First March Motion: Turkey keeping an ally, or keeping the International law
Salad Sh. Yusuf Addow
Abstract
This study aims to address Turkish parliament’s vote against the government’s motion to
authorize American troops to use Turkish airspace and to be stationed ın Turkey’s territory to
attack Iraq. Exclusively, the article is trying to answer why the Turkish Grand National
Assembly voted down against the government’s motion to authorize American troops to be
stationed in Turkey’s territory? Since the two countries has been strategic allies for more than a
half century. To answer this question the article uses normative theory of IR, and argues that the
illegitimacy of the war was the core reason of Turkey’s denial to ally with the United States’ war
on Iraq. As it lost the legality and the approval of the United Nations Security Council, it was
considered as unjust, an immoral war. The study argues that the Iraq war violated the
international law and the norm of sovereignty, and as a result the Turkish parliament voted
against the government’s motion.
Introduction
urkey has been an ally with the United States for more than a half century, and both
countries have enjoyed a special relationship. As a member of the North Atlantic treaty
Organization (NATO), Turkey represents a NATO’s vital eastern anchor, and strategic
ally for US. However, on the first March 2003, Turkey’s Grand National Assembly
(TGNA) opened a new page of history of the US-Turkey relations, as the TGNA voted
down the government’s motion to deploy American troops in Turkey to open a northern
front in Iraq. As this move shocked the US and its allies, this article is aimed to examine the
critical reasons why the Turkish legislative body turn down the America’s demands?
Although First March Motion is still unfolding, scholars have already used much ink to analyze
and enlighten the grounds of Turkey’s negative response to US and more generally its foreign
policy actions following that decision. Most of the writings regarding the subject centered on
either on the implications of the choice of Turkey’s foreign policy, or the causes as some claimed
security, economy or leadership were the motive of such a move. For instance the constructive
theorists argued that the identity and the background of AKP elites was the driving force to
refuse America’s demands to invade a Muslim state. The realists explained the case from the
aspect of balance of power, as they argued the move was a Turkish foreign policy strategy to
increase its influence vis-à-vis the US via non-military means, or soft balancing. The realists
argued Turkey used a soft power foreign policy to mitigate the risks and the negative
consequences of the war to the regional stability. Liberals argued, the public opinion, which was
strongly against the war, had pressured the parliament members to vote against the motion. The
Turkish public opinion strongly opposed the government’s cooperation with US to authorize the
American soldiers use Turkish territory. For liberals, since the government was democratically
T
elected, the parliament had to listen to the public opinion and had to vote against the motion.
This paper acknowledges the merits of all of these arguments; however, it contends that a very
little thought has been paid to the impact of the Turkey’s docility to the international law, the UN
Security Council and EU resolutions toward the TGNA decision. These studies overleaped the
significance of the illegality of the war that had enforced Turkey to obey the international law
and support the UN and European resolutions.
In general the article aims to enlighten the question of why TGNA voted down against the
government’s motion to authorize the American troops to be stationed in Turkey and use its
airspace to open a northern front to Iraq, since Turkey has been a historic and strategic with US
for more than a half century. From the dialectics of normative theory of international relation,
this paper argues the unjust war, its violations of international law to intervene a sovereignty
nation, and the UNSC and European resolutions (as legitimate international bodies) against the
American war on Iraq, had urged the Turkish parliament to vote against the motion. Moreover,
the Turkish constitution stipulates international legitimacy to the stationing of foreign troops in
Turkey or decelerating a war against a sovereign nations, according to article 92 of the
constitution1. In all over the world, the war had been regarded and considered as an Illegal, and
unjust, since it has lost the approval of the United Nations, infringed the international law, and
the norm of sovereignty. Therefore, this study argues that there was no other choice available for
Turkish Parliament other then “no” vote to war on Iraq, as the constitution forbids legally a such
kind of war.
The article is structured into three sections. The first section gives an overall understanding about
the literature of normative theory and the intervening sovereign nations, by applying to the Iraq
war case and Turkey’s refusal. The second section will discuss about the legality of the Iraq
invasion by outlining the US justifications, UN Security Council’s resolution, and the
international law regarding this war. The third section will analyze and conclude TGNA’s
decision based on the normative theory of international relations.
Intervening Sovereign nations (Normative theory)
Normative theory addresses the moral dimension of international relations. Most basically it
addresses the ethical nature of the relations between communities and states. Such issues include
order, war and peace, justice, human rights, intervening of sovereignty states, and similar ethical
questions of a fundamental kind.2
In world politics, the normative issues refer either directly or
indirectly, to the state, interstate relations and the role of individuals as citizens of states.3 As the
theory covers a wide range of moral and legal issues, from environmental to human rights;
however, in this article, the study will only focus on the specific aspects of war and interventions
1 Baris Kesgin and Juliet Kaarbo, university of Kansas: “when how parliaments influence foreign policy: the case of
Turkey’s Iraq decision”. International studies prospective, 11(1),2010, pp. 19-36 2 Robert H. Jackson, and Georg Sørensen “Introduction to International Relations: Theories and Approaches”,
Oxford, fourth edition, 2012 3 Dr. Zerrin Ayse Bakan “Normative Theory in IR: Frost’s Constitutive Approach”
to sovereign states. According to the theory, any kind of war or conflict between communities or
states, has to conform with just war’s principles, which are (1) states rightfully go to war (jus ad
bellum) with just cause (a legitimate cause) such as self-defense in response to aggression, as the
decision to go to war is made by legitimate authority in the state, and it’s the last resort after
failing peaceful solutions, (2) states exercise right conduct in war (jus in bello) when the means
employed are proportional to the ends sought, when weapons (typically those that are
indiscriminate or cause needless suffering) are not used, and when actions are taken with a right
intention to accomplish legitimate military objectives and to minimize collateral damage.4
These principles of just war are part of the body of international law that is legally binding the
actions of the states. Normative theory preconditions the respect of international law and the
legitimacy of any action to be taken by any state to intervene to a sovereign nation. International
law conceives the international community as a society of states and as that law (International
law) is made by the states. Any action to be taken by one state shouldn’t infringe the law and has
to be accepted by the UN, a representation of all states. The international law necessitates the
Security Council’s members’ consensus; -a body in the United Nations charged for the
maintenance of international peace- of any intervention in a sovereign state. The UN Security
Council’s resolutions toward the international peace are obligatory to all nations in the United
Nations to comply with. The charter of the United Nations is very clear in prohibiting the
offensive use of military force against a sovereign nation. The international norm against
offensive warfare, like certain other norms that also have become codified international law,
reflects a broadly held moral standard.
