Foreign Policy Approach of the EU toward the Arab Spring: The Cases

of Tunis and Egypt

Author: Turgut Can DEMİRAL

Tallinn

2013

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The main aim of this research is to analyze the foreign policy approaches of the

European Union (EU) toward the Arab Spring incidents in Tunis and Egypt in the field of

contemporary International Relations. The research will comparatively investigate the first

reactions and attitudes of the EU foreign policy toward both critical North African countries

which have terribly experienced the development and effect of the Arab Spring incidents

during the last two years. The research will mainly focus on what the importance of the Arab

Spring has been for the EU and also how that event has influenced the EU’s neighborhood

policy toward Tunis and Egypt as well as the prospective political possibilities in both

countries. The research starts from my personal hypothesis that refers that the EU as a whole

could not act as an effective and determined actor through its soft power and democratic

transformation competences due to different and clashing foreign policies of the member

states. So, the research is going to figure out the following main question: What were the

basic conflict prevention efforts and democratic commitments of the EU toward the Arab

Spring in Tunis and Egypt? In order to address the main question, I also need to reveal a

number of subordinate questions to support my main hypothesis: What were the basic

assumptions and approaches of the EU’s foreign policy toward the Arab Spring in Tunis and

Egypt? It will be supported by two separate questions: How did the EU act toward Egypt and

how did it act toward Tunis? The second sub-question refers: Why were the plans and policies

of the EU in this process weak and slow?. It will comprise two separate questions as well:

What were the main weaknesses of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of the

EU during this process? What were the basic clashing foreign policies of the member states

about these two countries?

I am going to answer the first subordinate question that is asking the assumptions and

approaches of the EU toward Arab Spring process in both countries. First of all, the

unexpected uprisings in the EU’s Northern Africa neighborhood made tremendous impact

both within and beyond the region, including European governments and institutions. The

rapid spread of the social revolts which broke out in Tunis at the beginning of 2011 towards

other Arab countries challenged the capability of the EU institutions and national

governments to perceive and react to the events on time (Fernandez&Lecha, 2011: 4). This

situation led to doubtful and uncoordinated statements of the European politicians to the

democratic demands and expressions of the Arab societies. The close political and economic

networks between the EU and the toppled Tunisian and Egyptian regimes since the Barcelona

Process of 1995 also led to a dilemma for the EU’s current assumptions and approaches

toward the new post-dictatorship era. Both Tunis and now Egypt turned the tables on their

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traditional authoritarian regimes under pro-Islamist groups (Ennahda in Tunis and Muslim

Brothers in Egypt), so their revolutions have resounded not only around the Arab world, but

entire the EU, even before Mubarak has departed, or the destiny of the Bin-Ali regime has

become obvious in Tunis (Emerson, 2011: 2). Hence, the Arab Spring in both countries paved

the way of the EU to review and upgrade the Euro-Mediterranean relations within the context

of ‘Common Foreign and Security Policy’ in order to truly understand and approach to the

waves of change that have been extending throughout other Arab countries in the MENA

region by challenging to transform their societies’ traditional political cultures

(Fernandez&Lecha, 2011: 5). The reasons are various. The socio-political changes which

have shook the Tunisian and Egyptian societies have to be evaluated in combination with the

early ineffectiveness of the some European approaches and initiatives over the recent years.

On the other hand, although the EU’s image in these countries has not been in its best shape

and Euro-Mediterranean partnership couldn’t generate extreme prosperity for both sides since

the Barcelona process, the Arab Spring actually introduced a meaningful opportunity for the

European foreign policy not to ignore what happens in Tunis and Egypt who have had closer

links with the Northern shore of the Mediterranean (Fernandez&Lecha, 2011: 5-6). Therefore,

the political dialogue and dedicated democracy promotion programs of the EU have still

aimed at supporting the civil society, the private sector and the improvement of democracy

within a peaceful political atmosphere in the both countries.

