Fortunes and Misfortunes of Messengers and Merchants in the Amarna Letters. In: O. Drewnowska- M....

Fortune and Misfortune in the Ancient Near East

Proceedings of the 60th Rencontre Assyriologique Internationale

at Warsaw 21–25 July 2014

edited byOlga DrewnOwska anD MałgOrzata sanDOwicz

Winona Lake, Indiana eisenbrauns

2017

Offprint from

© 2017 by Eisenbrauns Inc. All rights reserved

Printed in the United States of America

www.eisenbrauns.com

The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of the American National Standard for Information Sciences—Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI Z39.48–1984. ♾ ™

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Names: Rencontre assyriologique internationale (60th : 2014 : Warsaw, Poland) | Drewnowska, Olga, editor. | Sandowicz, Małgorzata, editor. | Uniwersytet Warszawski, host institution.

Title: Fortune and misfortune in the Ancient Near East : proceedings of the 60th Rencontre assyriologique internationale at Warsaw 21–25 July 2014 / edited by Olga Drewnowska and Małgorzata Sandowicz.

Description: Winona Lake, Indiana : Eisenbrauns, 2016. | Includes bibliographical references.

Identifiers: LCCN 2016039641 | ISBN 9781575064659 (cloth : alk. paper)Subjects: LCSH: Assyriology—Congresses. | Civilization, Assyro-Babylonian—

Congresses.Classification: LCC PJ3121 .R45 2014 | DDC 892/.1—dc23LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2016039641

v

Contents

Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . viiiProgram . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xviiIntroduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Part 1what is FOrtune?

what is MisFOrtune?Luck, Fortune, and Destiny in Ancient Mesopotamia

Or How the Sumerians and Babylonians Thought of Their Place in the Flow of Things . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

PiOtr steinkeller

The Concept of “Misfortune” in Sumerian Wisdom Literature . . . . . . . . . . 25JacOb klein

Man’s Fate: Divine Responsibility for Human Welfare in Ḫatti . . . . . . . . . 39gary beckMan

Part 2Man

Fortune and Misfortune of the Individual: Some Observations on the Sufferer’s Plaint in Ludlul bēl nēmeqi II 12–32 . . . . . . . . . . 51

tzvi abusch

On the Fortune—or Misfortune—of Having Children: The Abundance of Children According to the Omen Text K. 6403 . . . 59

nils P. heessel

Gendering for Fortune and Misfortune: Ritual Gender Assignment in the Ancient Near East . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75

kathleen MccaFFrey

Why Did Paškuwatti’s Patient Fail in the Matrimonial Bed? . . . . . . . . . . 97zsOlt siMOn

Introduction aux symptômes mentaux en Mésopotamie . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105Magalie Parys

Legal Remedies against Misfortune: Evasion, Legal Fiction, and Sham Transactions in Late Bronze Age Emar . . . . . . . . . . . . 119

lena FiJałkOwska

Hierarchy at the Hittite Court . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129tayFun bilgin

Contentsvi

Fortunes and Misfortunes of Messengers and Merchants in the Amarna Letters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143

graciela gestOsO singer

Made Men: Rich Slaves of the Nūr-Sîns and the Egibis . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165benJaMin DrOMarD

Betting on the Right Horse: Loyalty in the Early Years of the Neo-Babylonian Empire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177

yuval levavi

Part 3king

The Origins of the LUGAL Office . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 193Petr charvát

Ups and Downs in the Career of Enmerkar, King of Uruk . . . . . . . . . . . . 201Dina katz

“Šulgi, Mighty Man, King of Ur” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 211tOnia sharlach

The Fate of Yasmaḫ-Addu, the King of Mari . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 221raFał kOliński

Finding the Good Genius in Your Bowl . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 237Daniel bOnneterre

The Royal Adoption Scene in Ugaritic and Biblical Texts . . . . . . . . . . . . 247JOanna töyräänvuOri

“One Epic or Many?” Das Tukultī-Ninurta-Epos zum Ersten, zum Zweiten und zum. . . ? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 259

steFan JakOb

Part 4city anD state

Climate Change, the Mardu Wall, and the Fall of Ur . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 271Minna (lönnqvist) silver

Regional Differences in Middle Assyrian . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 297JacOb Jan De riDDer

The Anatolian and Iranian Frontiers: Analyzing the Foreign Policy of the Assyrian Empire under Esarhaddon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 307

seliM Ferruh aDali

Finis Assyriae: The Fall of the Assyrian State, or the Fall of the Assyrian Civilisation? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 325

steFan zawaDzki

Fortune and Politics: Nabopolassar’s Campaigns in 616–615 b.c.e. and His Alliance with Media . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 335

kabalan MOukarzel

Contents vii

More about the Crisis in Uruk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 347raDOsław tarasewicz

Part 5gOD anD teMPle

Don’t Insult Inana! Divine Retribution for Offense against Common Decency in the Light of New Textual Sources . . . . . . . . . 359

Jana Matuszak

Fortune and Misfortune of the Eagle in the Myth of Etana . . . . . . . . . . . 371evelyne kOubkOvá

Within the Ekur: Sitz im Leben for a Literary Topos Regarding Nintur . . . . 383Mark a. avila, Marcel sigrist, anD uri gabbay

Some Remarks on the Archaeology of the Ekur of Nippur during Post-Kassite Times . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 409

bernharD schneiDer

143

Fortunes and Misfortunes of Messengers and Merchants in the Amarna Letters

Graciela Gestoso SingerhOlOn anD buenOs aires

1. IntroductionDuring the Amarna period, political contacts and transactions became more

pronounced, as exemplified by an increase in marriage alliances and by the large volume of exchanged royal gifts. The complex political and economic contacts in-cluded alliances and the exchange of gifts between the Great Kings through an intricate chain of messenger-merchants who traveled between the various courts. Great Kings proclaimed their self-sufficiency, but in fact depended on each other for the supply of gold, copper, silver, horses, garments, and grain. They obtained these goods by a dense network of reciprocal ties and by the regular exchange of messengers. Negotiations were essential mechanisms for managing these ties and transactions.

The Amarna Archive is considered a privileged source of information for the study of the role of messengers and merchants in the Eastern Mediterranean dur-ing the Late Bronze Age (1550–1200 b.c.e.). Egyptian interests as reflected in the Amarna Letters are related to geopolitical and commercial concerns principally in the Syro-Canaanite corridor. Egyptian residents in the Levant, principally mer-chants, messengers, agents, officials, and soldiers, seem to have enjoyed some claim to protection. Egypt would be concerned, as the other Great Kings, for the welfare of its people living abroad. Without order in this region, people would be at risk, free passage in jeopardy, and the payment of tribute and performance of other ruler duties in question (Cohen 2000: 88–89). Inter-regional politics was focused on the struggle to maintain the Levantine corridor, a complex buffer zone. The great pow-ers had similar interests, such as the control of trade routes and ports and the maintenance of a fluid exchange system and security. Most of the inter-regional con-tacts was concerned with exchange and its complications. Nevertheless, the study of the inter-regional contacts would remain biased without considering the impact of unofficial mechanisms, which are very difficult to recognize in the official sources. Several factors, such as conflicts, competence, prestige, autonomous interests, and informal networks of power, increased the difficulty for ancient states in exerting

Author’s note: I am particularly grateful to Dr. Yitzhaq Feder (University of Haifa) for reading this pa-per and making significant comments. Translations of Amarna letters follow Moran 1992, with minor changes.

Offprint from:Olga Drewnowska and Malgorzata Sandowicz, eds.Fortune and Misfortune in the Ancient Near East: Proceedings of the 60th Rencontre Assyriologique Internationale at Warsaw 21–25 July 2014© Copyright 2016 Eisenbrauns. All rights reserved.

graciela gestOsO singer144

thorough control over their territories, resources, and subjects (Moreno García 2013: 1064). The sources reflect that sometimes messengers and merchants had to put into practice their own decision-making processes to accomplish a royal mission or a private enterprise.

2. Fortunes of MessengersMessengers and interpreters had to travel extensively to deliver messages, re-

quests and gifts, and to prepare the route for merchants in peaceful circumstances or troops in times of hostility. Regarding the letters between Great Kings, relations between royal houses became formalized through a rule of “brotherhood.” This was an intrinsic aspect of the kin-based structure of Amorite society and was further cemented through inter-dynastic marriages. Gift-exchange followed the traditional rules of reciprocity and generosity. Similarly, hospitality was a typical aspect of the way negotiations were established (Liverani 2014: 229).

Great Kings during the Amarna period are known to have maintained a commu-nication network which allowed the rapid flow of information vital to the welfare of the palaces. In general, messengers found hospitality and rest in official-posts and private taverns. According to the status of his employer, a messenger was provided with a means of transportation, such as a donkey, horse, chariot or boat. Often, he traveled with a caravan or was provided with an escort or messenger.

Selection of a MessengerThe Amarna Letters make reference to messengers, though the term mār šiprim

(‘messenger’) has a wide variety of meanings, ranging from mere couriers or deliv-erymen to distinguished envoys, high officials, and even chief ministers (Greene 1989). The expression mār šipri (‘messengers’) is sometimes used interchangeably with the Akkadian word tamkāru for ‘merchants’ (EA 7; 8; 11; 39–40; Bachhuber 2003: 90). Merchants in the Levant seem to have conducted both official and private transactions (Jones 2007: 18; Liverani 2000: 20).

