finances were foremost in dissuading men of higher social status in

taking on commissions. Cost was the greatest factor, as prior to 1908, officers, in

addition to the sums associated with the maintenance of their unit (as discussed in

Chapter Two), were required to purchase their own uniforms. Even in corps maintained

by subscription or grants, there was no guarantee that all expenses would be covered. As

it stood, the status gwoplaced "a premium on wealth as a qualification for high office, as a

financially insecure man would be unwilling to run the risks involved."10 Much like the

wider attempt to restructure the auxiliary forces, the Conservative government was on the

whole unable to remedy the dearth of quality officers, with the issue being left to debate.

The plan that carried the greatest interest called for a 'new class of reserve officers'—

men who in return for a retainer fee, were to undergo more extensive training as well as

be available in the event of national peril.11 This arrangement, however, was not

implemented, remaining consigned to theory.

The inability to bring about a concrete solution ensured that this was a matter that

continued to elicit great attention within military and political circles. A number of

additional solutions were posed in these interim years—ranging from compulsory

measures such as universal training and the reintroduction of the militia ballot—to

retaining the tradition of voluntary service utilizing the resources of Britain's schools.

'"Cunningham, 60. uWorthington, 91.

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Regarding the last proposal, schemes included the creation of special military public

schools, assisting existing cadet corps through capitation grants, turning to universities to

make good on the officer shortage, and fostering ties between schools/universities and the

Volunteer corps.12 While decision-makers were keenly aware of the importance of

schools and universities, such notions were not by any means original, as by the late-

nineteenth century, institutions of learning were increasingly regarded as a potential

wellspring of future officers.13 This would eventually form official policy in 1906 with

the incoming Liberal government and its Secretary of State for War, Haldane.

Building a viable body of auxiliary officers was a prominent issue in Haldane's

subsequent efforts to restructure the army. To accomplish this, he drew on both

established opinion, as well as his lifelong interest in education. As contained in his

fourth memorandum (April 1906), Britain's schools had a place within a nation-in-arms:

Our best chance of future success will, I believe, lie in concentrating our attention mainly on the rising generation, and we shall, I am sure, do well to invite the County Associations, as they come into being, to encourage in every way possible physical training in the schools, cadet corps, Miniature Rifle clubs, and all other means of interesting boys and lads in military exercises.14

Similar views would be presented via a committee created at the Secretary of State's

behest later that year. In its interim report of 1907, the panel found that while there

existed a surplus of higher ranking officers, captains and subalterns were plagued by a

lack of numbers. The panel estimated that the Army as a whole suffered a shortage of

12Ibid., 90-91. 13Cunningham, 59. 14Fourth Memorandum, Haldane Papers.

237


10,000 (4000 regular, 6000 auxiliary) of such officers.15 Their recommended solution

was to create an administrative structure that incorporated the existing cadet and

university corps. This would form the basis of the Officer Training Corps. The idea was

that participation in the OTC, regarded as a leisure-time activity, would be considered in

lieu of a greater period of training otherwise required of officers. An additional strength

of the scheme was that it offered a uniform method of training, replacing the inconsistent

and often haphazard standards hitherto. It was hoped that, given an interim period, this

scheme would boost the number of officers as well as reduce the amount of training

required to render them efficient. While this would not produce an immediate increase in

the officer ranks, a system would be put in place which, in the long-term, would rectify

the longstanding shortage of qualified men. Of a similar nature to the War Office's

ambitions vis-a-vis uniformed organizations such as the Boys' Brigade, the concept of

raising officers through Britain's schools and universities is rooted in the Secretary of

State's interest in education.

However, the limitations of militarism in British society were evident in the

significant reservations amongst MPs which had to be addressed. The direct financial

support of cadet corps was a key element in Haldane's reforms, though this proved one of

the controversial facets of his plan. The official sanctioning of military-inspired youth

groups was particularly unsettling to Labour politicians. Ramsay MacDonald opposed

funding of cadets on the ground that it inculcated militarism in boys at an early age. In

his words:

15Spiers, The Army and Society, 279. 238


The problem was an exceedingly simple one for it [a boy]; it believed in force; candidly and honestly the child believed in force. It believed in the force of the Empire, and it was at its early age and development incapacitated from remembering the power of diplomacy, the power of peaceful means, in piloting a country successfully through dangerous situations. So, if the cadet corps was bad for military purposes and for the true military spirit, it also poisoned the springs of politics at the very source.16

Haldane downplayed such criticisms levied towards his proposal by stating that there

existed no "danger of increasing the spirit of militarism there, because the spirit of

militarism already runs fairly high both there and at the universities. What we propose to

do in our necessity is to turn to them, and to ask them to help us by putting their

militarism to some good purpose."17 Nonetheless, opposition was significant enough that

in order to pass this final parliamentary hurdle and ensure support for his bill, Haldane

compromised on this issue, dropping the proposed funding of school cadets by the

Associations. Lord Esher would later include the clause that financial support of this

type could be given, but only with Parliament's consent, an amendment that passed both

houses.18 The Officer Training Corps, like the Territorial Force, came into being in April

1908. The OTC regulations of that year reflected that key compromise, stating that:

"cadet corps and battalions will, for the present, be administered as now by the War

Office, and do not come within the jurisdiction of the Associations."19

The OTC was structured into two tiers: a junior division comprised of public

school cadet corps; and a senior division, based in the universities. An immediate

16Hansard, 4th ser., vol. 172 (1907), col. 1600. 17Hansard, 4th ser., vol. 169 (1907), col. 1321. 18Spiers, Haldane: an Army Reformer, 113. 19Regulations for the Territorial Force, 2.

239


observation is that the OTC was largely built upon pre-existing entities. Aside from a

more rational system of organization and evaluation, there was little that had to be

constructed from scratch. This practicality was a major strength, reflected in its low

financial cost, and was a point that Haldane repeatedly used against his Conservative

critics.20 Secondly, as an examination of the OTC in Glasgow in its early years shows,

despite closer links to the Territorial Force falling victim to political expediency, they

nonetheless shared extensive, albeit semi-official ties during this period. Combined,

these considerations owed much to pre-1908 arrangements, as both the Territorial Force

and OTC were inheritors of the Volunteer and Cadet past.

Rechristened as the OTC Junior Division, public school cadet corpswere to serve

a similar role as the Boys' Brigade (the latter's religious emphasis aside); that is, they

were to offer a means by which military training could be offered to the nation's young

men. While the Boys' Brigade catered to working-class boys—particularly the children

of skilled workers—the OTC's focus was on those of higher social standing. This carried

with it the inferred notion that public school cadet corps, the domain of well-to-do

families, would naturally provide a steady stream of potential officers. This belief was

well-founded, given the gradual militarization of schools in the Victorian and in

particular Edwardian eras, and the tendency of Army officers to have been educated at

such institutions. Considering the function of the cadet corps within the newly-created

OTC, strong continuities with the Victorian-era can be discerned, particularly in its

continued ties with amateur soldiering. Though Parliament had curtailed the relationship

20Spiers, Haldane: an Army Reformer, 138-139. 240


between the OTC and the Territorial Force, it was difficult to undo decades of

precedence, for the cadet corps were from their beginnings intimately linked to the

Volunteer movement.

The cadet corps, like the Volunteer Force, was formed in 1859 in the wake of

French invasion scares.21 From this early stage, corpswere affiliated with local Volunteer

units. In the ensuing decades, the nature of this movement was relatively consistent.

Centered in the public schools, this was a movement dominated by the middle and upper-

classes. Further, the overall health of these corps tended to run parallel with that of the

Volunteers they were attached to. In essence, they were the de facto youth wing of the

00

Volunteer movement, insofar as they were feeders for middle-class Volunteers. By the

late-nineteenth century, units were present in private schools throughout Britain.

However, the prevailing attitude within such schools was one of acceptance, but not

necessarily enthusiasm towards cadet activities. Despite drill, annual camps, shooting

matches, and the hiring of ex-army as adjutants, the value of these units as potential

soldiers was suspect. According to one commentator "annual inspections were ...

matters of a somewhat farcical nature and of very spasmodic occurrence."24 Instead, the

use of military-style physical education was more an expression of the period's elevation

21 John Springhall, Youth, Empire and Society: British Youth Movements, 1883-1940 (London: Croom Helm, 1977), 71. Though the Cadet movement dates back to 1859, official recognition did not occur until 1863.

22Summers, "Militarism in Britain," 113. The level of support, however, varied on what local Volunteer units were willing (or able) to provide. See: Alan R. Haig-Brown, The O. T. C. and the Great War (London: Country Life, 1915), 15-16. 23 Geoffrey Best, "Militarism and the Victorian Public School," in The Victorian Public School: Studies in the Development of an Educational Institution eds. Brian Simon and Ian Bradley (Dublin: Gill & Macmillan, 1975), 136 24Haig-Brown, 21.

241


of bodily improvement, promoted through social/institutional Darwinism and Muscular

Christianity.25 This was a cultural phenomenon that was felt amongst Britain's youth

irrespective of class or social status. From the mid-nineteenth century, "manliness was

moving from the chapel to the changing-room"; that is, it was widely believed that moral

virtues could be fostered through physical activity, a concept that persisted into the

Edwardian years.26 In large part, this explains the varied pursuits of the Boys' Brigade as

evident in camps, demonstrations and inspections—they were in place to not only

maintain the interest of members, but also to develop within these boys a state of

'Christian Manliness.'27 Yet it was in the public schools where this faith-inspired 'cult of

athleticism' was created, first in England's great schools and later spreading north of the

border. The "frock-coated" and "silk-hatted" Scottish headmasters of the Victorian era

were reluctant to include physical education as part of a wider curriculum, yet the

growing popularity of such activities—and the belief that they fostered moral and civic

virtues—proved difficult to resist. In Scottish schools, attitudes changed with the

25 According to promoters of Muscular Christianity, through games and athletic pursuits, a boy could achieve a physical state seen as pleasing to God—a 'living sacrifice.' See: J.A. Mangan, Athleticism in the Victorian and Edwardian Public School. The Emergence and Consolidation of an Educational Ideology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 53. Such notions were not refined to boys, as groups such as the YMCA shifted their focus to incorporate sport within its traditional framework of evangelism. See: R.J. Morris, "Clubs, societies and associations" in The Cambridge Social History of Britain 1750-1950: Vol. 3, Social Agencies and Institutions ed. F.M.L. Thompson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 421. 26 Norman Vance, "The Ideal of Manliness," in The Victorian Public School: Studies in the Development of an Educational Institution eds. Brian Simon and Ian Bradley (Dublin: Gill & Macmillan, 1975), 123; Mangan, 9. 27 As stated in a biography of William A. Smith: "The B.B. ideal physically is the human figure as its Creator meant it to be." See: Roger S. Peacock, Pioneer of Boyhood: Story of Sir William A. Smith Founder of the Boys' Brigade (Glasgow: The Boys' Brigade, 1954), 36. 28Mangan, 49, 203; Indeed, organizations such as the cadet corps and Boys' Brigade came to be viewed as "valuable auxiliaries to the work of the school." See: Robert David Anderson, Education and the Scottish people, 1750-1918 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 203.

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appointment of English-educated masters, men whose background encouraged an espirit

de corps through games.29 Though it continued to be couched in the language and

imagery of religion, it could be argued that by the turn of the century this trend was

largely driven by the impulses of social Darwinism.30For Edwardian adolescents

attending private schools, many of whom were destined to be the future administrators of

Empire, team sports was seen as an ideal means of developing the values and physical

attributes required for imperial service.31 Even if such boys' future did not call for life

abroad, the effect of acquiring a sense of proper citizenship and efficiency was sufficient

in justifying this trend.

While an emphasis on healthy bodies and patriotic hearts remained, the South

African campaign altered the primary focus of the cadet movement. If anything, the pre-

existing sporting culture fostered within the walls of Britain's private schools served as

an ideal conduit for subsequent militaristic tendencies.32 The Anglo-Boer War and the

related public enthusiasm during the conflict resulted in an increase in not only the

29 Robert Anderson, "Secondary Schools and Scottish Society in the Nineteenth Century," Past and Present,no. 109 (November 1985): 197-198. According to Anderson, this growth must be qualified, as while there was a discernable growth in school support of sports and physical drill, these activities were not compulsory, and were to a large extent still the domain of former pupil clubs (201). 30 Some caution must be given to the notion that public school athleticism was entirely rooted in religion. Mangan offers a more cynical view, arguing that by the late-nineteenth century in practice muscular Christianity was only nominally Christian, having had more in common with contemporary beliefs in Social Darwinism and that 'might makes right.' See: J.A. Mangan, "Social Darwinism and upper-class education in late Victorian and Edwardian England" in Manliness and morality: Middle-class masculinity in Britain and America, 1800-1940, eds. J. A. Mangan and James Walvin (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1987), 149-150. 31 James Walvin, "Symbols of moral superiority: slavery, sport and the changing world order, 1800-1950," in Manliness and morality: Middle-class masculinity in Britain and America, 1800-1940, eds. J. A. Mangan and James Walvin (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1987), 248. 32 Best, 141.

