French ‘Reality Television’: More Than A Matter of Taste? ‘Television has been the witness and companion of a changing France that has learned to wear off-the-peg clothes and to lose its provincial accent; to an extent, television has dug the grave of the old France’. (Hervé Bourges, Director General of France Télévision, 1993). 1. Introduction During the 1990s, what is commonly known in France as the ‘reality show’ has become an increasingly frequent new feature of French television programming. Although some programmes screened in the 1980s can be identified as precursors of those produced in the early 1990s and now, it is only since the start of the current vogue for reality shows that the French television industry has really been forced to define and analyse its attitudes towards reality programming. Periodically during the early growth of the genre on French television there were outbreaks of concern over the legality, morality, and quality of the programmes, but by early 1994 an initial equilibrium of positions in the debate over the new trend of ‘télé-réalité’ seemed to have been established, and industry, regulators and audiences were waiting to see how reality shows would develop. Indeed, now, in the mid-1990s, the permanence of reality programming on French television is leading to a renewed discussion of the merits and disadvantages of showing real-life experience on TV. Reality programming has had success in many countries other than France, and it has been suggested that the reactions of specific countries to this style of television have varied, creating different versions of ‘generic’ programme formats specifically suited to national cultures and television traditions (Kilborn, 1994:430). This is arguably the case in the French experience of adapting US and Italian programme ideas, but the debate in France on reality shows is also interesting in the way it reveals characteristic concerns of French politics and society in general and characteristic features of the relationship between television and the state in particular. Essentially, for some analysts and practitioners, the rise of the reality show is held to be a result of waning confidence in the Republican blueprint (‘modèle républicain’) of government and of the declining welfare state, as well as an indication of trends towards post-modernity in French

television (Leblanc, Maffesoli, 1994). For France, perhaps more so than for other European countries, the evolution of broadcasting has, as Hervé Bourges underlines, reflected a move from the old to the new and from the modern to the post-modern. Reality shows are taking their place in the constant modernisation of French television and society. Analysing the mass media in France, Rigby and Hewitt (1991) have suggested that: ‘If one accepts that the cultural field in France has been dominated by traditional notions of legitimacy, and that these notions have been set up and policed by the educated and cultivated classes, then one does not need to ask to what extent the new media, insofar as they escape from the grip of legitimate culture, have liberated people from norms of cultural oppression and intimidation, and released them into a culture of choice, pleasure and even fun.’. And as a recent study of French thinking on ‘cultural TV’ rightly points out, perhaps the foremost practitioner of the re-thinking of programme genres, formulae and formats as well as what is meant by ‘culture’ in the 1990s has been Pascale Breugnot, the reality show producer of France’s major commercial channel, TF1 (Emanuel, 1994: 145). Some see the new genre of programmes as a contribution to a regrettable lowering of standards towards lowest-common-denominator television (LCDTV), and others believe in their empowering qualities for ordinary citizens, but in the short term at least, reality shows now seem here to stay on French screens. This article will present the major political and economic influences on the development of French television in the 1980s and 1990s, consider the ‘first generation’ of reality programming on French channels and the reactions which arose against the new genre, examine the longest-running and most successful of French reality shows, the Crimewatch-inspired ‘Témoin No. 1', situate reality shows of the mid-1990s within the context of ‘second generation’ reality programming and general trends in French television, and analyse the discourse of justification which has grown up in defence of reality shows. In conclusion, it will be seen how the phenomenon of reality shows illustrates the paradox in which France is caught as she attempts to maintain her cultural sovereignty within the international system at the same time as

succumbing to encroaching commercial imperatives in the broadcasting industry. 2. The French Television Industry in the 1990s The 1980s and the early 1990s have been a period of substantial changes in the French broadcasting system, involving the break-up of the traditional public service framework of three state-owned channels and the gradual multiplication of other channels based on different financial bases and operating with new ethoses. Pressures on the system causing it to evolve have been political, ideological, economic and technological, but all have pushed French broadcasting increasingly towards greater variety, greater competition, and increased sensitivity to commercial criteria in defining programming choices, both in the public service channels and in the private channels. In the 1990s, French television has developed into a dual system in which public service channels (la télévision publique) which are partly funded by the TV licence fee compete with commercial channels (les télévisions privées) for audience figures and in attracting advertising. In the early 1980s, when the first changes to the old, essentially Gaullist-originated TV system first started to appear, France boasted three state television channels providing public service broadcasting, and an absence of any private, commercial television sector. The early years of socialist government saw moves towards the eventual dismantling of the public service monopoly and an increasing freedom of communication in the television industry, based on the July 1982 law on ‘liberté de communication’�. 1981�Télévision de France 1 (TF1)�Antenne 2 (A2)�France 3 (FR3) �� In November 1984 the broadcasting system was galvanized by the creation of the pay-TV channel Canal Plus, which marked the first move away from the system inherited from the ORTF-derived structures of the 1970s. Subsequently, in line with the free-market economic policies of the centre-right Chirac cohabitation government of 1986-88, the nation’s foremost public service channel TF1 was privatized in 1987, introducing a further element of competition into the ‘paysage audiovisuel français’ (‘French

audiovisual landscape’, or PAF for short), after the intervening attribution of fifth and sixth stations firstly to France 5 and TV6 (under the socialist government) and then (under cohabitation) to La Cinq and M6 in 1986. 1987�TF1 �A2�FR3�Canal Plus�La Cinq�M6�� In addition to these changes in the ownership and raison d’être of the off-air channels, reforms were applied throughout the 1980s to the long-standing production monopoly by which channels had been obliged to purchase programmes from the state-owned Société française de production (SFP). From 1982, channels have been able to diversify their sources of programme production, leading to a more varied diet of programmes and a stimulated production industry, albeit in many cases in cooperation with foreign partners.� Some analysts of the PAF see 1991-92 as a turning point in the gradual metamorphosis of the French television system away from a public service monopoly into a demand-led, advertising-dependent and audience figure-driven free market of audiovisual services and products. In such a view, the media’s saturation coverage of the Gulf War, combined with increasing competition between channels in general forced the viewing public to the realisation that it could in fact watch slightly less television, and, in so doing, heightened channels’ competition to attract advertising (Chaniac and Dessault, 1994: 3-4). In 1991, the fifth terrestrial channel La Cinq was actually forced to cease broadcasting because of its failure to obtain high enough audience figures and sufficient advertising revenues, and after its final liquidation in April 1992, the channel’s frequency was re-allocated to the new quality public service Arte-La Sept. 1992�TF1 �A2�FR3�Canal Plus�M6�Arte/La Sept�� Arte and the production company it partners (La Sept) can be considered to have been introduced as an ‘antidote’ to the effects of the commercial imperative throughout the late-1980s and the early 1990s. Certainly, in the view of Hervé Bourges, one of the most influential figures in French television of the past twenty years as a former chief executive of TF1 (and Director-General of Antenne 2/FR3) and as the current president of the regulatory Conseil supérieur de l’audiovisuel (CSA), the expansion of reality