There is certainly evidence of well-qualified messengers at work in the Amarna system. Most negotiations take place through messengers, agents, and envoys, who are authorized to represent their kings or rulers in the Levant. In general, the messengers were high officials from the palace administration and sometimes even members of the royal family (Oller 1995: 1466). Some of them were of noble position, including the sons of Great Kings and even small rulers or kinglets them-selves. In EA 29, three members of the same family are mentioned as messengers of the king of Mitanni: Keliya, his brother (?), and his uncle Masibadli. Most of the letters where the messengers are named come from Great Kings, but we know of envoys from Levantine kinglets, such as Puḫeya from Byblos and Ili-Milku from Tyre (Holmes 1975: 376). A significant number of messengers (around 28) are men-tioned by name in 23 letters from the Amarna archive. Some of them are mentioned several times, such as the Egyptian messenger, Mane, and the Mitannian envoy, Keliya; but most appear only once. 1

1. EA 3: 16 (Kasi from Egypt); EA 119: 51; EA 120: 31, 35 (ʿAbdi-Hadda from Egypt); EA 142: 7; EA 161: 11, 17, 27, 31; EA 162: 56, 63; EA 227: 16; EA 367: 7 (Ḫani/Ḫanni from Egypt); EA 19: 17, 21; EA 20; EA 21: 24; EA 24, IV: 21–29; EA 27: 7, 70, 83, 96–97; EA 28: 17, 37; EA 29: 70, 78, 89–90, 151, 167, 174, 176 (Mane from Egypt); EA 31: 29 (Iršappa from Egypt); EA 7: 73, 80; EA 11: rev. 8 (Salmu from

Fortunes and Misfortunes of Messengers and Merchants 145

Some of them were professionals, such as Mane and Keliya, who were trained as scribes and linguists. These were skilled in negotiation and bearers of letters of credence (Berridge 2000: 217). These envoys assumed a symbolic significance. For example, Tušratta of Mitanni made clear in his letters with Amenhotep III that the selection of a messenger was of importance (Jönsson 2000: 202). For the negotia-tions related to the renewed alliance with Egypt, Tušratta sent Keliya, his chief minister, as his main messenger: “I send Keliya, my chief minister, and Tunip-ibri. May my brother let them go promptly so they can report back to me promptly” (EA 17: 46–50). He made clear that the selection of the Egyptian messengers mattered to him as well: “May he send only Mane!” an important Egyptian messenger (EA 24 IV, § 31: 54).

Burnaburiyaš II requested that Akhenaten make available his magnate Ḫaya to head the escort of the Babylonian princess to Egypt: “Send many chariots and soldiers so that Ḫaya will be the one to take the princess to you” (EA 11 rev. 14–15). Nevertheless, the Pharaoh complains that instead of sending “dignitaries,” the King of Babylon dispatched a delegation of “nobodies”: “Did you ever send here a digni-tary of yours (. . .). The men whom you sent here are nobodies” (EA 1: 15–21).

Nevertheless, other officials are attested in the role of messengers, such as members of the Egyptian military stationed in the Levant (EA 367: 6–13; Mynářová 2014: 29).

Functions of the MessengerThe messengers were responsible for carrying the tablet, reading it, and in-

terpreting and defending the state policy (Holmes 1975: 377; Gestoso Singer 1992: 63–69), as reflected in the letter of Zimredda from Lachish to the Pharaoh: “As to the messenger of the king (. . .), I have listened to his orders very carefully, and I am indeed making preparations in accordance with his order” (EA 329: 13–20). When ready for dispatch, the letters were enclosed in clay envelopes 2 secured by the sender’s seal and entrusted to messengers who conveyed them to their destination, on foot or by wagon, occasionally on horseback and by boat (Bryce 2003: 57).

The messengers have important duties, such as: (1) to re-establish political rela-tions before the accession of a new king (EA 27; 41); (2) to attend royal funerals and festivals (EA 27); (3) to escort royal brides (EA 5; 11); (4) to collect information or spy for their kings (EA 31; 58; 75; 174; Cohen 2000: 85–98); (5) to collect the payment for special transactions (EA 35); (6) to bring greetings-gifts between courts (EA 4; 24; 27); (7) to exchange goods, as a merchant (EA 7; 11; 39); (8) to serve as witnesses at a legal process or transaction (EA 3; 8; 313), and (9) to collect taxes in special circumstances (EA 160).

Sometimes, the messengers and interpreters were involved in ceremonies re-lated to the anointing (Stewart 2010: 15) and farewell of royal brides before their departures to the Egyptian court. Burnaburiyaš II of Babylon informs Akhenaten:

Babylon); EA 8: 14, 16 (Aḫutabu from Babylon); EA 10: 37, 48 (Šindi-Šugab from Babylon); EA 17: 46; EA 19: 25, 39, 71; EA 20: 18, 23; EA 24, I: 83, 92, 114; EA 24, II: 7; EA 24, IV: 20–21, 26–27, 36–37; EA 26: 15, 19; EA 27: 59, 70; EA 29: 34, 156, 162 (Keliya from Mitanni); EA 24, IV: 36; EA 29: 173 (Ar-Teššup and Asali from Mitanni); EA 27: 89, 93, 100; EA 28: 12 (Pirissi from Mitanni); EA 30: 3 (Akiya from Mitanni); EA 151: 45 (Ili-Milku from Tyre).

2. EA 101; EA 113; EA 245; EA 251 (Mynářová 2014: 22). See van den Hout and Karasu 2010 (for Hatti).


“[When] I presented my daughter to Ḫaamašši, your messenger, and to Miḫuni, the interpreter, they poured oil on the head [of my] daughter (. . .). They have trans-ported the daughter of a Great King [t]o Egypt” (EA 11: 16–22). In these anoint-ing ceremonies, messengers were involved with special duties, such as presenting the terḫatu (‘dowry’), tāmarātu (‘wedding-gifts’), and šulmānu (‘greeting-gifts’) sent between Great Kings. Tušratta of Mitanni reported to Akhenaten about previous marriages: “[When] your messenger came the second [time], oil was poured [on] her head (the daughter of Tušratta), and when I received her bride-price, I ga[ve her. And the] bride-price (. . .) was beyond measure (. . .). He (Amenhotep III) sent [along] four sacks full [of] gold, [not to] mention the jewelry [. . .], which he se[nt] separately.” (EA 29: 22–27). Also, Iršappa, an Egyptian messenger, “(. . .) will pour oil on her head (the daughter of the King of Arzawa). Behold, I have sent to you a sack of gold; it is (of) excellent (quality)” (EA 31: 11–16).

Safe JourneyWestbrook (2000: 31) affirms that it is impossible to understand the Amarna

world without emphasizing the very real presence of the gods. The will of the gods must be favorable in order to undertake the journey of a messenger or merchant. Di-vine sanction rather than state consent gave ancient law its obligatory quality, and it was in some respects more feared and binding than modern international law.

Rituals and prayers were used to guarantee a safe trip. In Mari, to guard against the dangers of the road, omens were consulted before departure: “I had the omens consulted concerning the welfare of the messengers and they were unfavorable. I will have them consulted again. If the omens are favorable, I will send them” (ARM 2 97: 5–11; Munn-Rankin 1956: 106). In Mesopotamia, Nergal was the patron deity to whom the messenger would turn for protection on the road, as reflected in one of his epithets “valiant messenger, quick of knees” (Nougayrol 1947: 41). The Neo-Assyrian texts record omens, oracles and an “incantation for seeing a sign when [starting on a journey]” (Reiner 1960: 27, 33). In EA 35, the ruler of Alašiya requests an Egyptian “expert in eagle-omens.”

In ancient Egypt, amulets were carried by travelers and used in necklaces, bracelets, and rings, and placed in bags. Protective amulets of Sekhmet, Wepwawet as the “opener of ways,” and Thoth, the “Messenger of the gods” were used by messengers. Some travelers—as Wenamun—carried with them a statue of Amun (“Amun of the roads”) as a magical protector (Lichtheim 1976: 225, 228). Amun was the god of the “less fortunate,” upholding the rights of justice for the travelers and poor in Deir el-Medina (1976: 105–7). According to Papyrus Lansing I, 3 merchants take their gods with them when they travel. In Ein Besor (Israel) was found a little faience figurine of Thoth, as baboon, perhaps used as protector of messengers on their roads.