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number of schools with cadet corps, but also overall membership.33 Throughout Britain,

it became fashionable to include military training as part of the wider programme of

creating loyal, dutiful young men. While militaristic aims were downplayed, the overall

ideological thrust remained. Rev. Andrew Laidlaw, before the 1902 Royal Commission

on Physical Training (Scotland), read from a pamphlet to parents from the High School

of Glasgow regarding its cadet corps:

At the outset it should be observed that membership of this company is not intended in any way as preparatory for, or introductory to, the profession of arms. The positive aims of the cadet corps are—(a) The improvement of physique, (b) The inculcation of habits of obedience, discipline, and self-control, (c) A quickened sense of school life and unity, and the development of public spirit, (d) A realization of the responsibilities which must be incurred, and the duties which must be discharged as citizens of the Empire.34

This militarization of private schools was further driven by notable conscriptionist

groups such as the National Service League, as well as the anxiety over the state of the

British Army that also formed the impetus for the Territorial scheme.35 Considering the

subsequent attention towards schools, it is unlikely that such developments escaped the

attention of reform-minded Army planners. With the 1908 reforms, prospective schools

were required to show an enrolled strength of at least thirty cadets and possess qualified

officers to give instruction. As contingents of the OTC junior division, private school

33 C.B. Otley, "Militarism and Militarization in the Public Schools, 1900-1972," The British Journal of Sociology 29, no. 3 (September 1978): 330. Otley remarks that while rapid growth occurred during the war "the real expansion" took place with the creation of the OTC; by the start of the First World War "79 percent of all public schools had O.T.C. units" (ibid.). 34Report of the Royal Commission on Physical Training (Scotland), Vol.11., #7987. 35 Best, 136-7. Best describes Lord Roberts as "pre-eminently influential" in the militarization of public schools.

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cadet units were allowed to take advantage of military training, though were not required

to take any oath of service. Age requirements were fairly broad, with enrolment open

from boys at the age of thirteen, up to their twentieth birthday. Beyond this regulation,

much was left to the discretion of headmasters and school authorities.36 The proscribed

training regimen was designed to "bring the largest possible number of cadets" up to a set

standard of efficiency.37 To a large extent, such activities were similar to those required

of Territorial units, consisting of parades, exercises, and musketry. Cadets were also

expected to attend annual camp, which attempted to simulate real-life scenarios in which

they would be called upon as Territorial officers. One such example involved two teams,

an invading 'Blue' army, and a 'Red' force set to halt their advance. The latter consisted

of Glasgow units, with cadets from various Edinburgh schools acting as their

• • 38

opposition.

Like its junior counterpart, the senior division too had strong ties with the amateur

soldiering movement, and in large part was built upon pre-existing institutions. If they

opted to do so, existing University Volunteer Corps after 1908 were transformed into

senior divisionsof the OTC.39 Membership centered on, but was not necessarily limited

to, university students. In the case of corps that were created after 1908 and had no prior

connections to the Volunteers, they had to abide by a series of qualifications before they

were granted OTC status. Qualifications were along the same lines as private schools,

36United Kingdom, Regulations for the Officer Training Corps 1909 (London: HMSO, 1909), 12. 37Ibid„ 15. 38Glasgow Herald, May 24, 1913. In the report, no clear winner was designated, with weaknesses in tactics identified for both sides. 39Regulations for the Officer Training Corps 1909, 2.

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but in many cases with greater requirements reflecting a demand for formal military

instruction. For instance, University Corps had to possess a "committee of military

education officially recognized by the university authorities"—in essence a faculty of

military science.40 Senior Division terms of service were of a similar nature, but varied

from institution to institution, as cadets were liable to a "contract drawn up by each

university to suit its own conditions."41This appears to mirror the aim of Territorial

Associations in that these bodies were by design flexible enough to adapt to local

peculiarities.

Although control of the OTC rested ultimately in the hands of the War Office,

relations with the County Associations were encouraged; the degree to which this

occurred was entirely at the discretion of their respective commanding officers.42 As

revealed through available evidence, the Glasgow Territorial Association and the city's

OTC opted for close relations; this owed much to their shared Volunteer past.Further, this

was a logical arrangement, as current cadets wereto be future Territorial officers. At the

outset of the OTC programme, three Glasgow schools participated as contingents of the

Junior Division—Glasgow Academy, Kelvinside Academy, and Ardrossan Academy.43

By 1912, this number expanded to five with the inclusion of Glasgow and Hillhead High

Schools.44 None of these institutions were by any means new to military education, as

despite some opposition to militarism after the Anglo-Boer War (as will be discussed), by

40Ibid.,8. 41 United Kingdom, Regulations for the Officer Training Corps 1908 Provisional (London: HMSO, 1908), 4. 42Ibid„ 2. 43Regulations for the Officer Training Corps 1909,47. 44United Kingdom, Regulations for the Officer Training Corps 1912 (London: HMSO, 1912), 57.

246


the turn of the century not only had cadet units been formed throughout Britain, they had

also quickly become very popular, to the extent that they were considered integral to

school identity.45Kelvinside Academy was the first school in the city to have a cadet

corps, it being created in 1893. The High School of Glasgow's Corps was formed in 1902

and was linked to the First Lanarkshire Rifle Volunteers.46Hillhead High School had an

established relationship with the Second VBHLI.47 This relationship endured with the

1908 reforms. As an OTC unit, it continued to draw instruction from the Sixth Highland

Light Infantry, evidenced in unit commander James A. Maclean, adjutant for the

battalion 48 Further, a company within the Sixth HLI was comprised of ex-members of

the school.49 Camp activities also drew both organisations together. In the

aforementioned 1913 mock-battle, officers from the Fifth, Seventh, Eighth Scottish

Rifles, and Seventh HLI acted as umpires.50

Similarly strong ties can be found later between the Glasgow University OTC,

founded in January 1909, and the city's Volunteers and its TF successors.51 Like

university corps elsewhere, Glasgow University's, while not exclusive to students, had at

45 Anderson, 199. 46 Harry A. Ashmall, The High School of Glasgow, (Edinburgh: Scottish Academic Press, 1976), 44. 47A.D. Campbell, HillheadHigh School, 1885-1961 (Glasgow: Hillhead High School, 1962), 15. This is at-odds with a Glasgow Herald report stating that Hillhead was attached to the 4th Volunteer Battalion Scottish Rifles (later 8th Scottish Rifles). See: Glasgow Herald, June 21, 1907. 48Campbell, 20. 49Glasgow Herald, March 21,1912. 50Ibid., May 24, 1913. 51 According to a retrospective speech given at a Glasgow OTC ceremony, authorization for a infantry company was given in January 1909, which was expanded to two a month later to account for its popularity. A third was created that July, while a company of engineers came into being in February 1910. Ibid., January 17, 1911.

247


an early stage been active in the Volunteer movement.52 After 1908, while the bulk of

the First Lanarkshire Rifle Volunteers was rechristened as the Fifth Scottish Rifles, the

University Corps—'K' company (1870)—was transformed into the Glasgow University

OTC.53 Despite this break, strong cooperation between the university and that particular

battalion was felt in a number of ways. The first commandant of the University OTC

contingent was W.G. MacAlister of the Fifth Scottish Rifles.54 Additionally, Colonel

Roxburgh, the battalion's commanding officer had also served on the OTC committee.55

This relationship was further expressed in the transfer of officers between the two

organizations. As indicated in a host of Gazette entries, the Glasgow University

contingent supplied officers to the Territorial Force, and vice-versa. Upon their taking up

duties with the Corps, officers were expected to adhere to terms of service as if they

belonged to the Territorial Force.56 From the Fifth Scottish Rifles Gazette: "we shall, no

52Grierson, 224, 372. Contemporaries downplayed the links between the university community and the volunteer company. Professor F.O. Bower remarked that although the Glasgow University corps was attached to the 1st LRV, he expressed doubt that "it is kept exclusively by university students." "It is more a nominal connection [to the student body] than a close connection." See: Minutes of Evidence ...the Militia and Volunteers, Vol.1, #12322, 12327. Nonetheless, the university company formed the basis for the later OTC. 53This chapter's earlier suggestion that the Territorial officer corps remained the domain of the well-do-to is supported in the aim of contemporary institutions of learning. The Royal Technical College (formerly the Andersonian Institution)~later the University of Strathclyde—offered education "directed towards tradesmen and others who could not or would not enrol in Glasgow University, and is not strictly comparable to university-level education." Paul Robertson, "Scottish Universities and Industry, 1860-1914," Scottish Economic and Social History 4 (1984): 41. 54 Glasgow University OTC Joint Committee Minutes, January 25, 1909, GB 248 DC 099, Glasgow University Archives. Originally Lieutenant, upon his appointment, MacAlister was promoted to Captain; on his 1912 departure, he had been elevated to the rank of Major (May 21, 1912). To comply with War Office regulations (Regulations for the Officer Training Corps 1909, 13) requiring Adjutants come from the Regular Army, the Committee appointed Captain A.N.E. Browne of the 1st Highland Light Infantry to that position, while a colour sergeant from the 2nd HLI was appointed as sergeant-instructor. 55 Col. Roxburgh was originally invited as a member in 1910 (Glasgow University OTC Joint Committee Minutes, June 16, 1910). 56Regulations for the Officer Training Corps 1909, 15.

248


doubt, in future years welcome to our Commission ranks not a few cadets from the

Glasgow University Contingent of the Officer Training Corps."57Indeed, though there

were instances of new officers being attached to other battalions, the majority of cases

were of men being passed to/from the Fifth Scottish Rifles.58

Aside from the enduring ties between the Glasgow University OTC and the Fifth

Scottish Rifles, collaboration with the city's Territorial Association manifested itself in

other ways. Dean of Arts and Professor of History, Dudley Medley, in addition to serving

as the first chairman of the university OTC committee, also acted as the university

representative on the Glasgow Territorial Association.59 Further, the committee's

original selection for Commandant of the University Corps—T.A.Harvie Anderson—was

rejected by the War Office on the grounds that Anderson was acting as Secretary of the

city's Territorial Association.60This relationship extended beyond personal affiliations. It

was intended that when possible, the OTC "obtain facilities from local units as regards

technical instruction, the loan of material, and the use of rifle ranges and training

grounds" under the condition that the relevant County Association be reimbursed for

such.61 The Glasgow Territorial Association was accommodating in this regard, allowing

use of its drill halls and ranges for OTC purposes, though this decreased in frequency as

""The Officers' Training Corps," Fifth Scottish Rifles Gazette] , no.2. (January 1910): 52. 5BLondon Gazette, no.28241 (April 13, 1909): 2924; London Gazette, no. 28242 (April 16, 1909): 2970; London Gazette, no. 28363 (May 6, 1910): 2970. 59 Glasgow University OTC Joint Committee Minutes, May 18, 1908.Prof Medley's active participation in TA/OTC affairs likely stems from his upbringing, as both his father and maternal grandfather were army generals. Eyre Todd, under "Who's Who in Glasgow in 1909," http://gdl.cdlr.strath.ac.uk/eyrwho/eyrwhol254.htm (accessed August 17, 2010). 60 Glasgow University OTC Joint Committee Minutes, January 5, 1909. 61Regulations for the Officer Training Corps 1909, 8.

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http://gdl.cdlr.strath.ac.uk/eyrwho/eyrwhol254.htm


the University secured its own facilities.

Despite the clearer means of instruction offered in Officer Training Corps, the

essential nature of service remained the same—even for officers, this was a part-time

endeavour pursued by young men whose primary ambitions fell outside military matters.

The OTC, while an avenue towards service in the Territorial Force, was likely not seen

by its cadets as a future occupation. In his 1914 testimony to a Royal Commission

regarding civil service selection, Professor Medley stated that the vast majority of

Glasgow University students—by his figure ninety percent—already had a settled

career.63 This too coincided with established patterns that had existed prior to 1908,

whereby men affiliated with the university served as Volunteers. This calls into question

the ability to bolster the numbers of Territorial Officers, the main reason for the OTC's

very existence.

Table 6 - Officer Statement of Strength (% of establishment, October 1)M

1908 1909 1910 1911 1912 1913 Glasgow 95.91 93.13 92.81 90.15 87.04 91.98 Edinburgh 97.86 103.14 100 98.43 94.79 95.83 East Lancashire 71.74 85.43 85.89 82.09 79.88 80.44 West Lancashire 77.96 86.1 88.13 86.32 84.39 84.89 City of London 75.36 87.64 87.93 86.21 80.8 81.27 County of London 76.52 89.92 89.83 86.87 85.1 86.13 Lowland District (Scot.) 88.33 93.18 92.54 90.66 86.04 89.25 Total (UK-wide) 75.24 86.34 87.06 84.23 82.54 83.59

62 Glasgow University OTC Joint Committee Minutes, January 20, 1911. The use of Drill Halls lasted until 1912, when at that point the University OTC had its own drill facilities (November 13, 1911). 63 Richard A. Chapman, The Civil Service Commission, 1855-1991: a bureau biography (London: Routledge, 2004), 222. 64Returns of the Territorial Force (1908-1913).

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However, if the success of the OTC scheme in these early years is gauged in terms of

numbers, the results were encouraging.

For the Scottish Lowland District, as well as Associations therein such as

Glasgow and Edinburgh, officer recruitment was consistently higher by proportion than

other major population centres. This may stem from a pre-existing culture of enthusiasm

amongst the elite towards amateur soldiering, as discussed in the previous

chapter.65However, in the cursory glance of officer returns from 1908-1913, Haldane's

belief that time was required before his plan would come to fruition is justified. From a

UK-wide perspective, the OTC had a modest, though positive effect upon officer

numbers—with recruitment averages consistently higher than that previously-cited eighty

percent of total strength prior to 1908. While these early figures may infer only a slight

improvement on officer strength, the value of the OTC was all the more apparent with the

outbreak of hostilities in 1914, as much like the structures put in place involving the

Expeditionary and Territorial Forces, it too provided a clear means of expanding the

officer pool in the event of war. As one contemporary noted, it represented "a transition

from an almost unrecognized existence to a definite position amongst His Majesty's

Forces."66There was an inherent economy behind the OTC scheme as well, for it was

built upon the existing institutions—in this case, the schools. Indeed, official support

marked the beginnings of a formal relationship between the Army and places of learning.

