Democratising Governance after the Arab Revolutions: The People, the Muslim Brotherhood and the...

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Part IIITransitional and Transnational Attempts to Democratise Governance

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149

From late 2010 a series of dramatic and unprecedented events swept across the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). It began in the quiet Tunisian town of Sidi Bouzid, where a young street vendor set himself alight in response to the corruption and oppression that surrounded him. Mohamed Bouazizi’s desperate act of self- immolation resonated with a deeply disgruntled population and led to weeks of popular pro-tests across the country. On 14 January 2011, the 23- year autocratic rule of President Ben Ali came to an end. These events led to several scat-tered protests in other Arab states, most notably in Egypt where tens of thousands of protestors eventually took control of Tahrir Square in Cairo. A stand- off ensued between elements loyal to th e government and the popular uprising. Although President Mubarak remained obstinate that he would introduce reform and then see out his term, by 11 February 2011 the Arab Revolutions had claimed their second dictatorial regime. Meanwhile, the Arab Revolutions had mixed results elsewhere: in both Libya and Yemen, the regimes fell only after a protracted and bloody struggle; in countries like Bahrain, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and others, those who held power employed a potent cocktail of brutal suppression and modest political and economic concessions to keep it; and in Syria the battle to oust President Assad continues with no end in sight. Today, while there is certainly cause for optimism – especially in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya where democratically elected governments have replaced dictatorial regimes – the patience and commitment needed to turn the ideals of the revolutions into a reality pose an enormous challenge as the political reform process comes face- to- face with the many intracta-ble problems that have plagued the region as a whole for decades.

7Democratising Governance after the Arab Revolutions: The People, the Muslim Brotherhood and the Governance Networks of EgyptBenjamin Isakhan


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150 Democracy and Crisis

Not surprisingly, a great deal of academic literature has emerged which has documented and analysed the precursors to, and events of, the Arab Revolutions and discussed from varying perspectives the consequences of these events for the future of Arab politics, for ‘Western’ engagement with the region and for international relations (Bishara, 2012; Dabashi, 2012; Lynch, 2012; Noueihad and Warren, 2012). Central to this debate have been discussions over the future of democracy in the Middle East with opinions ranging from pessimistic tones about the emergence of political Islam (Bradley, 2012) through to an emphasis on the need for a new conceptual framework that captures the complex relationships between Islam, democracy and civil society in a changing MENA (Cavatorta and Durac, 2011; Isakhan, Mansouri and Akbarzadeh, 2012). While such debates are clearly important, the overwhelming emphasis has been on the importance of toppling dictators and holding elections – perhaps the easiest bit of any democratic revolution – and much less has been said about the patience and commitment needed in order to (re)build the entire apparatus of the state in a democratic rather than an autocratic form (Amin et al., 2012). Here, the Arab Revolutions are so much more than calls for elections and representative government – they are an ongoing attempt to challenge the entire Arab system of governance that has ruled since the middle of the twentieth century. To put it another way, the key question facing the post- Revolution MENA states is not so much what to do with ‘government’ (the answer here has been clear from the beginning of the Revolutions: topple the old elite and replace them with democratically elected representatives) but what to do with ‘gov-ernance’. In fact, it might well be argued that the Arab Revolutions were really much more about ‘governance’ than they were about ‘democracy’. Bouazziz did not set himself alight for ‘democracy’, nor did millions risk their lives in protests in Cairo, Tripoli or Damascus. They were (and still are) fighting for a better life, for opportunities, for political legitimacy and for sound economic management – for ‘good governance’.

