Francisco Suárez on Beings of Reason and Non-Strict ...

volume19,no.27 june2019

Francisco Suárez on Beings

of Reason and Non-Strict

Ontological Pluralism

Brian EmbryUniversity of Groningen

© 2019 BrianEmbryThis work is licensed under a Creative Commons

Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License. <www.philosophersimprint.org/issue/>

A retherebeingsofreason?Thisquestionappearsinthetitleof thefirstsectionof thefifty-fourthofFranciscoSuárez’sMetaphysical Disputations (DM). At this point in the Meta-

physical Disputations,allweknowisthatbeingsofreasonarenotreal(DM1.1.4–6,XXV,3a–4a;54,prol.1,XXVI,1015a).SothefirstquestionofDM54.1isthis:aretherebeingsthatarenotreal?Atfirstglancethisquestionseemsabsurd.Ifsomethingisabeing,howcoulditfailtobereal?ThefirstpositionreportedbySuáreztakesjustthisline.Accord-ingtothisnegativeposition,abeingofreasonismadeup[fictum],justasPegasusismadeup.Butclearlysuchthingsdonothavebeing:“itisacontradictiontosaythatthereissuchabeing,sincewhatisonlymade up [fingitur] does not have being [non est]” (DM 54.1.2, XXVI, 1015b).1

Buttherearealsoreasonstosaythattherearethingsthatarenotreal,thingsthatareonlymadeup.TheprimaryargumentinsupportofwhatIwillcallthepositiveposition(‘realist’willnotdo,sincebe-ingsofreasonarebydefinitionnotreal)isthat“thepropertiesofbeingapplytobeingsofreason,forabeingofreasonisoneormany,anditisintelligible,etc.”(DM54.1.3,XXVI,1016a).2Thisone-lineargumentcanbereadinseveralways.Itcanbereadasaffirmingthatbeingsof

All references are to the Vivès edition of Suárez’s Opera omnia. The Meta-physical Disputations are cited by disputation, section, and paragraph num-ber,followedbythevolumeandpagenumbersoftheVivèsedition.Ihavecomparedallquotationsagainstthe1597Salamancaeditionandnotedonediscrepancyinthenotes.AlltranslationsfromLatinaremyown,butIhaveconsultedJohnDoyle’s(1995)generallyreliabletranslationofDM54.

1. Thenegativepositionseemstohavebeenaminorityposition.Suárezattri-butes it tooneAntonioBernardidellaMirandola(1503–1565),andhesaysthat Francisco Mayrone (d. ca. 1328) defends the negative position for thesakeofargument.AsfarasIcantell,Mirandoladoesnotdiscussbeingsofreason in his commentary on the Categories (Institutio in universam logicam [Rome,1562]).Foracriticaleditionof therelevantMayronetext,seeNoraCuhrováandLukášNovák,eds.(2006).LaterJesuitsattributethenegativepositiontooneVallesius,loco non invento.

2. Suárezdoesnotciteanyoneinfavorofthisposition.Inhistranslation,DoylesuggeststhatSuárezhasinmindThomistssuchasCapreolus,Ferrara,andSoncinas(Doyle1995:60,fn.14).However,itisnotclearfromtheirdiscus-sionsofbeingsofreasonthat theseauthorsendorsedthepositiveviewasSuárezstatesit.

brianembry Suárez on Beings of Reason and Non-Strict Ontological Pluralism

philosophers’imprint –2– vol.19,no.27(june2019)

MysecondmaincontentionisthatSuárezprovidesaninterestingandcogent response to this objection when arguing against ontologicalmonism (§3). Suárez’s response to this objection forces us to distin-guishbetweentwokindsofontologicalpluralism:strictandnon-strict.In the end it will become clear that Suárez’s pluralism is non-strict.Suárez’spluralismpresentsadialecticaloptionnotcurrentlyon themenuofcontemporarymeta-metaphysics.

1. Suárez’s Remarks: An Exegetical Puzzle

Myintentioninthissectionisnottoestablishtheontologicalpluralistreadingbut topresentSuárez’sposition inhisownwords.ThiswillsetupandexplaintheexegeticalpuzzlethatmotivatesmuchofthecurrentscholarshiponSuárez’spositiononbeingsofreason,apuzzlethattheontologicalpluralistinterpretationcansolve,asexplainedinthefollowingsection.

Suárez initially seems to affirm the positive position. The “trueopinion,”hetellsus, is that“thereare[dari]3somebeingsofreason”(DM54.1.4,XXVI, 1016a). It isat thispoint thatSuárezprovideshisformaldefinitionofabeingofreasonas“whathasbeingonlyobjec-tivelyintheintellect”(DM54.1.6,XXVI,1016b).4Ireturnbelowtothis

3. Ihaveencounteredasurprisingamountofresistancetomychoiceoftranslat-ingdari as‘thereare’.Ihavetworeasonsfortranslatingdarias‘thereare’:first,theclaimthatthereare[dari]beingsofreasonissupposedtobeananswertothequestionwhetherthereis[an sit]suchathingasabeingofreason.Sec-ond,Suárezoftenusesdari andesseinterchangeably.Forexample:“Therefore,unlesshedoesnotknowwhathe issaying,noonecandenythat there is[dari]suchathing,madeupbycognitionalone,unlessperhapsheisequivo-catinginhisuseoftheverbdarioresse” (DM54.1.7,XXVI1017a).Thisclaimmakessenseonlyifweassumethatesseanddariareequivalent,forwhyelsewouldanequivocationonesseberelevanttotheclaimthatthereare[dari] notbeingsofreason?Further,Suárezoftenmakesontologicalclaimsusingbothesseanddari.Forexample,inhisargumentfortheexistenceofGod,heusesbothesseanddaritoexpresstheclaimthatGodexists(DM29).Tothosewhoremainunconvinced,Isaybearwithme.Whatmattersistheexegeticalpuzzlegeneratedbelow,andthatpuzzlecanbegeneratedwithoutrelianceontheuseofdari,sinceSuárezalsosaysorimpliespassimthatbeingsofrea-sonhavebeing(esse).

4. Thedefinitionofabeingofreasonwasthesubjectofsomedebatesincethe

reasonhavepropertiessuchasbeingoneandbeingintelligible;butsomethingmustbe tohaveproperties;so,therearebeingsofreason.Call thisthecharacteristic argument for non-existents.Alternatively,theargumentcouldbereadasaffirmingthattherearetruthsaboutbeingsofreason.Forinstance,itistruethatagoat-stagisnotaman-lion(sotheyaremanyinsteadofone).Butpropositionsaretrueonlyifsome-thingmakesthemtrue,andtheonlythingscapableofmakingittruethatagoat-stagisnotaman-lionarethegoat-stagandtheman-lion.Hence,therearesuchthingsasgoat-stagsandman-lions.Callthisthealethic argument for non-existents.Finally,theone-lineargumentcanbereadasaffirmingthatwecanthinkaboutbeingsofreason—theyareintelligible—butonecan’tthinkaboutsomethingunlessitistheretobethoughtabout.Hence,therearebeingsofreason.Callthisthein-tentionality argument for non-existents.Thepositivepositionallegesthattherearebeingsofreasoninthesamesenseinwhichtherearecatsandhats.Suchitemsareneededasbearersofproperties,astruthmak-ers,andasintentionalobjects.

