Forsyth, L., Gould, D., Lawrence, D. “History Didactics in the Post Cold War World: Central Asia,...

Society for History Education

History Didactics in the Post Cold War World: Central Asia, the Middle East, and ChinaAuthor(s): Louise Forsyth, David Gould and David LawrenceSource: The History Teacher, Vol. 33, No. 4 (Aug., 2000), pp. 425-451Published by: Society for History EducationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/494941 .

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History Didactics in the Post Cold War World: Central Asia, the Middle East, and China

Louise Forsyth Educational Testing Service

David Gould Durham Academy, Durham, North Carolina

David Lawrence University of Toronto

DURING THE LAST DECADE of the twentieth century the world has witnessed a series of political, economic and social transformations that have left many of us, particularly those who make it their business to examine the past, pondering the significance of these changes and wondering how to best address them when we enter the classroom. The end of the Cold War and the subsequent dissolution of the Soviet Union marked the beginning of a new era in history, one that appeared, at first glance, to have given rise to a less precarious world, and one that most observers hoped would see a reduction in the threat of nuclear annihilation that had overshadowed human history since 1945. The changes that occurred in 1989 had wide ranging repercus- sions, affecting the political, economic and social systems of countries throughout the world. The events of 1989, and those that have followed, left many historians not only pondering the causes of these monumental changes but also questioning the direction of historical development. The History Teacher Volume 33 Number 4 August 2000 O Society for History Education



Louise Forsyth, David Gould, and David Lawrence

Responding to this profound transformation, Francis Fukuyama pro- claimed in a controversial essay published in the journal The National Interest (Summer, 1989) that "history had ended." He suggested that the end of history as a single, coherent evolutionary process was within sight: liberal democracy had triumphed over the socialist/communist model and the beginning of a new era in human relations was now assured. Several years later Fukuyama presented a more detailed analysis of his thesis entitled The End of History and the Last Man, suggesting that the individual's struggle for recognition and dignity were driving forces behind the emergence of liberal democracy during the last two hundred years. In the future, nations might experiment with different extremes of totalitarianism, with socialist models, and with dictatorships, but trial and error would inevitably lead these nations to realize that the only viable option which could provide economic, social and political stability would be one based on the capitalist, liberal democratic model, and in particular the kind of democratic system practiced by the United States of America. While it may be argued that Fukuyama states his claim in extreme terms, teachers must be aware that Americans tend to assume that all other nations want to be like us and so share Fukuyama's expectations.

It is not the intention of the authors of this article to address the many facets of Fukuyama's thesis, as supporters and critics alike produced a wide range of responses in 1989 and again in 1992 when The End of History and the Last Man was published. Instead, we would like to address some ideas that he mentioned only briefly but which we believe are too important to be marginalized. As historians and teachers, it is imperative that we understand the forces which have shaped the past and it is equally important that we provide our students with the tools to carry on the study of human existence. Fukuyama's suggestion that we have reached the "end of history" implies that the great ideological confronta- tions that have shaped the development of the moder world are literally a "thing of the past." As the list of nations which have accepted liberal democracy continues to grow, those nations which have not followed in these footsteps will eventually be left with no other alternative than to join the ranks of the democratic states or face the possibility of economic and political isolation. While Fukuyama contemplates what we might call the larger forces shaping history-the struggle between systems of government and economics-he pays little attention to the cultural, ethnic, religious and regional differences that now appear to be shaping the world in the post-Cold War era. While Fukuyama believes these problems will have little influence on the "end of history" we believe that they cannot, and should not, be dismissed by students of history. We do not disagree with Fukuyama's claim that the struggle to attain recogni-

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History Didactics in the Post Cold War World

tion and dignity is what all people seek, but we believe that the end of the Cold War opened the door to a new and unique set of problems for which our students now need to begin the process of formulating answers. Their answers may help in assuring that the coming century is not shaped by the same catastrophic forces that marred the last one hundred years.

In this article, we will examine three key regions of the globe and ask how each has been affected by the changes that have accompanied the end of the Cold War. We will also seek to determine how teachers of history might best address the nature of these changes and how our students might look beyond the old guideposts for measuring historical events, that of proclaiming winners and losers, and instead search for methods which foster greater understanding and empathy between peoples and nations. As we move into the twenty-first century new challenges will confront our students and our responsibility is to help them overcome such challenges by looking for common ground rather than return- ing to the thinking that helped shaped the twentieth century.

Section One of the article will examine Central Asian republics of the former Soviet Union in light of the events of the last ten years. Only a short time has transpired since the break-up of the Soviet Union, but we believe that this early period of adjustment will be crucial to the future development of these new states. If Fukuyama is correct, Central Asia's transition to a market economy and a democracy may be bumpy at first, but eventually new states in this region will take their place along with other nation states which have accepted liberal democracy. We would suggest, however, that the wide variety of social, economic and political forces vying for recognition in both Transcaucasia and Central Asia have complicated the region's search for identity and led to instability and conflict. We believe it is important for our students to understand the nature of some of these underlying forces, be they nationalistic, ethnic or religious and that they be able to trace their evolution and understand their importance in shaping the new Central Asian states. In a similar vein, we will examine the same forces in post Cold War Middle East and China.

Central Asia

Despite the tumultuous road that Russia and the former Soviet republics faced in the first few years after the collapse of the USSR, Fukuyama suggests that these nations remain on course to become converts to Western-style liberal democracy and capitalism. However, he notes with some caution that "we should not be surprised if all the formerly communist countries do not make a rapid and smooth transition to stable democ-

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428 Louise Forsyth, David Gould, and David Lawrence

The Caucasus and Central Asia




racy; in fact, it would be very surprising if this did happen. There are enormous obstacles to overcome before successful democracies can arise."' Yet, it is these obstacles that historians should now be addressing because the economic, political, cultural and ethnic diversity in the former Soviet Union represents the greatest threat to peace in the region. While the persistent discussions over NATO expansion, relations with the former Baltic Republics, and the continuing struggle in the Trans- Dneister suggest that Russia's western border regions will remain tense, there is still a degree of stability in this region. In the south, however, the possibility of conflict either within or between the new states remains more plausible as evidenced by the continuing struggles in Transcaucasia and in Tajikistan.

The historical legacies that have shaped relations between Russia and her neighbors in Transcaucasia and Central Asia have raised concerns that new fault lines may emerge that could lead to a dramatic reshaping of the region in the years to come.2 To imply that liberal democracy and a free market economy will, over time, cure the ills that now plague the southern and Central Asia states of the former Soviet Union, neglects the region's history and pays little attention to the new political actors that are involved in the process of nation building in both Moscow and the former republics. To suggest that Western political and economic ideals can be readily deposited in these states, fertilized with ample infusions of IMF funds and produce liberal democracies, neglects the past that has shaped both Russia and her southern neighbors.