Therefore, the key question facing the post- Revolution MENA states is: how do you democratise the sprawling bureaucratic machine and mori-bund networks of quasi- governmental and private sector organisations that have not only held power for many decades but also have been shaped by the very autocratic system they served? In striving to address this question, the temptation for the post- Revolution MENA states dur-ing this period of crisis is to do one of two things. First is to dismantle the entire system of governance associated with the former regime. While perfectly understandable, given the tyranny associated with many of these institutions, this temptation must be resisted as it would include


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Democratising Governance after the Arab Revolutions 151

getting rid of many functioning – if troubled – systems of governance that could prove critical to providing transitional security, stability and justice, as well as checks and balances on power ( judiciary, police, mili-tary and public service). Here, the result of wholesale de- Baathification following the toppling of Saddam Hussein in Iraq illustrates the dire consequences of the complete removal of existing systems of governance (Isakhan, 2011b). The second temptation – and this is also a common sentiment across the Post- Revolution MENA – is that, while the govern-ment ought to be democratised, the existing systems of governance should remain much as they are in order to ensure continuity, stability and security. This too must be resisted as maintaining such mechanisms of governance provides avenues for continued corruption and nepotism and paves the way for the potential return of former elites.

The tension between these two extremes is being felt right across the post- Revolution MENA in a way they have not been before, perhaps nowhere more critically than in Egypt– the Arab world’s most populous, and one of its most influential, states. If a complex Arab state like Egypt – with its rich and proud history, religious diversity and ideological depth and variety – can transform into a robust democracy then it would set a significant precedent for the region. Therefore, this chapter examines the tensions that have emerged between Egypt’s very powerful govern-ance networks (consisting of over six million government employees whose salaries account for around one- third of all state spending), the democratically elected government which has recently come to power, and the broader citizen body who agitated for change and drove the revolution.1 This chapter concludes by noting that a process of ‘democ-ratising governance’ is the best chance for the Arab Revolutions to yield truly robust democracies in the MENA and to deliver on the hopes and aspirations of those who took part in the revolts. It also argues that such democratic mechanisms of governance could help mitigate or avoid altogether many of the problems that threaten to overturn or under-mine the successes of the Arab Revolutions: economic stagnation, a return to autocracy, military rule and retrogressive (rather than progres-sive) Islamism. How post- Mubarak Egypt manages the tension between ‘democracy’ and ‘governance’ in this time of crisis will be critical to the survival and proliferation of democracy across the region.

After the revolution: democracy v. governance

The post- Mubarak period in Egypt provides an interesting case study through which to more closely examine the tension between democracy


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and governance during times of crisis. This tension dates to the fall of the Mubarak regime itself and the ascension of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), the 18- member military council which oversaw the transition from the end of the Mubarak era to the rise of the democratically elected civilian government that rules today (11 February 2011– 30 June 2012). Although SCAF are relatively popular across Egypt, their leaders well known and respected, and their role in the revolution praised by supporters and critics alike, they were also a central part of the military autocracy that had governed Egypt since the Free Officers Movement came to power in the Revolution of 1952 (Marsot, 2007 [1985]). In 2011, without a nationwide election or a mandate from the people, the military junta assumed executive power overnight, promising to oversee the transition process in which power would move from the military to a civilian government elected by the people.

It should be pointed out that post- Mubarak Egypt has much to thank the SCAF for. They did stick to their word: they (partially) lifted the 30- year- old Emergency Law; they immediately dissolved the Egyptian Parliament and suspended the Constitution before overseeing success-ful elections for both the ‘People’s Assembly’ (PA, the Lower House of Parliament) and the Presidency; they established a time frame for the drafting of a new constitution and, when the time came, they stood aside peacefully as a new and democratically elected civilian govern-ment took the reins. However, it could well be argued that such progress is less a sign of SCAF’s willingness to usher in a new era of Egyptian democracy and more a reflection of the weight of international and domestic scrutiny that kept the junta in check. Not least among these was the unflinching eye of the global media and the fact that Egyptian protestors returned to Tahrir Square time and time again to pressure the interim military government to stay true to their word (Carlstrom and Hill, 2012b).

Indeed, SCAF‘s time in office was far from uncontroversial. They appointed – rather than elected – 15 new governors, the bulk of whom came from within their own ranks or were apparatchiks of the former regime. None were youth, women, Copts or representatives of the various movements, unions and civil society organisations that had fuelled the revolution (‘Uproar in Egypt’, 2011). In addition, SCAF failed to reform the notorious security services, did not hold to account military personnel responsible for violence during the revolution and did not release political prisoners. They also continued their military trials in which some 16,000 people who had been involved in the


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revolution – including bloggers, journalists and peaceful protestors – were tried behind closed doors (Martini and Taylor, 2011). SCAF also came under intense scrutiny for their heavy- handed approach to security, especially following an October 2011 incident in which sol-diers clashed with Coptic Christians in Cairo, leaving around 20 dead (‘Egypt’s delaying tactic’, 2011).

