Institut d'Etudes Politiques de Paris

ECOLE DOCTORALE DE SCIENCES PO

Master 2, Recherche

Master de Science politique, mention Relations internationales

The Arab League and the Arab Spring

Strategic reconfiguration in response to new security challenges

Lucie Kröning

Mémoire dirigé par Bertrand Badie, Professeur des universités en science politique à Sciences Po

Soutenu May 2013

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For Manfred and Bette

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Acknowledgements

I would like to extend my gratitude to my advisor, Bertrand Badie, for his general guidance and encouragement. I would also like to thank Bernard Rougier, director of the CEDEJ in Cairo, for welcoming me into the CEDEJ family and giving me access to the Center's resources during my time in Egypt. I would never have been able to accomplish my fieldwork had it not been for Yasmine Farouk, whom I thank for her accessibility, sound advice, and invaluable contacts. I am also grateful to Leslie Piquemal, for her help with transliteration, and to my Arabic professor, Nejmeddine Khalfallah, for his linguistic expertise. Finally, I am much obliged to my Sciences Po classmates, whose feedback and emotional support I could not have done without.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Notes on transliteration and translation................................................................................................6

INTRODUCTION..............................................................................................................................7Outline...........................................................................................................................................10

Part I: History of Security Cooperation in the LeagueIntroduction: Political and security cooperation in the League texts ............................................11

Political coordination................................................................................................................11Security cooperation in the League Pact...................................................................................12The Joint Defense and Economic Cooperation Treaty of 1950................................................12

A. Practical application of the texts in intra-state conflicts 1945-2000.........................................131. Case studies...........................................................................................................................13

a) Yemen, 1948.....................................................................................................................13b) The Arab Cold War: Yemen (1962) and Lebanon (1958)................................................13c) Lebanon 1976: Arab Defense Force.................................................................................15d) Ta'if Accord......................................................................................................................16e) When the League goes silent............................................................................................17

2. Trends....................................................................................................................................18a)Flexible, ad hoc solutions..................................................................................................18b)Aversion to coercive measures: Preserving the Arab consensus.......................................19c)Importance of the Secretary-General................................................................................20

Summary........................................................................................................................................21

B. Arab League Reform: New notions of security?.......................................................................221. Reforming the League...........................................................................................................23

a) Procedural changes ..........................................................................................................23b) Arab Charter of Human Rights........................................................................................24c) Arab parliament................................................................................................................25d) Arab Peace and Security Council ....................................................................................26

2. A case of symbolic placation.................................................................................................26

Part II: The Libyan crisis: Ideal or exceptional behavior?Introduction: Regional security prior to the Libyan uprising........................................................30Focus on inter-state disputes..........................................................................................................30Egypt and Tunisia: No coordinated response................................................................................30

A. Pressure to conform to international norms..............................................................................331. International condemnation of the violence in Libya ..........................................................332. Amr Moussa: The influence of a symbol .............................................................................353. A popular demand for action: The power of Tahrir..............................................................37

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B. The League reacts to the pressure: A play in two acts..............................................................391. Stage I: Libya's suspension from the League........................................................................39

a) Analysis of the text...........................................................................................................39b) Qaddafi, the outsider........................................................................................................40c) 22 February 2011, a non-decision?..................................................................................40

2. Stage II: Post-February 22, 2011 and the road to the no-fly zone........................................41a) Qaddafi's threats...............................................................................................................41b) Regional hesitation...........................................................................................................43c) The no-fly zone: The importance of being part of the consensus....................................44

Summary........................................................................................................................................46

III. The League as a threatIntroduction....................................................................................................................................48A. Uncomfortable in its new shoes................................................................................................49

1. Criticism of the no-fly zone decision....................................................................................49a) Trading accusations..........................................................................................................49b) Amr Moussa hesitates......................................................................................................50

2. Circumventing the League....................................................................................................51a) The GCC unites over Bahrain..........................................................................................51

i.The GCC and the Libyan revolution: Varying degrees of support................................52ii. Internal security cooperation in the GCC....................................................................52iii. Saudi-Qatari rivalry....................................................................................................53

b) Thwarting the opposition, confirming alliances...............................................................55i. Baghdad summit delayed..............................................................................................55ii. Egypt's foreign policy “frozen”...................................................................................57iii. Selective invitations to join the GCC ........................................................................58

B. The Syrian crisis: The League as a weapon..............................................................................601. Tentative consensus (August 2011 – January 2012).............................................................60

a) Saudi Arabia take the lead ...............................................................................................60b) Resistance ........................................................................................................................62c) Different interpretations of the decision to suspend Syria...............................................64

2. The polarization of the League post-January 22, 2012.........................................................65a) Qatar: The new face of the Arab League?........................................................................66b) Saudi Arabia reframes the “Arab interest”.......................................................................67c)Algeria contests.................................................................................................................69

CONCLUSION.................................................................................................................................72BIBLIOGRAPHY.............................................................................................................................75LIST OF INTERVIEWS..................................................................................................................91ANNEXES.........................................................................................................................................92

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Note on transliteration

I have used the standard spellings of prominent individuals used in the English language press. If their name begins with a definite article (al-), I have dropped it when using their last name alone. For example: “Bashar al-Assad” also appears as “President Assad,” “Muammar al-Qaddafi” is often referred to simply as “Qaddafi.” For all other Arabic, I have used the following transliteration system:

Long vowels (اا, وو, يي) will be transcribed as â, î, û. The latter two, when they act as dipthongs, will be written as “y” and “w” respectively. The (ثث ) is transcribed as “th”, and (ذذ )“dh”. The letters (هه )and (حح )will both be written as “h” ; (خخ ) is transcribed as “kh” and (غغ )as “gh.” The glottal stop hamza ( is not marked when it appears at the beginning of the word, but it will appear as an apostrophe (’) if (ءit is in the middle or at the end. A reverse apostrophe (‘) will be used to indicate the letter (عع). The kâf ( is written as “z,” as is the ( ظظ) will appear as “q.” The letter (قق) will be marked by “k” and the qâf (ككletter (زز). Finally, the letters (دد ) and (ضض ) are both transcribed with the letter “d”

As for the tâ marbûta (ةة) at the end of a word, it will be transcribed simply as “-a” except if it is part of an idâfa, in which case if the first term (mudâf ilayh) ends with a tâ marbûta, will be written “-at” instead of “-a” in order to better reflect the pronunciation and meaning of the expression. Thus, I would write al-jâmi‘a al-‘arabiya (Arab League) but jâm‘iat al-duwal al-‘arabiya (League of Arab States).

Note on translation

All translations from French, German, and Arabic into English are my own unless otherwise noted.

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Introduction

The Arab League has been much maligned since its founding, both by member states, who have dismissed it as a tool of Egyptian foreign policy,1 and by outside observers, who have accused its designers of intentionally tying its hands.2 When the League took the decision to suspend Libya's participation in League meetings, many expressed surprised at the League's united will to sanction one of its members. Some believed they were witnessing a breakthrough in the League's approach to regional security. They declared a “change of habit,”3 a “renaissance,”4 a “revolution.”5 The change was overwhelmingly framed as a positive development in the Western media, as the dawn of a “New and Improved Arab League.”6

The League undeniably gained a new prominence in 2011. Perhaps the most unexpected development was the international community's use of League decisions to justify military, humanitarian intervention in Libya. This was a first for an organization founded by states that had, to varying extents, been subject to Western imperialism. As we shall see, Libya was partly the result of a demand from Western countries for regional backing so as to disassociate themselves from the Iraq debacle. However, international pressure is not sufficient to coerce an organization to cause a permanent change in its perception of state sovereignty, the ultimate norm enshrined in its founding documents. The League's reaction to Libya was an anomaly, a decision taken in times of crisis. However, it has had real implications for the way the League is perceived, by both outsiders and insiders, and used.

The legitimacy problemThe Arab League was founded on March 22nd, 1945. The Pact of the Arab League was signed by

six countries: Egypt, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, and Transjordan (soon to become known as the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan). The latter two members states were not yet entirely autonomous, having been under French and British mandate respectively since the end of World War I. Today the League is made up of 21 independent states, plus the Palestinian National Authority.7

In order to understand the contents of the Pact, it is essential to remember that the vast majority of the League's member states were subject to colonial control, albeit to varying degrees. For the most part, contemporary borders in the region have little historic precedent. The artificiality of these borders, imposed upon the states by non-Arab powers, whether European or Ottoman, continues to impact inter-Arab politics to this day.8

The fact that these borders were imposed, rather than establish through a cycle of war-making and state consolidation,9 has resulted in a lack of regime legitimacy.10 While this situation is common in 1 HUDSON, Michael. Middle East Dilemma: Politics and Economics of Arab Integration. p. 122 BARNETT, Michael, SOLINGEN, Etel. Designed to fail or failure of design: The origins and legacy of the Arab

League. 2007. 3 BLAIR, Edmund. Analysis: Arab League Breaks Habit, Turns on Syria. Reuters. 23 november 20114 MUDHOON, Loay. The Arab League and the Conflict in Syria: The Unexpected Renaissance of the Arab League,

Qantara. 23 November 20115 LAW, Bill. How the Arab League embraced revolution. BBC. 2 December 2011.6 ELGINDY, Khaled. A New and Improved Arab League? Up Front blog (Brookings Institution). 27 March 2011.7 A complete list of member states and their year of accession is available in Annex B.8 Enduring border disputes in the Gulf countries is just one example. See DA LAAGE, Olivier. L’arabie et ses voisins: la

revanche des vassaux. Cahiers de l’Orient. 2006.9 See TILLY, Charles. War Making and State Making as Organized Crime. 1985.10 LUSTICK, Ian. The Absence of Middle Eastern Great Powers: Political 'Backwardness' in Historical Perspective. p. 657;

For a more detailed discussion of the legitimacy problem in the Arab world, see HUDSON, Michael. Arab Politics.

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Third World countries,11 it was further aggravated by the presence of Pan-Arab ideology, according to which the ultimate goal was the creation of a single, unified Arab state. In reaction to this state of affairs, regimes took to pursuing legitimacy through alternative strategies, among them “the assertion and maintenance of claims with regard to other states, based on what were viewed as historic rights, or on denunciation of partitions and divisions imposed by colonialism.”12 Thus, the strong linguistic, ethnic, and cultural links were (and are), both a source of solidarity as well as a justification for interference. The affairs of an Arab neighbor are not considered “foreign affairs,” but rather are seen as “one's own.”13 To this day, when Arab politicians talk about “foreign” powers, it is clear that this term does not include their Arab brothers, who seem to occupy a space somewhere in between the “foreign” and “domestic” realms. The result of this struggle is an interpenetrated state system that more closely resembles “porous membranes”14 than the classic realist concept of impervious, billiard ball-like states.

Dialogues in Arab politicsAccording to Michael Barnett, the history of the Arab state system is best viewed as a dialogue

among the League member states surrounding the norms of Arabism and the proper balance between these norms and the states' national identities.15 This has fluctuated over the course of history. For example, the period between 1956-1967, often referred to as the Arab Cold War after Malcolm Kerr's book by the same title,16 was marked by a rivalry “to monopolise the specific meaning of the ‘Arab interest’ and to define the associated norms for ‘proper’ Arab behaviour.”17 Lacking legitimacy acquired through state consolidation or by democratic means, these regimes were inordinately dependent on their Arab nationalist credentials. The “game” of Arab politics came to revolve around the struggle to shape the symbols of Arab nationalism so as to best fit their own regime. This served to constrain competitors as well as increase their own regime's legitimacy.18 Because the Arab League's decisions are meant to represent the “Arab consensus,” the organization became the central symbol for which the Arab states competed. As Barnett points out, this competition led to a fragmentation of the community of states rather than fostering regional cooperation, let alone integration. The result was the emergence of the more statist dialogue that marked the 1970s and 1980s, culminating in the complete rupture of the Arab state system during the Second Gulf War.

The lack of real integration among the Arab states has meant that most scholars prefer to refer to “Arab state system”19 or “Arab regional system”20 rather than the League when discussing the politics in the region. However, the Arab Spring has given the League new importance, which is why we have decided to study the Arab League Council decisions more closely. This work therefore focuses on the main decision making body of the organization, despite the fact that some believe the League is better described as “an umbrella organization for specialized agencies.”21

Chapter 1.11 DAVID, Steven R. Choosing Sides: Alignment and Realignment in the Third World. 199112 Fred Halliday quoted in EHTESHAMI, Anoushiravan. Globalization and Geopolitics in the Middle East: Old Games,

New Rules. p. 4813 NOBLE, Paul. From Arab System to Middle Eastern System?: Regional Pressures and Constraints. p. 8314 Ibid., p. 8415 BARNETT, Michael N. Dialogues in Arab Politics. p. 516 KERR, Malcolm. The Arab Cold War: Gamal 'abd Al-Nasir and his rivals, 1958-1970. 1971. 17 VALBJØRN, Morten, BANK, André. The New Arab Cold War: rediscovering the Arab dimension of Middle East

regional politics. p. 918 BARNETT, Michael N. Dialogues in Arab Politics. p. 819 MADDY-WEITZMAN, Bruce. The Crystallization of the Arab State System. 199320 MATAR, Gamîl, HILÂL, Alî al-Dîn Al-nizâm al-iqlîmî al-‘arabî: dirasa fî al-‘ilâqât al-siyâsiya al-‘arabiya. 198321 HUDSON, Michael C. (ed.), Middle East Dilemma: The Politics and Economics of Arab Integration. p. 10

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The New Arab Cold WarIn the years leading up to the Arab Spring, the competition over the meaning of the “Arab

interest” was renewed, giving birth to a “New Arab Cold War.”22 The rivalry erupted during the 2006 war between Israel and Hezbollah. Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan condemned Hezbollah's behavior, effectively breaking a “classic taboo of Arab politics”23 by siding with Israel. This group, often referred to as the “moderate reformist”24 camp, came in confrontation with the “radicals,” namely Syria and its regional allies, Hezbollah, Hamas, and Iran. One of the central ways in which this rivalry differs from the first Arab Cold War is the entrance of non-Arab states and non-state actors into the fray. Iran has tried to frame itself as the ultimate defender of the Palestinian cause, portraying itself as “more Arab than the Arabs” in order to undermine rival regimes.25 In response, the “moderates” have ramped up their use of anti-Shia, anti-Iran rhetoric. Thus, when the Arab Spring bloomed, the core of the Arab system, consisting of the “Arab triangle,” was split into two camps: Saudi Arabia-Egypt versus Syria.26

The shock of the Arab SpringThe popular uprisings of 2011, which fundamentally called into question the legitimacy of the

regimes in place, made the Arab states feel even more vulnerable. While their populations had always represented a kind of threat, these regimes had never been confronted by such large, simultaneous peaceful protests. Furthermore, the protesters presented the legitimacy problem in a new way. They challenged the legitimacy of the regimes on the grounds that they were brutal and corrupt and did not provide for the basic needs of their populations. While the Arab governments were interested in optimizing their legitimacy in order to ensure sovereignty over their territory and thereby preserve their regimes, the people demanded more. The Arab populations had assimilated the principles of human rights and, in rising up, sought to assert their rights to a minimum of human security. Thus the Arab Spring was also a confrontation between two concepts of state sovereignty: “sovereignty as control” and “sovereignty as responsibility.” This “re-characterization” of sovereignty was a key element in the articulation of the doctrine of Responsibility to Protect,27 one of the justifications for the establishment of a no-fly zone over Libya. Bringing the debate over this emerging norm to the center of the Arab League has had important consequences on the struggle for Arab identity.

The League as a tool in the New Arab Cold WarFrom the outside, the League appeared to present a unified front in response to the violent

repression of the Libyan uprising. However, as we shall see, due to the particular constraints of the situation, the League's decisions were not taken in a deliberate way. Nonetheless this improvisation resulted in new international expectations for the League as a key partner in regional security matters. While this seemed a positive development to outside actors, member states reacted quite differently to

22 VALBJØRN, Morten, BANK, André. The New Arab Cold War: rediscovering the Arab dimension of Middle East regional politics. 2011

23 Ibid., p. 524 This term stems from the American government's perspective on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. As Valbjørn and Bank

point out, “moderate” is somewhat of a misnomer, seeing as how “some of of the 'moderate reformists' are to a large extent status quo-oriented Arab autocrats with limited popular legitimacy.” VALBJØRN, Morten, BANK, André. The New Arab Cold War: rediscovering the Arab dimension of Middle East regional politics. p. 5

25 VALBJØRN, Morten, BANK, André. The New Arab Cold War: rediscovering the Arab dimension of Middle East regional politics. p. 19

26 FAROUK, Yasmine. Autonomisation, accommodement et "wait to seize" : les stratégies réactives du triangle arabe après l'intervention américaine en Irak : l'Arabie saoudite, l'Égypte et la Syrie (2003-2007). p. 169

27 The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty.. p. 13

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the emerging role of the League. Arab regimes came to see the organization itself as a threat, just as they had during the first Arab Cold War. Regional actors have reacted differently to this new threat. Some have looked to exploit the League in order to redefine the “Arab interest” in a way that favors the legitimacy of their own regimes. An analysis of the “securitization”28 rhetoric surrounding Arab identity indicates that they are indeed using the League to secure their own rule. Others have tried to block these efforts, refusing to change the League's approach to sovereignty, which is tied to its long history of resistance to imperialism.

OutlineIn order to understand how changing notions of security have impacted the League and

influenced its behavior during the Arab Spring, we must first look at how the League has viewed regional security in the past. We will briefly examine the founding texts before proceeding to a survey of League intervention, or non-intervention, in intra-state conflicts from the time of its founding through the year 2000. This study will reveal the impact of the evolving Arab dialogues surrounding sovereignty and Arabism on regional security. We shall then look at the League's efforts to reform in the early 2000s. While the reforms undertaken indicate a sensitivity to the changing international environment and new definitions of security, a closer look at the texts of the reforms reveals their limitations.

The second section addresses the first months of the Arab Spring and the various factors that led to the League's decision to suspend Libya's participation in League meetings and eventually to the demand for a no-fly one. We shall see that this was truly an exceptional decision.29 It was the fruit of particular circumstances. It nonetheless had vital implications for the League.

The third and final section examines the consequences of the Libya decision. The power dynamics among League members will be examined through the lens of the Bahraini and Syrian uprisings. We shall see that the Libyan and Bahraini experiences combined to create a very particular response to the Syrian revolution on the part of the Gulf countries, most notably Saudi Arabia. The evolution of League decisions concerning Syria reveals the new constellation of the Arab system, defined by the struggle over what it means to be Arab in the wake of the Arab Spring.

28 BUZAN, Barry, WÆVER, Ole, DE WILDE, Jaap. Security: A New Framework for Analysis. 1998. 29 BELLAMY, Alex J. Libya and the Responsibility to Protect: The Exception and the Norm. 2011

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Part I: History of Security Cooperation in the League

Introduction: Political and security cooperation in the League textsPolitical coordination

The Arab League was partly a response to popular demands for Arab unity, giving pan-Arabism concrete, institutional form. However, due to the lack of legitimacy and resulting insecurity of the member state regimes, the founding document, the Arab League Pact, was redacted so as to protect individual state sovereignty above all else. As Barnett and Solingen explain, “the concept of Arab unity provided an invaluable tool to mask what was at the heart an inward-looking, state-building political strategy of regime survival.”30 In other words, the creation of the League was “a reluctant decision against Arab unity,”31 rather than a genuine effort to further Arab cooperation in the political domain.32

A clear indication that the League was founded in order to resist pan-Arab calls for unity is the fact that the Alexandria Protocol, a text signed six months before the Pact and which served as the basis for the Pact, contained much more explicit language regarding foreign policy coordination and security cooperation. With regards to establishing common foreign policy, the Protocol stated: “In no case will the adoption of a foreign policy which may be prejudicial to the policy of the League or an individual member state be allowed.”33 The Pact contains no such clause, but rather several articles requiring absolute respect of individual member state policies (Art. 7 and Art. 8). In other words, the idea that the League indeed had any common policy was dropped.

The Protocol states that “A subcommittee will be formed of the members of the Preliminary Committee to prepare a draft of the statutes of the Council of the League and to examine the political questions which may be the object of agreement among Arab States.” The League did create the Political Committee in 1946. However, over time, the Committee and the League Council became practically indistinguishable.34 As MacDonald notes, the two groups were often made up of the same members and most recommendations that came from the Political Committee are approved by the Council “without serious debate.”35 The Committee then gradually became replaced with ad hoc conferences of foreign ministers and other informal decision-making structures not provided for in the Pact, in particular the institution of the League Summit, the first of which was proposed by Nasser in 1964. This very centralized decision-making process reflected the dictatorial nature of most member state governments, as well as their wariness of real regional integration.

Finally, regardless of which body was meant to help coordinate member states' political positions, such coordination has largely been limited to the Palestinian question. The most successful initiative was the boycott of Israel. In this case, the will of the Arab states was united enough to stand firm and punish those who violated the policy, notably Egypt, who was expelled from the League in 1979 after Sadat signed the Camp David Accords. However, even this common policy eventually collapsed in the wake of the Second Gulf War, opening the way for the Oslo Peace Process.

30 BARNETT, Michael, SOLINGEN, Etel. Designed to Fail or Failure of Design? p. 20731 MACDONALD, Robert W., The League of Arab States. p. 5332 Ibid., p. 4333 Alexandria Protocol [English translation], 7 October 1944. 34 PINFARI, Marco. Nothing But Failure? The Arab League and the Gulf Cooperation Council as Mediators in Middle

Eastern Conflicts. p. 335 MACDONALD, Robert W., The League of Arab States. p. 64

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Security cooperation in the League PactWith regards to security cooperation, both the Alexandria Protocol and the Pact were principally

concerned with interstate rather than intra-state conflicts. The Protocol states: “The Council will intervene in every dispute which may lead to war between a member state of the League and any other member state or power, so as to reconcile them.”36 From a contemporary perspective, the document's vague reference to the possibility of war with another “power” leaves room for non-state actors to be considered threats, such as terrorist groups. The Pact, however, stipulated further constraints on the League's ability to intervene in such conflicts by limiting Arab League intervention in disputes by requiring that the states involved in the dispute formally request help (Art. 5). The same article also restricts the types of disputes in which the League may mediate to disputes that “[do not] concern a state's independence, sovereignty, or territorial integrity.”37 If a dispute is indeed brought before the Council, the decision to accept arbitration or mediation of the conflict is to be taken by a majority vote. However, the following article confuses this picture. Article 6 states that “In case of aggression or threat of aggression by a State against a member State, the State attacked or threatened with attack may request an immediate meeting of the Council. The Council shall determine the necessary measures to repel this aggression.”38 Once again, on the state subject to the act of aggression may bring the issue before the League. As Marco Pinfari points out, “aggression” is never defined, nor differentiated from the term “dispute.”39 Nonetheless, Council procedure differs in its treatment of the two situations. In the case of aggression, the decision for action must be taken unanimously rather than by majority vote.

The Joint Defense and Economic Cooperation Treaty of 1950While the Arab states had discussed including collective security measures in the Pact, in the

end, they discarded them.40 It was only in the wake of the Arab defeat and loss of large swaths of northern Palestine in 1948 that the Arab League truly began to address the issue of security cooperation. In 1950, the Joint Defense and Economic Cooperation Treaty (commonly known as the Arab Collective Security Pact) was signed by the seven member states. Despite the fact that participation in the League organs was contingent upon one's adherence to the treaty, it was not ratified by all member states until 1964. Based on article 51 of the United Nations Charter enshrining the right of states to self-defense, the Defense Pact focused on external threats, although Article 1 explicitly states that signatories “confirm their desire to settle their international disputes by peaceful means, whether such disputes concern relations among themselves or with other powers.”41 The treaty also established a Permanent Military Commission made up of the General Staff of the various national armed forces to draw up plans for joint defense. The Commission was to be overseen by a Joint Defense Council, made up of the member states' respective Defense and Foreign Ministers. Decisions were to be taken by a two-thirds vote (Art. 6).

The Defense Pact also sought to increase policy coordination through Art. 10, which forbids the conclusion of international agreements that run counter to the Pact, or even to “act, in their international relations, in a way which may be contrary to the aims of this Treaty.” While intended to increase political integration among member states, the article remains vague enough to allow the states room to maneuver, as they are left to interpret “the aims of this treaty” as they like.36 Alexandria Protocol [English translation], 7 October 1944.37 See Annex A38 Ibid.39 PINFARI, Marco. Nothing But Failure? The Arab League and the Gulf Cooperation Council as Mediators in Middle

Eastern Conflicts. p. 340 BARNETT, Michael, SOLINGEN, Etel. Designed to Fail or Failure of Design? p. 19141 For the full text of the treaty in English, see HASSOUNA, Hussein A., The League of Arab States and Regional

Disputes. 1975

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A. Practical application of the texts in intra-state conflicts: 1945-2000

In order to determine whether the Arab Spring marked a change in the League's reaction to regional security threats, one must first look at the organization's history in the domain of conflict resolution. The 2011 uprisings clearly fit into the category of intra-state conflict rather than inter-state, even if embattled leaders, like Qaddafi and Assad, repeatedly accused outside powers of being at the root of the unrest. We will therefore limit our historical survey to comparable situations.42 We shall see how the different “dialogues” surrounding Arab identity influenced the interpretation and implementation of the texts analyzed above.

1) Case studies

a) Yemen, 1948

The first internal conflict the League addressed was the civil war in Yemen in 1948 that occurred in the wake of the assassination of the Yemeni ruler, Imam Yahya. In order to determine Yemen's status in the League, the League Council decided to send a fact-finding mission in order to determine who was in control of the country. The group met with both parties to the conflict and eventually concluded that neutrality, rather than recognition of the new government, was the wisest position at the time. In keeping with the League's strict understanding at the time of sovereignty as absolute non-interference, the organization decided to treat the two sides of the conflict equally until the facts on the ground provided a clear winner. Only when Imam Ahmed, Imam Yahya's son, regained control of San'a did the League felt comfortable taking a position, and formally recognizing of the new government.

b) The Arab Cold War: Yemen (1962) and Lebanon (1958)

Later conflicts, notably the second civil war in Yemen (1962-1967) and the first Lebanese civil war (1958), began as internal disputes but, as a consequence of the Arab Cold War, quickly grew to involve other member states. While during the first civil war in Yemen, League member states had agreed to be cautious, during the second civil war, different states openly took sides. While Saudi Arabia and Jordan recognized the royalist government in exile, the Arab republics supported those who had staged the coup. Both factions approached the League asking to represent Yemen but no consensus could be found. What was initially a wholly domestic political conflict quickly became a war by proxy between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Republic (UAR). From that point forward, the League approached the conflict as an inter-state conflict, prioritizing reconciliation between the heavy-weights in disagreement. The League formed a peace mission which visited Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Yemen. The mission did not seek out the royalist camp, which indicates the extent to which the later was merely a stand-in for Saudi Arabia and Jordan.

The League kept the conflict on its agenda, addressing the issue at the first Arab League summit, held in 1964 in Khartoum, Sudan. Hassouna credits the summit conference with repairing diplomatic relations between the UAR. and Saudi Arabia, as well as Jordan's agreement to recognize

42 For more information about how the League has dealt with inter-state conflicts cf. HASSOUNA, Hussein A., The League of Arab States and Regional Disputes. 1975; PINFARI, Marco, Nothing But Failure? The Arab League and the Gulf Cooperation Council as Mediators in Middle Eastern Conflicts. 2009; BOUTROS-GHALI, Boutros. La Ligue des États arabes. 1972.

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the republican government.43 Thus, although the Khartoum summit did not produce a common League position as to who should represent Yemen in the Council, it was an important occasion for rapprochement. The United Nations Secretary-General, present at the summit, noted that the conference had indeed “[increased] unity of feeling and purpose within the Arab world.”44 The context of the League summit seems to have facilitated reconciliation, despite not producing an official decision.

As for the first Lebanese civil war, the Lebanese government itself brought the situation to the attention of the League. However, Lebanon chose to frame the unrest not as an internal conflict, but rather as the result of interference on the part of the UAR. Lebanon appealed to the League under Article 6 of the Pact, accusing the UAR. of indirect aggression in the form of press campaigns targeting Lebanese government in addition to direct aggression, reporting the infiltration of armed groups and the provision of arms to the rebels.45 Unlike in Yemen, there was no question of Lebanon's legitimate representation in the League, as there had been no coup d'état. Had the League addressed the question, it is highly unlikely that the organization would have condemned the UAR., because of Egypt's domination of the League at the time.

Perhaps it was for this reason that Lebanon addressed its complaint directly to the United Nations Security Council. Whether or not the Lebanese government considered submitting the question to the League's review a mere “formality,”46 the fact that Lebanon felt obligated to do so shows how important it was at this time not to be entirely dismissive of the League. Ignoring the League would have been seen as disregard for Arab unity and would have had severe consequences for the state's popular legitimacy.

Lebanon nonetheless did all it could to thwart the organization's efforts to resolve the conflict, rejecting all proposed solutions when its approval was required for action. This showed a clear preference for the UN process. However, the Lebanese government was equally disappointed by the conciliatory tack taken by the world governing body, whose Observer Group refused to confirm UAR arms deliveries to the opposition. When the pro-Western Iraqi monarchy was toppled later in the year, the United States finally agreed to intervene in order to ensure their influence in the region now that Iraq had been lost to the Soviets.47 The United States sent twenty-thousand troops to Lebanon and, according to some, was key to resolving the crisis.48

Although a political solution to the situation on the ground had been found, the Arab League did not simply let the matter drop. The League Secretary-General called for a meeting of the member states representatives at the UN General Assembly in order to devise a resolution to be presented to the world body. While the resolution was “notable mainly for its blandness and absence of finger pointing,”49

Boutros Boutros-Ghali asserts that the diplomatic work of the Secretary-General was key to assuaging differences among the member states involved.50 Thus, the UNGA resolution was not intended as a solution to the Lebanese conflict, but rather as a an effort to re-habilitate the image of the organization and to give the impression of Arab unity.

43 HASSOUNA, Hussein A. The League of Arab States and Regional Disputes: A Study of Middle East Conflicts. p. 18744 Ibid.45 Ibid., p. 6346 Ibid.47 HUDSON, Michael C. The Domestic Context and Perspectives in Lebanon. p. 131 48 Ibid., 132 49 Ibid., p. 133 50 BOUTROS-GHALI, Boutros. La Ligue des États arabes. p. 51

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c) Lebanon 1976: Arab Defense Force

When the second Lebanese civil war broke out in 1975, the Arab Cold War had come and gone. The strategy of “entrapment in the name of Arabism”51 had resulted in the fraying of the concept of Arabism itself.52 The 1970s were therefore marked by a move towards a more “centrist” version of Arab nationalism, “more consistent with state sovereignty and better able to accommodate the Arab states' separate identities.” While the loosening of Arab norms may be credited with what some consider Arab victories, such as the 1973 war, it also cleared the way to greater statism. This new arrangement made it possible for Sadat to begin negotiations with Israel for its disengagement from the Sinai peninsula without first consulting the other members of the League. Prior to this moment, it was unthinkable that an Arab country would take action regarding Palestine without consulting its Arab brothers.

The Lebanese civil war is complicated beast. While the roots of the conflict were essentially domestic, the presence of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) on Lebanese territory beginning in 1971 complicates the picture.53 The League recognized the PLO as a full member in 1974, shortly before the violence began. Thus, the beginning of the Lebanese civil war, even before the Syrians arrived and before the Israeli invasion, lies somewhere between a civil conflict and and a dispute between two member states. Perhaps this is why the League was able to take the initiative to mediate between the Lebanese factions, without a formal request from the Lebanese government. However, Libya, Syria, and the PLO boycotted the League meeting in Cairo. Any decision taken without the approval of the latter two parties, both of whom were heavily implicated in Lebanon, would have been meaningless, so the League limited itself to a statement condemning the violence. By not participating in the meeting, Syria wished to express its disapproval of Egypt's recent signature of the disengagement agreement with Israel.54 Like Egypt, part of Syria's territory was occupied by Israel and if Egypt were to negotiate, Syria feared it would have to do the same. Hafez al-Assad's government believed that the Arabs should remain united in the struggle against Israel. Just as the recovery of Sinai and the Golan Heights were linked, so the Lebanese conflict, tied to the Israeli-Arab conflict by the presence of the PLO, was inseparable from the larger issue. In May 1976, Syria unilaterally decided to send in its own troops to help reestablish order, a move that other Arab states disapproved of. Syria justified its actions using Arab nationalist rhetoric, claiming that the unrest in Lebanon threatened the Arab and Palestinian cause. This is a classic example of an Arab country framing events with a definition of Arab nationalism that coincides with its national interests.55

The Arab League eventually decided to establish an Arab peacekeeping mission, the Arab Deterrent Force, to attempt to calm the situation. However, the Lebanese government refused to receive the Deterrent Force unless it recognized the Syrian troops already present on its territory as part and parcel of the initiative. Because of its respect for sovereignty, the League had no choice but to accept Lebanon's terms, effectively recognizing the Syrian presence as a fait accompli. Asking the Syrian troops to withdraw before sending in the Deterrent Force would have signaled the League's disapproval of Syria's unilateral move as a form of interference. Syria's strong position in the League at the time made this impossible.56 Moreover, accepting the situation helped preserve the image of collective action and joint responsibility. Syria's use of Palestine in its justification of the intervention also made it more

51 BARNETT, Michael. Dialogues in Arab Politics. p. 25752 Ibid., p. 1453 See KASSIR, Samir. La guerre du Liban: De la dissension nationale au conflit régional, 1994.54 POGANY, Istvan. The Arab League and Peacekeeping in the Lebanon. p. 6955 BARNETT, Michael. Dialogues in Arab Politics. p. 1056 POGANY, Istvan. The Arab League and Peacekeeping in the Lebanon. p. 76

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agreeable for the other Arab states to go along with the plan, as their action would be seen as supporting the Palestinian cause. The Deterrent Force was comprised of approximately twenty-five hundred troops from Syria, Libya, Sudan and Saudi Arabia, with Syria making up 80 percent of the manpower. By 1979, all other Arab contingents had withdrawn their troops.57 This was the beginning of the Syrian occupation of Lebanon that would last for nearly three decades.

d) Ta'if Accord

In the fall of 1988, Lebanon effectively had two governments, “one more illegitimate and surrealist than the other,” as the historian Georges Corm blithely put it.58 After almost fifteen years of civil war in Lebanon, the League Council met at the Foreign Minister level to discuss what was to be done. They decided to create a Committee of Six made up of the foreign ministers of Algeria, Jordan, Kuwait, Sudan, Tunisia and the United Arab Emirates, who goal was to devise a peace proposal.59

Despite early optimism, a fresh wave of violence broke out in February 1989 between the Lebanese army, headed by General Aoun, and the Syrians, with Aoun receiving significant aid from both Iraq and France.60 In light of the renewed chaos in Lebanon, a League summit held in May 1989 in Casablanca. Despite popular Arab and international disapproval of the brutal Syrian response to Aoun's offensive, the final communiqué of the summit did not condemn Syria. Rather than place blame, the League chose instead to dissolve the committee of ministers and to replace it with a smaller committee consisting of the heads of state of Saudi Arabia, Algeria, and Morocco.

It is important to note the regional political context at the moment of the Casablanca meeting. The summit was marked by significant hostility between Syrian and Iraqi heads of state, the former having supported Iran in its war agains the latter. In fact, Saddam Hussein left Morocco before the conclusion of the conference, threatening that if the rest of the Arab states did not recognize Lebanon's sovereignty, Iraq would question Kuwait's sovereignty, foreshadowing the Second Gulf War.61 At this point in time, Iraq had the upper-hand in the war against Iran. While most Arab countries had supported Iraq during the war, the prospect of a strong, victorious Iraq nonetheless instilled fear in its Arab neighbors in the Gulf.62 The statism that had emerged in the 1970s had crystallized by this time, resulting in sub-regional moment, or what some termed the “return to geography.”63 For the Gulf countries, the Gulf was the ultimate priority.

