First March Motion: Turkey keeping an ally, or keeping the International law

Salad Sh. Yusuf Addow

Abstract

This study aims to address Turkish parliament’s vote against the government’s motion to

authorize American troops to use Turkish airspace and to be stationed ın Turkey’s territory to

attack Iraq. Exclusively, the article is trying to answer why the Turkish Grand National

Assembly voted down against the government’s motion to authorize American troops to be

stationed in Turkey’s territory? Since the two countries has been strategic allies for more than a

half century. To answer this question the article uses normative theory of IR, and argues that the

illegitimacy of the war was the core reason of Turkey’s denial to ally with the United States’ war

on Iraq. As it lost the legality and the approval of the United Nations Security Council, it was

considered as unjust, an immoral war. The study argues that the Iraq war violated the

international law and the norm of sovereignty, and as a result the Turkish parliament voted

against the government’s motion.

Introduction

urkey has been an ally with the United States for more than a half century, and both

countries have enjoyed a special relationship. As a member of the North Atlantic treaty

Organization (NATO), Turkey represents a NATO’s vital eastern anchor, and strategic

ally for US. However, on the first March 2003, Turkey’s Grand National Assembly

(TGNA) opened a new page of history of the US-Turkey relations, as the TGNA voted

down the government’s motion to deploy American troops in Turkey to open a northern

front in Iraq. As this move shocked the US and its allies, this article is aimed to examine the

critical reasons why the Turkish legislative body turn down the America’s demands?

Although First March Motion is still unfolding, scholars have already used much ink to analyze

and enlighten the grounds of Turkey’s negative response to US and more generally its foreign

policy actions following that decision. Most of the writings regarding the subject centered on

either on the implications of the choice of Turkey’s foreign policy, or the causes as some claimed

security, economy or leadership were the motive of such a move. For instance the constructive

theorists argued that the identity and the background of AKP elites was the driving force to

refuse America’s demands to invade a Muslim state. The realists explained the case from the

aspect of balance of power, as they argued the move was a Turkish foreign policy strategy to

increase its influence vis-à-vis the US via non-military means, or soft balancing. The realists

argued Turkey used a soft power foreign policy to mitigate the risks and the negative

consequences of the war to the regional stability. Liberals argued, the public opinion, which was

strongly against the war, had pressured the parliament members to vote against the motion. The

Turkish public opinion strongly opposed the government’s cooperation with US to authorize the

American soldiers use Turkish territory. For liberals, since the government was democratically

T

elected, the parliament had to listen to the public opinion and had to vote against the motion.

This paper acknowledges the merits of all of these arguments; however, it contends that a very

little thought has been paid to the impact of the Turkey’s docility to the international law, the UN

Security Council and EU resolutions toward the TGNA decision. These studies overleaped the

significance of the illegality of the war that had enforced Turkey to obey the international law

and support the UN and European resolutions.

In general the article aims to enlighten the question of why TGNA voted down against the

government’s motion to authorize the American troops to be stationed in Turkey and use its

airspace to open a northern front to Iraq, since Turkey has been a historic and strategic with US

for more than a half century. From the dialectics of normative theory of international relation,

this paper argues the unjust war, its violations of international law to intervene a sovereignty

nation, and the UNSC and European resolutions (as legitimate international bodies) against the

American war on Iraq, had urged the Turkish parliament to vote against the motion. Moreover,

the Turkish constitution stipulates international legitimacy to the stationing of foreign troops in

Turkey or decelerating a war against a sovereign nations, according to article 92 of the

constitution1. In all over the world, the war had been regarded and considered as an Illegal, and

unjust, since it has lost the approval of the United Nations, infringed the international law, and

the norm of sovereignty. Therefore, this study argues that there was no other choice available for

Turkish Parliament other then “no” vote to war on Iraq, as the constitution forbids legally a such

kind of war.

The article is structured into three sections. The first section gives an overall understanding about

the literature of normative theory and the intervening sovereign nations, by applying to the Iraq

war case and Turkey’s refusal. The second section will discuss about the legality of the Iraq

invasion by outlining the US justifications, UN Security Council’s resolution, and the

international law regarding this war. The third section will analyze and conclude TGNA’s

decision based on the normative theory of international relations.