But SCAF’s most controversial moves came just days before the run- off elections ( 16– 17 June 2012) that would see the ascension of Egypt’s newly elected government. Under their auspices, various gov-ernance bodies issued last minute edicts. On 13 June 2012 Egypt’s Justice Ministry bypassed the recently elected PA and issued a decree that allowed SCAF and its security subsidiaries to arrest and detain civilians – particularly those who would co- ordinate peaceful protests against the government. Many critics argue that it simply replaced the recently amended Emergency Law (‘Egypt decree’, 2012). The following day, Egypt’s highest judicial authority, the High Constitutional Court (HCC), ruled that the PA was unconstitutional and SCAF immediately dissolved it (despite the fact that SCAF had overseen the elections). Then, on the final day of the run- off presidential elections and, at the eleventh hour of their transitional reign, SCAF issued another decree which they labelled as ‘Constitutional Annex’. This document sharply limited the power of the incoming president, including leaving him with virtually no control over the nation’s budget (Carlstrom and Hill, 2012a; El- Rashidi, 2012).

Such deliberate interference in Egypt’s democratisation needs to be understood in context. While both the legislative elections for the PA (28 November 2011– 11 January 2012) and the presidential elections (held over two rounds, one on the 23– 24 May, with a second round run- off election between the two most popular candidates held on 16– 17 June) were widely contested and hailed as great success stories by observers, it was the Islamist Muslim Brotherhood (MB) and its recently formed Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) who emerged as the major political powerbrokers of post- Mubarak Egypt (Tadros, 2012). Virtually overnight they had achieved an unprecedented degree of power and democratic legitimacy that would have been unthinkable even a year earlier. They now controlled about 47% of the PA and Mohamed Morsi, a former leader of the MB, had won the Presidential run- off election by the narrow margin of 51.7%.

What is especially important to note here is that while there has been much fear- mongering about the Islamist agenda of the MB, especially in the Western press, as well as accusations that they ‘hijacked’ a largely


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secular revolution (Bradley, 2012), the MB and the FJP campaigned largely on a platform that de- emphasised Islamist ideology. Their cam-paign was relatively simple but struck at the heart of the revolutionary impetus: more than anything else – and certainly more than religious indoctrination – Egypt urgently needed ‘good governance’. The MB outlined a plan to respond to five urgent problems: a return to stability and an overhaul of Egypt’s vast security services; reform of the public health sector, especially sanitation and waste; the need for subsidised bread supplies and lifting the standards of food production whilst low-ering the cost; dealing with energy shortages, especially the availability of electricity and butane gas; and addressing long- standing urban plan-ning issues, especially traffic congestion in Cairo.

The tensions between SCAF and the MB have deep roots that have little to do with the MB’s campaign platform and predate their elec-toral successes. Having been founded in Egypt in 1928, the MB rose to become arguably the Arab world’s most influential and popular Islamist political network (Mitchell, 1993 [1969]; Rubin, 2010). Working mostly as a clandestine opposition movement, the MB fast developed a reputation as a sophisticated Islamist network that served as a bulwark against the secular and increasingly dictatorial and corrupt regimes of the MENA, nowhere more enthusiastically than in their homeland of Egypt (Rutherford, 2008). Since 1954 and continuing under Mubarak’s rule, the MB was outlawed, and SCAF and its affiliates such as the Central Security Forces (CSF) operated under the Emergency Law which granted them wide- ranging powers. Bodies such as SCAF and the CSF were generally not held accountable, were subject to little oversight and were known for corruption and nepotism as well as draconian and brutal law enforcement. They, along with much of Egypt’s sprawling bureaucracy, saw themselves as proudly secular- nationalist, the defend-ers of the republic. They were therefore natural ideological and physical opponents of the MB who were routinely harassed, arrested, imprisoned and tortured by SCAF throughout the Mubarak period (Zahid, 2010). SCAF’s mentality of defending the republic at all costs was also evident in their attempts to quash the earliest protests that sprung up across Egypt in early 2011. Although they have been praised for their restraint and gradual support for the revolution, it must be remembered that SCAF clashed frequently with the various protest movements, and there are still many rank- and- file members of SCAF who support the former regime and have not masked their disdain for the revolution. Similarly, SCAF has barely been able to hide its resentment of the emergence of the MB (and its FJP) as a legitimate political movement following the