shows in TF1’s programming in 1991-92 marked the final dimension of a drift towards commercialism which had started in the economic difficulties and editorial changes accompanying the channel’s privatisation (Bourges, 1993: 85-86). The ‘state commercial television’ called for by Bourges would combine the financial and commercial rigour of the private sector with the ethical standards and civic duties of France’s traditional public service broadcasting system. Analysis of the distribution of reality shows between the various French TV channels reveals that the public service stations have been more reticent than their commercial competitors in embracing this new genre of programme. Such a reluctance to participate in the vogue for these popular and populist televison programmes is doubtless the result of disinclination, on the part of ‘télévision publique’ to engage openly in what has sometimes been seen to verge on ‘la télévision poubelle’, or trash-tv. The development of the French television industry in the 1980s and 1990s has been principally determined by the movement towards a pluralist system of co-existing public service and commercial channels, within which competition for viewing figures and advertising has itself been the trigger for debate and conflict over issues of quality and cost, or culture and commercialism. In addition, however, French television has also been involved in France’s continuing insistence on protecting her culture in the international system in general, and also in the vexed controversy over France’s ‘cultural exception’ in GATT. In January 1990, French channels were directed to broadcast 50% of films and programmes of French production and 60% of French or European Community origin, these quotas becoming applicable for prime-time scheduling from January 1992. In addition to these constraints on programme choice, the government also obliged national channels to invest 15% of their turnover in French programmes (with the further requirement of broadcasting at least 120 hours per month of French production at prime-time), and to encourage independent programme producers by devoting 10% of turnover to them. This overarching cultural imperative may paradoxically work against the desire to maintain quality. 3. Precursors And Beginnings - 'First Generation’ Reality Shows

The first programme to adopt the approximate format of the reality show was the Antenne 2 'Psy-Show', hosted between 1984 and 1986 by Alain Gillot-Petré, previously best known for his career as a somewhat eccentric television weatherman. Devised by Pascale Breugnot, who has now become the foremost producer of reality shows in France, this programme laid the bases for the ‘psychoanalytic’ obsessions of numerous subsequent 'shows' and indeed for much of the intellectual debate about the phenomenon as a whole (see for an example Daney, 1992).� After these precursors, in the early 1990s the first generation of reality shows started to make its mark on schedules and on the viewing public. The table below presents summarily the main examples of reality programming during this period: Reality Shows 1990 - 1993 Title and Channel �Start�End�Topic and Presenter�� Le Glaive et la Balance (M6) � March 1990� May 1991� Private and public scandals�� En quête de vérité (TF1) � April 1990� December 1990� Retrospective views of press stories (J.-P. Foucault) �� Perdu de vue (TF1) � October 1990 � Continuing� Tracing missing persons (Jacques Pradel)�� Cas de divorce (La Cinq) �

June 1991� April 1992� Adaptation of US show ‘Divorce Court’ using French law �� La Nuit des héros (France 2) � September 1991� December 1992� Reconstitution of real-life heroism, (Laurent Cabrol) �� Défendez-vous (A2) � September 1991 � July 1992� Simulated courtroom arbitration between individuals in conflict �� Urgences (La Cinq) � September 1991 � April 1992� Emergency services stories (J.-C. Bourret)�� L’Amour en danger (TF1) � October 1991� May 1993� Psychoanalysis for struggling couples (Jacques Pradel and Catherine Muller) �� Mea Culpa (TF1) � March 1992� May 1993�

Attempted conciliation between individuals and groups in conflict (Patrick Meney) �� C’est mon histoire (FR3) � March 1992� June 1993� Real-life stories�� Les Marches de la gloire (TF1) � September 1992� June 1993� Re-adaptation of ‘La nuit des héros’ (Michel Creton) �� La vie continue (TF1) � March 1992� March 1992 (1 show)� Reconstituted accidents with handicapped victims (C. Collange) �� La Trace (TF1) � April 1990� Cancelled � Tracing missing persons (Ladislas de Hoyos) ��(Table adapted from Lattanzio, 1994) The French sociologist Alain Ehrenberg has proposed a typology of French reality shows which divides them into three classes depending on their content and, particularly, on their style of presentation. This typology reveals that 'la télé-vérité' can draw its content and approach from all kinds of television programmes, but that most of the original reality shows are derived from three basic styles of television. For Ehrenberg, some French reality shows are based on a 'téléfilm' model, others draw on the 'information-débat' format of programme and others still find their inspiration in the example of French 'variétés' (Ehrenberg, 1993: 15-16).