Suárezendsupendorsingaviewthatmakesgoodontheinsightsofboththenegativepositionandthepositiveposition.Heagreesthatthereisasenseinwhich‘therearebeingsofreason’iscontradictoryandthereforefalse.Buthealsorecognizesthepowerofthevariousargumentsfornon-existentobjects,especiallytheintentionalityargu-ment, and he develops a position according to which we can thinkabout non-existent objects. Suárez’s view of non-existents has re-ceivedsomescholarlyattention,butithasbeeneithermisrepresentedornotfullyunderstood,inwaysthatwillbecomeclearasweproceed.Myaim in thispaper is toestablishwhat I take tobe thedefinitivefeaturesofSuárez’sviewofnonexistentobjectsanddemonstratetheirphilosophical import. My main contention is twofold. First, Suárezthinksthatbeingsofreasondonotexist,buttheyhavebeingnonethe-less.Suárezisthereforeanontologicalpluralistinthatherecognizesmorethanonewayofbeing(§2).Themainobjectiontoontologicalpluralisminthecontemporaryliteratureisthat,atbest,itisamatterofmerebookkeepingratherthanontologyand,atworst,itisnonsense.



Forstrictlyspeakingthisproposition,‘Achimeraisnotabeing[est non ens]’,istrue.Becauseifitisafictitiousbe-ing,itisthereforenotabeing.[DM54.5.16,XXVI,1035b]

HereSuárezclearlystatesthatbeingsofreasondonothavebeingandarenotbeings,therebyapparentlyendorsingthesortofcontradictionimputedtothepositivepositionbyadvocatesofthenegativeposition.Forheendorsesboth(1)and(2):

(1)Therearebeingsofreason.

(2)Beingsofreasonhavenobeing.

We are therefore faced with an exegetical puzzle. What exactly isSuárez’sviewoftheontologicalstatusofnonexistentobjects?Aretheybeingsornot?Ifso,whatarewetomakeofSuárez’sinsistencethattheyarenot?Ifnot,whatarewetomakeofhisinsistencethattherearesuchthings?

2. The Ontological Pluralist Interpretation

Suárezhimselfprovidestheresourcestoresolvetheapparentcontra-dictionbetween(1)and(2).Insupportofhisview,Suárezciteswithapproval Aristotle’s distinction between two kinds of being [duplex esse]:“onewhichistrulyinreality,andtheother,whichisnotalwaysinreality,butonlyintheapprehensionofthemind”(DM54.1.4,XXVI, 1016a).5ThefirstkindofbeingSuárezcalls‘realbeing’,andthelatterhecalls‘objectivebeing’(DM54.2.3,XXVI,1019a).Asweknowfromabove,beingsofreasonarenotreal,sotheylackrealbeing.ButSuárezinsiststhroughoutDM54thatbeingsofreasonhaveobjectivebeingor,equivalently,theyhavebeingobjectively.Totakeanespeciallyclear

5. Seealsothe Index locupletissimus, (4.2.2,XXV,xva):“Wespeakintwowaysaboutbeing:inoneway,as‘being’comprehendsonlytruerealbeings.[…]Inanotherway,asitextendstomanythingsthattrulyandintrinsicallyarenotbeings,butarecalledbeingsonlythroughacertainextrinsicattribution.Suchareprivations,andallbeingsper accidensorbeingsofreason.”

notionof“beingobjectivelyintheintellect.”FornowitissufficienttonotethatforSuárez,beingsofreasonappeartohavesomesortofbe-ing.SoSuárez’sviewisthattherearenonexistentobjectsofthought.

Suárez thinks we must posit beings of reason precisely becausewecanthinkaboutthemandsaytruethingsaboutthem.Suárezalsomakes the point, now familiar from Quine (1948), that denying be-ingsofreasonlandsoneinparadox:“Wecouldnotevendebateaboutbeingsofreasonwithoutthinkingofthem.[…]Therefore,unlesshedoesnotknowwhatheissaying,noonecandenythatthereissuchathing,madeupbycognitionalone”(DM54.1.7,XXVI,1017a).

Suárez faces the charge of contradiction raised by advocates ofthenegativeposition.Howcantherebenonexistentobjects?Suárez’scharacterizationof theontologicalstatusofbeingsof reasonexacer-batesthisproblem.Immediatelyafterstatinghisview,Suáreztellsusthat beings of reason do not “have any true similarity with real be-ingsbyreasonofwhichtheyshareacommonconceptofbeingwithrealbeings”(DM54.1.4,XXVI,1016a).Thus,beingsofreasonareun-likerealbeingsinsofarasbeingsofreasondonothavebeing!Suárezmakessimilarremarkselsewhere:

Tobeonlyobjectivelyinreasonisnottobe[non est esse] but to be cognized or made up. Thus the common de-scription that can be given of the common concept ofbeing–namely, thatwhichhasbeing–reallydoesnotapplytobeingsofreason[…]abeingofreasonissuchthatbeingcannotapplytoit[ens autem rationis tale est ut ei repugnat esse].[DM54.1.10,XXVI,1018a]

medievalperiod.Foradetailedandcritical reviewof themajorviews,seeFonseca, In libros metaphysicarum, vol. 2 (Rome: 1589) lib. 5, ch. 7, q. 6, pp.402ff.Suárezalsoprovidesasecondarydefinition:abeingofreasonis“thatwhichiscognizedbyreasonasabeingbuthasnobeinginitself”(DM54.1.4,XXVI,1016a).Suárezseemstotakethisdefinitiontobeequivalenttothefirst,butitisnotclearthatthetwodefinitionsareequivalent,asnotedinNovotny(2013:103).



we would be involved in a contradiction” (DM 54.1.7, XXVI, 1017a).Hereheisassumingthatabeingofreasonisbydefinitionsomethingthatdoesnotexist;hence,itwouldbecontradictorytosaythatbeingsof reason, which do not exist, exist. Yet Suárez has also stated that(1)thereare[dari aut esse]beingsofreason.Intheabovepassage,heexplains thatwhenhemakesclaimssuchas(1),weare to interprethimasmeaning(1a).Inexactlythesamewayandforexactlythesamereasons,whenSuárezmakesclaimssuchas (2),weare to interprethimasmeaning(2a).

Soonmyreading,Suárezisanontologicalpluralistinsofarashethinks there ismore thanonewayofbeing.6Theontologicalplural-istinterpretationgivesuseverythingwewantinaninterpretationofSuárez’sviewoftheontologicalstatusofbeingsofreason.Itcomportsfairlystraightforwardlywiththetexts,anditaccommodatestheargu-mentsforthepositiveposition.ForSuárez,therecanbetruthsaboutbeingsofreason,thoughtsaboutbeingsofreason,andpropertiesofbeingsofreason,allbecausethereisasenseinwhichtherearebeingsofreason.Beingsofreasondonotexist,but theydohaveobjectivebeing.