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fall of Mubarak (Tarek, 2012). It is little wonder then, that in the closing moments of their interim rule over Egypt, SCAF sought to frustrate and curtail the power of the ascendant MB.

SCAF’s actions paved the way for a confrontation between a triumvi-rate of Egypt’s most formidable players: the Executive (now dominated by a democratically elected and hugely powerful MB) and two rem-nants of the governance networks that had held great power under the auspices of the former regime: the judiciary (including the HCC, the Justice Ministry and the Judges’ Club) and the vast Egyptian Security Forces (including SCAF, CSF and others) (Carlstrom and Hill, 2012a; Shukrallah, 2012). At the core of this showdown was the question of who would wield real power in the ‘new Egypt’. It is a great shame – and more than a little ironic – that the answer to this question is being fought over by a newly elected and very powerful political party and the remnant governance networks of an ousted dictatorial regime at the exclusion of the broader Egyptian populace despite all the energy and enthusiasm that facilitated the revolution and the subsequent elections.

The Muslim brotherhood and the governance networks of the former regime

The tension was palpable when Morsi was sworn in as the first demo-cratically elected Egyptian President on 30 June 2012. Controversy sur-rounded the ceremony in which the HCC, instead of the PA, witnessed the Presidential oath as Morsi’s critics argued that such a move was tan-tamount to tacit approval of SCAF’s dissolution of the PA (‘Ambiguity overshadows’, 2012; Rashwan, 2012). Even more tense was the military parade held later the same day in honour of Morsi’s election in which he was received by the head of SCAF, Field Marshall Mohamed Hussein Tantawi (also Defence Minister since 1991) and his Chief of Staff, Sami Anan. In a terse speech, Morsi thanked them for their role in the revolu-tion and for helping Egypt during the transition to a civilian democracy (‘Morsi addresses Army’, 2012).

But such pleasantries were to be short lived. A little over a week into his Presidency, Morsi made the first serious challenge to SCAF’s authority by issuing a decree which not only called for fresh legislative elections to be held 60 days after the ratification of Egypt’s new constitution but also, more controversially, reinstated the dissolved PA – overthrowing SCAF’s earlier decree (‘Morsi reinstates’, 2012). Although the move was ultimately undermined by another court order which prevented the reinstatement of the PA, the sudden show of Morsi’s executive power


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and his blatant challenge to the governance networks of the former regime took many by surprise. The SCAF and HCC were furious. Morsi was criticised for having acted without consultation or due process and for disrespecting SCAF and the HCC, which even Mubarak had feared to do. An unofficial body of Egyptian Judges known as the ‘Judges Club’ gave Morsi 36 hours to retract the decree or else unspecified ‘severe measures’ would be taken against his government (Mourad, 2012). This led others to call on Morsi to dismiss or dismantle the HCC because they were interfering in state politics, democratic process and under-mining the purpose of the revolution (‘Morsi should dismiss’, 2012).

Many came out in support of Morsi’s edict including, predictably, the MB who called for a ‘million man’ march to show their backing of the President (‘Brotherhood calls’, 2012). Other support came from some of Egypt’s high- ranking judges and members of the influential revolution-ary network, the April 6 Youth Movement (A6YM) and their Democratic Front (‘April 6’, 2012; ‘Egyptian judges quarrel’, 2012; El Gundy, 2012a). They argued that Morsi’s decree was in the interests of Egypt’s democ-ratisation and was designed to undermine attempts by SCAF to retain their power. At the core of the issue was a debate over whether it was within HCC’s mandate to deliver their initial decree, within SCAFs man-date to enforce it, or within Morsi’s mandate to overturn them both by issuing his own decree (Shukrallah, 2012).