The téléfilm group of programmes is represented by 'C'est mon histoire', (FR3), and by 'Etat de choc' (M6). These reality shows used actors to give film reconstructions of authentic stories or fait divers-style events and then called on the real protagonists of the events to validate the television version of their story. The information-débat style of reality show is perhaps the most generalized, and depends on the presentation of a problematic situation which is then resolved by the individuals involved and a by certain number of 'experts' present in the studio. The main examples of the information-débat style of reality show are 'Perdu de vue' (TF1), 'L'amour en danger' (TF1), and 'Mea culpa' (TF1). 'Perdu de vue' is concerned with tracing individuals who have disappeared and whose children/partners/families attempt to find them through the services of TF1, involving appeals on screen, telephone calls from viewers and investigations by the TV journalists. 'L'amour en danger' is even more 'intimate’ in its subject and style, dealing with couples whose relationships are in difficulty and who accept to re-enact their differences on camera and to discuss them with the show’s host and TF1's resident psychoanalyst. The third of TF1's original reality shows is 'Mea culpa', which deals with situations in which individuals have been wrongly accused of a crime or of some kind of anti-social behaviour. By showing the behaviour and by attempting to create a dialogue between the protagonists of the quarrel, this show, in the words of its creator Pascale Breugnot, aims to ‘give an opportunity to speak out to people unjustly accused of a crime they have not committed’. Moreover, according to Breugnot: ‘Mea culpa does not provide criminal reconstructions of events, but simple “documents” on France’ (See Dau, 1992).� The variétés-inspired group of reality shows is perhaps the easiest to understand and place in the tradition of French popular television, drawing as it does equally upon the imported concept of the reality show itself and upon the long-established variétés programmes. These shows are exemplified by 'La nuit des héros' (Antenne 2), and 'Les marches de la gloire', in which members of the public participate in the studio in a viewing of an event reconstructed from their own lives and in a discussion of their experiences. As Ehrenberg points out, in his classification the third category combines elements from the first two to produce a composite reality show involving the presence in the studio of real

individuals, viewing a reconstruction of scenes from their own lives. The crucial ingredient for all reality shows is the notion of authenticity, or the obvious reality of the situations being presented to the television audience. In the téléfilm reality shows this authenticity is implicit, because the viewers believe that they are watching re-enactments of nevertheless 'real' events. In the information-débat and variétés reality shows the authenticity of the events is rendered explicit by the presence of the original protagonists in the studio and their interaction with a reality show 'host', with 'experts' and with viewers calling the studio by telephone. We can justify calling these three categories of reality show a 'first' typology of the genre, after its quiet débuts with 'Psy-Show' and arguably 'Le Divan', because Ehrenberg's classification was devised before the appearance of perhaps most controversial of the télévérité programmes. This programme, called 'Témoin No.1', produced by Pascale Breugnot for TF1 and presented monthly from March 1993 by Jacques Pradel represents in many ways the resurrection of an earlier planned programme called 'La Trace', which was cancelled in 1990 because of atavistic fears of informing and civil unrest provoked in France by the desecration by right-wing skinheads of a Jewish cemetery in the southern town of Carpentras. The debate about 'Témoin No.1', has arguably crystallized most of the major doubts about reality shows held in France concerning their legality and quality and the effects they will have on French society and its values. As the longest running of the shows, the very continuity of 'Témoin No.1' has helped to anchor reality programming in French television schedules. 4. Témoin No.1 - TV Justice 'Témoin No. 1' is the French version of Crimewatch-UK. The programme is directly inspired by its UK forerunner, and even Jacques Pradel, the smooth, plausible and ever reasonable presenter of 'Témoin No. 1' seems a clone of British TV and radio's Nick Ross.� In Britain, the potential dangers of programmes such as Crimewatch-UK, Crime Stoppers and Crimebusters have been addressed notably by the Grade Report (HMSO, 1989) and by other studies (Schlesinger and Tumber, 1993, 1994) but in

France the debate has been wider and more heart-felt simply because of traditional French unease at the prospect of informing (Weill, 1990). Created by the Pascale Breugnot/TF1 reality show production line, this programme combines all the features of the genre which caused the withdrawal of the proposed 'La Trace' in 1990 because of the feared abuses of confidence which screening the programme might have encouraged. In fact, the threat of 'Témoin No. 1' goes further than that of ‘La Trace’ through its appeal for viewer-participation and the consequent possibility of discrediting existing traditional mechanisms for the upholding of law and order. As with Crimewatch, the principle of 'Témoin No. 1' is simple : unsolved crimes are presented in the form of filmed reconstructions to the viewing public, who are encouraged to contribute information by telephone to the studio where the presenter of the programme animates a discussion between police, examining magistrates, witnesses and victims. If 'Perdu de vue' can be thought of as a version of 'Avis de recherche' which pulls fewer punches, 'Témoin No. 1' is a kind of 'Perdu de vue' cranked up to include crime and violence. All three of these programmes worried government, the judiciary and viewers’ organisations on their first appearances because of the implicit encouragement that they were feared to give to individuals to intervene in the lives of others without approval, permission or even knowledge of these persons, be they ill, missing, or suspected. From the outset, 'Témoin No. 1' attempted to present its investigations in as serious a fashion as possible - its monthly scheduling represented a desire to distinguish the programme from other reality shows and game programmes in a reflection of its producers’ uncertainty over the reaction of the public and authorities. Despite the cautions of by its creators, 'Témoin No. 1' attracted criticism for the choices of fait divers (incidents) which were investigated and for some of the more sensationalist aspects of its presentation, starting with the very first programme, broadcast on 1 March 1993. This first programme covered unresolved child murders, a topic thought by several critics and analysts of French television to be unnecessarily emotive for a reality aiming at such claims to

seriousness and with such ambitions to be of public service, if not of service publique (Psenny, 1993). In addition to the choice of topics, the style in which the various cases were presented to the viewing public provoked criticism, especially the filmed reconstructions of events (which combined actors and real witnesses), the extravagant camera work, the use of melodramatic music, and even the studio décor. Such criticisms arose even despite the care with which the producers had resolved to deal only with unsolved cases in which there was no suspect, to not screen identikit photos, to not broadcast live phone calls, to not show the reconstruction films without approval from both the families of the victims and the legal authorities, and to transmit any phone leads immediately to the examining magistrates. Ironically, the lengths gone to by TF1 in negotiations with the police and the legal authorities to attempt to guarantee the acceptability of 'Témoin No. 1' also contributed to undermining the programme, since the presence of police and magistrates ‘live in studio’ was seen by some to encourage an unacceptable confusion in the mind of the viewing public between what remained a reality show (however ostensibly careful and serious) and the usual, legitimate procedures of policing and justice.� ‘Témoin No. 1’ is now approaching the end of second year, and has arguably acquired a certain respectability as the doyen of French reality shows. The popularity of the programme with the viewing public has not however made it immune from continued sporadic criticism from the legal establishment. As early as the beginning of the second series, in October 1993, the apparent ‘failure’ of safeguards guaranteeing the close and harmonious collaboration of television journalists with representatives of the examining magistrates allowed the programme presenters to call directly for witnesses to come forward with information, rather than only allowing such appeals to be made by examining magistrates. Again, in late March 1994, ‘Témoin No. 1' was considered to have moved a further step away from its original best intentions of working hand in hand with the established channels of justice when a murder case was taken to TF1 by the lawyer representing the victims parents and screened against the advice and without the participation of the examining magistrate. Such slips can be claimed to be minor errors of organisation, or can be justified by other arguments, but there is a tendency to believe that reality