Intervening Sovereign nations (Normative theory)

Normative theory addresses the moral dimension of international relations. Most basically it

addresses the ethical nature of the relations between communities and states. Such issues include

order, war and peace, justice, human rights, intervening of sovereignty states, and similar ethical

questions of a fundamental kind.2

In world politics, the normative issues refer either directly or

indirectly, to the state, interstate relations and the role of individuals as citizens of states.3 As the

theory covers a wide range of moral and legal issues, from environmental to human rights;

however, in this article, the study will only focus on the specific aspects of war and interventions

1 Baris Kesgin and Juliet Kaarbo, university of Kansas: “when how parliaments influence foreign policy: the case of

Turkey’s Iraq decision”. International studies prospective, 11(1),2010, pp. 19-36 2 Robert H. Jackson, and Georg Sørensen “Introduction to International Relations: Theories and Approaches”,

Oxford, fourth edition, 2012 3 Dr. Zerrin Ayse Bakan “Normative Theory in IR: Frost’s Constitutive Approach”

to sovereign states. According to the theory, any kind of war or conflict between communities or

states, has to conform with just war’s principles, which are (1) states rightfully go to war (jus ad

bellum) with just cause (a legitimate cause) such as self-defense in response to aggression, as the

decision to go to war is made by legitimate authority in the state, and it’s the last resort after

failing peaceful solutions, (2) states exercise right conduct in war (jus in bello) when the means

employed are proportional to the ends sought, when weapons (typically those that are

indiscriminate or cause needless suffering) are not used, and when actions are taken with a right

intention to accomplish legitimate military objectives and to minimize collateral damage.4

These principles of just war are part of the body of international law that is legally binding the

actions of the states. Normative theory preconditions the respect of international law and the

legitimacy of any action to be taken by any state to intervene to a sovereign nation. International

law conceives the international community as a society of states and as that law (International

law) is made by the states. Any action to be taken by one state shouldn’t infringe the law and has

to be accepted by the UN, a representation of all states. The international law necessitates the

Security Council’s members’ consensus; -a body in the United Nations charged for the

maintenance of international peace- of any intervention in a sovereign state. The UN Security

Council’s resolutions toward the international peace are obligatory to all nations in the United

Nations to comply with. The charter of the United Nations is very clear in prohibiting the

offensive use of military force against a sovereign nation. The international norm against

offensive warfare, like certain other norms that also have become codified international law,

reflects a broadly held moral standard.

Why Nations obey the international law

Although respecting the international law is obligatory to all nation states, however, many states

violate the law for reasons of their interest at certain times. But states generally comply with the

law for many reasons include: fear of isolation and sanction, condemnation from the

international community, and seeking reputations as regulations-abiding and moral state. In the

following sections, the paper explains these different reasons by applying to the case of Turkey

case to refuse the Iraq war.

First: nations obey the international law because of fear of the negative consequences of

offending acts. The state concern about the condemnation, opprobrium, and other directly

negative reactions from the world community. Launching an offensive act against an

independent nation will create negative responses from the international community in

condemnations, threatening of sanctions and isolation from the international interactions. The

Iraq war was very controversial among the United States and its allies in the war, and the rest of

the world community of nations. Many states opposed believing the war was illegal according to

the United Nations Charter and resolutions, while others believed the war will only create a

regional instability. Turkey, as a Middle Eastern country and a European Union candidate faced

4 Viotti, P. and M. Kauppi, “International Relations Theory”, (eds.) 1987, Macmillan Publishing Company, New York

a dilemma of supporting a historic and strategic ally-United States- or face the negative

consequences of offense acts, so that be subject of condemnation from the international

community, and isolation from the EU which it had to conform with its resulutions in order to

be accepted for full membership. Eventually, Turkey objected America’s demands to join the

war and aligned with the EU and other international partrners’ decision. Therefore, nations act to

obey the international law as a consequence of its repeated interaction with other governmental

and non-governmental actors in the international system. State’s violation of law generates

inevitable frictions and contradictions that hinder its ongoing participation in the transnational

legal method. For that reason, fear of potential negative consequences, nations encounter reduces

the likelihood of violating the international law.5

Second: nations obey the international law for fear of the negative consequences of weakening