These factors most certainly contributed to Saudi Arabia's decision to take the lead on Lebanon so as not to allow Iraq's influence to extend too far into the Levant.64 After several months of negotiations in an effort to strike a balance among the interested parties, the League committee published a report condemning President Assad's intransigence. Their frustration led them to call on the United States and the USSR to assert pressure on the parties to the conflict. The Arabs felt that, without such pressure from the Great Powers, mediation efforts would fail.65 In response, on September 20th, 1989, the UN Security Council released a Presidential Statement in support of the League's efforts. This indicates how little regard the Arab states had for the Arab consensus by this point.

57 HUDSON, Michael C. The Domestic Context and Perspectives in Lebanon. p. 138 58 CORM, Georges. Le Liban Contemporain. p.13459 VIORST, Milton. The Arab League to the Rescue. The New York Times [online]. 12 November 2005.60 CORM, Georges. Le Liban Contemporain. p.13861 Ibid.62 Ibid., p.13963 SALAME, Ghassan. Inter-Arab Politics: The Return to Geography. p. 345-46.64 By 1989, Iraq could afford to remove troops from the Iranian border and send them to Lebanon. See CORM, Georges.

Le Liban contemporain. p.13565 CORM, Georges, Le Liban Contemporain, Paris : La Découverte, 2005. p.140

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The Ta'if Accord was eventually agreed on October 22nd, 1989 in Ta'if, Saudi Arabia thanks to “active mediation of Saudi Arabia, discreet participation by the United States, and behind-the-scenes influence from Syria.”66 Hudson characterizes the Accord as “a diplomatic initiative organized through the Arab League.”67 While an Arab consensus was required in order to set up the committees that would develop the Accord, their efforts would have likely been fruitless had the regional and international context been different. For instance, had Syria not found itself isolated both regionally and internationally, the regime might not have come to the negotiating table at all.68

As this brief summary demonstrates, the Lebanese civil war was not an exclusively internal affair, neither could it be clearly declared a case of aggression. It was essentially a multi-faceted war by proxy in what came to look like a failed state. The Pact does not provide any guidelines for such a situation. If there is no government to request mediation by the League, can the League still mediate? By the end of the 1980s, Lebanon did not possess a unified government capable of taking such a decision. The Pact also expressly forbids the Council to intervene should the dispute “involve the independence of a State, its sovereignty or its territorial integrity state.” The Ta'if Accord was clearly concerned with Lebanese sovereignty and independence. The League took up the case nonetheless. This demonstrates that the League was clearly willing to work outside the Pact in a situation of crisis.

e) When the League goes silent

There have also been many internal disputes and conflicts in the region that the League did not address at all. Some of the more violent among them occurred in the 1980s, such as the government repression of the Hama uprising in Syria in 198269 and Saddam Hussein's repression of Kurds and Shiite muslims in Iraq over the course of the same decade. As noted previously, the 1980s were marked by a focus on sub-regional security. Thus, there was a general lack of interest for what was going on sub-regions in the Arab world outside of one's own. The Gulf, in particular, was distracted by the Iran-Iraq war that raged throughout the decade. The Gulf countries all supported Iraq in its fight against the Islamic Republic, which they considered to be the greatest direct threat to their existence. The GCC therefore would have seen no advantage in criticizing Saddam Hussein's repression of his own people. Their priority was solidarity with his regime in the face of Iran. Criticism could have undermined the Iraqi government at a time when it needed the Gulf's support. Syria, on the other hand, supported Iran and could have sought to call attention to the atrocities being committed by the Iraqi government. However, the Syrian government was waging its own war against dissidents and was in no position to criticize the Iraqi state's repression of its people. Moreover, had Syria attempted to bring the Iraqi issue before the League, it would have been easily dismissed, as the majority of the member states supported Iraq.

The 1990s saw a continuation of the trend of non-intervention with regards to the civil war in Algeria. While certain member states of the League were involved in the conflict, on one side of the other,70 the League was prevented from taking collective action. This was both due to the sharp divisions in the League in the wake of the Second Gulf War, as well as the Algeria government's absolute refusal of all offers of international mediation.71

66 HUDSON, Michael C. Lebanon After Ta'if: Another Reform Opportunity Lost? p. 2767 HUDSON, Michael C. The Domestic Context and Perspectives in Lebanon. p. 144 68 The Cold War context is particularly important. By 1989, the USSR had changed its policy and had significantly reduced

its military support to Syria, upon which the latter depended for its operations in Lebanon.69 HADIDÎ, Subhî. Hama 1982: Inqilâb al-majzara 'alâ al-jazzâr [Hama 1982: The massacre overthrows the slaughterer]

Al-Quds Al-Arabî [online]. 2 February 2012.70 SCHULHOFER-WOHL, Jonah. Civil War in Algeria: 1992-present. p. 115-11671 Ibid. p. 117

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2) Trends

This overview of Arab League treatment of intra-state conflicts allows us to tease out several trends. Firstly, the League generally intervenes in intra-state conflicts that have an inter-state aspect to them. Secondly, the League has shown a certain amount of creativity in its attempts at conflict resolution, but has failed to institutionalize these practices. Lastly, the League has shown a clear preference for the use of good offices and member state mediation in order to reconcile the parties in conflict. The League, as a whole, generally tries to avoid punishing member in order to preserve the image of Arab unity. As we have seen with the Ta'if Accord, this image had become increasingly difficult to maintain. It finally crumbled in 1990, when Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait.

a) Flexible, ad hoc solutions

In the conclusion of his assessment of the League, Hassouna points out “the absence from the League system of an elaborate formal machinery with detailed procedures for the settlement of disputes.”72 This fact, in addition to the numerous protections of state sovereignty embedded in the Pact, has resulted in a generally ad hoc approach to conflict resolution. While this absence of clear guidelines can be a source of blockages when a dispute does not easily fit the mold envisioned by the Pact, vagueness can also foster innovation.73 For example, neither the Pact nor the Joint Defense Treaty provides for the creation of a peacekeeping force or an observer mission, nor do the texts provide guidelines for the application of sanctions other than expelling a member state, which must be decided unanimously (Art. 18 of the Pact). This has not prevented the League from endorsing such initiatives.

Improvisation is not a feature unique to the League. For instance, there is no provision for peace-keeping missions in the UN Charter. Rather, peace operations evolved on in an ad hoc manner,74its legal basis resting on the UN Security Council's mandate to maintain peace and security. The difference between the UN and the Arab League is that, while UN peace operations may have begun as an experiment, practice has reinforced legal custom.75 This has not been the case within the Arab League, which has twice authorized the creation of peacekeeping forces, without the practice becoming standard procedure.76 However, one cannot reproach the Arab League for its inaction. As Devin and Smouts point out, it was only when relations between the US and the USSR thawed that confidence in the UN's peacekeeping capacities were restored and they became routine.77 The end of the Cold War coincided with sharp political divisions within the League , completely paralyzing it. Thus, as the number of intra-state conflicts rose in the 1990s78 and peace-keeping culture gained ground, the Arab League was not in a position to develop the tools with which they had experimented with in the 1960s and 1970s.

72 HASSOUNA, Hussein A. The League of Arab States and Regional Disputes. p. 37473 “le flou n'est pas seulement une faiblesse de la politique, c'est aussi ce qui conditionne sa possibilité” KÜBLER, Daniel,

DE MAILLARD, Jacques. Analyser les politiques publiques. p. 6274 DEVIN, Guillaume, SMOUTS, Marie-Claude. Les organisations internationales. p. 17275 Ibid., p. 173-17476 This solution was attempted not only in Lebanon in 1976, but also in 1961 in Kuwait. When Kuwait gained its

independence from the United Kingdom that year, the state applied for membership in the League. Iraq submitted a memorandum to the League laying claim to Kuwait's territory and threatened to take it by force. The League decided to send in Arab forces to protect Kuwait's sovereignty. Boutros-Boutros Ghali considers this one of the more successful interventions by the League. See BOUTROS-GHALI, Boutros. La Ligue des États arabes. p. 52

77 DEVIN, Guillaume, SMOUTS, Marie-Claude. Les organisations internationales. p. 17378 DAVID, Charles-Philippe. La Guerre et la Paix: Approches et enjeux de la sécurité et de la stratégie. p. 141

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b) Aversion to coercive measures: Preserving the Arab consensus

When the founding texts are as vague as that of the League, practice can be more indicative of the organization's priorities and function.79 There have been very few cases in which the League actively took side with one of the parties to a conflict. Generally, the League sought to reconcile the parties rather than assign blame. The aim of this approach was to preserve Arab unity, or at least to project the image of Arab unity to their populations. Consequently, when it did intervene in regional disputes, the Arab League decisions tended to take the form of broad statements rather than concrete propositions in its interventions in regional disputes.80

The few cases in which the League has been bold enough to take sides have been conflicts in which the most fundamental norms of the system, namely state sovereignty and support for the liberation of Palestine, the ultimate Pan-Arab concern, are under threat or have been violated. The earliest instance of the League taking a categorical position was its decision to send an Arab force to secure Kuwait from the threat of Iraqi annexation after it gained independence from the British in 1961. On the one hand, article 5 of the Pact states that the League Council may not arbitrate disputes regarding the independence, sovereignty, or territorial integrity of member states. While this dispute directly concerned Kuwait's independence, sovereignty, or territorial integrity, the Council did not actively arbitrate, but rather preempted an armed conflict. As paragraph 3 of article 5 states, “The Council shall mediate in a dispute which may lead to war between two member States or between a member State and another State in order to conciliate them.” Thus, the Arab forces sent to Kuwait served to prevent Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, as well as buy time for mediation efforts. Although mediation remained the tool of choice, the decision to assemble an Arab peacekeeping force can be interpreted as a general condemnation of Iraq's behavior.

The second and clearest example of the League Council taking a categorical position is the 1979 decision to expel Egypt from the League after Sadat's signature of the Camp David Accords. This decision was based on a policy developed in 1950, when the League came close to expelling Jordan for its attempt to conclude a separate peace with Israel. When member states got wind of King Hussein's plan, the League passed a resolution prescribing punishment for the conclusion an agreement with Israel without consulting the rest of the group. The resolution stated that if four members of the League should agree that the principle of collective negotiation had been violated, the decision would be binding and could lead to the severance of political and diplomatic relations, border closures, and economic sanctions.81 In response to this decision, Jordan backed away from the deal with Israel. This indicates that, at least until the 1990s, the ultimate norm in the Arab state system was that which dictated that the fight for Palestine's independence was a united, Arab fight. The conflict was between the Arab world as a whole and Israel, not between individual states and Israel.

Interestingly, shortly after avoiding expulsion for warming up to Israel, Jordan faced renewed calls for its expulsion, this time in response to its annexation of the West Bank. However, the League opted to allow Jordan to hold onto the territory, though only temporarily, in order to preserve a semblance of Arab solidarity.82 The crises of 1950 indicate a clear hierarchy of norms. While territorial integrity is of the utmost importance, its violation does not always lead to punishment. On the other hand, acting outside the Arab consensus on Palestine had concrete consequences. The League has, at

79 KÜBLER, Daniel. DE MAILLARD, Jacques. p. 6480 Critics of the League have pointed out that these texts have not provided durable solutions. However, as Marco Pinfari

argues, this does not mean that the organization has been an absolute failure. See PINFARI, Marco. Nothing But Failure? The Arab League and the Gulf Cooperation Council as Mediators in Middle Eastern Conflicts.

81 BARNETT, Michael, SOLINGEN, Etel. Designed to Fail or Failure of Design? p. 19782 Ibid.

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times, preferred to tacitly accept the status quo resulting from aggression or annexation in order to placate key regional players and keep them within the Arab fold. A key example of this is the League's effective legitimization of Syria's invasion of Lebanon in 1976 through the integration of Syrian troops into the Arab Defense Force. However, the argument can also be made that the Pact prevented the League Council from reacting more strongly to Syria's move, seeing as how Lebanon's independence was at stake, it did not ask for the Council to intervene.83 If Lebanon's government agreed to Syria's help, then the League could do nothing, even if other member states disapproved of the move.

Thus, because of the constraints imposed by the text of the Pact and the importance of maintaining an Arab consensus, the League Council has principally served as a forum for the facilitation of mediation rather than an adjudicating body. However, the system broke down in 1991, despite key efforts on the part of King Hussein to reconcile the various Arab actors.84 The League was not able to come to a consensus about how to response to Saddam Hussein's act of aggression against Kuwait, nor were the heads of state able to mediate between the two sides.

c) Importance of the Secretary-General

As noted previously, the Pact circumscribes the cases in which the League Council can act as arbitrator. It cannot intervene if the dispute concerns the independence, sovereignty, or territorial integrity of member states. According to Hassouna, one of the consequences of this has been the elevated importance of the Secretary-General in conflict resolution in the Arab system.

The Secretary General's job description remains rather broad, consisting mostly of administrative duties. Article 13 of the Pact states merely that “The Secretary-General shall prepare the draft of the budget of the League and submit it for approval to the Council before the beginning of each fiscal year.” There is no explicit mention of his obligation to intervene as a mediator. However, unlike the Council, he is not explicitly excluded from intervening in disputes, no matter the content of the conflict.85 Thus, his capacity to conduct “discrete diplomacy” has been key in the resolution of a number of conflicts since the League's founding.86

The vagueness of the founding texts have also allowed the Secretary-General to act as if he were the equal to the representatives of the member states, though his vote does not count. For instance, in a discussion of the 1963 dispute between Morocco and Algeria, Boutro Boutros Ghali points out that the Secretary General seemingly acted outside the Pact by calling for an extraordinary session of the Council, an action normally undertaken by a member state.87 As we saw earlier, it was the Secretary-General who took the initiative to bring together the member states at the UN to issue a resolution on the Lebanon crisis of 1958. Hassouna claims that this leverage stems from the “impartially institutionalized” nature of the office of the Secretary-General. That is, the depoliticized nature of the office has been key in the Secretary General's ability to intervene. This was not always the case. For instance, when Nasser was in power, the fact that the Secretary-General was Egyptian reduced his influence vis-à-vis states that were in competition with Egypt. He was largely seen as a tool of Egyptian foreign policy. However, after the Arab Cold War, the Secretary-General became dissociated from the Egyptian state, assuming the neutral role that Hassouna proclaims for the position. This was notably the case of Mahmoud Riad, the third Secretary-General, who resigned in response to Sadat's signature of the Camp David accords. His influence therefore fluctuates depending on Egypt's position

83 See Article 6 of the Pact (Annex A)84 See SHLAIM, Avi, The Lion of Jordan, 2008 for a detailed account of Jordanian efforts to avert the crisis.85 HASSOUNA, Hussein A. The League of Arab States and Regional Disputes. p. 37486 BOUTROS-GHALI, Boutros. La Ligue des États arabes. p. 5687 Ibid.

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in the system. The role of the Secretary-General will be addressed in further detail in a later section.

SummaryThis summary of League interventions in internal conflicts reflects the member states' priority

to hold the League together so as to be able to project a united face. The maintenance of the League is essential because it is the ultimate symbol of Arab nationalism. The League embodies the concept of Arab nationalism. The perpetuation of the League is therefore essential to the perpetuation of these regimes. The League's emphasis on reconciliation and good offices, even when these approaches seem to violate the League's own norms (as in the case of the League's tacit acceptance of Syria's occupation of Lebanon or its agreement to allow Jordan to hold onto the West Bank temporarily) aims to preserve the organization as “a forum of collective legitimation.”88 Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde tell us that an issue has been “securitized” if it “is presented as an existential threat, requiring emergency measures and justifying actions outside the normal bounds of political procedure.”89 Thus, making exceptions to the norm of sovereignty, such as that made for Jordan's annexation of the West Bank in 1950, indicates the securitization of Arab identity.

The “dialogue” around the definition of Arabism broke down after the Second Gulf War, when the Arab countries were split over how to react to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. Observers of Arab politics declared the conflict the official death knell of Arab solidarity, although it had already been on the wane for more than a decade. The differences among the member states led to the League's paralysis. Only two summits were held between 1990 and 1996.90 In 1995, Hosni Mubarak was the only head of state present at the celebration of the League's 50th anniversary.91 At the time, Clovis Maksoud, a veteran Arab League diplomat, declared the League “irrelevant.”92 The divisions within the League contributed to the initiation of the Oslo Peace process. The peace process, in turn, removed the taboo from relations with Israel. The highest norm of the Arab nationalism was no longer valid and so the League became unnecessary. Arab identity had been “desecuritized.” Desecuritization is defined by Buzan et. al. as “the shifting of issues out of emergency mode and into the normal bargaining processes of the political sphere.”93 The Oslo Peace process initially brought the Palestine issue into the sphere of normal politics and negotiation.

Despite the fact that many Arab countries initiated friendlier relations with Israel during the first half of the 1990s, there were also some efforts to hold the Arab countries together. Egypt, notably, tried to resuscitate the organization by calling a meeting in Alexandria in December 1994, attended by President Hafiz al-Asad of Syria and King Fahd of Saudi Arabia. They concluded the event by “[reaffirming] their support for the Arab League.”94 There seems to have a been a residual desire to maintain the semblance of Arab solidarity. While this mini-summit was generally well-received in the region95, a follow-up meeting in January 1995 which included Israeli prime minsiter Yitzhak Rabin “slowed, and ultimately, reversed the momentum started in Alexandria.”96

In the end, it was the failure of the Oslo Peace process, which became apparent with the 1996

88 BARNETT, Michael, SOLINGEN, Etel. Designed to Fail or Failure of Design? p. 19389 BUZAN, Barry, WAEVER, Ole, DE WILDE, Jaap. Security: A New Framework for Analysis. p. 2490 DAKHLALLAH, Farah. The League of Arab States and Regional Security. p. 1891 MAKSOUD, Clovis. Diminished Sovereignty, Enhanced Sovereignty: United Nations-Arab League Relations at 50. p.

58992 Ibid., p. 58593 BUZAN, Barry, WAEVER, Ole, DE WILDE, Jaap. Security: A New Framework for Analysis. p. 494 MAKSOUD, Clovis. Diminished Sovereignty, Enhanced Sovereignty: United Nations-Arab League Relations at 50. p.

58695 Ibid.96 Ibid., 587

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election of the conservative Benjamin Netayanhu as Prime Minister of Israel, that ultimately led to the League's revival. As Farah Dakhlallah puts it, the Arab League “emerged from the shadows” after the Second Palestinian Intifada. The particularly violent revival of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict contributed to a renewed desire on the part of member states to adhere to the Arab consensus. The struggle to define Arab nationalism was thus also renewed. Beginning in 2000, the Arab League vowed to meet on a more regular basis. The events of the following years, and the 2003 U.S invasion of Iraq in particular, served as further incentives to formulate a united Arab position. As we shall see in the following section, this increase in the frequency of Arab League meetings was accompanied by a number of initiatives that seem to change the approach of the League to regional security from a state-centered concept to one more closely resembling, at least on paper, the security concepts developed at the UN during the 1990s, while the League was paralyzed.

B. Arab League Reform: New notions of security?

After almost a decade of paralysis, the League came together in 2000 for an emergency summit called for by President Mubarak to address Israeli repression of the Second Palestinian. The final communiqué declared the timing of the meeting “an extremely important moment in the history of the Arab nation and a new stage in the life of the Arab people.”97 The peaceful path upon which Arabs and Israelis had embarked with the signing of the Oslo Accords had been blocked by Israel, who had turned the peace process in to a “war process,”98 stated the League.

In addition to denouncing Israel's actions, the League took the opportunity to institutionalize the decades-long informal tradition of the Arab League Summit, to be held every year in March from then on. The second article of the Annex to the Pact Regarding Council Meetings at the Summit Level (al-mulhaq al-khâs bi al-in‘iqâd al-dawri li majlis jâmi‘at al-duwal al-‘arabiya ‘alâ mustawâ al-qima) states that the main duties of the summit conference are to discuss “strategies of Arab national security, in all its aspects; political coordination regarding issues of regional and international importance; recommendations, reports, and joint projects referred to the Summit by the League Council at the Foreign Minister level.” The selection of the Secretary-General, as well as any decisions regarding amendments to the Pact, were also to be taken at the summit level. While the Alexandria Protocol had called for regular meeting, the Pact had never before insisted on them.99 This was new.

The Second Intifada can thus be seen as the impetus for a renewed investment in the League on the part of the member states, even if the investment was largely symbolic and limited to their presence at the summit meetings. More substantive efforts to reform the League began as the threat of a US invasion of Iraq loomed large. On March 1, 2003, a League summit was held in Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt. While the main issue under discussion was the impending American invasion, Qatar and Sudan also put forward initiatives to enhance inter-Arab cooperation, while Libya submitted a set of proposed changes to the Pact that it said intended to make the League more efficient. The Summit called for all other interested member states to submit their own suggestions of reform so that the Council could study the options and propose changes at the following summit in Tunis.

The Tunis Summit in 2004 is generally seen as a turning point in the work of the League.100 It was at that moment that the heads of state signed the Document for Solidarity Among the Arab Heads

97 Final communiqué, Emergency Arab League Summit, Cairo, Egypt. 22 October 2000. 98 Ibid.99 BARNETT, Michael, SOLINGEN, Etel. Designed to Fail or Failure of Design? p. 191100The Summit was almost cancelled entirely. The night before the meetings were scheduled to begin, Tunisian president,

Ben Ali, postponed the meeting without giving a reason. After intense negotiations, it was held two months later. See ABOU TALEB, Hassan. The Arab League and the Challenge of Self-Reform.

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of State (wathîqat‘ahd wa wifaq wa tadâmun bayn qâdat al-duwal al-‘arabiya), which aims for the “development and modernization of the League apparatus and institutions.”101 This document served as a renewal of the promises contained in the Pact and in which the member states pledged to work together to further “al-‘amal al-‘arabî al-mushtarak,” or “joint Arab action.” One close observer of the League noted that the decision to avoid the Arabic word for integration (takâmul) is indicative of the limit of the League's ambitions.102 The 2004 Summit, as well as the following summit held in Algiers in 2005, resulted in slight amendments to the foundational texts, as well as the creation of new organs that seemed aimed at catching up to the League's peer organizations, such as the European Union and the African Union. These changes seemed to widen the League's definition of security and to promote human rights and democracy, thus appearing to fall in step with the UN debate regarding humanitarian intervention and human security underway at the time.103 On the surface, these changes seemed to indicate a new political will on the part of the member states to move away from their strict, sovereignty-first model of the organization towards the ideal type of a regional security organization, with a potentially pivotal role to play in the promotion of security in its neighborhood. However, a closer look at the new texts shows that the changes continue to enshrine the notion of sovereignty and to put regime security above the fundamental rights of the people.

1) Reforming the League

a) Procedural changes

Since the League's founding, there have been many attempts to reform the Pact. In the 1950s, member states were usually at the origin of such initiatives and aimed at furthering their own conception of Arab unity. For instance, in 1951 Syria proposed changing the League into a union and renaming it the United Arab States.104 The second Secretary General, ‘Abd al-Khaliq Hassouna, also proposed a reform program that sought to give the political committee a more legislative role, change the voting rules from unanimity to a simple two-thirds majority, and give voice to the Arab people by complementing the League's organization with an Arab parliament. In 1965, additional propositions were made to create an Arab Court of Justice and a Special Commission for Conciliation, Mediation, and Arbitration. These projects would be continuously discussed for decades, with committees regularly set up to consider the means of implementation, but yielding few concrete results. These propositions have been revived on a regular basis over the course of the organization's history. It is important to note that, while amendments to the Pact need only to be approved by a two-thirds majority, a member state that disagrees with the changes may withdraw from the Pact once the changes go into effect (Art. 20). In other words, amendments to the Pact always carry the risk of the League's dissolution.

The most significant changes to the Pact were agreed during the Algiers summit in 2005. They

101Arab League Summit, Resolution 255, Tunis, Tunisia, 23 May 2004102A former Egyptian diplomat at the League has said that the term “al-manzûma al-‘arabiya al-mushtaraka” or “al-‘amal

al-‘arabî al-mushtarak” was coined by Moussa, seeking to convey the idea of parallel policies. Interview with retired Egyptian diplomat, Cairo, Egypt, 20 July 2012.

103The term “Responsibility to Protect” was first put to paper in 2001, when the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty published a study by the same name. The concept was a central part of the recommendations of the UN High Level Panel's report A More Secure World in 2004. The UN General Assembly voted to endorse the principle in the General Assembly Resolution of 24 October 2005, A/RES/60/1.

104BIN ARIFA, Al-Tâhir Al-Mahdî. Al-jâmi‘a al-‘arabiya wa al-‘aml al-mushtarak 1945-2000 [The Arab League and joint action, 1945-2000]. p. 44

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concerned article 6, regarding recourse to the League Council in the case of aggression, in particular. The Pact originally stated “the Council shall by unanimous decision determine the measures necessary to repulse the aggression.”105 The new text, which went into effect in September 2007, states that the Council is to take its decisions by consensus “whenever possible.” Should consensus prove impossible, the amendments permit the Council to take its decisions by a two-thirds majority. The text provides no guidelines for how to determine when consensus is “impossible,” however it does set for forth a procedure for cases in which this is the case. If the issue is not considered “an emergency,” a decision may be delayed until a later session.106 If the issue qualifies as an “emergency,” again left undefined, an extraordinary session of the Council must be held within a month's time. If consensus remains illusive, a two-thirds vote is in order, however only in cases of “objective issues.” Objective issues include an extremely wide variety of issues, among them “peace-keeping and Arab security,” “sovereignty, security, and unity of member states,” “strategies and plans for Arab national security,” “issues of Arab high politics,” “decisions regarding boycott of Arab or non-Arab countries.”107 The exception to this amendment is Article 18 of the Pact regarding the expulsion of a member state, for which unanimity remains the rule. As for issues that fall outside the “objective” category, the Council may take its decision by a simple majority vote, as was already the case for decisions of arbitration and mediation (article 5, paragraph 4) and issues addressed in article 16 of the Pact. Finally, the reforms also stipulated that two-thirds of the member states must be present in order for a meeting of the Council to be considered valid. Should an issue qualify for a two-thirds vote, and if only two-thirds of the member states are present, a decision may be considered valid even if only ten states agreed to it.

While these changes inscribe the possibility of a two-thirds majority vote in the Pact, the rules for its application remain very vague. Even if the states were to take a decision by two-thirds, the League lacks the tools to enforce these decisions, that is, force those who voted against the initiative to adhere. Finally, as we have see, the League's priority remains the maintenance of an image of unity. Considering the League's emphasis on consensus throughout its history, it is likely that the organization will do all it can to avoid putting issues to such a vote.

b) Arab Charter of Human Rights

The first Arab Charter of Human Rights was proposed and approved by the League Council in 1994, although a committee of experts had studying the question for more than twenty years.108 By 2004, not a single Arab country had ratified the Charter, signaling a general dissatisfaction with the text.109 A new text was proposed and approved at the Summit in Tunis, however, and went into effect relatively quickly. By March 2008, the necessary seven signatories had ratified the Charter.110

The Charter differs significantly from the 1994 text, particularly in its emphasis on the Arab nation, distancing itself from the religious tint of the previous text..111 The 2004 charter insists on linking the history of Arab civilization to the fundamental principles of universal human rights.112 While the preamble strives for a universal tone, it continues to make use of language that underlines the particularities of the Arab world, and the situation of the Arab population. For instance, the Charter

105See Annex A for original and amended text.106Arab League Summit, Resolution 290, Algiers, Algeria, 23 March 2005107Arab League Summit, Resolution 330, Khartoum, Sudan, 29 March 2006108MAHIOU, Ahmed. La Charte arabe des droits de l'homme. p. 7 109Ibid., p. 8110Libya, Syria, and Bahrain, all of whom have been condemned by members of the UN Human Rights Council for

violating citizens' rights during the Arab Spring, were among the first states to ratify the Charter. 111MELHEM, Dina. La problématique d'une charte arabe des droits de l'Homme. p. 189112Ibid., p. 188

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emphasizes the need for Arab people to learn about the culture of human rights, as if they were not yet ready to incorporate these values into their daily life. In this way, the states put the responsibility for any violations of these rights on the people rather than themselves.113

Another distinguishing aspect that sets the Charter apart from other human rights texts is the emphasis on state sovereignty and state discretion. Article 4 of the Charter states that a signatory may exercise its right to suspend certain rights enshrined in the text should there be a threat “to the existence of the nation.”114 Because the Charter does not designate a judicial body that is qualified to interpret the Charter (such as the European Court of Human Rights), this gives the states a very large margin to decide what qualifies as an “emergency.”115 Rather than interpreting the Charter, the Committee on Human Rights that is associated with the text, made up of specialists selected by the member states, has no right to investigate cases of possible human rights violations. Instead, Charter signatories submit their own reports on the status of human rights in their countries to the Committee.116

The Charter therefore poses virtually no firm constraints on states as to the treatment of their populations. Nonetheless, at present, six Arab countries have yet to sign the Charter (Djibouti, Somalia, Iraq, Oman, Comoros, Mauritania). Of those who have signed, five states have not ratified it (Tunisia, Sudan, Kuwait, Egypt, Morocco). In other words, half the League member states legally adhere to the Charter.

c) Arab Parliament

During the 2004 Summit in Tunis, heads of state also agreed to create a provisional Arab parliament. At the following summit, the League approved the provisional parliament's internal regulations. In the preamble to the latter resolution, the Council states that the decision was taken “in recognition of the importance of consultation and of popular participation as the foundation of democracy; believing in the aspirations of the Arab people to strengthen the bonds between them and with the aim of founding an Arab system that realizes the hopes of the Arab nation in terms of economic development, as well as development in the social and political realms, [an Arab system] in which there is respect for the rule of law, in which human rights are promoted, and whose ultimate goal is complete Arab unity.”117 The temporary parliament had a five-year mandate, with the possibility of a two-year extension, after which it would be replaced by a permanent Arab parliament. The temporary parliament's mandate was extended for two years at the summit in Sirt, Libya in March 2010. The internal regulations of the permanent parliament were finally approved at the Baghdad summit in 2012.

One important difference between the temporary and permanent parliament is that the representatives can now be directly elected, rather than selected by their national government, as was the case for the preliminary parliament. However, this remains one of three options for selecting parliamentary representatives. State governments may still choose to appoint them rather than allow the population to elect them. The Parliament may submit written questions to the heads of the various ministerial committees, however it remains a consultative body whose decisions are not enforceable.118

113Ibid., p. 191114Ibid., p. 390115Bahrain recently proposed the creation of such a court. The project was discussed during the Doha summit in March

2013.116MELHEM, Dina. La problématique d'une charte arabe des droits de l'Homme. p. 402117Arab League Summit, Resolution 292, Algiers, Algeria, 23 March 2005118It is not clear what kind of influence the Arab Parliament will have on the League Council in the future. One interesting

development during the Arab Spring was the body's advocacy for Syria's suspension well before the Council took the decision.

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d) Arab Peace and Security Council

The idea for the Peace and Security Council was first proposed at a meeting of the League Council in January 2005. After conducting a study on the possibles forms it could take, the organization of the new Peace Council was proposed and approved in Khartoum, Sudan in 2006. The Council has two main duties: to prevent disputes between member states and to report, study, and present recommendations to the League Council regarding developments that concern “Arab national security” (al-amn al-qawmî al-‘arabî). The Peace Council's founding text focalizes almost exclusively on inter-state aggression, although it also proposes coordination on trans-border threats, such as terrorism. The text also allows the Peace Council to propose the creation of an Arab peace-keeping force, when necessary. However, all recommendations must pass through the League Council for approval.

The Peace and Security Council is based on the concept of “Arab national security,” an oft-cited but nebulous concept. It is unclear what is supposed to be secured.119 In order to facilitate the work of the Peace Council, a group was formed at the summit in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia in March 2007 to determine the various threats the region faces. The preamble to the resolution that created the study group underlines “the importance of the preservation of the security of the member states, their independence and their regional integrity; the importance of firm security and stability in the region, of reinforcing the bonds between member states and of the peaceful settlement of disputes that may arise among them.”120

While the emphasis remains on threats stemming from states, the text also acknowledges that threats maybe be “political, economic, cultural and social,” opening the door to a wider conception of security than that embodied by state sovereignty, independence, or territorial integrity. The text also includes threats that may emerge from within member states, although this likely refers to terrorism, drug trafficking, etc. At the regular session of the League Council held in September of the same year, the League decided to make “Arab national security” a permanent rubric for meetings of the Council at the ministerial level.121

2) A case of symbolic placation

As we have seen, the League did make some changes gesturing towards democracy and human security. However, the texts very clearly continue to put sovereignty first. Caveats are consistently embedded in the texts in order to shield the regimes, as does the use of undefined concepts. Cobb and Ross's theory of agenda setting sheds some light on why the League pursued these reforms. As they explain, it is important to consider “the interaction between agenda-setting initiatives and macro-level political forces that affect the agenda-setting process.”122 One of the macro-factors is what they call the “climate of the times.” The “distinctive dominant ideological or social conditions” of the historical moment may help explain why a certain issue was put on the agenda and why it succeeded or failed to be inscribed on the agenda. It is therefore incumbent upon us to taken into consideration both the regional and international context in the first half of the aughts.

The latest round of Arab League reform was initially called for at the Amman conference in March 2001. It is important to note that the first issue on the Summit agenda was a resolution declaring the League's support of the Palestinian Intifada. As mentioned earlier, the blockage of the peace process

119The concept is problematic in many ways, not least because the region includes people who do not identify as Arab, such as the Kurds in Syria and Iraq or the Amazigh in North Africa.

120Arab League Summit, Resolution 366, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, 29 March 2007121Arab League Council, Resolution 6790, Cairo, Egypt, 2 September 2007122COBB, Roger W., ROSS, Marc Howard. Agenda Setting and the Denial of Agenda Access: Key Concepts. p. 10

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was key to the revival of League activity. Many credit the Al-Aqsa Intifada with having awoken feelings of Arab solidarity among the Arab public.123 Member states, many of whom had undertaken normalization of their relations with Israel, also became the target of their populations' ire.124 Caught in this difficult situation, the states sought to shore up their legitimacy by calling for the strengthening of the League, hoping to reinforce their Arab credentials in the process.

The Arab League was thus brought back to life due to popular pressure relating to the ultimate pan-Arab concern: Palestine. However, this pressure fell off as other, more pressing threats revealed themselves in the wake of the terrorist attack on the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001 and the ensuing American military campaign in Iraq. As Marc Lynch notes, the period just before the Iraq war until Saddam Hussein fell “was perhaps the least reform-oriented in the history of the new Arab public.”125 Rather, it was a time of Arab retrenchment and solidarity in the face of an external threat. Some Arab regimes even exploited popular fear of regional instability to renege on social and political reforms.126

When the reform agenda picked up again in Tunis in 2004, the impetus was due more to external than to internal demand for change. At the time, many Arab League member states, such as Syria and Libya, feared becoming the next target of the Bush administration's policy of regime change. Because “leaders of countries care about what leaders of other countries think of them,”127 especially when a particularly powerful actor in the international system adopts an aggressive posture, the remaining Arab states sought to portray themselves as members of the “community of liberal states.”128

They did not wish to be identified as pariah states, out of the fear that they would face the same fate as Iraq.129 Adopting democratic initiatives such as the Arab parliament and amending the Arab Charter of Human Rights were rational steps to release this pressure. However, at the same time, member states took pains to dress the reforms up as authentically “Arab,” that is, appropriate to the region's particularities. An example of this strategy is the “Arab Reform Forum,” held in Alexandria, Egypt in 2004. An initiative thought up by President Mubarak, it called for greater integration of civil society in Arab politics, while simultaneously expressing the region's utter rejection of the US's “Greater Middle East” project. As Yasmine Farouk writes, this forum in the name of reform also expressed “the refusal of these societies that their problems would provide an excuse for foreign intervention in regional affairs.”130 While acknowledging the external demand for change, the Forum, as with the other League reforms, sought to keep the change within the regional framework and thus limit its tangible impact.

However, assuming that the main goal of the member states is to preserve their respective regimes and privileges, and that “international human rights norms challenge state rule over society and

123‘ABD AL-‘ÂL, ‘Abd al-Rahmân. ‘Amr Mûsa wa ishkâliyat tatwîr wa fa‘âliya al-jâmi‘a al-‘arabiya [Amr Moussa and the development in the activities of the Arab League]. Al-Ahrâm. 1 October 2001.