As for the Amarna Letters, Keliya, a high rank messenger from Mitanni, was sent several times as a special ambassador to Egypt. He was involved in the negotia-tion of inter-dynastic marriages, accompanying two royal brides and the delivery of greeting-gifts. On one occasion, Tušratta said to Keliya that he had a revelation of the goddess Šauška (Ištar) while traveling to Egypt (may be to heal the Pharaoh or

3. “The merchants are busy, carrying goods from one town to another. They may depart from Egypt to Djahy. Each man’s god (statue) is with him. Not one of them dares to say: ‘We shall see Egypt again’ (. . .)” (Papyrus Lansing I, 4.8–5.1, in Caminos 1954: 384). I am grateful to Dr. Deborah Sweeney (Univer-sity of Tel Aviv) for the references.


to bless the new Mitannian bride), ensuring that the journey will be safe and guided by the goddess Šauška and the god Amun: “I (Tušratta) will lead her (the bride) in safety to my brother’s country (Egypt). May Šauška and Amun make her the im-age of my brother’s desire!” (EA 19: 17–24; Podany 2010: 4–5). In EA 23: 13–17 is reported that the goddess will travel to Egypt and then return: “Šauška of Nineveh, Mistress of all lands, said: ‘I wish to go to Egypt, a country that I love, and then return’ (. . .).” The goddess Šauška, who travels in the form of a gold statue, guided the messengers and brides on their way to Egypt, and then blessed the royal couple for an everlasting love: “May Šimige and Šauška go before her (the bride). May they make the image of my brother’s desire (. . .), and grant my brother a great blessing and exquisite joy” (EA 21: 13–23). Accordingly, she would guarantee a long friend-ship for both countries: “May Šauška, Mistress of Heaven, protect us, my brother and me, 100,000 years (. . .), and let us act as friends” (EA 23: 26–30).

Rations and Means of TransportationThere is little data specifically relating to rations received by a messenger before

his departure. Typically, the food ration was enough just for one day’s march until the messenger arrived at a courier station or border-post for a night and a meal, where presumably he received food for the next day on the road (Meier 1988: 64, 94–95).

There is more information about provisioning and transportation issues on the road. A Neo-Babylonian messenger is provided with 50 shekels toward the purchase of a donkey for the road and flour for his trip to Tema (Meier 1988: 64). Provision lists are preserved from the courts of several palaces (Ugarit, Rimah, and Mari), some of which assigned to messengers large quantities of wine and honey (Uga-ritica 5: 193, Schaeffer 1968). In Egypt, a list of “provisions for the messengers of Djahy” and from Megiddo, Taanach, Sharon, Ashqelon, and Hazor, specified that each messenger received “1 jar of beer and 1 ½ sacks of grain,” but the messenger from Lachish received for 15 days: “10 sacks; making (a total of) 20 sacks of grain” (Valloggia 1976: 100–101).

According to three Amarna letters, a messenger was provided with means of transportation, such as horses and donkeys: “I gave him horses and donkeys for his journey” (EA 161: 23–24); “The messenger of the king of Akko is honored more than my messenger since a horse is put under him” (EA 88: 46–48); “I sent a man (a messenger) of mine to my lord, and both his horses were taken” (EA 83: 10–12). In special cases, chariots were used for speed: “When my messenger reaches you, let him take chariots so that he can reach me quickly” (EA 10: 37–39).

Free-PassesAfter selecting the messenger and entrusting the message, the court should in-

sure a safe passage. In order to ensure safe passage the messenger would carry documents which identified him as a messenger of a king and allow him to bypass any administrative delays and extra charges on his road. Lafont (2001: 46) affirms that “diplomats seem to have a kind of ‘diplomatic passport’ (. . .) in tablet form that gives successively in five lines the name of the holder, his title as ambassador of a given king, his starting point, the description of his delegation and escort, and his destination.”

The Great Kings were able to reaffirm their authority by granting the messen-gers safe-conducts and letters of warning for preventing problems with the local


rulers. The Great Kings made clear to the rulers of Canaan that the minor borders between the small kingdoms were irrelevant from an inter-regional point of view. In EA 30, the King of Mitanni provided his messengers with a free-pass (a pass-port) through Canaan: “To all the kings of Canaan, servants of my brother, thus (says) the king: I am sending herewith my messenger Akiya to the king of Egypt, my brother, in a hurry (. . .). Let him go on immediately, and as far as his presents are concerned, he is to owe nothing.” The passport of the messenger was valid only for this messenger, and it could not have been reused, so it was left in the Amarna archive. The archive of Ugarit contains a passport left behind by a messenger of Beirut, sent to Ugarit (PRU 3: 12–13).

The rulers of Canaan answer to the king of Egypt: “The king, my lord, sent me Ḫaya in order to say: ‘This caravan (to) Ḫanigalbat, they sent it: let it pass!’ Who am I, not to let pass the caravans of the king, my Lord!? (. . .). Let the king, my Lord, send a caravan even to Karaduniyaš” (EA 255: 8–25).

In EA 15: 7–21, the messenger’s credentials are included in the Assyrian king’s message of introduction: “I send my messenger to you to visit you and to visit your country (. . .). Do [no]t delay the messenger whom I send to you for a visit. He should visit and then leave for here.”

Although these letters fulfilled an essential diplomatic function, as “free passes” (Liverani 1990: 89), there is no evidence that they were legally required in every case to establish an envoy’s credentials (Westbrook 2000: 33).

Tax ExemptionsThe letters carried by messengers and merchants allowed them to bypass any

unnecessary economical charges. The Amarna letters and the Ugarit archive docu-ment several cases of custom exemptions for messengers and merchants.

A Mitannian messenger carries a passport on his way to Egypt, which gives him exemption from taxes: “To the kings of Canaan (. . .): Let him go on immediately and as far as his presents are concerned, he is to owe nothing” (EA 30). The ruler of Alašiya requests safe passage and exemption from taxes for his merchants: “These men are my merchants (. . .). No one making a claim in your name is to approach my merchants or my ship” (EA 39: 14–20); “These men are servants of the king, [my] lord, and no one making a claim in your name is to approach them (. . .)” (EA 40: 24–28).

The avoidance of any taxes is mentioned in Ugaritic texts as well: “I sent my man to my son. Everything that he needs on his trip he is to receive. Let no one stop him. Let no tax-collector collect any tax from him” (PRU 4: 196–97). In Ugarit, Sina-ranu seems to have had a franchise to trade with Crete and had his private cargo exempted from taxes: “Ammistamru, the son of Niqmepa, king of Ugarit, declares Sinaranu, the son of Siginu, exempt from duty. His grain, his beer, (nor) his oil shall not enter the palace (. . .). His ship is exempt from duty, when it arrives from Caph-tor (Crete) (. . .)” (PRU 3: 107–8). He was even exempt from serving as a messen-ger to the king of Ugarit, a service which was apparently usual for foreign traders (Bachhuber 2006: 351; Jones 2007: 49).

Travel Expenses and Small ChangeThe Assyrian and Alašian letters are much more focused on economic aspects of

the partnership, such as travel expenses and prices. Aššur-uballiṭ of Assyria men-tions to the Egyptian king the high travel expenses invested in his messengers.


The economic value of the exchanged gifts was not always worth the trip, as the Assyrian king realized: “(What you sent me) is not even enough to cover my mes-sengers’ expenses for their trips to and from! (. . .). We are distant lands: should our messengers keep running to and from like this?” (EA 16: 29–36). The ruler of Alašiya emphasizes the lack of payment for an important delivery of timber and the delay of his messengers/merchants in the Egyptian court: “The people of my land (Alašiya) protest because of the timber that the king of Egypt took from me: (there-fore) my brother, give me its price!” (EA 35: 27–29); “My brother, let my messengers go promptly and safely. These men are my merchants (. . .)” (EA 39: 10–14).

Small amounts of scrap were carried with merchants almost certainly to be used as a means of exchange to pay travel expenses and supplies (Dercksen 1996: 45–47; Gestoso Singer 2010: 271). For example, one Alalakh tablet (AT 403) records: “Receipt for 20 talents of copper from the palace received by Birriaššuwa for the journey to the Hittite country” (Wiseman 1953: 14, 105). Also, the captain of the Cape Gelidonya ship had in his cabin small ingots and scrap metal probably to use in his own transactions. The diversity of types of pan balance weights recovered from the Cape Gelidonya shipwreck and their wide distribution across the eastern Mediterranean allowed a merchant to trade with his counterparts in Egypt, Syria, Canaan, Alašiya, the Hittite empire, and the Aegean. The ship represents an itiner-ant merchant, buying and selling material wherever possible (Bass 1967: 142; 163).

Escorts and InterpretersDuring the Amarna period, the custom of providing an escort appears in full

vigor. Foreign delegations were generally provided with a military escort. The size of the escort was increased when the caravans included a large consignment of goods, and mainly if the delegation accompanied a royal bride (Bryce 2003: 66). Nevertheless, the Akkadian term ālik adi used for messenger ‘escorts’ is never used in the Amarna letters. Messengers returning to their homeland often travel with messengers from a host country: “Send my messenger with your messenger to Egypt” (EA 35: 8–9); “When my messenger comes here with your messenger” (EA 10: 41–42).

In a few contexts, the Amarna letters mention targumannu (‘interpreters’), who translate messages for the kings. Burnaburiyaš sent his messenger with an inter-preter to the Egyptian court and Amenhotep III did the same (EA 11: 5–10). Miḫuni (EA 11) and Ḫane (EA 21) were two Egyptian interpreters, who went to Babylon and Mitanni. Probably, the rise of the Akkadian as lingua franca may have diminished the need for interpreters.

Nevertheless, Tutu, a high official, had an important role before foreign delega-tions in the Egyptian court at Amarna (EA 158: 10–31), and he was depicted as an interpreter of foreign rulers (Davies 1908, Pl. 19–20). Huy, the Viceroy of Kush during the reign of Tutankhamun, was a skilled intermediary between the king and the foreign chiefs and was depicted twice in the same scene looking to the king and to the chiefs, revealing his role of interpreter (Davies 1926, Pl. 19–20, 23–33; Galán 2011: 306–7).