the norm against offensive war and increasing the likelihood that others would violate the

international law. Knowing if the one state doesn’t respect the law, it cannot expect others to do

vise verse, meaning, a world in which states are more likely to launch offensive wars would be

more detrimental to any other state interest than a world in which the rule against launching such

acts is respected. Therefore, from the dialectical reasoning states a more likely to avoid

infringing the international law and invade foreign nations. The Turkish parliament perceived

that violating the international law and invading sovereign nations would only encourage other

nations to violate and excuse for foreign invasion. A more war-prone Middle East, which already

suffered from ethnic and religious conflicts, would entail more destruction and instability to the

regions. Undermining the international order by hosting foreign troops in Turkey, would only

for the most part work in favor of the most powerful nations of the world to repeat the same

actions against other states including even Turkey. For that reason the TGNA rejected the

motion.

Third: nations respect the international law as a reflection of their own domestic rules. Law-

abiding states internalize the international law by incorporating it into their domestic legal and

political structures 6 to align with the corporate worldwide norms and laws. Therefore opposing

the international law will be the same also violating the state’s domestic laws. As it is stipulated

in Turkish constitution, a declaration of state war against a sovereign nation must be deemed

legitimate by the international law. The Turkish constitution stipulates international legitimacy to

the stationing of foreign troops in Turkey or declaring a war against a sovereign nation,

according to article 92 of the constitution7. Therefore, Turkey had to respect its domestic

(constitution) law first, which stipulates to respect the international law.

Finally: Nations obey the international law as a regulation-abiding state to seek international

reputation. The nations obey the international law as an advantage as the costs of advancing

nation's interest are more efficient than it what it costs to the nation if they violate the

5 Paul R. Pillar “The Value of Obeying International Law”, the national internets journal, August 2012

6 Paul R. Pillar “The Value of Obeying International Law”, the national internets journal, August 2012

7 Baris Kesgin and Juliet Kaarbo, university of Kansas: “when how parliaments influence foreign policy: the case of

Turkey’s Iraq decision”. International studies prospective, 11(1),2010, pp. 19-36

international order, 8 and the advantages include greater goodwill in the international community.

For Turkey, the Iraq war was a test of its credibility to the international law; hence it declined to

join with the US as many states clearly opposed. The EU, France, Germany, Russia and other

world powers were from the very outset publicly opposed military action against Iraq. Therefore,

as it rejected to line up with the United States, and act upon the UN Security Council resolutions,

Turkey’s good image and diplomatic power in world politics has risen. The move to vote ‘no’

was greatly welcomed by the EU, the Arab and the Islamic world.

Iraq war and the International Law

Despite its violation of the international law, the wisdom of the Iraq war can be questioned,

merely in that respect, that there was a simple evidence and general agreement among pro- and

anti-war thinkers that the war was opposed to the many international opinions and biased from

prevailing normative conventions. Given that lacking UN approval or credible evidence of

imminent danger which necessitates immediate preemptive action, the U.S. Invasion of Iraq was

broadly seen as a violation of international norms. Most international legal scholars agree that

the prevailing UN Charter paradigm restricts the use of force to limited circumstances of self-

defense with UNSC authorization. However, within the realm of self-defense, the notion of legal

preemption has been approved on the basis of necessity, immediacy, and proportionality.

Using a self defense against a perceived future threat to the US or its allies in the region, the

Bush Administration justified the war according to the international law. The controversial

“Bush Doctrine” of the National security strategy claimed:

“We must be prepared to stop rogue states and their terrorist clients before they are

able to threaten or use weapons of mass destruction against the United States and

our allies and friends”.9

This doctrine marks a departure from the prohibition of the use of force under international law,

starting from the Kellogg Briand pact, the establishment of the Nuremberg Charter, the

conclusion of the United Nations Charter and the establishment of the International Criminal

Court, all call avoidance to use force in international relations. Unlikely, The United States and

its allies had justified the war for preventive purposes, which gives them the right to act in

according to the international law. However, in the framework of the customary international law

which recognized self-defense as a legitimate basis to use force, it strongly urges to clearly

distinguish the reasons of self defense and aggression, according to the following statement:

“The safest plan is to prevent evil where that is possible. A Nation has the right to resist the

injury another seeks to inflict upon it, and to use force... against the aggressor. It may even