124EL-HAMALAWY, Hossam. Egypt's revolution has been ten years in the making. The Guardian. 1 March 2011. 125LYNCH, Marc. Voices of the New Arab Public: Iraq, Al-Jazeera, and Middle East Politics Today. p. 240126FAROUK, Yasmine. Autonomisation, accommodement et "wait to seize" : les stratégies réactives du triangle arabe

après l'intervention américaine en Irak : l'Arabie saoudite, l'Égypte et la Syrie (2003-2007). p. 145127RISSE, Thomas, SIKKINK, Kathryn. The socialization of international human rights norms into domestic practices:

introduction. p. 8128Ibid.129For a more detailed look at the various strategies adopted by three major actors in the Arab system, Egypt, Syria, and

Saudi Arabia, in reaction to the invasion of Iraq, see FAROUK, Yasmine, Autonomisation, accommodement et "wait to seize" : les stratégies réactives du triangle arabe après l'intervention américaine en Irak : l'Arabie saoudite, l'Égypte et la Syrie (2003-2007).

130“le refus de ces sociétés que leurs problèmes fournissent une excuse pour l’intervention étrangère dans les affaires de la région.” FAROUK, Yasmine, Autonomisation, accommodement et "wait to seize" : les stratégies réactives du triangle arabe après l'intervention américaine en Irak : l'Arabie saoudite, l'Égypte et la Syrie (2003-2007). p. 156

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national sovereignty,”131 the adoption of a wider definition of security was not in the Arab regimes' interest. The clauses included in the Arab Charter of Human Rights allowing for the abrogation of these rights in case of a “threat to the nation” are a clear indication that the member states preferred to avoid a broader concept of security. In other words, although it was the member states that passed the reforms, they actually represented the main opposition to reform.

The League's decision to put reform on the agenda is best viewed through the conceptual lens of “symbolic placation.”132 Symbolic placation is a strategy used by policy-makers seeking to “address the grievance through visible, but not very significant, action.”133 Cobb and Ross tell us that the reason officials tend to prefer treating the issue superficially rather than not at all is because they “recognize the importance of giving the appearance of 'coping' with a problem that people see as significant.”134

This lines up with Risse and Sikkink's first phase in the socialization of international human rights norms, when the norms are used instrumentally for other ends: “Actors – norm-violating governments in this case – pursue exogenously defined and primarily instrumental or material interests and change their behavior in order to reach their goals.”135 Once again, their ultimate goal was the survival of their respective regimes.

In its gestures towards reform, the Council made use of some of the most common symbolic placation strategies, in particular the formation of committees to study each proposed reform. The Council also tried to postpone the reforms, such as when the Council decided not to vote on the reform proposals presented by Iraq, Sudan, and Qatar in 2003, but rather to issue a call for alternative proposals. When it did finally approve the reforms, their impact on regional governance was restricted by vague language and clauses that assured that member states had the final word in their domestic application. These new texts are carefully crafted to give the impression of change without actually enacting it. As Cobb and Ross explain, symbolic placation often results in actions that “appear on the surface to deal with the problem,” but in reality “are really nothing more than superficial actions that make no difference.”136

The fact that the new reforms mimic elements present in other regional organizations is indicative of the League's awareness of the international community's new expectations for regional organizations, especially concerning their role in global security through the promotion of human development, and the protection of human rights. However, this mimicry also betrays the superficiality of these efforts to conform. The idea of creating an Arab parliament when the majority of the member states do not possess representative legislative bodies at home is simply absurd. The only question was how long these gestures would suffice as a bulwark to social pressure from the international community. The instrumentalization of such norms can actually be dangerous to regimes who wish to stay in power. As Risse and Sikkink explain, norm instrumentalization is often the first step in the process leading to the absorption of these norms. One of the mechanisms through which this occurs is that of “self-persuasion,” a psychological process in which “over time people come to believe what they say, particularly if they say it publicly.”137 The mere use of human rights and democracy rhetoric can create new constraints on behavior: “The more [politicians] 'talk the talk' […] the more they

131RISSE, Thomas, SIKKINK, Kathryn. The socialization of international human rights norms into domestic practices: introduction. p. 4

132COBB, Roger W., ROSS, Marc Howard. Denying Agenda Access: Strategic Considerations. p. 34133Ibid.134Ibid.135RISSE, Thomas, SIKKINK, Kathryn. The socialization of international human rights norms into domestic practices:

introduction. p. 12136COBB, Roger W., ROSS, Marc Howard. Denying Agenda Access: Strategic Considerations. p. 36137RISSE, Thomas, SIKKINK, Kathryn. The socialization of international human rights norms into domestic practices:

introduction. p. 15

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entangle themselves in a moral discourse which they cannot escape in the long run.”138 However, prior to the Arab Spring, the new reforms, made in the name of human rights and

democracy, do not seem to have hampered the League's support for regimes accused of the repression of their citizens' rights. The most blatant example is the enthusiastic support the League has shown for Omar al-Bashir, going so far as to hold the League summit in Khartoum in 2006.139 Cobb and Ross explain that symbolic placation strategies are most successful, in the sense that they succeed in making the grievance disappear, in two situations: “when the power differential between the initiators and opponents is so great that the former conclude that there is not much likelihood of success, or when commitment to wider community values is, in fact, relatively high and feelings about the issue under consideration are not.”140 In the case of Darfur, the Council put the “wider community values” of the League of sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs ahead of human rights concerns. The evolution of the US occupation of Iraq also facilitated this posture. . The violence in Iraq hit its peak in 2006-2007, in the wake of the bombing of the al-‘Askarî mosque in Samarra, and the US faced heavy criticism both within the region and without. The Darfur conflict thus coincided with loss of the US's standing as a “norms carrier.” Bellamy explains “If the credibility of those most associated with the new norm is undermined by perceptions that they have abused it or raised it for primarily self-serving purposes, the process of normative change is likely to be slowed or reversed.”141 An Arab League diplomat confirmed in an interview that one of the central reasons the Arab League was able to resist the idea of a no-fly zone over Darfur and maintain solidarity with Bashir was because the United States was a main proponent of the no-fly zone.142 Thus, the League felt safe being in contradiction with the principles enshrined in its recent reforms, going so far as to accuse those calling for an intervention in Darfur of showing contempt for the Arab world and violating human rights.143

As we have seen, the reforms undertaken did not create any new constraints on the member state behavior. The Council, and thus the member states themselves, have the ultimate word on every matter. Even when they agree on a new policy, the system remains devoid of an enforcement mechanism or a judicial body with the authority to interpret the texts. The reforms were intended to change the League's image but not its central function as a forum for collective legitimation for the regimes in place. While the strategy of symbolic placation sufficed for the first decade of the 21st

century, the uprisings of 2011, in combination with sustained pressure from the international community and a push from within the organization, made the continuation of this approach untenable. As members of the international community, the member states were called on to live up to the norms that they purported to support in their reforms of the League.

138Ibid., p. 16139WEBER, Annette. Bridging the Gap Between Narratives and Practices: The Role of the Arab League in Darfur. p. 8140COBB, Roger W., ROSS, Marc Howard. Denying Agenda Access: Strategic Considerations. p. 34141BELLAMY, Alex J. Responsibility to Protect or Trojan Horse? The Crisis in Darfur and Humanitarian Intervention after

Iraq. p. 32-33142Interview with Arab League diplomat, Cairo, Egypt, 12 June 2012143WEBER, Annette. Bridging the Gap Between Narratives and Practices: The Role of the Arab League in Darfur. p. 8

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Part II: The Libyan Crisis: Ideal or exceptional behavior?

Introduction: Regional security prior to the Libyan uprisingFocus on inter-state disputes

Despite the wave of reform in the first decade of the 2000s and its potential to open up the concept of security, the League summits held in the five years preceding the Arab Spring were largely concerned with cooling “New Arab Cold War” tensions. Member states were focused on containing inter-state disputes rather than improving economic and food security for the region's population. A mere glance at the human rights situation in the domestic affairs of the member states in the run-up to the Arab Spring shows that these issues were a secondary concern for the regimes, although popular outrage was growing.144

This period was marked by multiple efforts to close ranks among the Arab states. The Gaza war of December 2008-January 2009, for instance, precipitated a Saudi initiative to resolve these inter-Arab differences at the League economic summit in Kuwait in January 2009.145 At the following summit in Doha, Qatar in March of the same year, the heads of state signed the Document for Arab Reconciliation and Solidarity (waraqat ta‘zîz al-musâliha wa al-tadâmun al-‘arabî). The document, stated in its preamble that it “takes into account the dangerous consequences of inter-Arab quarrels and the negative effects they have on the interests of the Arab nation and its key concerns.” The document is “premised on the importance of striving to clear the air and to build bridges that will allow [Arab states] to overcome [their] differences through joint efforts in which all will partake.”146 The following year, at the summit in Sirt, Libya, Syria proposed a program for the peaceful resolution of inter-Arab conflicts. The resolution, which was approved by all member states, stipulated that, in the event of an inter-Arab dispute, states promised not resort to freezing relations with either party.147 Furthermore, they shall not undertake any media campaigns aimed at the policies of another Arab government, they shall strive to keep inter-Arab conflicts within the Arab family, and they shall seek to work together in the face of common threats, such as economic sanctions and blockades.148 Finally, with this resolution, the member states promised not to bring any issue before the Council concerning another member state unless the aforementioned state had agreed to the initiative. The need to emphasize the importance of non-interference is a sign of the severity of the tensions among the states at the time.

Tunisia and Egypt: No coordinated responseThe Tunisian revolution came as a complete surprise to League members. They also seemed to

assume it would be an isolated incident. The League did not produce a collective position or call for an emergency meeting of the Council. Instead, the League Secretariat made two declarations. On February 14, 2011, the day President Ben Ali fled to Saudi Arabia, a spokesperson for the Secretariat stated that the League was worried about the situation in Tunisia, and was following the news closely. The spokesperson also called on “all sides” to work towards national consensus in order to extricate the

144The story of Khaled Said, a young entrepreneur who was beaten to death by Egyptian police in June 2010, and the subsequent Facebook campaign proclaiming “We are all Khaled Said” was one sign among many that the region's population was reaching its limit. Many consider Said's death in June 2011 one of the sparks that set off the Egyptian uprising six months later. Khaled Said: The face that launched a revolution. Ahram Online. 6 June 2012.

145Musâliha sa‘ûdiya sûriya misriya qatariya fî maqar al-malik ‘Abd allah bi al-kûwait [Saudi, Syrian, Egyptian, Qatari reconciliation at King Abdallah's headquarters in Kuwait]. Al-Arabiya. 19 January 2009.

146Arab League Summit, Resolution 10/(03/09)21, Doha, Qatar, 30 March 2009 147Arab League Summit, Resolution 499, Sirt, Libya, 28 March 2010148These are implicit references to Syria and Gaza, respectively.

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country from “the crisis.”149 The Secretary-General, Amr Moussa, called the situation in Tunisia “dangerous.”150 However, he went on to say that the developments in Tunisia also had “an historic aspect,” and that the changes meant the country was entering a new era, thus framing the change in a more positive way. He did not, however, predict that Ben Ali's overthrow would have regional consequences. Rather he focused on the internal situation: “We are following the situation with hope and interest for the stability of Tunisia. We hope that the events will not lead to decisions that will result in greater tensions and that the political center will arrive at an agreement in accordance with the constitution.” The Tunisian revolution was thus painted as a domestic matter, with the League emphasizing the importance of stability and political compromise. The positions of the Arab states themselves varied widely. While Saudi Arabia allowed Ben Ali and his family to take refuge on Saudi soil, Qatar declared its respect for the choice of the Tunisian people, as did Algeria.151 Qaddafi, on the other hand, expressed his support for Ben Ali, saying he was “pained” to see Ben Ali go.152 Overall, the League seemed to deal with Ben Ali's fall in a hands-off manner, as it had the coup in Yemen in 1948.

Before the Tunisian surprise, the League had already been planning to hold an Economic, Social, and Development Summit in the Egyptian city of Sharm El-Sheikh on January 19, 2011. The document issued at the conclusion of the summit emphasized the importance of food and water security. The Summit also addressed youth unemployment, acknowledging that the regional population is young and that the regional economy depends on them, and endorsed a Kuwaiti initiative to found a regional bank that would provide loans to small businesses.153 Despite the ousting of Ben Ali, for which lack of economic opportunity and differences between rural and urban levels of development were driving forces, the League continued to offer general declarations of member states' will to improve quality of life in the region. The heads of state who spoke at the summit focussed largely on the international economic crisis and food security.

However, Amr Moussa, changing from his usual diplomatic tone to one of insistence, framed the debate about these issues in light of Arab national security, stating that “the concept of Arab national security has breached the traditional meaning and has developed to include food security, water security, and environmental security.”154 He explained that “the concept now englobes individual security, from which stems the individuals' right to life, right to development, right to freedom, right to live with dignity, without fear, and in a peaceful environment.”Although the concept of “human dignity” has been a central concept in human rights discourse since the end of the Second World War and figures prominently in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, here the word for dignity in Arabic, “karâma,” echoes the slogans chanted during the Tunisian revolution, such as “equality, freedom, national dignity.”155 Moussa clearly chose his words carefully. By this time, one may assume that many in the Arab world had heard the slogan, along with what would become the most emblematic statement of the Arab Spring, “the people want the fall of the regime” (al-sha‘b yurîd isqât al-nizâm)

149Wasat samt rasmî, tarhîb sha‘bî ‘arabî bi taghîr tûnis [In the midst of official silence, positive popular reception of the change in Tunisia]. Al-Jazîra. 15 February 2011

150Mûsa: ahdâth tûnis khatîra wa tawatur lahu ab‘âduh al-târîkhîya [Moussa: the events in Tunisia are dangerous and have historic aspects]. WAFA [Palestinian News and Info Agency]. 15 January 2011.

151 UPI. 19 January 2011. 152WEAVER, Matthew. Muammar Gaddafi condemns Tunisia uprising. The Guardian [online]. 16 January 2011. 153Sharm El-Sheikh Statement, Sharm El-Sheikh Economic and Social Development Summit, Sharm El-Sheikh, Egypt, 19

January 2011154Arab League Secretary-General Amr Moussa's speech, Sharm El-Sheikh Economic and Social Development Summit,

Sharm El-Sheikh, Egypt, 19 January 2011155MJAYID, Muhamad Sâlah. Tûnis, min thawrat al-karâma ilâ ma‘rikat al-hûwiya [Tunisia, from the revolution of dignity

to the battle for identity] Elaph. 20 March 2012.

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via the Qatar-based satellite television news channel Al-Jazeera.156 Although the word “karâma” appeared prominently on signs during other uprisings (for example, in Egypt, where “bread, freedom, human dignity” could be seen all over Tahrir Square), the term was closely associated with Tunisian revolution. In fact, Al-Jazeera's documentary channel produced a film about the Tunisian uprising entitled “The Revolution of Dignity” (Thawrat al-karâma).

By the end of January, there had been reports of demonstrations across the Arab world, although they remained small in comparison to those that had brought down Ben Ali.157 Nonetheless, Amr Moussa found little support for his Sharm El-Sheikh statements among the League member states, who chose a different tack. Despite the convenient timing of the summit, in the sense that it would have offered an opportunity to discuss the recent events, there seems to have been no sense of urgency on the part of the member states. In fact, only 10 of 22 leaders actually attended the summit at Sharm El-Sheikh. Those in attendance remained far more concerned with external rather than internal threats, going so far as to issue a special document rejecting foreign interference in the region.158 This document was a response to two recent church bombings, one in Baghdad and one in Alexandria in November and December 2010, respectively. The member states felt that Western powers were exploiting these terrorist attacks on the Christian minorities as an excuse to interfere in Arab affairs. In expressing their rejection of foreign meddling, the member states sought to emphasize that Arab governments are perfectly capable of protecting their own citizens without outside help. The document inadvertently underlines the responsibility of Arab countries to protect their citizens, a claim they would soon be called on to prove.

Despite the accumulating demonstrations, few expected what was to come in Egypt. While heads of state were likely somewhat concerned with the domestic impact of these uprisings, none believed the Tunisian scenario would repeats itself, and certainly not in Egypt, which was seen as an extremely stable regime. A mere week before the Egyptian revolution kicked off, the Egyptian Foreign Minister, Ahmed Abu El-Gheit said that those who suggested that what happened in Tunisia could spread to other countries in the region were uttering “empty words.”159 Close observers of Egyptian society felt similarly.160

When the demonstrators appeared en masse in Tahrir Square on January 25, 2011, the League did not react. The member states continued their individualized approach, with each country taking a separate line. A good example of this is the difference between Saudi Arabia and Qatar's reactions to the Egyptian revolution. The King of Saudi Arabia was the first head of state to react to the demonstrations in Egypt, phoning Mubarak personally on January 29 to express his support and calling the protesters “infiltrators.”161 According to Stephane Lacroix, a specialist on Saudi Arabia, the Saudi

156LYNCH, Marc. Tunisia and the New Arab Media Space. Abu Aardvark's Middle East Blog [Foreign Policy]. 15 January 2011.

157Libya, Yemen, and Egypt all witnessed demonstrations during this time. 158Bayân sâdr ‘an al-qima al-iqtisâdiya wa al-tanmawiya wa al-ijtimâ‘iya bi sha'n mukâfiha al-irhâb al-mustahdif li fi'ât

min muwâtinî ba‘d al-duwal al-‘arabiya wa rafd al-tadakhul al-kharijî fi shu'ûn al-dâkhiliya fi al-duwal al-‘arabiya [Statement issued from the Economic and Social Development Summit on the issue of combatting terrorism targeting section of the population of some Ara states and the refusal of foreign interference in the internal affairs of Arab states]

159AL-NÛBI, Mahmûd. Abû Al-Ghayt: al-makhâwuf min imtidâd ma yajri fî Tûnis ilâ duwal arabiya kalâm fârigh [Abu El-Gheit: Fears of the spreading of what is happening in Tunis to other Arab countries are empty words] Al-Ahram Al-Yawmi, 17 January 2011.

160EL-GHOBASHY, Mona. The Praxis of the Egyptian Revolution. 2011.161Khâdim al-haramayn: Misr al-‘urûba wa al-islâm la yatahamal al-insân al-‘arabî wa al-muslim an ya‘bath bi amnihâ wa

istiqrârihâ ba‘d al-mundasîn bi ism huriya al-ta‘bîr [Saudi King: The Arab muslim will not tolerate infiltrators to fool around with Egypt's security and independence in the name of freedom of expression]. Al-Sharq Al-Awsat. 30 January 2011.

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regime felt personally insulted by Mubarak's fall from grace.162 On the other hand, Al-Jazeera, which can be seen to reflect Qatari foreign policy,163 covered the progress of the revolution obsessively, even going so far as to create a new channel, Al-Jazîra Mubâshir Misr (Egypt Direct), whose cameras were permanently trained on Tahrir Square.

Considering their focus on external threats, general dismissal of what happened in Tunisia, and their divisions on Egypt, how is one then to explain the decision of the League to opt for collective action on Libya? We believe there were three major factors that contributed to this decision. The first concerns the structure of the international system and the weight of international norms on the conscience of the League. The second pertains to the regional level, in particular, the role of Amr Moussa as a catalyst for change. Finally, there was a popular demand for the League to assume its responsibilities, a produce of the “New Arab Consciousness” fostered by pan-Arab media.164 as interpreted by the newly mobilized Arab public. The Egyptian revolution was an essential turning point that facilitated these three actors in a position to pressure the League member states into taking the decision to hold Libya accountable.

A. Pressure to conform to international norms

1) International condemnation of the violence

The anniversary of the Libyan Revolution is celebrated on February 17, the date of the first “Day of Rage” declared by Libyan dissidents at home and abroad. However, the revolution is widely acknowledged to have begun two days before the appointed date, when 200 people in the eastern city of Benghazi voiced their objection to the arrest of a prominent human rights activist, Fathi Terbil. The protest was attacked by police and government supporters outside the prison where Terbil was being held. The state repression seems only to have served to encourage further demonstrations. Reliable information about what was happening on the ground was particularly difficult to come by, with many news sources quoting Libyan human rights NGOs based outside of the country or relying on “user-generated content.”165 The regime also cut off internet and telephone service, making it even more difficult to verify the facts.166

The international community reacted quickly but cautiously. President Obama made his first remarks on February 18, 2011. Referring jointly to the events in Yemen, Bahrain, and Libya, he said: "The United States condemns the use of violence by governments against peaceful protesters in those countries, and wherever else it may occur."167 The US government was careful not to single out any one country. The same day, France the United Kingdom reportedly halted exports to Libya of security equipment that could be used to suppress crowds.168

162Interview with Stephane Lacroix, February 28, 2013, Paris, France; This was confirmed by a source in Riyadh, cited by the Times , who stated "Mubarak and King Abdullah are not just allies, they are close friends, and the king is not about to see his friend cast aside.” See TOMLINSON, Hugh. Saudis told Obama not to humiliate Mubarak. The Times.10 February 2011.

163Claire-Gabrielle Talon tells us this was true from moment the channel was born. As we shall see, the link has been reinforced via the Arab Spring. See TALON, Claire-Gabrielle. Al Jazeera: Liberté d'expression et pétromonarchie. p. 136

164VALBJØRN, Morten, BANK, André. The New Arab Cold War: rediscovering the Arab dimension of Middle East regional politics. p. 12

165WILLIAMS, John. The difficulty of reporting from inside Libya. BBC. 20 February 2011.166Libya cuts off internet service: network monitor. Reuters. 19 February 2011.167COLVIN, Ross. Alarmed by Bahrain violence, U.S. appeals to government. Reuters. 18 February 2011.168Britain, France halt security exports to Bahrain & Libya. AFP. 18 February 2011.

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Two days later, in a statement to the press, Philip J. Crowley, the spokesperson for the State Department, addressed the situation in Libya specifically, saying “The United States is gravely concerned with disturbing reports and images coming out of Libya.”169 At this point, the US government was still in contact with their Libyan counterparts, endeavoring to convince them to stop the violent crackdown.170 In the view of the US government, the Libyan government was still the legitimate representative of the country and could be trusted to handle the situation responsibly.

The same day (February 20), the Libyan permanent representative to the Arab League, Abd al-Moneim al-Houni, resigned from his position and asked that Qaddafi be put on trial for “the mass killings in Libya.”171 Al-Houni's defection was followed the next day by that of the Libyan delegation to the UN, which announced its opposition to the Qaddafi government, although it did so in the absence of the Libyan Ambassador to the UN, Abd al-Rahman Shalqam. On that day, in an interview on the Saudi television channel Al-Arabiya, the deputy permanent representative of Libya to the UN, Ibrahim Dabashi, issued the first call for a no-fly zone over his country in order to prevent the delivery of arms to the regime.172

These defections encouraged the international community to take a stronger position. The day the Libyan UN delegation announced its loyalty to the opposition, the US Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, declared: “The government of Libya has a responsibility to respect the universal rights of the people, including the right to free expression and assembly. Now is the time to stop this unacceptable bloodshed. We are working urgently with friends and partners around the world to convey this message to the Libyan government.”173 Clinton's use of the word “responsibility” must be underlined, as it echoes the doctrine of Responsibility to Protect. However, one should also retain Clinton's emphasis on the US's priority of working with international partners, a key element of the US strategy in the Libyan case, in which President Obama sought to “lead from behind.” Qaddafi was feeling pressure from other international sources, such as the Secretary-General of the UN, Ban Ki Moon, who spoke to the Libyan leader on the phone the same day, telling him “that the violence must stop – immediately.”174

Thus, the line taken by the international community preceding the Arab League's emergency meeting of the permanent representatives held on February 22, 2011 was one of clear condemnation of the repression of peaceful protest using the language of Responsibility to Protect. We have already seen that the League is sensitive to international norms and has a shown a certain wish to appear to be a collective actor in good standing. Seeing as how “international law and international organizations are still the primary vehicles for stating community norms and for collective legitimation,”175 the fact that the international community had condemned the violence most certainly had an impact on League member states. The decision taken by the League Council to suspend Libya's participation in the meetings of the various organs of the League can therefore be seen as an effort to align itself with

169CROWLEY, Philip J. Situation in Libya. United States Department of State Press Statement. 20 February 2011.170“Libyan officials have stated their commitment to protecting and safeguarding the right of peaceful protest. We call

upon the Libyan government to uphold that commitment, and hold accountable any security officer who does not act in accordance with that commitment.” CROWLEY, Philip J. Situation in Libya. Press Statement, United States Department of State. 20 February 2011

171Arab League Bars Libya From Meetings. AP. 23 February 2011.172LibyanGirl80, video, Ibrâhîm al-dabâshî yatlub fard al-hazr al-jawî yawm 21.2.2011. [Ibrahim al-Dabashi asks for a no-

fly zone]. 21 February 2011 [consulted 20 May 2013]. 173CLINTON, Hillary Rodham. Situation in Libya. Press Statement, United States Department of State. 21 February 2011174BAN, Ki-Moon. Remarks to the Global Creative Forum Dinner. Los Angeles, California, USA. 22 February 2011;

According to Alex J. Bellamy, the UN Secretariat was instrumental in framing the Libya situation in terms of the Responsibility to Protect, see BELLAMY, Alex J. Libya and the Responsibility to Protect: The Exception and the Norm. p. 264

175RISSE, Thomas, SIKKINK, Kathryn. The socialization of international human rights norms into domestic practices: introduction. p. 8

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international tendencies. It nonetheless represents a radical departure from the League's preference for dialogue over sanction.

2) Amr Moussa: The influence of a symbol

In addition to a nascent international consensus condemning the Libyan regime and increasing defection in the ranks of the Libyan diplomacy, several other factors contributed to the League's change in approach. According to a close observer of the League, Amr Moussa was instrumental in putting Libya on the Council's agenda.176

As previously mentioned, the texts of the League contain few details about the duties of the Secretary-General. His duties fit into three categories: executive, political, representative. He is to follow the progress of the implementation of Council decisions, he is responsible for proposing the organization's budget, and he is the voice of the League, and must therefore seek to represent the Arab consensus as accurately as possible in his declarations. He may also submit reports to the Council on any topic he considers relevant. Magdî Hamâd, professor and expert on the League, explains that despite the vague job description, those who have held the position have exercised important influence on the general workings of the League and in the area of conflict resolution, in particular. This role has developed over time through the individual practices of those who have held the office.177

Hamâd identifies several aspects of the position of Secretary-General of the League that determine his influence on League Council decisions. Firstly, he has direct access to the head's of state by virtue of the fact that they are the ones that appoint him. This allows him a clearer view of state policies, as he does not have to wade through the national bureaucracy. Amr Moussa had also served ten years as the Foreign Minister of Egypt prior to becoming Secretary-General in 2001, and therefore had developed solid relations with the various governments. His knowledge of the League environment gives him power. As Richard K. Ashley notes:

“To have power, an agent must first secure its recognition as an agent capable of having power, and, to do that it must first demonstrate its competence in terms of the collective and coreflective structures (that is, the practical cognitive schemes and history of experience) by which the community confers meaning and organizes collective expectations. It is always by way of performance in reference to such collectively “known” (but not necessarily intellectually accessible) generative schemes that actors gain recognition and are empowered.”178

As noted previously, the Secretary-General's nationality (generally Egyptian) also has an impact on his potential for influence. His connection to Egypt can add weight to his word or take away from his influence, depending on Egypt's position within the Arab system at the time.179 Egypt is the most populous Arab country and possesses strong Arab nationalist credentials, despite its 10-year absence from the League (1979-1990). However, after Mubarak's fall, Egypt's status was up in the air. Moussa placed himself decisively on the side of the revolutions from the beginning of the Arab Spring. On February 4, 2011, Moussa reportedly joined the crowds in Tahrir Square, although he did not openly

176Interview with Western diplomat and close observer of the League, Cairo, Egypt, 12 June 2012177HAMÂD, Magdî. Jâmi‘at al-duwal al-'arabiya: Madkhal ilâ al-mustaqbal [The League of Arab States: Entrance to the

future]. p. 318178ASHLEY, Richard K. The Poverty of Neorealism. p. 291-292179The Secretary-General's ties to Egypt has also left him open to accusation of working in the interest of their home

country and not in the general interest of the League. This conflict of interest was particularly problematic under Nasser, when Egypt hit its peak moment of influence, culturally and politically.

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call for Mubarak to step down.180 On February 9, 2011, two days before Mubarak's fall, he stated that he believed that “the world and the Middle East will be influenced by what is happening in Egypt. I personally believe there is no going back in Egypt.”181 During his last months in office, Moussa often emphasized the idea that the Arab world had entered a new era182 and that the League needed to leave behind its history of inaction. In an interview given to the German magazine Der Spiegel shortly after the League Council's request for a no-fly zone over Libya, he underlined the historic nature of the Arab League decision of February 22, 2011: “This was the first time in the history of our organization that we suspended the membership of a state because its leadership was mistreating its citizens.”183 In framing the events of the Arab Spring as exceptional and historic, Moussa seemed to imply that the League should take exceptional, revolutionary measures.

The impact Moussa's decision to align himself with change had on his influence inside the League is difficult to measure.184 On the one hand, most Arab regimes saw the revolution in Egypt as a threat to their own existence. Therefore, anyone promoting the revolution would also be considered a threat. On the other hand, the Secretary-General's status as the “symbol of the Arab nation,”185 in addition to Moussa's personal popularity in the region made it dangerous to ignore him, especially at a time when the member states were desperate for public approval.

The crisis aspect of the Arab Spring undoubtedly made the member states more open to policy suggestions, as long as they did not perceive the Secretary-General himself as a source of threat. His efforts to promote regional security reform during times of regional stability, such as his proposal to award neighboring states with observer status at the League, largely failed Moussa seemed to believe that the new conditions created by the Arab Spring had the potential to force the League to listen to what he had been saying. As Moussa has said, “Arab unity could not be achieved by the states, but perhaps the people will make it a reality.”186 The Secretary-General's influence on member states is heavily dependent on the security situation.

Assuming Moussa did play a role in putting Libya on the agenda, the fact that he faced little criticism at the beginning of the crisis seems to indicate a certain amount of unity among the member states as well as trust in his judgment, seeing as how there was little resistance to the decision to suspend Libya's participation in League meetings. However, as we shall see, Moussa became a target for criticism once the no-fly zone was approved by the Council. He also failed to push the League to condemn the Bahraini and Yemeni regime.187 The Secretary-General's influence is therefore limited in its scope. The moment he treads on specific norms or spheres of influence, he can be attacked. The supremacy of the will of the member states has caused Nabil al-Araby, Moussa's successor, to remark

180The Secretariat claimed that Moussa had gone down to “calm the protesters.” 181Mûsâ: Inahâ thawra wa misr lan ta‘ûd li al-warâ' [Moussa: It is indeed a revolution and Egypt will not go back]. Al-

Ahram. 9 February 2011. 182In May he was quoted as saying “I repeat, nothing will stay as it has been for the last sixty years.” See ‘Amr Mûsâ:

qimat baghdâd lâ bud min ta'jîlih...wa lâ nîa li ilghâ'ihâ [Amr Moussa: the Baghdad summit must be postponed...but there is no intention to cancel it]. Al-Masry Al-Youm [online]. 1 May 2011.

183“Das erste Mal in der Geschichte unserer Organisation haben wir die Mitgliedschaft eines Landes suspendiert, weil seine Führung die Bevölkerung misshandelt.” BEDNARZ, Dieter, FOLLATH, Erich, WINDFUHR, Volkhard. Eine epochale Entwicklung. Der Spiegel.14 march 2011.

184Many of those interviewed for this paper ascribed Moussa's motives for siding with the revolution to his ambition to become Egypt's president. However, his record of pushing for reform within the League, as well as his speech at Sharm El-Sheikh, before it was at all clear that there would be an uprising in Egypt, indicate that this stance was not entirely opportunistic.

185HAMÂD, Magdî. Jâmi‘at al-duwal al-'arabiya: Madkhal ilâ al-mustaqbal [The League of Arab States: Entrance to the future]. p. 324

186Diplomatic document187According to a Western diplomat in Cairo, Amr Moussa advocated for pressure on Bahrain and Yemen but was denied.

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that the Arab League belongs more to the first generation international organizations, that of the League of Nations, than to the world of the United Nations.188

3) A popular demand for action

With the Arab Spring, we witnessed the emergence of a new source of pressure on the League: the Arab public. While the domestic and foreign policies of individual member states have been the target of protest in the past, in 2011, the League, its headquarters in particular, became a target in its own right. The Arab League embassy in Paris reportedly received numerous phone calls from Libyans on the ground and abroad urging the League to take action.189 Dozens of Libyans demonstrated outside of the League headquarters in Cairo the very day that the League decided to suspend Libya, complaining of the organization's slow reaction to the regime's crackdown.190 These demonstrations were made possible by the fact that the League's headquarters are located on the edge of Tahrir Square. As Sahar Keraitim and Sami Mehrez explain, the transformation of the square into an emblem of freedom via the Egyptian revolution also “re-signified relationship to public space(s) in general.”191

These demonstrations in front of the League headquarters also reveal a demand on the part of the Arab public for a League that serves the region's population.

Tahrir SquareA towering white building located on the eastern edge of Tahrir Square, between the emblematic

roundabout and the Qasr al-Nil bridge, the League's headquarters are visible from any point in Tahrir Square. The employees of the Secretariat had the best seats in the house to watch the thousands of protesters flood into the square during the first 18 days of the revolution. During this period, the League drew no protesters, seeing as how their grievances were directed at the Egyptian state. Nonetheless, the Egyptian revolution opened up new spaces, physical and mental, for protest. Tahrir has actually been the principal locus of contestation in Egypt as early as 1919. It was “the space that [epitomized] protest par excellence during both colonial and national histories.”192 However, under Mubarak's Emergency Law, the square had become virtually inaccessible to public protest.193

Nonetheless, as Mona El-Ghobashy points out, a culture of protest had been developing in Egypt for a decade before January 25, 2011. What changed in 2011 was the convergence of the different protest sectors and, more importantly for our analysis, the geographic extension of the protests to include new parts of the city.194 These factors in turn changed the way people in Egypt viewed the act of protesting: “The simultaneity of protests across very different locations, especially the filling of streets in neighborhoods entirely unused to such processions, revised citizens’ calculations of what was possible and reduced uncertainty about the consequences of action.”195 The idea of “reduced uncertainty” is key. Keraitim and Mehrez explain that in reclaiming Tahrir, “demonstrators effectively transformed the

188BBC Arabic, video, Liqâ' Nabîl al-Arabî ma‘ al-BBC [BBC Interview with Nabil al-Araby]. 2 May 2011. 189Interview with Arab League diplomat, Paris, France, 18 May 2012190Mûsâ yastajîb li nidâ' al-mutazâhirîn wa yanzil min al-jâmi‘a al-arabiya [Moussa responds to the protesters calls and

goes down]. Al-Ahrâm [online]. 22 February 2011. 191KERAITIM, Sahar, MEHREZ, Samia. Mulid al-Tahrir : Semiotics of a Revolution. p. 45192Ibid. p. 38193Ibid. p. 39194Until 2011, El-Ghobashy tells us, state security had “a stellar track record in branding each sector of dissent with a

different label,” dividing and thus controlling the different movements. In January 2011, “The diffusion of protests on January 25–27 shattered both the mental and material divisions between Egypt’s three protest sectors, forcing the regime to confront them simultaneously.” EL-GHOBASHY, Mona. The Praxis of the Egyptian Revolution. 2011

195EL-GHOBASHY, Mona. The Praxis of the Egyptian Revolution. 2011

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midan (square) into a re-signified space : a sanctuary (Haram).”196 It became a “utopian”197 space in which “the collective sense of responsibility and public safety among all the protesters was the rule of the day.”198 The Square became a safe space, in which a joyful atmosphere reigned.