InarecententryintotheliteratureonSuárez’sviewofbeingsofreason,ChristopherShields(2012)arguesthatSuárezisanontologicalmonist,andbeingsofreasonhavenobeingwhatsoever.WhenSuárezsaysthatbeingsofreasonhaveobjectivebeing,Shieldsinterpretsthisasmeaning simply that wecan think aboutbeingsof reason,but itdoesnotfollowthatbeingsofreasonaretheretobethoughtabout.AsIexplainbelow,IthinkthereissometruthtoShields’sinterpretation,butIalsothinkitismisleadinginsofarasitdeniesthatSuárezisanontologicalpluralist.IdonothavethespacetoargueatlengthagainstShields’smonistinterpretation,butItakeitthatthereisenoughgoingfortheontologicalpluralistinterpretationtowarrantworkingoutitsdetails,towhichInowturn.

6. AversionofthisinterpretationisendorsedbyCanteñs(2003)andNovotny(2013,2015),anditishintedatinDoyle(1987,1988).

example,Suárezstates,“Althoughabeingofreasondoesnothaverealbeing,itdoeshaveobjectivebeing”(DM54.2.3,XXVI,1019a).

Suárezexplicitlystatesthat‘being’ispredicatedanalogouslyofrealbeings and beings of reason and that we do not have a concept ofbeingthatappliestoboth(moreonthisclaimbelow;DM54.1.9–10,XXVI,1017b–1018a).Thatis,‘being’hastwodifferentsenses,andonesenseappliestobeingsofreason,whileanothersenseappliestorealbeings.Soonewaytoresolvetheapparentcontradictionbetween(1)and(2)istoreadthemasexpressingtwodifferentsensesof‘being’:

(1a)Beingsofreasonhaveobjectivebeing.

(2a)Beingsofreasondonothaverealbeing.

Thisreadingdissolvestheapparentcontradictionbetween(1)and(2).Suárezhimselfdisambiguatesontologicalclaimsinexactlytheway

Iamsuggesting.Hewrites:

Whenwesaythatthereare[dari aut esse]beingsofrea-son, we do not mean that they are in reality accordingto trueexistence,otherwisewewouldbe involved inacontradiction. […]Suchbeingsare therefore said to benotsimpliciterbut ina respect,according to theircapac-ity—namely,onlyobjectivelyintheintellect.Andsothematterisclear.[DM54.1.7,XXVI,1017a]

AtthispointSuárezhasasserted:

(1)Therearebeingsofreason,

butSuárezisawareofthefactthat(1)isambiguousbetweenatleasttworeadings:

(1a)Beingsofreasonhaveobjectivebeing,

(1b)Beingsofreasonexist.

Suáreznotesthat(1b)isself-contradictorywhenheclarifies:“wedonotmeanthattheyareinrealityaccordingtotrueexistence,otherwise



And now Suárez can say everything the ontological monist can say.But themonistalsocanacceptSuárez’sspecificonticpredicates,de-finingthemintermsofthegenericonticpredicateandsuitableotherpredicates,perhapsasfollows:

xobjectivelyis=dfxgenericallyisandxismind-dependent

xreallyis=dfxgenericallyisandxisnotmind-dependent

AndnowthemonistcansayeverythingthatSuárezcansay(eveniftheydisagreeaboutcases).ThisshowsthatwhileSuárezandthemo-nistuseadifferentlanguage,theysaythesamething.Theonlydiffer-enceisthatSuáreztakesspecificonticpredicatestobemoresemanti-callyprimitivethanthegenericonticpredicate,whilethemonisttakesthegenericonticpredicatetobesemanticallymoreprimitive.Butthisappearstobeamatterofbookkeeping,notamatterofphilosophicalimport.

Fortunately,Suárezrespondstothispreciseworry.Itiseasytomiss,butSuárezisfullyawareofthethreatfromontologicalmonism,andhethinkshehasadecisivereasontopreferontologicalpluralismtoontologicalmonism.InSuárez’scontext,theontologicalmonistmain-tains that ‘being’ is univocal between cats and goat-stags. Suárez’sargumentagainst thisclaimconstitutesanargument forontologicalpluralismand,a fortiori,aresponsetotheidlehypothesisobjection.Toseehowtheargumentgoes,wemustfirsthaveinmindaroughsketchofSuárez’sframeworkforthinkingaboutsemanticanalogy.

Suárez takes for granted the standard scholastic framework forthinkingaboutlanguage.8Accordingtothisframework,thetermsofanartificiallanguagelikeEnglishorLatinareassociatedwithor“sub-ordinatedto”concepts,whichfunctionastermsinamentallanguage.ForSuárez,a termn inaspoken language isunivocal just incasen issubordinatedtoasingle,uniformconcept(DM28.3.2,XXVI, 13b;28.3.21,XXVI,21a). (It isnotentirelyclearhowSuárezconceivesof

8. SeeSuárez,De anima3.5–6,III,630a–641a.FormoresustainedtreatmentofSuárez’sdoctrineoftheanalogyofbeingasbetweenvariousexistents,seeAshworth(1995),Heider(2007),andSalas(2014).

3. The Idle Hypothesis Objection

Theontologicalpluralistinterpretationsolvestheexegeticalpuzzlein-troducedinSection1,butitraisesanew,philosophicalproblemaboutontological pluralism itself. Some philosophers, like Peter van Inwa-gen(1977:300a),professnot tounderstandontologicalpluralismatall.Otherssaythatontologicalpluralismis“obfuscation”(Quine1948:23),“hallucinating”(Lewis1990:30),“gibberishormerenoise”(Lycan1979:290).7Thereisonebasicideabehindalloftheseobjections.Theworryisthatontologicalpluralismisanidlehypothesisbecauseitisor canbemade tobenecessarilyequivalent toontologicalmonism(McDaniel2009;2017,ch.1).Asaresult,thereisnoreasontopreferontologicalpluralismtoontologicalmonism.Toseethis,consideranontologicalmonistpositionthatSuárezhimselftakestobeanalterna-tiveviewtohisown.Suárez’smonistopponentsdenythattherearemultiplewaysofbeingand that therearemultiplesensesof ‘being’.Themonistthereforesaysthattherearebeingsofreasoninthesamesenseinwhichtherearecatsandhats.Forthemonist,thedifferencebetweenbeingsofreasonandcatsisnottheirwaysofbeingbuttheirproperties:beingsofreasonaremind-dependent,say,butcatsarenot.

Suárez’s languagecanbemadenecessarilyequivalent to themo-nist’s.Thispoint is typicallymadenowadays in termsofquantifiers.Suárez uses quantifiers to express ontological claims, but he moreoftenusesonticpredicates like ‘is’.Accordingly, Iwill formulate theobjectionintermsofonticpredicates.Suárezrecognizestwospecificonticpredicates—‘objectivelyis’and‘reallyis’—whereashismonistopponentsrecognizeonlyone,whichwecanwrite,‘genericallyis’.AsMcDaniel(2009;2017,ch.1)nicelyshowsinanothercontext,Suárezcanaccepttheontologicalmonist’sgenericonticpredicate,definingitasadisjunctionofhisspecificonticpredicates,asfollows:

xgenericallyis=dfxobjectivelyisorxreallyis

7. LycanusesthesewordstodescribeMeinongianquantification.



(2)Beingisnotintrinsictobeingsofreason.