8

John Ikenberry “After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order After Major Wars”, Princeton University, 2001 9 ROBERT J. DELAHUNTY & JOHN YOO “The “Bush doctrine”: can preventive war be justified?”

anticipate the other’s design, being careful, however, not to act upon vague and doubtful

suspicions, lest it should run the risk of becoming itself the aggressor10

On the other hand, the United Nations charter clearly states in its foreword that the UN was

established “to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war”; and its substantive

provisions obligate member states to “settle their international disputes by peaceful means” and

to refrain from using force against each in a manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United

Nations (Article 2 (4)). Regarding the states’ traditional right to use force, the charter initiated a

collective security scheme in which the Security Council is authorized to “determine the

existence of any threat to the peace, or act of aggression” and to “decide what measures shall be

taken... to maintain international peace and security” (Article 39).11

International law has conceived the international community as a society of states as the law is

made by the states. In that society, it is the states, in their capacity as members of regional and

interstate organizations such as the UN Security Council and the General Assembly, that decide

when a situation necisitates a humanitarian intervention or preventive war, and ‘whether the

force deployed is appropriate and commensurate with the necessity’ 12 States are peers through

their common membership in the society of states, and since states are the self-professed agents

of military force in world politics, it would seem logical to conclude that the people who can

determine the legitimacy of military action by a state or collectivity of the states must be

representatives of states themselves which is the UN.13 After failing to gain the Security

Council’s approval, the United States, in its “Bush Doctrine” of national security, together with

the United Kingdom, Australia and a number of other states, launched the war on Iraq,. Many

international law experts believe that the move was illegal and amounted to a war of

aggression.14

Turkey and TGNA’s refusal of the Iraq war

Turkey, as a strategic partner with the US and a key player in the Middle East, was significant to

the US invasion to Iraq for two reasons. First: easily defeating Saddam from northern Iraq; as the

region’s dominant Kurdish population greatly oppose the regime. Second: low cost strategy,

since a two Frontlines will be heavy to Iraq forces to resist against the coalition forces. To

minimize the cost and casualties of the war, the Bush administration demanded from the NATO

member and strategic allay-Turkey, a military base, however the demand put the country in a

dilemma of either sticking with its ally or respecting its constitution and international law. As a

regional middle power, it was difficult to resist the demands of the superpower; United States.

10

Laurence Boisson De Chazournes, & Marcelo Gustavo Kohen (2010). International Law and the Quest for Its Implementation. Leiden: Koninklijke Bril NV. P. 394 11 David M. Ackerman Legislative Attorney American Law Division “International Law and the Preemptive Use of

Force Against Iraq” CRS Report for Congress 12

Franck, ‘Legality and Legitimacy in Humanitarian Intervention 13

Catherine Lu, “Just and unjust interventions in world politics, public and private”, Global Issues Series, Palgrave MacMillan edition 14 Duncan E. J. Currie LL.B. (Hons.) LL.M “Preventive War’ and International Law After Iraq” , Global Law;

International, Environmental and Transnational Law, 22 May, 2003

The United States and Turkey has been a long-time strategic ally and the two countries have

enjoyed a special relationship for more than a half century. Turkey supported US in a number of

international operations, for instance, Turkish troops fought alongside the US forces in the

Korean War in 1950. In the wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks, the Turkish government

reaffirmed its solidarity and in about a month, the Turkish Grand National Assembly voted 319-

101 to send troops to Afghanistan to assist the United States in its Global counter terrorism

War.15

Despite these longstanding relations with US, the 2003 US demands were unlikely to proceed on

the Turkish side regardless its pressure. According to the Turkish constitution, the parliament has

the last determination of such move in placing foreign troops in Turkey. Accordingly, the

government passed the American demands to the parliament to vote for. The parliament had

faced a wide range of moral, legal questions to deal with such as: Is the Iraq war just? What are

the justifications for intervention? Do the US legal justifications for the war enough to

necessitate an intervention and is it according to the international law of respecting the

sovereign, independent nations? In addition to the legal questions, the parliament had to consider

two more things before its decision. First: the special relationship of the two countries and the

consequences may inherently should they reject the demand. Second: the strong domestic

opposition against the war, including the government, the majority of Turkish politicians and

public opinion, who had seen the war as an aggression and a violation of United Nations Security

council’s resolutions. Considering all these dimensions, there were no easy answers for the

Turkish parliament to decide quickly.