Many inhabitants of Cairo went to visit Tahrir as a family outing, including non-Egyptian Arabs. Keraitim and Mehrez point out that flags from Egypt, Palestine, Libya, Syria, Yemen, and Bahrain could be seen flying over the square.199 Other Arabs living in Cairo who did not go down to Tahrir during the 18 days would certainly have seen images of the square on Al-Jazeera. Keraitim and Mehrez claim that one of the most interesting outcomes of this form of passive participation, of “watching” the revolution, was “the thorough understanding that Tahrir/tahrir is not just a physical place but a collective state and consciousness through which the basic demands of Egypt's revolution – “Huriya, karam insaniya” ('freedom, human dignity') – continue to amass signification and translations.”200 Thus, the Egyptian revolution made Tahrir Square into a natural and safe place for Syrian, Libyan, and Yemeni expatriates to protest. The revolution also inspired them to translate what they had seen and attempt to transpose it on their own country. Because the League headquarters were located in this safe space, the building became a valid and possible target.

Since the first protest in front of the League on February 22, 2011, different national groups have adopted the League as a prime location to express their demands. On March 12, the day of the League's no-fly zone decision, Libyans protesting against Qaddafi's regime gathered outside headquarters. They were joined by Yemeni protesters demanding that Ali Abdullah Saleh of Yemen relinquish power as well.201 When the Syrian revolution got underway, Syrian refugees in Cairo built a protest tent at the base of the building.202 Decorated with posters of martyrs and banners calling for the end of Bashar al-Assad's rule, protests were held in front of the tent every Friday in solidarity with peaceful protests taking place inside Syria.203 A Syrian refugee living in Cairo who had participated in protests in Syria before being forced to leave the country explained that the location for the tent, a few meters from the main entrance to League headquarters, was not coincidental. They had expressly chosen not to build the tent in the center of the roundabout, next to the Egyptian tents, because they wanted to direct their appeals at the League, not the Egyptian government.204 Protests in front of the Arab League have become relatively common, especially regarding the situation in Syria, with participants adopting tactics, such as the hunger strikes, which have figured prominently in other uprisings.205

As Keraitim and Mehrez write, “the midan provided the space for solidarities with neighboring Arab revolutions and uprisings, which also worked as unifying poles for the demonstrators and reinforced a sense of imagined community beyond the immediate and limited Egyptian one.”206 The protests in front of the League demonstrate that there is a belief among sections of the Arab public that Arab states have obligations towards the populations of other League member states. There is an expectation of Arab solidarity and a desire for the organization to live up to this expectation.

196KERAITIM, Sahar, MEHREZ, Samia. Mulid al-Tahrir : Semiotics of a Revolution. p. 40197Ibid. p. 31198Ibid. p. 51199Ibid. p. 51200Ibid. p. 60201Libyans in Egypt protest outside Arab League; League still divided over no-fly zone. MENA. 12 March 2011.202See Annex D for photographs of the tent.203When I returned to Cairo in January, 2013, the tent had been taken down.204Personal communication, 8 June 2012, Cairo, Egypt. 205The hunger strike has notably been used in Bahrain, as well as among Palestinian prisoners. EL GUNDY, Zeinab. Syrian

hunger strikers demand 'actions not speeches' from Egypt's Morsi. Ahram Online. 10 September 2012.206KERAITIM, Sahar, MEHREZ, Samia. Mulid al-Tahrir : Semiotics of a Revolution. p. 37

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Furthermore, these protests show that the Arab public has assimilated, at least to an extent, the ideal type of the regional security organization.207 Finally, the presence of demonstrators just outside of the building where the Council meets almost certainly has an impact on the decision-makers inside. The protests were the physical form of a popular demand for Arab solidarity, a reminder that state legitimacy still depends in part of their endorsement of Arab unity.

B. The League reacts to the pressure: A play in two acts

1) Stage I: Libya's suspension from the League

a) Analysis of the text

The emergency meeting on February 22 was officially called for by Qatar, which was also the first Arab country to speak out against the violence being committed by the Libyan regime. The statement issued at the end of the meeting expressed the League's “condemnation of the crimes committed against peaceful protesters in numerous Libyan cities and in the capital, Tripoli, being reported by international and Arab media; [the League's] strong disapproval of the violence perpetrated against civilians, which cannot be accepted or justified and, in particular, the recruitment of foreign mercenaries, the use of live ammunition, heavy artillery, and other weapons against protesters, which represent dangerous violations of human rights and international humanitarian law.”208

The document calls for a halt to the violence and for the initiation of a national dialogue. It demands that the Libyan regime answer its people's legitimate calls for change, as well as respect their right to peaceful demonstration and free speech. The document does not make reference to any human rights documents, neither the Universal Declaration, nor the Arab Charter of Human Rights. However it underlines the importance of maintaining the territorial unity of Libya, one of the key norms in the Arab system. The document also addresses the lack of reliable information coming out of Libya, demanding an end to the media black-out and the reinstatement of communication services. Finally, it rejects the Libyan regime's allegations that other Arab countries were responsible for the violence against Libyans, a response to Sayf al-Islam al-Qaddafi's speech on Libyan television on February 20. During this speech, he claimed the unrest was the result of a foreign conspiracy, saying: “The security forces [...] have arrested dozens in Libya who unfortunately were among our brother Arabs and among the African expatriates [...] who were used in these events at these times to create problems.”209 He also blamed the Arab media in particular for fomenting the demonstrations.210 The text goes on to propose that a committee be set up to assess the verity of these accusations, in other words, to help settle an inter-Arab dispute. These last points regarding the important role of the media and the reference to inter-Arab conspiracies harken back to the Arab Cold War, notably Lebanese complaints against the UAR in 1958.

207It should be noted, however, that the League has also been the target of contestation by groups that disapprove of its condemnation of the Syrian regime. The League website has been hacked repeatedly (November 2012, March 2013) by the Syrian Electronic Army, loyal to the al-Assad regime.

208Arab League Council, Statement 136, 22 February 2011209Gaddafi son: 'We will eradicate them all. Reuters. 21 February 2011. 210Ibid.

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b) Qaddafi, the outsider

No delegations expressed any reservations on the text, reflecting, in part, Qaddafi's lack of popularity among his Arab peers. Some, such as Lebanon and Iraq, were actively hostile towards Libya.211 The Lebanese President, Michel Suleiman, boycotted the 2010 Arab League Summit held in Sirt because of Libya's implication in the 1978 disappearance of the prominent Shia cleric Musa al-Sadr.212 There has also been an enduring grudge between Saudi Arabia and Libya, dating back to the Sharm El-Sheikh summit in 2003, when Qaddafi, referring to the Second Gulf War, accused Saudi Arabia of being willing to make “an alliance with the devil” to keep its territory safe from an Iraqi invasion. Crown Prince Abdullah famously shot back that Qaddafi's regime was the product of the colonial powers (and therefore artificial) and finished by telling the Libyan leader not to talk about thing that do not concern him and that “[Qaddafi's] grave was before [him].”213 A year later, Libya was accused to have been plotting the assassination of Crown Prince Abdullah, although Libya denied the charges. Nonetheless, the grudge seems to have held. Qaddafi boycotted the 2007 League Summit in Riyadh and directly insulted the Kingdom again at the 2009 League Summit held in Doha. On the latter occasion, he was quote as saying that the King was “made by the British and protected by America.”214

The sound of the transmission of the conference was cut off as Qaddafi continued his tirade, an effort to cover up discord in the League. The media later reported that that the two had been reconciled, with the press issuing a picture of the two sharing a couch. The series of insults exchanged by the two heads of state shows how the basic legitimacy of these regimes remains a central concern to them, as well as how dangerous it is considered for one's regime to be linked to the West.

c) February 22, 2011: A non-decision?

Despite these personal grudges and general distaste for Qaddafi's behavior, the majority of the Arab governments avoided openly condemning the violence in the first days of the Libyan uprising. At this early stage, only Qatar and Jordan spoke out against the use of military force against civilians.215

Moreover, the League took pains to make clear that the decision to suspend Libya's participation in League meetings did not amount to an expulsion from the League, as had been the case with Egypt in 1979.216 Knowing this, the statement issued by the League looks to be simply a gesture in the direction of the international community, though completely without teeth. This is underscored by the fact that the document was issued by the League Council at the permanent representative level, generally not the level where important decisions are taken.217 For the member states, the matter was not viewed as urgent enough convene at the foreign minister level. Rather, it was the series of events that occurred in the wake of this decision, and Qaddafi's choice of words that, in retrospect, made this decision seem monumentally important as the first step towards the UN Security Council's approval of the no-fly zone. However, it should be viewed as an essentially conservative position, made to placate the demands of the international community and their own populations.

211Interview with Arab League diplomat, Cairo, Egypt, 12 June 2012212The Lebanese permanent representative to the League, Khalid Ziada, attended in his place.213Al-Qathâfi yu‘ârid istid‘a' safîr lîbîy ladâ al-sa‘ûdîyâ [Qaddafi announces the withdrawal of Libya's ambassador to

Saudi Arabia]. Al-Jazîra. 4 March 2003.214OTTERMAN, Sharon, MACKEY, Robert. Qaddafi erupts, on schedule. The Lede Blog (The New York Times) 30 March

2009. 215Al-jâmi‘a tûwaqif mushârikat wûfûd al-Qathâfî [The League announces the suspension of Libya delegation

participation] Al-Jazîra. 22 February 2011. 216Arab League diplomats felt the need to underline this fact repeatedly in interviews conducted in June and July 2012. 217Interview with Western diplomat and close observer of the League, Cairo, Egypt, 12 June 2012

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2) Stage II: Post-February 22, 2011 and the road to the no-fly zone

a) Qaddafi's threats

In the afternoon of the same day that the Arab League suspended Libya's participation in League meetings, the UN Security Council held a closed meeting on “Peace and Security in Africa,” in the presence of many additional, interested parties, during which the Libyan ambassador to the UN still loyal to Qaddafi, Abd al-Rahman Shalqam, spoke.218 According to the Press Statement made by Maria Luiza Ribeiro Viotti of Brazil after the meeting, the Security Council session was initially called for by the Libyan delegation in the absence of the ambassador.219 In other words, the meeting was called for by the deputy head of the office, Dabashi, who had come out strongly against the regime. Dabashi led the Libyan delegation during the morning session of the Security Council meeting. According to The Guardian, Russia and China held up proceedings by calling into question Dabashi's right to represent the Libyan government.220 Shalqam reappeared for the afternoon session and was ultimately given the right to make a statement on behalf of the Libyan government. While Shalqam denied that there had been any aerial bombardments, he confirmed that the regime was responsible for at least part of the bloodshed.221 He claimed to be working to persuade the regime to stop the violence, accepting part of the responsibility himself.

While it was a closed meeting, the Press Statement presages what is to come. The statement makes explicit reference to the proposal of the League Council to suspend Libya's participation in League meetings.222 The United States, France, and Britain would continue to emphasize the importance of regional consent for intervention, later enshrined in Security Council Resolution 1973. The Press Statement also refers to the principle of Responsibility to Protect: “The members of the Security Council called on the Government of Libya to meet its responsibility to protect its population.” It is likely that this unified position issued by the UN Security Council was facilitated, not only by the League decision, but by a speech given by Qaddafi on the same day. In his first speech addressing his country since the beginning of the uprising,223 he openly threatened the opposition with retribution, declaring that he would hunt down the rebels “house by house.”224 The speech, which lasted over an hour, was televised while the Security Council was in session in New York,225 meaning that the members of the Council would have been able to take into account his words before issuing their statement.

One cannot underestimate the impact of this speech. Known for his rambling, often incoherent and inflammatory declarations, his televised appearance served to reinforce ideas held by the international community about him as an irrational actor with a capacity for violence. Long an international pariah for funding militant movements and acts of terrorism, Qaddafi had only recently become palatable to the West when, in 2003, he agreed to give up any chemical and nuclear weapons he possessed. Dartmouth professor, Dirk Vandevalle, summarizes the West's attitude to the Libyan ruler

218In his statement at the Global Creative Forum Dinner in Los Angeles, California, Ban Ki-Moon indicated that the League's decision preceded the UNSC meeting.

219Security Council Press Statement on Libya, SC/10180, 22 February 2011. 220PILKINGTON, Ed. Libya erupts as Gaddafi clings on: Lives updates. The Guardian. 22 February 2011.221PILKINGTON, Ed. UN ambassadors clash over condemnation of Gaddafi. The Guardian, 23 February 2011.222Security Council Press Statement on Libya, SC/10180, 22 February 2011. 223Qaddafi had appeared on Libyan television the day before. Sitting in a car holding an umbrella, he briefly addressed the

public in order to deny rumors that he had fled to Venezuela.224Defiant Gaddafi vows to die as martyr, fight revolt. Reuters. 22 February 2011.225PILKINGTON, Ed. Libya erupts as Gaddafi clings on: Lives updates. The Guardian, 22 February 2011.

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before the uprising: “The man who had once personified terrorism thus became our valued ally in the fight against terrorism. We could live with his foibles and occasional ranting in return for his cooperation.”226 He did not possess the deep-rooted relationship with the West that Ben Ali and Mubarak had enjoyed. As Robert Jervis notes in his classic book on perception in international politics: “People are predisposed, set or ready to see what they expected to be present.”227 Thus, Qaddafi's speech only confirmed the conviction that he was capable of committing genocide. This idea had already been planted by officials who had defected from the government, notable Dabashi, who was quoted in the New York Times saying ““We are sure that what is going on now in Libya is crimes against humanity and crimes of war.” He went on to declare “The regime of Qaddafi has already started the genocide against the Libyan people.”228 The speech clearly encouraged Western governments to take stronger positions against the Libyan leader. The US government issued a statement only minutes after the end of the speech, calling the violence “appalling.”229 Later the same evening, President Obama went further in his condemnation of Libya, saying that “[the Libyan government] will also be held accountable for its failure to meet those responsibilities and face the cost of continued violations of human rights."230 The day after, French President Nicolas Sarkozy became the first international leader to call for a no-fly zone over Libya.231

As Simon Chesterman points out, Qaddafi's declarations that he would hunt down the rebels “house by house” made it simple to invoke the responsibility to protect. His speeches enabled analysts and politicians to point to “unusual clarity of the situation in Libya.”232 As Chesterman writes, “impending massacres are rarely so easy to foresee.”233 The clearer the situation is portrayed, the more difficult it is not to use the tools at the disposal of the UN: “the true significance of RtoP is not in creating new rights or obligations to do 'the right thing'; rather, it is in making it harder to do the wrong thing or nothing at all.”234 Moreover, both France and the US had been embarrassed by the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions, respectively, during which they had been accused of supporting the repressive regimes with which they maintained close, amicable relations.235 They were caught in blatant contradiction to the values they purported to defend, such as democracy and the right to free speech and peaceful assembly. They had lost face in front of the international community, further disposing them to react strongly in the case of Libya. At the same time, haunted by the specter of Iraq, they sought explicit regional backing. The role of regional organization is also part and parcel of the “emerging

226VANDERVALLE, Dirk. The Many Qaddafis. The New York Times, 23 February 2011. 227JERVIS, Robert. Perception and Misperception in International Politics. p. 145228MOYNIHAN, Colin. Libya's UN Diplomats Break With Qaddafi. 21 February 2011. 229LEE, Matthew. U.S. Condemns 'Appalling' Violence In Libya. Associated Press. 22 February 2011. 230ROBINSON, Dan. Obama condemns Libya crackdown. Voice of America, 22 February 2011. 231WATT, Nicholas, WINTOUR, Patrick. Libya no-fly zone call by France fails to get David Cameron's backing. The

Guardian. 23 February 2011. 232CHESTERMAN, Simon. Leading from Behind: The Responsibility to Protect, the Obama doctrine, and Humanitarian

Intervention After Libya. p. 282233Ibid.234Ibid.235The French Foreign Minister at the time of the Tunisian uprising, Michèle Alliot-Marie, was forced to resign after

having offered France's help quell the protests and after her close ties to Ben Ali's regime became apparent. In the case of Egypt, the United States had come out strongly in support of Mubarak on January 25th, 2011, with the Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, declaring “Our assessment is that the Egyptian government is stable and is looking for ways to respond to the legitimate needs and interests of the Egyptian people.” The Obama administration was also criticized for its choice of special envoy to Cairo during the uprising, who is alleged to have said that it was “critical” that Mubarak stay in power. For more details, see: GAY STOLBERG, Sheryl. Eyebrows Raised Over Envoy to Cairo. The Caucus blog (The New York Times Online). 7 February 2011.

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norm”236 of the Responsibility to Protect. The 2005 United Nations Summit outcome document states: “we are prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis and in cooperation with relevant regional organizations as appropriate, should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities are manifestly failing to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.”237

During the following week, calls to halt the violence would multiply as the international community looked for different ways to put pressure on the regime. Along with France and the United Kingdom, who led the calls for a no-fly zone, Ban Ki Moon took a forceful position, also relying heavily on the Statement made by the Arab League on 22 Feburary. On February 25, Ban Ki-Moon briefed the Security Council on the Libya situation. During his speech, he noted that “strong statements”238 had already been made by the Arab League, among others. In the same briefing, the UN Secretary-General indicates that his Special Advisers on the Prevention of Genocide and the Responsibility to Protect had already reminded the Libyan authorities of the possible consequences of their actions. He concluded his remarks on Libya with the following words: “It is time for the Security Council to consider concrete action. The hours and days ahead will be decisive for Libyans and their country, with equally important implications for the wider region. The statements and actions of the Security Council are eagerly awaited and will be closely followed throughout the region. Whatever its course, let us be mindful of the urgency of the moment. In these circumstances the loss of time means more loss of lives.”239 The Secretary-General juxtaposes propositions made by some Security Council members to impose trade and financial sanctions or an arms embargo to what he calls “effective action to ensure real accountability.” Combined with his emphasis on the urgency of the situation, he seems to be pushing for more than just sanctions. On February 26, 2011, the Security Council voted unanimously in favor of Resolution 1970. Under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, Resolution 1970 referred the situation to the International Criminal Court, established an arms embargo as well as imposed a travel ban and an asset freeze on individuals implicated in the violence against civilians.

b) Regional hesitation

While certain major players in the international community, including three permanent members of the UN Security Council, the Secretary-General of the UN, and the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, leaned towards intervention, often relying on the Arab League decision to suspend Libya to justify their positions, the League's own position was not as unified as these actors sought to portray it. Although, as one Arab League diplomat put it, the Libyan leader “belonged to no system,”240neither the Arab nor the international system, the League sought nonetheless to tread carefully. Mere distaste for a leader was not reason enough to cause League members to break with the most important norm in the regional system, that of non-interference in internal affairs.

On March 2, 2011, the League Council convened for its regular session at the Foreign Ministers level to discuss the situation in Libya. First of all, it is important to point out that the League was in no hurry to take a stronger position, waiting instead until the time appointed for its regular session. Neither was Libya the only topic on the agenda. The resolution closely resembles the statement issued

236A more secure world: our shared responsibility. Report of the High-level Panel on Threats,Challenges and Change. United Nations. 2005. p. 57

237United Nations General Assembly resolution A/Res/60/1, 2005, p. 30238Security Council, 6490th meeting, 25 February 2011, p. 3239Security Council, 6490th meeting, 25 February 2011, p. 4240Interview with Arab League diplomat, Paris, France, 18 May 2012

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previously by the Permanent Representatives. As the League lacks an enforcement mechanism, there is little difference in the legal implications of the two documents. Nonetheless, the fact that the decision took the form of a “resolution” at the ministerial level gives the decision more weight. The preamble to the resolution cites the UN Human Rights Council decision to suspend Libya's membership in the body, as well as to UN Security Council Res. 1970, both of which refer to the 22 February League statement in their respective preambles. This is symptomatic of how the original Statement's significance grew retroactively as the crisis deepened.

The two major differences between the Resolution and the previous Statement are to be found in articles 5 and 11. Article 5 declares the Council's “absolute refusal of all forms of foreign interference in Libya and [the Council's] affirmation of its full dedication to the preservation of national unity for the Libyan people, of [the people's] sovereignty, and of unity and integrity of the people's territory.”241 This article categorically rejects foreign interference, although it does not elaborate on the meaning of interference. It also focuses on the Libyan people, sidelining the current Libyan government, making it clear that only the Libyan people are able to determine its legitimacy. While article 5 warns against foreign interference, article 11 simultaneously opens the way to humanitarian intervention, specifically in the form of a no-fly zone, although it limits the actors who may legitimately take part in such an intervention. The article expresses the Council's intention to “continue discussions surrounding the best way to ensure the protection and security of the Libyan people.” The article continues, “The Arab countries cannot remain with their hands tied in the face of the bloodshed with which the brotherly Libyan people are confronted. [The continuing discussions may include the possibility of] resorting to a no-fly zone, and the continued coordination between the Arab League and the African Union with regards to this option.” The inclusion of these two articles in the same resolution indicates a hesitation on the part of the League to fully endorse a no-fly zone, which would likely be coordinated by Western powers, and results in a certain ambiguity. The text differentiates between foreign interference and intervention by regional organizations in the name of protecting the Libyan people, as if the line between the two were clear. The Resolution was an effort to reconcile opposing camps within the League, while trying to respond to the international calls for united action by the regional organization. League members not only showed hesitation surrounding the idea of foreign intervention, but also regarding Libya's expulsion from the League. The ministers decided to defer the ultimate decision as to whether Libya has adhered to its obligations as a member of the League to the summit level. This indicates how severe this punishment is considered by the Arab states.

c) The no-fly zone: The importance of being part of the Arab consensus

The March 2 Resolution put the no-fly zone (no-fly zone) on the table at the Arab League, but it was framed as one option among many. Ten days later, however, the League met in an extraordinary meeting at the Foreign Ministers level and formally requested that the UN Security Council endorse and implement the no-fly zone. The preamble of the March 12 decision notes that the League Council has taken into account debates underway inside the UN Security Council, demonstrating that the decision is, at least in part, a response to demands from the UN Security Council for a green light from the League.242 It also refers to positions issued by the Gulf Cooperation Council, which advocated for

241Arab League Council, Resolution 7298, 2 March 2011; It is worthwhile to note that the term “tadakhul ajnabî” can be translated as “foreign interference” or “foreign intervention.” I have chosen to use the word “interference” because it comes closest to the French translation of the technical term “ingérance étrangère.” An in-depth study of the language used in Arab League would greatly contribute to our understanding of how the member states relate to the League.

242It is unclear who first had the idea to impose the no-fly zone. Neither Arab League diplomats, nor well-informed Western diplomats present in Cairo at the time could answer this question.

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the League to consider a no-fly zone in a statement issued on March 7, 2011.243 The resolution takes pains to show that the League is acting in line with the international community, foremost the UN, and in cooperation with other regional organizations, such as the Organization for Islamic Cooperation, the European Union, and the African Union.

Finally, the preamble concludes with a restatement of the Council's “dedication to the unity, regional integrity, and political independence [of Libya], as well as to peace among the Libyan people and the assurance of their security and their national unity.” The Council is also dedicated to “[the Libyan people's] independence, to the people's sovereignty over its territory, and to the refusal of all forms of foreign interference in Libya. [The Council] affirms that the lack of necessary precautions to end this crisis will lead to foreign interference in the internal affairs of Libya.”244 The text justifies the no-fly zone because if such an action is not taken, foreign interference will surely result. In other words, the League called for humanitarian intervention in order to pre-empt foreign interference. As Buzan, et al. point out, counterfactuals, such as the one that appears in the League text, are common in security arguments.245 Thus, one could interpret the text as securitizing not only the Libyan people, but also Arab states freedom from foreign interference. This statement in the preamble indicates the particular sensitivity of some Arab states to the experience in Iraq, where the US invasion led to the rise of Iranian influence in Iraqi affairs.

The first article of the resolution states that the Council “[requests] the Security Council to shoulder its responsibility in the face of the deteriorating circumstances in Libya and to immediately take the necessary steps to impose a no-fly zone on Libyan military aviation, and to establish safe areas in places exposed to shelling as a precautionary measure that allows the protection of the Libyan people and foreign nationals residing in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya.”246 The fear of retribution against nationals from other Arab countries is still very present in the minds of the other member states. In addition to calling for the no-fly zone, the Resolution also takes a step towards recognizing the new Libyan National Transitional Council (NTC). The second article of the resolution announces the League's intention to “cooperate” with the Libyan Transitional National Council (NTC), which had been established on February 27, 2011. Although this does not imply any legal recognition of the NTC, it represents the death knell for Qaddafi's legitimacy.

There were various reports in the press that Sudan, Mauritania, Yemen, Algeria and Syria voted against the resolution. The latter two had been the most vocal as to the possible consequences of endorsing intervention. Shortly before the emergency meeting, Syria's permanent representative to the League, Ahmad Yusaf, stated that his country objected to all foreign interference in Libya, warning that a no-fly zone could serve as a cover military intervention. During the debate, Yusaf demanded that any resolution agreed by the League Council should include protections against the instrumentalization of its decision.247 The day before the meeting, the Algerian Foreign Minister, Mourad Medelci, stated that Algeria would prefer mediation over intervention and that, in any case, it was up to the UN, and not the League, to decide whether intervention was necessary. He stated: “We are against foreign intervention, but we are not alone and I can understand that the messages from the international community have become more and more firm. If the situation persists, we understand that, at one time or another, the Security Council will take its decisions. Let us leave it to the Security Council to evaluate the situation,

243Al-nas al-kâmil li al-bayân al-sâdir ‘an ijtimâ‘ wizarâ' khârijiya duwal majlis al-ta‘awun al-khalîjî [Full text of the statement issued after the meeting of the foreign ministers of the GCC]. Al-Sharq Al-Awsat. 11 March 2011.

244Arab League Council, Resolution 7360, 12 March 2012245BUZAN, Barry, WÆVER, Ole, DE WILDE, Jaap, Security: A New Framework for Analysis. p. 32246Arab League Council, Resolution 7360, 12 March 2012247Al-safîr Ahmad: ‘adam ‘itâ' ghatâ' li ay tadakhul ‘askarî khârijî fî lîbiyâ [Ambassador Ahmad: Refusal to give cover for

foreign military intervention in Libya]. Syrian Arab News Agency, 13 March 2011

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but let us hope that there will be no intervention.” He continued, with a note of warning, “You are aware of the results of previous foreign interventions, are you not? We cannot feed terrorism.”248

Despite these states' objections, they seem to have adhered to the Arab consensus in the end, if somewhat passively. The final document does not list any reserves, as is customary on League documents. During the press conference announcing the League's decision, Amr Moussa, as well as the President of the Council, the Foreign Minister of Oman, Yusaf bin Alwi, made sure to underline the Council's absolute refusal that this consisted of or would lead to foreign interference in any form.249

This wording hints at the compromise necessary to keep the above-mentioned member states from openly objecting to the decision.

SummaryWhile the member states reached a consensus, it was a febrile one, based on a highly ambiguous

text. The decision can be interpreted as the result of external pressure, an activist Secretary-General, and a general fear of domestic unrest, which, by the time of the no-fly zone decision, had affected half the member states, to varying degrees.250 The League responded to an unprecedented crisis with an unprecedented solution, sanctioning a member state for the mistreatment of its own citizens. In light of the earlier discussion of failed attempts at League reform to incorporate international norms related to human security, it is reasonable to assume that the member states were not reacting to the same crisis that the international community strongly condemned, that is, the humanitarian crisis in Libya. Rather, the Arab regimes viewed the Libyan revolution, and the Arab Spring more generally, as an existential crisis that called into question the very basis for their political legitimacy. Their initial statement, issued on February 22, was meant as a stop gap measure, a way to take both international and popular pressure off the League. Suspending Qaddafi's right to participation in the League meetings, he who had many times expressed his disregard for the League, appeared to be a punishment but had few real consequences. It was low-risk and the League hoped it would therefore be the most cost-effective solution.

This reaction resembles the policy-making style that Charles Lindblom calls “the science of muddling through.” The Arab Spring presented the League with a wholly new situation, in which it was impossible for them to conceive of the totality of possible options that would help resolve the crisis. According to Lindblom's theory, faced with this uncertainty, states tend to consider alternatives that do not result in major changes to current policies, hence Libya's suspension.251 A second characteristic of this process is that decision-makers tend to prioritize limiting scandal rather than working towards a positive goal. The League did not use the Libyan crisis as an opportunity to redefine the concept of Arab national security, but reacted to limit the damage to the League's and their own reputation.

As for the decision to advocate for a no-fly zone over Libya, many members of the League were nervous that it could be easily exploited by their rivals in the future. As a close observer of the League

248"Nous sommes contre une intervention étrangère, mais nous ne sommes pas seuls et je peux comprendre que les messages de la communauté internationale deviennent de plus en plus fermes. Si la situation devait durer, on sait très bien qu’à un moment ou à un autre le Conseil de sécurité (de l’ONU) prendrait des décisions. Laissons-lui l’appréciation de la situation, mais espérons qu’il n’y aura pas d’intervention [...] Vous connaissez les résultats de précédentes interventions étrangères, n’est-ce pas? Nous ne pouvons pas nourrir le terrorisme." See Libye: Alger espère qu'il n'y aura pas d'intervention. AFP. 11 March 2011.

249MUTAWALÎ, Nahlâ. Al-Jâmi‘â al-‘arabiya tuwâfiq ‘alâ fard hazr jawî ‘alâ lîbiyâ. Wa al-thuwâr yurahibûn [The Arab League agrees to a no-fly zone. Libyan revolutionaries welcome the decision]. Al-Ahrâm Al-Masâ'î. 13 March 2011.

250Egypt, Tunisia, Yemen, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Morocco, Algeria, Iraq, and Libya all witnessed protests within the first two months of 2011.

251KÜBLER, Daniel, DE MAILLARD, Jacques, Analyser les politiques publiques. p. 44

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pointed out, Algeria, Syria, and Yemen feared that they would be next.252 The decision was not taken lightly, but external and internal pressure to act was increasing by the minute.253 Moreover, the no-fly zone decision has precedent in the region, there having been two no-fly zone declared over Iraq during the 1990s and much talk of the possibility of implementing one over Darfur. Policy makers are often confined in their thinking by the tools already on the table. However, because of the fragile consensus and hesitation on the part of several member states, in the days following the issuing of the resolution, several countries attempted to back-pedal on their position or to nuance it. After the UN Security Council passed resolution 1973 on March 17, 2011 and NATO took on the mandate, the delicate nature of the consensus forced Amr Moussa, who had been a strong supporter of the initiative but who is obligated to speak in the name of the member states, to criticize the resolution's implementation. He tried to balance the League's rhetorical embrace of regional security in the larger sense and its support for the Libyan revolution with its historical identity as an anti-colonialist, non-aligned organization. His waffling was the reflection of the struggle between factions within the League over their different visions of the League and the political use to which it can be put.

252Interview with Western diplomat and close observer of the League, Cairo, Egypt, 12 June 2012253Bellamy also points out how important the short time frame was in Security Council's decisions regarding Libya.

BELLAMY, Alex J. Libya and the Responsibility to Protect: The Exception and the Norm. p. 266

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Part III: The League as a threat

IntroductionAfter UN Resolution 1973 was passed, League members reacted severely towards the regional

organization. The League had adopted a new role, that of an instrument of legitimization for foreign intervention. As we have seen, this ran counter to the League's founding principles, as an organization created to in opposition imperialism and to prevent foreign meddling. In approving the no-fly zone decision, member states came to the realization that the organization, until then a forum for regime legitimation, had morphed into a potential threat to their regimes as it had been during the first Arab Cold War. In the months that followed, states' reactions varied. Some were critical of the organization, such as Algeria, while others strove to circumvent the League, showing a strong preference for sub-regional organizations. These reactions support the argument that the decision to punish Qaddafi was an exceptional decision, the fruit of unique circumstances, rather than a conscious decision to change the League's regional security policy.

The Libya decisions were taken at the beginning of the Arab Spring. As noted previously, the Arab states were surprised not simply by the size of protests, but by what the people were capable of achieving in such a short time.254 They did not know how widely the protests would spread, nor could they have foreseen protesters' endurance in the nascent uprisings in Bahrain, Yemen, and Syria. While the GCC bloc, with Saudi Arabia at its head, managed to keep the League out its sub-regional affairs, as the crisis in Syria became more severe, largest Gulf kingdom saw an opportunity in the new role the League had played in Libya. Taking advantage of the new power constellation in the Arab system created by the Arab Spring, it sought to instrumentalize the League to further its own policy.

Reducing Iranian influence in the region has long been a Saudi priority.255 We argue that Saudi Arabia chose the League as its primary tool to pursue this policy because doing so would simultaneously prop up its legitimacy at home, as well as appease Western demands for regional support in their condemnation of human rights violations. However, because the way that Saudi Arabia framed its position on Syria was informed by the struggle with Iran, the Saudi efforts to exploit the League for its own ends has had significant consequences for the organization. Shibley Telhami explains “In the absence of electoral legitimacy in the Arab world, most symbols of legitimacy are social, cultural, and religious; they are thus transnational. Arab governments are thus dependent on for their legitimacy not only on what happens within their borders but also on how the transnational symbols of legitimacy are affected elsewhere in the region. Arab governments have felt the need to compete for the control of transnational instruments of legitimacy.”256 The League, as the symbol of Arab nationalism, is such a transnational instrument of legitimacy. In using the League against Iran, Saudi Arabia appears to redefine Arab identity so as to better fit the characteristics of their own regime. These efforts to narrow the definition has exacerbated divisions within the group and made the Arab consensus meaningless.

254In an interview with the Washington Post, Amr Moussa was asked if he had expected the Egyptian revolution to happen. He replied “No. With this intensity and the outcome in a few days to topple two dictatorial regimes in Tunis and in Egypt — it was amazing.” WEYMOUTH, Lally. Amr Moussa’s vision for Egypt. The Washington Post. 9 May 2011.

255GAUSE, F. Gregory III. Saudi Arabia in the New Middle East. p. 16256TELHAMI, Shibley. Power, Legitimacy, and Peace-Making in Arab Coalitions: The New Arabism. p. 52

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A. Uncomfortable in its new shoes

The League's endorsement of a No Fly Zone over Libya was unprecedented, in that the League had never before endorsed foreign intervention in a member state. The decision led directly to UN Security Council Resolution 1973, adopted on March 17, 2011, five days after the League's own resolution. Although individual Arab states had indeed supported foreign intervention in other member states before, most notably during the Second Gulf war in 1991, a League consensus had never been the vehicle for such a policy.

1) Criticism of the no-fly zone decision

a) Trading accusations

As noted previously, there was some confusion in the press over the nature of the League's decision requesting that the UN Security Council authorize a No Fly Zone over Libya. Rumors abounded concerning the states that allegedly opposed the decision. Sudanese and Algerian foreign ministries objected strongly to reports that they had not been part of the consensus, saying they had merely been expressing their concerns.257 An Algeria diplomat went so far as to accuse the French press of intentionally spreading false information about its position.258 Arab states also accused each other of similar misinformation campaigns. While Algeria claimed that Yemen had abstained,259 Yemen refuted this, as it refuted reports aired on Al-Jazeera that it had expressed reservations on the matter. The Yemeni news service, SABA, quoted Minister of Foreign Affairs Abu Bakr al-Qirbi saying "these news are baseless and Yemen is in favor of the Arab consensus."260 Qirbi went on to say that it was Algeria and Syria who had had reservations on the decision. These official reactions demonstrate how vitally important it is for these states to appear to be part of the Arab consensus and hints at the competition going on behind the scenes to portray one another as outside the group.

In the days following the March 12 decision, Algeria continued to emphasize that it had expressed its concerns about the implications of a No Fly Zone, but had not directly opposed the initiative, nor even expressed any official reservations. The North African state underlined the fact that only the UN can authorize such a move,261 implying that this was not the appropriate role for the League. However, as it became clear that the UN Security Council would indeed vote on a No Fly Zone, Algeria began to take a different tack, relying on a more legalistic argument. The Algerian foreign ministry claimed that the League's decision was being misrepresented in the press, partly due to the way the Secretary-General had presented the initiative during the press conference on March 12. Algeria insisted on clarifying that the League takes its decisions by consensus and that its resolutions are not the result of an official vote.262 On March 15, the Algerian foreign ministry reportedly published a statement declaring that Algeria was not bound by the March 12 resolution because it did not fully

257MATARESE, Mélanie. Libye: la doctrine algérienne face aux frappes aériennes. Visa pour l'Algérie blog (Le Figaro). 22 March 2011.