65 According to Wood, elite participation in part-time soldiering was also strong in Edinburgh, where a "close-knit commercial and professional world was strongly represented in its officer corps." Wood, " 'Be Strong and of a Good Courage'," 103. 66 Haig-Brown, 15

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With a presence in private schools and Glasgow University the OTC became an

established part of school life in the city. Yet, as revealed in a 1912 meeting of the city's

educational board, its acceptance was not universal. Although contemporary writers

elsewhere argued that the corps "should mean discipline and self-reliance...There is no

danger among schoolboys of 'militarism,'" and that Haldane himself remarked that

indeed, it had already run deep in the nation's schools, this did not mean that such trends

were universally received.67A discussion over the funding of a sub-machine target in

1912 sparked a debate over the value of the High School of Glasgow's participation in

the OTC scheme. One school board member acknowledged that he "was perfectly aware

that there was a blatant militarism, which was never far away, which masked itself as

/TO

patriotism," and did not wish to be "caterers to the War Office." Another agreed,

stating that the boys were sent to the High School "to be educated. To teach shooting

was outside the province of the Board altogether."69 Other members of the board came to

the defence of the OTC. To cries of shame, one member argued that "plenty of parents 10

advised and encouraged their boys to join the corps." A colleague concurred and "said

the citizens of Glasgow.. .were also proud of its Officer Training Corps."7'Reporting on

the opening of the University contingent's new headquarters, the Glasgow Herald

expressed hope that the value of the OTC would not be hampered by its detractors, whose

67 Alan Penn, Targeting Schools: Drill, Militarism, and Imperialism (London: Woburn Press, 1999), 151; Cyril Norwood and Arthur H. Hope, The Higher Education of Boys in England (London: John Murray, 1909), 446. 68Glasgow Herald, December 27, 1912. 69Ibid. 70Ibid. 71Ibid.

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79

rhetoric "professes to be anti-militarist but in reality involves a denial of civic duties."

Although proponents of Haldane's scheme would have to defend its worth, it stands to be

known that for decades the military, through the Volunteers, was already present in

Britain's public schools and universities. In that regard, contemporary concerns were to

an extent, a moot point, as militarism had been a part of student life well before the

OTC's creation. It was this longevity—along with the cooperation of the Territorial

Force—that facilitated the development of the OTC and its positive effect on officer

numbers. Much the same forces that sustained the cadet movement can be argued as also

occurring within organizations focused on working-class boys.

The Boys' Brigade

The application of a nation-in-arms to working-class youth was also rooted in wider

societal forces. In particular, a merging of military and civilian interests grew out of a

similar sense of crisis—in this instance concern over antisocialtendencies andthe

resulting perceived need to regulate the behaviour of the lower classes. The prevailing

living conditions in industrial Britain during the Victorian era—characterized by urban

squalor, poor health, and crushing poverty—resulted in an increasing proportion of young

people deemed in the environmentalist and eugenicist discourse of the time as

'degenerate.'73 If language contained in the 1866 Reformatory and Industrial Schools

72Ibid.,January 13, 1912. 73 Thomas E. Jordan, The Degeneracy Crisis and Victorian Youth (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1993). Through statistical data, Jordan provides a comprehensive analysis of life in Victorian Britain and its effects on the period's young people. These sentiments were strongly held by middle class Britons, who viewed the urban slum as a breeding ground for degeneracy (both physical and social). This in turn, had

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Acts serves as a guide, this included children who were felons, vagrants, or otherwise

falling outside parental control.74 Although a concern throughout Britain, the centres of

trade and industry—London, Liverpool, and Glasgow, for example—drew the greatest

attention. In the case of Scotland's largest city, rapid population growth in Clydeside

throughout the nineteenth century was thought to produce "disturbingly high rates of

'crime and destitution,'" which enveloped a significant portion of the area's youth—

particularly those residing within the lower echelons of society.75

To counter this trend, efforts were made to regulate the conduct of working class

youth. This battle over the hearts and minds of this demographic was highly contested.

By the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries, "socialists, feminists, trade

unionists, evangelical Christians and founders of various youth organizations" were all

actively interested in the nation's youth.76 The most conspicuous activity was that of

middle-class reformers, who, largely driven by evangelicalism, sought to reshape the

whole of British society in accordance with their beliefs. The objective promoted by

these individuals was to take working class youth, characterized by sloth, crime and

wastefulness, and mould them into moral, hard-working young adults with a keen sense

of deference and subordination to their social superiors. They were to become 'new'

individuals—God-fearing, temperate, and adhering to behaviour deemed appropriate for

wide implications, not only for social order, but Britain's standing in the world. See: Donald MacKenzie, "Eugenics in Britain," in "Aspects of the Sociology of Science: Papers from a Conference, University of York, UK 16-18 September 1975," special issue, Social Studies ofScience6, no. 3/4 (September 1976): 515. 74 Linda Mahood, Policing Gender, Class and Family: Britain, 1850-1940 (Edmonton: University of Alberta Press, 1995), 51. 75Ibid. 76Ibid.,132.


their gender and class.77 Broadly speaking, the general pattern was that when possible,

efforts were made towards preventing children from falling into degeneracy, or at the

very least, halting their descent into such a condition of 'moral danger.' Failing that,

reformers adopted more corrective measures as allowed by law. To accomplish this, a

range of methods were turned to. Up to the mid-nineteenth century, philanthropic and

evangelist societies were tasked with this cause. Founded in 1844, the Young Men's

Christian Association held a pioneering role in this regard, offering charity coupled with

7 8

religious education. An early Scottish example that will be discussed is the Glasgow

Foundry Boys' Religious Society (1865), which operated under a similar religious

emphasis.79 Running in parallel was increased action by the state to intervene in the

name of rehabilitating wayward youth. In Scotland, this entailed the use of various

industrial schools and reformatories, instituted through legislation passed in both 1854

and 1866, where 'at risk' children were rehabilitated through education and discipline.80

Formal state intervention, however, did not mark the demise of child-saving

77Ibid„ 122. 78 For an early history of the YMCA, see: John Ernest Hodder-Williams, The Life of Sir George Williams Founder of the Young Men's Christian Association (New York: The International Committee of Young Men's Christian Associations, 1906). For a later historical treatment, see: Clyde Binfield, George Williams and the Y.M.C.A.: a Study in Victorian Social Attitudes (London: Heinemann, 1973). 79Callum Brown, Religion and Society in Scotland since 1707 (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1997), 103; Springhall, Fraser, and Hoare, Sure and Steadfast, 37 80Anderson, 96.In the 1870s, local bodies in Scotland were granted greater powers in the administration of schools (per the 1872 Education Act). This is reflected in the creation of day industrial schools; for example, the Glasgow Juvenile Delinquency Prevention and Repression Act (1878) established three such schools in the city. In addition to these acts, later legislation (for example in 1893, 1894) further defined the scope and authority of children placed in these institutions. See: John Davis, "Central government and the towns," in The Cambridge Urban History of Britain, Vol.111, 1840-1950, ed. Martin Daunton (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 264 ; J.A. Haythornthwaite, Scotland in the Nineteenth Century: An Analytical Bibliography of material Relating to Scotland in Parliamentary Papers, 1800-1900 (Aldershot: Scolar Press, 1993), 49, 344; Andrew G. Ralston, "The Development of Reformatory and Industrial Schools in Scotland 1832-1872," Scottish Economic and Social History8, (1988): 40-55.

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organizations; rather, new groups (primarily religious in nature) were founded and

operated in parallel to government entities. These included but were far from limited to

the Anti-Smoking League (1905), the Boy Scouts (1908), and a prime example for the

purposes of this study, the Glasgow-based Boys' Brigade (1883), all of which proved

influential in the promotion of proper conduct and 'useful' knowledge to working-class

youth.81

From its 1883 founding, the Boys' Brigade (BB) formed one facet of the wider

trend towards regulating the behaviour of working-class youth though a nation-in-arms.

This organization was created by William A. Smith, who found that traditionalProtestant

Sunday Schools could no longer carry the interest of young men.82The BB's means of

developing the spiritual and moral qualities of boys was through discipline and drill along

military lines, which by the early twentieth century was widely accepted as a form of

physical training in schools.83 Specifically, the Boys' Brigade adopted methods very

similar to those practiced by the Volunteer Force. This was in large part the result of

Smith's association with the FirstLanarkshire Rifle Volunteers. His experience as a

Volunteer officer whereby "he had no difficulty in making a hundred men obey his every

word of command on the nearby drill ground," would form the basis of the Boys' Brigade

81 Brad Beaven, Leisure, Citizenship and Working Class Men in Britain, 1850-1945 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005), 92. The author states that these clubs were modelled on similar adult male societies. As this chapter will emphasise this was certainly the case with the Boys' Brigade, which heavily mimicked the Volunteer Force. 82 Donald M. McFarlan, First for Boys: Story of the Boys' Brigade, 1883-1983 (London: Collins, 1982), 13. Olive Checkland states that this was a wider trend felt throughout Britain since the 1850s, whereby "older boys could no longer be occupied successfully in the traditional Sabbath School.. .Most boys had been subjected to work or school discipline all week and their natural energies and exuberance were hard to repress on the day of rest." See: Olive Checkland, Philanthropy in Victorian Scotland: Social Welfare and the Voluntary Principle (Edinburgh: John Donald, 1980), 54. 83Beckett, Amateur Military Tradition, 199.

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movement.84 Through the assistance of two fellow Volunteers (and YMCA members)

James R. Hill and John B. Hill, the structure and procedures of Boys' Brigade activities

were fashioned. "It was a happy thought that if the boys' energies could be marshalled

into drill, parades and such pursuits they would be healthfully occupied as well as

remaining within the influence of the church."85 This proved a ready-made relationship,

as "many of the officers of the Volunteer units were keen churchmen already working in

Sunday Schools."86 The Boys' Brigade was organized in city 'battalions' which in turn

were comprised of 'companies' attached to individual churches or Sunday schools.

Members ranged from twelve to seventeen years of age. They were ranked along military

lines, depending on each boy's proficiency and willingness to accept responsibilities.

8 7

Adults—many of whom were themselves Volunteers—served as 'officers.' This

approach was novel in a number of regards: not only was the Boys'Brigade the first

uniformed youth organization88, but also that movement harnessed "the patriotic and

84McFarlan, 13. Specifically, Smith encountered the problem being that "much of the time that should have been given to teaching was wasted in efforts to secure order and attention." Checkland, Philanthropy in Victorian Scotland, 56. 85Checkland, Philanthropy in Victorian Scotland, 55; Olive Anderson, "The Growth of Christian Militarism in Mid-Victorian Britain" The English Historical Review?,6, no. 338 (January 1971): 66-67. 86Checkland, Philanthropy in Victorian Scotland, 55. 87 According to one Borders constable, "The most successful Boys' Brigades I have known were officered by civilians who had been trained in the Volunteers." See: Report of the Royal Commission on Physical Training (Scotland), Vol.11., #10836. Springhall also notes the deep connections the early BB shared with the city's Volunteers. See: Springhall, Fraser, and HoarsSure and Steadfast, 41. 88 There was a strong interconnectedness amongst such groups. For instance, William A. Smith was an active member of the YMCA, and drew much inspiration from that organization in the creation of his Boys' Brigade. Further, his Boys Brigade served as the launching platform for the William Baden-Powell's (himself a Vice President of the BB) Boy Scouts. Although it would become the dominant uniformed youth organization, the Boy Scouts was much less enthusiastic towards military drill. Nonetheless, in many regards the BB served as inspiration for the Boy Scouts, and helped publicize the Scouting movement in its infancy. Indeed, with the (as sources suggest, unplanned) founding of the Boy Scouts, considerable debate existed within BB circles over the relationship between the two organizations. Yet, as the early years of the Scouts shows, the prevalence of ex-military scout masters suggests strong

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moral values of the volunteers to a primarily religious aim."89 Through an organization

and methods inspired by the Volunteer Force, the BB aimed to promote "discipline,

obedience, courtesy, punctuality, and reverence" amongst boys under their guidance.90

Combined, these traits formed the ideal of 'Christian Manliness.' As described in a 1906

letter to the Boys' Brigade Gazette, under this philosophy one:

Imitates Christ, taking Him as his Examples and seeking in character and conduct to conform to His teaching. Thus he seeks to be strong and true, yet gentle and kind, he is loyal to his sense of duty.. .he refuses to let life be ordered by self-interest only but tries to be of benefit to others.91

Such was indicative of a philosophy that sought to instil an active, assertive faith.92These

guiding principles suggest the continuedefforts of the Victorian middle class to remould

society in its desired image. However, on account of heavy working-class church

attendance in a Scottish society that had a higher proportion of churchgoers than the rest

parallels between the Scouts and the Boys' Brigade See: Beaven, 98; Michael Rosenthal, The Character Factory: Baden-Powell and the Origins of the Boy Scout Movement (New York: Pantheon Books, 1984), 236-237. 89Beckett, Amateur Military Tradition, 220. As will be discussed, there existed some backlash against the perceived militarism of uniformed youth movements, particularly in the wake of the First World War. The Woodcraft Folk, the co-operative movement's youth organization was founded in 1925 as an alternative to not only the increasing militarism/jingoism of the uniformed boys' movements, but also the overt religious indoctrination that featured within this subculture. Indeed, the Woodcraft Folk was largely built from pacifist Scoutmasters. See: Susan Barton, Working-class organisations and popular tourism, 1840-1970 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005), 101; David Prynn, "The Woodcraft Folk and the Labour Movement 1925-1970" Journal of Contemporary History IS, no.l (January 1983): 79; Brian Morris, "Ernest Thompson Seton and the Origins of the Woodcraft Movement" Journal of Contemporary History5, no. 2 (1970): 193. 90The Scotsman, February 10, 1908. 91Rev. J. William Butcher, "Parade Address, 'Christian Manliness'," Boys' Brigade Gazette[hereafter BBG]XIV, no. 9 (1 May, 1906): 133. 92 John Springhall, "Building Character in the British Boy: the Attempt to Extend Christian Manliness to Working Class Adolescents, 1880-1914," in Manliness and Morality: Middle-Class Masculinity in Britain and America, 1800-1940, eds. J. A. Mangan and James Walvin (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1987), 54.