AudienceThe reception of envoys, which took place in a special room of the king’s palace,

followed a strict protocol. After the usual greetings, the messenger would offer the gifts he brought to the king, and then he would reveal the contents of the message


he carried by reading the tablet, the envelope having been first broken in the pres-ence of the king (Lafont 2001: 47). The significant role of the written clay tablet is shown in a letter found at Ugarit. The text portrays the audience given by an Assyrian king, who relates: “The Hittite king sent me a messenger carrying two tablets [declaring] war and one tablet [proposing] peace. He presented me [first] the two tablets of war. When my soldiers heard these messages of war, they burned to go fight. And the Hittite messenger took note of this. Then, three days later, the messenger of the Hittite king produced for me the tablet of peace” (RS 34.165: 21–37). Evidently, the messengers played an important role in the discussions, which lasted—at least—“three days.” According to Singer (1985: 101, 108), the letter re-veals the unfolding of a peace negotiation.

HospitalityIn general, the messenger was received with due signs of respect and hospi-

tality. The satisfactory treatment of messengers on their missions abroad was an important component of the Amarna political system. Messengers were to a reason-able extent protected by the laws of hospitality, especially at their final destination (Liverani 2000: 22).

After the royal audience, the envoys were invited to festivals and banquets. The ritual related to these festivals included the delivery of ceremonial garments and scented oils to the messengers, the distribution of gifts, and the sharing of meals. The Egyptian messengers received wine and food from the Babylonian king: “I am going to have a festival. Come to eat and drink with me” (EA 3: 23–28). Also, envoys received gifts in the form of garments, weapons, horses, metal objects and silver, distributed according to their rank. For example, the messengers would receive gifts from Great Kings and small rulers in Canaan, such as horses and donkeys: “I (Aziru of Amurru) gave him horses and donkeys for his journey” (EA 161: 23–24). The gifts give them honor and prestige: “The messenger of the king of Akko is praised more than my messenger, since he received a horse as a gift” (EA 88: 46–48); “Let (the king) give a gift to his servants (messengers), so that our enemies will see it and eat dust!” (EA 100: 33–36). Aziru of Amurru insists that the Egyptian messenger was well taken care of and received provisions, food and drinks: “They gave him oxen, sheep, goats, birds (fowl), his food, and his strong drink (bread and beer)” (EA 161: 15–22).

The treatment of messengers served as an indicator of inter-regional relations, and as a concrete expression of the good will between the parties. When Great Kings were on amicable terms, delegations sent by one to the other were hospitably re-ceived by the host court, often with much pomp and ceremony, particularly if a rich array of gifts came with them (Bryce 2003: 57). In one letter, the Babylonian king apologizes for not receiving the Egyptian messenger due to his illness: “From the time the messenger of my brother ar[rived here], I have not been well, and so on no occa[sion] has his messenger eaten food and [drunk] spirits [in my com]pany” (EA 7: 8–10). Tušratta of Mitanni honored a messenger and an interpreter from the Egyptian court with gifts: “Mane, [my brother’s] messenger, and Ḫane, my brother’s interpreter, I have exalted like gods. I have given [them] many gifts” (EA 21: 24–29). In another text, he invites another messenger to a festival in Mitanni: “When my brother’s messenger [arrives] along with Pirissi, [I shall invite] them to cele[brate] a great feast, the kimru-feast (. . .)” (EA 27: 99–103).


The Assyrian king expresses joy upon the arrival of the Egyptian messengers: “When I saw your messengers, I rejoiced greatly. Your messengers shall reside with me as objects of great solicitude” (EA 16: 6–12). Often, the arrival of emissaries was celebrated by the king and his court with festivities: “Mane, my brother’s messen-ger, came again (. . .) and I (Tušratta of Mitanni) read the tablet which he brought and heard his message. And my brother’s message was very pleasing. So (. . .) that day and night I celebrated” (EA 20: 8–13); “The day that I heard my brother’s greet-ing, that very day I made a festive occasion” (EA 27: 35–36). All the population of Amurru experienced the same joy upon the arrival of the Egyptian messenger and interpreter: “Ḫatip has come and brought the gracious and sweet words of the king (. . .). My land and my brothers, the servants of the king, my lord, and the servants of Tutu, my lord, are overjoyed when the breath of the king, my lord, comes” (EA 164: 4–14).

Finally, the reception of a foreign delegation was tantamount to the recognition of a king as a member of the “brotherhood”: “I have sent my messenger to visit you and [your country]. Until now, my predecessors have not sent word. Today, I have personally sent word to you (. . .). As for the messenger, whom I sent to visit you (. . .), let him see your hospitality and the hospitality of your country (. . .)” (EA 15: 7–22).

In brief, festivals were religious and sociopolitical events, in which messengers and high-ranking foreign emissaries were received. Some feasts marked special events such as the king’s investiture, military victories, alliances, or the inaugura-tion of a temple or a palace. The feast reinforced the king and queen’s prestige and authority (Schmandt-Besserat 2001: 397–401).

Temporary ResidenceIn particular during a period of regular contacts between courts, it was probably

quite common for messengers to reside in a foreign court for a short or long period of time, in order to fulfill several assignments for their kings. On their arrival, for-eign envoys would be first given a particular residence, a “guest house” outside the palace (EA 29: 28–54; Lafont 2001: 46).

The Amarna letters reflect the existence of resident embassies, in which foreign messengers frequented the dwellings of princesses of their own courts married to Pharaoh (Cohen 1996: 258). The households of these princesses constituted a kind of permanent embassy, with the princess herself playing a role equivalent to the head of the delegation. The Mitannian messengers were “in residence in the quar-ters that [were established] for Tadu-Ḫepa” in the Egyptian court. A “large delega-tion” of messengers was promised by the King of Mitanni to Egypt: “I will send Keliya to my [brothe]r, [I will] provide a large expedition (. . .), and I will send a large delegation to my [bro]ther” (EA 29: 32–37, 166–172). Tušratta of Mitanni uses the expression “all the nobles [and] all the envoys” (EA 24 III: 25, 31) for an assem-bly at court, which Cohen (1996: 258) considers as a reference for the existence of a “collective diplomatic corps.” 4 Na’aman (2005: 475–76) affirms that Tušratta urges the Pharaoh to display his daughter and her rich dowry before the Egyptian nobles

4. See also EA 20: 73–74 (“The men of my country and all my foreign envoys/delegation (ubārūtu)”); EA 29: 32–37 (“My messengers, as my nobles, and the residing foreign envoys”), 85–90 (“the people of my land and [. . .] with the residing foreign envoys”). Contra “resident ambassadors” and “diplomatic corps,” see Berridge 2000: 215–16.


and the foreign envoys (ubārūtu): “May my brother assemble, and may all other lands and the nobles (and) all envoys be present. And they may show his dowry to my brother (. . .). And may my brother take all the nobles and all the envoys and all other lands (. . .)” (EA 24 III: 21–34).

The ruler of Tunip informs about the temporal residence of foreign envoys at the Egyptian court: “For 20 years, we have gone on writing to the king, our lord, but our messengers have stayed on with the king, our lord. And now, our lord, we ask for the son of Aki-Teššup (the last king of Tunip) from the king, our lord. May our lord give him” (EA 59: 13–17).

Ugaritic texts (RS 17.130; PRU 4: 103) refer to foreigners residing within the territory of Ugarit, particularly around its harbor. Some of these merchants had special privileges appropriate for envoys, including gifts of food and access to a ship (Jones 2007: 51–52). The Ugarit tablets (Yon 2003: 48) include lists of merchandise, commercial contracts, bills of lading, and lists of residents, sailors and merchants of diverse origins (from Ashqelon, Ashdod, Akko, Tyre, Byblos, and Alašiya) (Vidal 2006b: 274–76; Hesse 2008: 54).

According to Beckman (1999: 177; 2013: 207), a Hittite edict (CTH 93) was in-tended to prevent the Anatolian tradesmen (“the men of Ura”) from acquiring total economic domination over Ugarit: “The men of Ura shall carry on their mercantile activities in the land of Ugarit during the summer, but they will be forced to leave the land of Ugarit for their own land in the winter. The men of Ura shall not live in the land of Ugarit during the winter. They shall not acquire houses or fields (in Ugarit) with their silver.” The edict intended to avoid the permanent residence of foreign messengers and merchants, who could not buy houses or fields, in the land of Ugarit.

In summary, the Amarna archive reveals that some messengers and merchants were well-received en route and upon arrival, and were granted due hospitality.

3. Misfortunes of the MessengersThe life of a messenger in transit was not easy. It was made harsh by the pres-

ence of thieves, murderers, bureaucratic delays, and rigors of the road. Even when the messenger would arrive at his destination abroad, he may not necessarily be feted, but rather deliberately insulted, thrown into prison, beaten or killed, or sim-ply kept under house arrest and detained for years.

Rigors of the RoadIn general, the roads were dangerous and difficult, and the journeys very long.

The ideal messenger would never rest, even during the nights. The presence of hostile elements required that the messengers should leave under the cover of dark-ness: “By night, because of the dog, the messengers of the king bring (news) and by night they return (news)” (EA 108: 52–56).

Harsh environmental conditions, fierce heat, and failure of water supplies were amongst the natural hazards the envoys faced. The hard conditions on the roads are described by the Babylonian king, when he explained why communications seem to be faltering: “It is said that the way is difficult, the water in short supply, and the weather hot, therefore I have not sent many gifts (. . .) When the weather improves, then I will have my future messenger who will go and bring many gifts” (EA 7: 53–60).