258Al-jazâ'ir tanfî rafdahâ fard hazr jâwî ‘alâ lîbiyâ [Algeria denies its objection to the no-fly zone over Libya]. Ennahar Online.14 march 2011

259Ibid.260Yemen denies reservations about UNSC no-fly zone over Libya. SABA [Yemen News Agency]. 13 March 2011261Alger veut que l'Onu tranche sur une zone d'exclusion en Libye. AFP. 14 March 2011. Available at:

http://www.lalibre.be/actu/international/article/648685/alger-veut-que-l-onu-tranche-sur-une-zone-d-exclusion-en-libye.html (accessed 6 May 2013)

262Ibid.

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support the move. Algeria recalled that the League Pact states that the League Council should take its decisions by consensus and that, because Algeria had qualms about the decision, the resolution should therefore be declared null and void as it does not adhere to the legal mechanisms described in the Pact.263 By asserting that the Secretary-General had violated the Pact, Algeria hoped to portray those endorsing the decision as the one's violating the principle of the Arab consensus.

This fluctuation in the Algerian position reveals the fragility of Arab League decisions, especially in light of the fact that the minutes of League Council meetings are not available to the public. States can change their official positions without being held accountable. The hardening of the Algerian position also reveals a fear and recognition of the use to which the League's decision could be put. Algeria was caught between wanting to be part of the Arab consensus, indicated by its fierce denials of having “voted against” the decision, and the state's respect of one of its core foreign policy values, that of non-interference in internal affairs.

b) Amr Moussa hesitates

This struggle over the appropriate role of the League remained largely behind the scenes, as the press concentrated on the seemingly ground-breaking nature of the decisions and the UN's consequent reliance on the League's resolution to justify its own. However, a key moment served to unveil the fundamentally tentative nature of the consensus. It occurred a mere 72 hours after the No Fly Zone over Libya had been established, when Amr Moussa seemed suddenly to withdraw the League's consent. He was quoted by the Middle East News Agency as saying: “What is happening in Libya differs from the aim of imposing a no-fly zone […] And what we want is the protection of civilians and not the shelling of more civilians.”264 The next day, League officials claimed that he had been misquoted.265 At a joint press conference with the UN Secretary General on March 22, he reiterated the League's support, saying: "We are committed to UN Security Council resolution 1973. We have no objection to this decision, particularly as it does not call for an invasion of Libyan territory."266

Moussa's waffling is symptomatic of the disagreements inside the League and belies a fundamental discomfort among some League member states with its new status as a legitimizer of foreign intervention. As the representative of the League, Moussa was bound to express the general sentiment within the League. However, faced with a divided membership, this job became exponentially more difficult. As we have seen, Amr Moussa had a well-established reputation as someone in favor of reforming the League and believed that it should play a more active role in the region. He also believed that the uprisings had fundamentally changed the League's environment and that the League should accept this and act accordingly. He would therefore have had a personal inclination to support the idea of a no-fly zone. At the same time, he has said that, as Secretary-General, his priority is to “maintain the integrity of the League.”267 That is, he must try to reconcile the different positions as much as possible in order to hold the League together. Because of the fundamental link between the League and Arab identity, there is much at stake in presenting a united front.

Many have theorized that Moussa's avowed support for the uprisings was motivated by his own

263LAHIYÂNÎ, ‘Uthmân. Al-jazâ'ir tahtaj ‘alâ tasrîhât ‘Amr Mûsâ [Algeria complains of Amr Moussa's statements]. Al-Khabar, 16 March 2011.

264CODY, Edward. Arab League condemns broad Western bombing campaign in Libya. The Washington Post. 20 March 2011.

265BECKFORD, Martin. Libya attacks criticised by Arab League, China, Russia and India. The Telegraph. 21 March 2011. 266CHULOV, Martin. Arab League to reiterate backing for Libya no-fly zone. The Guardian. 22 March 2011. 267‘Amr Mûsâ yatahadath ‘an al-rafd wa al-tahafuzât fî qimat sirt...wa yad‘û al-shabâb al-diblûmâsiyî al-‘arab li qirâ'at

mu‘aradat al-amîr sa‘ûd al-faysal [Amr Moussa speaks about the refuls and the reservations at the Sirt summit]. Al-Sharq al-Awsat. 14 October 2010.

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electoral ambitions. However, had this been his sole motivation, he would not have waffled after the no-fly zone was put in place. The No Fly Zone decision posed a particularly difficult dilemma for someone seeking the approval of the Egyptian population, as they shared many of the Libyan people's demands. As a presidential candidate, Moussa would thus have felt obligated to support the Libyan uprising. On the other hand, the general Arab population, perhaps more so than the Arab regimes, has consistently opposed Western intervention in their countries. Neither Amr Moussa, nor states such as Algeria and Syria, wanted to be seen as enabling another Western occupation in the region. Torn between wanting to see the League progress in its defense of human security, wanting to appear supportive of the Libyan uprising, and wanting to avoid making it look as though the League were endorsing regime change, Moussa expressed his doubts about the intentions of those responsible for establishing the no-fly zone.

2. Circumventing the League

a) The GCC unites over Bahrain

The first calls for a Bahraini day of rage were made in early February. The date chosen, February 14, was symbolic, as it marked the tenth anniversary of the referendum that validated the National Action Charter, reinstating a parliamentary system in the country after its 27-year suspension. Despite overwhelming support for the Charter in 2001, the population's optimism had been short-lived, as the royal family decided shortly thereafter that it would prefer a bicameral system, with an upper house chosen by the regime itself. Disappointed with this previous attempt at political reform and echoing the complaints they heard coming from Tunisia and Egypt, Bahrainis headed to Pearl Roundabout to express their frustration. Ulrichsen describes the atmosphere in the country in the days before the uprising thus: “socio-economic discontent was bubbling up, propelled by high levels of unemployment, the inability of economic diversification to generate sufficient jobs or economic opportunities for Bahraini youth, and popular anger at perceived corruption at the heart of government.”268

While the demonstrations were small in scale at first, police repression encouraged more Bahrainis, both Sunni and Shia, to take part in the movement.269 By February 16, tens of thousands had filled Pearl Roundabout and occupied the square. The regime reacted by brutally attacking the demonstration in the middle of the night, firing on the sleeping crowds. Protests continued in the days that followed, culminating in a massive pro-democracy demonstration on February 25, attended by an estimated one in six Bahrainis. While there had already been calls for the fall of the regime, the major demand at this rally was the resignation of the Prime Minister, Khalifa bin Salman al-Khalifa, in office since 1971. Under pressure, the Bahraini regime, namely the reformist-minded Crown Prince Salman bin Hamad al-Khalifa, began negotiations with the opposition bloc, al-Wifaq. However, after a few weeks of continued demonstrations, the talks fell through. On March 14, the GCC sent in the Peninsula Shield Force to support the Bahraini security forces in quashing the dissent. The GCC troops consisted of 1,000 member of the Saudi Arabia National Guard and a group of military police from the United Arab Emirates.270 This assistance enabled the Bahrain Defense Force to arrest those accused of wrongdoing.

268ULRICHSEN, Kristian. Bahrain's Aborted Revolution. p. 28269One of the chants that could be heard in the early days of the revolution was “No Shias, no Sunnis, only Bahrainis.”

Ibid., p. 28-29270Ibid., p. 29

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i. The GCC and the Libyan revolution: Varying degrees of supportAs the expert on Saudi Arabia, Gregory Gause, explains, when the uprising in Bahrain broke

out, “the Saudi losing streak in regional politics was reaching a dangerous level.” It had just seen its closest ally outside of the Gulf, Mubarak, fall unceremoniously. Thus, “Riyadh's first impulse was defensive: to maintain its own sphere of influence in Arabia itself with its GCC partners and in Yemen.”271 We have pointed out earlier that there were significant differences in the attitude towards the wave of revolutions between Saudi Arabia and Qatar, particularly in the case of Egypt. Before Bahrain, Saudi Arabia had taken a comparatively conservative position vis-à-vis the Arab Spring, even in the case of Libya, despite personal grudges against the Libyan leader.

In contrast to Qatar and the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia preferred to act as part of a group rather than come out loudly in favor of the rebels or call for Qadhafi's downfall. For example, Saudi Arabia chose not attend the first meetings of the Contact Group on Libya, although a representative of the GCC was present. The Kingdom went along with the consensus in the GCC when it came out in support of the Libyan NTC at the end of April, before the Arab League took a collective position on the matter. In a joint statement with the EU, the Gulf organization “stressed Colonel Qaddafi’s regime has lost its legitimacy and expressed support to the Transitional National Council as a legitimate interlocutor representing the aspirations of the Libyan people.”272 Note the choice of the word “interlocutor” rather than “representative.” The statement in no way implies that the Libyan NTC has become the legal representative of the Libyan state. Saudi Arabia continued to melt into the crowd when they consented to the Arab League's decision to recognize the Libyan NTC as the legitimate representative of the Libyan people, allowing the rebel group to represent Libya at the League. This strategy is very much in line with the Saudi state's general preference for behind the scenes diplomacy. As an Egyptian diplomat who served in Libya during the uprising noted, Saudi Arabia extended this strategy past Qaddafi's fall, taking their time to send a new ambassador to restart diplomatic relations with the new Libyan state.273

ii. Internal security cooperation in the GCCThe unity among GCC members during the Bahrain crisis can partly be explained by the

organization's prioritization of internal security. As Mohammed Ayoob explains: “[The GCC's] main task was and continues to be coordination of internal security measures, including sharing of intelligence, aimed at controlling and suppressing the populations of member states in order to provide security to the autocratic monarchies of the Persian Gulf.”274 While originally founded in 1981 in the face of the dual threats presented by Iran and Iraq, the GCC avoided security-related language in its charter.275 It saw itself as a sub-regional organization made up of “natural” allies whose goal was cooperation, not integration.276 However, a coup attempt in Bahrain in 1982 led to the drafting of a cooperation agreement on internal security that asserted that the “preservation of the security and stability of the GCC countries is the joint responsibility of the GCC countries.”277 The states were to cooperate not only against terrorist threats, but also help each other resist “opponents of regimes.”278

271GAUSE, F. Gregory III. Saudi Arabia in the New Middle East. p. 17272Joint Communiqué, 21st EU-GCC Joint Council and Ministerial Meeting, Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates. 20 April

2011. 273Interview with Egyptian diplomat, Cairo, Egypt, 12 january 2013274AYOOB, Mohammed. The GCC shows its true color. The Middle East Channel blog (Foreign Policy), 16 March 2011. 275The six member states are: Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates, and Oman.276BARNETT, Michael, GAUSE, F. Gregory III. Caravans in opposite directions: society, state, and the development of

community in the Gulf Cooperation Council. p.169277Ibid., p. 173278Ibid.

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Cooperation on internal security stemmed from their political and social similarities. All six states are monarchies founded on strong Sunni ideologies, despite the presence of Shia muslims in their populations. Although the numerical balance and relationships between Sunni and Shia in the GCC states differ,279 all six regimes see Iran as a potential source of instability.

As Barnett and Gause note, the underlying rivalries among the Gulf states comes to the surface when external and internal threats are reduced, and vice versa.280 Thus, the period following the Second Gulf War, when Iraq and Iran were both severely weakened, was “characterized by increasing rivalries, a halt to any meaningful military coordination and a return of border disputes among the GCC states.”281 The Arab Spring clearly represented an internal threat to these regimes, causing the GCC countries to coordinate their policies, at least in the short-term. It seems to be a classic case of Steven David's theory of “omnibalancing.” in which third world states “[appease] other states (which often pose less pressing threats ) in order to counter more immediate and dangerous domestic threats.”282 While the smaller Gulf states fear Saudi Arabian hegemony, their greater fear is for their own survival. They therefore joined Saudi Arabia in tamping down the Bahraini uprising.

iii. The Saudi-Qatari rivalry Until the uprising in Bahrain, one particular member of the GCC, Qatar, had a history of

actively working against other members of the GCC, most notably Saudi Arabia. The cooperation between the two states in Bahrain runs counter to the Qatari-Saudi rivalry of recent years. The current Qatari emir, Shaykh Hamad bin al-Khalifa al-Thani, had been at the root of Qatar's anti policy well before he overthrew his father in 1995.283 Since then, Qatar has used ever opportunity to chip away at Saudi Arabia's influence in the Gulf and in the wider Arab world. Over the past few years, it has fostered relations with actors close to Saudi Arabia's biggest sub-regional rival, Iran, such as the March 8 movement in Lebanon, and Bashar al-Assad's Syria, where it replaced Saudi Arabia as the largest investor in 2007.284 In 2008, Qatar tried to assert itself as mediator the conflict between Yemen and Huthi rebels in the north, along the Yemeni-Saudi border. Its efforts were eventually thwarted by Saudi Arabia, who went so far as to portray Qatar as an agent of Iran supporting the Shia rebels.285

However, in the case of Bahrain, the conservative Saudi Arabia and its smaller, trouble-causing neighbor, Qatar, who had been the most outspoken Arab proponent of the revolutions in Libya, Tunisia, and Egypt, fell into lock step.286 One of the ways this change in the Qatari position can best be measured by the lack of Al-Jazeera Arabic's coverage of the Bahraini uprising. As opposed to Al-Jazeera Arabic's intensive coverage of the Egyptian revolution, Bahrain did not get the same treatment. As Vivian Salama has phrased it, “Not all revolutions are created equal” on Al-Jazeera.287 While Al-Jazeera English did eventually produce and air a documentary about the Bahraini revolution called

279See HERB, Michael. Subordinate Communities and the Utility of Ethnic Ties to a Neighboring Regime: Iran and the Shi'a of the Arab States of the Gulf, for a more detailed discussion of the individual relationships between the Gulf regimes and their Shia minority populations.

280BARNETT, Michael, GAUSE, F. Gregory III, Caravans in opposite directions: society, state, and the development of community in the Gulf Cooperation Council. p. 185

281Ibid., p.161282DAVID, Steven R. Choosing Sides: Alignment and Realignment in the Third World. p. 6283DA LAAGE, Olivier. L’arabie et ses voisins: la revanche des vassaux. p. 95 284FAROUK, Yasmine. Autonomisation, accommodement et "wait to seize" : les stratégies réactives du triangle arabe

après l'intervention américaine en Irak : l'Arabie saoudite, l'Égypte et la Syrie (2003-2007). p. 148285KAMRAVA, Mehran. Mediation and Qatari Foreign Policy. p. 551286We chose to use the word “relative” as Qatar received the Iraqi Shia cleric, Muqtada al-Sadr, who had strong ties to Iran,

in May 2011. The Qatari emir extended the invitation in an effort to resolve the Bahraini crisis. See EAKIN, Hugh. The Strange Power of Qatar. The New York Review of Books. 27 October 2011.

287SALAMA, Vivian. Al-Jazeera's (R)Evolution? Jadaliyya. 20 May 2012.

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“Shouting in the Dark,” it was shown only once, in July 2011, and never on the Arabic channel. If, as Claire-Gabrielle Talon notes, before the Arab Spring, Al-Jazeera had already become a “locus of power,”288 that could be exploited for political ends on demand,289 one may thereby conclude that the relative absence of coverage of the Bahraini uprising is indicative of Qatar's desire to fall into line with its fellow GCC members.

Kristian Coates Ulrichsen argues that the Libyan revolution “provided welcome breathing space for GCC states in February and March.”290 He believes that the main reason the UAE came out as strongly as it did in the Libyan case was because it wanted to take international attention away from the regime's crackdown on domestic opposition.291 While internal unrest does not explain Qatar's vocal pro-revolutionary stance (Qatar did not face internal disturbances, as did the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Oman), the avowed presence of internal dissent could potentially explain Qatar's alignment with Saudi Arabia on the Bahrain issue. David points out that one form of omnibalancing is the appeasement of the international allies of its internal rivals.292 As opposed to the other Gulf states, the Qatari regime's main opposition is the pro-Saudi groups that supported the emir's father.293 The Qatari alignment with Saudi Arabia could be seen as such an appeasement, however, in this case, why not align oneself with the largest Gulf state from the beginning? Why change its stance and risk its international reputation, “rendering it vulnerable to accusations of double-standards”294?

Instead we propose that the key to understanding Qatar's alignment on Bahrain is the structure of influence within the Arab League. If Qatar had strongly objected the repression of the Bahraini protests, it would have lost Saudi Arabia's support, and the more internally vulnerable GCC's countries' with it. Without Saudi Arabia's support, Qatar seems to have little influence in the Arab system. For instance, few followed its enthusiastic lead in Libya. The Qatari Prime Minister Hamad bin Jassim al-Thani justified Qatar's military contribution to the Libya campaign saying “Qatar will participate in military action because we believe there must be Arab states undertaking this action, because the situation is intolerable.”295 No Arab country except the UAE answered this call. As a founding member of the League and as “servant of the holy cities of Mecca and Medina” (khâdim al-haramayn al-sharîfayn), Saudi Arabia's influence has much stronger symbolic foundations than Qatar.

Thus, without Saudi Arabia, Qatar has no weight in the League. And without the League's backing, it could never have pushed for the no-fly zone over Libya, with which it hoped, in turn, to improve its international standing by endorsing the principle of the Responsibility to Protect. Qatar has been trying to pad its Arab credentials in other ways for several years, for example through its efforts to

288“Depuis sa création en 1996, Al Jazeera, dont l'influence internationale n'avait cessé de croître, s'était affirmée comme un nouveau lieu de pouvoir au Qatar.” TALON, Claire-Gabrielle. Al Jazeera: Liberté d'expression et pétromonarchie. p. 137

289“Quant au cheikh Hamad ben Jassem, il semblait garder une influence certain sur la chaîne...” Ibid. p. 136290COATES ULRICHSEN, Kristian. Small States with a Big Role: Qatar and the United Arab Emirates in the Wake of the

Arab Spring. p. 12291Ibid., p. 13292“[Third world states] seek to split the alignment against them and focus their energies on their most dangerous

(domestic) opponents. To do this they appease their domestic opponents’ international allies.” DAVID, Steven R. Choosing Sides: Alignment and Realignment in the Third World. p. 6

293“En promouvant dans les instances administratives d'Al Jazeera, face à la branche dominante des Al-Thani (les Ben Jassem), deux branches latérales de la famille jusque'-là, peu représentées dans les instances de pouvoir (les Ben Thani et les Ben Jaber) et une étrangère à la famille régnante (cheikha Moza), il s'assurait une base de soutien élargie face aux membres de la dynastie qui s'étaient ralliés à son père déchu en 1995.” TALON, Claire-Gabrielle. Al Jazeera: Liberté d'expression et pétromonarchie. p. 109

294COATES ULRICHSEN, Kristian. Small States with a Big Role: Qatar and the United Arab Emirates in the Wake of the Arab Spring. p. 14

295Qatar to Take Part in Military Action over Libya. Reuters. March 20, 2011.

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reconcile Syria and Saudi Arabia, chairing the ministerial committee of the Arab Peace Initiative, or most recently, by proposing a candidate for Arab League Secretary-General, Abd al-Rahman al-Atiya. This would have bestowed upon the Gulf state incontrovertible Arab credentials. However, the Arab League ultimately chose another Egyptian, Nabil al-Araby, in accordance with tradition.296 The Qatari regime seems to have understood that the key to influence for a small state such as itself is to be seen to represent a larger group. In this sense, Qatar does not behave as a typical third world state would, as the Third World “places a premium not on expanding power per se but on surviving.”297

b) Thwarting the opposition, confirming alliances

The consolidation of the GCC served effectively to repulse any efforts by League to condemn the Bahraini regime's repression of peaceful protests or Saudi Arabia's assistance. Amr Moussa reportedly pushed for the League to address the Bahraini and Yemeni uprisings,298 however the GCC managed to keep the two conflicts firmly under their control and out of the hands of the League. The League made only one statement condemning the violence against peaceful protesters and calling for reforms and for calm in Yemen, Libya, and Bahrain.299 The League contented itself with declarations in support of national dialogue and of GCC initiatives. For instance, the first statement the League published regarding Bahrain, released on March 2, weeks after the crackdown in the Pearl Roundabout, makes no mention of the violence. The League Council statement states: “after listening to the presentation by Bahrain regarding the latest developments in the Kingdom […] the Council confirms its support for the King's initiative […] to start a serious national dialogue in which all Bahrainis will participate in order to build a better future [for the country] and leading to a reform program that moves toward the realization of the hopes and aspirations of the Bahraini people according to what was agreed upon between the leadership and people in the National Action Charter in 2001, while protecting the national gains and achievements.”300

i. Baghdad summit delayedThe only country to speak out against the GCC's actions in Bahrain was Iraq. Two days after the

Peninsula Shield Force entered Bahrain, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki stated that this would only serve to complicate the situation in the region and to “fuel sectarian violence.”301 Ten days later, in an interview aired on BBC Arabic, Maliki continued his criticism, insisting that he was not motivated by sectarian sympathies: "We did not move to support the Shi'ites in Bahrain but we called for interference in Bahraini affairs to be stopped and don't want to make it a sectarian issue. Because if it happens, it

296Little information is available as to how the League Council chose Nabil al-Araby, who was serving as Egypt's Foreign Minister at the time. Qatar objected to Egypt's preferred candidate, Mustafa al-Fiqi. Qatar agreed to withdraw its own candidate under the condition that Egypt find a substitute for Fiqi. In his acceptance speech, Araby said he was surprised to have been chosen and thanked Qatar in particular for the opportunity to serve. See Ikhtiyâr al-misrî Nabîl al-‘Arabî amînâ ‘âmâ li jâmi‘ât al-duwal al-‘arabiya [Nabil al-Araby chose as Secretary-General of the League of Arab States]. BBC. 15 May 2011; For Araby's acceptance speech, see EslamMediaOnline, video, Kalimat al-iftitâh: Duktûr Nabîl al-‘Arabî amîn ‘âm al-jâmi‘a al-‘arabiya [Opening speech: Dr. Nabil al-Araby Secretary-General of the Arab League]. 15 May 2011.

297DAVID, Steven R. Choosing Sides: Alignment and Realignment in the Third World. p. 17298Diplomatic document299This document is not available on the League website. However, the press reported that a statement was indeed made on

the behalf of the League. See Al-jâmi‘a al-‘arabiya tad‘û li al-islâh wa al-hudû' [The Arab League calls for reform and calm]. Al-Jazîra. 21 February 2011.

300Arab League Council statement 137, 2 March 2011301RAJAB, Imân. Siyâsat al-‘Iraq al-khârijiya tujah al-thawrât al-‘arabiya [Iraqi foreign policy towards the Arab

revolutions]. Al-Ahram Strategic Reports. 1 July 2011.

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will be like a snowball, it will get bigger if it is ignored [...] The region may be drawn into a sectarian war."302 It is important to note that Maliki is not concerned by the Bahraini security forces' repression of peaceful protest, but rather by the GCC countries' plan to enter Bahrain militarily. Other Iraqi factions took stronger lines, such as Muqtada al-Sadr, who organized demonstrations in several Shia-majority cities in Iraq against the GCC intervention. His language was more clearly about the repression, criticizing “the violations perpetrated against the Bahraini people.”303 He went on to say “the revolution in Bahrain is the revolution of the 'truth' and a people's revolution may never be suppressed.”304

At this point, GCC countries were entering what would grow into a serious diplomatic row with Iran, including the withdrawal of the Bahraini ambassador from Iran and vice versa. The GCC tried to frame the Bahraini uprising as a Shia uprising instigated by Iran, complaining of Iranian interference in sub-regional affairs.305 The comments made by Muqtada al-Sadr, which echoed those made by the Iranian government, lent a more threatening different tone to Maliki's words, despite the fact that his links to Iran are weaker. The latter's comments ultimately helped to sideline the Arab League in the Bahrain affair by contributing to the postponement of the Arab League summit, initially to be held at the end of March in Baghdad.

The League Council had already delayed the meeting once, citing the regional upheaval, pushing the date back to mid-May. By mid-April, as the row with Iran became amplified, Bahrain asked the Secretary-General of the League to cancel the summit entirely.306 No specific reason was given for the decision. Just a few days prior, Iraq's Foreign Minister, Hoshyar Zebari, had underlined Iraq's readiness to hold the summit, saying all Arab states had agreed to it and that the significant sum of $450 million had already been spent in preparation. He also emphasized how important it was that the summit take place, in light of “the developments in the political and security situation and the historical shifts in a number of Arab states.”307 He noted that the Secretary-General was in full support of the meeting. On April 18, Moussa informed the press of an ongoing debate within the League about a second possible delay. The next day, the head of the Iraqi parliament, Usama al-Nujayfi, underlined the necessity of the Summit, saying that another postponement would damage relations between Iraq and those calling for the summit to be postponed.308

By the beginning of May, the Iraqi position had been greatly eroded. On May 1, Amr Moussa declared that it was absolutely necessary to delay the Summit once again, due to regional upheaval.309 However, he also felt the need to underline the fact that the upheaval was the result of popular revolutions, and not external interference, as if to counter GCC statements regarding Bahrain.310 Moussa cited “the accumulation of disputes between Iraq and the Gulf states” as a reason to expected low turn-out, although he also noted that internal instability might keep others away as well. He nonetheless denied that any state had demanded the cancellation of the summit, only its delay, pointing out that no states were fundamentally opposed to allowing Baghdad to host the meeting.

302Iraq's Maliki says Bahrain may ignite sectarian war. Reuters. 25 March 2011[consulted 7 May 2013]303RAJAB, Imân. Siyâsat al-‘Iraq al-khârijiya tujah al-thawrât al-‘arabiya [Iraqi foreign policy towards the Arab

revolutions]. Al-Ahram Strategic Reports. 1 July 2011. 304Ibid.305Iran and Saudi Arabia Spar over GCC Troops in Bahrain. Middle East Policy Council. 5 April 2011. 306Al-bahrain: talab khalîjî li ilghâ' qimat baghdâd [Bahrain: Gulf request to cancel Baghdad summit]. Al-Jazîra.13 April

2011. 307Ibid.308MUSTAFÂ, Hamzâ. Ra'îs al-barlamân al-‘irâqi: ta'jîl qimat baghdâd sayadur bi ‘ilâqâtinâ al-‘arabiya [Iraqi Parliament

Speaker: Delaying the Baghdad summit with damage our Arab relations]. Al-Sharq Al-Awsat. 19 April 2011. 309‘Amr Mûsâ: qimat baghdâd lâ bud min ta'jîlihi...wa lâ nîa li ilghâ'ihâ [Amr Moussa: the Baghdad summit must be

postponed...but there is no intention to cancel it]. Al-Masrî Al-Yawm.1 May 2011. 310Ibid.

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A few days later, Moussa and Zebari held a joint press conference during which Moussa declared that Iraq had requested that the summit be put off until March 2012. When Zebari spoke, he insisted on Baghdad's preparedness to host the summit, but said it was necessary to postpone the event in order to maintain Arab unity: “We do not want to hold the summit at just any price, especially not if it will break the Arab ranks.”311 He continued “The security situation in Iraq is good. Iraq, strong and healthy, was prepared to hold the summit. But we want harmony, consensus, and a strong decision that serves Arab interests, that we protect in their entirety.”312 He added “We have emerged from a state of stubbornness to accept the new reality, with the knowledge that Baghdad is prepared to host the summit. But the most important thing is the political circumstances and we do not want to hold the summit at any price.” The way it is phrased, it is unclear whether Zebari is referring to Iraq's stubbornness or that of another party.

While the decision to postpone the Summit was finally presented as a rational decision on the part of the Iraqi government, the fact that it was Bahrain's foreign minister that first proposed that the summit not take place, and this just in the wake of Maliki's comments about the Peninsula Shield campaign, makes it clear that what motivated Iraq's change in tune was the Gulf states refusal to attend. This episode indicates the blocking power of the Gulf when it acts as a unit. Therefore, states able to constitute a solid group within the League can wield the organization as a weapon to affect the reputation of other members of the Arab system. The case also highlights the value Arab governments continue to bestow on appearing to be an integral part of the Arab community.

ii. Egypt's foreign policy “frozen”Had the Baghdad summit taken place at the appointed date, the League would probably not

have issued a formal condemnation, as the six GCC countries would have prevented a consensus from forming. Thus, the goal of the campaign to delay the Summit was primarily intended to prevent giving the Iraqi government access to a symbolic platform from which to express their disapproval of the Peninsula Shield intervention in Bahrain. Iraq found itself alone in its criticism of the GCC military aid, largely because of the way it framed its argument. It is important to note that the Peninsula Shield forces entered Bahrain by request of the Bahraini government itself. Because the demand came from the regime, those who had taken principled positions of non-interference in internal affairs, such as Algeria, would have considered Iraq's comments, and not the GCC's action, as a form of interference.

One could have imagined that Tunisia and Egypt, whose revolutions had succeeded in overthrowing their respective regimes, speaking out against the repression of the peaceful protests in Bahrain. However, the ideology carried by these uprisings had not yet taken root to an extent that would have allowed them to create a separate bloc within the League in support of the values promoted during their revolutions. Some expressed hopes for such a development, such as the head of the Iraqi parliament, Usama al-Nujayfi, who called on Egypt to reclaim its “pioneering role in the region.”313 In April 2011, Nabil al-Araby, as the Egyptian Foreign Minister under the first post-revolutionary Prime Minister, Essam Sharaf, made a comment that seemed to hint at a new approach to Egyptian foreign policy. Because of Egypt's weight in the League, the comment held the potential to shift the balance within the League. While Essam Sharaf's government had not been elected, it possessed a certain “revolutionary legitimacy,” explained an Egyptian diplomat, stationed in Cairo during the revolution.314

311ABÛ HÛSAYN, Sawsan. Mûsâ: ta'jîl al-qima al-‘arabiya bi talab rasmî min al-‘iraq [Moussa: The Baghdad summit delayed in response to official Iraqi demand]. Al-Sharq Al-Awsat. 6 May 2011.

312ABÛ HÛSAYN, Sawsan, “Mûsâ: ta'jîl al-qima al-‘arabiya bi talab rasmî min al-‘iraq,” Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, 6 May 2011. 313MUSTAFÂ, Hamzâ. Ra'îs al-barlamân al-‘irâqi: ta'jîl qimat baghdâd sayadur bi ‘ilâqâtinâ al-‘arabiya [Iraqi Parliament

Speaker: Delaying the Baghdad summit with damage our Arab relations]. Al-Sharq Al-Awsat. 19 April 2011. 314Interview with Egyptian diplomat, Paris, France, 23 October 2012

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There was still hope for concrete policy changes. Thus, when, during a press conference at the end of March, Araby was quoted as saying “Iran, as a state, is not an enemy of Egypt. Cairo is turning to a new page in the relationship. Iran is a friend,”315 some heralded this as a sign of a “revolution in Egyptian foreign policy.”316

Araby's comment came as a shock to everyone, including those inside the Egyptian foreign ministry. As the Egyptian diplomat at the embassy in Paris explained, six months prior, the Foreign Minister could never have made a comment concerning Iran without first consulting the highest levels of government.317 Araby's remark was made possible by the lack of organization inside the Egyptian foreign ministry at the time. It was “a salad with no rules.”318 Thus, despite appearances, Araby's words did not imply a real change in relations with Iran. This was made abundantly clear when, a week later, Araby abruptly changed direction, saying: “the security, stability, and Arab identity of the Gulf states was a red line that Cairo would not let anyone get close to.”319 He went on, “the Gulf remains an essential, strategic part of Egypt's national security.”320 He had been reeled in by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), which was running the country at the time. An Egyptian diplomat posted to the embassy in Tripoli during the Libyan revolution noted that SCAF's first reaction to being in power was to “pause” Egyptian foreign policy.321 According to the same diplomat, General Tantawi's alleged mantra was: “do not try to pick up any stone, because it may fall on your foot.”322 Thus, SCAF maintained essentially the same foreign policy as the Mubarak regime, but without being actively engaged. For instance, General Tantawi made only two diplomatic trips during his time in power, visiting Saudi Arabia and Libya, largely out of fear of what could happen inside Egypt while he was gone.323 SCAF's position was rewarded with a Saudi pledge of $4 billion in aid in late May, 2011.324

iii. Selective invitations to join the GCCThe Arab Spring thus did not result in any immediate, substantive policy change on the part of

the revolutionary states. Despite a popular call for an ideological shift, the revolutions made internal stability the priority. Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya became increasingly inward-looking and tried to avoid making enemies, even if this meant ignoring instances of state repression, such as what happened in Bahrain. This environment provided an opportunity for the regimes that were less affected by the revolutions to attempt to close ranks, effectively consolidating the so-called “moderate.”

In late May 2011, after the struggle over the Baghdad summit had been settled, the GCC made an “ad hoc and sudden” invitation to Jordan and Morocco to join the GCC.325 The decision came as a surprise to many, as the GCC had historically been very hesitant to admit new members.326 Gause interprets the invitation as the sign of a “desire to preserve monarchy as a regime type in the Arab

315JÛDÂ, Sulaymân. Nabîl al-‘Arabî yaqûm bi nasf thawrâ! [Nabil al-Araby undertakes half-revolution!]. Al-Sharq Al-Awsat. 4 April 2011.

316The Egyptian daily newspaper, Al-Akhbar, carried this as a headline, see JÛDÂ, Sulaymân. Nabîl al-‘Arabî yaqûm bi nasf thawrâ! [Nabil al-Araby undertakes half-revolution!]. Al-Sharq Al-Awsat. 4 April 2011.

317Interview with Egyptian diplomat, Paris, France, 23 October 2012318Ibid.319JÛDÂ, Sulaymân. Thawrat Nabîl al-‘Arabî taktamil [Nabil al-Araby completes his revolution]. Al-Sharq Al-Awsat. 11

April 2011. 320Ibid.321Interview with Egyptian diplomat, Cairo, Egypt, 12 January 2013322Ibid.323Interview with Egyptian diplomat, Paris, France, 23 October 2012324Saudi Arabia pledges $4 billion aid to Egypt. AFP. 21 May 2011. 325GAUSE, F. Gregory III. Saudi Arabia in the New Middle East. p. 18326BARNETT, Michael, GAUSE, F. Gregory III. Caravans in opposite directions: society, state, and the development of

community in the Gulf Cooperation Council. p.168

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world.”327 However, it may also be seen as an attempt to consolidate its support within the League, which had now become a dangerous weapon. Morocco and Jordan have often aligned their positions with Saudi Arabia on other matters, notably regarding relations with Israel. However, joining the GCC would have taken their commitment to another level. As Snyder explains, a formal alliance “would enhance their confidence in each other's support useful for deterring opponents and for influencing the behavior of non-allied states.”328 A formal alliance would reassure the GCC of these countries' support and ensure that the Arab consensus would never contradict their most fundamental interests.

It seems Morocco and Jordan ultimately chose to subtly reject the GCC's offer. As Gause points out, since the offer, Muhammad VI “has supported constitutional change in a more democratic direction.”329 While the Jordanian regime has resisted making changes to the election laws that would make parliament more representative, as the Jordanian street had demanded.330 The King partially answered their calls, announcing the dissolution of parliament in November 2012. Elections were held in January 2013, marked by high voter turnout.331 Like Morocco, the Hashemite Kingdom chose limited reform over repression. Although it is uncertain what the long-term effects of these reforms will be, the strategy chosen by Morocco and Jordan nonetheless demonstrates a limit to Saudi influence. “If Saudi patronage was supposed to swing those monarchs against political reform, it does not seem to be doing the job,” remarks Gause.332

Morocco and Jordan clearly prefer informal alignment to an institutionalized alliance, as GCC membership, in whatever form, would imply. Accepting the GCC's invitation, especially so soon after the Saudi intervention in Bahrain, would have looked like a whole-hearted approval of the organization's internal security methods, which could in turn have had undesirable domestic consequences. Moreover, adhering to the GCC would have had implications for the national identity of these countries. Barnett and Gause credit the GCC with reinforcing a Gulf, or “khalîjî” identity. A general wariness of the rest of the Arab world existed among the Gulf countries prior to the creation of the organization.333 This was augmented by the discovery of oil in the sub-region, which made the Gulf countries “highly suspicious of the economic motivations underlying any new expressions of fraternal devotion.”334 However, today, the feelings of hostility and suspicion run in both directions. Barnett and Gause note the prevalence of stereotypes about Gulf Arabs among Arabs from the Maghreb and the Mashriq.335 Thus, joining the GCC also represents a commitment to a new community.