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of the United Kingdom, it cannot be assumed that this was an organization simply driven

by middle-class influence. Rather, the Boys' Brigade's emulation of the Volunteers

indicates a working-class movement using means familiar to them to foster ideal

behaviour. Given, Moreover, the creation of the BB ran in parallel to the increasing

Christianization of the British military—a trend that according to Mackenzie

demonstrated that "it was possible to be both a professional soldier and a zealous

Christian."94Interdenominational in nature, this movement garnered a wide appeal,

priding itself on uniting the various Protestant sects.95 The development of this brand of

masculinity was seen as an antidote of sorts to the social problems that plagued

contemporary Britain. 96This belief runs parallel to how the Volunteer Force was initially

viewed as a means of regulating the behaviour of working-class men. In the case of the

93Peter Hillis, The Barony of Glasgow: A Window onto Church and People in Nineteenth-Century Scotland (Edinburgh: Dunedin Academic Press, 2007), 2; Callum G. Brown, "Religion, Class and Church Growth," in People and Society in Scotland II, 1830-1914, eds. W Hamish Fraser and R.J. Morris (Edinburgh: John Donald, 1990), 328. 94MacKenzie, 86. 95It should be noted that while the Boys' Brigade was a Protestant organization, parallel groups coexisted amicably and with similar aims, including the Church Lads' Brigade (Anglican breakaway), described as the BB's "brother organization" (see: Peacock,48); the Jewish Lads Brigade (see: Richard A. Voeltz, '"A Good Jew and a Good Englishman': The Jewish Lads' Brigade, 1894-1922," Journal of Contemporary History23, no. 1 (January, 1988): 119-127); the Catholic Boys Brigade; and the Boys' Life Brigade (see: Harry Hendrick, Images of Youth: Age, Class, and the Male Youth Problem, 1880-1920 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), 159). The Lads' Drill Association, formed in 1897 by the Earl of Meath had the express purpose of military training for national defence, eventually joining the National Service League. According to Meath: "The Lads' Drill Association advocates the training of every lad in physical and military exercise up to the age of eighteen.. .because they believe that the responsibilities of the Empire are now so vast that unless some such system is adopted it will sooner or later be found necessary to require that every man shall be trained to arms for a certain period of his life." See:Report of the Royal Commission on Physical Training (Scotland), Vol.11., #8403; Penn, 84; Summers, "Edwardian Militarism," 243. It has been remarked that two-fifths of all boys born 1901-1920 passed through at least one uniformed youth organizations. See: John Herbert Grainger, Patriotisms: Britain 1900-1939 (London: Routledge&Kegan Paul, 1986), 40. 96 J. A. Manganand James Walvin, "Introduction," inManliness and Morality: Middle-Class Masculinity in Britain and America, 1800-1940, eds. J.A. Manganand James Walvin (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1987), 4-5.

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Boys' Brigade, spiritual education and the cultivation of Christian manliness were the

paramount aims of the movement. For the latter, this entailed a broad set of

considerations extending beyond religious matters and into practical concerns; for

example, directing Brigade members towards an acceptable calling in adulthood.

The 1908 volume of the Boys' Brigade Gazette contained a series of articles

detailing suitable "trades for boys," such as printing, bookbinding, plumbing, electrical

engineering, and the railway service.97 In a later column regarding career options, boys

and their parents were asked to consider factors such as initial pay, religious and

character considerations, and opportunities for advancement or to learn a trade. Ideally, it

was advised that a boy should seek:

Employment which cultivates his powers, makes him punctual, methodical, self-reliant, giving him gradually increasingly responsibilities, and where he will be under the supervision of a foreman of high character and business qualities.98

At a more basic level, such writings indicate a continued promotion of the skilled trades

as opposed to casual or unskilled labour; not surprising, given the preponderance of

children of tradesmen enrolled in the BB.99 This also reflects the wider focus of the

period's residential schools, aimed at "the acquisition of an appropriate work ethic for

97For example, see: "Trades for Boys," BBG XVI, no. 1 (September 1, 1907): 7-9. 98"Parade Addresses. IV.—Choice of a Profession," BBGXXI, no. 4(December 1, 1912): 55. "Springhall, "Building Character in the British boy," 70.Springhall notes that the expansion of Christian Manliness was inherently limited by costs associated with enrolling boys into groups such as the BB; as a result, the benefits of this movement were "often beyond the purses of the poorest working class families." Spiers acknowledges that such paramilitary youth movements were a presence within areas occupied by skilled workers. See: Spiers, TheLate Victorian Army, 191. In his analysis of Boys' Brigade enrolments, R.Q. Gray shows that the BB was more oriented towards those of higher incomes. See: R.Q. Gray, "Religion, Culture and Social Class in Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Century Edinburgh," in The lower middle class in Britain, 1870-1914, ed. Geoffrey Crossick (London: CroomHelm, 1977), 138.

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working class boys."100 Similar to what has been suggested regarding employer

patronage of amateur soldiering, there was a political impetus for encouraging working-

class boys to enrol in organizations such as the Boys Brigade. The BB's promotion of

values such as deference to authority and patriotism can be seen as running counter to

challenges to established socioeconomic structures, as called for by trade unions or

socialist Sunday schools; by instilling such beliefs in working-class youth, namely, the

recognition of the legitimacy of the existing social class hierarchy, reform-minded groups

would be weakened.

In modern Scotland, the adoption of military methods in reforming youth—and as

such a manifestation of a nation-in-arms—had an established precedent. One early

example of such initiatives was the Glasgow Foundry Boys' Religious Society (1865), a

group that offered religious instruction, alongside the powerful attraction of physical drill

and military exercise.101 The combination of moral guidance with social outlets proved a

success and the training of boys in imitation of volunteer methods provided inspiration

for the broader-based Boys' Brigade movement that would later supplant it. Another

notable example was the use of industrial training ships, one of which was dry docked on

the River Clyde. Such vessels were part of a trend that began in the 1860s through which

delinquent children, as wards of the court, were removed from their homes and placed in

'healthier' locations on the outskirts of cities.102 Generally, this entailed placing young

people into reformatories. The repurposing of these ships was unique in that it originated

100Mahood, 118. 101Checkland, Philanthropy in Victorian Scotland, 55. 102Mahood, 51.

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not in a desire to reform youth, but rather to remedy a lack of naval preparedness exposed

by the Crimean War. At the outset, they were designed to train aspiring naval officers

and midshipmen. Decades on, the programme was expanded to include boys falling foul

of the Reformatory and Industrial Schools Act (1891). In much the same way that the

Boys' Brigade held the patronage of Volunteers and leading businessmen, industrial

training ships were supported by "retired Royal Navy officers and industrialists with

interests in shipping."103 The average period a boy spent on such ships was a year and

nine months. There, he was subject to not only the routine expected of a sailor, but also

trained in tasks that would aid him in obtaining a living wage in adulthood. While the

emphasis shifted over time towards teaching boys a craft, there nonetheless remained the

notion that life aboard such vessels would also produce future sailors.104 Although

without the force of a magistrate's warrant, similar traits can nonetheless be found within

the voluntary Boys' Brigade.

Though promoting the positive moral and physical development of young men, in

being part of a nation-in-arms, the Boys' Brigade was not without its detractors, who

cited the inherent militarism within the movement. Before the 1903 Royal Commission

on Physical Training (Scotland), Reverend W. Walsh of Dundee decried the BB's

methods: "The instruction in the use of deadly weapons; it is that I object to. I say, if you

103Mahood, 52. According to a contemporary source such methods were "to the material advantage of the mercantile marine service, by educating boys to become efficient seamen." See: W.J. Millar, The Clyde,

from its source to the sea, its development as a navigable river, the rise and progress of marine engineering and shipbuilding on its banks, and the leading historical, geological, and meteorological

features of the Clyde valley (London: Blackie & Son, 1888), 134. 104 The effectiveness of such a program was debatable, as the prison-like conditions (as cited by contemporary critics) discouraged boys aboard these vessels to pursue a seafaring career. See:Checkland, Philanthropy in Victorian Scotland, 255.

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use a broomstick, giving sword or bayonet exercise with the broomstick, it constitutes

exercise the end of which is killing."105Three years later, the Peace Societydescribed the

movement as '"this young praying and fighting monster,'" and '"the master-stroke of

Mars.. .dragging true religion into the gutter of corruption.'"106

Such were criticisms that Smith continually faced as his organization grew.

Although creating a youth organization that in many ways imitated the Volunteer Force,

Smith claimed that "it was no part of the purpose of the Boys' Brigade to train boys for

107

the Army." Despite his assertions, contemporary suggestions that the BB was well-

suited in preparing boys for later enlistment could not be easily dismissed. Aside from

the obvious organizational considerations (city battalions, church/Sunday school

companies, 'enlisted men' and 'officers'), the very dress and equipment required of

members—consisting of a belt, haversack, cap and wooden rifle—conveyed a clear

soldierly image.108 Additionally, war enthusiasm during the Anglo-Boer War suggest

such links, as enrolment in the Boys' Brigade grew by thousands in the first year of the

conflict, fuelled in large part by such patriotic sentiments. Furthermore, as shown in a

survey of key Boys' Brigade activities, contemporary rhetoric, and the numerous

105 Report of the Royal Commission on Physical Training (Scotland), Vol.11., #7576. Commissioner J.C. Alston, then president of the Boys' Brigade took exception to this, suggested that this was a mistaken assertion, to which Walsh retorted "I am afraid I shall have to remain, because I have studied all the facts." (#7579) Alston's reply: "I happen to be the President of the whole movement, so I ought to know something about it, and I think it is a pity you should be under a misapprehension." (#7580) 106Ibid.,58. Similar sentiments are offered in a December 1906 edition of the Peace Society's monthly The Herald of Peace, whereby it was argued that although the BB "had avowedly a Christian object in view, was essentially military." (The Herald of Peace (1 December, 1906): 304). X01The Scotsman, February 10, 1908. 108 Citing the need for economy (likely noting his own personal expense as a Volunteer officer), W.A. Smith explicitly opposed a full uniform for Boys' Brigade members, instead only requiring that members wear sensible business attire, along with those few select accessories.

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additional links between the BB and the amateur soldiering movement, a different picture

persists—suggesting that indeed, it served as an ideal vehicle for producing future

soldiers.

During the interim period between the Anglo-Boer War and First World War, the

annual demonstrations and drill inspections were important dates in the Boys' Brigade

calendar, and highlight an interaction between military and civilian spheres. The Glasgow

BB battalion conducted these events not only to display the discipline and abilities

fostered by the movement, but also as a potent marketing tool for new recruits. Held in

late winter/early spring, public demonstrations though only featuring a small portion of

the city's battalion (generally about 1500), nonetheless provided an opportunity for eager

boys to demonstrate their skills before the public and their peers.109 A prominent figure,

usually from the military, presided as Chairman. The evening was opened with a

th

chaplain's prayer and a singing the 100 psalm, followed by a two part programme

consisting of a variety of military displays, as well as a host of less martial pursuits. Here

interested members of the public witnessed activities including bayonet exercises,

"physical drill without arms," ambulance, signalling, bugle calls, vaulting horse, free

gymnastics, and a sport quickly growing in popularity amongst Americans—"Basket

Ball."110A music accompaniment was provided by both brass and pipe bands.111 During

the intermission of one such demonstration, the event chair stated that he was so 109"Glasgow Battalion Demonstration," BBG XX, no. 8(April 1, 1912): 125. mThe Scotsman, May 1, 1906; March 1, 1907; "Glasgow Battalion Demonstration," BBG XIV, no. 9 (May 1, 1906): 142. 111 According to Paul Wilkinson "The marching bands were an especially effective means of recruiting as the movement spread among the cities of Scotland." See: Paul Wilkinson, "English Youth Movements, 1908-1930," Journal of Contemporary History4, no. 2 (April 1969): 5.

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impressed by the boys' ambulance display that "an accident of a mild kind would be

almost welcome."112 Though widely entertaining, demonstrations were of a magnitude

smaller than annual inspections.

The Glasgow drill inspections were much more prominent, drawing a greater

portion of the city's battalion. These were highly publicized events, with thousands of

spectators in attendance. Much like demonstrations held earlier in the year, the general

pattern of these proceedings remained consistent throughout the early-twentieth century.

Drill inspections were held during in the spring months at a parade ground or suitable

venue, over 6,000 boys/officers stood in formation to be viewed by a distinguished

military figure, who on invitation acted as inspecting officer. Following his inspection

(performed on horseback), the boys marched in columns and engaged in various drill

movements. Along with such manoeuvres, displays of semaphore signalling took place,

while a musical selection was rendered by a brass band. The inspecting officer's address

to the company commanders and colour sergeants marked the close of the day's

activities.

Organizations such as the Boys' Brigade and subsequent youth movements also

introduced camping to a demographic unlikely to have experienced it otherwise.

Summer camps were week-long events either in the countryside or at a seaside locale.

Glasgow BB camps were the latter, held in places such as the Kyles of Bute in

Argyllshire, and the Isle of Arran.113 There, while drill and marches were conducted, the

m"Glasgow Battalion Demonstration," BBG (1906): 142. U3"Glasgow," BBG XVII, no. 1 (September 1, 1908): 9.