The both pillar programs of the new European Neighborhood Policy that have been in

force since the Barcelona Declaration, launched in 1995, may have improved the governance,

democratization and institution building process within the limits reflected by authoritarian

rule of both countries, but it has hardly advanced the reason of serious political reforms in the

Arab Spring’s eve (Kienle, 2011: 11). In the light of this information, the basic assumptions

and approaches that shape the EU’s attitude toward the Arab Spring in Tunis and Egypt

comprise both federalist and intergovernmental views on its CFSP concept. First, the

federalist assumption, namely the optimist view, has welcome outcome of the Arab Spring by

emphasizing the great chance for the EU to review and upgrade its current neighborhood

policies in MENA through the both countries which are the two essential actors of Euro-

Mediterranean partnership (Viilup, 2011: 2). For this reason, the prospect of democratic

transition, institution building and the access to market economy emerged as opportunities for

the EU’s stabilization and democratization agenda. As Adam Balcer, a Polish intellectual,

points out that the collapse of authoritarian rules in Tunis and then Egypt created a great

chance for the EU to heed lessons and opportunities rather than perceive threat perceptions in

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the post-Spring period. Also, the federalist argument assumes the modest role of Islamists in

the revolts in these countries, but it predicts the revolutions as a grass-root process that drove

by the youth and professionals who committed to democracy, namely the pioneers of real

democratic forces. For this reason, the democratic transformation and the market accession

objectives of the EU may have successively ensured thanks to the participation of internal

democratic forces in these countries. For instance, Egypt has succeeded a free market-oriented

economic reform that has been sponsored by the EU management over the last years and

Tunis became the first Arab country who initiated the reforms for women rights in her region.

(Viilup, 2011: 3).

On the other hand, the intergovernmental approach, namely the pessimist view within

the EU, assumes that the potential threats of massive illegal immigration and the spread of

fundamentalist Islam reemerged within an anarchical political ambiance; especially the

realization of the rise of Mursi-led Muslim Brothers in Egypt may be the most problematic

issue, in which the EU has to cope with the new occurring questions in aftermath of the

revolts. This is because, both the Tunisians and Egyptians have not been ready enough for the

democratic transition and institutional transformation since the beginning of the Arab Spring

due to lack of capability to pursue them and also ongoing chaotic political atmosphere,

especially in Egypt. This statement reflects the basic misconception of the federalist

assumption over the mainstream of the revolutions (Grant, 2011: 3). This view also stresses

that neither Tunis nor Egypt has intention to maintain democratization and liberal economic

reforms, because they have no membership motivation like Turkey and Macedonia who have

been already official candidates of the EU. It is clear that, the intergovernmental

understanding of the EU towards the Arab Spring in both countries seem so oriental with its

mainstream and outcome. I am now going to answer the first part of the first subordinate

question.

The Arab Spring has exposed Europe’s old ‘neighborhood policy’ towards North

Africa as very largely a self-serving sham. European leaders have realized that the fledgling

Arab democracies deserve help, especially through financial aid, market access and easier

travel possibilities, but the proposals of the EU have not been measured up so far. However,

Egypt who is the Arab world’s center of gravity with a population of 80 million is the key for

the region’s future as well as the prosperity of the new neighborhood policy of the EU

(Dworkin&Korski, 2011: 4). After giving €600 million over the last decade to Egypt in

exchange for illusory box-ticking reform, the EU now needs to offer a real partnership, but it

subjects to real progress down the democratic path. Therefore, the EU launched a

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comprehensive task force to inspect critical issue of the market access in Egypt, because the

revolution is expensive and Egypt’s tattered economy needs better opportunities to serve

European interests in the North Africa. The task force is composed of three phases including

the possibility of cancelling Egypt’s crippling debt that refers to the exchange for a program

of benchmarked reform, a European endowment for democratic transition that supports

institution-building and democracy without tainting Western-backed winners and finally, a

longer term vision of constructive relations between the north and south shores of the

Mediterranean, based on enlightened European self-interest rather than simple altruism in the

post-dictatorship period (Al-Bayoumi, 2011: 70). At this point, Nick Witney, the first chief

executive of the European Defense Agency in Brussels, stated: ‘’For far too long, Europe has

been content to leave Egypt to the USA. Cairo’s new government may rapidly become an

independent regional actor, so Europe needs to abandon its traditional defensive attitude and

engage positively with this new North African democracy’’ (Dworkin&Korski, 2011: 7). It is

seen that, Mr. Witney is actually criticizing the misconception of the pessimist approach

within the EU mentioned above.