The next battle between Morsi and the governance networks of the former regime came after 5 August 2012 when armed men ambushed an Egyptian military base on the Sinai Peninsula, killing 16 Egyptian soldiers. They then stole two armoured cars which they used to cross into Israel where one vehicle exploded resulting in a fire- fight with Israeli Defence Forces. Although a minor international crisis ensued, which Morsi handled deftly, it also presented him with a pretext to further cleanse SCAF of high- ranking remnants of the former regime, arguing that such incompetence could not be tolerated in the ‘new Egypt’. Within days, Morsi had sacked a handful of Mubarak- era SCAF officials, including the chief of Egyptian Intelligence (Mourad Mowafi), and (under pressure from Morsi’s office) effected the replacement of the commander of Egypt’s Military Police, Hamdi Badeen, with the head of SCAF, Mohammed Tantawi. Indicating the popularity of such a move, the A6YM again rallied in support of Morsi (‘Egypt’s April 6’, 2012).

All of this was merely a forerunner to Morsi’s most significant move against SCAF. On 12 August 2012 Morsi issued a ‘Constitutional Declaration’ which revoked SCAF’s 17 June ‘Constitutional Annex’ and granted himself full executive and legislative power. This latest decree


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meant that Morsi had the power to set all public policies, sign inter-national treaties and place the constitutional drafting process directly under his control. Thus, he now held the power to form a Constituent Assembly that would draft Egypt’s first post- Mubarak constitution. On the same day, Morsi also sent seven of SCAF’s top brass into early retire-ment, including Tantawi and Anan. As a token departing gesture, they were both awarded Egypt’s highest honour, the Nile Medal, and asked to stay on as advisors to the President (‘Morsi retires’, 2012; Rageh, 2012). Once again, Morsi’s supporters gathered in Tahrir Square in solidar-ity with his most recent move. Indeed, Morsi’s actions garnered him support from many different quarters: Salafists, academics, secularists, youth movements, even Morsi’s most credible opposition movement, the loose band of political organisations that go under the collective name of the National Front for the Salvation of the Revolution (NFSR) (Ali and Mourad, 2012; ‘Crowds in Cairo’, 2012). But others had their doubts; Morsi was accused of having overstepped his mark in a cyni-cal power- grab that would see him hold a degree of power similar to Mubarak ( Al- Anani, 2012).

Despite such criticisms, Morsi’s purging of the governance networks loyal to the former regime did not end there. In September, Morsi also forcibly retired Mohamed Farid Tohamy, the head of the Administrative Control Authority (ACA), Egypt’s public sector watchdog, and in October he stood down, Egypt’s Prosecutor- General, Abdel Maguib Mahmoud. Tohamy stood accused (but was never convicted) of having concealed evidence of corruption by ousted regime officials including Mubarak himself (El Gundy, 2012b). While Mahmoud was dismissed after he presided over a controversial case in which 24 of Mubarak’s cronies – those of the famous ‘Camel Battle’ who had conducted vio-lent raids on protestors during the revolution – were acquitted (‘Egypt prosecutor- general’, 2012).

With SCAF, HCC, ACA and the Prosecutor- General forcibly removed, demoralised or increasingly sidelined, there were few left who could serve as a bulwark against Morsi’s rising power. Morsi seized the chance to issue another far- reaching decree on 24 November 2012. This time, he effectively put himself above the law, granted himself additional sweeping powers (including the ability to enact any law he saw fit) and banned all challenges to his decision making. Although Morsi stated that his most recent edict was designed to protect the revolution and was only temporary, remaining in force until a new parliament was elected, it met with both immediate support and criticism (‘The president’s new powers’, 2012). In fact, among his supporters, Morsi’s


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decree served as a unifying force, bringing together unlikely comrades such as the A6YM, various Judges’ movements and even supporters of the former Mubarak regime (‘Egypt’s judges condemn’, 2012; Hill, 2012). But others, including Egypt’s embattled judiciary, criticised it as another unlawful power- grab. The decree was so controversial that tensions reached boiling point in Cairo. On 5 December 2012, violent clashes erupted between Morsi’s supporters and the various opposition parties at the front of the Presidential Palace resulting in 7 deaths and more than 600 people wounded (Fick, 2012). A few days later, Morsi succumbed to widespread pressure (including accusations that he was Egypt’s new Pharaoh) and annulled his latest decree (‘Egypt’s Morsi rescinds’, 2012).