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military component of Boys' Brigade life was superseded by activities one normally

associates with camping, such as sing-songs and concerts, tug-of-war, sack races, and

football. Parents and visitors were welcomed as spectators, who took the opportunity to

view the proceedings. U4As the Boys' Brigade during this period was populated by

working-class boys, issues of pay factored in a strikingly similar manner as part-time

soldiers. Because camps tended to be week-long affairs, some boys had to forego income

they would have otherwise earned on the job.115 This suggests that in lieu of economic

incentives, the movement's intrinsic values were themselves a form of deferred

gratification.

Combined, these key events—demonstrations, inspections and camps—further

show a nation-in-arms, in that there existed strong resemblances with similar activities

held by the Volunteers, and after 1908, the Territorial Force. While sports and prayer

reflected the Christian, youth-oriented nature of the Boys' Brigade, at a fundamental

level, the bulk of these events mirrored activities normally undertaken by the men of the

Volunteer Force and its Territorial successor. These proceedings featured the use of

skills required of the city's amateur soldiers. The time under canvas, the church parades,

and the recreational activities further bore a strong resemblance to what an average

Territorial experienced during their annual training—a combination of preparing for

national emergency, coupled with the availability of recreational attractions. Like their

adult counterparts, members of the Boys' Brigade were drawn particularly by the outdoor

114lbid. "5Colin Ward and Dennis Hardy, Goodnight Campers! The History of the British Holiday Camp, (Taylor & Francis, 1986), 5.

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pursuits which were available through membership—despite the assertions of more

hagiographic accounts, the martial and religious aspects were not as favoured. 116This

suggests a practical limitation to militarism in this period, even in groups widely seen as

promoting such values.Inspections and demonstrations alone suggest the conscious

promotion of the movement's core aims, including an underlying acclimation of these

young men to military life. Yet, as revealed by examining the respective speeches given

by chairmen and inspecting officers at these events, there exists an overarching theme

that can be associated with the Boys' Brigade—the conditioning of boys for service to

empire.

The concept of taking part within a worldwide empire with Britain as its epicentre

was very familiar to boys of the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century, a pervasive

image impressed upon them in a variety of ways. For these boys, their military-inspired

training served as preparation for active citizenship— that they would be expected to

maintain and contribute to the empire. Moreover, the religious nature of the BB

complemented participation in the maintenance of empire, as it was believed that there

was a moral purpose to British hegemony. Alongside the emphasis on Christian

Manliness, the expectations that these boys would take up service to this was a recurring

premise in virtually all such addresses given in the years leading up to the First World

War. The theme of service feeds into Haldane's notion how through such organizations,

116Springhall, "Building Character in the British Boy," 60-61. In one newspaper account, recreational and educational activities were key components of BB life. "Ambulance classes are conducted.. .Athletic clubs of various kinds—football, cricket, swimming, gymnastics, etc.—exist in connection with most of the companies, while boys' reading and recreation rooms and boys' libraries form prominent features of the work." The Scotsman, September 26, 1910.

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the Territorial Force could be sustained. The MP Sir John Stirling-Maxwell, presiding at

the 1906 battalion demonstration, remarked that "Glasgow has reason to be proud that to

her belongs the honour of having invented the Brigade and endowed our nation with what

117 •

will be, more and more in the future, a most valuable asset." The 1907 inspection was

seen to by Field Marshal Sir George S. White, who in his subsequent address found that

in the Boys' Brigade the "way to make bright, brave, and patriotic Britishers, and he

could not imagine any education better fitted to bring up manly Christian men, fit in

emergency.. .to stand and defend their country."118General John French (Inspector

General of the Forces) considered it:

An excellent thing it was for them all—for their training, their education, their up-bringing—that they should be banded together like that under discipline, that they should be taught lessons of military discipline, order, and method, and all those qualities which were so essential in life.. .He wanted them to remember that the first duty of every good man was to be patriotic and loyal, to serve his country, to be unselfish, and to remember that his country and all concerning the good of his country should come first in his estimation."119

At the Boys' Brigade semi-jubilee later that year, Prince Arthur, Duke of

Connaught and Strathearn,described Glasgow as "the first city to inaugurate a movement

which is so full of promise for the physical development and moral welfare of the youth

of our Empire."120 Lord Provost Bilsland in his speech replied that he "knew of no

"'"Glasgow Battalion Demonstration," BBG XIV, no. 9 (May 1, 1906): 142; Eyre Todd, under "Who's Who in Glasgow in 1909," http://gdl.cdlr.strath.ac.uk/eyrwho/eyrwhol253.htm (accessed August 17, 2010). 118 "Glasgow Battalion: Two Memorable Parades," BBG XV, no. 10 (June 1, 1907): 153; Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, s.v. "White, Sir George Stuart (1835-1912)". u9The Scotsman, May 4, 1908. 120The Scotsman, September 7, 1908.

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http://gdl.cdlr.strath.ac.uk/eyrwho/eyrwhol253.htm


movement in which the Corporation ought to have a deeper interest than a movement

which instilled in the hearts and minds of the younger citizens a right appreciation of

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citizenship and true manliness." Admiral Lord Charles Beresford, acting as inspecting

officer in 1910, congratulated the boys whom he assessed.

The utility of a Brigade like that was not only useful to themselves, but to their country and the Empire.. .the training they had in the Brigade not only fitted them to go into the service of the country in the Army or the Navy.. .but they fitted them for any condition of life.122

He stated further that "The Boys' Brigade, as pioneer of the great movement for training

boys to habits of discipline, obedience, and self-respect, has done a great and patriotic

work for the Empire."123

At the 1912 battalion demonstration Ralph G.C. Glyn stated that three key ideas

had well served the British people—"Fear God, honour your King, and serve your

country."124 By adhering to these basic tenets, he was confident the boys would become

"worthy citizens of a great Empire."125 According to the Earl of Shaftesbury at the 1912

inspection later that year, the Boys' Brigade movement provided the means by which

boys could achieve "the standard of uprightness and of manliness that would help them in

the future to be good citizens of our great Empire." Before concluding, he also wished to

121 Ibid. 122"Glasgow Battalion Inspection," BBG XIX, no. 10 (June 1, 1910): 157. mThe Scotsman, May 5, 1910. 124"Glasgow Battalion Demonstration," BBG XX, no. 8 (April 1, 1912): 125. It is very likely that the very same message was inculcated in these boys at school as well. Nevertheless, such tenets were heavily emphasized at BB functions. 125Ibid.

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impress upon the boys the maxims "love the brotherhood, fear God, honour the King."126

Despite William A. Smith's assertions, such speeches, imbued with the rhetoric of

patriotism and active service to Empire, are telling as to how his contemporaries viewed

the Boys' Brigade movement. Indeed, this was a period steeped in militarism.

Reflecting popular attitudes, juvenile literature paralleled the rhetoric of these men,

emphasizing manliness, chivalry, service, and courage. 127By the turn of the century, there

existed an increasing emphasis on fostering a sense of duty to the nation amongst

Britain's youth—to "instil patriotic duty, encourage masculine traits and bring discipline

to their work routines and leisure pursuits."128 Although the Boy Scouts would more

conspicuously adopt this platform, these were traits already well-known to the Boys'

Brigade. Belonging to the BB was preparation for the culture of civic participation at the

local level, and in the wider sense, contributing to nation and empire.

Additionally, when compared to activities of the Volunteer units as described in

Chapter Three of this study, the Bible classes, sporting events, and ex-members'

associations suggests that life in the Boys' Brigade can be seen as mimicking the

Volunteers not only in its martial aspects, but also in the BB serving as a valuable social

outlet for its members. This programme was successful. By the time of Haldane's

reforms, the Boys' Brigade was an established entity not only in the United Kingdom, but

also beyond the nation's shores, including the United States and much of the British

126"Glasgow Battalion Inspection," BBG XX, no. 10 (June 1, 1912): 150. l27Patrick A. Dunae, "Boys' Literature and the Idea of Empire, 1870-1914" Victorian Studies 24, no. 1 (Autumn 1980): 105. Such was a theme shared by the BB's contemporaries, for example the Boy Scouts (Rosenthal, 53,197). 128Beaven, 96-97.

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Empire. Starting with only one company and a handful of boys, it rapidly grew in the

ensuing twenty-five years; by 1908 it had 1,324 companies and 58,090 boys.129 During

semi-jubilee celebrations of that year, the importance of Glasgow in the Boys' Brigade

movement was evident, highlighted by the overwhelming proportion of companies

hailing from the city—in total 142 took part in the festivities. 130A year later, the BB

claimed 1,350 companies and membership of over 70,000 nationwide; including the rest

of the world, that figure nearly doubled, with 2,300 companies with a total strength of t i i

120,000. In Britain, this growth was partially attributable to The Boys' Brigade being

a movement founded and sustained by the initiative of part-time soldiers—a relationship

particularly evident in the city of its birth. Aside from the notable example of William A.

Smith's background in the 1st Lanark Rifles, there was substantial, active involvement of

Volunteers (and later Territorials) in BB affairs, further highlighting the longstanding

links between the BB and the amateur soldiering movement in the city of Glasgow. For

example, men with Volunteer (and later Territorial) commissions dominated donation

and annual subscription lists.132

In sum, the Boys' Brigade, religious in emphasis, nonetheless drew significant

inspiration from the period's amateur soldiering subculture. Training and drill were

129The Scotsman, 5 September, 1908. 130"Royal Review: List of Staff, Battalions, Companies and Detachments," BBGXVII, no. 2 (October 1, 1908): 30. While it may be inferred that the predominance of local companies was resulting purely from travel expense considerations, a cursory glance at editions of the Boys Brigade Gazette reveal deep Glasgow participation, not only in national demonstrations, but also through the numbers of companies in the city and in donations/subscriptions from local citizens. mThe Scotsman, June 19, 1909. U2BBG XVIII, no. 6 (February 1, 1909): 95. In this list of annual subscriptions, out of the 83 entries, 38 were from Glasgow individuals or businesses.

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along lines not unfamiliar to William A. Smith and his contemporaries, many of whom

oversaw similar activities as Volunteer officers. Attempts to downplay the military

potential of the BB were often overlooked by others who instead viewed the BB as an

avenue towards serving the Empire. As a survey of key aspects of Boys' Brigade

activities shows, while religious considerations drove the movement, the military value of

BB discipline and training did not go unnoticed either in the Volunteer era, or as evidence

suggests, in the early years of the Territorial Force. It was through such an organization

that Richard Burdon Haldane envisioned the TF ranks would be filled. In 1906 as the

newly-appointed Secretary of State for War was outlining his army reforms, part of his

wider vision entailed the role of youth, and how the vigour of the nation's young people

could be harnessed towards home defence. To counter arguments in favour of universal

service, Haldane instead proposed to work with schools and existing youth organizations.

That January, he wrote arguing that raising a body of soldiers:

Is better done through educational channels.If our boys and young men can be induced to prefer rifle shooting to football, and to take an interest in organizing themselves into voluntary corps, a moderate amount of assistance, given ab extra from the Army, will produce material which will naturally tend to organize itself i i-i into large additions to the Volunteer Forces and possibly to the Army itself.

His fourth memorandum of April of that year specifically gave mention to the Boys'

Brigade—an organization that by that time had an established reputation (desired or

otherwise) in preparing youth for later military service. According to the Secretary of

State:

133First Memorandum, Haldane Papers. 272


Even with very little encouragement from the public authorities, and with no help from the public purse, existing cadet corps and Boys' Brigades have proved their value as a means of instilling military efficiency and military discipline in the youth of the nation.134

This was an ideal Haldane continued to hold as the years progressed. In a 1917 address

on the future of the Boys' Brigade movement, he emphasized to the military value of

such organizations:

If in the time of youth, in the Boys' Brigades and in the cadet corps, the boys go through a sufficient amount of training, if they learn enough to make out what they may have to do if they are called on to join the Territorials and defend their country, they would pick up at the age of 18 military knowledge with a rapidity and power of assimilating discipline that is impossible in any other way, and consequently it ought to be more easy to us—organised as the Boys' Brigades may be, without bringing in any undue spirit of militarism—so to shape them that they may be of immense service in a time of real national emergency.135

Haldane cannot be faulted for his ambitions towards the Boys' Brigade, as aside

from its religious undertones, this was an existing organization that fully exemplified his

nation-in-arms: fostering of patriotic initiative through drill and training along the lines of

what a boy would routinely take part in once old enough to join the Territorial Force. It

was precisely through the examples of groups such as this, Haldane argued, that

conscription was unneeded. During the early years of the Territorial Force, he had taken

measures to bring about an official relationship between the War Office and such

uniformed boys organizations. A virtual ultimatum was presented in the 1910 Army

134Fourth Memorandum, Haldane Papers. 135Richard Burdon Haldane, "The Future of the Boys' Brigade Movement" in Proceedings of the Royal Philosophical Society of Glasgow (Glasgow: Royal Philosophical Society of Glasgow, 1917), 10.

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Council's Cadet Regulations to these groups, demanding that they affiliate with County

Associations or potentially lose government assistance.136 If accepting the offer, Boys'

Brigade battalions would be recognized as cadet corps, and have use of a number of

benefits—free use of drill halls and firing ranges, loan of government camp equipment,

and disused army carbines. Further, if these newly-designated cadets were to enlist in the

regular army, the required training period would be reduced.137 The response of the

Boys' Brigade was clear—in a 1911 vote it overwhelmingly rejected affiliation.138

Consequently, access to Territorial facilities was withdrawn. Nonetheless, the BB's

decision reaffirmed the continued emphasis on religious education in its affairs, and was

a strong rebuke to critics who decried the perceived militarism of the movement. Yet, this

was only a temporary measure, as the cadet movement was drastically expanded during

the First World War. A significant number of Boys' Brigade companies were

subsequently incorporated into a Territorial Cadet Force during the war and years

immediately following.139

136Springhall, Fraser, and Hoare, 97. Though the Boys' Brigade thought otherwise, Haldane described affiliation as "certain elementary conditions" (Hansard, 5th ser., vol. 22 (1911), col. 2046).When asked if he were applying pressure on such groups, Haldane replied "Not at all. If they choose to do so they will be very little interfered with: they will be supervised to see that they are efficient.If they are recognized they get certain advantages, but they are perfectly free to remain out" (Hansard, 5th ser., vol. 22 (1911), col. 2045). 137McFarlan, 51. 138 Beckett, Amateur Military Tradition, 220-221. According to Beckett, this measure was voted down by a margin of 87 percent. The Boy Scouts too rejected the War Office proposal, though the Church Lads Brigade (with an executive dominated by conscriptionists) did choose to affiliate. Springhall noted the personal efforts of William A. Smith in steering the BB away from deeper integration with Britain's military establishment, which included threats of unionist support in a contentious 1910 election campaign. See: Springhall, Youth, Empire and Society, 30. 139 R.A. Westlake, A Register of Territorial Force Cadet Units, 1910-1922 (Wembley, Middlesex: R.A. Westlake, 1984), 25.