Other obstacles to overland travel were the distance one messenger could make per day, factors of dissimilar terrain, different purposes of travel, and variation of season, which could dictate the actual distance covered in a day (Beitzel 1992: 646). Great distances were the basis of fantastic descriptions. The messengers would re-port that the journey is longer than anyone can imagine: “Why did not he send his messenger to me when I was sick? My brother’s messenger said, ‘This is not a place close by so that your brother can hear (you are sick) and send greetings. The country is far; who can tell your brother so that he can write quickly?’ (. . .). I said to him, ‘Is there such a thing as a near or far land to my brother the Great King?’ He said, ‘Ask your own messenger if the way is far!’ (. . .) I asked my messenger and he said the way is far, so I kept quiet” (EA 7: 16–32).

The emissaries had to avoid the season of winter rains. Covering the distance between Amarna (or Thebes) and the capital cities in the Levant or beyond would take at least a month (to Washukanni) or a month and a half (to Ḫattuša or Baby-lon) for a fast courier, and around twice that (two to three months) for a caravan of loaded donkeys. It has been estimated that on average the distance covered in a day ranged from about 27 to 37 km (Bryce 2003: 66). From one of Tušratta’s letters to Akhenaten (EA 29: 26), we learn that a period of three months was considered a commendably short time for a return journey between the Mitannian capital and Amarna of a caravan with a large consignment of valuable goods and a royal bride. A round-trip, including time for negotiating and for preparing the return caravan, took an entire year, unless there was a particular time-pressure (Liverani 2000: 21–22; Zaccagnini 2000: 148). A letter from Alašiya confirm this hypothesis: “And year by year let my messenger go [into your presence] and, on your part, year by year let your messenger come from [your country] into my presence” (EA 33: 27–32).

The messengers needed several weeks to travel from Egypt to Babylon, even do-ing 40 to 60 kilometers per day, without delays. An Old Babylonian text (AbB 7 144: 4–7) confirms this fact: “You have sent no one. The way is far and no one wants to travel to me” (Meier 1988: 73).

Robbery, Murder, and CompensationThe Great King was responsible for the safety of merchants and messengers

crossing his territories on behalf of his peers. Each small king was accountable to his Great King for everything that happened in his kingdom. Customary tools, such as safe-conducts and letters of warning from the Great Kings, were not always enough for preventing problems during the journey. In such circumstances, mes-sengers were in danger of being robbed and murdered on the roads before reaching their destination (Liverani 2000: 23; 2014: 289).

During the Late Bronze Age, the practice of compensation was a well-known procedure applied to cases of robbery and murder of messengers and merchants (Srzednicki 1969: 255–58; Liverani 1990: 95).

The king of Babylon urges the Pharaoh to intervene regarding crimes that oc-curred to his messenger in Canaan, whose caravan was robbed twice: “My messen-ger Salmu, whom I sent to you, twice has his caravan been robbed. First, Biryawaza robbed him, and second, Pamaḫu (. . .) your own governor robbed him. My brother should take up this case. As my messenger spoke before my brother, (so) now may Salmu speak before my brother! One should give him back his objects and one should compensate him for the losses he suffered” (EA 7: 73–82). Also, he informed the Egyptian court about the robbery of his merchants and asked for compensation: “My


merchants who traveled with Aḫu-tabu, they remained in Canaan for their busi-nesses, after Aḫu-tabu went on to my brother. In the city of Ḫinnatuna in Canaan, Šum-Adda son of Balume and Šutatna son of Šaratum, of Akko, sent their men to kill the merchants and take their silver. I send you Azzu: ask him and he will tell you. Canaan is your land, and its kings are your servants. I was robbed in your land. Summon them, and the silver they took, let them repay and the people who killed my servants, kill them or compensate their blood!” (EA 8: 13–29). Evidently, the responsible persons were the local authorities, but the Babylonian king from his remote location could only complain about the lack of justice and order in Canaan to the Egyptian authorities: “If you do not kill these men, they will go back and kill again either a caravan of mine or a messenger of yours, and the (traffic of) messen-gers between us will be interrupted” (EA 8: 30–33). Na’aman (2005) affirms that an important ‘foreign resident’ (ubāru), may be a diplomatic delegate, was murdered by a commissioner and his men (EA 162: 74–75).

According to Westbrook (2000: 35), in EA 313: 1–11 are documented “two pay-ments for two separate matters: compensation in lieu of ransom and compensation for goods stolen, in that order”: “13 merchants from Egypt, who were struck down in the attack of the Ḫabiru. I have given 400 shekels of silver, plus 1000, to the Com-missioner of the king who is over me.”

Most of these letters reflect a standard pattern: a description of the incident, an underscoring of the addressee’s higher responsibility, the confirmation of the official task of their messengers/merchants and a request for compensation or punishment (Liverani 1990: 98).

The answers are standardized as well, but the letters contain some amount of contradictions, based on state prestige and economical interest. The responsible king has to demonstrate not only that the country is under control, but also to keep the fluid political and economic contacts. But the prestige of his country could be damaged by taking responsibility for a crime.

However, the accountable king might claim ignorance of the incident, beside the fact that he has just received a long letter relating the situation and asking for justice: “My brother, you told me: ‘People of your land were together with them (the pirates)’. But I do not know, my brother, if they were with them. If people of my land are (with them), write to me and I will act as I want.” (EA 38: 13–18). “How am I to know whether they actually executed merchants?” (KBo 1 10: 24, letter from Ḫattušili III to Kadašman-Enlil II). Alternatively, the king might offer a complete denial that these kinds of incidents are taking place in his country: “You do not know the people of my land. They do not do such things!” (EA 38: 19–20).

The Hittite king refuses to carry out the blood-revenge demanded by the Baby-lonian king, offering compensation instead: “As to these words that you wrote to me: ‘My merchants have been killed in Amurru and in Ugarit’, I answer: ‘In the Hittite lands nobody is killed!’ If the king hears about such a thing, they seize the killer of such a person and hand him over to the brothers of the murderer man. His brothers take the monetary compensation for the murdered man and they perform the expia-tory ritual of the murderer, through whose acts a life was taken.” After the prestige problems are solved, the king begins the normal juridical procedures: “So, send me the brothers of the killed merchant, in order that I can examine the case” (KBo 1 10: 15–25; Vita 2011: 304; Naʾaman 1998: 61–67).

The security of their persons and merchandise was of special concern to rul-ers (Beckman 2013: 205). For example, the Hittite Laws stipulate: “If anyone kills


a merchant, he shall pay 100 minas of silver, and he shall hold his household re-sponsible for the fine. If it is in the lands of Luwiya or Pala, he shall pay the 100 minas and also replace his goods. If it is in the land of Hatti, he himself shall also bring that merchant to burial” (Hittite Laws §5, cf. Hoffner 1997: 19). Several Uga-ritic texts (PRU 4: 153–154, 158) registered similar agreements and the compensa-tion in silver (such as “two minas of silver”) for the murder of a merchant (Vidal 2006a: 130).

Nomadic ElementsConcerning areas inhabited by nomadic elements, a king had to show that the

territories were under his control: “It is the Suteans who have detained your mes-sengers. Their followers are dead. As soon as I gave orders, the followers of the Suteans were taken” (EA 16: 37–40). Otherwise, he had the risk of his territory being considered a small kingdom: “In regard to what my brother wrote: ‘As to the fact that I stopped my messengers, I stopped my messengers because the Aḫlamu are hostile’. How it is that you stopped your messengers because of the Aḫlamu?! My brother, is perhaps your kingdom a small one? (. . .) In my brother’s country the horses are more numerous than straw: should I grant to your messengers 1000 chariots in order to escort them until Tuttul (the boundary), and keep the Aḫlamu away?!” (KBo 1 10: 36–43, from Ḫattušili III to Kadašman-Enlil II). The principle is clear: a king must allow free passage of foreign messengers and merchants going to third countries. For example Assyria was expected to allow Babylonian messengers pass toward Hatti, just as Hatti would let Babylonian messengers pass headed for Egypt (Liverani 1990: 102).

Everywhere in Syria and Canaan were the Ḫabiru, a socially restive group of people who spread throughout the Near East during the second millennium b.c.e. The Ḫabiru encompassed groups of differing ethnic composition, expatriate fugi-tives from various city-states and tribal communities. According to a frequently used phrase in the Amarna letters (EA 67: 17; EA 116: 38; EA 179: 22), one could “become a Ḫabiru,” implying a lack of kinship or political ties. They are best defined as a social group, not an ethno-linguistic one (Knapp 1988: 187). They served as mercenaries, or formed independent communal or semi-tribal organizations on the borders of settled areas, often in the hill and forests of Syria and Canaan (Vidal 2006a: 127–33). They were not subject to any state’s legal authority. EA 313: 1–8 reports the murder of messengers and merchants by Ḫabiru in Canaan: “Your [mes-sengers] and 13 merchants from Egypt, who were struck down in the attack of the Ḫabiru.”