David Remnick noted in his most recent work Resurrection, that when considering the roots of Western democratic values, and particularly those which developed in America, it is important to remember that "the colonies were blessed with the inheritance of English history, law, and political culture, as well as an abundance of Enlightenment thinkers and politicians: Washington, Jefferson, Madison and Adams." On the other hand, Russia, states Remnick, "inherited a legacy of terror, xenophobia, and lawlessness; even the presence of artists as great as Pushkin, Turgenev, or Tolstoy could not erase that historical residue."3 This historical residue is also present in Central Asia, where centuries of migrations, colonization and war have created an explosive ethnic, religious and cultural mix. A survey of the last ten years of Soviet/Russian history indicates that ethnic and religious clashes in the "near abroad," particularly those in Transcaucasia and Tajikistan, are serious enough to create larger conflicts that could threaten not only regional but global peace in the next century. Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrott point out that historians must play a role in helping analysts come to understand the "volcanic changes" in the former Soviet Union and that an understanding of these changes

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can only come from "situating the collapse and transformation of the USSR within a broader context that takes account of the complex legacies of the past."4 Hence, a deeper examination of the problems facing the former Central Asian republics suggests that these complex legacies will continue to be stumbling blocks to peace in the region.

A survey of relevant literature indicates that there is presently no single unifying force that could easily link these new states and that each of the states appears to be developing along separate, and perhaps, disparate paths. Much has been written about the possibility of a unified Muslim state composed of the former Soviet Central Asian republics, but history suggests that this may be a chimera, stymied by the diversity that is present within many of the Central Asian states. An effort to create a unified state in the region was first attempted in the nineteenth century by Tsarist Russia but this failed due to Russia's inability to control the political, cultural and religious forces in the area. "Turkistan," as it came to be known, was merely an area on a map and not a true state by modem standards. In the years leading up to the Bolshevik Revolution, and while the Tsarist government was involved in World War I, various separatist groups in the region, particularly the Turkistan National Liberation Move- ment, attempted to free themselves from Tsarist rule and regain some of the autonomy they had lost as a result of nineteenth century Russian colonization. The efforts of the Turkistan liberation movement resulted in the creation of the Autonomous Turkistan in 1917. This was followed in 1918 by the creation of the Republics of Bashkurdistan and Azerbaijan. While some analysts have suggested that an Islamic resurgence in Cen- tral Asia-which could lead to the establishment of a new state of Turkistan-is now underway, there appear to be a number of barriers similar to those confronted during the first attempt to create a united Turkistan.

The early Soviet period saw renewed efforts by the Russians to regain control of Central Asia and bring the republics that gained their independence in 1917-1920 back into Moscow's orbit. During the Bolshevik Revolution and the Civil War that followed, Red Army troops re-entered the region and began to impose communist rule on the Central Asian states. The Stalinist era saw the reinstitution of strict controls placed on these republics, and the oppression that was visited on the Uzbeks, Kazahks, and other Central Asian peoples proved as harsh, if not harsher than that imposed on other groups in the Soviet Union. This period also saw further Russian emigration to the region and by the time the Soviet Union collapsed in 1992 nearly ten percent of the population of Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, twenty-two percent of the population of Kyrgyzstan and thirty-eight percent of Kazakhstan was Russian.5 These

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Russians played a significant role in the development of the region, acting in the role of managers and professionals. At the same time, however, many remained aloof from the Central Asian cultures, choosing instead to retain the language and customs of Russia as well as their loyalty to Moscow. Despite the collapse of the Soviet Union, many of these Russians remain citizens of the new Central Asian states; they will continue to play an important role in the region, first by connecting Moscow to the former republics, and second by providing technical expertise that, at this time, could prove difficult for the former republics to replace.

The relocation of various ethnic groups, such as the Uzbeks and Tatars, that occurred during the Stalinist era has further complicated the process of nation-building in the region. In Tajikistan, while Russians compose ten percent of the population, nearly one quarter of the remain- ing population is Uzbek. A similar situation exists in Turkmenistan and Kyrgyzstan where Uzbeks compose approximately ten percent of the population. It is clear that this mix of populations in the former republics will complicate any efforts to create a sense of national identity. At the same time, however, this cultural mix might slow any movement towards the creation of fundamentalist Islamic states similar to the Iranian model which some in the West fear.

Samuel Huntington explores the possibility of an Islamic resurgence in Central Asia that may lead to the creation of a new Islamic civilization linking this region to the Middle East in The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. Huntington sees the recent struggle between Russia and the breakaway Chechen Republic, as well as the ongoing civil war in Tajikistan, as early evidence of the growing dissen- sion between the followers of Russian Orthodoxy and the new Islamic movements in Central Asia. These "local wars," Huntington believes, have led to the creation of new fault lines in which the Chechen and Tajik conflicts represent precursors to larger religious or even civilizational wars. According to Huntington,

in the early 1990s, as the Orthodox religion and the Orthodox Church again became central elements in Russian national identity, which "squeezed out other Russian confessions, of which Islam is the most important," the Russians found it in their interest to define the war between clans and regions in Tajikistan and the war with Chechnya as parts of a broader clash going back centuries between Orthodoxy and Islam, with its local oppo- nents now committed to Islamic fundamentalism and jihad and the proxies for Islamabad, Tehran, Riyadh, and Ankara.6

It might be premature, however, to assume that Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, or Kyrgyzstan in Central Asia or

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Azerbaijan in the Transcaucasus are ready to unite into an Islamic alliance with Middle Eastern states such as Iran or Turkey because of territorial or ethnic disputes they may have with the Russian Republic. While the new states of Central Asia are predominantly Muslim, they are composed of both Sunni and Shi'a communities, and there remain significant differences within the Islamic community in each of these states on the proper relationship between government and religion. To con- clude, therefore, that the region is a hotbed of Islamic fundamentalism, ready to boil over at any minute into a religious war between Russia and "Turkestan" is as misguided as Fukuyama's belief in the inevitable success of liberal democracy in the region. In an article published in the Bulletin of the Advancement of Central Asian Research in 1995, H.B. Paksoy noted that fears of the creation of an Islamic state have been fueled by Moscow's intent to paint a gloomy picture of the prospects for the region in which fundamentalists threaten to upset the delicate balance in Central Asia between Islam and Orthodoxy. Paksoy rightly claims that "(if) Western analysts grasped more clearly that national autonomy or political liberty were at the root of Central Asian discontent, Western governments might look upon it with a very different eye, one less tolerant of Moscow's use of force."7

Fukuyama's thesis would predict that, over time, the problem of resurgent Islamic power in Central Asia and the religious, cultural and ethnic differences noted above will eventually be overcome by the willingness of the individual to accept others on the basis of a shared economic system and a "universal and reciprocal recognition, where every citizen recognizes the dignity and humanity of every other citizen and where that dignity is recognized in turn by the state through the granting of rights."8 This view implies that the Central Asians are willing to first accept this Western conception of liberal democracy and then also agree that the capitalist market economy is the answer to their current problems. Yet if the region's economic troubles persist, Islam may provide the answer to the social and economic inequities that many in Central Asia are now facing. The Palestinian Hamas Organization has proven itself to be an important social and political force in the poverty- stricken West Bank and Gaza and further political, economic, or environ- mental problems in Central Asia may see the rise of such organizations in countries like Tajikistan or Azerbaijan. If this is the case, and conflicts between Moscow and the former Central Asian republics persist and widen, Huntington's thesis might prove correct. However, we must point out that both Fukuyama and Huntington are two possible scenarios that represent opposite poles and that a solution to the present situation in Central Asia will likely fall somewhere in between. States such as

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Uzbekestan and Kazakhstan may wish to maintain their ties to Moscow, while Tajikistan and Azerbaijan might work to establish new relationships with their Islamic neighbors to the south.