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Though the Boys' Brigade escaped more formal ties with the War Office, its

potential value in producing recruits could not be denied. Even within the BB movement

this was acknowledged. It took official stances decrying the withdrawal of Territorial

facilities and equipment, stating that this decision was contrary to national interests, for it

was from the BB "it has frequently been testified by officers commanding Territorial

units that they get their best recruits."140 At the Glasgow battalion's annual

demonstration, honorary vice-president Hugh Reid (mentioned in the previous chapter for

his interest in part-time soldiering) defended the value of the Boys' Brigade. In his

address, he argued that:

Both the Army Council and the Territorial Association were greatly indebted to the Boys' Brigade for the supplies, not of raw material but almost the finished article, which it turned out year after year, and so helped to keep up the character and the esprit de corps of the Territorial Force and the Army.14

This was a fact not lost upon Territorial administrators in Glasgow. The Glasgow

County Association unanimously agreed to a resolution in 1911 that "anything that can

be done to continue the cordial relations presently existing between the Military

Authorities and the Boys' Brigade is of benefit to the Territorial Force."142This resolution

formalized existing practice, for from its inception, there is a discernible effort on the part

Glasgow Herald, March 2, 1911. This stance was reiterated that May in a statement by W.A. Smith, where it was acknowledged that in fulfilling its primary religious purpose, "officers commanding Volunteer and Territorial units have frequently testified that that it is from the Brigade that they get their best recruits." Glasgow Herald, May 18, 1911. At an October demonstration at Perth, Smith further added that while not the express purpose of his movement was "desirous to see the Territorials recruited from the ranks of the Brigade." Glasgow Herald, October 30, 1911. 141 Glasgow Herald, 4 March, 1911. l42Minutes of Glasgow Territorial Forces Association, March 7, 1911, NAS.

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of the County Association to maintain a strong working relationship with the Boys'

Brigade. From 1908 on, while retired Volunteers continued to have a notable presence at

Brigade events, Territorials can be seen filling various roles that would have otherwise

been performed by the now defunct Volunteer Force. Not only did Fred J. Smith,

commanding officer of the Eighth Scottish Rifles, on multiple occasions act as inspecting

officer, he donated to the Brigade annually.143 At a 1913 Royal Review of the Glasgow

Battalion, the Ninth Highland Light Infantry served as guard of honour.144 Colonel Sir

George Beatson, an active Territorial officer (RAMC), presided over the annual

inspection of First Glasgow Company. The military potential of Boys' Brigade training

cannot be understated, as evident in overtures attempted by the Glasgow County

Association. At a November 1913 meeting, administrators sent correspondence to the

Commander of the Lowland Division regarding the enlistment of boys leaving the Boys'

Brigade, "suggesting that some arrangement be made whereby it would not be necessary

for these boys to put in the full number of recruit drills."145

This begs this question: To what extent did the Boys' Brigade prove a pool for

future Territorial recruits during these years? Unfortunately, due to a lack of hard

evidence, concrete answers are hard to come by. The nature of Boys' Brigade activities,

the rhetoric of guest inspectors and chairs, the continued participation of former

Volunteers and then-current Territorials in BB events, and even the tacit admissions of

Brigade figures—these considerations may suggest that the club was viewed by many as

143"Head-Quarters Fund: Contributions received by the Brigade Treasurer up till 16th Jan., 1909)," BBG XVIII, no. 6 (February 1, 1909): 95. 144"Royal Review at Glasgow," BBG XXII, no. 10 (June 1, 1913): 153. 145Minutes of Glasgow Territorial Forces Association, November 28, 1913, NAS.

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the natural precursor to future service as a part-time soldier. Given the preponderance of

companies in Glasgow, it is not beyond reasonable doubt that by virtue of numbers alone,

some BB members did continue on as Territorials when they became of age. This fact

was not lost on County administrators, who in a 1911 recruiting pamphlet expressed the

hope that "as the members of the Boys'Brigades and Boy Scout troops grow to man's

estate they would find places waiting for them in their affiliated companies."146 First

World War honour rolls provide some proof in that regard. In the Jubilee yearbook of the

76th Glasgow company, a list of fallen company members includes a substantial number

of men who served in the city's Territorial battalions—including the Fifth and Eighth

Scottish Rifles, the Ninth Highland Light Infantry.147 As the final chapter will show, this

also extended to the creation of a battalion comprised of former BB members.

By 1914, through the efforts of uniformed youth organizations, Britain's young

men had become highly organized.148 Formed with the intent of fostering dominant

middle-class values on working youth, the Boys' Brigade greatly contributed to this

trend. While committed to its guiding Christian principles, the BB nonetheless came to

be viewed as a vehicle for providing military training to boys. Despite the efforts of that

group's founder to insist otherwise, the parallels between the BB and the Volunteers

(later Territorials) were too great to discount. This was evident in the rhetoric of

inspecting officers and other dignitaries in the period leading up to the birth of the

l46The Territorial Force Association of the County of the City of Glasgow, Voluntary Service, 12. 147 Boys' Brigade, 76th Glasgow Company,The Boys' Brigade, 1887-1937 (Glasgow: John Smith & Son, Ltd, 1937), 42. 148Ian Beckett, "The Nation in Arms, 1914-1918," in A Nation-in-Arms: A Social Study of the British Army in the First World War, e d s . Ian F.W. Beckett and Keith Simpson (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1985), 4.

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Territorial Force and into its early years. Given this pattern, it was a natural option for

Haldane to include the BB as a future source of soldiers in his vision of reform. Such

thoughts were not outlandish by any means, for there was an inherent compatibility of

life as a member of the Boys' Brigade with Territorial terms of service as an adult.

Should he opt to enlist, once a boy was too old to continue as a BB member, he would

have quickly found the requirements of a Territorial soldier to be very familiar to what he

had long been accustomed. Because of this, continuities run strong, in both a boy's

transition from Brigade member to Territorial, and in the uninterrupted relationship

between this uniformed boys' movement and amateur soldiering; the latter in particular

speaking to a pre-existing nation-in-arms which underpinned these relationships.

Concluding Remarks

As he formulated his Territorial scheme, Haldane viewed the youth of Britain as the

determining factor in its long-term success; rightly so considering the cultural trends

affecting British adolescents in the years preceding his reforms. Yet our examination of

their role in the amateur soldiering movement draws into question the extent of

militarization of Glaswegian society. While militaristic tendencies were widely present

within schools and youth organizations, these had a limit. It must be cautioned that while

Britain's youth were subject to militarism which was enhanced by the amateur soldiering

movement, participation, especially in Scottish schools, was far from compulsory. The

fashionable use of military drill and discipline in a number of social circles fuelled

debates which took place over the compatibility of a militarized youth in a modern liberal

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democratic society.149 Though subject to criticisms, Baden-Powell's scouts were

somewhat successful in sidestepping notions that their movement was in the business of

training future soldiers. William A. Smith was not as fortunate, and was forced to

continually defend the moral rather than the martial qualities of his Boys' Brigade.

Although the BB held a pioneering role in the development of uniformed youth

organizations, and was better supported in Scotland, it was quickly overshadowed by the

broader-based Boy Scouts and its philosophy of active citizenship rather than martial

living and enforced religion.150 The exponential growth of the Scouts vis-a-vis the BB

suggests that enthusiasm towards military activities was held by a small portion of the

British public. As part of the wider uniformed youth movement, the cadet corpsalso had

its detractors who saw it as an avenue towards militarism for boys from more well-to-do

families.

These criticisms only had a partial influence, for it was a key component of

Haldane's vision that such institutions be co-opted into a wider nation-in-arms. While

not as pervasive as the Secretary of State would have liked, they provided a ready means

by which future Territorials (both enlisted men and officers) could be developed; that

these groups had long been in existence added the additional appeal of economy. Though

charges of undue militarism continued during these years, in groups such as the Boys'

Brigade and the OTC, Haldane had a concrete answer to the compulsion as called for by

his most vocal opponents. This was seen as one more facet within a clearer structure for

149Beaven, 95. Further, the discipline promoted within groups such as the Boys' Brigade can be seen as highly-compatible with what employers envisioned as ideal traits amongst their workers. 150Wilkinson, 7.

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expanding the army in the event of war—all the while based on the tradition of voluntary

military service.

It must be emphasized that the use of martial means to address civilian

concerns—be it physical fitness, improvement of behaviour, or reinforcing ideal

morals—indicated articulations of a nation-in-arms that pre-existed Haldane's reforms.

This limited militarism was enhanced by the continued links with the amateur soldiering

movement, demonstrating a widely felt presence that extended beyond shop floors and

office suites. Territorial officers replaced their Volunteer predecessors as Boys' Brigade

dignitaries; school Cadet units and university Volunteer companies were more or less

seamlessly rolled into junior and senior divisions of the Officer Training Corps; the

Glasgow County Association's stance toward both reflected these well-established ties.

Further, the class composition of the city's corps continued largely unchanged, with the

OTC the domain of those who could afford to attend the private schools and University.

Meanwhile, as the children of artisans, long the backbone of the amateur soldiering

movement in Glasgow, filled Boys Brigade companies. Social and economic distinctions

aside, the nation-in-arms provided the means by which future generations could take up

the cause of home defence, and in essence represented a continued articulation of the

Victorian ideals of active citizenship and proper behaviour. Yet without the nation-in-

arms, these structures would have had to be created from scratch, and done so without the

ready culture of youth participation these organizations had nurtured in the preceding

decades. Here, we see perhaps the most explicit example of how continuity prevailed as

regards the early Territorial Force. The intersecting of military and civilian influences 280


that sustained these youth groups—with their set of allures and constraints—were the

very same that continued to underpin amateur soldering beyond 1908. Indeed, as will be

shown in the conclusion of this study, elements of this culture would endure past the

outbreak of war in 1914, playing a distinctive role in the city's war efforts.

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Conclusion - The Challenge of War

To sum up the achievements of the Territorial Force, it can be said that they showed a remarkable efficiency and a zeal and patriotism beyond all praise.

Edgar Wallace, 19151

Introduction

This study concludes by examining the role of the Territorial Force in Glasgow in the

First World War. Upon the outbreak of hostilities in 1914, Glasgow was in a similar

situation as it was fifteen years prior—with the city's part-time soldiers taking up arms.

The challenge of war was met by local Territorial units, from being placed at strategic

points, to active duty abroad. This however was not a smooth, linear process. Rather, it

reflected both ad hoc adjustments to the strains of war, as well as the reservations of

decision makers as to the Territorial Force's capabilities—in a sense this process mirrored

similar factors at play in the opening months of the Anglo-Boer War. Nonetheless, when

called upon, these men—still the target of doubts as to their effectiveness—fulfilled the

duties required of them. Despite their service, Territorials were not used as a primary

vehicle of army expansion, being disregarded for Kitchener's 'New Armies.' Yet, under

such circumstances, the social and institutional links which bonded local society to the

amateur soldiering movement provided an alternate means in which units could be

mobilized. In Glasgow, three New Army battalions stand as prime examples of this

'Edgar Wallace, Kitchener's Army and the Territorial Forces, the Full Story of a Great Achievement (London: G. Newnes, 1915), 175.

282

The Challenge of War

phenomenon, in a sense demonstrating how the peacetime amateur soldiering movement

there unavoidably served as preparation for the trials of total war. The endurance of such

ties—this nation-in-arms—through both peace and war serves as a fitting close to this

study.

Glasgow's Territorials and the Great War

From both surviving contemporary accounts and regimental histories written after the

war, it can be ascertained that Glasgow Territorials, as well as their counterparts

throughout the United Kingdom, fulfilled and even surpassed their expected duties.

Initially, this entailed the Forceactively taking up their mandated home defence

responsibilities, but as the strains of war became manifest, the men tasked with protecting

the British mainland soon found themselves in front-line combat. Depending on one's

perspective, the coming of hostilities in the summer of 1914 came at either an opportune

time—many Territorial camps were already underway—or the very worst moment, as the

logistics of camp were suddenly complicated with mobilization orders.2 Regardless of

opinion at the time, Territorial units were prompted to their war stations. According to

the official history of the Fifth Scottish Rifles, "by midday 5th August, the battalion had

assembled at its headquarters in West Princes Street, where all was excitement at the

novelty of at last being 'pukka' soldiers. Little did we know then what was in store for

us."3 However, for the immediate future, the battalion, along with their contemporaries

2Mitchinson, Defending Albion, 53.;Mitchinson, England's Last Hope, 194-195. 3Martin, 2.

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in the Force, was far removed from the carnage at the Front.