DiscreditIn inter-regional gift-exchange, newcomers were not welcome. Much antago-

nism was directed at the Assyrians, whose king did not always respect the formal rules of brotherhood. The common reaction would be to discredit the king and his messengers. The Babylonian king accused the king of Assyria of acting like a mer-chant, pursuing only the material aspects of the partnership, without any reference to a prestige game: “I did not send to you the Assyrians, servants of mine: why did they travel to your country by their own decision? If you care for me, they must not do any buying there, send them away empty-handed!” (EA 9: 31–35).

The messenger should be faithful and truthful, but sometimes the messengers did not convey the exact message, seeking to please one of the parties involved in


the political contact, whether out of compassion or fear of punishment. The Pharaoh informs the Babylonian king about the breakdown in communication between the courts due to falsehood: “I (Amenhotep III) have quarreled because of your messen-gers since they report to you saying: ‘Nothing is given to us who go to Egypt’. Those who come to me: does one of the two (messengers) go (away) [without] taking silver, gold, oil, cloaks, every sort of finery, [more than i]n any other country? Your mes-sengers don’t speak truly to you. Don’t listen to your messengers whose mouths are false” (EA 1: 66–71, 81–88).

Messengers often had strong motives for distorting their messages, and the tab-let was the insurance that the messenger spoke truly. Rib-Hadda of Byblos reports to the Egyptian court a distinction between the reading of the tablet and the words of the messenger: “I sent my tablet and my m[essenger] to the king, my lord, but the k[ing] did not listen to the words of my tablet or [my messen]ger” (EA 92: 12–15).

Particularly at the highest levels of negotiations, between Great Kings, a mes-senger’s misrepresentation to a foreign king of what his own king had actually said, whether through malice or incompetence, could have the most serious consequences. Tarḫundaradu of Arzawa wrote to Amenhotep III expressing his concern about a discrepancy between a messenger’s verbal report and the contents of a letter: “As for the words Kalbaya has spoken to me: ‘Let a blood-relationship be established between us’, I do not trust what Kalbaya has reported on this matter, for the tablet contains no confirmation of it” (EA 32: 1–6).

Lack of HospitalityHead (2011: 80–81) challenges the view that oriental hospitality ruled the treat-

ment of messengers in the Amarna world, and maintains that “the Amarna messen-gers, and in particular the public feasts which did (or conspicuously did not) herald their arrival at court were used as tools in the games played by the kings to increase their own prestige.” Thus, the preparation, presentation, and consumption of food in a banquet or festival could be egalitarian or profoundly hierarchical, fostering either social cohesion or competition. Head (2011: 84) concludes that “the public feeding and care of messengers was part of an ideological system intended to strengthen both the host’s political base and international political prestige via a program of conspicuous consumption.” Also, Feldman (2006) affirms the existence of an elite style of object in the Amarna Age used to mark the Great Powers as superior, and which was copied in emulation by small rulers.

According to Warburton (2001: 73), envoys were treated much like Levantine kinglets. The kings of Babylon and Assyria found that their emissaries were de-tained for long periods; scorched by the sun during hours at festivals for Aten, the sun-god, and complained of their ill-treatment at the Egyptian court.

The deceit in the message of the Babylonian messengers is the cause of their poor treatment in the Egyptian court: “They (the messengers) report to you saying: ‘Nothing is given to us who go to Egypt’ (. . .). So I (Amenhotep III) say (to myself), whether I give or don’t give anything to them, they are going to speak thus falsely! So I laid down a rule: I didn’t give!” (EA 1: 66–77). Amenhotep III also faulted the Babylonian king’s messengers for failing to verify that his sister enjoys comfort-able living arrangements and is being treated well: “You wrote (. . .) my envoys did not recognize her. That was my sister who was with you (. . .). Who can identify her? Why will you not send a dignitary who will speak the truth to you about the


welfare of your sister who is here?” (EA 1: 26–35). The Babylonian king responded to Pharaoh, complaining not only about the delay of his envoys, but also about the lack of hospitality to his messengers, who were not invited to the isinnu festival in Egypt: 5 “When you arranged a great isinnu festival, your messenger did not send the word ‘to come, eat, and drink’. Nor did you send my greeting-gift for the festival. You have sent me only 30 minas of gold. My gift is not equivalent to what I [have given] you every year. Look what I have done in my palace. I have made a large [festival house]. Your messengers have seen it and are happy. Now, I have arranged the opening of the house (in the palace). Come with me to eat and drink. I did not do what you did” (EA 3: 19–29).

According to the rules of hospitality, the Egyptian messengers would be “wined and dined” upon their arrival to the Babylonian court. However, Burnaburiyaš of Babylon was not interested in the rules of hospitality, since the shipment of gold from Egypt had been minuscule (“only 30 minas of gold”). Indeed, from his point of view there was nothing to celebrate: “From the time the messenger of my brother ar[rived here], I have not been well, and so on no occa[sion] has his messenger eaten food and [drunk] spirits [in my com]pany” (EA 7: 8–10). The alleged sickness of the king was only an excuse.

The Assyrian king complains about the lack of hospitality of Akhenaten dur-ing a very long religious ceremony of Aten, the solar god, keeping all the foreign messengers in the “open sun” for hours and making them “die of sunstroke”: “Why should messengers be made to stay constantly out in the open sun and so die of sunstroke? If staying out in the sun means profit for the king, then let him (a mes-senger) stay out and let him die right there of sunstroke, (but) for the king himself there must be a profit” (EA 16: 43–49). For Liverani (2004: 119), the expression “in the open sun” means literally “stay in exit,” and practically “await before leaving” or “await for a departure permit” (Vita 2007: 309); perhaps reflecting a long delay of the Assyrian messengers in the Egyptian court. Aššur-uballiṭ was concerned not only for the well-being of his messengers, but also for preserving the political rela-tionship between Assyria and Egypt.

According to Head (2011: 87), in the Amarna letters, “feasting is a symbol of power and a tool by which power is maintained, with the messengers serving as pawns in this political game and not simply recipients (or not) of altruistic ‘hospital-ity’.” Schmandt-Besserat (2001: 401) notes that “festivals were the time when fame and shame were created,” so ideological coercion was used to cause people to bring the most sumptuous gifts in the greatest quantity. Failing to contribute was consid-ered a profound insult to the gods and king.

However, sometimes, the messengers never received an audience. The kings of Canaan report that the Pharaoh simply ignores their messengers and fails to meet them, even when the messenger is a son of the sender: “I sent my son to the palace; after four months he has not seen the face of the king!” (EA 138: 77–78). The recep-tion of messengers was regulated by the palace, and to deliberately avoid a messen-ger was an insult. Often, military and palace bureaucracies would keep messengers away from the king without the Pharaoh’s knowledge. Aziru of Amurru informs

5. The isinnu festival was a Mesopotamian cultic celebration in honor of a deity, as well as a com-munal festival displaying the beauty of the temple (von Dassow and Greenwood 2006: 193). But, in this letter, isinnu is mentioned to denote the Egyptian sed-festival, related to the New Year festival, which has been linked to an annual day of diplomatic gift-exchange.


Tutu: “You are in the personal service [of the king], my [lord]. Heaven forbid that treacherous men have spoken maliciously [again]st me in the presence of the king, my lord. And you should not permit them (. . .). You should not permit malicious talk against me” (EA 158: 20–31). The tomb of Tutu preserves a record of the procedure by which he would interact with messengers to the Pharaoh: “I would report their words to the palace, since I was daily in [. . .] and I would exit again to them as a royal messenger with all of his Majesty’s instructions” (Valloggia 1976: 108). In a word, the messengers were screened by court functionaries.

Death PenaltyThe host king could demand that the offending messenger be tried and punished

by his own country. Tušratta of Mitanni responds to the Pharaoh’s demand for the death penalty of two of his messengers, who committed crimes in Egypt: “Artašuba and Asali (. . .), they broke the law in your brother’s country. They were brought in (. . .) and they were convicted in [m]y presen[ce. Ma]ne spoke of their [reputation] (. . .). I put [them] in chains and (. . .) I transported to a town of mine on the border. But my brother [had said nothing] more, and for this reason I did not execute them (. . .). Now, my brother establish the nature of [their crime], and I will treat [them] just as my brother wants them treated” (EA 29: 173–81). However, Tušratta did not impose the death penalty, at least until the Pharaoh provided him with more infor-mation about the nature of their crime.

Burnaburiyaš II of Babylon informed the Pharaoh about the robbery of his cara-vans and the murder of his merchants in Canaan (which was under Egyptian influ-ence), asking for compensation and the death penalty for the murderers: “Canaan is your land (. . .). I was robbed in your land. Summon them, and the silver they took, let them repay and the people who killed my servants, kill them or compensate their blood!” (EA 8: 22–29). Also, Kadašman-Enlil II of Babylon requested the death penalty for a similar crime, continuing with the policy of his predecessor (Vita 2011: 303–4). But, in this case, the punishment required was not permitted by Ḫattušili III of Hatti, who granted only compensation for the killing of Babylonian merchants in Amurru and Ugarit (which were under Hittite influence) (KBo 1 10: 15–25).

Apparently, there were cases of killing messengers who delivered bad news. In the tomb of Paheri, at el-Kab, there is evidence of someone who took pride in his not killing messengers for bearing bad news: “I (Paheri) did not confuse the message with the messenger (. . .). I was a model of kindliness” (Lichtheim 1976: 19; Miller 2009: 15–16).