Moreover, the EU-Egypt partnership that has been continued since 1996 as a reflection

of the Barcelona Process, has also allowed the EU to earmark around €2996 million for

development assistance to Egypt during the period 1996-2013. In this process, it is planned to

earmark €449 million for the period 2011-2013, namely when the Arab Spring in this country

has shined out and reached its peak. These funds have been planned to use for modernizing

the private sector, health and educational services, improving the status of civil society,

supporting external trade capabilities, developing the south of Sinai and promoting alternative

energy as well as many other areas. These arrangements between two sides have received

increasingly attention in the Arab Spring of this country, thus Egypt has been benefiting from

the transfer of know-how, dialogue and advice for its further political stability and democracy

efforts. Its closer ties with the EU have been helping its efficiency and capability to improve

its own economic development, too (Al-Bayoumi, 2011: 70-1). It is clear so far that the

actions of the EU toward Egypt’s hybrid revolution loomed large as a more optimistic and

consequential approach rather than threat perception of the pessimistic assumptions as well as

the main hypothesis of the paper.

The second part of the first subordinate question will be now investigated according to

the information above. First, the incidents in Tunis sounded alarm bells not only for this

country’s destiny and its future, but also for other anti-democratic regimes of the Northern

Africa and the Middle East, in where the authoritarian rules confronted unexpected massive

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resistance movements. The ongoing socio-economic problems in this country required again

credible and sustainable solutions of the EU who had assisted it before with its internal

reforms such as introducing women rights, ensuring macro-economic growth and recovering

health and education system under the previous reign of Zeynel Abidin Bin-Ali. Tunis has had

a separate importance for the EU-Southern Mediterranean Partnership in the Barcelona

Process, because it was the first place where the Arab Spring started in January 2011, so this

unexpected circumstance paved the way of the EU to upgrade its current neighborhood policy

toward its Southern Mediterranean neighbors (Ayadi&Colombo, 2011: 3). For this reason, the

EU expected to promote early achieved reforms for democratization that refer to recovering

battered socio-economic conditions because of the anarchical environment of the revolution,

implementing serious political reforms in the post-authoritarian rule period, cooperating with

the transition government in the fight against terrorism, illegal immigration and broader

geostrategic objectives. Indeed, the EU aimed to receive support of the opposition or

democratic forces in the country by committing them for the reconstruction of a democratic

and free Tunis thanks to the benediction of its spring.

On the one hand, the EU has thought the outcome of this situation pragmatically and

rationally, because its approach here actually reflects its fear of a massive migration

movement toward its southern shores and the spread of fundamentalist Islamism from this

country after the revolution (Ayadi&Colombo, 2011: 4). However, since the opposition forces

remained weak, poorly organized and divided, the country lacks the necessary legal

framework for a vibrant political and civil society, in which the EU has intended to provide

for its democratization and liberalization process so far. The challenge is now to organize

credible democratic platforms and electoral campaigns which may reflect the will of Tunisian

people in the subsequent political life. Therefore, in order to contribute this democratic

transition, the EU needs to act quickly on its commitment of support for ‘an authentic

democratic transition’ and consult to the political parties both from the transition government

and the spearheads of opposition wing for the next elections (Ayadi&Colombo, 2011: 7).

Thus, all efforts of the EU in Tunis tried to ensure free and fair elections, pursuing, inter-alia

and the constitutional changes by the participation of different political parties, even

comprising Islamist ‘Ennahda’ which has been in power. A positive resolution of this crisis

will only be carried out if the internal and external actors in the country actively follow the

lessons of successful democratic transitions elsewhere (Ayadi&Colombo, 2011: 7-8). It is

seen that, Euro-approach to Tunisian revolution conveys positive assumptions through a set of

democratization approaches, but the actions still remain skeptical and hesitative about the

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outcomes like the risk over the spread of fundamentalism and illegal immigrations, in which

the inter-governmentalistic view looms large.