(3)Hence,thereisnoconceptofbeingcommontobeingsofreasonandrealbeings.

(4)Hence, ‘being’isnotpredicatedunivocallyofbeingsofreasonandrealbeings.

Understanding this argument is absolutely crucial to understandingSuárez’sbrandofontologicalpluralismandthemotivationbehindit.Italsoturnsouttobemuchmorecogentthanitatfirstappearstobe.Iwilldemonstratethisbyaprocessofexplanationandrefinement,be-ginningwithpremise(2).

3a. Intrinsic and Extrinsic BeingSuárezexplainsthedifferencebetweenexistenceandobjectivebeingintermsofintrinsicalityandextrinsicality:existenceisanintrinsicsortofbeing,andobjectivebeingisanextrinsicsortofbeing.Althoughitiseasytomiss,thisfeatureoftheviewisprominentinSuárez’sinitialstatementofhisposition:

Butthatwhichisthusobjectivelyinthemindsometimeshasorcanhavein itselftruerealbeing,accordingtowhichitisanobjectforreason,andthisabsolutelyandsimplyisnotatruebeingofreasonbutreal.[…]Butsometimessomethingisanobjectfororconsideredbyreasonthatdoesnothaveanotherrealorpositivebeing in itselfbe-sides being an object for the intellect or reason think-ingaboutit.[…]Therefore,‘beingofreason’iscorrectlydefinedas thatwhichhasbeingonlyobjectively in theintellect,orthatwhichiscognizedbyreasonasabeing,even though it has no entity in itself. […]Therefore,fromthisexplanationoftheword,whichisalsoadefinitionofthethingsignified(insofarasadefinitionispossible),itcanobviouslybegatheredthatthereissomethingthatcanbecalledbythetitleofabeingofreason.Formanythings

anon-uniformconcept,butforourpurposesthatwillnotmatter.)Atermnisequivocaljustincaseitissubordinatedtomultipleconceptsbychance.Forexample,theDutchword‘bank’isequivocalbecauseitissubordinatedbychancetotheconceptofafinancialinstitutionandtotheconceptofapieceoflivingroomfurniture.Aspokentermnisanalogicaljustincase(i)nissubordinatedtoanon-uniformconcept,9 or(ii)nissubordinatedtomultipleconceptsbydesign,duetoanap-propriaterelationshipbetweenthesignificatesofthoseconcepts.Theterm‘healthy’isanalogicalinthesecondsensebecauseitissubordi-natedbydesigntotheconceptaproperlyfunctioningbiologicalstate(asinahealthycat)andtotheconceptofthepowertobringaboutsuchastate(asinhealthyfood).

NowSuárezarguesagainsttheunivocityofbeingasfollows:

Butacommonconcept[ofbeing]hasnoplacehere,sincesuch a concept requires that inferiors truly and intrinsi-cally10participateintheformsignifiedbythename.Buta being of reason cannot intrinsically participate in thebeingbywhichabeingissaidtobe.[DM54.1.10,XXVI, 1018a]

HereSuárezdeniesthatthereisacommonconceptofbeingthatap-pliestocatsandgoat-stagsalike.Itfollowsthatthenaturallanguageterm ‘being’ (and its cognates) cannot be subordinated to a single,common concept of being. Hence, univocity is false. As a first pass,theargumentappearstorunasfollows.

Suárez’s argument against the univocity of being:

(1)IfconceptCiscommontox1,x2,…xn,thenCsigni-fiesapropertyintrinsictox1,x2,…xn.

9. Anexampleof this sortofanalogy is ‘exists’,whichsomehowhasenoughstructurebuiltintoapplyprimarilytoGod,andthentosubstances,andthentoaccidents(DM28.3.21,XXVI,21a).Howexactlythisworksremainsamys-terythatSuárezhimselfwasunsureabout.

10. Readingintrinsece withVivèsratherthanextrinsicewiththe1597edition.



hintscanbeilluminatedbythecontemporaryliteratureontheintrin-sic/extrinsicdistinction.14

David Lewis once informally characterized the distinction as fol-lows:“Ingeneral,somethinghasanintrinsicpropertysolelyinvirtueofhowthatthingitselfis;ithasapurelyextrinsicpropertysolelyinvirtueofhowaccompanyingthings,anditsexternalrelationstothoseaccompanying things, are” (Lewis 2001: 384). Here Lewis character-izestheintrinsic/extrinsicdistinctionintermsofthe in virtue of rela-tion.Heultimatelyfindsthischaracterizationunsatisfactorybecausewedonothavea“clearenoughunderstandingof‘solelyinvirtueof’”(Lewis2001:384).

However,thein virtue ofrelationhasbeenthesubjectofmuchprog-ressinrecentmetaphysics.Evencriticsofthein virtue of relationagreethatwehaveaclearenoughunderstandingofit(Wilson2014,Koslicki2015).Advocatesnotethatweoftensaythatcertainfactsobtaininvir-tueofothers.Wemightsay,forexample,thatglassisfragileinvirtueofitsmicrophysicalstructure,anactiswronginvirtueofthefactthatitcausespain,IaminpaininvirtueofthefactthatmyC-fibersarefiring,and‘Trump’referstoTrumpinvirtueofabaptismceremony.15 Grounding theorists advocate taking such claims at face value, andtheyoffertheoriesofthein virtue of relation,whichistheconverseofthegroundingrelation.Therearemanyopenquestionsaboutground-ing,butforourpurposeswemayunderstanditveryroughlyasarela-tionofnon-causalproductionbetweenfacts,suchthatifAgroundsB,

14. SomeofSuárez’sJesuitfollowersoffermoreinthewayofatleastdescribingthe difference between intrinsic and extrinsic denominations. A character-ization remarkablysimilar toLewis’scanbe found in Izquierdo,Pharus sci-entiarum,d.12,q.3,n.42,p.298a.AnotherinterestingpassageisinCarleton,Philosophia universa,Logica,d.14,s.1,p.70a.Carletonnotesthatthestandardexampleofanextrinsicdenomination,being cognized, canbehadinanintrin-sicfashion,aswhenonethinksaboutoneself,butbeing cognizedisanextrinsicdenominationnonethelessbecauseintrinsicdenominationsarenecessarilyintrinsic.