shows, by their very nature, must follow a downwards path of ever-increasing sensationalism in order to maintain viewer interest and audience figures. Although denied by TF1, there have been claims that only six months after its first showing, ‘Témoin No. 1' was already being distanced from its ‘safe’ formula of collaboration with the magistrates in favour of a ‘freedom of action’ which would allow it to maintain its popularity (Chemin, 1994). It is difficult to gauge to what extent the producers of ‘Témoin No. 1' are driven by the desire either to create a ‘parallel’ system of criminal investigation and justice hypnotically attractive to viewers or by the concern to respect the concerns of those in the legal profession worried by the risks that ‘informing’ and the ‘bypassing’, however slight, of official practices may create for French society. Certainly, the producers of the show repeatedly reject criticisms that they are sensationalist purveyors of human suffering and stress that they make every effort to work in harmony with the police and examining mgistrates.� However, it is also certain that the Breugnot-Mény-Pradel team also believes that ‘Témoin No. 1' is providing a service for those for whom traditional methods of criminal investigation have failed, and that consequently the programme is entitled to exercise occasional freedom from the conditions imposed on it by the CSA regulatory body and by the legal system. Such a belief not only serves to justify occasional ethical-legal slips, but also creates the conditions for a gradual divorce between the programme and the judicial system, since the more often the law can be seen to be an ass, the more often can ‘Témoin No. 1' appear to be producing results and drawing audiences. The easiest path forward is the one that goes downhill, and much debate over reality shows in general has focussed on the fear that like pornography, they may trap viewers in a downwards spiral of stronger and ever less ethically acceptable thrills (Girard, 1993). 5. RP In The Mid-1990s And Trends In French Scheduling The reality shows of the mid-1990s have arguably benefitted from the battles fought for télé-réalité by iconic shows such as 'Témoin No. 1' and from the public’s interest, encouraged by the original first generation of programmes. Some of the especially controversial shows such as ‘Mea culpa’ have been withdrawn because of adverse reactions, and the genre has arguably become

more accepted through reality show producers’ new emphasis on less potentially explosive programme formulae.� Current Reality Shows (1992-1995) Title, Channel and Producer �Start�Topic / Comments�� Bas les Masques - France 2 - Mireille Dumas � September 1992 (Weekly)� Presented by Mireille Dumas. Intimate conversation between presenter and an individual having lived through a crisis. �� Mystères - TF1 - Philip Plaisance � November 1992 (Monthly until May 1994) � Presented by Alexandre Baloud. Investigation/reconstitution of supernatural phenomena with participation of witnesses, experts. �� Témoin no 1 - TF1 - Pascale Breugnot � March 1993 (Monthly)� Presented by Jacques Pradel and Patrick Mény. Appeals for assistance from the viewing public to resolve unsolved crimes. �� Etat de choc - M6 - Philip Plaisance � January 1993 (Monthly until June 1993) �

Presented by Stéphane Paoli. Reconstitution of crimes, interviews with witnesses, protagonists and magistrates. �� Grande famille - Canal + � September 1991 (Weekly) � Jean-Luc Delarue, then Michel Field - ‘émission de témoignages’ �� Pour une nuit ou pour la vie - TF1 � June 1994 (Monthly) � Presented by Annie Pujol, new couples and potential problems in their relationships. �� J’y crois, j’y crois pas - TF1 - Catherine Sinet � September 1994 (Monthly) � Presented by Tina Kieffer. Talk-show on ‘débats de société’�� Perdu de vue - TF1 - Bernard Bouthier � October 1990 (Monthly)� Presented by Jacques Pradel. Tracing of missing persons, appeals for information, reunions in studio. �� Tout est possible ! - TF1 - Pascale Breugnot � September 1993 (Monthly)�

Presented by Jean-Marc Morandini. Discussions, video reports on individuals in various social/personal situations. �� Famille je vous aime - TF1 - Isabelle Quenin � September 1994 (Monthly)� Presented by Isabelle Quenin. Intimate discussions with celebrities about their family life and video reports on various aspects of family relations. �� Le cercle de famille - France 3 � February 1995 (Weekly)� Presented by Isabelle Gayrard and Jean-Claude Oualid. Discussions in studio with individuals experiencing family difficulties, camcorder footage of family life. �� Leçons d’amour - TF1 - Bernard Bouthier � September 1993 (Monthly until November 1993) � Presented by Christian (Doc) Spitz. Questions of sex and love, presented by a ‘yoof doctor’. Third programme withdrawn and series cancelled after complaints. ��(Table compiled from Le Monde and Libération) Antoine de Caunes, one of the prime movers behind developments in French satirical and talk-show television recently described French broadcasting in the 1990s as having moved from the old-fashioned ‘télé du miel’, or saccharine style of 1980s variety shows to what he calls ‘télé du fiel’ - newer, harder, acerbic forms of programmes which he claims respect the intelligence and integrity