I’m now going to respond the second subordinate question that is asking the reasons

behind the weakness and slowness of the European plans and policies in the Arab Spring

process in both countries. Before analyzing the weak and slow policies of the EU foreign

policies in this case, it ought to be noted that in spite of the rhetoric of the single policy

framework, the EU’s attitudes towards both Egypt and Tunis have always been obviously

diverse in terms of policy focus and financial commitments. While focusing on eastward

perception, the EU plans and policies have usually been geared at stimulating democratic

transformation and institutional reforms by altering levels of exigency and prosperity (Viilup,

2011: 1). In contrast, the policies sponsored by the EU towards Southern Mediterranean have

been criticized for decades because of its lack of political will or methods to pursue the

promised objectives, among them the creation of an area of peace, stability and financial

development in the Northern Africa, as emphasized in the Barcelona Declaration

(Fernandez&Lecha, 2011: 8).

Similarly, the EU policies towards the Arab Spring in both countries have clearly

ignored such considerations, and have concentrated upon the concerning of security, potential

conflicts, stability and managing migratory flows towards the southern shores of the EU.

These worrisome factors have clearly competed with the early assumptions and expectations

of the EU in the beginning of the Arab Spring, so the difference between the European

politics and policies shine out in this case. This dilemma or double approach has also caused a

rivalry for funding from the two countries of the southern neighborhood, to favoritism by EU

member states themselves in accordance with cultural and geographical proximity over the

years (Viilup, 2011: 1-2). Also, the EU’s Arab Spring policies have not been officially funded

due to internal disagreements about direction of the money, despite its periodical funding

plans in the following years. For instance, even though it allocated €449.290 million for Egypt

and €240 million for Tunis in the period of 2011-2013, there is not still a consensus among

the member states about approval of these assistance funds in the eve of Arab Spring. This

contradiction undoubtly interrupts basic objectives of the Barcelona Process in the current

Mediterranean policies of the Union. Moreover, there has been an extensive understanding

that both in Tunis and Egypt, the EU has tried to deal with its questions by throwing money at

them up to now, by ignoring the wrongdoing of their regime. In the meantime, as senior

researcher Nicu Popescu rightly pointed out recently, “seems to look increasingly like the

south a few years ago – a collection of states with increasingly close economic relations with

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Europe, but with centralized, non-competitive politics, which routinely afford to ignore the

EU on many political and security questions” (Viilup, 2011: 3). Thus, it would be wise to

accomplish a close inspection regarding the previous usage of the fund as well as their

ongoing application, and necessary efforts ought to be made with an understanding to recover

the funds. The first part of the second subordinate question will highlight the reasons behind

the weaknesses of the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU in accordance with the

above. Firstly, the Lisbon Treaty which was signed in 2009 has been expected to assist the

EU in its efforts to play an active role during the Arab Spring. The treaty introduced two

significant authorities including the permanent European Council Presidency and the High

Representation of Common Foreign and Security Policy to quickly activate the Common

European Foreign Policy and Crisis Management within a problematic area across Europe.

Thus, the European CFSP, declared within the second pillar of the Maastricht Treaty, was

strengthened and further collectivized through these two comprehensive organs (O’Donnell,

2011: 74). It was also expected to loom large as the consensus of foreign and security policy

framework of separate foreign policy orientations of the member states. However, in spite of

the high expectations of the optimist groups who recognized the post-Lisbon CFSP as a great

instrument of the EU’s collective strategies toward the Arab Spring, the EU as a unique body,

has not been achieved any meaningful successes by implementing particular reactions and

sanctions toward neither Tunis nor Egypt. That is, the EU could not reach a common

reconciliation to impose financial and arms embargo against early dictatorships of both

countries and it obviously failed to strategically handle the revolutions according to its post-

Lisbon CFSP due to clashing interests of major member states who have been pursuing

different political and economic objectives because of their individual proximity with these

countries (Viilup, 2011: 4). This is because, both Bin-Ali and Mubarak had succeeded to

realize a set of EU-backed reforms in their own countries and they had also close individual

connections with different European organizations, institutions or politicians.