With the fall of communism, we have not seen the end of interstate conflict or the creation of a "new world order" as many Western analysts suggested; as well, it is difficult to say whether liberal democracy has been readily accepted in either Russia or her former republics. The euphoria of the early 1990s has died away quickly and, as we begin the twenty-first century, these states continue to be faced with a plethora of problems, some inherently more complicated than Fukuyama or Hun- tington would have us believe. Therefore, when the future of Central Asia is addressed, it is important that historians play a role in helping to shape relations between Russia and the Central Asian states. It is vital that an attempt be made to construct bridges and build better relations not only between Russia and Central Asia, but also between the West and Central Asia by taking the precaution not to fuel the fires of nationalist sentiment. If improvements in relations between all these political actors are to occur smoothly, historians must play a decisive role in educating the public on the forces which have shaped Central Asia and the Transcaucasus. The process of historical re-examination that has accompanied the Soviet collapse has been a difficult one and it is paramount that historians continue to probe and reassess both Tsarist and Soviet writings on the Caucasus and Central Asian peoples. Special attention should be paid to improving our understanding of the "pre-colonial" period of the new states of Central Asia in much the same way as studies have sought to do in India and Latin America. There should also be a concerted effort to continue to examine the Stalinist period and the accompanying diaspora, regardless of what painful memories might be resurrected. We should also seek to gain a better understanding of the role that Islam played in the pre-revolutionary period as this might help to foster better ties, not only between the Russians and Central Asians, but also between Russia and the Islamic states of the Middle East. Improve- ments in relations with the Muslim nations to the south might eliminate possible areas of confrontation and help improve the likelihood of peace in the region.

We should, however, enter into any study of the new Central Asian states with caution and a clear understanding that we must step lightly, as the "nationalities question" and the future of the these new states represent a minefield, strewn with explosive historical material that can be readily commandeered to justify political attacks on ethnic, cultural or religious groups. The lessons learned from the recent Balkan conflict should still be fresh in our minds and while we must be willing to address

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these issues with our students, it is important that as historians we remain aloof from the extremism that has often accompanied historical debates over the future of the former Soviet republics. As historians and teachers, it is our role to re-examine both Russian history and the history of the former republics and to address the historical underpinnings of the conflicts that now trouble these states. The former Central Asian republics of the USSR represent an area of the globe that has received little attention in Western history courses and their newly acquired independence offers us a fresh opportunity to explore their history. Students in the West have long focused their attention on the impact of Russian policies on Western Europe and vice versa. In doing so, they have often neglected the more complex ethnic and religious differences that exist between the populations of southern Russia and those of the newly independent states in the Transcaucasus and Central Asia. Newer history textbooks, especially those revised since the breakup of the Soviet Union, have begun to provide more detailed information on these new states, but it will take a number of years before we in the West can begin to provide our students with more detailed texts on the region or to re-construct existing courses to take advantage of these new materials.

The Middle East

When history teachers consider the usefulness of Fukuyama's paradigms for the Middle East, it becomes readily apparent that it is in this region of the globe, more than any other, that his march to liberal democracy is most problematic. It is not accidental that The End of History and the Last Man devotes few pages to the Middle East. Fukuyama can marshal supporting evidence from contemporary events in Asia and Latin America as well as Russia and Europe, although as noted in the first section of the paper, there are a number of difficulties even here. When it comes to the Middle East, however, he says little. In his impressive list of more than sixty-five liberal democracies worldwide, he only includes three Middle Eastern states: Turkey (listed under Europe), Israel and Lebanon;9 it is probably no accident that one of these states is a member of NATO, the second Jewish and heavily European in population, and the third at one time dominated by a Christian, highly Westernized elite. The unique development of the contemporary Middle East poses interesting and difficult challenges for historians in the post Cold War era.

The end of the Cold War has had a huge impact on the nations of the Middle East because it coincided with internal events within the region and within the major states themselves. Arab socialism, the political program of a majority of the states in the 1960s and 1970s, proved to be

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problematic, if not a failure, in many countries at the same time that a reevaluation of ties with American interests was deemed necessary. The disillusionment with socialist alternatives and the re-evaluation of relations with the United States has led, in one form or another, to a rise in religious fundamentalism, Islamic in most countries of the region and Jewish in Israel. These groups are seeking recognition and acceptance from a secular world dominated by those very liberal democracies which Fukuyama applauds. It is a world, however, they fundamentally reject as inappropriate for their cultures, immoral and perhaps even irrelevant. Fukuyama himself reveals the gap between these liberal values and Islamic ones when he calls them fascistic and nostalgic.10

The so-called worldwide threat of Islamic fundamentalism, or as some in the region prefer to call it, Islamism, has been much discussed both in the media and in scholarly communities. Islamism has been denounced in the Western media both as intentional terrorism and as a cultural war on the key Western ideals of liberty, secular governments and justice systems derived from rational rather than religious values. Huntington's previously noted The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order articulates this perceived threat. It is possible, however, that treating Islamism as a threat does disservice to the issues as they appear to people in the Middle East. It thus remains fundamentally a Western ethnocentric vision that fails to see Islam in its true light. As teachers of history, it is crucial that we present the developments in the Middle East as they are experienced there rather than through our Western viewfinder.

The model for the initial hope and subsequent failure of socialism in the Arab world is clearly Egypt, the most populous and influential of the Arab states. Nasser's socialist program of state-controlled economic and educational modernization combined with fierce nationalism to generate widespread optimism and enthusiasm. This particular nationalism was originally Arab in orientation; the United Arab Republic-Egypt, Syria and Yemen-sought to be the nucleus of a unified Arab community which would then be strong enough to resist the encroachments of the Western powers symbolized by their imposition of the state of Israel over virtually unanimous Arab opposition. In this general venture, the Soviet Union was at first a welcome ally, as symbolized by the Soviet funding and technical support of the Aswan Dam after President Eisenhower withdrew American support in the wake of the 1956 war. Nasser's vision remained convincing to the Egyptians in spite of the military debacle of 1967 and the quick collapse of Pan-Arabism. While there were many successful state socialistic policies, such as those programs which created widespread improvements in education and medicine, there were also huge social consequences, particularly rapid population growth and ur-

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banization. Nasser's government could not successfully meet the needs for employment or social services of the rapidly urbanizing population, nor did it succeed in reestablishing the reputation of the Arab states in its military conflict with Israel. The Sadat and Mubarak governments that followed Nasser after his much-mourned death in 1970 have steadily and surely lost the support of a great part of the Egyptian people, particularly and most importantly, the middle and professional classes.