Meanwhile, concerns about the MB’s domination of the drafting of Egypt’s fifth Constitution and their failure to engage a wide variety of stakeholders in the process (let alone capture the imagination of the broader citizen body) led to fears that it would have a profoundly Islamist bent (Bayoumi, 2012). Many argued that the largely secular impetus of the revolution, as well as the needs and aspirations of Copts, women, youth and other Egyptians, would not be adequately represented in this important document. Further controversy emerged when, only days before the national referendum on the Constitution, Morsi issued another Presidential edict that prohibited people from vot-ing unless they did so in their home province. This meant that, in one example, some 300,000 workers who had left home for employment in the Sinai Peninsula’s thriving tourist economy were among the many rendered ineligible to cast a vote (Sabry, 2012).

Despite criticisms over such moves and wide dissatisfaction with the Constitution drafting process, Morsi was determined to go ahead with the national referendum on 15 December 2012. While the turnout was a paltry 33% of the 52 million eligible Egyptian voters, of those who did vote, 63.8% approved the new Constitution (‘Egypt’s Morsi admits’, 2012). The dense 237 article document had been distributed ahead of the referendum and sparked immediate controversy, not least because Article 2 stipulated that ‘Islam is the religion of the state and … [the] Principles of Islamic Sharia are the principal source of legislation’ (‘Egypt’s draft constitution’, 2012: Article 2). However, it did guarantee freedom of religion and Article 3 granted that both Egyptian Christians and Jews may draw upon their own canons as a source of legislation for their personal status laws, religious affairs and the selection of their spir-itual leaders. Even more important is the fact that the Constitution is premised on social justice and seeks to capture the spirit of the revolution


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by ensuring the freedom, dignity, equal opportunity and rights of every Egyptian citizen (‘Egypt’s draft constitution’, 2012: Articles 5, 8, 9, 14). It also had a number of important articles which pertained to ridding the state of government corruption, as well as those which guarantee the freedom of the press, the right to peaceful protest and demonstra-tion, and others that would open up the political landscape and allow parties to form freely by simply notifying the government (‘Egypt’s draft constitution’, 2012: Articles 48, 50– 51, 88, 158). It also emphasised the rule of law, the independence of the judiciary, the right to a fair trial and the right to legal representation with strict measures designed to curtail any abuses of these and other rights (‘Egypt’s draft constitution’, 2012: Articles 74– 80). However, as Larbi Sadiki has pointed out, perhaps the most important dimension of the new Constitution was the severe limitations it placed on the government and especially the President’s office, in a clear attempt to silence calls that Morsi was the new Pharaoh (Sadiki, 2012a). Ending the popular MENA notion of a President- for- life, the new constitution prohibited the President from any more than two terms in office (eight years in total). Also addressing the concerns of his critics, Morsi had ensured that the new Constitution annulled all laws and declarations issued by Morsi or SCAF since the fall of the former Mubarak regime, thereby ending the period of controversial decrees and counter- decrees (‘Egypt’s draft constitution’, 2012: Articles 226, 236).