Although some of the Turkish government members endeavor to support the American demands,

however a great number of the high ruling elites including the president opposed openly the war.

President Sezer; as a former judge, insist that Turkey should act according to international law.

The president persisted that a UN Security Council resolution was necessary to support the

United States, and that in its absence, the president urged the government not to facilitate U.S.

led operation in Iraq without international legitimacy on many occasions, including in National

Security Council meetings. The opposing leaders also included the speaker of the parliament

Bülent Arinç, who clearly voiced his resistance more than once 16

While the government was backing the motion to support the US mission, however, most of its

statements released showing the need for international legitimacy. For instance After the national

security summit meeting on 17 January 2003 at the Presidential Palace, in which several high

level government decision makers (President Sezer, Prime Minster Gül, Foreign Minister Yakis,

Defense Minister Gönül and Chief of Staff Özkök) was determined that '...without a second UN

Security Council decision [after Resolution 1441], it would be difficult to obtain a mandate from

the Parliament...' which seemed that they were not convinced with the American demands. The

15

Michael Rubin, A comedy of errors: American-Turkish Diplomacy and the Iraq War, Middle East Forum 16

Hasan B. YALÇIN, Making Sense of 1 March: A Proactive Strategy of Avoidance, Perception: journal of International relations, 28 (1), Spring 2003, pp. 155-183

second meeting on 31st January, the National Security Council recommended to the government

that Turkey should act in accordance with article 92 of the constitution which stipulate

international legitimacy 17. Instead of military intervention, the meeting also recommended to

seek peaceful means to resolve the issue.

Beside the top leaders of the government, there are many other important institutions opposed

the war, and these in institutions include the military, which play a great role in the foreign

policy, and the opposition leaders. Opposition members argued the Iraq war lacked legitimacy

and that participating in it would equal participation in a crime. The interesting was that the

secularist party (CHP) used religion (invading a Muslim nation) to convince the ruling party

against approving such a motion.18 The chief of staff also urged the government of the necessity of

the harmony between the positions of the Turkish Armed Forces and the Gül government. 19 Not

only most of the Turkish politicians and leaders concerned the Iraq war as illegal, but also the

public opinion was greatly against the war as this encouraged the moral of some of the

parliament’s intention to vote against the war. About 90% of the Turkish population were

absolutely against as a number protests took place before the parliament’s decision, demanding

to respect the constitution and the international law. On the other hand, most of the Turkish

academicians, civil society activities and the opinion makers were in consensus the need for

adoption of a UN Security Council resolution to respect the international law.

Turkey’s decision to refuse the war was also encouraged by the uging voices of the international

community. The United Nation, the European Union and many other great powers have made

statements urging to respect the United Nations’ resolutions regarding Iraq. Russia argued that

the activities of the international inspectors in Iraq must be continued before going to war, and

this was endorsed by the EU, China, France, Mexico and Pakistan. The US arguments for war

was further weakened by the 14 February 2003 report of the Executive Chairman of the United

Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) Hans Blix, to the

UNSC, who acknowledged a utmost cooperation from the Iraq government with the inspectors.

The report has come to dismiss some of the United States’ earlier claims that Iraq wasn’t

cooperating enough with the inspectors. Meanwhile, France and Germany presented an

alternative proposal for strengthening the inspections after the report, however, Colin Powell

rejected the proposal, insisting that continued inspections would not bring about disarmament.20

The US decline of UNMOVIC report, and France and Germany’s proposal had further

strengthened Turkey’s position on the war and encouraged to the members of the parliament to

vote against the war.