Sadat and Mubarak have slowly pulled Egypt out of socialism and away from the socialist world community and created considerable contact with Western powers, particularly the United States. This was done partly out of conviction, partly out of thinking it would be a better deal economically, partly as a result of the Russian war against Afghani Muslims, and partly in hopes that peace with Israel would have fruitful consequences beyond the mere return of Egyptian territory. However, just as Arab socialism proved to be a chimera, so has this Westernization process. Egypt remains beset by economic problems: disappointing agri- cultural returns since the building of the Aswan Dam and its disruption of the natural flooding of the Nile; over-population and continuing rapid population growth; and massive unemployment not only of poor people but of newly educated middle classes. A particularly debilitating problem is the massive bureaucracy created to employ the hordes of young people coming out of universities (most wonderfully portrayed in a splendid Egyptian film entitled Terrorism and Kebab and in the great short stories of Yusef Idris).11

The ongoing failure of Egypt's government was most tellingly re- vealed after the October, 1992 earthquake. The government took more than a day to get men and supplies to damaged areas, but the Muslim Brotherhood was on the spot immediately with doctors, food, blankets, and other help. Massive immobility of the government and its inability to deal with the needs of the populace has allowed space for non-govern- mental organizations to flourish and to demonstrate their superior compe- tence. The Muslim Brotherhood grows continuously because it provides medical, educational and social services to the people whom the government has neglected. And unlike similar charitable organizations in Jew- ish and Christian communities, the Muslim Brotherhood has a comprehensive political agenda. This organization was created in the 1920s to demand a return to government by Shar'ia and has long been an object of persecution by the Egyptian government. Its membership has grown substantially in recent years, however, because of government failures and a widespread disappointment with the secular, Westernized world. Peace with Israel, rewarded by a huge influx of American investment, has not really benefited the average Egyptian. Certain peace policies have

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enriched some bureaucrats, but the promised benefits to society as a whole have not materialized. Instead, Egypt has had its leadership position within the Arab world tainted by its association with Israel and with the United States. Nor has secular society made itself attractive to those people fearful of social dislocation. Reduction in the strength of the family unit-as villagers leave for jobs in urban areas-and Western secular models promoted strongly by Egyptian leaders have produced the typical patterns of destabilization visible throughout most developing nations. Western tourists are ubiquitous, as are Western films, books and television,which seem, to many Middle Eastern minds, the epitome of immorality and cultural vacuity.

Infiltration of Western values is particularly disturbing for those who uphold the traditional roles of women. The excesses of Taliban in Af- ghanistan create horrific impressions of Islamism in the West and many Westerners make faulty assumptions that the Taliban typify Islamists in their oppression of women. Without excusing what is undoubtedly an unwelcome and brutal imposition of traditional tribal roles on Afghani women, it is crucial for us as educators to present the relationship of women with Islam in a balanced light that reveals what Muslim women find valuable and empowering about their religion. What is most striking is that the decision to wear Islamic dress and put on the veil is not typically imposed by males but voluntarily made by hundreds of thou- sands of Muslim women in the Middle East (and increasingly in the West as well). These choices are often baffling to American students who have strong feelings about freedom of personal expression. The best way for students to understand the complexities of such issues is to hear the voices of these women through their writings.12

Westerners, whether liberal or conservative, find the status of women in the Middle East most disconcerting. Generally they expect that women around the globe would want to adopt Western values of equality and full participation in the economic and social life of the community as well as in the political process. Yet, in Iran, it was the women themselves who imposed and enforced Islamic dress and played an important public role both in creating the revolution of 1979 and in the new regime which appears to Western eyes as so repressive. Revolutionary Iran has provided many professional opportunities for women, positions outside of the home and often of significant power. Ironically, the position of women under the last Shah was not much better.'3 Perhaps the typical image of contemporary Iran might be a woman fully covered in Islamic dress holding a rifle or working at a computer console. On other fronts, too, the position of women in Middle Eastern countries is often surprising. In the West, we are bombarded with stories of the brutal dictatorship

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of Saddam Hussein in Iraq, yet it is in this country that women have the position of greatest equality anywhere in the Arab world.'4

What is most surprising about the rise of Islamic fundamentalism in Egypt is the strong support it has from a large percentage of the professional classes. There are now numerous Egyptian organizations of law- yers and physicians which articulate a call for government by Shar' ia and demand the inclusion of Islamists in the political process. Similar groups exist in many Middle Eastern states. In Iran such professional and religious organizations joined with business interests to successfully engi- neer the dramatic revolution of 1979 which overthrew the last Shah. The country had suffered the failures of his Westernization program and the terrible consequences of the oil boom, followed by a subsequent decline in oil prices. These had created initial rapid industrialization and urban- ization followed by-in the years prior to the revolution-inflation, increasing unemployment and tight credit, and a narrowing of opportunities at the top.15 When the Shah, adapting Western nation-state models, publicly envisioned Iran as more connected to its national Persian history than to its Shi'a history, the long-standing dissatisfaction burst forth. The mosque-bazaar leadership established the first major Islamic Republic in the Middle East, led by a cleric but supported by the middle classes.

It is this phenomenon which is disturbing to many Westerners because in our history these same classes are responsible for the establishment of liberal democracy. While there are groups with such Western values throughout the Middle East, in many countries members of the educated elite insist that a religiously based democracy is a truer, more successful model than the Western democratic secular one because it creates both a better society and one that is organically connected with the population. The contemporary Islamicist conception of the relationship between the religious establishment and the government is fundamentally different from the moder Western conception in that it articulates a unified organic vision between public and private sectors. Interestingly enough, we are currently seeing this moder Western conception of the separation of church and state under challenge in various parts of the world from segments of the American political spectrum to India. Perhaps nowhere in the Middle East is the issue being played out more dramatically at the moment than in Turkey, a fully secularized state with a functioning democracy and close relations to the West. In recent years we have seen the fundamentalist Welfare Party elected to the prime ministership in a parliamentary election only to then witness its removal by intervening Turkish generals who, ironically, see themselves as bastions of political stability and democracy.

Iran's surprisingly successful recent transformation to a more modified Islamicist state has provided a model for the Islamicist movements in

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virtually each nation with a Muslim majority.16 In these states, whether oil-rich sheikdom or monarchical or totalitarian dictatorship, whether dominated by one political party (like the Ba'athist state of Iraq) or by oligarchies, there is some form of confrontation between the growing Islamic forces and the ruling elite. Comparative models are helpful in examining the various ways this confrontation is being played out. For Western students, however, it is important to first remember how recent (and tenuous) the secularist victory is in their own culture. They also need to understand the organic Islamic political vision as an inherent part of Middle Eastern Muslim societies. The Islamic Republic of Iran is a marvelous example of the combination of traditional religious values and a highly sophisticated society with full appreciation of the values of modernity. The Iranians are creating a new identity, a self-definition that neither apes the West nor denies their own history.