Conclusion

The tone of the constitution and especially its severe restrictions on the role of the President of Egypt raises the question as to whether Morsi’s decrees and his cleansing of the former regime’s governance networks were designed to prevent them from frustrating his own attempts to continue the work of the revolution and build a new democracy, or whether they were – as frequently portrayed in both Egypt and around the world – a blatant power- grab designed to consolidate the FJP and the MB’s stranglehold on power. Whatever the answer, Morsi and the MB should at least be recognised for having stood up to the sprawling governance networks of the former regime in their attempt to navigate the tensions between democracy and governance during times of crisis. Calls that Morsi is the new Pharaoh are too simplistic. It must be remem-bered that Egypt – under SCAF and under Morsi – has achieved more democratic progress than any other post- Revolution MENA state many of which still struggle under the weight of military- backed dictators or entrenched monarchies (Levine, 2012; Sadiki, 2012b). Nonetheless,


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the close scrutiny of Morsi and his government must continue. The President has certainly made mistakes, not least of which has been to mimic the work of dictators everywhere by issuing poorly articulated decrees, to make sure that those loyal to him hold key positions and to be very clear about his willingness to remove perceived opponents from office should they stand in his way.

Perhaps an even bigger problem has been the unfortunate tendency of Egypt’s new political elite to emphasise a top- down model of democrati-sation that preferences two elements: the ‘reform’ aspects of democracy (that is, reforming existing institutions and bureaucracies by removing their leaders) and the ‘performative’ aspects of democracy (that is, hold-ing elections, writing constitutions and staging national referenda). As democratic experiments in other Arab states such as Iraq and Yemen have illustrated, these top- down approaches are simply not enough to bolster the transition from despotism to democracy (Isakhan, 2012b; Phillips, 2008). Egypt, along with other post- Revolution MENA states, requires a steady process of grass- roots, bottom- up democratisation that is driven by, done in consultation with, and under the purview of, the very people who drove the revolution in the first place. This participa-tory and deliberative process must be dynamic and responsive to the divergent needs of the Egyptian people, relevant to their cultural norms and in tune with the rich history of this proud nation (Isakhan, 2011a).

For this to be successful Egypt urgently needs two things. Firstly, Egypt requires its complex array of civil society actors, political parties and protest movements to begin working towards a credible and coher-ent opposition that develops policies and agendas to demonstrate how they would govern differently. It is one thing to criticise Morsi and the MB and to go out into the street and protest every decision – it is quite another to offer lucid alternative policies that capture the imagina-tion of the people and which are then used to lobby the government through formal mechanisms for change. Unfortunately, many Egyptians have caught a type of ‘Revolution fever’ in which they flood into Tahrir square (or elsewhere) to air every minor grievance in protests which all too often turn violent. While protesting is an important way to convey public sentiment to those in charge in a democracy, it cannot be taken in lieu of a credible, coherent opposition. Calling for the ousting of a dictator who has ruled for more than 30 years is very different to calling for the removal of a democratically elected figure only six months into his tenure without offering a credible alternative or a coherent national opposition government. If democracy is to succeed in Egypt, those who took part in the revolution must learn that protests (and especially


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violent ones) will not solve their problems, that democracy and good governance take time and require their input. Democracy is about cooperation as much as it is about contestation, and there comes a time when differences must be put aside in order to pull together behind the incumbent government so that the country can move forward, whilst reserving the right to oust them at the next election (Isakhan, 2012a).

Secondly, Egypt also faces a unique opportunity not just to flower into a modern democratic state but to re- think the relationship between the people, their democratically elected government and the sprawl-ing networks that enact the day- to- day mechanics of governance. As mentioned earlier, the MB’s electoral campaign highlighted five key crises of governance that need urgent attention: stability and security, public health, bread subsidies, energy shortages and urban planning. To date, however, the MB have struggled to address these problems, in part because they are systemic crises with no easy solution, but also because they have emphasised the ‘reform’ and ‘performative’ aspects of gov-ernance rather than seizing the opportunity to extend the democratic project by democratising governance itself. Indeed, these crises provide Egypt with a rare opportunity to introduce innovative approaches to governance from the bottom up that are unprecedented in the modern MENA, subjecting governance networks to a degree of public participa-tion and scrutiny that they have not previously faced. The challenge facing Egypt and the entire post- Revolution MENA is to apply fresh thinking and innovative action towards engaging the myriad civil soci-ety movements that drove the revolution as well as the broader citizen body in addressing the key crises facing the region today. Indeed, the Arab Revolutions themselves give us insight into what this might look like. Recent events are encouraging for the extent to which divergent voices have been heard, legitimate grievances have been aired, and women and minorities have been involved. They are also to be admired because a balance has often been struck between the pragmatic and the ideal, between the secular and the religious, between the desires not just to oust failing tyrants but to replace them with something new, some-thing that could respond to the varying needs of the citizens.