Pace of JourneysThe length of stay was entirely at the discretion of the host king, whose permis-

sion was necessary before the envoy could depart. The rules of hospitality prevented the envoy from leaving without the consent: “What are messengers? Unless they are birds, are they going to fly and go away?” (EA 28: 21–22).

Sometimes emissaries were detained for economic reasons, such as the payment of debts. Wenamun was detained in Byblos for a month for this reason: the prince of Byblos would not grant the Egyptian request for lumber until he saw the pay-ment on the table (Lichtheim 1976: 226–28). A similar motive, such as the lack of greeting-gifts usually sent during a royal ascension, could provoke the detention of


an Assyrian messenger in Hatti: “Now, I have detained here my ambassador whom I sent to you and Bel-qarrad. And for the following reason I have detained him: All the wishes you wrote me about, I [. . .] sent to you. That’s why I have detained him” (CTH 173: rev. 11–14).

The delay of a messenger was not always intentional. A plague raging in Alašiya caused the delay of a messenger from Egypt for three years: “My brother, do not be concerned that your messenger has stayed three years in my country, for the hand of Nergal is in my country and in my own house” (EA 35: 35–39).

In many instances, detention probably had no hostile intentions, but stemmed from incompetence or bureaucratic delays due to the preparation of a large consign-ment of gifts or the dispatch of a royal bride. For example, the large amount of goods delivered from Mitanni to the Egyptian court caused the involuntary delay of Mane, the Egyptian messenger, and Keliya, the Mitannian messenger, for six months in the Mitannian court: “Within six months, I (Tušratta) will send Keliya, my messenger, and Mane my brother’s messenger. I will deliver my brother’s wife (Tadu-Ḫepa) and they will bring her to my brother” (EA 20: 23–25). Also, Tušratta explained to Amenhotep III that Mane had been kept in Mitanni because of the time taken to prepare the princess for her journey to Egypt. He assured the Pharaoh that he should not have concern about his envoy’s welfare: “I have honored Mane, my brother’s messenger, and all my brother’s troops who accompanied him, and I have treated them with great distinction (. . .). Mane is not dying, he is just the same, and he is not ill” (EA 20: 64–70).

The messengers and merchants were sometimes retained for years just to prove who was more powerful (Liverani 1990: 217). Detaining a messenger was a sign of a tense relationship between correspondents, for such detention was often used as a means of coercion.

Sometimes messengers visiting a foreign court found themselves detained in reprisal for similar action taken by their own king, or simply because of the ruler’s whim: “Earlier, I had said this to my brother: ‘I am going to detain Mane, [my brother’s] messenger, until [my] brother lets my messengers go free and they come to me.’ And now my brother has absolutely refused to let them go, and he has put them under very strict detention” (EA 28: 16–22; EA 29: 148–50).

Sometimes detention was explicitly intended as a punitive measure (Bryce 2003: 62). Akhenaten detained a messenger from Alašiya as a protest against his fellow countrymen’s alleged participation in pirate activities on the Egyptian coast: “Why, my brother, do you say such a thing to me? (. . .) I have done nothing of the sort. Indeed, men from Lukka, year by year, seize villages in my own country” (EA 38: 7–12).

Messengers were afraid to remain abroad for a long period of time. The Assyr-ian king inquired of the Pharaoh: “Do not delay the messenger whom I sent to you for a visit. He should visit and then leave for here. He should see what you are like and what your country is like, and then leave from there” (EA 15: 16–22).

An Assyrian messenger was held for three years in the land of Hatti: “[The mes-senger] of the land of Assyria who went to Hatti and was detained for three years, they have [rel]eased him and he has returned to Ashur [and the messen]ger of Hatti with him” (Gurney 1949: 139). Another messenger from Assyria was taken out of circulation by the king of Hatti for an undetermined period of time (CTH 173), long enough to have fathered a scribe with a Hittite name (Beckman 1983: 111).


A messenger from Alašiya was held in Egypt for two years (EA 36: 18), and an Egyptian messenger was detained in Alašiya for three years (EA 35: 35–36).

In the Egyptian court, a Babylonian messenger was held for six years: “Previ-ously, my father (Kadašman-Enlil I) would send you a messenger and you wouldn’t detain him many years. Quickly you sent him off, and you sent fine gifts. Now when I (Burnaburiyaš) sent you my messenger and you held him for 6 years, (and) you sent (only) 30 minas of gold that was worked with silver (. . .)” (EA 3: 9–20). This letter is mainly a complaint to Pharaoh regarding inequitable treatment of envoys. He complains about the length his envoys are detained, and the amount of his good-will gift.

Another extreme case is mentioned by the ruler of Tunip, which emissaries were detained during 20 years (EA 59: 13–14), violating any immunity attained during previous years.

The messengers were afraid not to be allowed to return home or even to die far away in a foreign land: “Truly, I (the ruler of Byblos) have not done to you (Wena-mun) what was done to the messengers of Khaemwase after they spent 17 years in this land. They died on the spot. And he said to his servant: ‘Take him to see the tomb where they lie’ (. . .)” (Tale of Wenamun II: 51–53, Lichtheim 1976: 228).

In short, sometimes messengers were protected in their journeys through letters of safe-conduct and by the norms of hospitality in foreign courts. However, as soon as a problem arose, emissaries were the first to suffer the consequences. Being an emissary was therefore both a prestigious and dangerous role (Liverani 2014: 284). Some of the messengers were unwelcome, and their ways were blocked by robbery, bureaucracy, taxes, detentions, abuse, and even murder.

4. ConclusionsThe most important expectations in the choice of a messenger were his truth-

fulness and speed. In addition, his social status could play an important role in his selection. High ranking officials, royal family members, and merchants were selected as royal emissaries. Experience, tact, reputation, age, decisiveness, and connections were a few prerequisites needed to get a royal commission. The ability to read and write, a good memory and the knowledge of foreign languages were not necessary, but they were desirable. Before departing, the king—with the help of the main gods—sought a propitious day to send his messengers, and he would have rituals, omens, and prayers performed in order to guarantee a safe journey. Then, the messenger would receive rations and a means of transportation in order to be-gin his long journey. The journey was not easy, the roads were dangerous, and the general conditions were not enviable. Beyond the hazards of water shortage, foul weather, and nearly impassable roads, messengers and merchants also had to con-tend with bandits, infiltrators, and wild beasts along roads. Traveling in groups or in the company of an escort minimized danger. Some messengers were welcome and granted hospitality, but some of them were unwelcome, and their ways were blocked by bureaucracy, robbery, and detentions. The messengers are documented in a wide spectrum of activities, as bearers of messages, mediators of communication, bearers of goods, merchants, witnesses to legal transactions, and informants. There were messengers in the service of the palaces and independent entrepreneurs. Some-times they were active in both official and private levels of activities.


The most remarkable feature of the Amarna network of political and economic relations was its survival for more than two hundred years. Several factors contrib-uted to this stability. Mutually recognized spheres of influence and buffer states worked to reduce friction. In this manner, the parties succeeded in obtaining the needed goods and prestige, while facilitating trade and cultural contacts. In ad-dition, “brotherhood” status, religion, language, and messengers were important reasons why the system remains relatively intact for so long. The brotherhood con-tributed to a kind of sense of solidarity. The system was multipolar and, to some extent, interdependent. As for religion, gods were recognized to be worshipped un-der different names in different places, and statues of gods and goddesses traveled between courts. Furthermore, the shared use of the Akkadian language contributed to integrate the system. Finally, messengers and merchants created the conditions for inter-polities relations to flourish.

BibliographyBachhuber, Ch.

2003 Aspects of Late Helladic Sea Trade. MA dissertation. Texas University.2006 Aegean Interest on the Uluburun Ship. AJA 110: 345–63.

Bass, G. F.1967 Cape Gelidonya: A Bronze Age Shipwreck. Philadelphia: American Philosophical

Society.Beckman, G.

1983 Mesopotamians and Mesopotamian Learning at Ḫattuša. JCS 35: 97–114.1999 Hittite Diplomatic Texts. WAW 7. Atlanta: Scholars Press.2013 Foreigners in the Ancient Near East. JAOS 133: 203–15.

Beitzel, B.1992 Travel and Communication. Pp. 644–48 in vol. 6 of The Anchor Bible Dictionary, ed.

D. N. Freedman. 6 vols. New York: Doubleday.Berridge, G.

2000 Amarna Diplomacy: A Full-fledged Diplomatic System? Pp. 212–24 in Cohen and Westbrook 2000.

Bryce, T.2003 Letters of the Great Kings of the Ancient Near East: The Royal Correspondence of the

Late Bronze Age. London and New York: Routledge.Caminos, R.

1954 Late-Egyptian Miscellanies. London: Oxford University Press.Cohen, R.

1996 On Diplomacy in the Ancient Near East: The Amarna Letters. Diplomacy & State-craft 7: 245–70.

2000 Intelligence in the Amarna Letters. Pp. 85–98 in Cohen and Westbrook 2000.Cohen, R., and Westbrook, R., eds.

2000 Amarna Diplomacy: The Beginnings of International Relations. Baltimore and Lon-don: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Davies, N. de G.1908 The Rock Tombs of El Amarna, vol. 6: Tombs of Parennefer, Tutu and Aÿ. 6 vols.