Perhaps no issue in contemporary Middle Eastern affairs is more important and more difficult to understand than the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This problem is deeply connected with issues of religious fundamentalism, with the Cold War and its aftermath, and with ambiguous relationships with the West. We suggest seven levels or approaches to the topic, each of which is necessary for a comprehensive understanding and recognition of the deeply sensitive nature of the issue and its ethnic, religious and even racial overtones.

The first level consists of an objective overview of the historical events leading up to the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948, particularly the nature of the British Mandate, the patterns of population growth, the conflicts over Jewish immigration to Palestine, the impetus given to Zionism by the Nazi Holocaust, and the decision-making process after the end of World War II. The second is a careful political and social examination of the refugee problem from the Arab-Zionist war in 1948 to the present, for it is this issue which remains both a political conundrum and an intense source of emotionality. The third is an analysis of the conflict between Israel and Palestine as seen within the larger political context of the Middle East and of the Cold war itself, document- ing how the interests of the United States and the Soviet Union increased the tensions in the region and impacted the Arab-Israeli several wars. The fourth level is an exploration of the history of the three main religions in what to each is a Holy Land-Judaism, Christianity and Islam-to discern what religious and emotional claims each has on Jerusalem and on the rest of the land of Israel and to articulate both their shared visions and significant differences. While in many other areas of the world, such as the Balkans, Indonesia, Ireland or India, religion often outweighs other public concerns, nevertheless, religious passions in the Middle East and

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particularly in Israel seem to drink from very deep wells. This is no doubt because of the spiritual importance of the Holy Land for the three monotheistic religions. It is important as well to separate the established religions from the deeply passionate fundamentalists on both sides of the fence: Israel's Jewish fundamentalists and their Palestinian counterparts on the West Bank and Gaza are both minorities within their communities. Whether it is right-wing Jewish religious nationalists (who get substantial support from American Christian fundamentalists) or Hamas or Hizballah, religious prophecies and historical events of long-ago have a surprisingly alive presence, generate enormous power for small political groups, and challenge the authority of secular authorities.

A consideration of three more levels (the fifth through seventh) is crucial to better understand the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the possibilities for its resolution. In all the media attention given to terrorists of both sides, little attention is given to the Jewish, Christian, and Muslim peacemakers within Israel and within Palestine. This is the fifth level. Even though their media visibility is low, the peacemakers are not small in number. They have to struggle against the overwhelming political momentum that inhibits peace and find ways to reach and empower the majority of the population (especially within Israel) which desires peace.

The sixth level of examination involves the situation of those Arabs who did not emigrate in 1948, who live in Israel as Israeli citizens, and who comprise about twenty per cent of the population. Some are Chris- tian, some Muslim, some are Druze. Their second-class citizenship raises important issues about the lessons learned by persecuted peoples and the complexities of multicultural nation-states. Interesting comparisons can be made to other ethnic issues in the region, particularly the Kurds in Iraq, Turkey and Syria. In each of these states minorities are seeking ways to define their particular nationality and finding the process as difficult and as complex as it has been for European minorities during the past five hundred years.

The last issue, which will no doubt be the most crucial one of the twenty-first century for Middle Eastern states, is water. It is already an important source of tension among Israel, Palestine, and Jordan as both Palestine and Jordan claim that Israel siphons off more than its rightful share of the Jordan River. The issue of control over water resources has also increased tensions between Turkey, the only Middle Eastern nation in NATO, and its Arab neighbors, Syria and Iraq. When Turkey's massive development program in the southeast part of the country (designed to ease the complaints of the Kurdish population there) is completed, it will be able to dam the Euphrates River and control the amount of water flowing through Syria and Iraq. A war over this crucial resource seems

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not an unlikely scenario. As the oil resources of the region diminish by mid-century and the consequent ability of nations to import their food worsens, the tensions over water will increase.

Understanding the contemporary Middle East requires much time and energy, for perhaps in no other world region do issues of religion, geography, natural resources, ethnicity, and politics intertwine so deeply. The superficial explanations for American participation in military conflicts in the region and the often prejudiced media treatment of Middle Eastern peoples make the role of educators particularly crucial. Neither Fukuyama's optimism about the worldwide sweep of liberal democracy and a globalized economy that benefits the peoples of the world, nor Huntington's vision of core civilizational cultures are adequate models for understanding a region whose history and values have created pecu- liarly different cultures. Like the former Russian states, Middle Eastern countries are struggling to incorporate a multivariate heritage with spe- cific religious and national components into a viable economic and political presence in the moder world. Their future dignity depends on their ability to maintain the coherence of those heritages and having that coherence acknowledged on the world stage.17

China

The complicated search for an identity, still tantalizingly out of reach for new states that were formerly part of the Soviet Union and for the peoples of the Middle East, is also problematic for the Chinese in the post Cold War world. Whether zhongguoren (mainland Chinese) or huaren (overseas Chinese/of Chinese origin), there is an emerging and vital perception amongst Chinese that a profound restructuring of political and economic realities in East Asia is in progress, that the eras of empire, warlordism and civil war, and "Mao Zedong Thought" have been rel- egated to the pages of history texts, probably for good. The China of the twenty-first century will be as different from that of the twentieth century as the austere mao-suits of mid-century party cadres are from the fashion- able silk suits and ties of the moder politician and businessman from Beijing, Chengdu, Xian, and Guangzhou. China's search for legitimate recognition and dignity will undoubtedly alter the face of East Asia and the entire Pacific Rim.

If Fukuyama is correct in his observations about the triumph of democracy and the inevitable link between that ideology and the overall course of economic development in nation-states,18 then one might be tempted to overlook the profoundly complex nature of late twentieth century Chinese political/economic problems. On one hand, the Beijing

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government insists on authoritarian political control which brooks no opposition; on the other, that same government increasingly allows free entrepreneurial choice in a highly competitive and capitalistic market economy. Westerners comfortable with democratic, free market capitalism have a hard time grasping the emerging Chinese model and cannot even begin to empathize with it.

If what Huntington posits, however, is even partially correct, then deal with it we must. He suggests that the twenty-first century will be defined by "core civilizations" and that one of the most powerful of these-if not the most powerful-will be China.19 If this paradigm indeed eventuates, to continue fostering the decades old fearful image of vast, "red" Chinese hordes bent on destruction of the "Western" way of life is not only reprehensible, but highly dangerous. Those sitting in our classrooms today will very likely be striking deals with their counterparts in the People's Republic in the not too distant future, and so to view those counterparts with a subliminal fear is certainly not conducive to creating sustainable relationships built on acknowledged and accepted cultural differences. Understanding the role that history has played in creating present day realities is crucial to understanding the forces behind growing Chinese political and economic hegemony in East Asia and their increasing importance on the world stage.