On the other hand, the CFSP was quite successful in the case of common sanctions

over Libya, because most of the European leaders agreed upon imposing arms embargo

against Qaddafi’s oppressive regime and to freeze his all the assets in Europe. The main

reason behind the weakness of the CFSP in Tunisian and then Egyptian context mostly refers

to contradiction of the European politics and the implementation of policies that encompass

different approaches and practices (Viilup, 2011: 5-6). Even though the EU’s early political

approaches had planned to deal with democratic transformation, liberalization of the people

and institutionalization of liberal market economy as its political objectives over these

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countries, they rapidly replaced to security concerning and individual political interest focuses

of the member states’ policies toward them. In addition, neither the Presidency of European

Council nor the High Representative of Common Foreign and Security Policy which were

introduced with the Lisbon Treaty were not effective and successful enough during the Arab

revolutions in these countries as well. This situation was actually caused by the unpopular

identity of Hermann von Rompuy, the former Belgian PM and the current European Council

President, and the weak leadership of Baroness Catherine Ashton, a former Commissioner of

Commerce in the Commission and the current High Representative of Common Foreign and

Security Policy. It is a fact that both leaders of these main collective foreign policy authorities

of the EU could not formulate and achieve a common European foreign policy framework

during the Arab Spring incidents (Grant, 2011: 5). This is because, the foreign policy

priorities and interests of member states over Tunis and Egypt became more dominant than

the weak and insufficient leadership of Lady Ashton who has not been recognized well even

her own country, the United Kingdom. For this reason, she has been harshly criticized by the

federalists within the EU who claim that Ashton could not save and maintain the post-Lisbon

CFSP since the beginning of the revolutions in the Northern Africa and her wait-see policy

brought nothing for the prosperity of the EU in the region. Moreover, Stefan Füle who is the

Representative for Enlargement in the Commission also disagrees with her (Grant, 2011: 5-6).

For instance, Baroness Ashton advocated to promote the democratic change in these countries

through diplomatic and financial cooperation like between the EU and post-communist iron

curtain countries in the 1990s, but Füle stressed the obvious ineffectiveness of the Union to

halt conflict during the revolutions and to defend the democratic forces in the revolution

process by underlining the major differences between the post-communist Eastern European

and Northern African countries (Viilup, 2011: 6). Therefore, the constructive action task has

been ignored by the High Representative of the Common Foreign and Security Policy and

rational interests of the member states have emerged as more active statements than the

leadership of Ashton in describing their foreign policies towards Tunis and Egypt.

The second phase of the second subordinate question will also be analyzed in

accordance with the second subordinate question and its first phase. When the anti-

dictatorship uprisings in Tunis began in January 2011, the approaches and reactions of the

major member states were fairly different from each other, although the EU as a collective

entity had agreed upon pursuing the principles of Barcelona Process towards each Southern

Mediterranean countries in the common manner. For instance, when the Tunisian Spring

began to become a great threat for the reign of Zeynel Abidin Bin-Ali who had ruled the

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country with his iron-fist since 1987, France offered him police assistance to defend his

throne against the rebels (Kausch, 2011: 45). However, France criticized Mubarak’s

suppressive methods during the Egyptian revolution in the square of Tahrir and it de facto

supported the opponent democratic forces in the country. Especially, it preferred to pursue a

national foreign policy rather than collective European action towards both Tunis and Egypt

in the eve of their Arab Spring. The approaches of the Southern European countries that have

shores on the Mediterranean like Spain, Italy and Greece toward the revolution in Egypt were

much more irritated than Germany, because their main concerning referred to the risks of an

illegal massive migration movement towards their southern coasts and the spread of

fundamentalist Islamist ideas in administrations such as the Muslim Brotherhood across the

Mediterranean due to anarchical conditions of the revolution (Kausch, 2011: 45-6).