of viewers more than did the old ‘condescending’ shows of show-business celebrities endlessly advertising their activities, slavishly abetted by uncritical star-presenters.� De Caune’s intuitive awareness of a change in the mood and nature of some aspects of French television is confirmed by diachronic studies of programming trends in the 1990s (Bosséno, 1994, Lochard and Boyer, 1995). The saccharine TV of the 1970s and 1980s was based on hopelessly dubbed ‘séries américaines’ (imported US serials), an unremitting diet of American films, the ubiquitous prime-time ‘variétés’ and failed attempts to create French soap operas. Since the shake-up of the television industry initiated in 1984 with Canal Plus and reinforced by the creation of La Cinq and M6 and the privatisation of TF1 in 1986-87, scheduling has become varied, with some older programme genres disappearing and new formats, such as reality shows, becoming firm favourites. Two major trends can perhaps be separated out from the complex developments in the programming of the six channels, firstly increasing demand for ‘fiction’, and secondly, a progressive blurring of divisions between different programme genres, particularly within the category of ‘magazines et documentaires’ (Chaniac and Dessault, 1994: 5-6.). The rising demand for fiction actually reached its peak in 1991-92, at the same moment as reality shows broke into prime-time schedules and as the new Franco-German cultural channel Arte/La Sept started to introduce an antidote to the commercialism of the period from 1987. In the taxonomy of programme genres used by the Institut national de l’audivisuel (INA), reality shows are included under the heading of ‘magazines et documentaires’, a category of programmes which behind the increase in fiction, has experienced the second largest expansion over the last ten years. According to INA calculations, the total output of ‘magazines et documentaires’ on all French channels more than quintupled during the period 1983-1993, the volume of such programmes increasing vigorously from 1989 and particularly during 1991-93. The vitality of the category is principally a result of the reality shows produced by TF1, which, classed as ‘magazines’, and alongside other new programmes of light-hearted style based on a presenter-meets-guests format (‘Ciel mon mardi’, ‘Frou-frou’ and ‘Coucou c‘est nous!’) and more slowly evolving ‘cultural’ magazines have caused the genre ‘magazines et documentaires’

to increase its share of broadcasts by 60%. As well as being produced in greater quantities, ‘magazine’ programmes are attracting increasing viewer attention, doubling the number of hours devoted to them between 1989 and 1993, again largely thanks to the appeal of reality shows screened at prime-time. The increasing profusion of magazine styles and formats is leading to consequent difficulties of classifying programmes which, like reality shows in general, combine elements of the talk show, the documentary, variétés and other kinds of television. For some analysts, the confusion is so great that it reveals a general uncertainty on the part of channels about their programming strategy (Jost and Lochard, 1994). Defining reality programming is not a simple task, and inventorising the reality shows offered on French television shows how problematic establishing a nomenclature can be. In the view of Kilborn (1994: 423): ‘RP will involve (a) the recording “on the wing”, and frequently with the help of lightweight video equipment, of events in the lives of individuals or groups, (b) the attempt to simulate such real-life events through various forms of dramatized reconstruction and (c) the incorporation of this material, in suitably edited form, into an attractively packaged television programme which can be promoted on the strength of its “reality” credentials.’ Beyond this useful working definition of the basic technical features of the genre, the French experience of RP illustrates the interest of a thematic approach to describing reality shows. Kilborn suggests that in Britain and France resistance to the US models of reality programming has favoured the development of ‘styles and forms of RP . . . more in tune with national and cultural priorities’ and characterizes French RP in particular as concentrating on topics of ‘love, sex and family relationships’. Thematically, it is possible to divide French reality programming into three main types, namely (i) Everyday dramas of courage, (ii) Talking about feelings, and (iii) Civic action. Such a ‘common-sense’ classification of the varieties and vagaries of the genre is useful in focussing attention on both the specificities of content of French reality shows and on the political-philosophical issues raised in France by their popularity. ‘Everyday dramas of courage’ includes those reality shows which are in many ways the least problematic, for the viewing

public, for analysts, and for moralists. Such programmes deal typically with rescues and the work of emergency services, as in ‘La nuit des héros’. ‘Talking about feelings’ covers those programmes which Kilborn has rightly suggested are most typical of French reality television and which are concerned with ‘love, sex and family relationships’ (Kilborn, 1994: 430). It would be difficult to argue that such concerns are exclusively French, or indeed that national-stereotype perceptions of France as a country of seductively-accented lovers are proved true by her reality shows, but, nevertheless, the success of this type of programme does arguably reflect aspects of the French (Parisian?) obsession with ‘psychotherapeutic discourse’. ‘Civic action’ is a category of reality shows by theme which exemplifies many of the deeper issues concerning French society which are raised by some aspects of the new television. It is this group of reality shows which has focussed attention on the potential of television to create parallel ‘institutions’ of policing, justice and arbitration, whose existence alongside traditional mechanisms may undermine their rôle in a post-modern society. The feared effect of RP on the attitudes of French citizens towards the state and its activities is probably the most ‘culture-specific’ of the phenomena related to reality shows. Analysis of the debate over Témoin No. 1' reveals, as we have seen, how reaction to the programme was informed by concern at a renewal in the French tradition of informing and by anxieties over destabilizing the delicate relationship between the French media and the judicial system. 6. The discourse of justification: empowering reality or counterfeiting ? The first reaction to the early reality shows was especially influenced by a concern over their ethical acceptability and by fears over the influence they might exert on viewers. The highest profile reality show was initially ‘La Trace’, which was eventually withheld from the screens before its first programme, because of anxiety that it might recreate the tradition of informing last seen under the Vichy regime. The cancellation was explained by the then deputy Director of of TF1 as being the consequence of a climate in France in which a programme such as La Trace could not be broadcast, because of the ‘illness and shock’ suffered by the country as a result of a skinhead-led desecration of a Jewish

cemetery in the town of Carpentras (Claude, 1990).� Even without the stimulus given to the debate over reality shows by Carpentras, government and judiciary had already shown disquiet at the dangers of such programme formulae. The regulatory Conseil supérieur de l'audiovisuel (CSA) had warned TF1 that programmes must avoid encouraging informers and must not interfere in ongoing trials or with personal liberties. The Justice ministry had suggested the establishment of a 'comité d'éthique audiovisuel', and both various syndicats de magistrats and television viewers’ associations had expressed reservations. One forthright official view on ‘La Trace’ was expressed by Catherine Tasca of the Communications Ministry, for whom such reality shows were doubly ‘deceitful’, firstly as copies of foreign programmes, and secondly because duping honest citizens into believing that self-help, tale-telling and informing could be more effective than the police and the courts was ‘medieval’, and a much more serious offence than even simple monetary counterfeiting (Cojean, 1990).� Tasca’s reference to the foreign origin of the reality show formula is by no means gratuitous in the context of French television’s paranoia about ‘cultural imperialism’, but the main thrust of debate about ‘La Trace’ and subsequently about 'Témoin No. 1' concerned the pernicious influence they might exert on the public’s confidence in France’s institutions. TF1 defended 'Témoin No. 1' against criticisms by claiming that the programme fulfilled a rôle of public service and public interest in providing the police and the courts with the assistance of the foremost media, television (Mougeotte, quoted in Le Caisne, 1993).� In general, the early debate over reality programming concentrated on the political and social issues which they were felt to raise in the particular context of France’s sensitivity about informing, the rôle of the police and the independence of the courts. As the shows have evolved and gained currency in schedules, a variety of arguments have been developed for and against the reality show genre of television. The supporters of reality shows believe that they are a healthy example of French television's praiseworthy modernization and a sign of a laudable new attention being paid to the demands of the viewing public, features which have made the new style of programmes a firm favourite (Pradel, 1992 and Breugnot, 1992). For their critics, reality shows represent the worst excesses of a