15. These examples are adapted from Rosen (2010). Similar examples can befoundpassiminthegroundingliterature.

areconceivedbyourintellectthathavenorealbeingin themselves. [Myemphasis,DM54.1.6–7,XXVI,1016b]

HereSuárezstatesthatbeingsofreasonbydefinitionhavenobeingin themselves.Inotherwords,objectivebeingisanextrinsicsortofbe-ing.InotherplacesSuáreztellsusthatobjectivebeingisanextrinsicdenomination,whileexistenceisanintrinsicdenomination.11

ForSuárezthenotionofanextrinsicdenominationdoestheworkofthecontemporarynotionofanextrinsicproperty,asopposedtoanintrinsicproperty.Examplesofintuitivelyintrinsicpropertiesincludebeing made of tin, being a human, and having negative charge. Ex-amplesofintuitivelyextrinsicpropertiesincludebeingagrandmother,beingPeter’sfavoritecoffeeshop,andbeingthoughtabout.Suárez’sownexamplesofextrinsicdenominationsincludebeingseen,beingloved,beingto the leftofacolumn,beingclothed,being located inRome(DM54.2.8–9,XXVI,1020a),beingmarried,beingabuyer,andbeingaseller(DM54.6.6,XXVI,1040b).12SoSuárezthinksthatbeingforagoat-stagisanextrinsicproperty,likebeingtotheleftofacolumn,whereasbeingforacatisanintrinsicproperty,likebeingmadeoftin.13

Buthowexactlyarewe tounderstand thenotionofextrinsicbe-ing? Getting a grip on this concept provides significant insight intoSuárez’sbrandofontologicalpluralismandalsohelpstounderstandwhyherejectstheunivocityofbeingwithrespecttorealbeingsandbeingsofreason.AsfarasIknow,Suáreznowhereattemptstoanalyzetheintrinsic/extrinsicdistinction,buthedoesprovidehints,andthose

11. Examplesof theseclaimsaboundinSuárez.Forastart,seeDM54.2.11–12,XXVI,1020b–1021a;8.1.4,XXV,276b;31.1.2,XXVI,225b;32.2.14,XXVI,323a.Theclaimthatobjectivebeingisextrinsicdoesnotmakeaprominentappear-anceinmanylaterJesuittreatmentsofbeingsofreason,butGiuseppePolizziattributesittoSuárezandarguesatlengthforit(Philosophicarum disputatio-num tomus primus de logica,d.11,s.5,pp.133a–136a).

12. Formoreexamples,seeDoyle(1984).

13. Ifirstproposedtheideaofunderstandingextrinsicbeingasanextrinsicprop-ertyinEmbry(2017).



columninvirtueof therelativepositionsofmyselfandthiscolumn,whichisnotapartofme,sobeing to the left of this columnisanextrinsicproperty.Iamasellerbecauseofatransactionbetweenmyselfandabuyer,whoisnotapartofme,sobeingasellerisanextrinsicproperty.Andsoon.18Itisimportanttonotethatgroundingisnotefficientcausa-tion.Otherwise,everypropertythatiscausedbysomethingoutsideitsbearerwouldbeextrinsic.Ireturnbelowtotherelationshipbetweengroundingandcausationvis-à-visbeingsofreason.19

Suárezthinksthatobjectivebeingislikebeingseen,beingtotheleftofacolumn,beingaseller,andotherextrinsicproperties.Rosen’sanalysisofextrinsicalitycanhelpusgetsomegriponwhatitmightmeantosaythatbeingisextrinsic.InlightofRosen’sanalysis,tosaythatobjectivebeingisextrinsicistosaythatfactsoftheform[xhasobjective being] could be grounded in facts with constituents thatarenotpartofx.Asmentionedabove,Suárezdoesnotleaveuswithanexplicittheoryofgroundingorextrinsicality.MyclaimhereisnotthatSuárezexplicitlyendorsestheaboveanalysisofextrinsicality;myclaim is that Rosen’s analysis of extrinsicality helps us to get an in-dependentgriponwhatitmightmeantosaythatobjectivebeingisextrinsic,andwhythatclaimmatters.

ButIcanalsomakeaslightlystrongerclaim:Suárez’sownremarksarenotonlyconsistentwithbutalsosuggestiveoftheaboveexplana-tionofextrinsicbeing.ForSuárezexplicitlystatesthatobjectivebeingisgroundedinsomerealbeing:

18. ApotentiallyseriousproblemforRosen’sanalysisisthatitentailsthatnon-existence is intrinsic, for how can something that does not exist have in-trinsicproperties?ItisnotentirelyclearhowSuárezwouldrespondtothisworry,butthereissomeevidencethathethinksthatnon-existentscanhaveintrinsicproperties.Thisisbecausehethinksnon-existentscanhavethein-trinsicpropertyofbeing“non-repugnant”ornotmetaphysicallyimpossible,eveniftheyhaveextrinsicbeing(DM31.2.2,XXVI,230a;31.3.3,XXVI,233b;31.6.13,XXVI,246a).SoitispossiblethatSuárezwouldbitethebulletonthisobjection.

19. Thefactthatgroundingisnotefficientcausationdoesnotbyitselfruleoutthepossibilityofaneffectbeinggroundedinitscause,justasbeing taller than isnotthesameasthinking about,andyetIcanthinkaboutsomethingthanwhichIamtaller.

thenAgivesrisetoB.Inthatcase,Aalsoprovidesasui generismeta-physicalexplanationforB,andAisontologicallypriortoB.16

Thisisnottheplacetoargueforaparticularanalysisofintrinsicality,butIwanttoshowhowthenotionofgroundingcanprovideabettersenseofwhatitcouldmeantosaythatsomethinghasextrinsicbeing.GideonRosen(2010)developsLewis’sinformalcharacterizationintoananalysisofintrinsicproperties.17AdaptingRosen’sanalysisslightlyforpresentpurposes,wecanunderstandintrinsicalityasfollows:

The grounding analysis of intrinsicality:

Fisintrinsicifandonlyif,asamatterofnecessity,forallx:

(i) IfxisFinvirtueofφ(y)—whereφ(y)isafactcontaining y as a constituent—then y is partofx;and

(ii) Ifxisnot‐Finvirtueofφ(y),thenyispartofx.

Herethe‘all’in‘forallx’hastobeunderstoodunrestrictedly,asrang-ingoveranythingwithanysortofbeing.Anypropertyorwayofbeingthatisnotintrinsicisextrinsic.Thus,therearetwowaystobeextrinsiconRosen’sanalysis.Fisextrinsicjustincase(i)afactoftheform[x isF]couldbegroundedinϕ(y),whereϕ(y)isafactcontainingyasaconstituent,andyisnotapartofx,or(ii)afactoftheform[xisnot-F]couldbegroundedinϕ(y),whereyisnotapartofx.(Thepurposeofthesecondclauseistoaccountfortheextrinsicalityofloneliness.Something isnot-lonelybecause there is somethingelse, so,by thesecondclause,lonelinessisextrinsic.Forourpurposeswemayfocusonthefirstclause.)Rosen’sanalysisyieldsthecorrectresultswithre-specttoSuárez’sexamplesofextrinsicproperties.Possibly,Iamseeninvirtueofaperceptualepisodebelongingtosomeoneelse,whoisnotapartofme,sobeing seenisanextrinsicproperty.Iamtotheleftofthis

16. Theliteratureongroundingisvastandgrowingquickly.InadditiontoRosen(2010),canonicaldiscussionsincludeSchaffer(2009)andFine(2012).