Contemporary China can perhaps be best understood by focusing on the tremendous changes within its body politic during the twentieth century, and especially since 1949. Between 1900 and 1949, China was a civilization embroiled in chaos and change. The age-old Confucian hierarchical system which buttressed the Ch'ing Dynasty for centuries was discarded, along with the Dowager Empress Cixi and the last Emperor Pu Yi in the early decades of the century. From then until 1949, China was nearly rent asunder; great ideological/ethnic conflicts between Republi- can vs. Warlord, Democrat vs. Communist, and Chinese vs. Japanese created such great instability, divisiveness, and shifting loyalties that it became impossible for the emerging nation-state to find any real direction or purpose. The torment and suffering during the 1920s to the 1940s was massive. The utter foreign-ness of it all, the closed nature of its society since the end of the "Open Door" Era, and vast ignorance about its culture and customs only served to heighten the informational and increasingly xenophobic barrier between China and the West. These notions only deepened with such news as the atrocities of the Rape of Nanjing during the Sino-Japanese War, the never ending fratricidal civil war between the Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalists and Mao Zedong's Communist party, and the consequent inability of the Chinese to help themselves during World War II.

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Japan's defeat in 1945 and Mao's triumphal entry into Beijing in 1949 brought these seemingly interminable conflicts to a halt. Coming so quickly on the heels of the American-Soviet split after WW II, however, the specter of the most populous nation in the world joining forces with Communist Russia was almost too much to imagine for the anti-communist democracies of the West, especially the U.S. American support of Chiang Kai-shek and his Nationalists during the civil war (against the advice of senior American diplomats and military personnel in China at the time) caused Mao to "close down" his new People's Republic to all things American. His subsequent embracing of Stalin in the early 1950s convinced America and the West that the emerging bipolar world was now even more dangerous. These actions, however, were mostly indica- tive of Mao's desire to modernize and bring greater political stability to a still fractured nation. China's successful test of her first nuclear device in 1964 further solidified her efforts to be recognized as a legitimate major world power.

Mao, however, was experiencing extremely serious internal political and economic problems. The newly minted communist state which seemed warlike and powerful was, in fact, everything but that. The Sino-Soviet alliance was all but dead by 1960 when Khrushchev recalled Soviet politicians, scientists, and technicians and a disgruntled Mao chafed at the notion that China was a junior partner in their relationship. Coming on the heels of the politically repugnant "Let One Hundred Flowers Bloom' campaign of 1956 and the economically disastrous Great Leap Forward of 1958, the loss of technical, industrial and economic aid created such domestic problems for the Chinese Communist Party, that the ensuing Cultural Revolution was perhaps unavoidable. The decades of the 1950s and 1960s initiated intense changes in China's body politic: the violent, extreme swings in political and economic policies under Mao's tutelage came close to destroying the very revolution he had put in place in 1949. Even Nixon did not fully sense the vast and pervasive nature of China's internal troubles during his visit to Beijing in 1972. The searing depth of this chaos20 did not become apparent to most outsiders until after The Great Helmsman's death in September 1976, when China began to "open up." In the three years following, the Gang of Four were discredited, Deng Xiaoping gained power (he had been purged twice before from leadership roles under Mao) and replaced Mao's anointed successor Hua Guofeng as titular head of the Party, and full diplomatic relations were established between China and the United States.

China's rise to legitimate world prominence began with Deng's recognition that internal political peace could only be bought with drastic changes in economic and diplomatic policies. Reaffirming the iconic

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slogans of the recent past (Zhou En-lai's "Four Modernizations," the Cultural Revolution's "Four Bigs," and Mao's "Four Cardinal Principles of Socialism"), Deng proceeded to wean China away from the policies of Mao and towards a "socialist democracy," economic liberalization, and political reconciliation with the West. The 1980s were fraught with policy change as liberals, moderates and conservatives within the party structure fought with one another to control the direction of political and economic reform.21 And looming behind these changes was the sheer size of their task: China's population passed the 1 billion mark in 1982-since 1949, 460,000,000 additional Chinese now lived on the mainland.

Deng's reform policies instilled a "chop and change" aura to the politically fragile domestic scene during the 1980s. His pronouncements of "One country, two systems," "A black cat can catch the mouse just as easily as the white one can," and "We can allow the bird to fly around in the cage" speak to his pragmatic leanings and awareness that China's vast political and economic potential could only be realized if she were willing and able to compete in an increasingly globalized community. These reformist ideas are part of the background to the "Beijing Spring" of April-May 1989 and the ensuing Tiananmen "counterrevolutionary rebellion" of early June. China was a country desperately searching for balance. On the one hand, some measure of central control was necessary because of its sheer size and rapid economic change from a command Marxist model to a modified version of a free market model. On the other hand, a great deal of individual initiative was necessary to move the Chinese away from their "iron rice bowl" mentality and towards one which rewarded hard work, risk taking, and an entrepreneurial spirit. The search for balance between state control and individual initiative on both political and economic levels remains a key issue in contemporary China. Realizing the country's huge potential depends absolutely on creating such a balance.

Since the crackdown on the students at Tiananmen Square on June 4, 1989, China has continued to search for a workable balance. Deng perhaps said it best on June 9, 1989 when, referring to the crackdown, he acknowledged, "The crux of the current incident is basically a confrontation between the four cardinal principles (adherence to: the socialist road; the people's democratic dictatorship; the leadership of the Communist Party; and Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought) and bourgeois liberalization."22 The iconic photograph of the Goddess of Democracy statue standing in front of Mao's picture on the wall of the entrance to the Forbidden City during those early days in June, 1989, provides a stark reminder of the deep divisions which still remain in today's Chinese society.

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The 1990s experienced continued gyrations in policy: from the conservative retrenchment and higher military budgets of the early decade, to the emergence of younger and more liberal leaders like Jiang Zemin and the demotion of hard liners like the Yang "family generals" and most recently, Li Peng; from a greater willingness to affirm its hegemonic desires in East Asia and oppose American demands for greater sensitivity on human rights issues to the warm reception for Western investments and the attempt to secure favorable trading agreements around the globe. Clearly, today's Chinese society is in a state of political and economic flux; the "Yan'an" revolutionary spirit is alive and well and will undoubtedly remain active in the coming decades.23 There is no question, however, that the People's Republic is committed to modernization and that it expects to play an increasingly larger role in Asian and world affairs.

Fukuyama's insistence that this modernization will necessarily lead to a lessening of state political control is highly debatable, given the tumultuous history of post 1949 China. The principles of liberty and equality unleashed in the economic sector may simply not mesh with the political demands required by a such a huge state which has experienced such revolutionary extremes in such a short period of time. It is perhaps more than ironic that Marx, writing in the mid nineteenth century about post- Napoleonic Europe, made similar observations about the authenticity of Hegel's "Universal Historical Model."24 Huntington's focus on the need for greater civilizational/cultural literacy and understanding may be particularly instructive here. His insistence that civilizations-especially the Western-must perceive themselves as unique rather than universal implies that cultural filtering lenses must become a thing of the past. Refusing to discard such lenses creates not only ignorance and fear but also dramatically increases the chance for major civilizational fault lines to appear.