lowest-common-denominator programming policy driven by audience viewing ratings (the infamous 'dictature de l'Audimat'), and the ever-present necessity to contain production costs (Garcin, 1992, Girard, 1993 and Mamou, 1993). The various reality shows undoubtedly attract healthy viewing ratings, and are also inexpensive to produce for television channels inreasingly aware of commercial imperatives, as the following table illustrates.� The low price of reality shows compared with the production costs of films or other fiction programmes is one of the principal reasons for the increase in their numbers (Cortade, 1992: 44-45). The popularity and cost of reality shows Reality show�First shown�Channel & time �% viewers aged + 6 �Market share�Cost per programme�� Perdu de vue La Nuit des héros L'Amour en danger � Oct. 1990. Sept. 1991. Oct. 1991.� TF1, 20h 50. A2, 20h 50. TF1, 22h 45.� 8.4 11.4

7.5 � 40 %. 28 %. 45 %.� 1.5 million francs 2.1 million francs 0.8 million francs ��(The table is modified from Cortade, 1992) Surprisingly, for a country generally held to be obsessed with its status as a purveyor of high culture, in France the arguments against reality shows have made relatively little reference to issues of quality, and consequently, the defenders of reality programming have been able to develop a case for the shows which justifies them in other terms. Rather than quality, it has been criticisms of the political acceptability and ethical value of reality shows which have guided the elaboration of the case for their defence. The case for the defence of reality programming has evolved in two stages: firstly, the producers of shows such as 'Témoin No. 1' made efforts to work within the guidelines set out by the regulatory bodies such as the CSA; secondly, a ‘discourse of justification’ was developed for reality shows which disqualifies criticism of them for competing with official, traditional institutions and excuses them when they contravene the guidelines established to curtail their ambitions. This justification emphasizes the ‘direct democracy’ and ‘empowering’ effects of reality programmes. In the case of 'Témoin No. 1', the efforts made by TF1 to comply with the requirements of the CSA actually increased potential confusion on the part of the viewing public over the ‘legitimacy’ of the show’s phone-in to the police, at the same time as reducing the perceived freedom of action of the show in providing a ‘parallel’ system of investigation and justice. 'Témoin No. 1' has since drifted away from its initial readiness to address fears over its influence on civic values in a move towards the

single most important justification advanced for reality shows: the ‘interactive’ participation of real citizens in television. The authenticity, interactivity and 'hyper-reality' of the reality shows, in which viewers are audience, participants, experts and animators are all factors which are adduced by reality show supporters such as Jacques Pradel when they claim that this a new kind of television - a convivial, caring 'télé du frère' rather than the didactic authoritarian 'télé du père' of the bad old days (Pradel, 1992). However, the issue of ‘quality’ has nopt been totally forgotten in the debate. One aspect of maintaining France’s cultural values through television is represented by occasional (usually annual) dictation competitions, the finals of which are screened at prime-time, revealing to the public the difficulties and glories of French grammar. The ‘high-priest’ of such spectacles, (and also an indefatigable presenter of higher-brow literary discussion programmes), is Bernard Pivot, who has arguably become an unofficial champion of broadcasting standards, and who, early in the debate over reality shows, castigated the genre in the following curious mix of scatology and existentialism: ‘The more I learn that my neighbours are up shit creek, the more I see them undressing, arguing, being shouted at, crying or calling for help, the more I’m content with my own lot in life: Hell is other people.’ (Garcin, 1992: 92).� 7. Conclusion: ‘Hell is other people’ ? Reality programming in France is indeed an issue which raises many questions. The introduction of reality shows in France has generated criticism and justification, and their continued presence in the PAF reflects features both of the broadcasting industry, and, more generally, of trends in French society. In summing up, it is necessary to consider again ‘empowerment’ and ‘commercialism’, and to reflect on the future impact of newer technologies than simple broadcasting on French audiovisual culture. Firstly, RP in its French forms is claimed by many of its practioners to provide ‘empowerment’ of the individual, sometimes legally and socially, but most often through enhanced mental hygiene. Countering this view in particular is Pivot’s opinion that reality programming forces viewers into interaction, and that ‘Hell is other people’, an opinion diametrically opposed to the discourse

of justification appealing to crudely Freudian notions of the cathartically therapeutic benefits to be derived from the sharing of intimate details on TV, and to the democratic ‘plus’ they bring to society. It is true to say that the worst reality shows can be accused not only of airing people’s secrets, but also of encouraging viewers to watch dirty linen in public. Pivot’s defence of ‘quality’ (and modesty) reveals the properly disturbing feature of reality shows in France, which is that they proclaim the supposed irrelevance in the modern world both of time-honoured patterns of private behaviour and the breakdown of society’s traditional mechanisms for dealing with its own dysfunctionings through recourse to impersonal, impartial justice or professional, private, expertise. Whatever French society’s occasional misgivings about the relationship between its judicial system and politics, whatever the scandals that occasionally discredit politicians and however frail the confidence expressed in the reliability of the media, the discourse of justification for RP overstates the case for parallel procedures of personal, social and legal interaction. At the same time, French RP has ignored the simpler ‘viewpoint-empowerment’ of citizens provided in Britain by video-diary and other individual-opinion programmes. Crucially, the psychoanalytically-dominated discourse of justification has hijacked the debate on RP and stifled discussion of simpler questions of cost and quality, neglect of which may well be undermining France’s higher-order ambitions of maintaining her cultural standing in the world. Secondly, the French example of ‘téléréalité’ confirms the conclusion of general studies of reality programming in Europe that recourse to RP reflects a general trend for commercial imperatives to become predominant in production and programming decisions. In France as well, reality shows are indeed cheaper to produce for comparable audience ratings than other forms of programmes, and they are devised and sold according to principles of marketing (Chaniac and Dessault, 1994). Much of the argument over the place of reality shows in the schedules of either TF1 or France 2 mirrors the evolution of the PAF during the 1980s and 1990s into ‘télévision publique’ and ‘télévisions privées’ and the implicit conflict that this implies between ambitions to maintain ‘quality television’ on the one side and temptations to take advantage of lowest-common-denominator