17. TheapplicationofRosen’sanalysisofextrinsicality toextrinsicbeing IamborrowingfromEmbry(2017).



metaphysically fundamental.Sobeingsofreasonaremetaphysicallydependentonandposteriortode re thoughtsaboutthem.

Itisnaturaltothinkthatobjectsofthoughtarealready“outthere”,waitingforussomehowtograspthemmentally.Shields’s interpreta-tioniscorrectinsofarasitdeniesthispicture.OnSuárez’sview,beingsofreasonarenotthereuntilwethinkaboutthem.AsSuárezexplains,thereisasenseinwhichwearetheefficientcausesofbeingsofreason(DM54.2.3,XXVI,1019a).21Tobesure,beingsofreasondonothaveefficient causes strictly speaking, since efficient causes bring thingsinto existence, and beings of reason do not exist (DM 54.2.2, XXVI, 1018b).Buttheintellect“produces”beingsofreasonbyproducingthethoughtsinwhichtheyaregrounded:

Theintellectistheefficientcause[looselyspeaking]22ofbeingsofreason,butitproducesthemonlybyproducingsome cognition or concept, by reason of which [ratione cuius]thebeingofreasonissaidtohaveobjectivebeingintheintellect.[DM54.2.4,XXVI,1019a]

Sothepictureisthis.Theintellectefficientlycausesathought.Thatthoughtgroundsabeingofreason.Soweproducebeingsofreasonindirectly,byproducingthementalactsinwhichtheyaregrounded.Similarly,wemightproducesemantic factsbyproducing thebaptis-malceremoniesinwhichtheyaregrounded,normativefactsbypro-ducingthesocialfactsinwhichtheyaregrounded,andsoon.23Aswill

21. Some authors reject Suárez’s position on the grounds that the object ofthoughtmustbeavailableforthoughtpriortoourthinkingaboutit.Suárez’sdefenderssimplyrejectthatidea,sayingthattheobjectsofthoughtareinasensegeneratedbyourthoughts.SeeCarleton,Logica,Philosophia universa,d.13,s.2,n.4,p.66a–66b.

22. Thisinsertionisjustifiedbyanearbytext,whereSuárezsaysthattheintel-lectisanefficientcauseofbeingsofreason“in a broad sense[lato modo]”(myemphasis,DM54.2.4,XXVI,1019a).

23. InthegenerationafterSuárez,otherJesuitsarguethatbeingsofreasoncanbeproducedinthiswaybythesensesandsimpleactsofapprehension(Ar-riaga,Cursus,Metaphysica,d.7,s.3,ss.2–3,pp.1013a–1015b).

Thatobjectivebeing,althoughitisnothinginthebeingof reason, nevertheless necessarily presupposes somereal being, in which it is grounded [fundetur], or fromwhose denomination or relation that objective beingquasiresults.[DM54.2.3,XXVI,1019a;seealsoDM1.1.6,XXV,4a;DM54.1.9,XXVI1018a]

InthesurroundingpassageSuárezmakesitclearthattherealbeinginwhichabeingofreasonisgroundedisatokenthought[aliquam cogita-tionem] (DM54.2.4,XXVI,1019a).20Sohisviewisthatobjectivebeingisgrounded in thoughts.Suárezhimselfdoesnotexplicitlyconnectthisgroundingclaimwithhisclaimstotheeffectthatobjectivebeingisextrinsic,butinlightofRosen’sanalysisofextrinsicality,itbecomesexegeticallyfruitfultodoso.Theideacanbesummeduplikethis:

(i)Suárezclaimsthatobjectivebeingisextrinsic,likebe-ingmarriedorbeingtotheleftofacolumn.

(ii)Forapropertyorfeatureofsomethingtobeextrinsicis for it to be grounded in something else—somethingnotapartofthethingextrinsicallydenominated.

(iii)So,whenSuárezclaimsthatobjectivebeingisextrin-sic,wecanunderstandhimassayingthatobjectivebeing,or facts about objective being, are grounded in some-thingoutsideoftheobjectivebeingsthemselves.

(iv) In fact, this ishowSuárez talks:he says thatobjec-tivebeingisgroundedinde rethoughtsaboutobjectivebeings.Forexample, theobjectivebeingofgoat-stag isgroundedinmythoughtaboutagoat-stag.

ThisexplanationofobjectivebeingrevealsthetruthbehindShield’sinterpretation.WhileSuárezclearlystatesthatthereismorethanoneway of being, one of those ways of being—objective being—is not

20.Suárezalsoallowsthatobjectivebeingcanbegroundedinactsoftheimagi-nation(DM54.2.18,XXVI,1023b).



tohisfrequentdiscussionofextrinsicdenominations.Ifwehavenoconceptsforextrinsicproperties,thenwehavenoconceptofobjectivebeing.PresumablythatconclusionwouldnotbewelcometoSuárez.

Aweaker,moreplausiblereadingofthecommonconceptprincipleisavailable,onthebasisofanotherpassageinwhichSuárezagainaf-firmssomethingclosetothecommonconceptprinciple:

[Someterms]signifyaformthatisintrinsicallyinthefirstanalogatealoneand in theothersonlybya relationorextrinsicdenomination,like‘health’andotherterms.Theunityoftheformalconceptisinconsistentwiththissortofcase,sincetheanalogatesarenotproperlysimilarorinagreement.[DM2.1.14,XXV,70a]

Thispassageisimportantlydifferentfromthepreviouspassage.Theclaim in this passage is not that we do not have concepts of extrin-sicproperties,butthatsuchconceptsdonothave“unity.”WemightthereforeunderstandSuárezassayingthatifwehavesuchconcepts,theymustbecomposite,perhapsbecausetheyarebuiltupbywayofdefinitionoutofconceptsforintrinsicpropertiesandrelations.Onmyproposedweakening,thecommonconceptprincipleisabouttherela-tive semantic fundamentality of certain terms in a mental language,anditstates:

The weak common concept principle: Anyconceptofanex-trinsicpropertyhasadecompositionintomorebasiccon-ceptsofintrinsicpropertiesandrelations.

As faras Iknow, there isnosmoking-gunproof textsupporting theweakcommonconceptprinciple.Themeritsoftheweakprinciplesarethat(i)itisplausibleandconsistentwithSuárez’sseemingpresump-tionthatwedoinfacthaveconceptsofextrinsicproperties,whereasthestrongversion isnotsoconsistent,and(ii) theweakreadingofthecommonconceptprincipleissupportedbySuárez’streatmentoftheanalogyofextrinsicattribution,asIwillnowexplain.Thissortof

becomeclearbelow,themetaphysicallyderivativenatureofobjectivebeingiswhySuárez’sbrandofpluralismisnon-strict.