As regular units prepared and embarked for France, Territorials took up

designated strategic positions. For the most part, this entailed the guarding of ports and

waterways. For example, in late October 1914 (26), the Fifth Scottish Rifles were order

to man defences along the River Tay. According to its official history during the Great

War, this move was in hindsight seen as "only a preliminary to prepare for what was then

considered the supreme honour of being sent on active service."4 Their counterparts in

the Fifth Highland Light Infantry experienced a similar process. After gathering at the

Normal School in Glasgow, they departed for Dunfermline. At this early stage, the

battalion guarded the docks at Methil, Fifeshire.5In accordance with orders received on

August 8, the Ninth Highland Light Infantry was also sent to Dunfermline where they

trained.6 The diary of shipbuilding magnate Sir James Lithgow (then an officer in the

Royal Garrison Artillery) details the activities of his unit of Renfrewshire Territorials.

Before embarking upon active duty on the Western Front, his RGA battalion spent the

initial months of the war guarding the Firth of Clyde. For his men, this early period was

not marked by repelling German raiders, but rather escorting intoxicated night-time

boaters to shore.7

Despite the structures put in place via the 1908 reforms for these very

circumstances, the Territorial Force would be relegated to this limited role, and not turned

4Ibid., 6. 5Officers of the Fifth Battalion Highland Light Infantry, TheFifth Highland Light Infantry in the War, 1914-1918 (Glasgow: MacLehose, Jackson and Co., 1921), 3. 6Weir, 31, 36. 7 Diary of James Lithgow, August 14, 1914, Sir James Lithgow Papers, GB 248 DC 035, Glasgow University Archives.

284


to as the first means of expansion in the early war effort. Doubters within the British

high command, most notably Lord Kitchener (who was appointed Secretary of State for o

War, August 6, 1914), held an unflattering view of the Force. Rather, the new Secretary

of State for War set out to raise corps utilizing the flood of war enthusiasm felt

throughout British society that accompanied the outbreak of hostilities. His 'New

Armies' would consist of battalions based on locality or personal/organizational ties, and

driven by patriotic initiative.9 Though almost entirely consisting of raw recruits eager to

serve King and Country, it was through the New Armies rather than the TF that men like

Kitchener believed large numbers of soldiers could be mustered for a prolonged

conflict.10 His first call for men was made two days after taking office (August 8), asking

for 100,000 volunteers to take up arms. The Territorial Force was immediately

hampered, as they were forbidden to recruit beyond their establishment until this call was

met.11

8 Kitchener succeeded Prime Minister Asquith, who had taken on the Secretary of State position following the resignation of J.E.B. Seely (who replaced Haldane upon his being named Lord Chancellor in June 1912) in March of that year. Simpkins, Kitchener's Army, 31. 9 Hew Strachan, The First World War. Volume 1: To Arms (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 160; Peter Simkins, "The Four Armies 1914-1918," in The Oxford History of the British Army, eds. David Chandler, Ian F.W. Beckett(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 240; David Silbey, The British Working Class and Enthusiasm for War, 1914-1916 (New York: Frank Cass, 2005), 112. As Grieves writes, wider political sentiment in Britain meant that conscription was not a viable option for raising needed manpower, and the New Armies reflected a continued emphasis on voluntary service, even in wartime. See: Keith Grieves, The Politics of Manpower, 1914-1918 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1988), 16. 10 Peter Simpkins, "Kitchener and the Expansion of the Army," mPoliticians and Defence: Studies in the Formulation of British Defence Policy, eds. Ian Frederick William Beckett, John Gooch (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1983), 97; Grieves, 7. "Dennis, 31.Dennis further states that this regulation ensured that when Territorials or New Armies were allowed to simultaneously recruit, momentum was in favour of the latter, which proved more popular. More locally, in the 5th Scottish Rifles' account: "There was a considerable crowd of eligible recruits anxious to join us, but, under orders, we were prohibited from enlisting any but trained ex-members." See: Martin, 2-3.

285


On a basic level, his emphasis on raising the New Armies stemmed from a lack of

familiarity with Britain's auxiliary forces. Kitchener was a detractor of the Territorial

Force since its inception, and viewed every aspect of its operation since then—from

training to its administration—as being of little value.12 This disdain was the product of a

number of considerations: Kitchener had personal reservations about the TF's creator,

based on suspected pro-German sympathies. Although he believed that a force of

500,000 would be needed to effectively prosecute the war on the Continent, he was also

unconvinced as to the ability of the County Associations to handle the task of mass

recruitment.13 There were other, less cynical reasons behind such decision-making;

Territorials being placed at strategic points throughout Britain as opposed to moved more

swiftly to the front reflected Kitchener's fear of German invasion. 14The possibility of the

enemy capturing ports along the English Channel made his decision all the more sensible,

for as Mitchinson writes: "If that scenario became reality, and the Germans launched an

invasion across the Straits, a Territorial division fighting with local knowledge could have

proved invaluable."15

Yet for most of the Territorial Force, this limited role would not endure. With the

realities of the first industrial war and the ensuing need for manpower, the army that was

designed for home defence was ultimately tasked with service abroad. Though at this

early juncture (prior to conscription in 1915), the regulation stating that any overseas

service was purely voluntary was still in force, the overwhelming number of Territorials

12Dennis, 30; Peter Simpkins, Kitchener's Army,41. 13 John Howard Morrow, The Great War: An Imperial History (London: Routledge, 2005), 63. 14Beckett, Amateur Military Tradition, 227; K.W. Mitchinson, England s Last Hope, 236. l5Mitchinson, Defending Albion, 59.

286


assented to the higher obligations. This stands as a great contrast to circumstances before

the war when, as one historian writes "the response [to overseas service] was not

impressive."16 The prewar arrangement and its lack of incentive to take up the optional

'imperial service' resulted in a paltry seven percent of Territorials willing to accept the

greater obligation. With the declaration of war, this changed.17 Concern hitherto

surrounding the willingness to serve during a national emergency was only a peacetime

issue, as war fever resulted for the most part in the majority of TF units assenting to the

expanded duties. Indeed, "it was not uncommon to find units where 80 or 90 per cent did

volunteer immediately."18Glasgow Territorials were particularly eager for active duty, as

over ninety percent of corps such as the Eighth Scottish Rifles did so "without

hesitation."19

The manner in which these men were transferred to frontline duty was an irregular

one.20 The need for men as a stop-gap meant that the anticipated six month period of

training (per TF regulations) did not occur.21 For example, by November 2, 1914, the

Fifth Scottish Rifles were assembled at Southampton alongside their counterparts in the

Ninth HLI, Edinburgh's Eighth Royal Scots, and three London battalions, after which

16Dennis, 29. 17 Beckett and Simpson, Nation in Arms, 129. 18 Beckett, Amateur Military Tradition, 229. Beckett cautions that this was "not always the case." This mostly stemmed from the pre-war demographics of the Territorial Force—many men were older and with families—and also persisting health issues. 19 Ion S. Munro, Youth of Yesteryear: Campaigns, Battles, Service and Exploits of the Glasgow Territorials in the last Great War (Glasgow: William Hodge and Co., 1939), 241, Edward Spiers, "The Scottish Soldier at War," in Facing Armageddon: The First World War Experienced eds. Hugh Cecil and Peter Liddle (London: Leo Cooper, 1996), 316. 20Mitchinson, England's Last Hope, 235. 21Mitchinson, Defending Albion, 59.

287


they departed (November 4) for front-line duty.220nce in France, Glasgow's Territorial

units served ably in combat. The battle record of Glasgow Territorial units is not only

testament to the pressures of total war, but also their ability to prove their worth as

soldiers. The Ninth Highland Light Infantry was one of the first TF units to go overseas,

being sent in November 1914.23 The most recent history of the battalion cites its

participation in a host of major battles, including Loos, Ypres and the Somme. The Fifth

HLI saw action at Gallipoli and took part in a series of campaigns in the Middle-East,

while the Fifth Scottish Rifles were involved in nearly twenty battles in the West.24The

consensus amongst theseaccounts suggests that despite its doubts and detractors,

Haldane's creation—from wartime home defence to service as a reserve line—had

fulfilled its intended purpose.

Additionally, there were factors that distinguished the TF compared to the New

Armies. The first wave of Territorial units to depart overseas required less training than

their New Army counterparts.25 In one such example, as early as 1915 it was stated that

"for this reason they [Territorials] were employed earlier, and, long before Kitchener's

Army had sailed for France, half-a-dozen Territorial units had made their mark in the

field."26 Later historians have noted that even if limited vis-a-vis regular soldiers, the TF

training regimen placed them in a position whereby they could be used on the front, even

22Martin, 8, 12. 23 William Pratt Paul, The Glasgow Territorials, 1858-1946 (Glasgow: McKenzie, Vincent & Co., 1946), 13. 24Fifth Highland Light Infantry, Martin, xix. 25Ian Beckett, "The Territorial Force," in A Nation-in-Arms: A Social Study of the British Army in the First World War, eds. Ian F.W. Beckett and Keith Simpson (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1985), 131. 26Wallace,174.

288


if only as a stop-gap measure as New Armies were raised and trained.27 Kitchener's fear

of the County Associations not being capable of recruiting was—at least in Glasgow—

unfounded. Local initiative is evident in strength of numbers; a total of 7,786 men in

28

1913 rose to over 27,000 on the eve of conscription in 1916.

The extent to which Kitchener consciously excluded the Territorials from his

wartime stratagem has been debated by historians.29 Simpkins argues that notions of

Kitchener's wholesale neglect of the Territorial Force are inaccurate. Their home defence

role was ideal in establishing readiness in the event of a German invasion, which

Kitchener considered a real possibility. It has been also noted that even he recognized the OA

stop-gap value of the Territorials while greater numbers could be brought to bear. Most

telling are Simpkins' statistics, which reveal that in retrospect TF battalions were almost

as numerous as their New Army counterparts.31 In this light, one particularly valid

criticism remains—not in the favouring of one force for another, but rather the inherent

redundancies of two parallel, but not equivalent, bodies mobilizing for war. An early

historian of the Territorial Force believed that "there is no reason to suppose that the

machinery would not have produced the efficient second-line that Haldane intended."

Dennis later argues that "the machinery he [Haldane] created for the Territorial Army

would surely have been a better basis on which to establish a national army than the

27Dennis, 31. 28Annual Returns of the Territorial Force (1913); Munro, 25. 29 Dennis, 31-32. 30George H. Cassar, Kitchener's War: British strategy from 1914 to 1916 (Dulles: Brassley's, 2004), 35. 31 Simpkins, Kitchener's Army, 46. 32M.E. Howard, Lord Haldane and the Territorial Army (London: J.W. Ruddock and Sons, 1966), 14.

289


makeshift organisation that Kitchener set up."33

The neglect of the Territorial Force in favour of the New Armies did not signal the

end of its influence on the war effort in the city of Glasgow. Rather, an emphasis on the

New Armies resulted in a redirection of energies for groups long associated with the

Volunteers and later Territorials. Three strong examples of this phenomenon are the 15-

17th Highland Light Infantry. These service battalions stand out in the context of this

study, as they were raised from amongst the Boys' Brigade, Tramways Department and

Chamber of Commerce, respectively.34 Through such ties, one postwar writer's

assessment is especially apt in that through "the process of time the Territorial and

Service Divisions, so far as the handling and quality of their personnel were concerned,

became practically indistinguishable."35As suggested in these three examples, this

blurring of distinctions was a direct result of an established nation-in-arms in Glasgow

that sustained—and was sustained by—the existence of part-time soldiering there.

The Fifteenth Highland Light Infantry was formed at the behest of Tramways

Department head James Dalrymple and was an intensified articulation of his previously-

discussed enthusiasm for soldiering. During the first fourteen months of the war, the

Tramway Department was turned into a recruiting station. As claimed in the official

battalion history, Dalrymple was able to encourage 10,000 men to take up arms. To do

so, he used the facilities at his disposal, including pipe bands, propaganda posters, open-

air cinemas, and advertisements which "for the first time appeared on tramcar windows

"Dennis, 37. 34Spiers "The Scottish Solider at War,"315. 35Munro, 11.

290


and streamers on the sides."36 Yet, his influence was most felt in what would become the

Fifteenth HLI. Bearing strong parallels to his overtures to the Glasgow County

Association in 1909, this service battalion was recruited from among "drivers,

37

conductors, mechanics, depot specialists, [and] labourers" under his employ.

Chalmers' account of the formation of the Sixteenth Highland Light Infantry—

which came into being September 9, 1914—is much less detailed. Yet, in the wider

focus of this study, the Sixteenth stands out, as it was recruited "to a considerable extent"

from former Boys' Brigade members. Its commanding officer was Lieutenant-Colonel

David Laidlaw, who served in the city's Territorial Force (Royal Engineers) and was also

treasurer of the Boys' Brigade.39The creation of this battalion stands as powerful evidence

of the BB's ability to foster new soldiers, an ability drawn from a pre-existing (though

limited) militarism, and enhanced by decades of ties with amateur soldiering units.

The final of these three service battalions was the Seventeenth Highland Light

Infantry (or Third Glasgow). At a special meeting held on September 3, 1914, it was

unanimously decided to raise a battalion "from mercantile classes."40 In its official

history, it recruited four companies: 'A' consisting of students from the Royal Technical

College (now the University of Strathclyde); 'B' whose ranks were filled with former

private school students; and 'C' and 'D' companies, "composed principally of men from

36 Thomas Chalmers, An Epic of Glasgow: History of the 15th Battalion, the Highland Light Infantry (City of Glasgow Regiment) (Glasgow: John McCallum & Co., 1934.), ix. 37Chalmers^4« Epic of Glasgow, ix-x. 38 Thomas Chalmers, A Saga of Scotland: History of the 16th Battalion The Highland Light Infantry (City of Glasgow Regiment) (Glasgow: John McCallum & Co., 1930), 2. 39 Chalmers, A Saga of Scotland, 4. 40Minutes of the Glasgow Chamber of Commerce, September 3, 1914, Mitchell Library.