Understanding China's cultural traditions, for instance, would greatly improve western understanding of why the post-1949 period in China has been so unbalanced and chaotic. Centuries of teaching and inculcating Confucian values in the populace meant that while the communist egali- tarian model was certainly attractive to dispossessed peasants, there was no way it could be easily institutionalized. Confucian emphasis on order, discipline, work, obedience to a hierarchical structure, and punishment flew in the face of egalitarianism. Hence, when Mao instituted his political and economic reforms, confusion should have been expected. Loyalty then, as now, was focused on the family rather than an ideology or the nation. The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution attempted to exorcise the Confucian demon but fell flat; and today, the mere mention of "the years of chaos" excites fears beyond belief. Stories Chinese colleagues

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recounted-always behind closed doors and during a teaching stint in Guangdong Province in 1988-89-about their experiences during the late 1960s are some of the most terrifying imaginable.25 Little wonder there has been no serious political challenge to the central cadre of leaders in Beijing since the 1949 revolution. One might argue that the Beijing Spring culminating in the Tiananmen debacle was such a challenge. The hierarchy at the time disagreed. Referring to the importance of hierarchical power and implying the need for punishment at times, Deng said, on April 25, 1989, "Some people crave nothing short of national chaos.... We must take a clear-cut stand and forceful measures to oppose and stop the turmoil. Don't be afraid of students, because we still have several million troops."26

A similar focus on the importance of culture might also help to understand why guanxi is at the heart of doing any kind of business in China today. The term means different things to different people. A foreigner might equate it with bribery or corruption. The Chinese loosely translate it as "going through the back door" or "connections." It refers to the Chinese inclination to do business with family, relatives and those they absolutely trust. These business relationships are decades old and not based on the Western habit of striking the best deal with whomever provides the greatest and quickest profit. The Oriental bottom line is not three months or a year away; it is measured generationally. Given that China has been averaging eight percent growth in their GDP since the mid 1980s and considering the size of its domestic market-not to mention its potential industrial/technological workforce-one might be well advised to pay better attention to the history behind business relationships with the mainland Chinese. In a similar vein, one might also reassess the importance of overseas Chinese communities which funnel millions of investment dollars back to relatives on the mainland; as China strengthens its political and economic position, where might lie the real loyalties of these huaren communities which already control significant portions of most Asian economies?

Conclusion

If we employ that part of Fukuyama's template which posits that the leveling power of post industrial economies combined with the increasing globalization of trade is creating a dramatically different paradigm than that which existed during the Cold War,27 we must also acknowledge that emerging non-western states have legitimate claims to power in their own regions. In doing so, we must respect their right to establish their own identity on their own terms. To do anything less would be to deny

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these states their right to recognition and dignity. As historians and teachers, it is incumbent on us to present as fair a picture as possible, a history without ideological bias and a story told not from the Western or American perspective but from an evolving civilizational and global perspective.

Huntington offers clues on how we may be able to present such a history. He argues that we can no longer depend on old paradigms to create necessary understanding, and, somewhat like Fukuyama, he suggests that the world is about to embark on an entirely different adventure. That adventure will not be based on ideological struggle, pure power politics and the emulation of Hegel's grand statist scheme, but will be dependent on our ability to accept the reality of a multipolar, multicivilizational world during the twenty-first century.28 Technological innovation and an international trade market have decreased the size of our economic and political world. We are becoming, like it or not, absolutely interdependent. And that means we had better learn how to better learn about our new political and economic partners. It also means we must extend the perimeters of our compassion and tolerance. As Huntington argues, we must cast aside our ideological, political and economic proclivities and seek instead to understand that our cultural distinctions define us. Above all, we must acknowledge and accept cultural uniqueness rather than promote civilizational universality.

The key to teaching history in the post Cold War classroom is to understand that the shrinking world has changed fundamental relationships between nation-states. We no longer live in a world where one or several states can universally declare their political and/or economic ideology sacrosanct. Nor do we live in a world where there can be a multiplicity of states continually vying for control. Given the dramatic political and economic changes which have transformed areas such as Central Asia, the Middle East, and China over the past several decades, it is clear that America and the West will have to learn to deal with civilizations it has not understood well. As historians and teachers, we will have to acknowledge that the "cultural cat" can be skinned many different ways, that past differences do not necessarily mean future conflicts, and that empathetic cultural study is far more useful than any ideological polemic. We must work to create an accurate and meaningful literacy that is conducive to understanding rather than enmity.

Teaching the post Cold War world will be a challenge. Textbooks that provide brief stereotypical historical highlights of the non-Western world must be revised to present a more accurate account of diverse cultures. Courses-particularly at the secondary level-cannot be dressed-up eurocentric Western Civilization courses with token acknowledgements

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of how and when other civilizations came into contact with that of the West. Within such courses, we should combine the classic historical narrative with novels and books which provide insights into non-Western cultures, representative stories written from the inside out whose poi- gnancy provides deeper meaning and a better understanding of cultural context-lessons, for instance, on China's Great Cultural Proletarian Revolution would be far more worthwhile and properly instructive with the inclusion of Nien Cheng's Life and Death in Shanghai rather than just providing students with a mere litany of dates, events, and political and economic consequences.

The burgeoning power of the Internet and World Wide Web can also be of great help in breaking down perceived cultural barriers and estab- lishing student to student contact. In effect, these technologies allow us to create an immediate international dialogue between classrooms. Schools should, as many have already done, join international classroom computer forums with their counterparts from around the world. As the level of technology rises and as computers in classrooms become more normal in other cultures, direct contact between American and foreign students can become the rule rather than the exception. The spinoffs of such technological contact are potentially limitless. Intercivilizational courses "interetted" across geographic and political boundaries rather than in- ter-disciplinary courses within a single school's departmental structure, more frequent and more focused student exchanges between schools in different cultures, and "live" guest lectures via partnered schools' internet video hookups are just a few of the possibilities. Which, for instance, would have greater impact: a lecture on gender problems in Middle East politics by a teacher who is male, Christian, and who has never been to that part of the world, or one, via the internet, by a female, Muslim teacher in Cairo or Beirut or Teheran?

Certainly, one goal of all historical study is increased understanding of who we are and why we think the way we do. Such understanding increases our perspective and gives us a greater appreciation of the human condition. In that common human condition lies an appreciation for all humans in all cultures-perhaps, after all, there is an implicit order to Spaceship Earth. As historians and teachers, we must commit to inculcating that appreciation-it is at the very heart of our craft.

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Bibliography

Central Asia Section

Dawisha, Karen and Bruce Parrot. Russia and the New States of Eurasia:The Politics of Upheaval. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994.

Fukuyama, Francis.The End of History and the Last Man. New York: Avon Books, 1992. Huntington, Samuel P. The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. New

York: Touchstone Press, 1996. Paksoy, H.B. "Nationality or Religion: Views of Central Asian Islam," AACAR Bulletin.