Meanwhile, Germany, the most powerful engine of the European integration policies,

remained poised and preferred to pursue wait-see policy over the revolution in Egypt. Its main

concerning was actually the cost of the revolutions for the EU. On the other hand, David

Cameron who is the PM of the United Kingdom made a speech in the Kuwaiti Parliament on

22 February 2011 by evaluating the crises in Tunis. In his speech, he underlined the

importance of the EU’s ultimate interests and objectives in the Southern Mediterranean and its

problematic relations with political Islamist parties in the region. He offered other European

leaders to contact with Ghanushi’s Ennahda in Tunis and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt

who have been already powerful political actors in these countries, but according to the trust-

check principle (Kausch, 2011: 46). However, Cameron’s suggestion was seen as a

conventional reflection of the British interests in the Northern Africa by France and Germany.

Furthermore, Franco Frattini, the Italian foreign minister, prepared the ‘European Marshall

Plan’ to revive the role of the EU in the Southern Mediterranean by shifting the European

financial aid from the East to the South. The main aim of this plan was to transfer high

amount of money to the countries in the Northern Africa that confronted the Arab Spring by

preventing internal conflicts and massive migration risks because of their socio-economic

difficulties. Thus, Frattini planned to moderate negative effects of the revolutions in the

region and to save the salvation of Schengen arrangements against further illegal migration

risk. The European Marshall Plan of Italy was supported by France, Spain, Greece, Slovenia,

Cyprus and Malta; however it was reacted by Germany that opposed the high amount of

financial costs of this project for the EU’s budget due to her biggest contribution proportion in

the European budget (Kausch, 2011: 47-8). On the one hand, the foreign policy attitudes of

the Scandinavian members like Sweden, Finland and Denmark were somehow apathetic about

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the revolutions in the Northern Africa. It is clear that, different foreign policy approaches and

contradicting attitudes of the member states prevented the efficient work of the CFSP within a

collective European framework over the both countries.

In conclusion, the main question of the research paper that is asking the basic conflict

prevention efforts and democratic commitments of the EU toward the Arab Spring in Egypt

and Tunis will be analyzed with evaluation of the main hypothesis of the paper. First, The

European Commission and the EU’s External Action Service drafted the ‘Partnership for

Democracy’ and ‘Shared Prosperity’ programs in order to halt political anarchy and conflicts

in the post-revolution process of the both countries and to recover the battered internal

political and socio-economic conditions through four phased concept of operations including

the prevention of risks over a civil war, the people to people contact, the democratic

transformation and economic development programs (Grant, 2011: 6-7). These two European

action plans were incorporated to the constituent commitments of the Barcelona Process

within a deeper and more comprehensive policy shape in dealing with the unexpected

negative outcomes of the Arab Spring in Tunis and then in Cairo. The EU had also guaranteed

to provide approximately €690 million in total for the new democratic governments of Tunis

and Cairo between the periods of 2011-2013 so as to finance democratic development after

the revolutions. Also, Hermann van Rompuy’s urgent European summit call to the European

leaders after the first Arab Spring in Tunis were agreed by many member states except

Germany to take a collective action against the events within a European venture (Grant,

2011: 7). However, the main hypothesis of the research paper that argues obvious failure of

the EU’s conflict prevention commitments and soft power competences because of clashing

foreign policies of the member states has been proven thanks to analysis in the second

subordinate question. Especially, national foreign policies of the major MSs have determined

the direction of the EU policies within the context of rationalism principle rather than

European constructivism towards the Arab Spring in Tunis and Egypt. Therefore, independent

variable of the hypothesis that refers to the national foreign policies has shined out with the

analysis of the second sub-questions. Even though the collective assumptions and approaches

of the EU politics attempted to perceive the Arab Spring as a further comprehensive and

strategic decision-making process for its Neighborhood and Mediterranean Politics with the

Barcelona Process, individual foreign policies and different priorities of the member states

over the two countries have overcome the European politics in the both cases, as it is

mentioned above. Hence, it is hard to prove that the basic conflict prevention efforts and

democratic commitments of the EU which encompass the ‘Partnership for Democracy’ and

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‘Shared Prosperity’ programs will sustain a great prosperity in accordance with a complete

agreement between the member states and supranational institutions in the near-future as well.

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