London: Egypt Exploration Fund.1926 The Tomb of Huy, Viceroy of Nubia in the Reign of Tutankhamun. London: Egypt

Exploration Society.


Dercksen, J. G.1996 The Old Assyrian Copper Trade in Anatolia. PIHANS 75. Istanbul: Nederlands His-

torisch-Archaeologisch Instituut.Feldman, M.

2006 Diplomacy by Design: Luxury Arts and an “International Style” in the Ancient Near East, 1400–1200 b.c.e. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Figulla, H. H., and Weidner, E. F.1916 Keilschrifttexte aus Boghazköi I. Leipzig: J. C. Hinrichs’sche Buchhandlung.

Galán, J. M.2011 Intérpretes y traducciones en el Egipto Imperial. Sémata 23: 295–313.

Gestoso Singer, G.1992 Los mensajeros en la época de El Amarna. REE 3: 63–69.2010 Forms of payment in the Amarna Age and in the Uluburun and Cape Gelidonya

shipwrecks. UF 42: 261–78.Greene, J. T.

1989 The Role of the Messenger and Message in the Ancient Near East. Oral and Written Communication in the Ancient Near East and in the Hebrew Scriptures: Communica-tors and Communiqués in Context. BJS 169. Atlanta: Scholars Press.

Gurney, O. R.1949 Texts from Dūr-Kurigalzu. Iraq 11: 131–49.

Head, R.2011 Amarna Messengers and the Politics of Feasting. Maarav 18: 79–87.

Hesse, K. J.2008 Late Bronze Age Maritime Trade in Eastern Mediterranean: An Inland Levantine

Perspective. MA dissertation. Uppsala University.Hoffner, H.

1997 The Laws of the Hittites. DMOA 23. Leiden, New York, and Köln: Brill.Holmes, Y.

1975 The Messengers of the Amarna Letters. JAOS 95: 376–81.Jean, Ch.-F.

1950 Lettres. ARM 2, TCL 23. Paris: Imprimerie Nationale.Jones, M. R.

2007 Oxhide Ingots, Copper Production, and the Mediterranean Trade in Copper and Other Metals in the Bronze Age. MA dissertation. Texas University.

Jönsson, Ch.2000 Diplomatic Signaling in the Amarna Letters. Pp. 191–204 in Cohen and Westbrook

2000.Knapp, A. B.

1988 The History and Culture of Ancient Western Asia and Egypt. New York: Dorsey.Lafont, B.

2001 International Relations in the Ancient Near East: The Birth of a Complete Diplo-matic System. Diplomacy & Statecraft 12: 39–60.

Lichtheim, M.1976 Ancient Egyptian Literature, vol. 2: The New Kingdom. 3 vols. Berkeley: University

of California Press.Liverani, M.

1990 Prestige and Interest: International Relations in the Near East ca. 1600–1100 B.C. Padova: Sargon.

2000 The Great Powers’ Club. Pp. 15–27 in Cohen and Westbrook 2000.


2004 The Fate of Ashur-uballit’s Messengers in EA 16. Pp. 117–20 in Von Sumer nach Ebla und zurück: Giovanni Pettinato zum 27. September 1999 gewidmet von Freun-den, Kollegen und Schülern, ed. H. Waetzoldt. HSAO 9. Heidelberg: Heidelberger Orientverlag.

2014 The Ancient Near East: History, Society and Economy. London and New York: Routledge.

Meier, S. A.1988 The Messenger in the Ancient Semitic World. HSM 45. Atlanta: Scholars Press.

Miller, W. I.2009 Messengers and Intermediaries: Insights from Ancient Law. Pp. 2–26 in Institute for

International Law and Justice, International Legal Theory Colloquium, 2009: Vir-tues, Vices, Human Behavior and Democracy in International Law, ed. B. Kingsbury and J. Weiler. New York University Law School.

Moran, W. L.1992 The Amarna Letters. Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Moreno García, J. C.2013 The ‘Other’ Administration: Patronage, Factions, and Informal Networks of Power

in Ancient Egypt. Pp. 1029-–65 in Ancient Egyptian Administration, ed. J. C. Moreno García. HdO 104/1. Leiden and Boston: Brill.

Munn-Rankin, J. M.1956 Diplomacy in Western Asia in the Early Second Millennium B.C. Iraq 18: 68–110.

Mynářová, J.2014 Egyptian State Correspondence of the New Kingdom: The Letters of the Levantine

Client Kings in the Amarna Correspondence and Contemporary Evidence. Pp. 10–31 in State Correspondence in the Ancient World: From the New Kingdom Egypt to the Roman Empire, ed. K. Radner. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Na’aman, N.1998 The Closing Paragraphs of Letter KBo I 10. AoF 25: 61–67.2005 Resident-Alien or Residing Foreign Delegate? On the ubāru in Some Late Bronze

Age Texts. UF 37: 475–78.Nougayrol, J.

1947 Textes et documents figurés. RA 41: 23–53.1955 Le Palais Royal d’Ugarit, vol. 3: Textes accadiens et hourrites des archives est, ouest

et centrales. MRS 6 . Paris: Libraire C. Kincksieck.1956 Le Palais Royal d’Ugarit, vol. 4: Textes accadiens des archives sud. MRS 9. Paris:

Imprimerie Nationale.Oller, G.

1995 Messenger and Ambassadors in Ancient Western Asia. Pp. 1465–73 in vol. 3 of Civi-lizations of the Ancient Near East, ed. J. M. Sasson. 4 vols. New York: Scribners.

Podany, A. H.2010 Brotherhood of Kings: How International Relations Shaped the Ancient Near East.

New York: Oxford University Press.Reiner, E.

1960 Fortune-Telling in Mesopotamia. JNES 19: 23–35.Schaeffer, C. F. A., Nougayrol, J., Laroche, E. Virolleaud, Ch., eds.

1968 Ugaritica, vol. 5: Nouveaux textes accadiens, hourrites et ugaritiques. Paris: Paul Geuthner.

Schmandt-Besserat, D.2001 Feasting in the Ancient Near East. Pp. 391–403 in Feasts: Archaeological and Eth-

nographic Perspectives on Food, Politics, and Power, ed. M. Dietler and B. Hayden. Washington: Smithsonian Institute Press.


Singer, I.1985 The Battle of Niḫriya and the End of the Hittite Empire. ZA 75: 100–123.

Srzednicki, C.1969 Early International Law Documents Concerning the Protection of Merchants. Folia

Orientalia 11: 255–58.Stewart, A. C.

2010 The Lord’s Anointed. Covenantal Kingship in Psalm 2 and Acts 4. Ph.D. dissertation. Liberty University.

Valloggia, M.1976 Recherche sur les “messagers” (wpwtyw) dans les sources égyptiennes profanes. Paris:

Librairie Droz.van den Hout, T., and Karasu, C.

2010 A Note on Hittite Envelopes and HKM 86. Pp. 372–77 in Pax Hethitica: Studies on the Hittites and their Neighbours in Honour of Itamar Singer, ed. Y. Cohen, A. Gilan, and J. L. Miller. StBoT 51. Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag.

Vidal, J.2006a La participación de tribus nómadas en el comercio internacional del Levante medi-

terráneo durante el Bronce Reciente. AuOr 24: 127–33.2006b Ugarit and the Southern Levantine Sea-ports. JESHO 49: 269–79.

Vita, J.-P.2007 Messengers who must live or die: A Note on EA 16 and ARM XXVIII 14 [A.2114].

Pp. 309–11 in “He unfurrowed his brow and laughed”: Essays in Honour of Professor Nicolas Wyatt, ed. W. G. E. Watson. AOAT 299. Münster: Ugarit Verlag.

2011 La pena de muerte en la Siria-Palestina del Bronce Final. Pp. 301–13 in Esta Toledo, aquella Babilonia. Convivencia e interacción en las sociedades del Oriente y del Medi-terráneo Antiguos, ed. J. A. Belmonte and J. Oliva. Cuenca: Universidad de Castilla-La Mancha.

Von Dassow, E., and Greenwood, K.2006 Correspondence from El-Amarna in Egypt. Pp. 182–214 in The Ancient Near East:

Historical Sources in Translation, ed. M. Chavalas. Oxford: Blackwell.Warburton, D.

2001 Egypt and the Near East: Politics in the Bronze Age. Civilisations du Proche Orient 4/1. Neuchâtel: Recherches et Publications.

Westbrook, R.2000 International Law in the Amarna Age. Pp. 28–41 in Cohen and Westbrook 2000.

Wiseman, D. J.1953 The Alalakh Tablets. OPBIAA 2. Liverpool: Tinling.

Yon, M.2003 The Foreign Relations of Ugarit. Pp. 41–51 in ΠΛΟΕΣ. Sea Routes: Interconnections

in the Mediterranean 16th – 6th c. BC. Proceedings of the International Symposium held at Rethymnon, Crete, September 29th–October 2nd 2002, ed. N. Chr. Stampoli-dis and V. Karageorghis. Athens: A. G. Levantis Foundation.

Zaccagnini, C.2000 The Interdependence of the Great Powers. Pp. 141–53 in Cohen and Westbrook

2000.

Fortunes and Misfortunes of Messengers and Merchants in the Amarna Letters. In: O. Drewnowska- M....

Documents

Transcript of Fortunes and Misfortunes of Messengers and Merchants in the Amarna Letters. In: O. Drewnowska- M....