Aside from these ideological arguments against adherence, there was also a significant geo-strategic component to Jordan and Morocco's decision not to join. Snyder points out that “When interests are divergent [...] the costs of alliance are high because the contract commits the parties to fight for interests not their own.”336 As we have mentioned, the GCC, and particularly Saudi Arabia, was waging a vicious war of words with Iran in May 2011. Especially in the case of Jordan, which shares a border with a close ally of the Iranian regime, taking a strong position against Iran carried

327GAUSE, F. Gregory III. Saudi Arabia in the New Middle East. p. 18328SNYDER, Glenn H. Alliance Politics. p. 9329GAUSE, F. Gregory III. Saudi Arabia in the New Middle East. p. 15330BANI RASHIA, Zaki. The Jordanian Spring has begun. The Guardian. 12 October 2012 331AL-SHARIF, Osama. King Abdullah Seeks to Champion Jordanian Reforms. Al-Monitor. 18 March 2013. 332GAUSE, F. Gregory III. Saudi Arabia in the New Middle East. p. 15333“Arab Gulf states were rather wary of and aloof from the rest of the Arab world and often followed their statements of

fraternity with aggressive claims that they were a separate entity bounded by common interests, and, accordingly, shared little with the other Arab states.” BARNETT, Michael, GAUSE, F. Gregory III. Caravans in opposite directions: society, state, and the development of community in the Gulf Cooperation Council. p.167

334Ibid., p.169335Ibid., p.187336SNYDER, Glenn H. Alliance Politics. p. 10

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significant risk. Interestingly, neither Jordan nor Morocco chose to openly refuse the invitation, thereby

avoiding creating animosity between their regimes and the GCC. Nonetheless, these countries' behavior inside the League after this episode clearly indicates their alignment with the GCC positions, albeit a flexible one. The group established during this period (GCC, Morocco, Jordan, Egypt) is the same as what some have referred to as the “moderate” camp in the Arab world, although “moderate” does not accurately describe their view of the League's role in security in the region, particularly with regard to the Syrian crisis.

B. The Syrian crisis: The League as a weapon

As we have seen, the Bahrain crisis saw the consolidation of what some have called the “moderate” axis in Arab politics. These countries include the GCC states, plus Jordan, Morocco, and Egypt (under Mubarak, then SCAF). Qatar is a relative newcomer to the group, formerly strongly aligned with the “radicals.” The members of this group remained aligned through the first wave of the Arab Spring, until the fall of 2011, when Saudi Arabia and Qatar began to take a particularly strong line against the Syrian regime. Until then, the group faced little resistance from other members of the League.

In this section, we shall see that Syria's inscription on the League agenda, beginning in late August 2011, has had significant impact on the dynamics inside the organization. As an enduring crisis, Syria has managed to put the Responsibility to Protect and the League's ability to sanction foreign intervention at the center of debate around Arab identity in a way that Libya did not. Syria has blurred the New Arab Cold war constellation described by Valbjørn and Bank. The crisis has revealed a split between the “radical,” pro-interventionist camp, such as Saudi Arabia and Qatar, who wish to instrumentalize the League for their own ends, and the conservative camp, typified by Algeria, who wish to contain the League's security role. The exploitation of the League's symbolism has weakened the salience of the Arab consensus, but it has also created space for an intermediate position to begin to emerge.

1) Tentative consensus

a) Saudi Arabia takes the lead

As we have seen, in the wake of the first revolutions, Saudi Arabia sought to consolidate its influence over the GCC and its other allies in the League. The invitation extended to Morocco and Jordan, combined with the Saudi effort to contain the Yemeni transition and the emergence of a markedly anti-Iranian rhetoric, are part and parcel of Saudi Arabia's reactive strategy.337 Rather than promising to reform their political system in an attempt to placate their population,338 their survival strategy has been aimed at strengthening their ties with regional partners and undermining the influence of their rivals. Their support for the uprising in Syria should be seen in the same light.

While it is possible to see Saudi Arabia's uncharacteristically verbal support of the Syrian revolution as a response to what Saudi Arabia sees as Iranian-inspired disturbances in their own Eastern 337FAROUK, Yasmine. Autonomisation, accommodement et "wait to seize" : les stratégies réactives du triangle arabe

après l'intervention américaine en Irak : l'Arabie saoudite, l'Égypte et la Syrie (2003-2007). p. 172338In late February, 2011, Saudi Arabia did, however, announce $10.7 billion in pay raises, job creation, and loan

forgiveness schemes in reaction to the Egyptian and Tunisian revolutions. See Saudi king announces new benefits. Al-Jazeera. 23 February 2011.

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provinces, it is unlikely the Kingdom would be willing to sacrifice another Arab regime purely to get rid of a sub-regional rival. It may be true that “Saudis have pursued a policy of balancing against, and rolling back where possible, Iranian influence in the Arab world,”339 but the regime is also fundamentally averse to changes in its regional environment. As Gause explains, “The Saudi commitment to its monarchical partners in the GCC is as much about preserving the regime type as it is about keeping Iranian (or other) influences out of those close neighbors.”340 Thus, the intervention in Bahrain “was about preserving a fellow monarch more than anything else.”341 Syria and Saudi Arabia have attempted reconciliation over the past few years and even in times of significant hostility, economic and diplomatic relations have continued between the two countries.342 Saudi Arabia would not take the decision to cut all ties with Syria easily. Decisions that may have been intended as a warning to the Syrian government gradually became the basis for a more extreme stance. This was the result of worsening relations with Iran and the emergence of an intense propaganda war with the Syrian government itself.

Although Saudi Arabia was one of the first countries to speak out against the violence in Syria, it nonetheless took the Kingdom four months to address the issue, indicating some hesitation. In August 2011, Saudi Arabia became the second Arab country to withdraw its ambassador from Syria,343 with King Abdullah calling on Damascus to “stop the killing machine.”344 He said that the violence had "nothing to do with religion, or values, or ethics"345 and that "Syria should think wisely before it's too late and issue and enact reforms."346 The king did not, however, threaten Syria with intervention, saying: "Either it chooses wisdom on its own or it will be pulled down into the depths of turmoil and loss."347 Kuwait and Bahrain followed suit, withdrawing their ambassadors, as loyal members of the GCC.348

This initial position stems from a combination of factors. On the one hand, it can be seen as a concession to Saudi Arabia's international allies, the US in particular. Two days after Peninsula Shield forces entered Bahrain, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton called the situation in the small Gulf country “alarming,” warning its Gulf neighbors "There is no security answer to this, and the sooner they get back to the negotiating table and start trying to answer the legitimate needs of the people, the sooner there can be a resolution."349 The Saudi regime's survival, in its present form, depends on the preservation of the Bahraini regime. It could not allow the Bahraini uprising to go too far, because it would encourage their own Shia minority to call for democratic change. In the month prior to Saudi Arabia's withdrawal of its ambassador from Syria, the US's position vis-à-vis the Syrian regime had become clearer. In early July 2011, the US ambassador, Robert Ford visited Hama, at the time under siege by the Syrian army, showing his solidarity with the peaceful protesters.350 At the end of the month, shortly before Ramadan, Syrian tanks launched an attack that rights groups said killed 80

339GAUSE, F. Gregory III. Saudi Arabia in the New Middle East. p. 16340Ibid., p. 18341Ibid.342This is not the case, for example, with Iraq, where Saudi Arabia still has no embassy.343Qatar had already withdrawn its ambassador from Damascus in July, due to attacks on the Embassy allegedly against the

channel Al-Jazeera. See Qatar pulls out of Syria after attacks over Al Jazeera coverage. AFP. 19 July 2011. 344GAUSE, F. Gregory III. Saudi Arabia in the New Middle East. p. 16345SOLOMON, Erika, COLES, Isabel. Gulf States recall envoys, rap Syria over crackdown. Reuters. 8 August 2011.346Ibid.347Ibid.348Three Gulf States Withdraw Ambassadors From Syria. VOA. 7 August 2011. 349WARRICK, Joby, LEIBY, Richard. Clinton visits Cairo's Tahrir Square, decries violence in Bahrain. The Washington

Post. 17 March 2011. 350CHULOV, Martin. Syria condemns US ambassador's 'provocative' visit to Hama. 8 July 2011.

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people.351 This prompted even stronger language from President Obama, who called the violence "horrifying.”352 By mid-August, the US had called for Bashar al-Assad to step down.353

At the same time, speaking out against the repression of the Syrian uprising was a way for Saudi Arabia to apply pressure to an element in the Arab system that was too close to its most important sub-regional rival. However, if cutting Iran down to size was the Kingdom's priority, it would not have waited until August to speak out on Syria. This confirms Saudi Arabia's “inherent fear of instability.”354 In general, the Saudi state would have preferred for the region to remain stable and the Syrian regime in place. But Saudi Arabia's preferences seem to have changed, as its policies grew increasingly aggressive as its “cold war” with Iran intensified.

Its new stance towards Syria is likely linked to growing unrest in Saudi Arabia as well. While demonstrations had been ongoing in Saudi Arabia's eastern provinces since March 2011, autumn of 2011 saw an uptick in their intensity. In early October, the Saudi Interior Ministry alleged that rioters had violently attacked Saudi security forces. They claimed that these action were “motivated by a foreign country that attempts to destabilize the nation’s security, and this is considered a breach of sovereignty,”355 a thinly veiled accusation of Iran. Saudi security forces reportedly responded to the October round of unrest with live fire, which was unprecedented.356 Around the same time, Saudi Arabia revealed what it called an Iranian plot to assassinate the Saudi Arabian ambassador to the US.357

Saudi Arabia brought the latter event to the attention of the Arab League on October 13, 2011. An exceptional meeting of the permanent representatives to the League was held and issued a statement condemning the Iranian assassination attempt. The document states that this act was unacceptable because it was contradictory to religion and international law: “This kind of behavior, which is contradictory to religious and human values, undermines efforts for international peace and security.”358

This decision demonstrates Saudi Arabia's preoccupation with Iran at the time, as well as its willingness to bring the conflict with its sub-regional rival into the League.

b) Resistance

As far as Syria is concerned, up until this point, the League had been generally hesitant to take aim at one of the organization's founding states and a point on the “Arab triangle.” Syria had first been put on the League's agenda on August 27, 2011, when the foreign ministers decided, during an exceptional meeting, to send Nabil al-Araby to Damascus to talk to the Syrian regime. The text, which was classified as a statement, not a resolution, emphasized that the solution to the situation should be “Arab,” a sign of the general fear within the League of a repeat of Libya. The resolution also underlined Syria's importance for the security of the region.359According to a high-level Arab League diplomat, Nabil al-Araby had already been to Damascus in July, on his own initiative and trusted that Damascus intended to go through with its announced reforms.360 The League's position remained very 351At this point, Damascus had expelled most foreign journalists, making it exceedingly difficult to verify the details of

these incidents, including the number and identity of the deceased. 352OWEIS, Khaled Yacoub. Syrians mark bleak Ramadan after 80 killed in Hama. Reuters, 31 July 2011.353MEYERS, Steven Lee. U.S. and Allies Say Syria Leader Must Step Down. The New York Times. 18 August 2011.354GAUSE, F. Gregory III. Saudi Arabia in the New Middle East. p. 19355AL OMRAN, Ahmed. Deaths Fuel Protest Movement in Restive Qatif. Riyadh Bureau blog. 14 October 2011. 356COCKBURN, Patrick. Saudi police 'open fire on civilians' as protests gain momentum. The Independent, 5 October

2011. 357SAVAGE, Charlie, SHANE, Scott. Iranians Accused of a Plot to Kill Saudis' U.S. Envoy. The New York Times. 11

October 2011. 358Arab League Council, Statement 153, 13 October 2011359Arab League Council, Statement 148, 27 August 2011360Interview with Arab League diplomat, Cairo, Egypt, 13 June 2012

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cautious throughout September. In a second statement issued on September 13, 2011, the League avoided naming the regime as the sole perpetrator of violence. It also called for national dialogue and recommended that the League send a high-level delegation once a ceasefire had been established.361

However, three days after the statement regarding the Saudi ambassador was issued, Saudi Arabia, along with Qatar, made their first attempt at convincing their fellow Arab states to suspend Syria's participation in League meeting, as had been done in the case of Libya. The rise of Saudi Arabia's internal insecurity coincided almost day for day with its offensive against Syria inside the League. On October 16, 2011, before the emergency ministerial meeting, Saudi Arabia and Qatar reportedly called an informal meeting at the Four Seasons Hotel in Cairo, in the absence of the Syrian representative to the League.362 According to a close observer of the League, the proposition to suspend Syria elicited outrage and many countries found the format of the meeting unsavory. It is important to note that Saudi Arabia and Qatar were not the first to have called for such action. The Arab Parliament had asked for the suspension of Yemen and Syria at the end of September and some 176 rights groups, including Human Rights Watch, had already called for the same.363 This shows how the League's action during the Libya crisis created new international expectations for the organization.

Despite this popular and international pressure, the League Council did not suspend Syria. Instead, the League Council agreed to create a Special Ministerial Committee on Syria, headed by Qatar, with the participation of Algeria, Sudan, Oman, Egypt, and Nabil al-Araby that would seek to facilitate dialogue between the Syrian opposition and the regime. This eventually resulted in the Arab Action Plan of October 30, 2011 agreed in Doha, Qatar, and confirmed by the League Council a few days later.364

The hesitation to freeze Syria's participation in League meetings, as well as the emphasis in League texts on finding an “Arab” solution, which remained a constant through January 2012, indicate strong resistance on the part of the other member states to Saudi Arabia and its allies' more aggressive moves. Their campaign against the Syrian regime was ramped up in November 2011, when Jordan's King Abdullah became the first to suggest such a solution, although he phrased it as a piece of friendly advice. The king was quoted by BBC world news as saying "If I were in his shoes, I'd step down […] If Bashar considers the interest of his country, he would step down, but he would also create an ability to reach out and start a new phase of Syrian political life."365 A few days later, Saudi Prince Turki al-Faisal was more direct, saying it was “inevitable” that Bashar al-Asad would step down.366 Despite the pressure from Saudi Arabia and its allies, the League resisted this demand explicit until July 2012.

However, on November 12, ten days after the Council approved the Arab Action Plan, the member states finally decided to suspend Syria's participation in League meetings. In the interim, Syria had ramped up its verbal assaults on the those who had introduced the idea of its suspension into the League. Ahmad Yusaf, speaking in the League Council, accused members of the Arab League of having policies that contradict the collective Arab interest. He also criticized Arab media, clearly aiming at Al-Jazeera, of mounting a smear campaign against the Syrian regime.367 Here it is important

361Arab League Council, Statement 152, 13 September 2011362Interview with Western diplomat and close observer of the League, Cairo Egypt, 12 June 2012. See also RASLÂN,

Âmâl. Al-jâmi‘â al-‘arabiya tafshal fi tajmîd ‘udwiyat sûriya [The Arab League fails to freeze Syria's membership]. Youm 7. 16 October 2011.

363SALEH, Yasmine. Arab League body wants to suspend Syria, Yemen membership. Reuters. 20 September 2011.364Arab League Council, Resolution 7436, 2 November 2011365CHULOV, Martin. Assad should quit, says King Abdullah as pressure mounts on Syrian regime. The Guardian.14

November 2011. 366Syria crisis: Arab ministers mull increasing pressure. BBC. 16 November 2011.367HananNoura, video, Al-safîr Yûsaf Ahmad 2/2 mandûb sûriya al-jâmi‘a al-‘arabiya 16/10/2011 [The Ambassador, Yusaf

Ahmad 2/2 Syrian delegate at the Arab League]. 17 October 2011.

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to point out that, by this point in the Arab Spring, Al-Jazeera's news coverage style had undergone noticeable changes. According to Marc Lynch, Al-Jazeera and similar media outlets had changed the Arab public sphere by “[challenging] the media monopolies gained by the local regimes in the decades following the Nasserist ‘radio wars’, where the state institutions had experienced a relative ‘hardening’.”368 The Arab Spring, and the Syria crisis in particular, prompted what seems like a reversion to the old Arab Cold War media wars.369 By the time Syria was suspended, the Qatari news channel had already begun losing credibility due to its coverage of the revolution there, having been accused of airing fake footage. It was also charged with having a pro-Muslim Brotherhood bias in its coverage of post-revolutionary Egypt.370 The resignation of the Director-General, Waddah Khanfar, in September 2011, and his replacement with a member of the Qatari royal family, further eroded the channel's claims of editorial independence.371 Whereas in the 1990s and early 2000s, Al-Jazeera was heralded for its unprecedented emphasis on “news and political debate,”372 this role seemed to be shifting in the wake of the Arab Spring towards private channels with a national focus, such as ONTV in Egypt.373 Al-Jazeera began to be seen more and more as a Qatari propaganda tool.

c) Different interpretations of the decision to suspend Syria

Despite the League's initial hesitance, Syria's support inside the League nonetheless seemed to be waning. During the fall of 2011, the November 12 decision to suspend Syria's participation was the only Council resolution that elicited reservations or abstentions, and these came from countries who risked Syrian retribution or feared the same fate. The two countries to express reservations regarding Syria's suspension were Lebanon and Yemen, while Iraq abstained. In other words, there was an Arab consensus that it was at least necessary to address the crisis. Some member states attempted to frame the decision as less severe than it looked. As with all such resolutions, each state interpreted it in a different way. While Saudi Arabia and Qatar may have seen this as the first step towards foreign intervention, Egypt and Algeria continued to emphasize the importance that this not lead to foreign intervention. For instance Algeria's foreign minister, Mourad Medelci, tried to soften the blow, underlining that the suspension was only temporary and could be restored as soon as the violence stopped.374 It seems, however, that the GCC had far more weight in the League. For example, after its suspension, Syria called for an emergency summit to discuss the “Arab situation.” The idea was refused, the main opposition to the meeting reportedly being the members of the GCC, demonstrating the bloc's vetoing power for a second time.375

368VALBJØRN, Morten, BANK, André. The New Arab Cold War: rediscovering the Arab dimension of Middle East regional politics. p. 12

369League decisions requesting Arabsat and Nilesat to stop broadcasting Libyan and Syrian state televisions channels (League Council Resolution 7363, 15 May 2011; League Council Resolution 7507, 2 June 2012) indicate how important the Arab states consider the media portrayal of the uprisings in the implementation of their policies.

370AL-QASSEMI, Sultan. Breaking the Arab News. Foreign Policy. 2 August 2012. 371KHATIB, Lina. Qatar's foreign policy: the limits of pragmatism. p. 428; also NOE, Nicholas, RAAD, Walid. Al-Jazeera

Gets Rap as Qatar Mouthpiece. Bloomberg. 10 April 2012. 372VALBJØRN, Morten, BANK, André, “The New Arab Cold War,” p. 12373EL AMRANI, ISSANDR. Jazeera loses audience share in Egypt, Tunisia. The Arabist blog. 27 February 2013; Private

national channels have also recently become the target of regimes wishing to quash dissent. A clear example of this is the arrest warrant issued for the Egyptian humorist, Bassem Youssef, in late March 2013, accused by the prosecutor-general of “insulting the president and Islam.”

374Madalsî khilâl mu'tamar sahafî ma‘ wazîr al-khârijiya al-masrî: ta‘lîq ‘udwiyat sûriya mu'aqat wa yumkin raf‘uh fî aqrab waqt [Medelci during a press conference with the Egyptian foreign minister: Suspension of Syria's membership is temporary and it is possible to lift it soon]. El-Badil. 13 November 2011.

375Syria crisis: Arab ministers mulling pressure. BBC. 16 November 2011.

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What is most interesting about the Arab consensus that lasted through the fall is that there is an understanding that the Arab League is expected to take coercive measures against a member state for the mistreatment of its own population. Thus, in the same decision of November 12, 2011 the League proposed political and economic sanctions against the Syrian regime and called on the member states to withdraw their ambassadors, while “recognizing this a sovereign decision for each state.”376 This last point is key. Seeing as how the League possesses no enforcement mechanism, agreeing to sanctions had no real cost for the states who endorsed the resolution. The decision to apply the resolution comes back to the individual states. These resolutions served to create an image of Arab unity, without obliging the member states to take action. Many of these countries maintained their diplomatic ties with Syria. Algeria, for example, announced that it would keep its ambassador in Damascus despite the League's recommendation that member states call back their ambassadors.377 Thus, the crisis of the Arab Spring seems to have forced member states to accept that League has a new responsibility to take a collective position on human rights violations within member states. However, they only accepted this as long as the resolutions remain within the limits of the Pact, and therefore remain non-binding.

2) The polarization of the League post-January 22, 2012

IntroductionThe period between the approval of the Arab Action Plan and the end of January 2012 was

marked by a struggle to get Syria to sign the Protocol specifying the mandate of the Arab observers mission. Syria eventually signed the document on December 19, largely thanks to the efforts of Khaled Meshal, the leader of Hamas, who served as mediator between the League and the Syrian regime.378

Before Syria's signature, the League had issued toothless threats of sanctions in an effort to coerce the Syrian government. The fact that only Hamas could convince Syria to commit to the plan indicates how isolated Syria was from the community of Arab states and confirms the growing importance of non-state actors in the New Arab Cold War as described by Valbjørn and Bank.379

The day after Syria signed the Protocol, the League Council issued a statement that continued to emphasize that the League's actions were not a form of foreign interference. The statements reads: “[The League] underlines the extreme importance of the Syrian government's adherence to the full implementation of the Protocol in order to realize the goal of the provision of protection for all defenseless Syrian citizens and the success of the Arab Action Plan within the framework of the maintenance of Syria's security and unity and the prevention of foreign interference.”380 The mission lasted from December 24, 2011 until January 18, 2012. The end of the observer mission was a turning point, after which the divisions within the League with regards to foreign intervention grew more pronounced, with Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and their allies favoring the internationalization of the conflict and Algeria categorically rejected any attempt to bring the issue before the UN Security Council.

The January 22 decision consisted of a proposal for a peaceful transition, closely resembling the solution used in Yemen, with Bashar al-Assad handing power over to his vice-president, who would be

376Arab League Council, Resolution 7438, 12 November 2011377The first call for political and economic sanctions was made on November 12, 2011. See Arab League Council

resolution 7438, 12 November 2011.378Al-‘arabî yuhamil Mash‘al risâlâ li al-Asad li waqf al-‘unf...wa yu'akad: Hamâs aqtana‘at Dimashq bi tawqî‘ al-brûtûkûl

[Araby gives Meshal mission to deliver message to Assad to stop the violence...confirms that Hamas convinced Damascus to sign the Protocol]. Al-Sharq Al-Awsat. 7 January 2012.

379VALBJØRN, Morten, BANK, André. The New Arab Cold War: rediscovering the Arab dimension of Middle East regional politics. p. 21

380Arab League Council, Statement 161, 20 December 2011

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charged with forming a national unity government within three months.381 It called on the opposition to meet within two weeks of the resolution in order to begin to organize themselves for this transition. It also requested that the President of the League Council, at the time the Qatari foreign minister, and the Secretary-General present the plan to the UN Security Council for approval. Lastly, the resolution prolonged the Arab observer mission by one month, with an accompanying resolution calling for an increase in funds for the mission.

Although Saudi Arabia had been calling for Bashar al-Assad's departure for a time, before late January there seems to have been enough resistance within the League to avoid putting this option to paper. The January 22 resolution hints at the possibility, however the League insisted that this was not the resolution's intention. When the plan was presented to the Security Council a few days later, the Qatari foreign minister asserted that “We are not after a regime change, because this is a matter that we believe the Syrian people should decide.”382 Nabil al-Araby underlined the same “I should like to stress that the road map adopted on 22 January can in no way be interpreted as calling on the Syrian President to renounce power.”383 In other words, the resolution was not meant to permanently sideline the Syrian president, but to make space for the Syrian people to decide his future role in the government.

Algeria was the only member state to express reservations on this resolution, on the last paragraph, to be specific, which reads: “[The League asks] the President of the [Special Ministerial Committee on Syria] and the Secretary-General to raise the issue before the Security Council to support this plan according to the decision taken by the League Council.”384 As Nabil al-Araby said in the press conference after the decision was taken that the intention behind this paragraph is that the Security Council approve of the Arab initiative as is, no more and no less, in order to “give it the weight that will help in its implementation.”385 While the body of the resolution did not mention sanctions, the preamble refers to previous League decisions, including those threatening the Syrian regime with sanctions. Thus, had the resolution been endorsed by the UN, these sanctions might have been enforced. As the Qatari foreign minister made clear in his speech to the Security Council, this is what the League intended, saying: “We also call on the Council to undertake all measures based on the resolutions of the League of Arab States, specifically economic resolutions and bans on travel to Syria. We are not calling for military intervention; we are advocating the adoption of concrete economic pressure to bring the Syrian regime to understand that it cannot avoid meeting the demands of its people.”386 Nabil al-Araby made not mention of sanctions. This is precisely why Algeria did not agree to this section of the resolution. They did not take issue with references to sanctions as long as they were made in the context of the League, which could not enforce them.

a) Qatar: The new face of the Arab League?

During the League Council meeting on January 22, Nabil al-Araby stated that the observer mission had made “partial or relative progress” and that the general consensus, as stated in the resolution, was to move forward with the mission. Despite this image of unity, there were important disagreements among the member states. While Saudi Arabia did not express reservations on the resolution, the Kingdom announced that it would unilaterally withdraw its delegation from the observer 381Arab League Council, Resolution 7444, 22 January 20113826710th UN Security Council Meeting, 31 January 2012, p. 5383Ibid., p. 9384Arab League Council, Resolution 7444, 22 January 2012385FreeMediaSyria, video, Al-mu'tamar al-sahafî li nabîl al-‘arabî wa hamad bin jâsim li al-jazîra 22.01.2012 [Nabil al-

Araby and Hamad bin Jassem press conference]. 22 January 2012. 3866710th UN Security Council Meeting, 31 January 2012, p. 5

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mission, despite its extension. This decision had an immediate influence on its allies in the League. Over the next few days, other GCC members, as well as Morocco, would follow Saudi's example and withdraw their observers. Al-Jazeera reported that Egypt, Sudan, and Mauritania planned to send additional observers to replace those who had chosen to withdraw,387 indicating that there was still mixed support for the observer mission. Clearly the consensus over the January 22 decision had been very fragile. The League would eventually freeze the mission on January 28, with Nabil al-Araby blaming an uptick in violence.388

Meanwhile, as President of the League Council, Qatar tried to present itself as supportive of the consensus during the press conference, despite Qatar's well-known pro-interventionist position. Only a week earlier, the Qatari Emir had suggested sending Arab peacekeeping forces to Syria to stop the bloodshed.389 During the press conference announcing the resolution, Hamad bin Jassim bin Jaber Al Thani, the Qatari foreign minister, nonetheless emphasized the importance of Syria to the Arab system as a founding member of the organization and a pivotal actor in the League. He also underlined the League's continued preference for an “Arab” solution, which would save Syria “from many dangers,” surely a reference to outside interference. The Foreign Minister intentionally toned down the Qatari position in order to be able to speak in the name of all member states.

While it was pure coincidence that Qatar became president of the Council as the Syrian crisis worsened, as this position is passed on alphabetically, Qatar has done all it can in order to appear to be the Arab face of the Syria dossier. For instance, Qatar is the president of the Special Ministerial Committee on Syria and has therefore hosted many of its meetings in the capital, Doha. It also helped negotiate the formation of the Syrian National Coalition. The Gulf emirate has used the Syria crisis to continue to develop its “global branding strategy” to develop a reputation as an indispensable and forward-thinking regional actor. As we shall see, the Qatari policy differs from that of Saudi Arabia, despite their alignment on the issue of intervention. As opposed to Qatar, who justified the decision to suspend Syria because it was necessary in order to preserve “credibility of the League,”390 Saudi Arabia is not heavily invested in the League as an organization. They do not seem interested in representing the Arab consensus, but rather in shaping it.

b) Saudi Arabia tries to reframe “Arab interest”

The Saudi foreign minister, Prince Saud al-Faisal, declared that the reason behind the decision to withdraw their observers from Syria was that the Assad regime “had not implemented a single element of the Arab Action plan, whose goal is to stop the spilling of the blood that is so dear to all of us.”391 Rather than observing the conditions of the agreement, the Syrian government “accused the Arab leaders and their countries of conspiracy and questioned their Arabism [‘urûba].” This was a response to Ahmad Yusaf's invocation of the Arab interest after the League decided to suspend Syria. Yusaf had called those who favored the measure “collaborators and traitors.”392 Earlier, he had also accused “certain Arab states” of having been involved in “the Zionist-American conspiracy” against Syria from the moment the unrest began, insult Qatar, Nabil al-Araby, specifically, as well as all countries who

387Qatlâ wa jarhâ fajar al-yawm fi sûriya [Dead and wounded this morning in Syria]. Al-Jazeera. 28 January 2012. 388The Arab League suspends Syria mission – Nabil el-Arabi. BBC. 28 January 2012. 389OWEIS, Khaled Yacoub. Qatar emir suggests sending Arab troops to Syria. Reuters. 14 January 2012. 390Hamad bin jâsim: al-azmâ al-sûriya tada‘ misdâqiyat al-jâmi‘a al-‘arabiya ‘alâ al-mihak [Hamad ben Jassem: The Syrian

Crisis puts the credibility of the League to the test]. Al-Ahrâm. 16 October 2011. 391Al-sa‘ûdiya tashab muraqibîha min ba‘that al-jâmi‘a ilâ sûriya [Saudi Arabia withdraws its observers from the Arab

League mission]. Al-Arabiya. 22 January 2012. 392Al-Arabiya, “Mandûb sûriya bi al-jâmi‘a al-‘arabiya yakîl al-shata'im li ra'îs al-wizarâ' al-qatarî,” Al-Arabiya, 12

November 2011.

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favored the motion.393 Thus, during the debate on January 22, Prince Saud al-Faisal returned the accusation, asking rhetorically “Is it in the Arab character for the ruler to kill his own people? Is it the duty of the Arab armies to divide their citizens, or is it their duty to protect them, their property and to preserve their security and stability?”394

An analysis of Saud al-Faisal's words, taken in combination with the Saudi king's initial remarks regarding Syria, allow us to better understand Saudi intentions. Firstly, Saud al-Faisal takes full aim at the Syrian government. From Saudi Arabia's perspective, the violence was being perpetrated exclusively by the government, despite the fact that the League's resolution refers to multiple “sources of violence.” Al-Faisal specifies that those responsible for the violence are “those who are supposed to protect the people's well-being, their rights, their security, and their interests.”395 Prince Saud al-Faisal has created a frame in which it is Bashar al-Assad's responsibility, as an Arab, to protect his people, not to kill and torture them. Second, by linking the “sense of Arab unity” or “Arab nationalism” (‘urûba) to the responsibility to protect the Syrian people, Faisal is trying to undermine Syria's Arab credentials. The Syrian people are implied to be a subset of a larger group: the Arab people. Thus, as an Arab, it is an Arab leader's duty to protect the Arab people. If one extends this logic, the League, as a symbol of Arab nationalism, also has an obligation to intervene.

The urgency of the language used by Saudi Arabia implies that there is an existential threat to the Syrian people, making them the object of a security policy. However, other elements of Saudi rhetoric further circuscribes the group being securitized. We recall the Saudi king's first words about the conflict in Syria: “[the violence has] nothing to do with religion, or values, or ethics.” This emphasis on religious duty, coming from the head of a state founded on a very specific understanding of Islam, should not be ignored. As Gause had already noted in December 2011, “The Saudis have made a conscious decision to increase the salience of the Sunni-Shia divide since the beginning of the Arab upheavals, to increase support for their allies and to isolate Iran and its allies in the Arab world.”396 The object being securitized thus becomes more narrow: Sunni muslim Arabs. However, Buzan et. al. observe that the object being securitized is not always the object that the securitizing actor intend to preserve.397 In the case of Syria, as in Bahrain, Saudi Arabia's ultimate goal is to securitize its own regime against its main sub-regional rival, Iran, by reinforcing the connection between Arab identity and its regime. Finally, the act of securitization sanctions “emergency measures,” measures that violate the rules of the system. Saudi Arabia was asking the League to ignore the norm of non-intervention. This could, in turn, lead to the violation of another rule, enshrined in article 8 of the League Pact, which states: “Every member State of the League shall respect the form of government obtaining in the other States of the League, and shall recognize the form of government obtaining as one of the rights of those States, and shall pledge itself not to take any action tending to change that form.” In other words it could open the door to regime change.

The specificity of Saudi Arabia's frame has had important consequences on the Arab League, creating new rifts and deepening others. As Buzan et. al. point out, “How others judge the reasonableness of a securitization matters because it influences how other actors in the system respond”398 Saudi Arabia's efforts to tie Arab identity more tightly to Sunni Islam and to redefine the obligations of Arab nationalism, meant to protect the Saudi regime, have effectively increased the 393pcanytime, video, Mandûb sûriya bi al-jâmi‘a al-‘arabiya yashtum mandûb qatar [Syrian delegate to the Arab League

insults Qatari delegate]. 12 November 2011. 394Al-sa‘ûdiya tashab muraqibîha min ba‘that al-jâmi‘a ilâ sûriya [Saudi Arabia withdraws its observers from the Arab

League mission]. Al-Arabiya. 22 January 2012. 395Ibid.396GAUSE, F. Gregory III. Saudi Arabia in the New Middle East. p. 21397BUZAN, Barry, WAEVER, Ole, DE WILDE, Jaap. Security: A New Framework for Analysis. p. 32398Ibid., p. 31

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perception of the Saudi threat on the part of states whose identities have other foundations, notably Algeria and Iraq.

a) Algeria contests

In their implicit framing of the Arab identity as Sunni, Saudi Arabia also calls into question the Arab credentials of regimes that do not fit this mold, such as Algeria, which identifies as a secular republic. Moreover, Saudi Arabia's calls for international intervention and more subsequent support for arming the opposition clash with the anti-imperialist, non-aligned movement foundations of political Arabism upon which Algeria has built its foreign policy.399 In a way, this is a classic case of the security dilemma. Saudi Arabia, in trying to increase its own security in the face of one threat, Iran, makes others feel insecure and increases hostility towards themselves. What is unique about this security dilemma is that it is largely the result of political rhetoric used in the struggle over the definition of Arabism and not the result of changes in arms policy.

Faced with Saudi Arabia's increasingly aggressive attempts to use the League to endorse its own policies, Algeria took to formally declaring its reservations on any League resolution it disagreed with. This contrasts with its behavior through December 2011, which was to go along with the consensus but clarify, through press statements, its own interpretation of the League text. As we have seen, Algeria did not agree with the decision to take the Arab plan developed in January 2012 to the Security Council. On April 26, 2012, the League issued a resolution requesting that the Arab representative in the UN executive body, Morocco, “to ask the Security Council to stop the killing and protect civilians immediately.”400 Algeria protested that this article could lead to the application of Chapter 7 of the UN Charter and therefore did not adhere to this section of the resolution. In the summer of 2012, when the League finally issued a resolution that formally demanded that Bashar al-Asad step down, Algeria again protested, arguing that this was “not among the powers of the League Council and remains, on principle, a sovereign decision of the Syrian people.”401 Finally, Algeria has protested any attempts to recognize a specific opposition group as representative of the Syrian people. On December 9, 2012, the Special Committee on Syria produced a statement applauding the Syrian National Coalition, formed in early November 2012 in Doha, for its work founding a joint military command. Algeria objected to this reference to the Coalition, underlining that the question of recognition is a sovereign decision to be taken by each member state individually.402 Most recently, Algeria rejected the decision to allow the Syrian National Coalition to take Syria's seat in the League at the summit held in Doha in March 2013. This time it based its objection on the League Pact itself, arguing that the Pact does not allow non-state entities to be represented in the Council.403

This summary of the Algerian positions demonstrates the North African state's absolutist interpretation of the League's norm of non-interference in internal affairs. Algeria has attempted to cling to the old version of the League, largely out of fear that what happened in Libya should repeat itself. Should the League be used again to justify international intervention, this would undermine Algerian policy, heavily influenced by its colonial past. Algeria's diplomacy within the League can be described as what Bertrand Badie classifies as “contestatory diplomacy” and can be seen as a response

399The history of its membership in the Non-Aligned Movement remains central to Algerian foreign policy. According to Akram Belkaïd, Boumeddine's speech in front of the United Nations General Assembly in 1974 on the New International Economic Order is considered to be one of the great victories of the golden age of Algerian diplomacy. BELKAÏD, Akram. La diplomatie algérienne à la recherche de son âge d’or. p. 340

400Arab League Council, Resolution 7503, 26 April 2012401Arab League Council, Resolution 7510, 22 July 2012 402Statement issued by the Special Ministerial Committee on Syria, 9 December 2012403Arab League Council, Resolution 7595, 6 March 2013

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to the oligarchic nature of today's multilateral system, characterized by “connivance diplomacy” practiced by the GCC countries and their allies, both inside and outside the League. This contestation diplomacy is characterized by a discourse “centered on denunciation more than on concrete propositions of reform.”404 Algeria has in fact contented itself with criticizing the resolutions put forward by the League, without proposing an alternative policy.