Note

1. This chapter, written in early 2013, focuses on the period that followed the Egyptian revolution and the triumph of the Muslim Brotherhood at the June 2012 elections through to Morsi’s drafting of the new Egyptian constitution by the end of that same year. In many ways this chapter therefore documents


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a very significant epoch in post- Mubarak Egypt but also proved prescient to the extent that it argued that the fundamental struggle for power in Egypt was between the military/judiciary and the Muslim Brotherhood, often at the expense of the people who had driven the initial revolution. The chapter also emphasised that, more than anything else, the Egyptian people needed to exercise patience and restraint towards building a new democracy and that whatever their problems with Morsi’s government they should deal with these via non- violence, the forming of a credible opposition and electorally challenging the MB at the next election. Instead, Egyptians chose to stage near constant protests against Morsi and thus allowed the military, under General Abdel Faath Al- Sisi (commander of Egypt’s armed forces), to capital-ise on the popular momentum to declare the removal of Morsi and the MB in July 2013 after serving only one year of their four- year term. Indicating the close relationship between Egypt’s military and the judiciary, as well as their mutual disdain for the MB, Al- Sisi has since put in place a provisional government under the leadership of the Head of the Supreme Constitutional Court (Adly Mansour) as the interim head of state. Together, they have taken a number of troubling steps: they have arrested and imprisoned Morsi and various other senior MB members with some being sentenced to life in prison; they have violently suppressed many protests by MB activists who have called for Morsi’s reinstatement; an Egyptian judicial panel has ordered a court to formerly dissolve the MB and withdraw its status as a legitimate NGO; they have re- imposed the draconian state of emergency law, including dusk- to- dawn curfews, which had only been partially lifted following decades of emergency law under Mubarak; and they have suspended the constitution drafted by the MB in late 2012 and approved via a national referendum. Not surprisingly, the actions of the interim government have greatly angered many across Egypt and especially those among the ranks of the MB, lead-ing to a deepening in the already troubled divide between Islamists and the military/judiciary across the country. By excluding the MB form the political process, the military and judiciary risk making political martyrs of Morsi and the MB and stifling any effort to move towards a robust democracy.

Nonetheless, President Mansour, continues to argue that Egypt is ‘moving towards democracy’ (Mansour in: ‘Egypt interim president’, 2013). Sisi has called for the drafting of a new Egyptian constitution (put to another national referendum by November 2013) as well as fresh parliamentary and presiden-tial elections. However, the military were in power for nearly 18 months after the fall of Mubarak (February 2011– June 2012) and it seems unlikely that they make the mistake of creating a truly free civilian democracy – or at least not one in which the MB have any chance of success. A recent article in Foreign Affairs in fact argued that ‘Although he [Sisi] has vowed to lead Egypt through a democratic transition, there are plenty of indications that he is less than enthusiastic about democracy and that he intends to hold on to politi-cal power himself’ (Springborg, 2013). The article then goes on to argue that in fact Sisi has in mind ‘a hybrid regime that would combine Islamism with militarism’ (Springborg, 2013). These are troubling signs. The MB’s campaign against SCAF and the judiciary during their brief year in power has led to a coup and what can only be described at retaliatory attempts to quash and vestige of the MB as a legitimate political entity. Whatever happens next in


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Egypt, if there is to emerge any genuine attempt to move the country away from the bitter deadlock between the military/judiciary and the MB and towards a robust democracy, it must be premised on a democratic ethos that seeks to engage the broader Egyptian population in the political process. Central to this, as is detailed in this chapter, is the need for Egypt to not just to stage more elections or re- draft its constitution, but the need for everyday citizens to be involved in the operation of their governance. Such a move might not only help to abate deep- seated political divisions across the coun-try but also help Egypt better manage the series of intractable governance challenges that will confront whatever government emerges on top.

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