Vol. VIII, No. 2, Fall 1995. Pipes, Richard. Russia Under the Bolshevik Regime. New York: Vintage Press, 1995. Remnick, David. Resurrection:The Struggle for a New Russia. New York: Random

House, 1997.

Middle East Section

Beck, Lois and Nikki Keddie.Women in the Muslim World. Cambridge:Harvard Univer- sity Press, 1978.

Burke, Edmund III. Struggle and Survival in the Modern Middle East. Berkeley: Univer- sity of California Press, 1993.

Eisenstadt, S.N. The Transformation of Israeli Society. Boulder, Colorado: Westview, 1985.

Ferea, Elizabeth Warnock. Women and the Family in the Middle East: New Voices of Change. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1985.

Hodgson, Marshall G.S. The Venture of Islam: Conscience and History in a World Civilization: Volume 3, The Gunpowder Empires and Modern Times. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1974.

Hourani, Albert. A History of the Arab Peoples. New York: Warner, 1992. Karpat, Kemal H. editor, Political and Social Thought in the Contemporary Middle East.

New York: Prager, 1982 al-Khalil, Samir. Republic of Fear: the Politics of Modern Iraq. Berkeley: University of

California Press, 1989. Mottahedeh, Roy. The Mantle of the Prophet: Religion and Politics in Iran. Berkeley:

University of California Press, 1985.

China Section

Baum, Richard. Burying Mao-Chinese Politics in the Age of Deng Xiaoping. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994.

Butterfield, Fox. China: Alive in the Bitter Sea. New York: Times Books, 1982. Ethridge, James W. China's Unfinished Revolution- Problems and Prospects Since Mao.

San Francisco: China Books, 1990. Fukuyama, Francis, The End of History and the Last Man. New York: Avon, 1992. Fukuyama, Francis. "The End of History ?," The National Interest 16. (Summer 1989): 3-

18. Huntington, Samuel P. The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. New

York: Touchstone Press, 1996. McDougall, Walter. " The Merits and Perils of Teaching About Other Cultures," Address

to a History Institute for Educators on "Multiculturalism in World History," at the

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History Academy of the Foreign Policy Research Institute, Philadelphia, Pa., May 1-2, 1999.

Meisner, Maurice. The Deng Xiaoping Era, An Inquiry into the Fate of Chinese Social- ism, 1978-1994. New York: Hill and Wang, 1996.

Spence, Jonathan D. The Search For Modern China. New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1990.

Terrill, Ross, ed. The China Difference. New York: Harper and Row, 1979. Woodruff, John. China in Search of Its Future-Years of Great Reform, 1982-87. Seattle:

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Notes

1. Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man, New York:Avon Books, 1992, p. 33.

2. See Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, New York: Touchstone Press, 1996.

3. David Remnick, Resurrection:The Struggle for a New Russia, New York: Random House, 1997. p. 91.

4. Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrot, Russia and the New States of Eurasia: The Politics of Upheaval, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994. p. 23.

5. Ibid., p. 81. 6. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, p.

270. 7. H.B. Paksoy, "Nationality or Religion: Views of Central Asian Islam," AACAR

Bulletin, Vol VIII, No. 2, Fall, 1995. p. 8. 8. Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man. p. xviii. 9. Fukuyama, The End of History..., pp. 79-80. However, Albert Hourani, in his

History of the Arab Peoples. New York: Warner Books, 1992 p. 456, while not optimistic about the possibilities of democracy in the Middle East, documents some recent attempts in Kuwait, Lebanon and Jordan to empower Parliaments.

10. Ibid, p. 236. 11. Idris writes incisive tales of both peasant and urban life and is considered by

many Egyptians to be as fine a writer as Naguib Mahfouz who is so far the only Arab to have won the Nobel Prize for Literature. Idris is widely anthologized. Many of his stories were collected in The Eyes of the Beholder: Tales of Egyptian Life, edited by Roger Allen. Minneapolis: Biblioteca Islamica 1978.

12. There is now a large body of literature. Several anthologies can be recom- mended. Elisabeth Femea and Basin Bezirgan, editors. Middle Eastern Muslim Women Speak. Austin, University of Texas Press 1977, or another edited by Ferea, Women and the Family in the Middle East: New Voices of Change. Austin, University of Texas Press, 1985. Also of value is Geraldine Brooks' recent journalistic discussion, Nine Parts of Desire: The Hidden World of Islamic Women. New York: Anchor 1994.

13. Fukuyama notes there is now more liberal democracy in Iran than there was under the Shah's regime. Fukuyama, The End of History..., p. 44.

14. For example, Iraq's female literacy rate is the highest in the Arab world, matched only by Lebanon: Arab World Notebook (1989) quoting Unicef statistics.

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Government departments have a high proportion of women employees: for example, the Ministry of Oil claimed that, in 1980, 30 percent of its construction supervisors and 37 per cent of its design staff were women. Samir al-Khalil, Republic of Fear: The Politics of Modern Iraq. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1989. p. 89.

15. Roy Mottahedeh. The Mantle of the Prophet: Religion and politics in Iran. New York: Pantheon, 1985. pp. 326-333.

16. Algeria provides a model of the consequences of aborting democracy in order to prevent their coming to power.

17. Fukuyama, The End of History..., p. 237. 18. Ibid. See especially Chapters 9-12. 19. For a discussion of China's future role in Asia and the world, see Huntington,

The Clash of Civilizations..., pp. 103-109; 168-174; 218-238. 20. Three "inside" accounts of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution are par-

ticularly insightful: Liang Heng & Judith Shapiro, Son of the Revolution. New York: Vintage, 1983; Bette Bao Lord, Legacies: A Chinese Mosaic. New York: Fawcett, 1991; Nien Cheng, Life and Death in Shanghai. New York: Penguin, 1988.

21. Jonathan D. Spence, The Search For Modern China, New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1990, Chap. 24; James M. Ethridge, China's Unfinished Revolution, Problems and Prospects Since Mao, San Francisco: China Books, 1990, Chap. 4,5.; John Woodruff,China in Search of Its Future, Years of Great Reform, 1982-1987, Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1989; See especially Chap. 3,6.

22. Richard Baum, Burying Mao, Chinese Politics in the Era of Deng Xioaping. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994. p. 275; Chap. 12 has a detailed account of the policy decisions relating to the crackdown.

23. Maurice Meisner, The Deng Xiaoping Era: an inquiry into the fate of Chinese Socialism, 1978-1994, New York: Hill and Wang, 1996; See Chap. 15,16.

24. Fukuyama, The End of History,.., p. 64-70 25. During the 1988-89 academic year, David Gould was a "foreign expert" at the

Guangzhou Institute of Foreign Trade, a four year university specializing in international business, trade, and economics.

26. Quoted in Baum, Burying Mao..., p. 247. 27. Fukuyama, The End of History..., Chap. 8,9. 28. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations.... For a discussion of these ideas, see

Chap. 1-3.

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