17

Ramazan Gözen “Causes and Consequences of Turkey's Out-of-War Position in the Iraq War of 2003”, Turkish Yearbook of International Relations, 2005, 36, pp. 73-99. 18

Zeyne p Taydas¸ Özgür Özdamar, “A Divided Government, a n Ideological Parliament, and an Insecure Leader: Turkey’s Indecision about Joining the Iraq War” Social Science Quarterly, March 2013, pp. 155-183 19

Hasan B. YALÇIN, Making Sense of 1 March: A Proactive Strategy of Avoidance, Perception: journal of International relations, 28 (1), Spring 2003, pp. 155-183 20

Alex J Bellamy “ Feature — Legality of the use of force against Iraq” , international Law and the war with Iraq

Turkey’s parliament reluctance to approve the US demands was also encouraged by the United

States’ failure to secure the support of the UNSC members and the regional partners in the war

as this was also another evidence of the lack of international consensus and legitimacy for

military action against Iraq. The failure arose, moreover, not from a threatened veto by one or

two recalcitrant nations, but because there was no broad alliance favoring action, nor was there

an urgent humanitarian crisis to be averted or imminent threat to prevent such as might have

justified the action. Therefore, the lack of UNSC consensus and international support cast doubt

in the US and British governments’ claim, and It also reflected a widespread concern that

military action was being taken too soon, not as a last resort. While US was selling the notion

that Sadam Husein was not only a threat to the US, but also to the international peace, however,

as a neighbor country, Turkey perceived quite differently; Iraq wasn’t an imminent threat to the

national security of Turkey, instead Turkey had been one of Iraq’s major trading partners.

Therefore, as US was attempting to convince to cooperate, Turkey was reluctant, and was trying

to find a way of avoiding.

Since there was no international consensus on the Iraq war, Turkey while keeping its long

relations with US, tried to resolve the issue peacefully as it moved to explore the possibilities of

a non-military solution through international organizations, without being dragged into regional

instability. Turkey pursued a multi-dimensional policy based on five different tracks to prevent a

war in the region. These tracks were: negotiating with the Iraqi government, having joint efforts

at the UN and NATO level, forming contacts with the other UN Security Council members,

meeting with the regional countries, and finally negotiating with the US.21. Attempting to

prevent an illegal war on Iraq, the Turkish government every possibility. On a regional level,

then Prime Minister Abdullah Gül started his first visit to Syria, Egypt and Jordan, and then his

second went to Saudi and Iran to look at least other ways to prevent a war on Iraq. As result of

Turkey’s effort, foreign ministers from six Middle Eastern countries (Egypt, Turkey, Iran,

Jordan, Syria, and Saudi Arabia) met in a summit, called the “Meeting of the Foreign

Ministers of Iraq’s Neighboring Countries,” in Istanbul on 23 January 2003 with the aim

of preventing Washington from launching a war to overthrow Iraqi President Saddam

Hussein.22 The group urged neighboring Iraq countries to continue cooperating with the UN

inspections, and publicly stated that "military strikes on Iraq might further destabilize the Middle

East region". 23

Therefore, despite their country’s strategic alliance with the United States, Turkey’s leaders,

found it difficult to disregard the United Nations Security Council resolutions, the international

law and norms.

21

Hasan B. YALÇIN, Making Sense of 1 March: A Proactive Strategy of Avoidance, Perception: journal of International relations, 28 (1), Spring 2003, pp. 155-183 22

Murat YEŞİLTAŞ, “SOFT BALANCING IN TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY: THE CASE OF THE 2003 IRAQ WAR”, Perceptions: Journal of International Affairs, 14(1), Spring-Summer 2009,pp.25-51 23

George Joffé, “Iraq and its environment before March 2003”, an article submitted to Iraq Inquiry, 5 November

2009

Conclusion

The aim of this article was to study the Turkish Grand National Assembly’s denial to collaborate

with the United States in 2003 Iraq war, despite its strong and long relations with the US. The

study uses that decision to understand the Turkish parliament’s influence on the foreign policy

on one hand and to contribute normative based foreign policy analysis. The study argues that the

Turkish parliament voted against the motion because of its illegitimacy according to the Turkish

constitution and violated the international law.

The analysis of this study shows that foreign policy could raise questions of morality in

international relations. This could be done by reference to the individual responsibility of a state,

but even extend to the functions of multinational organizations, such as the United Nations. On

close examination of the Iraq war case, despite some other states’ violation of the norm of

sovereignty and international law, Turkey as an individual state come up with a foreign policy

based on morality and respecting the international law. Generally, the Iraq war showed that the

foreign policy is not necessarily based on national interest as it always has consequences for

others, it is a perpetual ethical challenge.

.

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