programming on the other. A manichean perspective on the public service-commercial division in broadcasting obviously understates the potential overlap between the two sides, and Hervé Bourges for one (and others) have been vociferous in their calls for a ‘state commercial television’ in which imperatives of culture and commerce would merge (Bourges, 1993: 199-217). It is interesting to note that reality shows are mainly to be found on the commercial channels TF1 and M6, the service public offered by France 2 and FR3 seemingly rationing its offerings of the new genre. However, the fact that France 2 and FR3 have been restrained in their use of reality shows does not necessarily mean that they have protected quality; even if it is TF1 which has led the way with RP, it is interesting to see how the public service channels have responded in the schedules by screening equally popular (and arguably equally ‘low-quality’) programmes in order to compete for viewing figures. Cultural and commercial imperatives have been in tension since the PAF started evolving towards its current hybrid form in the early 1980s, and reality programming is one of the aspects of French television which is raising the quality/ratings issue most visibly, but it is possible that the smoke of the battle over reality shows is hiding the real danger for French culture. If, as has sometimes been argued, the idea of a ‘state commercial television’ may reflect a certain envy of British patterns of broadcasting and Reithian quality and variety, France should realize that by producing her own, inexpensive, popular and populist television in the form of reality shows, she is undermining her higher-order ambitions to be the foremost purveyor of quality culture. There is a cruel paradox in France’s protectionist quotas of French programmes in television schedules and her insistence on ‘l’exception culturelle’ in GATT, that against a background of ‘bad’ television, dominated by American imports, innovatory French programmes such as reality shows, admittedly based on US or Italian models, are criticized for being low-quality televisual fare unsuitable for a country of such high cultural standards as France. To pursue the culinary metaphor, France should perhaps wonder rather more whether it is better to consume fast-food ‘made in the USA’ or to accept that the in the form of reality programming at least, the burger is here to stay, and then ensure it is made using indigenous ingredients . . .

Finally, to return to the suggestion made by Rigby and Hewitt (1991) that ‘the new media’ have freed people from ‘norms of cultural oppression and intimidation’, we can indeed see now that Pascale Breugnot’s polemicking with Bernard Pivot in 1992 illustrated her readiness to challenge received ideas of what was culturally legitimate on television, and how, in thus opposing her against the watchdog of the ‘educated and cultivated classes’ the issue of reality shows reveals how the ‘new media’ of television in the 1990s has begun to present the viewing public, if not with pleasure and fun, at least with choice of new programmes. Nowadays, of course, television is a ‘new media’ only in a relative sense, given the technological advances which have created multimedia and virtual reality, and French planners aim to provide a universal service of multimedia via the Information Superhighway by 2015. It will soon be to these newest of new media that one will have to look to see how the struggle between conservative and radical interpretations of culture, quality and politics is developing in France, but in the meantime, the last word on reality shows should perhaps lie with Hervé Bourges, now poacher-turned-gamekeeper president of the regulatory Conseil supérieur de l’audiovisuel: ‘Despite ratings successes - which may change - I refuse to believe that this hotchpotch of greed-TV, sleaze-TV and sex-TV is really the future of our television’ (Bourges, 1993: 220) References Bosséno, Christian (1994) (ed.), Télévision française, la saison 1993. Paris: Corlet-Télérama-CNC. Bourges, Hervé (1993) La télévision du public. Paris: Flammarion. Breugnot, Pascale (1992) 'Pascale Breugnot répond à Bernard Pivot', L'Evénement du jeudi (12-18 March): 104-105. Chambat, Pierre and A. Ehrenberg (1993) 'Les reality shows, nouvel âge télévisuel?', Esprit (January): . Chaniac, Régine, and S. Dessault (1994) La télévision de 1983 à 1993, chronique des programmes et de leur public. Paris: INA. Chemin, Ariane (1994) ‘L’émission de TF1 ‘Témoin No. 1' prend ses distances avec les magistrats’, Le Monde (20 April): 11. Claude, Patrice (1990) ‘TF1 abandonne le projet de l’émission “La trace”’, Le Monde (18 May); 13. Cojean, Annick (1990) 'Enquête en direct', Le Monde (18 April): 10.

Colonna d’Istria, Michel (1993) ‘Le CSA s'inquiète sur les dérives de la "télévérité" sur TF1', Le Monde (9 July): 7. Cortade, J.-E. (1992) 'De la réalité au show', Médiaspouvoirs (No. 28., October-December): 42-49. Daney, Serge (1992) ‘Marché de l’individu et disparition de l’expérience’, Libération (20 January): 8. Dau, S. (1992) ‘Reality shows: les chaînes se déchainent’, Libération (11 March): 2-3. De Caunes, Antoine (1994) ‘Antoine de Caunes - jusqu’où rira-t-il ?’ interview,Télérama, (22 December): 43-45. Cojean, Annick (1990) ‘Les risques de la justice face à la télévision’, interview with Mme Delmas-Marty, president of the commission justice pénale et droits de l'homme', Le Monde (18 April): . Ehrenberg, Alain (1993) 'La vie en direct ou les shows de l'authenticité', in Esprit, 'Les reality shows, un nouvel âge télévisuel?' (January): 13-35. Ehrenberg, Alain (1994) L’individu incertain. Paris: Calmann-Lévy. Emanuel, Susan (1994) ‘Cultural television: current French critiques’, French Cultural Studies June:139-50. Erhel, Catherine (1993) ''Témoin No. 1' : les gendarmes au bout du fil', Libération (23 May): 44. Garcin, Jérôme (1992) 'Putain de part de marché', interview between Bernard Pivot and Jérôme Garcin, L'Evénement du jeudi, (20-26 February): 89-93. Girard, I. (1993) ‘Reality shows: comme le porno, toujours plus hard!’, L’Evénement du jeudi (17-23 July): 33. Hare, Geoffrey (1994) ‘The Broadcasting Media’, pp. 238-270 in J. E. Flowers (ed.) France Today. London: Hodder & Stoughton Jost, François and G. Lochard (1993) ‘Les politiques de programmes: l’ère du doute’, Le Monde (19 April): 27. Kilborn, Richard (1994) ‘“How Real Can You Get ?”: Recent Developments in “Reality” Television’, European Journal of Communication 9(4): 421-439. Lattanzio, Liliane (1994) (Ed.), ‘De la Télé-vérité au Reality Show’, Dossiers de L’audiovisuel 55: . Leblanc, Gérardf. (1993) ‘Happy Ending, scénarios de la vie ordinaire’, in Esprit, 'Les reality shows, un nouvel âge télévisuel ?' (January):. Leblanc, Gérard (1994) ‘Reality Shows: l’intime dans le moule de l’institutionnel’, interview with G. Leblanc, in Médiaspouvoirs 34(2): 114-117.