291


the business houses and different trades in the city and district."41 On a number of levels,

the links between amateur soldiering and the city's Chamber of Commerce, as described

in Chapter Four, were evident in the formation and training of the Seventeenth HLI.

The special committee formed to oversee the creation of the battalion contained a

substantial number of men that took an active role in the early Territorial Force, for

example: Glasgow Association Secretary T. A. Harvie Anderson, former Lord Provost Sir

Archibald Mclnnes Shaw, R.C. Mackenzie (featured in Chapter One), and Association

Vice-Chairman Hugh Reid.42 As many of these names are those of men who had served

as members of Glasgow Territorial Association, it could be inferred that such service had

prepared them for the task of forming the service battalion at the outbreak of war.

Previous experience in the city's TF was also felt in military leadership. It was

anticipated that former Eighth Scottish Rifles commander Fred J. Smith, himself a

member of the Chamber, would be selected as commanding officer. However, he

withdrew from consideration on the grounds of poor health. Instead, Lieutenant-Colonel

David S. Morton, himself formerly of the Fifth Highland Light Infantry was chosen.43

In all three examples, the speed in which these service battalions were raised

reflected a ready culture of military service, fostered by the longstanding intersection of

martial and civilian interests. The Volunteers and later, the Territorial Force were the

most conspicuous expression of this nation-in-arms, blurring distinctions between these

spheres and offering opportunities for the average man to contribute to the maintenance

41 John Arthur and Ion Munro, The Seventeenth Highland Light Infantry (Glasgow Chamber of Commerce Battalion): Record of War Service, 1914-1918 (Glasgow: David J. Clark, 1920), 15 42Minutes of the Glasgow Chamber of Commerce, September 3, 1914, Mitchell Library. 43Arthur and Munro, 16.

292


of their nation and empire. During the trials of war the culture of active civic

participation that long sustained amateur soldiering in the city of Glasgow continued to

find expression through Kitchener's New Armies.In sum, the 15-17th HLI may represent

the greatest manifestation of continuity in this study.

The Early Territorial Force in Glasgow - A 'Nation-in-Arms'?

In his 1982 work Riflemen Form, Ian F.W. Beckett described the early Territorial Force as

in many ways largely resembling the Volunteer Force it replaced.44However, this notion

formed only a brief mention in his wider discussion, and has gone largely unexplored in

subsequent studies. Taking heed of Peter Dennis' observations as to the potential in

adopting a local perspective, this study has tested this very concept. Using the city of

Glasgow as an example, it is through such aview that the nature and extent of continuity

can be appreciated. It is argued that the practice of amateur soldiering in Glasgow was

relatively unaltered following the 1908 creation of the Territorial Force. Certainly,

substantial improvements did occur as a result of these reforms.The County Associations

gave a forum in which various interested parties could have a say in the administration of

the Territorial corps in their locality. Through a consistent stream of government funding,

officers were at last freed from the monetary liability to their units. Most importantly,

though its actual use was limited, there was instituted a clearly defined role for part-time

soldiers within the army as a whole—a structure that, as highlighted in the army's

experience in South Africa, was of an utmost necessity. Yet, when viewed in the



microcosm of the local, this period can best be characterized in terms of how things

remained the same. As shown in the preceding chapters, this largely stemmed from the

far-reaching presence of Volunteers and Volunteer-related institutions in local society

which were incorporated into the Territorial Force.

This co-optingmay have been driven by the previously cited political need for

economy—that is, had the TF been built on an entirely new foundation, the costs

associated with implementing the organizational and social networks required for the

scheme's success would have been counterproductive. Yet this did not happen, for there

was no need to do so, nor would it have been wise to adopt a radical departure from

previous arrangements. As this study has detailed, the amateur soldiering movement in

Glasgow consisted of a network of personal, professional, occupational, and

organizational ties. There, volunteering drew workers and their employers, schools and

universities, local government and community groups. In Glasgow, this movement was

driven by a local culture that placed a strong emphasis on civic participation. Through

the resulting networks in Glasgow and elsewhere that Haldane found a pre-existing

means for raising and maintaining a body of part-time soldiers. As the cuts proposed by

Haldane's predecessors suggest, to drastically break from these surviving networks would

have been met with insurmountable opposition. As such, the Territorial Force in this

period was not a new entity, but rather an improved version of the Volunteer Force.

Further, the rhetoric of wholesale reform could not dissolve the series of practical

constraints that had been long associated with part-time service on a voluntary basis.

This continuity was also underpinned by a host of social and economic considerations. 294


The "town clerks' army" as described by Arnold-Forster was in reality one of artisans—

and as such their set of requirements in large part ensured the reform would not be as far-

reaching as first envisioned. Indeed, many patterns and peculiarities long associated with

the Volunteers continued unchanged. A comparison of available training regulations,

combined with accounts from Glasgow battalions shows that the training and drill

obligations largely resembled those hitherto, as the everyday concerns of job security and

a living wage remained determining factors

Trade unions, aside from sending representatives to the Glasgow County

Association, had by virtue of its membership a longstanding link to amateur

soldiering.The same skilled workers that sustained organized labour in this period were

also those that had devoted their spare time to home defence. Moreover, the liberal-

leanings of the Glasgow Trades Council was compatible with the amateur soldiering

movement's identification with service to nation and empire. This may explain that while

militarism was a fear in Scottish trade unionism, this consternation would not extend to

full-blown criticism of the Territorial scheme. At the other end of the class spectrum were

the elites of Glasgow society. An analysis of the backgrounds of leading men in both

business and local government reveals in many cases, not only overlapping participation

in both commence and politics, but also an equally shared history in the Volunteer

movement. Although it was from a very early point a working man's movement, out of

financial necessity, those of higher social status continued to take commissions as

officers. In other words, while the rank-and-file remained the domain of skilled workers,

officers continued to consist of men of moneyed backgrounds—those who could afford to 295


attend the private schools and universities that were home to the Officer Training Corps.

It was this same group of officer-businessmen who continued their support either in the

workplace, or through participation in the County Association. Personal affiliation aside,

there may have been more powerful motivations for supporting the early Territorial

Force. That is, it served as a means by which the class relationships of the workplace

could be extended to the campgrounds and drill halls, or vice-versa. This suggests that

even in a period marked by the decline of paternalism, the final vestiges of such practices

can be seen in amateur soldiering.

The study of schools and boys' movements also demonstrate how a local

perspective reveals the reach of militarism during this period. Haldane's ambitions for

the inclusion of youth in his wider scheme were based on a pre-existing Volunteer culture

in places of learning. The university rifle corps and school cadets were transformed into

the Officer Training Corps, which enjoyed both official and non-official links with the

Territorial Force. Working-class youth filled the Glasgow-based Boys' Brigade, an

organization based on Christian beliefs, but also espousing notions of active citizenship.

Although resisting formal government oversight, the continued interaction with the adult

world of amateur soldiering after 1908 strongly suggests that despite protestations to the

contrary, uniformed youth movements were perceived as a pool of future Territorial

recruits.

While Haldane's envisioned nation-in-arms never fully materialized, the ways in

which the Volunteers—and later Territorials—were drawn into the various facets of local

society suggests that a limited form of this ideal did indeed take place, and had already

296


existed hitherto. As such, it is argued that this militarism was limited on account of it not

being an end in itself, but rather a means to other ends—be they social outlets, an avenue

to better health, the regulation of both workplace discipline and the behaviour of youth,

or a genuine concern over home defence. Additionally, military service—even on a part-

time basis—was a means of playing an active, conspicuous role in civic life. It is through

these considerations that despite its limitations, the amateur soldiering movement in the

years preceding the First World War was able to continue its wide reach across local

Glaswegian society.

297

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unte

er C

orps

wit

h di

stin

ct

wor

king

/art

isan

cla

ss c

ompo

siti

on

Oth

er V

olun

teer

Cor

ps (

self

-sup

port

ing,

mid

dle

clas

s, et

c.)

18

Cor

ps -

empl

oyee

s of

Mes

srs

Wyl

ie

& L

ochh

ead

(furn

isher

s and

und

erta

kers

) 39

th C

orps

- em

ploy

ees

of s

hipp

ing

com

pani

es

53rd

Cor

ps -

empl

oyee

s of

J &

W

Cam

pbel

l (W

areh

ouse

men

) 63

rd C

orps

- m

embe

rs o

f gra

in a

nd

prov

isio

n tr

ades

, bak

ers

72nd

Cor

ps -

(fin

e ar

ts) -

jew

elle

rs,

wat

ch/c

lock

mak

ers,

silv

ersm

iths,

engr

aver

s, et

c.

76th

Cot

ps -

dist

iller

ies,

saw

-mill

s, w

harv

es, s

tore

s, an

d su

garw

orks

. 50

th C

orps

- ne

wsp

aper

em

ploy

ees

and

pres

s-m

en(?

)

1st C

orps

- 'e

ntir

ely

self-

supp

ortin

g'

2nd C

orps

- U

nive

rsity

of

Gla

sgow

9th

Cor

ps -

Bank

ers

11th

Cor

ps -

over

flow

of

1st C

orps

15

th C

ompa

ny -

Proc

urat

ors

("m

embe

rs o

f leg

al p

rofe

ssio

n, c

lerk

s, an

d ap

pren

tices

")

17th

Cor

ps -

stoc

kbro

kers

and

acc

ount

ants

33

rd C

orps

- 's

elf-

supp

ortin

g'

50th

Cor

ps-'

'new

spap

er e

mpl

oyes

and

pre

ss-m

en"

77th

Cor

ps -

"mos

tly o

f the

mer

cant

ile c

omm

unity

, but

a u

nive

rsity

pro

fess

or

was

cap

tain

". L

ater

rec

ruite

d fr

om U

nive

rsity

79

th C

orps

- "L

ike

the

77th

at f

irst

a d

rill

clas

s"

22nd

Cor

ps -

wor

kers

of M

essr

s C

ogan

's

spin

ning

fac

tory

82

nd C

orps

- lis

ted

as c

ompr

ised

of

artis

ans

who

wer

e 'to

tal a

bsta

iner

s' 87

th C

orps

- em

ploy

ees

of M

essr

s In

glis

&

Wak

efie

ld (C

alic

o Pr

inte

rs)

8th C

ompa

ny -

wor

kmen

of t

he E

tna

Foun

dry

Com

pany

3rd L

anar

k (7

th S

cott

ish

Rifl

es)

3r Cor

ps -

'wel

l end

owed

,' fu

nded

by

subs

crip

tions

14

th C

orps

- 'p

artia

lly s

elf-

supp

ortin

g'

54th

Cor

ps -

'tota

l abs

tain

ers';

thei

r co

unte

rpar

t the

87th

list

ed a

s ar

tisan

Cor

ps -

4th C

orps

4th

Vol

unte

er B

atta

lion

Scot

tish

Rifl

es (8

th S

cott

ish

Rifl

es)

Art

isans

A

rtisa

ns

Art

isans

7th

Cor

ps-

8th C

orps

12

th C

orps

- E

mpl

oyee

s of

Ten

nant

's

'pur

ely

self

supp

ortin

g'

60th

Cor

ps -

'ent

irel

y se

lf su

ppor

ting'

'e

ntir

ely

self-

supp

ortin

g'

93rd

Cor

ps

Wel

lpar

k B

rew

ery

13th

Cor

ps -

Art

isans

(St.

Rol

lox

dist

rict

) 61

s' Cor

ps -

Art

isans

ijj

to

-o

Vol

unte

er C

orps

(T

erri

tori

al

Des

igna

tion

) V

olun

teer

Cor

ps w

ith

dist

inct

w

orki

ng/a

rtis

an c

lass

com

posi

tion

O

ther

Vol

unte

er C

orps

(se

lf-s

uppo

rtin

g, m

iddl

e cl

ass,

etc.

)

2nd V

B H

ighl

and

Ligh

t Inf

antr

y "C

lyde

Art

isans

" (6

th H

LI)

* A

ll de

rive

d fr

om C

lyde

shi

pbui

ldin

g an

d en

gine

erin

g ya

rds

25th

Cor

ps -

Mes

srs

Barc

lay,

Cur

ie, &

C

o.

26th

Cor

ps -

Mes

srs

R. N

apie

r &

Son

s 27

th C

orps

- M

essr

s. R

Nap

ier

and

Sons

, En

gine

erin

g D

ept.

40th

Cor

ps -

Var

ious

sm

alle

r sh

ipya

rds

68th

Cor

ps -

Mes

srs

Nei

lson

& C

o's

Loc

omot

ive

Wor

ks

69th

Cor

ps -

Mes

srs

J &

G T

hom

pson

's

70th

Cor

ps -

Mes

srs A

& J

Ingl

is, a

nd

Todd

and

Mac

Gre

gor'

s 71

st C

orps

- L

ance

field

For

ge a

nd th

e A

nder

ston

Fou

ndry

3rd

VB

Hig

hlan

d Li

ght I

nfan

try

(7th

HLI

) 30

th C

orps

- co

mpr

ised

"a g

ood

num

ber

of a

rtisa

ns."

(p.

265)

31

st C

orps

- Le

athe

r tr

ade

75th

Cor

ps -

Leat

her

trad

e (o

verf

low

co

mpa

ny o

f 31

st)

38th

Cor

ps -

"bet

ter

clas

s m

echa

nics

" (p

.266

) 45

th C

orps

- G

roce

rs

46th

Cor

ps -

Gro

cers

47

th C

orps

- G

roce

rs

84th

Cor

ps -

Gra

in a

nd p

rovi

sion

trad

e 86

th C

orps

- Ta

ilors

88

th C

orps

- Fl

eshe

rs

96th

Cor

ps -

"a m

ixed

sel

f-su

ppor

ting

corp

s of

citi

zens

"

UJ to

00

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