This position has two advantages. The first is that this populist approach contributes to the state's capacity for domestic governance.405 Algeria holds onto its interpretation of political Arabism as fundamentally anti-interventionist because it believes that is what Algerians expect of it. The second advantage is that this approach can raise the international status of the contesting actor: “The explicit affirmation of a refusal to align with decisions taken gives [the refusal's] author an importance that is equal, at least occasionally, to that of the club that stands in their way. By blocking a whole process, the actor becomes an active force in the international game, sending the club diplomacy into reactive mode, and making them less free in their actions.”406

In the wake of the Arab Spring, there are few member states in the League who would dare openly declare their solidarity with Bashar al-Assad. The mere insinuation that a state may still be in contact with the Syrian regime elicits forceful denials. An Algerian newspaper recently reported that Algeria had received a delegation from the Syrian government to discuss the possibility of the former serving as a mediator between the Assad government and the opposition. The Algerian foreign ministry “categorically” denied what it deemed “imaginary information.”407 It has effectively become impossible for League members to blatantly defend repressive measures taken against the political opposition in other Arab states. In the wake of the Arab Spring, Algeria could not attract allies to its cause in favor of the “old” League. Therefore, it has satisfied itself with the systematic expression of reservations, hoping to hold onto some influence as the voice of non-intervention.

Saudi Arabia's endorsement of foreign intervention and calls for military support for the Syrian opposition in the name of the security of the Syrian people fundamentally challenges the anti-imperialist underpinnings of traditional political Arabism. Algeria's Arab credentials are thus threatened by Saudi Arabia's demand that the League, as a whole, endorse such a policy. Algeria therefore finds itself caught between its desire to respect the norm of non-intervention and its desire to adhere to the new meaning of “Arab national security” that has emerged via the Arab Spring. The idea at the center of this new definition is that the Arab nation cannot exist without the Arab people. Therefore, the Arab people must be protected. Algeria fears more than ever being seen as supporting violence towards fellow Arabs. Thus, in September 2012, when the League issued a resolution that emphasized “the necessity of the continuation of efforts in order to reach a consensus in the Security Council” and calling on the Security Council “to issue a resolution demanding an immediate ceasefire under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter that is applicable to all Syrian parties,”408 Algeria did not express any reservations. This is does not represent a fundamental shift in Algeria's position. It is a pragmatic move that they hope will improve the government's image vis-à-vis its population without damaging its anti-interventionist stance. This concession was possible because by the time this resolution was issued, it had become clear that Russia and China would block any resolution in the Security Council. Algeria

404“un discours plus centré sur la dénonciation que sur des propositions concrètes de réform” BADIE, Bertrand. La diplomatie de connivence. p. 191

405“d'alimenter, à l'intérieur, une pratique populiste qui sert l'exercice du pouvoir” Ibid., p. 197 406“L'affirmation explicite d'un refus de s'aligner sur les décisions prises donne à son auteur une importance égale, au moin

pontuellement, au club qui les a arrêtées. Bloquant tout un processus, elle devient une force agissante du jeu international, renvoyant la diplomatie de club à une perspective réactive et, dès lors, beaucoup moins libre.” Ibid.

407Al-wada‘ fî sûriya: la tûjid ay wasâtâ jazâ'iriya (wazârat al-shu'ûn al-khârijiya) [The situation in Syria: There is no Algerian mediation (Foreign Ministry)]. Algérie Presse Service. 5 April 2013.

408Arab League Council, Resolution 7523, 5 September 2012

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therefore felt free to adhere fully to the consensus, as there was little chance it would lead to intervention.

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Conclusion

We have seen how the Arab states, confronted with a regional crisis that directly challenged the legitimacy of their regimes, took unprecedented, concerted action that seemed to conform with the rhetoric of human rights, democracy and human security they had adopted in response to previous crises. The procedures and practices improvised to cope with the crisis in Libya have been reapplied in the Syrian case. While their repeated use hints at the possible institutionalization of these principles, we have seen that, at present, these concepts and tools are being mobilized selectively by influential actors to further their own foreign policy aims. This strategy has caused severe division within the League, but it has also created opportunities for new actors to try to find a middle ground. Finally, despite the blockages in the League, its actions have created new expectations for League behavior, both on the part of the international community, as well as the Arab population.

Arab states agree to disagreeThe polarization in the League created by Saudi Arabia and Qatar's push for intervention in the

Syria conflict has led Arab League resolutions to become devoid of meaning. A prime example of this is the League's position regarding arming the Syrian opposition. The League resisted endorsing military aid at the Baghdad Summit, choosing instead to emphasize “Arab efforts to find a peaceful exit from the crisis.”409 It was not until the Doha Summit in March 2013 that the League acknowledged member states' rights to arm the opposition. The Summit resolution states: “Confirming the importance of the continuation of efforts aiming at the arrival at a political solution, as the preferred [solution] to the Syrian crisis […] and confirming the right of each state, according to its desire, to provide all means of self-defense, including military means, in order to support the perseverance of the Syrian people and the Free Syrian Army.”410 However, rather than offering active support for such policies, the resolution should be seen as the League's recognition of a fait accompli. Each member state may pursue its own policies while remaining part of the Arab consensus. However, those who choose to arm the opposition and those who oppose such action have very different views of the crisis. This kind of resolution therefore undermines the very concept of an “Arab consensus.”

Finding a middle groundAs the Arab Spring moves into what some have termed the Arab Winter,411 while the

polarization between Saudi Arabia and Algeria on the question of intervention remains, new fissures have begun to appear, notably among the GCC countries. The GCC member states seem to have different visions for the future of the revolutionary states, with each country supporting its preferred faction.412

There have also been more and more signs of resistance to the GCC countries' policies, both

409Arab League Summit, Resolution 554, Baghdad, Iraq, 29 March 2012 410Arab League Summit, Resolution 580, Doha, Qatar, 26 March 2013411Bertrand Badie: Le printemps arabe a révélé l'existence d'un islamisme hétérogène et composite. Le Monde, 19 January

2012.412For instance, Qatar strongly supports the Brotherhood, whereas the UAE has been cracking down on the group

domestically. See AL QASSEMI, Sultan Sooud. Qatar's Brotherhood Ties Alienate Fellow Gulf States. Al Monitor. 23 January 2013; There have also been reports of Saudi Arabia and Qatar arming competing factions of the Free Syrian Army. See ABOUZEID, Rania. Syria's Secular and Islamist Rebels: Who Are the Saudis and the Qataris Arming? Time Magazine. 18 September 2012

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from sections of the Arab population413 as well as from other Arab states. The most notable example of this was Muhammad Morsi's proposal, first announced at the summit of the Organization for Islamic Cooperation in Mecca, Saudi Arabia in August, 2012, to form a contact group made up of Egypt, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Iran whose goal would be to find a diplomatic solution to the Syrian crisis. His inclusion of Iran in the plan, as well as his rhetoric underlining a political solution, seemed to distance Egypt from the Gulf countries and their allies. At the Non-Aligned Movement summit held in Tehran a couple of weeks later, he said: "We should all express our full support to the struggle of those who are demanding freedom and justice in Syria and translate our sympathies into a clear political vision that supports peaceful transfer (of power) to a democratic system," he said.414 The plan has not borne fruit,415 however it hinted at the desire for some states to find a middle ground. Morsi's suggestion also acknowledges the role of non-Arab actors in the security of the Arab states, calling into question the suitability of the Arab League to deal with security issues. Perhaps by incorporating these significant actors, whom Buzan and Wæver include in their conception of the Middle East regional security complex,416 the organization would be less ripe for exploitation by a powerful minority trying to resolve their own security concerns.A new Arab solidarity

We do not know how the diplomacies in the newly revolutionary states will evolve. Considering the continued violence in Syria, the recent terrorist attacks in Libya,417 and Egypt's economic woes, it will be years before these countries fully recover from the Arab Spring and are able to form a bloc in the League capable of defending democratic principles and human rights. However, as the protests targeting the League seems to indicate, there is a popular demand for an Arab League that has the region's population at the forefront of its thoughts. Should the revolutionary states settle into their democratic systems, they will likely feel pressure to defend the emerging norm of “Arab national security,” defined as the protection of the Arab people, in the halls of the League.

Egypt and Tunisia have already tried to demonstrate their support for this notion, notably with their swift reactions to the Israeli bombing campaign in Gaza that began on November 14, 2012. The Egyptian Prime Minister, Hisham Qandil, visited the Gaza Strip on November 16, followed the next day by the Tunisian Foreign Minister, Rafik Abdesslem. The League supported Egypt's show of initiative, issuing a decision on November 17 endorsing Morsi's efforts to negotiate a truce.418 By coming out strongly in favor of the Syrian opposition and in support of the Palestinian resistance, Morsi has contributed to the crystallization of the new definition of “Arab national security.” In fact, during his speech at the NAM summit Tehran, Morsi had already linked the Syrian opposition's struggle to that of the Palestinians.419 One of the consequences of the Arab Spring may be a shift from

413A recent Pew Research survey revealed that the populations of Egypt, the Palestinian Territories, Tunisia, and Lebanon were divided on Arab military aid to Syrian rebels. Only the Jordanian population showed significant support. See Pew Research. Widespread Middle East Fears that Syrian Violence Will Spread: No Love for Assad, Yet No Support for Arming the Rebels. Pew Research Global Attitudes Project. 1 May 2013

414TISDALL, Simon. Egypt underlines Iran's isolation at Non-Aligned Movement summit. The Guardian. 30 August 2012415Egypt, Iran, and Turkey reportedly met on the sidelines of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation in Cairo in February

2013. Saudi Arabia did not attend. See Turkey, Egypt, Iran discuss Syria solution. United Press International. 8 February 2013

416BUZAN, Barry, WÆVER, Ole. Regions and Powers. p. 187417A car bomb went off in front of the French embassy in Tripoli on April 23, 2013. US ambassador Christopher Stevens

was killed in Benghazi in September 2012. Attacks on British, UN, and Red Cross missions in eastern Libya were also reported. See GUMUCHIAN, Marie-Louise, SHENNIB, Ghaith. Libya car bomb hits French embassy, wounds guards. Reuters. 23 April 2013

418Arab League 'backs Gaza against aggression. Al-Jazeera.18 November 2012419TISDALL, Simon. Egypt underlines Iran's isolation at Non-Aligned Movement summit. The Guardian. 30 August 2012

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Palestine as the “major mobilising symbol”420 of the Arab context to the broader cause of freedom from authoritarian governments.

Certain aspects of the New Arab Cold War as described by Valbjørn and Bank have been altered over the course of the Arab Spring. Firstly, The League has returned to the center of the struggle, as it was during the first Arab Cold War. Secondly, while non-state actors, especially Hamas, remain important players, Iran has been taken out of the game. Its unqualified support for the Syrian regime's violent repression of the popular uprising makes it impossible for Iran to participate in the redefinition of the “Arab interest.” Nonetheless, it seems that New Arab Cold War will pursue its course, with growing animosity between the two camps.421 The previously Arab Cold War resulted in the fracturing of the Arab state system and paralysis of the League. Considering the new international expectations for the League, and the intensity of the regional crisis, it is unlikely the Arab states will take the risk of disregarding the League as they did in the 1990s. However, the introduction of these new notions of security into the League will not be without consequence. By introducing human security and human rights into League discourse, those advocating for humanitarian intervention in Syria are unknowingly creating new constraints on their own behavior. How they will reconcile this position with their authoritarian behavior at home remains to be seen.

420VALBJØRN, Morten, BANK, André. The New Arab Cold War: rediscovering the Arab dimension of Middle East regional politics. p. 17

421Qatari activism in the region, in particular, has elicited hostility. Algeria reportedly sparked rumors that Qatar is arming groups in northern Mali in retaliation for the emirate's behavior during the Arab Spring (See KHATIB, Lina. Qatar's foreign policy: The limits of pragmatism. p. 426). Libya has also complained of Qatari interference in its affairs. See SOTLOFF, Steven. Why the Libyans Have Fallen Out of Love With Qatar. Time Magazine. 2 January 2012

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NOBLE, Paul. From Arab System to Middle Eastern System?: Regional Pressures and Constraints In KORANY, Bahgat, DESSOUKI, Ali E. Hillal, The Foreign Policies of Arab States: The Challenge of Globalization. Cairo; New York : American University in Cairo Press, 2008. p. 67-167

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RISSE, Thomas, SIKKINK, Kathryn. The socialization of international human rights norms into domestic practices: introduction In RISSE, Thomas, ROPP, Stephen C., SIKKINK, Kathryn (eds), The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change. Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1999. 318 p.

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SHLAIM, Avi, The Lion of Jordan: The Life of King Hussein in War and Peace. London : Allen Lane, 2007. 697 p.

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SNYDER, Glenn H. Alliance Politics. Ithaca, N.Y. : Cornell University Press, 1997. 414 p.

TELHAMI, Shibley. Power, Legitimacy, and Peace-Making in Arab Coalitions: The New Arabism In BINDER, Leonard (ed.), Ethnic Conflict and International Politics in the Middle East, Gainesville, FL : University Press of Florida, 1999. p. 43-60

TALON, Claire-Gabrielle. Al Jazeera: Liberté d'expression et pétromonarchie. Paris : Presses Universitaires de France, 2011. 286 p.

TILLY, Charles. War Making and State Making as Organized Crime In EVANS, Peter, RUESCHEMEYER, Dietrich, SKOCPOL, Theda (eds), Bringing the State Back In. Cambridge : Cambridge University Press. 1985. p. 169-191

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HAMÂD, Magdî. Jâmi‘at al-duwal al-'arabiya: Madkhal ilâ al-mustaqbal [The League of Arab States: Entrance to the future]. Kuwait : Al-majlis al-watanî li al-thaqâfa al-funûn wa al-âdâb, 2004. 523 p.

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BIN ARIFA, Al-Tâhir Al-Mahdî. Al-jâmi‘a al-‘arabiya wa al-‘aml al-mushtarak 1945-2000. [The Arab League and joint action, 1945-2000]. Zahran : Amman, 2010. 568 p.

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BELLAMY, Alex J. Libya and the Responsibility to Protect: The Exception and the Norm. Ethics and International Affairs, September 2011,Vol. 25, No. 3, p. 263-269.

BELLAMY, Alex J. Responsibility to Protect or Trojan Horse? The Crisis in Darfur and Humanitarian Intervention after Iraq. Ethics and International Affairs, September 2005, Vol. 19, No. 2, p. 31-54.CHESTERMAN, Simon. Leading from Behind: The Responsibility to Protect, the Obama doctrine, and Humanitarian Intervention After Libya. Ethics & International Affairs. September 2011, Vol. 25, No. 3, p. 279-285.

DAKHLALLAH, Farah. The League of Arab States and Regional Security: Towards An Arab Security Community? British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, November 2012, Vol. 39, No. 3, p. 392-411.

DA LAAGE, Olivier. L’arabie et ses voisins: la revanche des vassaux. Cahiers de l’Orient, 2006-04/06, No. 82, p. 87-98.

EL-GHOBASHY, Mona. The Praxis of the Egyptian Revolution. Middle East Research and Information Project, Spring 2011, Vol. 41, No. 258. Available at: http://www.merip.org/mer/mer258/praxis-egyptian-revolution [consulted 17 April 2013]

HUDSON, Michael C. Lebanon After Ta'if: Another Reform Opportunity Lost?, Arab Studies Quarterly, Winter 1999, Vol. 21, No. 1, p. 27-40.

Iran and Saudi Arabia Spar over GCC Troops in Bahrain. Middle East Policy Council [online]. 5 April 2011 [consulted 7 May 2013]. Available at: http://www.mepc.org/articles-commentary/commentary-0

KAMRAVA, Mehran. Mediation and Qatari Foreign Policy. Middle East Journal, Autumn 2011, Vol. 64, No. 4, p. 539-556.

KHATIB, Lina. Qatar's foreign policy: The limits of pragmatism. International Affairs, March 2013, Vol. 89, No. 2, p. 417-431.

LUSTICK, Ian. The Absence of Middle Eastern Great Powers: Political 'Backwardness' in Historical Perspective. International Organization, Autumn 1997, Vol. 51, No. 4, p. 653-683.

MAKSOUD, Clovis. Diminished Sovereignty, Enhanced Sovereignty: United Nations-Arab League Relations at 50. Middle East Journal, Autumn 1995, Vol. 49, No. 4, p. 582-594.

VALBJØRN, Morten, BANK, André. The New Arab Cold War: rediscovering the Arab dimension of Middle East regional politics. Review of International Studies, 2012, Vol. 38, No. 1, p. 3-24.

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Think-tank publicationsABOU TALEB, Hassan. The Arab League and the Challenge of Self-Reform In IEMed Yearbook 2005. Barcelona : IEMed-CIDOB, 2005. p. 140-143. Available at: http://www.iemed.org/anuari/2005/anarticles/anaboutaleb.pdf

COATES ULRICHSEN, Kristian. Small states with a big role: Qatar and the United Arab Emirates in the wake of the Arab spring. HH Sheikh Nasser al-Mohammad al-Sabah Publication Series, Durham University, no. 3, October 2012 [consulted 8 Feb. 2013]. Available at: http://www.dur.ac.uk/resources/alsabah/SmallStateswithaBigRole.pdf

ELGINDY, Khaled. A New and Improved Arab League? Up Front blog (Brookings Institution). 27 March 2011 [consulted 25 March 2013]. Available on: http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/up-front/posts/2012/03/27-arab-league-elgindy

GAUSE, F. Gregory III. Saudi Arabia in the New Middle East. Council on Foreign Relations Center for Preventive Action, Council Special Report No. 63, December 2011. 48 p.

PINFARI, Marco. Nothing But Failure? The Arab League and the Gulf Cooperation Council as Mediators in Middle Eastern Conflicts. Crisis States Research Centre (LSE), Regional and Global Axes of Conflict, Working Paper no. 45, March 2009. 27 p. Available at: http://www2.lse.ac.uk/internationalDevelopment/research/crisisStates/download/wp/wpSeries2/WP452.pdf

RAJAB, Imân. Siyâsat al-‘iraq al-khârijiya tujah al-thawrât al-‘arabiya [Iraqi foreign policy towards the Arab revolutions]. Al-Ahram Strategic Reports, Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies. 1 July 2011 [consulted 7 May 2013]. Available at: http://digital.ahram.org.eg/articles.aspx?Serial=684844&eid=6012

ULRICHSEN, Kristian. Bahrain's Aborted Revolution In KITCHEN, Nicholas (ed.), After the Arab Spring: power shift in the Middle East? LSE IDEAS reports, Special Report 11, May 2012. p. 28-32. Available at: http://www2.lse.ac.uk/IDEAS/publications/reports/pdf/SR011/FINAL_LSE_IDEAS__BahrainsAbortedRevolution_Ulrichsen.pdf

WEBER, Annette. Bridging the Gap Between Narratives and Practices: The Role of the Arab League in Darfur. FRIDE, March 2010. Available at: http://www.fride.org/publication/730/bridging-the-gap-betweennarrative-and-practices:-the-role-of-the-arab-league-in-darfur

Widespread Middle East Fears that Syrian Violence Will Spread: No Love for Assad, Yet No Support for Arming the Rebels. Pew Research Global Attitudes Project [online]. 1 May 2013 [consulted 18 may 2013]. Available at: http://www.pewglobal.org/2013/05/01/widespread-middle-east-fears-that-syrian-violence-will-spread/

Articles from the pressABOUZEID, Rania. Syria's Secular and Islamist Rebels: Who Are the Saudis and the Qataris Arming? Time Magazine [online]. 18 September 2012 [consulted 18 may 2013]. Available at: http://world.time.com/2012/09/18/syrias-secular-and-islamist-rebels-who-are-the-saudis-and-the-

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Alger veut que l'Onu tranche sur une zone d'exclusion en Libye. AFP. 14 March 2011 [consulted 6 May 2013]. Available at: http://www.lalibre.be/actu/international/article/648685/alger-veut-que-l-onu-tranche-sur-une-zone-d-exclusion-en-libye.html

AL QASSEMI, Sultan Sooud. Qatar's Brotherhood Ties Alienate Fellow Gulf States. Al Monitor [online]. 23 January 2013 [consulted 18 May 2013]. Available at: http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/01/qatar-muslim-brotherhood.html

AL-QASSEMI, Sultan. Breaking the Arab News. Foreign Policy [online]. 2 August 2012 [consulted 11 may 2013]. Available at: http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/08/02/breaking_the_arab_news?page=0,1

AL-SHARIF, Osama. King Abdullah Seeks to Champion Jordanian Reforms. Al-Monitor [online]. 18 March 2013 [consulted 9 May 2013]. Available at: http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/03/king-abdullah-jordan-reform-protests.html

Arab League 'backs Gaza against aggression. Al-Jazeera [online]. 18 November 2012 [consulted 18 May 2013]. Available at: http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2012/11/2012111715464384598.html

Arab League Bars Libya From Meetings. AP [online]. 23 February 2011 [consulted 22 April 2013]. Available at: http://blogs.wsj.com/dispatch/2011/02/23/arab-league-bars-libya-from-meetings/

AYOOB, Mohammed. The GCC shows its true color. The Middle East Channel, Foreign Policy [online], 16 March 2011 [consulted 3 May 2013]. Available at: http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/03/16/the_gcc_shows_its_true_color

BANI RASHIA, Zaki. The Jordanian Spring has begun. The Guardian [online].12 October 2012 [consulted 19 May 2013]. Available at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2012/oct/19/jordanian-spring-has-begun

BECKFORD, Martin. Libya attacks criticised by Arab League, China, Russia and India. The Telegraph [online]. 21 March 2011 [consulted 6 May 2013]. Available at: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/libya/8393950/Libya-attacks-criticised-by-Arab-League-China-Russia-and-India.html

BEDNARZ, Dieter, FOLLATH, Erich, WINDFUHR, Volkhard. Eine epochale Entwicklung. Der Spiegel [online].14 march 2011 [consulted 19 may 2013]. Available at: http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-77435247.html

Bertrand Badie: Le printemps arabe a révélé l'existence d'un islamisme hétérogène et composite. Le Monde [online], 19 January 2012 [consulted 18 May 2013]. Available at: http://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2012/01/19/bertrand-badie-le-printemps-arabe-a-revele-l-existence-d-un-islamisme-heterogene-et-composite_1632134_3210.html

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BLAIR, Edmund. Analysis: Arab League Breaks Habit, Turns on Syria. Reuters [online]. 23 November 2011 [consulted 19 May 2013]. Available at: http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/11/23/us-syria-arabs-league-idUSTRE7AM1QT20111123

Britain, France halt security exports to Bahrain & Libya. AFP [online]. 18 February 2011 [consulted 22 April 2013). Available at: http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2011/02/19/138283.html

CHULOV, Martin. Arab League to reiterate backing for Libya no-fly zone. The Guardian [online]. 22 March 2011 [consulted 6 May 2013]. Available at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/mar/22/arab-league-libya-no-fly?INTCMP=SRCH

CHULOV, Martin. Syria condemns US ambassador's 'provocative' visit to Hama. The Guardian [online]. 8 July 2011 [consulted 11 May 2013]. Available at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/jul/08/syria-condemns-us-ambassador-visit-hama

CHULOV, Martin. Assad should quit, says King Abdullah as pressure mounts on Syrian regime. The Guardian [online].14 November 2011 [consulted 11 May 2013]. Available at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/nov/14/assad-should-quit-king-abdullah

COCKBURN, Patrick. Saudi police 'open fire on civilians' as protests gain momentum. The Independent [online], 5 October 2011 [consulted 12 May 2013]. Available at: http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/saudi-police-open-fire-on-civilians-as-protests-gain-momentum-2365614.html

CODY, Edward. Arab League condemns broad Western bombing campaign in Libya. The Washington Post [online]. 20 March 2011 [consulted 6 May 2013]. Available at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/arab-league-condemns-broad-bombing-campaign-in-libya/2011/03/20/AB1pSg1_story.html

COLVIN, Ross. Alarmed by Bahrain violence, U.S. appeals to government. Reuters [online]. 18 February 2011 [consulted 22 April 2013]. Available at: http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/02/18/us-bahrain-usa-idUSTRE71H5L420110218?feedType=RSS&feedName=everything&virtualBrandChannel=11563

Defiant Gaddafi vows to die as martyr, fight revolt. Reuters [online]. 22 February 2011 [consulted 22 April 2013]. Available at: http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/02/22/us-libya-protests-idUSTRE71G0A620110222

EAKIN, Hugh. The Strange Power of Qatar. The New York Review of Books [online]. 27 October 2011 [consulted 12 May 2013]. Available at: http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2011/oct/27/strange-power-qatar/?pagination=false

EL GUNDY, Zeinab. Syrian hunger strikers demand 'actions not speeches' from Egypt's Morsi. Ahram Online, 10 September 2012 [consulted 24 April 2013]. Available at: http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/140/52333/Egypt/First--days/Syrian-hunger-strikers-demand-action,-not-speeches.aspx

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EL-HAMALAWY, Hossam. Egypt's revolution has been ten years in the making. The Guardian [online], 1 March 2011 [consulted 13 April 2013]. Available at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/mar/02/egypt-revolution-mubarak-wall-of-fear

Gaddafi son: 'We will eradicate them all. Reuters [online]. 21 February 2011 [consulted 29 April 2013]. Available at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/feb/21/gaddafi-son-muammar-libya

GAY STOLBERG, Sheryl. Eyebrows Raised Over Envoy to Cairo. The Caucus blog, The New York Times [online]. 7 February 2011[consulted 17 April 2013]. Available at: http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/02/07/eyebrows-raised-over-envoy-to-cairo/?scp=4&sq=wisner&st=cse

GUMUCHIAN, Marie-Louise, SHENNIB, Ghaith. Libya car bomb hits French embassy, wounds guards. Reuters [online]. 23 April 2013 [consulted 19 May 2013]. Available at: http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/04/23/us-libya-attack-idUSBRE93M05320130423

Iraq's Maliki says Bahrain may ignite sectarian war. Reuters [online]. 25 March 2011 [consulted 7 May 2013]. Available at: http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/03/25/us-iraq-politics-idUSTRE72O6JK20110325

Khaled Said: The face that launched a revolution. Ahram Online. 6 June 2012. Available at: http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/0/43995/Egypt/0/Khaled-Said-The-face-that-launched-a-revolution.aspx (accessed 30 April 2013).

LEE, Matthew. U.S. Condemns 'Appalling' Violence In Libya. Associated Press. 22 February 2011 [accessed 16 March 2013]. Available at: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/02/22/us-condemns-appalling-vio_n_826633.html

LAW, Bill. How the Arab League embraced revolution. BBC News [online]. 2 December 2011 [consulted 25 March 2013]. Available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-15948031

Libya cuts off internet service: network monitor. Reuters [online]. 19 February 2011 [consulted 22 April 2013]. Available at: http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/02/19/us-libya-protests-idUSTRE71G0A620110219

Libyans in Egypt protest outside Arab League; League still divided over no-fly zone. Middle East News Agency. 12 March 2011 [consulted 24 March 2013]. Available at: http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/libyans-egypt-protest-outside-arab-league-league-still-divided-over-no-fly-zone

Libye: Alger espère qu'il n'y aura pas d'intervention. Agence France Presse. 11 March 2011 [consulted 6 May 2013]. Available at: http://www.ennaharonline.com/fr/news/6821.html

LYNCH, Marc. Tunisia and the New Arab Media Space. Abu Aardvark's Middle East Blog, Foreign Policy [online], 15 January 2011 [consulted 16 April 2013]. Available at: http://lynch.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/01/15/tunisia_and_the_new_arab_media_space

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MATARESE, Mélanie. Libye: la doctrine algérienne face aux frappes aériennes. Visa pour l'Algérie, Le Figaro [online]. 22 March 2011 [consulted 23 April 2013]. Available at: http://blog.lefigaro.fr/algerie/2011/03/libye-la-doctrine-algerienne-face-aux-frappes-militaires.html

MEYERS, Steven Lee. U.S. and Allies Say Syria Leader Must Step Down. The New York Times [online]. 18 August 2011 [consulted 17 May 2013]. Available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/19/world/middleeast/19diplo.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0

MOYNIHAN, Colin. Libya's UN Diplomats Break With Qaddafi. The New York Times [online]. 21 February 2011 [consulted 27 March 2013]. Available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/22/world/africa/22nations.html?_r=0

MUDHOON, Loay, The Arab League and the Conflict in Syria: The Unexpected Renaissance of the Arab League, Qantara [online]. 23 November 2011 [consulted 19 may 2013]. Available at: http://en.qantara.de/The-Unexpected-Renaissance-of-the-Arab-League/17822c83/index.html

NOE, Nicholas, RAAD, Walid. Al-Jazeera Gets Rap as Qatar Mouthpiece. Bloomberg News [online]. 10 April 2012 [consulted 13 may 2013]. Available at: http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-04-09/al-jazeera-gets-rap-as-qatar-mouthpiece.html

OTTERMAN, Sharon, MACKEY, Robert. Qaddafi erupts, on schedule. The Lede blog, The New York Times [online]. 30 March 2009 [consulted 26 April 2013]. Available at: http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/03/30/there-was-no-shortage-of-drama/

OWEIS, Khaled Yacoub. Syrians mark bleak Ramadan after 80 killed in Hama. Reuters [online], 31 July 2011 [consulted 11 May 2013]. Available at: http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/07/31/us-syria-idUSTRE76T02020110731

OWEIS, Khaled Yacoub. Qatar emir suggests sending Arab troops to Syria. Reuters [online]. 14 January 2012 [consulted14 May 2013]. Available at: http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/01/14/us-syria-idUSTRE8041A820120114

PILKINGTON, Ed. Libya erupts as Gaddafi clings on: Lives updates. The Guardian [online]. 22 February 2011 [consulted 29 April 2013]. Available at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/blog/2011/feb/22/libya-erupts-gaddafi-live-updates

PILKINGTON, Ed. UN ambassadors clash over condemnation of Gaddafi. The Guardian [online], 23 February 2011 [consulted 26 April 2013]. Available at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/feb/23/un-ambassadors-clash-gaddafi

Qatar to Take Part in Military Action over Libya. Reuters [online]. March 20, 2011 [consulted 6 may 2013]. Available at: http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/03/20/ozatp-libya-qatar-idAFJOE72J00S20110320

Qatar pulls out of Syria after attacks over Al Jazeera coverage. Agence France Presse. 19 July 2011 [consulted 9 May 2013]. Available at: http://www.globalpost.com/dispatches/globalpost-blogs/the-casbah/qatar-pulls-out-syria-after-attacks-over-al-jazeera-coverage

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ROBINSON, Dan. Obama condemns Libya crackdown.Voice of America News [online], 22 February 2011 [consulted 29 April 2013]. Available at: http://www.voanews.com/content/obama-condemns-libya-crackdown-116768079/135508.html

SALEH, Yasmine. Arab League body wants to suspend Syria, Yemen membership. Reuters [online]. 20 September 2011 [consulted 11 May 2013]. Available at: http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/09/20/arabs-syria-yemen-idAFL5E7KK0RX20110920

Saudi Arabia pledges $4 billion aid to Egypt. Agence France Presse. 21 May 2011 [consulted 12 May 2013]. Available at: http://english.ahram.org.eg/News/12611.aspx

Saudi king announces new benefits. Al-Jazeera [online]. 23 February 2011 [consulted 10 May 2013]. Available at: http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2011/02/2011223105328424268.html

SAVAGE, Charlie, SHANE, Scott. Iranians Accused of a Plot to Kill Saudis' U.S. Envoy. The New York Times [online]. 11 October 2011 [consulted 12 May 2013]. Available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/12/us/us-accuses-iranians-of-plotting-to-kill-saudi-envoy.html?pagewanted=all

SOLOMON, Erika, COLES, Isabel. Gulf States recall envoys, rap Syria over crackdown. Reuters [online]. 8 August 2011 [consulted 10 May 2013]. Available at: http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/08/08/us-gulf-syria-envoys-idUSTRE7773O820110808

SOTLOFF, Steven. Why the Libyans Have Fallen Out of Love With Qatar. Time Magazine [online] 2 January 2012 [consulted 19 May 2013]. Available at: http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2103409,00.html

Syria crisis: Arab ministers mull increasing pressure. BBC News [online].16 November 2011 [consulted 11 May 2013]. Available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-15749672

The Arab League suspends Syria mission – Nabil el-Arabi. BBC News [online]. 28 January 2012 [consulted 14 May 2013]. Available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-16774171

Three Gulf States Withdraw Ambassadors From Syria. Voice of America News [online]. 7 August 2011 [consulted 19 May 2013]. Available at: http://www.voanews.com/content/saudi-arabia-recalls-ambassador-to-syria-127200838/143486.html

TISDALL, Simon. Egypt underlines Iran's isolation at Non-Aligned Movement summit. The Guardian [online]. 30 August 2012 [consulted 18 may 2013]. Available at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2012/aug/30/egypt-iran-non-aligned-movement-summit

TOMLINSON, Hugh. Saudis told Obama not to humiliate Mubarak. The Times [online]. 10 February 2011 [consulted 16 April 2013]. Available at: http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/news/world/middleeast/article2905628.ece

Turkey, Egypt, Iran discuss Syria solution. United Press International [online]. 8 February 2013 [accessed 20 May 2013]. Available at: http://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-

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VANDERVALLE, Dirk. The Many Qaddafis. The New York Times [online], 23 February 2011 [consulted 17 April 2013]. Available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/24/opinion/24vandewalle.html?pagewanted=all

VIORST, Milton. The Arab League to the Rescue. The New York Times [online]. 12 November 2005, [consulted 3 April 2013]. Available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2005/11/12/opinion/12viorst.html?pagewanted=print

WARRICK, Joby, LEIBY, Richard. Clinton visits Cairo's Tahrir Square, decries violence in Bahrain. The Washington Post [online]. 17 March 2011 [consulted 10 may 2013]. Available at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/03/16/AR2011031601641.html

WATT, Nicholas, WINTOUR, Patrick. Libya no-fly zone call by France fails to get David Cameron's backing. The Guardian [online]. 23 February 2011 [consulted 29 April 2013]. Available at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/feb/23/libya-nofly-zone-david-cameron

WEAVER, Matthew. Muammar Gaddafi condemns Tunisia uprising. The Guardian [online]. 16 January 2011 [consulted 16 April 2013]. Available at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/jan/16/muammar-gaddafi-condemns-tunisia-uprising

WEYMOUTH, Lally. Amr Moussa’s vision for Egypt. The Washington Post [online]. 9 May 2011 [consulted 4 May 2013]. Available at: http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2011-05-09/opinions/35232481_1_parliamentary-elections-egypt-presidential-elections

WILLIAMS, John. The difficulty of reporting from inside Libya. BBC News [online]. 20 February 2011 [consulted 22 April 2013]. Available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/theeditors/2011/02/reporting_from_libya.html

Yemen denies reservations about UNSC no-fly zone over Libya. SABA [Yemen News Agency]. 13 March 2011 [consulted 6 May 2013]. Available at: http://ns2.sabanews.net/en/news237623.htm

BlogsAL OMRAN, Ahmed. Deaths Fuel Protest Movement in Restive Qatif. Riyadh Bureau blog, 14 October 2011[consulted 12 May 2013]. Available at: http://riyadhbureau.com/blog/2012/10/qatif-unrest