Lochard, Guy, and H. Boyer (1995) Notre écran quotidien, une radiographie du télévisuel. Paris: Dunod. Maffesoli, Michel (1994) ‘Une télévision de la post-modernité’, interview in ‘De la Télé-vérité au Reality Show’, Dossiers de L’audiovisuel 55: 25-26 . Mehl, Dominique (1994) ‘La télévision compassionnelle’, in Dossier: ‘Télévision et débat social’, Réseaux 63: 101-122. Le Caisne, Nicole (1993) 'Télé-flic, télé-choc', L'Express (25 March): 52-54. Mamou, Yves (1993) ‘Le CSA émet des réserves sur l’”éthique des programmes” de France 2’, Le Monde (13 July): 16. Pradel, Jacques and J.-M. Perthuis (1992) Perdu de vue. Paris: Jean Claude Lattès. Pradel, Jacques (1992) ‘Démagogie ? Non, hygiène social', interview in Le Nouvel observateur (18 March): 43-44. Psenny, D. (1993) ''Témoin No. 1' fouille les impasses judiciaires’, Libération (1 March): 45. Report of the Working Group on the Fear of Crime (Grade Report) (1989), London: HMSO. Rigby, Brian, and N. Hewitt (1991) France and the Mass Media. London: Macmillan. Schlesinger, Philip and H. Tumber (1993) Fighting the war against crime: Television, police, and audience. British Journal of Criminology (Winter): 19-32. Schlesinger, Philip and H. Tumber (1994) Reporting Crime: Media Politics of Criminal Justice. Oxford: The Clarendon Press. Weill, Pierre (1990) ‘Les Français et la délation’, pp.121-132 in Duhamel, Olivier, and J. Jaffré (eds.) Sofres: l’état de l’opinion 1990, Paris: Le Seuil. Notes � Law of 29 July 1982 - article 1.: ‘Les citoyens ont droit à une communication audiovisuelle libre et pluraliste’. This was later almost completely abrogated by the Law of 30 September 1986 ‘relative à la liberté de communication’, itself modified and completed by the law of 17 January 1989. � For a fuller discussion in English of these changes, see Hare, 1994. � In a similar vein, and although not always classed as a reality show, the famous 'Le Divan', presented by Gérard Miller on

FR3 can perhaps be grouped together with 'Psy-Show' by virtue of its on-screen investigation of an individual's psyche, (albeit a celebrity individual rather than an ordinary member of the viewing public). � 'Donner la parole à des personnes injustement accusées d'un délit ou d'une faute qu'ils n'ont pas commis.' and 'Dans Mea culpa, il ne s'agit pas de reconstructions mais de simples documents sur la France.' � To place 'Témoin No. 1' in the context of American television (and, indeed as an illustration of the American origins of many 'reality shows') it suffices to say that it is the gallic version of crime programmes such as 'Rescue 911' (CBS), 'Unsolved Mysteries' (ABC), and 'America's Most Wanted' (Fox). � A further complication for the ambiguous status of 'Témoin No. 1' occurred in Spring 1993 when the judicial system and the police became even more closely involved in the programme through the 'requisitioning' of the journalists involved by the magistrates, and by the presence of police officers responding directly to telephone calls to the studio switchboard. (See C. Erhel, 1993). � For example, Patrick Mény, speaking at the British Institute in Paris conference on ‘Trial by Media’, 23-24 September 1994. (Proceedings to be published in Franco-British Studies.). � ‘Mea culpa’ was cancelled in April 1993 and withdrawn shortly after, following a series of complaints brought against TF1 by individuals and localities claiming to have been defamed by their portrayal in the programme. � De Caunes is best known in Britain for the pop music programme Rapido (BBC 2) and for the Friday-night titillation of EuroTrash (C4), with Jean-Gaul Gaultier. � Etienne Mougeotte: ‘J'ai la conviction qu'il y a aujourd'hui dans notre pays un climat qui fait que l'émission qu'on pouvait envisager ne peut plus se faire . . . La France est malade. Elle se relève d'un grand traumatisme, et nous devons en tenir compte.'.

� ‘Ce sont doublement des projets de faussaires. D'abord, ce sont des plagiats d'émissions étrangères. Ensuite, faire croire à d'honnêtes gens que le système D, les racontars, la délation peuvent faire mieux que police et justice pour révéler la vérité, c'est vraiment nous renvoyer tout droit au Moyen Age. Cela me paraît beaucoup plus grave de de fabriquer de faux billets’. � Etienne Mougeotte (Deputy Director, TF1): ‘Avec Témoin No. 1, nous exerçons une mission de service et d' intérêt publics en nous mettant à la disposition de la justice et de la police, en leur offrant, dans l'accomplissement de leur devoir, le soutien du plus grand média, la télévision'. � Other reality shows are similarly inexpensive and equally, if not more popular than these, such as TF1’s ‘La vie continue’ (2.0 million francs), and ‘Mea culpa’ (0.8 million francs). � 'Plus j'apprends que mon voisin est dans la merde, plus je le vois se déshabiller, engueuler, se faire engueuler, pleurer, appeler au secours, plus je suis satisfait de mon petit destin personnel. L'enfer, c'est les autres'. 'Putain de part de marché', interview between Bernard Pivot and Jérôme Garcin. �