3b. The common concept principleSohereiswherewestand:Suárezrejectstheunivocityofbeingwithrespect to real beings and beings of reason because being is not in-trinsictobeingsofreason.Thisistosaythatfactsoftheform[xhasobjectivebeing]aregroundedinfactscontainingde rethoughtsaboutx.24Buthowdoesitfollowthatthereisnocommonconceptofbeing?To answer this question, return for a moment to Suárez’s argumentagainstthegenericconceptofbeing:

Butacommonconcept[ofbeing]hasnoplacehere,sincesuch a concept requires that inferiors truly and intrinsi-cally participate in the form signified by the name. Buta being of reason cannot intrinsically participate in thebeingbywhichabeingissaidtobe.[DM54.1.10,XXVI, 1018a]

TheclaimthatthereisnocommonconceptofbeingappearsfromthispassagetobebasedonwhatIwillcallthecommonconceptprinciple:

The common concept principle:IfconceptCappliestox1,x2,x3,…xn,thenCsignifiesapropertyhadbyx1,…xninanintrinsicfashion.

Sinceacommonconceptofbeingwouldnotsignifyanintrinsicprop-erty, Suárez concludes that we simply have no common concept ofbeing.

Unfortunately,thecommonconceptprincipleisprima facie implau-sible,sinceitseemstoimplythatwedonothaveconceptsforextrinsicproperties.ThecommonconceptprinciplealsostandsintensionwithSuárez’soptimismaboutwhatthehumanintellectiscapableofcon-ceiving,asindicatedbyhistreatmentofbeingsofreason,inaddition

24. Alternatively, [a goat-stag has being] is grounded in a fact containing athoughtaboutagoat-stag.



thanourconceptsofextrinsicproperties.Onthisreading,Suárezcangrantthatwehaveconceptsofextrinsicproperties,and,moretothepoint,ofgenericbeing.Hispointisthatsuchconceptsaresemanticallyderivative.26Andintheimmediatelyabovequotation,Suárezalsopro-videsarationalefortheweakcommonconceptprinciple:“sincetheanalogatesarenotproperlysimilarorinagreement.”Inotherwords,Suárezassumes that thesemanticallyprimitive terms inourmentallanguageareresemblance-tracking.Buttermsthatpickoutextrinsicpropertiesarenotresemblance-tracking.Forexample,thepropertyofbeingmadeof tinorclose tosomethingmadeof tindoesnot trackresemblance-makingfeaturesoftheworld: itcanbesharedbyatincanandapileofcatfood.Suárezconcludesthatourconceptofsucha property, if we have one, is semantically derivative. The commonconceptofbeing fails to trackresemblance inexactly thesamewaythattheconceptofbeingmadeoftinorclosetosomethingmadeoftindoes(De anima4.1.3–4,III,713b–714a).27So,Suárezconcludes,thecommonconceptofbeing,ifwehavesuchaconcept,issemanticallyderivative on a more specific concept of being that is resemblancetracking.28

At thispoint someonemightobjectorat leastbepuzzledabouthowtosquare(myreadingof)Suárez’sviewofbeingwithapparent-ly conflicting passages throughout the Metaphysical Disputations. If Iamright,Suárezthinkswehavemultipleconceptsofbeing,andthegenericconceptofbeingisderivedfromthemoreprimitive,specificconceptsofbeing.But,someonemightworry,thewholepointofDM 2 is toestablish thatwehaveonly one formalandonly oneobjectiveconceptofbeing.Further,onmyreading,objectivebeingisextrinsic;

26.Suárezrecognizesthepossibilityof“aggregative”conceptsinhisdiscussionoftheconceptofbeing;oneofhisexamplesofsuchaconceptisthedisjunc-tiveconcept,substance or accident (DM2.2.8–9,XXV,72a–72b).

27. Suárezalsotellsusthatbeingsofreason“donothaveanysimilaritywithrealbeings,byreasonofwhichtheywouldhaveacommonconceptwithrealbe-ings”(DM54.1.4,XXVI,1016a).

28.Suárez states that the concept of real being is unitary precisely because ittracksaresemblance-makingfeatureoftheworld(DM2.2.14,XXV,74b–75a).

analogyoccurswhen‘F’signifiesapropertythatsomethingshaveinan intrinsic fashion and others have in an extrinsic fashion. SuáreztellsusthatwhatitistobeFinanextrinsicfashioncanbedefinedintermsofarelationtosomething’sbeingFinanintrinsicfashion.Con-sideroneofSuárez’sexamples:thegenericpredicate ‘beinghealthy’(DM 28.3.14). We could of course distinguish between various spe-cificwaysofbeinghealthy:beinghealthyforananimal,beinghealthyforadiet,beinghealthy fora relationship,andsoon.ButSuárez isconcerned with a generic predicate, generic in the sense that it ap-pliestoanimals,diets,andrelationships.Suáreznotesthatthegenericpredicate‘healthy’signifiesapropertythatsomethingshaveintrinsi-cally and some things have extrinsically. For example, a healthy cathashealthintrinsically,buthealthymedicinehashealthextrinsically.25 Thisissufficienttomakethegenericpropertybeing healthyextrinsic,accordingtotheaboveanalysisofextrinsicality.Forpresentpurposes,theimportantpointisthatSuáreztellsusthatwhatitisformedicinetobehealthycanbedefinedintermsofthehealthofananimal:formedicinetobehealthyisformedicinetocausethehealthofananimal.Soherewehaveanextrinsicproperty,thegenericpropertyofbeinghealthy.Thispropertyisextrinsicbecausesomethingshaveitinvir-tueoftheirrelationstootherthings.Theweakcommonconceptprin-ciplepredictsthat,ifwehaveagenericconceptofhealth,thatconceptmusthaveadecompositionintointrinsicpropertiesandrelations.AndthatisexactlywhatSuárezsays:tobehealthyinthegenericsenseis(somethinglike)tobeinaproperlyfunctioningbiologicalstate,ortocausesuchastate,or…Hence,theextrinsicpropertyofbeinghealthyhasadecompositionintotheintrinsicpropertyofbeinginaproperlyfunctioningbiologicalstateandcausalrelationstothatstate.

Accordingtotheweakcommonconceptprinciple,ourconceptsofintrinsicpropertiesandrelationsaresemanticallymorefundamental

25. Thispointreliesonadistinctionbetweenaproperty’sbeingextrinsicandaproperty’sbeinghadinanextrinsicorintrinsicway.Roughly,healthisextrin-sicbecause,possibly,somethingishealthyinvirtueofsomethingelse.Buthealthcanbehadinanintrinsicway,invirtueofbeinginaproperlyfunction-ingbiologicalstate.



(4) Hence, there is no univocal, semantically primitiveconcept of being common to existents and beings ofreason.

Premise (1) is based on the assumptions that (i) the primitives in amentallanguagetrackresemblance-makingfeaturesoftheworld,and(ii) extrinsic properties are not resemblance-making features of theworld.Evenifthefirstassumptionturnsouttobemistaken,theargu-mentmightbe re-stated in termsofan ideal languagewhoseprimi-tives track the “perfectly natural” properties in Lewis’s (1983) sense,extrinsic properties being less than perfectly natural. Premise (2) isbasedonSuárez’sclaimthatthebeingofbeingsofreasonisgroundedinde rethoughtsandisthereforeextrinsic.Givenagroundinganalysisofextrinsicality,Suárez’sclaimthatobjectivebeingisgroundedinde re thoughtsentailsthatobjectivebeingisextrinsic.