EL AMRANI, ISSANDR. Jazeera loses audience share in Egypt, Tunisia. The Arabist blog. 27 February 2013 [consulted 13 May 2013]. Available at: http://arabist.net/blog/2013/2/27/jazeera-loses-audience-share-in-egypt-tunisia.html

SALAMA, Vivian. Al-Jazeera's (R)Evolution? Jadaliyya. 20 May 2012 [consulted 3 may 2013]. Available at: www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/5610/al-jazeeras-(r)evolution

Arabic language pressABÛ HÛSAYN, Sawsan. Mûsâ: ta'jîl al-qima al-‘arabiya bi talab rasmî min al-‘iraq [Moussa: The Baghdad summit delayed in response to official Iraqi demand]. Al-Sharq Al-Awsat [online]. 6 May

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2011 [consulted 7 May 2013]. Available at: http://www.aawsat.com/details.asp?section=4&issueno=11847&article=620448&feature=#.UYjtQivAD_5

‘ABD AL-‘ÂL, ‘Abd al-Rahmân. ‘Amr Mûsa wa ishkâliyat tatwîr wa fa‘âliya al-jâmi‘a al-‘arabiya [Amr Moussa and the development in the activities of the Arab League]. Al-Ahrâm [online]. 1 October 2001 [consulted: 13 April 2013]. Available at: http://digital.ahram.org.eg/articles.aspx?Serial=220290&eid=289

Al-‘Arabî yuhamil Mash‘al risâlâ li al-Asad li waqf al-‘unf...wa yu'akad: Hamâs aqtana‘at Dimashq bi tawqî‘ al-brûtûkûl [Araby gives Meshal mission to deliver message to Assad to stop the violence...confirms that Hamas convinced Damascus to sign the Protocol]. Al-Sharq Al-Awsat [online]. 7 January 2012 [consulted 12 May 2013]. Available at: http://www.aawsat.com/details.asp?section=4&article=657817&issueno=12093#.UY_TPCvAD_6

Al-bahrain: talab khalîjî li ilghâ' qimat baghdâd [Bahrain: Gulf request to cancel Baghdad summit]. Al-Jazîra [online].13 April 2011 [consulted 7 May 2013]. Available at: http://www.aljazeera.net/news/pages/ae0994dc-e2e3-449e-b492-3186a4c41616

Al-jâmi‘a tûwaqif mushârikat wûfûd al-Qathâfî [The League announces the suspension of Libya delegation participation] Al-Jazîra [online]. 22 February 2011 [consulted 29 April 2013]. Available at: http://www.aljazeera.net/news/pages/6e55fa45-fddf-4b26-b399-03171d6e87e1

Al-jazâ'ir tanfî rafdahâ fard hazr jâwî ‘alâ lîbiyâ [Algeria denies its objection to the no-fly zone over Libya]. Al-Nahâr [online].14 march 2011 [consulted 29 April 2011]. Available at: http://www.ennaharonline.com/ar/national/75341.html

Al-jâmi‘a al-‘arabiya tad‘û li al-islâh wa al-hudû' [The Arab League calls for reform and calm]. Al-Jazîra [online]. 21 February 2011 [consulted 3 May 2013]. Available at: http://www.aljazeera.net/news/pages/98051336-4c76-4c98-9939-408168f30203

Al-Qathâfi yu‘ârid istid‘a' safîr lîbî ladâ al-sa‘ûdîyâ [Qaddafi objects to the withdrawal of Libya's ambassador to Saudi Arabia]. Al-Jazîra [online]. 4 March 2003 [consulted 29 April 2013]. Available at: http://www.aljazeera.net/news/pages/00cf5e75-6810-4061-9df5-5efe5f328f0a

Al-nas al-kâmil li al-bayân al-sâdir ‘an ijtimâ‘ wizarâ' khârijiya duwal majlis al-ta‘awun al-khalîjî [Full text of the statement issued after the meeting of the foreign ministers of the GCC]. Al-Sharq Al-Awsat. 11 March 2011 [consulted 29 April 2013]. Available at: http://www.aawsat.com/details.asp?section=4&issueno=11791&article=611991#.UX6EgivAD_4

AL-NÛBI, Mahmûd. Abû Al-Ghayt: al-makhâwuf min imtidâd ma yajri fî Tûnis ilâ duwal arabiya kalâm fârigh [Abu El-Gheit: Fears of the spreading of what is happening in Tunis to other Arab countries are empty words] Al-Ahrâm. [online]. 17 January 2011 [consulted 16 April 2013]. Available at: http://digital.ahram.org.eg/Policy.aspx?Serial=413150

Al-safîr Ahmad: ‘adam ‘itâ' ghatâ' li ay tadakhul ‘askarî khârijî fî lîbiya [Ambassador Ahmad: Refusal to give cover for foreign military intervention in Libya]. Syrian Arab News Agency [online], 13 March 2011 [consulted 29 April 2013]. Available at: http://sana.sy/ara/3/2011/03/13/336351.htm

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Al-sa‘ûdiya tashab muraqibîha min ba‘that al-jâmi‘a ilâ sûriya [Saudi Arabia withdraws its observers from the Arab League mission]. Al-Arabiya [online]. 22 January 2012 [consulted12 May 2013]. Available at: http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2012/01/22/189909.html

Al-wada‘ fî sûriya: la tûjid ay wasâtâ jazâ'iriya (wazârat al-shu'ûn al-khârijiya) [The situation in Syria: There is no Algerian mediation (Foreign Ministry)]. Algérie Presse Service. 5 April 2013 [consulted 14 May 2013]. Available at: http://www.aps.dz/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%88%D8%B6%D8%B9-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A7-%D9%84%D8%A7.html

‘Amr Mûsâ: qimat baghdâd lâ bud min ta'jîlih...wa lâ nîa li ilghâ'ihâ [Amr Moussa: the Baghdad summit must be postponed...but there is no intention to cancel it]. Al-Masrî Al-Yawm [online]. 1 May 2011 [consulted 19 May 2013]. Available at: http://www.almasryalyoum.com/node/419207

‘Amr Mûsâ yatahadath ‘an al-rafd wa al-tahafuzât fî qimat sirt...wa yad‘û al-shabâb al-diblûmâsiyî al-‘arab li qirâ'at mu‘aradat al-amîr sa‘ûd al-faysal [Amr Moussa speaks about the refuls and the reservations at the Sirt summit]. Al-Sharq al-Awsat [online]. 14 October 2010 [consulted 19 may 2013]. Available at: http://www.aawsat.com/details.asp?issueno=11700&article=590837#.UYaP0yvAD_5

Bûtaflîqa yakhruj ‘an samtih wa ya‘tarif bi al-ra'îs al-tûnisî al-mu'aqat [Bouteflika breaks his silence and recognizes the interim Tunisian president]. UPI. 19 January 2011 [consulted 16 April 2013]. Available at: http://www.alqabas-kw.com/Article.aspx?id=669013&date=19012011

HADIDÎ, Subhî. Hama 1982: Inqilâb al-majzara 'alâ al-jazzâr [Hama 1982: The massacre overthrows the slaughterer] Al-Quds Al-Arabî [online]. 2 February 2012 [consulted 4 April 2013]. Available at: http://www.alquds.co.uk/index.asp?fname=today%5C02qpt995.htm&arc=data%5C2012%5C02%5C02-02%5C02qpt995.htm

Hamad bin jâsim: al-azmâ al-sûriya tada‘ misdâqiyat al-jâmi‘a al-‘arabiya ‘alâ al-mihak [Hamad ben Jassem: The Syrian Crisis puts the credibility of the League to the test]. Al-Ahrâm [online]. 16 October 2011 [consulted 19 May 2013]. Available at: http://gate.ahram.org.eg/News/127279.aspx

Ikhtiyâr al-misrî Nabîl al-‘Arabî amînâ ‘âmâ li jâmi‘ât al-duwal al-‘arabiya [Nabil al-Araby chose as Secretary-General of the League of Arab States]. BBC Arabic News [online]. 15 May 2011 [consulted7 May 2013]. Available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/arabic/worldnews/2011/05/110515_egypt_league.shtml

JÛDÂ, Sulaymân. Nabîl al-‘Arabî yaqûm bi nasf thawrâ! [Nabil al-Araby undertakes half-revolution!]. Al-Sharq Al-Awsat [online]. 4 April 2011 [consulted 8 May 2013]. Available at: http://www.aawsat.com/leader.asp?section=3&issueno=11815&article=615584#.UYpVKSvAD_4

JÛDÂ, Sulaymân. Thawrat Nabîl al-‘Arabî taktamil [Nabil al-Araby completes his revolution]. Al-Sharq Al-Awsat [online]. 11 April 2011[consulted 8 May 2013]. Available at: http://www.aawsat.com/leader.asp?section=3&issueno=11822&article=616639#.UYLO9ivAD_4

Khâdim al-haramayn: Misr al-‘urûba wa al-islâm la yatahamal al-insân al-‘arabî wa al-muslim an ya‘bath bi amnihâ wa istiqrârihâ ba‘d al-mundasîn bi ism huriya al-ta‘bîr [Saudi King: The Arab muslim will not tolerate infiltrators to fool around with Egypt's security and independence in the name of freedom of expression]. Al-Sharq Al-Awsat [online]. 30 January 2011 [consulted16 April 2013].

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Available at: http://www.aawsat.com/details.asp?section=4&issueno=11751&article=606053#.UW12FCvAD_4 LAHIYÂNÎ, ‘Uthmân. Al-jazâ'ir tahtaj ‘alâ tasrîhât ‘Amr Mûsâ [Algeria complains of Amr Moussa's statements]. Al-Khabar [online]. 16 March 2011 [consulted 6 May 2013]. Available at: http://www.elkhabar.com/ar/autres/hadath/247560.html

Madalsî khilâl mu'tamar sahafî ma‘ wazîr al-khârijiya al-masrî: ta‘lîq ‘udwiyat sûriya mu'aqat wa yumkin raf‘uh fî aqrab waqt [Medelci during a press conference with the Egyptian foreign minister: Suspension of Syria's membership is temporary and it is possible to lift it soon]. El-Badil [online].13 November 2011 [consulted 11 May 2013]. Available at: http://elbadil.com/arabic-affaires/2011/11/13/22403

MJAYID, Muhamad Sâlah. Tûnis, min thawrat al-karâma ilâ ma‘rikat al-hûwiya [Tunisia, from the revolution of dignity to the battle for identity] Elaph [online]. 20 March 2012 [consulted 16 April 2013]. Available at thhttp://www.elaph.com/Web/opinion/2012/3/725461.html

Mûsa: ahdâth tûnis khatîra wa tawatur lahu ab‘âduh al-târîkhîya [Moussa: the events in Tunisia are dangerous and have historic aspects]. WAFA (Palestinian News and Info Agency) [online]. 15 January 2011 [consulted16 April 2013]. Available at: http://www.wafa.ps/arabic/index.php?action=detail&id=96237

Mûsâ: Inahâ thawra wa misr lan ta‘ûd li al-warâ' [Moussa: It is indeed a revolution and Egypt will not go back] Al-Ahrâm [online]. 9 February 2011 [consulted 23 April 2013]. Available at: http://ahram.org.eg/archive/438/2011/2/9/12/62044/219.aspx

Mûsâ yastajîb li nidâ' al-mutazâhirîn wa yanzil min al-jâmi‘a al-arabiya [Moussa responds to the protesters calls and goes down]. Al-Ahrâm [online]. 22 February 2011 [consulted 19 May 2013]. Available at: http://ahram.org.eg/archive/451/2011/2/22/25/64041/219.aspx

Musâliha sa‘ûdiya sûriya misriya qatariya fî maqar al-malik ‘Abd allah bi al-kûwait [Saudi, Syrian, Egyptian, Qatari reconciliation at King Abdallah's headquarters in Kuwait]. Al-Arabiya [online]. 19 January 2009 [consulted 19 May 2013]. Available at: http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2009/01/19/64501.html

MUSTAFÂ, Hamzâ. Ra'îs al-barlamân al-‘irâqi: ta'jîl qimat baghdâd sayadur bi ‘ilâqâtinâ al-‘arabiya [Iraqi Parliament Speaker: Delaying the Baghdad summit with damage our Arab relations]. Al-Sharq Al-Awsat [online]. 19 April 2011 [consulted 19 May 2013]. Available at: http://www.aawsat.com/details.asp

MUTAWALÎ, Nahlâ. Al-Jâmi‘â al-‘arabiya tuwâfiq ‘alâ fard hazr jawî ‘alâ lîbiyâ. Wa al-thuwâr yurahibûn [The Arab League agrees to a no-fly zone. Libyan revolutionaries welcome the decision]. Al-Ahrâm [online]. 13 March 2011 [consulted 23 April 2013]. Available at: http://digital.ahram.org.eg/articles.aspx?Serial=446743&eid=5492

Qatlâ wa jarhâ fajar al-yawm fi sûriya [Dead and wounded this morning in Syria]. Al-Jazîra [online]. 28 January 2012 [consulted 12 May 2013]. Available at: http://www.aljazeera.net/news/pages/e251abe8-a97c-4adb-b50f-73b22687d02f

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RASLÂN, Âmâl. Al-jâmi‘â al-‘arabiya tafshal fi tajmîd ‘udwiyat sûriya [The Arab League fails to freeze Syria's membership]. Youm 7 [online]. 16 October 2011 [consulted 2 May 2013]. Available at: http://www.youm7.com/News.asp?NewsID=514071&

Wasat samt rasmî, tarhîb sha‘bî ‘arabî bi taghîr tûnis [In the midst of official silence, positive popular reception of the change in Tunisia] Al-Jazîra [online]. 15 Feburary 2011 [consulted 16 April 2013]. Available at: http://www.aljazeera.net/news/pages/6c4ec4dd-7484-4e98-936c-e6bfe0659deb

Doctoral thesesFAROUK, Yasmine, Autonomisation, accommodement et "wait to seize" : les stratégies réactives du triangle arabe après l'intervention américaine en Irak : l'Arabie saoudite, l'Égypte et la Syrie (2003-2007), Doctoral thesis : Political Science. International Relations : Paris, Institut d'études politiques : 2010

MELHEM, Dina. La problématique d'une charte arabe des droits de l'Homme, sous la direction d'Ahmed Mahiou, Université Paul Cézanne (Aix-en-Provence, Bouches-du-Rhône, Marseille), 2008. 480 p.

Official documentsArab League documentsAll Arab League Council and Summit documents cited are available on the League's Arabic website unless otherwise noted below. The web address is: www.lasportal.org (limited documentation in English)

Alexandria Protocol [English translation]. Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 16, No. 411, May 18, 1947. Washington, DC : Government Printing Office, 1947. Available at: http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/alex.asp [consulted 19 May 2013]

Final communiqué, Emergency Arab League Summit, Cairo, Egypt, 22 October 2000 [consulted 8 April 2013]. Available at: http://www.aljazeera.net/specialfiles/pages/e6b51251-c5de-416e-a461-e8352946ad8a

UN DocumentsA more secure world: our shared responsibility. Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change. New York, N.Y : United Nations, Department of Public Information, 2005. Available at: http://www.un.org/secureworld/

BAN, Ki-Moon. Remarks to the Global Creative Forum Dinner, Los Angeles, California, USA. 22 February 2011 [consulted 27 March 2013]. Available at: http://www.un.org/apps/news/infocus/sgspeeches/statments_full.asp?statID=1088#.UVLTDauQf_4

United Nations Security Council Press Statement on Libya (SC/10180; AFR/2120), 22 February 2011 [consulted 29 April 2013]. Available at: http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2011/sc10180.doc.htm United Nations General Assembly, 2005 World Summit Outcome document (A/Res/60/1), 24 October 2005 [consulted 20 may 2013]. Available at: http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/un/unpan021752.pdf

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United Nations Security Council, 6490th meeting (S/PV.6490), 25 February 2011 [consulted 29 April 2013] Available at: http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/PV.6490

OtherCLINTON, Hillary Rodham. Situation in Libya. United States Department of State Press Statement. 21 February 2011 [consulted 27 March 2013]. Available at: http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2011/02/156836.htm

CROWLEY, Philip J. Situation in Libya. United States Department of State Press Statement, 20 February 2011 [consulted 27 March 2013]. Available at: http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/02/156829.htm

Joint Communiqué, 21st EU-GCC Joint Council and Ministerial Meeting, Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates. 20 April 2011 [consulted 6 May 2013]. Available at: http://www.eu-un.europa.eu/articles/en/article_10970_en.htm

The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. Ottawa : International Development Research Centre, December 2001. Available at: http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20Report.pdf

VideosBBC Arabic, video, Liqâ' Nabîl al-Arabî ma‘ al-BBC [BBC Interview with Nabil al-Araby]. 2 May 2011 [consulted 19 May 2013]. Available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/arabic/multimedia/2012/05/120502_arabi_clip_one.shtml?bw=bb&mp=wm&bbcws=1&news

EslamMediaOnline, video, Kalimat al-iftitâh: Duktûr Nabîl al-‘Arabî amîn ‘âm al-jâmi‘a al-‘arabiya [Opening speech: Dr. Nabil al-Araby Secretary-General of the Arab League]. 15 May 2011 [consulted 7 May 2013]. Available at: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DOL-e_MEsr0

HananNoura, video, Al-safîr Yûsaf Ahmad 2/2 mandûb sûriya al-jâmi‘a al-‘arabiya 16/10/2011 [The Ambassador, Yusaf Ahmad 2/2 Syrian delegate at the Arab League]. 17 October 2011 [consulted 11 May 2013]. Available at: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PLEAksRXfWc

FreeMediaSyria, video, Al-mu'tamar al-sahafî li nabîl al-‘arabî wa hamad bin jâsim 1i al-jazîra 22.01.2012 [Nabil al-Araby and Hamad bin Jassem press conference]. 22 January 2012 [consulted 19 May 2013]. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eDN60HgNrFc

LibyanGirl80, video, Ibrâhîm al-dabâshî yatlub fard al-hazr al-jawî yawm 21.2.2011. [Ibrahim al-Dabashi asks for a no-fly zone]. 21 February 2011 [consulted 20 May 2013]. Available at: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gBK5d63YuIo

pcanytime, video, Mandûb sûriya bi al-jâmi‘a al-‘arabiya yashtum mandûb qatar [Syrian delegate to the Arab League insults Qatari delegate]. 12 November 2011 [consulted 19 May 2013]. Available at: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EkFXO_t9gTw

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List of interviews

Interview with Arab League diplomat, Paris, France, 18 May 2012

Interview with retired Egyptian diplomat, Cairo, Egypt, 20 July 2012.

Interview with Arab League diplomat, Cairo, Egypt, 12 June 2012

Interview with Western diplomat and close observer of the League, Cairo, Egypt, 12 June 2012

Interview with Arab League diplomat, Cairo, Egypt, 13 June 2012

Interview with Egyptian diplomat, Paris, France, 23 October 2012

Interview with Egyptian diplomat, Cairo, Egypt, 12 January 2013

Interview with Stephane Lacroix, Assistant Professor, Sciences Po Paris School of International Affairs,

February 28, 2013, Paris, France

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Annex A: Pact of the League of Arab States422

With a view to strengthen[ing] the close relations and numerous ties which bind the Arab States,And out of concern for the cementing and reinforcing of these bonds on the basis of respect for the independence and sovereignty of theme Stated,And in order to direct their efforts toward[s] the goal of the welfare of all the Arab States, their common weal, the guarantee of their future and the realization of their aspirationsAnd in response to Arab public opinion in all the Arab countries,Have agreed to conclude a pact to this effect and have delegated as their plenipotentiaries those whose names are given below:Who, after the exchange of the credentials granting them full authority, which were found valid and in proper form, have agreed upon the following:

Article 1.- The League of Arab States shall be composed of the: independent Arab States that have signed this Pact.- Every independent Arab State shall have the right to adhere to the League. Should it desire to adhere, it shall present an application to this effect which shall be filed with the permanent General - Secretariat and submitted to the Council at its first meeting following the presentation of the application.

Article 2.- The purpose of the League is to draw closer the relations between member States and co-ordinate their political activities with the aim of realizing a close collaboration between them, to safeguard their independence and sovereignty, and to consider in a general way the affairs and interests of the Arab countries.- It also has among its purposes a close co-operation of the member States with due regard to the structure of each of these States and the conditions prevailing therein, in the following matters:(a) Economic and financial matters, including trade, customs, currency, agriculture and industry;(b) (communications, including railways, roads, aviation, navigation, and posts and telegraphs;(c) Cultural matters;(d) Matters connected with nationality, passports, visas, execution of judgments and extradition;(e) Social welfare matters;(f) Health matters.

Article 3.- The League shall have a Council composed of the representatives of the member States. Each State shall have one vote, regardless of the number of its representatives.- The Council shall be entrusted with the function of realizing the purpose of the League and of supervising the execution of the agreements concluded between the member States on matters referred to in the preceding article or on other matters.- It shall also have the function of determining the means whereby the League will collaborate with the international organizations which may be created in the future to guarantee peace and security and organize economic and social relations.

Article 4.- A special Committee shall be formed for each of the categories enumerated in article 2, on which the member States shall be represented. These Committees shall be entrusted with establishing the basis and scope of co-operation in the form of draft agreements which shall be submitted to the Council for its consideration preparatory to their being submitted to the States referred to.

422This bulk of this translation of the Pact is taken from American Foreign Policy 1950-1955, Basic Documents, Volume 1, Department of State Publication 6446, General Foreign Policy Series 117. Washington, DC : Government Printing Office, 1957. Available at: http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/arableag.asp [consulted 19 May 2013]. I have translated the amendments approved during the Algiers Summit in 2005 myself.

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- Delegates representing the other Arab countries may participate in these Committees as members. - The Council shall determine the circumstances in which the participation of these representatives shall be allowed as well as the basis of the representation.

Article 5.- The recourse to force for the settlement of disputes between two or more member States shall not be allowed. Should there arise among them a dispute that does not involve the independence of a State, its sovereignty or its territorial integrity, and should the two contending parties apply to the Council for the settlement of this dispute, the decision of the Council shall then be effective and obligatory.- In this case, the States among whom the dispute has arisen shall not participate in the deliberations and decisions of the Council.- The Council shall mediate in a dispute which may lead to war between two member States or between a member State and another State in order to conciliate them- The decisions relating to arbitration and mediation shall be taken by a majority vote.

Article 6.- In case of aggression or threat of aggression by a State against a member State, the State attacked or threatened with attack may request an immediate meeting of the Council.- The Council shall determine the necessary measures to repel this aggression. Its decision shall be taken by consensus. If this is impossible, the decision will be approved by a two-thirds majority of those present. If the aggression is committed by a member State the vote of that State will not be counted in determining unanimity.423

- If the aggression is committed in such a way as to render the Government of the State attacked unable to communicate with the Council, the representative of that State in the Council may request the Council to convene for the purpose set forth in the preceding paragraph. If the representative is unable to communicate with the Council, it shall be the right of any member State to request a meeting of the Council.

Article 7.424

- The presence of two-thirds of the member states represents the legal quorum necessary for a League Council to be held, as well as a meeting of the Economic and Social Council, and other ministerial councils within the framework of the League.- Without prejudice to provisions related to the second paragraph of Article 6 and the second paragraph of Article 18, decisions will be taken by consensus when possible. - If a consensus cannot be realized according to paragraph 2 of this article, the decision is made in the following way:

the decision is delayed until the next meeting if the matter is an emergency, an exceptional meeting is held within a month if there is no consensus, there is a vote and the decision is valid if it receives two-thirds of the vote of

those present, and this regards decisions relating to objective issues a simple majority of the States present and taking part in the vote, and this regards decisions to which the

previous paragraph of this article does not apply, taking into account the provisions put forth in paragraph 4 of Article 5 and the provisions in Article 16.

those present will explain the decision to resort to a vote in case consensus proves impossible

423This paragraph previously stated: “The Council shall determine the necessary measures to repel this aggression. Its decision shall be taken unanimously. If the aggression is committed by a member State the vote of that State will not be counted in determining unanimity.” It was changed in accordance with Arab League Summit resolution 290, 23 March 2005.

424This article previously stated: “The decisions of the Council taken by a unanimous vote shall be binding on all the member States of the League; those that are reached by a majority vote shall bind only those that accept them. In both cases the decisions of the Council shall be executed in each State in accordance with the fundamental structure of that State.” It was changed in accordance with Arab League Summit resolution 290, 23 March 2005.

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Article 8.Every member State of the League shall respect the form of government obtaining in the other States of the League, and shall recognize the form of government obtaining as one of the rights of those States, and shall pledge itself not to take any action tending to change that form.

Article 9.- The States of the Arab League that are desirous of establishing among themselves closer collaboration and stronger bonds than those provided for in the present Pact, may conclude among themselves whatever agreements they wish for this purpose.- The treaties and agreements already concluded or that may be concluded in the future between a member State and any other State shall not be binding on the other members.

Article 10.The permanent seat of the League of Arab States shall be Cairo. The Council of the League may meet at any other place it designates.

Article 11.The Council of the League shall meet in ordinary session twice a year, during the months of March and October. It shall meet in extraordinary session at the request of two member States whenever the need arises.

Article 12.- The League shall have a permanent General Secretariat, composed of a Secretary-General, Assistant Secretaries and an adequate number of officials.- The Secretary-General shall be appointed by the Council upon the vote of two-thirds of the States of the League. The Assistant Secretaries and the principal officials shall be appointed by the Secretary-General with the approval of the Council.- The Council shall establish an internal organization for the General Secretariat as well as the conditions of service of the officials.- The Secretary-General shall have the rank of Ambassador; and the Assistant Secretaries the rank of Ministers Plenipotentiary.- The first Secretary-General of the League is designated in an annex to the present Pact.

Article 13.- The Secretary-General shall prepare the draft of the budget of the League and submit it for approval to the Council before the beginning of each fiscal year.- The Council shall determine the share of each of the States of the League in the expenses. It shall be allowed to revise the share if necessary.

Article 14.- The members of the Council of the League, the members of its Committees and such of its officials as shall be designated in the internal organization, shall enjoy, in the exercise of their duties, diplomatic privileges and immunities.- The premises occupied by the institutions of the League shall be inviolable.

Article 15.- The council shall meet the first time at the invitation of the Head of the Egyptian Government. Later meetings shall be convoked by the Secretary-General.- In each ordinary session the representatives of the States of the League shall assume the chairmanship of the Council in rotation.

Article 16.

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Except for the cases provided for in the present Pact, a majority shall suffice for decisions by the Council effective in the following matters:(a) Matters concerning the officials.(b) The approval of the budget of the League.(c) The internal organization of the Council, the Committees and the General Secretariat. .(d) The termination of the sessions.

Article 17.The member States of the League shall file with the General Secretariat copies of all treaties and agreements which they have concluded or will conclude with any other State, whether a member of the League or otherwise.

Article 18.- If one of the member States intends to withdraw from the League, the Council shall be informed of its intention one year before the withdrawal takes effect- The Council of the League may consider any State that is not fulfilling the obligations resulting from this Pact as excluded from the League, by a decision taken by a unanimous vote of all the States except the State referred to.

Article 19.425 The foundation of an Arab Parliament. The Parliament's statute determines its form, its tasks, and its competence.

Article 20.- The present Pact may be amended with the approval of two-thirds of the members of the League in particular for the purpose of strengthening the ties between them, of creating an Arab Court of Justice, and of regulating the relations of the League with the international organizations that may be created in the future to guarantee security and peace- No decision shall be taken as regards an amendment except in the session following that in which it is proposed.- Any State that does not approve an amendment may withdraw from the League when the amendment becomes effective, without being bound by the provisions of the preceding article.

Article 21.- The present Pact and its annexes shall be ratified in accordance with the fundamental form of government in each of the contracting States.- The instruments of ratification shall be filed with the General Secretariat and the present Pact shall become binding on the States that ratify in fifteen days after the Secretary-General receives instruments of ratification from four States.- The present Pact has been drawn up in the Arabic language in Cairo and dated 8 Rabi al Thani 1364 (March 22, 1945), in a single text which shall be deposited with the General Secretariat.A certified copy shall be sent to each of the States of the League.

ANNEX ON PALESTINEAt the end of the last Great War, Palestine, together with the other Arab States, was separated from the Ottoman Empire. She became independent, not belonging to any other State.

The Treaty of Lausanne proclaimed that her fate should be decided by the parties concerned in Palestine.

Even though Palestine was not able to control her own destiny, it was on the basis of the recognition of her independence that the Covenant of the League of Nations determined a system of government for her.

425This article was added in accordance with Arab League Summit resolution 290, 23 March 2005.

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Her existence and her independence among the nations can, therefore, no more be questioned de jure than the independence of any of the other Arab States.

Even though the outward signs of this independence have remained veiled as a result of force majeure, it is not fitting that this should be an obstacle to the participation of Palestine in the work of the League.

Therefore, the States signatory to the Pact of the Arab League consider that in view of Palestine's special circumstances, the Council of the League should designate an Arab delegate from Palestine to participate in its work until this country enjoys actual independence.426

ANNEX ON CO-OPERATION WITH ARAB COUNTRIES NOT MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL OF THE LEAGUEWhereas the member States of the League will have to deal either in the Council or in the Committees with questions affecting the interests of the entire Arab world

And whereas the Council cannot fail to take into account the aspirations of the Arab countries not members of the Council and to work toward their realization, the States signatory to the Pact of the Arab League strongly urge that the Council of the League should cooperate with them as far as possible in having them participate in the Committees referred to in the Pact, and in other matters should not spare any effort to learn their needs and understand their aspirations and should moreover work for their common weal and the guarantee of their future by whatever political means available.

ANNEX ON THE APPOINTMENT OF SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE LEAGUEThe States signatory to the present Pact have agreed to appoint Abd Al Rahman Azzam Bey Secretary-

General of the League of Arab States.

His appointment shall be for a term of two years. The Council of the League shall later determine the future organization of the General Secretariat.

Annex B: Arab League member states and year of accession to the organization

1945: Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Saudi Arabia,Yemen, Lebanon, Jordan 1953: Libya1956: Sudan 1958: Morocco, Tunisia 1961: Kuwait 1962: Algeria 1971: United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain, Oman 1973: Mauritania 1974: Somalia 1976: Palestinian Liberation Organization 1977: Djibouti 1993: Comoros

426The Palestinian Liberation Organization was accepted as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people in 1976. The Palestinian National Authority has since taken its place.

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Annex C: Arab League Council documents relevant to the Arab Spring

Key:E – Exceptional; R – Regular; S – SummitPR – Permanent representatives; FM – Foreign ministersSMSC – Special ministerial committee on Syria

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Date Subject Level Title Status Location Reservation22.2.2011 Libya suspension PR S/136 E cairo2.3.2011 Baghdad summit delayed FM R/7293 R cairo

2.3.2011 FM R/7298 R cairo2.3.2011 Bahrain, national dialogue FM S/137 R cairo12.3.2011 Libya NFZ FN R/7360 E cairo12.3.2011 Musa Sadr's disappearance FM S/138 E cairo

22.3.2011 PR S/139 E cairo22.3.2011 Yemen, concern PR S/140 E cairo15.5.2011 SG elected FM R/7361 E cairo15.5.2011 Libyan tv channels FM R/7363 E cairo27.8.2011 UN recognition of Libya NTC FM R/7370 E cairo

27.8.2011 FM S/148 E cairo

13.9.2011FM

S/149 R cairo

13.9.2011FM

S/150R

cairo13.9.2011 Yemen, national dialogue FM S/151 R cairo

13.9.2011 FM S/152 R cairo

13.10.2011 PR S/153 E cairo

16.10.2011 FM R/7435 E cairo2.11.2011 Arab peace plan for Syria FM R/7436 E cairo

12.11.2011 Syria suspension FM R/7438 E cairo16.11.2011 Syria, protocol FM R/7439 E rabat16.11.2011 Syria suspension takes effect FM R/7440 E rabat

24.11.2011 FM R/7441 E cairo24.11.2011 Bahrain report submitted FM S/156 E cairo24.11.2011 Yemen signs GCC deal FM S/157 E cairo24.11.2011 Libya, new government FM S/158 E cairo24.11.2011 Tunisia elections FM S/159 E cairo

27.11.2011 FM R/7442 E cairo

Libya, confirm suspension, consider NFZ

Bahrain, denounce foreign interference, underlines legality of Peninsula Shield force mission

Syria, requests SG to go to DamascusBahrain, applauds King's actions, recommends investigationIran, importance of Arab-Iranian relations, concern over provocative rhetoric

Syria, concern, send AL delegation after ceasefire Iranian attempt to assassinate Saudi ambassadorMinisterial committee on Syria created

Yemen, Lebanon; Iraq abstains

Syria asked to sign protocol, ultimatum, threatens sanctions

Syria, sanctions committee formed

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3.12.2011 N/A SMCSN/A

doha

17.12.2011 Syria, pressure to sign protocol N/A SMCS N/A doha

20.12.2011 PR S/161 E cairo

8.1.2012 N/A SMCS E cairo

22.1.2012FM

R/7444 E cairo Algeria

22.1.2012 FM R/7445 E cairo

12.2.2012FM

R/7446 E cairo

10.3.2012 FM R/7460 R cairo lebanon abstains

10.3.2012 FM S/166 R cairo10.3.2012 Yemen, elections FM S/167 R cairo

29.3.2012 S SR/554N/A

baghdad lebanon abstains29.3.2012 Yemen, general support S SR/555 N/A baghdad 17.4.2012 Syria, ICC threat N/A SMCS E doha

26.4.2012 FM R/7503 E cairo

26.4.2012 FM S/168 E cairo

2.6.2012 FM R/7507 E doha

22.7.2012 FM R/7510 E doha5.9.2012 Syria, UN Chapter 7 FM R/7523 R cairo lebanon abstains 5.9.2012 Yemen, support for GCC plan FM R/7524 R cairo

5.9.2012 FM R/7525 R cairo

5.11.2012 PR N/A cairo

12.11.2012 FM / / cairo /

9.12.2012 N/A SMCS N/A doha23.12.2012 Syria, Palestinian refugees PR S/173 E cairo

Syria, list of people to be sanctioned, negotiations over observer mission

Syria, welcomes signature of protocolSyria, first report by observer missionSyria, extend observers mission, 6 point plan for political transitionSyria, increase funding for observersSyria, condemns government, call for political boycott, asks UN to form peacekeeping force

Lebanon abstains; Algeria

Syria, approval joint LA-UN envoyLibya, support for new government

Syria, support envoy, reject violence, UNSC should endorse arab plan

Syria, asks Morocco to bring issue before the UNSC

Algeria; Lebanon abstains

UAE, condemns Ahmadinejad visits island Abu MusaSyria, requests UN Chapter 7, Syrian tv ban

Algeria, Iraq; Lebanon abstains

Syria, asks Assad to step down

Algeria, Iraq; Lebanon abstains

Libya, support holding trials in Libya for war crimesCriticizes EU for condemning human rights violations in UAE

Press release

Recognition of Syrian National CoalitionSyria, creation of united military command Algeria, Iraq

Annex D: Arab League headquarters, Cairo, Egypt (Photographs taken July 2012)

View of Arab League headquarters from the Syrian tent.

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13.1.2013 FM R/7578 E cairo

11.2.2013 PR R/7581 E cairo

6.3.2013 FM R/7595 R cairo

6.3.2013FM

R/7596R cairo

6.3.2013FM

R/7597R cairo

27.3.2013 S SR/580N/A

doha

Syrian refugees in neighboring countriesAid for Syrians refugees in neighboring countriesSyria, National Coalition legal representative, prepare to take seat at summit, political solution but rights of states to provide military support

Algeria, Iraq; Lebanon abstains

Libya, general support (especially regarding security issues), refusal of foreign interferenceYemen, refusal of foreign interference, applauds call for national dialogue in support of GCC initiativeSyria, acknowledges interim governement, sanctions military aid

Algeria, Iraq; Lebanon abstains

View of Arab League headquarters with Syrian tent in the foreground.

View of Arab League headquarters from eastern edge of Tahrir Square

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Insulting graffiti [jâmi‘at al-kharâ] on the gate of the Arab League (Tahrir Street).

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