To be clear about the dialectical situation, Suárez does not offeranyarguments,as faras Iamaware, for theclaimthatobjectivebe-ingisgroundedinde rethoughts.Butitdoesnotfollowthatnothingcanbesaidinfavorofthatclaim.Inmyview,itisintuitivelyplausiblethatgoat-stagsandtheirilkhavebeingonlybecausesomeonethinksaboutthem.The‘onlybecause’hereisplausiblycashedoutintermsof grounding. Further support for the claim that objective being isgroundedinde rethoughtsmightcomefromtheattractivenessoftheresultingtheory.Aswehaveseen,thereissomemotivationtoassertthat(i)therearebeingsofreason,sincewecanthinkaboutthemandsaytruethingsaboutthe,but,obviously(ii)beingsofreasondonotexist.Suárezwantstoendorsebothclaims,therebysecuringtheben-efitsofboth.Ontologicalpluralismallowsonetoendorsebothclaims.ButastheIdleHypothesisshows,itisnotenoughmerelytoendorseontologicalpluralism.Onemustmotivateontologicalpluralism,andshowthatitisnot“mereobfuscation”.Suárez’sclaimthatobjectivebe-ingisgroundedinde re thoughtsisthelinchpinofhisresponsetotheIdleHypothesisobjection.Ifyougrantthatclaim,yougetanattractivetheoryofnonexistentobjectsofthought.

butinDM28.3.14–17,Suárezarguesfortheclaimthatbeingisanalo-gousbytheintrinsicanalogyofattribution,whichentailsthatbeingisintrinsictotheitemstowhichtheconceptofbeingapplies.

Myanswertothisworryistopointoutthat‘being’issystematical-lyambiguousintheMetaphysical Disputationsbetween(atleast)realbeing,genericbeing,andobjectivebeing(forsimplicityIomitotherwaysofbeing,likepotentialbeing).InDM1,Suárezarguesthattheobjectofmetaphysicsisrealbeing.Hence,heisgenerallyconcernedwith real being in the first 53 disputations, and claims that seem toconflictwithmyreadingcanbereadasbeingaboutrealbeing,notagenericconceptofbeing thatapplies torealbeingsandbeingsofreason. Consider the examples cited above from DM 2 and DM 28.SuárezopensDM2bytellingusheisconcernedwiththeratiooftheobjectofmetaphysics,whichisrealbeing.Sohisclaimthatwehaveonlyoneconceptofbeingmeansthatwehaveonlyoneconceptofrealbeing.AndinDM28.3,whereSuárezsaysthatbeingisanalogouswiththeintrinsicanalogyofattribution,Suárezisspeakingofthedi-visionof realbeing intoGodandcreatures (DM 28.3.10).Beingsofreasonareneitherreal,norGod,norcreatures;sohisclaimstherearenotaboutbeingsofreason.

WemaynowreturntoSuárez’sargumentagainsttheunivocityofbeing.Inlightoftheforegoing,theargumentappearstorunasfollows:

Suárez’s argument against the univocity of being:

(1)Anyconceptofanextrinsicpropertyhasadecomposi-tionintomorebasicconceptsofintrinsicpropertiesandrelations.

(2)Genericbeingisextrinsic.

(3)Hence,thereisnosemanticallyprimitiveconceptofgenericbeingcommontoexistentsandbeingsofreason.



iv.Noonticpredicatesareprimitive.

I have characterized ontological monism as (i) (as does McDaniel2009;2017,ch.1).Clearly,(ii)wouldbeakindofontologicalpluralism(McDaniel2009;2017,ch.1).ButSuárez’sviewisbestcharacterizedby(iii),akindofhalf-wayhousebetween(i)and(ii).Itisimportantto make these distinctions, since an argument for one of the aboveoptions might not support, and might even undermine, the others.Suárez rejects (i) because generic being is extrinsic, and he rejects(ii)becauseobjectivebeingisextrinsic.Heendorses(iii)becausehethinksthatexistenceisprimitive,butobjectivebeingisnot.NowthatweunderstandthestructureofandmotivationbehindSuárez’sview,itwouldperhapsbeidletohaggleoverlabels.ButinmyviewitisbesttocharacterizeSuárez’sviewasakindofontologicalpluralismaccordingtowhichthereismorethanonewayofbeing,butonlyonesuchwayis fundamental. Ipropose the label ‘non-strictontologicalpluralism’.If someonewants to insist thatSuárez’sview isbettercharacterizedasnon-strictontologicalmonism,Iwillnotobject,buttheimportantpoint is that there isaphilosophicaldifferencebetween(i)and(iii),andSuárezthinks(iii)hassomethingtorecommendit,while(i)doesnot.29

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If ontological monism is construed as the claim that the genericonticpredicateissemanticallyprimitive,whilethespecificonticpredi-catesarederivative,Suárez’sargumentagainstunivocityconstitutesanargumentagainstontologicalmonismand,a fortiori,aresponsetothe Idle Hypothesis objection. In the end, Suárez’s claim is that ‘ge-nericbeing’isnotresemblancetracking,justas‘beingtinorclosetosomethingtin’isnotresemblancetracking.Thereasonforthisisthatgenericbeingisextrinsic,justasbeing tin or close to something tinisex-trinsic,andextrinsicpropertiesarenotresemblance-tracking.Suárezthinks mental language is ideal insofar as its primitive terms are re-semblance-tracking.Itfollowsthatmentallanguagedoesnothaveaprimitive concept of being that applies univocally to cats and goat-stags.Giventhattherearegoat-stags,monismisfalse.

However,itisworthnotingthatSuárezrecognizesonlyoneintrin-sicwayofbeing:existence.ItfollowsfromtheforegoingthatSuárezcanrecognizeonlyoneonticpredicateassemanticallyprimitive:‘ex-ists’. ‘Objective being’ cannot be primitive because it is an extrinsicdenominationandthereforefailstoberesemblance-tracking,justlike‘beingseen’ fails tobe resemblance-tracking.SowhileSuárez recog-nizesmultipleonticpredicates,hecanrecognizeonlyoneprimitiveontic predicate: ‘exists’. If ontological pluralism is construed as theclaimthatmultiple,specificonticpredicatesareprimitive,itwouldfol-lowthatSuárezisnotanontologicalpluralist.ThisrevealswhythereissomethingrightaboutShields’sinterpretation,insofarasitrejectsanontologicalpluralistinterpretation.

ButtheclaimthatSuárezisanontologicalmonistobscuresanin-terestingdistinctionbetweendialecticaloptionsthatSuárez’sdiscus-sion brings to the fore. Given Suárez’s two specific ontic predicatesandthegenericonticpredicate,onemightthink:

i.Onlythegenericonticpredicateisprimitive,

ii.Allandonlythespecificonticpredicatesareprimitive,

iii.Onlyonespecificonticpredicateisprimitive,or



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