Why Nations obey the international law
Although respecting the international law is obligatory to all nation states, however, many states
violate the law for reasons of their interest at certain times. But states generally comply with the
law for many reasons include: fear of isolation and sanction, condemnation from the
international community, and seeking reputations as regulations-abiding and moral state. In the
following sections, the paper explains these different reasons by applying to the case of Turkey
case to refuse the Iraq war.
First: nations obey the international law because of fear of the negative consequences of
offending acts. The state concern about the condemnation, opprobrium, and other directly
negative reactions from the world community. Launching an offensive act against an
independent nation will create negative responses from the international community in
condemnations, threatening of sanctions and isolation from the international interactions. The
Iraq war was very controversial among the United States and its allies in the war, and the rest of
the world community of nations. Many states opposed believing the war was illegal according to
the United Nations Charter and resolutions, while others believed the war will only create a
regional instability. Turkey, as a Middle Eastern country and a European Union candidate faced
4 Viotti, P. and M. Kauppi, “International Relations Theory”, (eds.) 1987, Macmillan Publishing Company, New York
a dilemma of supporting a historic and strategic ally-United States- or face the negative
consequences of offense acts, so that be subject of condemnation from the international
community, and isolation from the EU which it had to conform with its resulutions in order to
be accepted for full membership. Eventually, Turkey objected America’s demands to join the
war and aligned with the EU and other international partrners’ decision. Therefore, nations act to
obey the international law as a consequence of its repeated interaction with other governmental
and non-governmental actors in the international system. State’s violation of law generates
inevitable frictions and contradictions that hinder its ongoing participation in the transnational
legal method. For that reason, fear of potential negative consequences, nations encounter reduces
the likelihood of violating the international law.5
Second: nations obey the international law for fear of the negative consequences of weakening
the norm against offensive war and increasing the likelihood that others would violate the
international law. Knowing if the one state doesn’t respect the law, it cannot expect others to do
vise verse, meaning, a world in which states are more likely to launch offensive wars would be
more detrimental to any other state interest than a world in which the rule against launching such
acts is respected. Therefore, from the dialectical reasoning states a more likely to avoid
infringing the international law and invade foreign nations. The Turkish parliament perceived
that violating the international law and invading sovereign nations would only encourage other
nations to violate and excuse for foreign invasion. A more war-prone Middle East, which already
suffered from ethnic and religious conflicts, would entail more destruction and instability to the
regions. Undermining the international order by hosting foreign troops in Turkey, would only
for the most part work in favor of the most powerful nations of the world to repeat the same
actions against other states including even Turkey. For that reason the TGNA rejected the
motion.
Third: nations respect the international law as a reflection of their own domestic rules. Law-
abiding states internalize the international law by incorporating it into their domestic legal and
political structures 6 to align with the corporate worldwide norms and laws. Therefore opposing
the international law will be the same also violating the state’s domestic laws. As it is stipulated
in Turkish constitution, a declaration of state war against a sovereign nation must be deemed
legitimate by the international law. The Turkish constitution stipulates international legitimacy to
the stationing of foreign troops in Turkey or declaring a war against a sovereign nation,
according to article 92 of the constitution7. Therefore, Turkey had to respect its domestic
(constitution) law first, which stipulates to respect the international law.
Finally: Nations obey the international law as a regulation-abiding state to seek international
reputation. The nations obey the international law as an advantage as the costs of advancing
nation's interest are more efficient than it what it costs to the nation if they violate the
5 Paul R. Pillar “The Value of Obeying International Law”, the national internets journal, August 2012
6 Paul R. Pillar “The Value of Obeying International Law”, the national internets journal, August 2012
7 Baris Kesgin and Juliet Kaarbo, university of Kansas: “when how parliaments influence foreign policy: the case of
Turkey’s Iraq decision”. International studies prospective, 11(1),2010, pp. 19-36
international order, 8 and the advantages include greater goodwill in the international community.
For Turkey, the Iraq war was a test of its credibility to the international law; hence it declined to
join with the US as many states clearly opposed. The EU, France, Germany, Russia and other
world powers were from the very outset publicly opposed military action against Iraq. Therefore,
as it rejected to line up with the United States, and act upon the UN Security Council resolutions,
Turkey’s good image and diplomatic power in world politics has risen. The move to vote ‘no’
was greatly welcomed by the EU, the Arab and the Islamic world.
Iraq war and the International Law
Despite its violation of the international law, the wisdom of the Iraq war can be questioned,
merely in that respect, that there was a simple evidence and general agreement among pro- and
anti-war thinkers that the war was opposed to the many international opinions and biased from
prevailing normative conventions. Given that lacking UN approval or credible evidence of
imminent danger which necessitates immediate preemptive action, the U.S. Invasion of Iraq was
broadly seen as a violation of international norms. Most international legal scholars agree that
the prevailing UN Charter paradigm restricts the use of force to limited circumstances of self-
defense with UNSC authorization. However, within the realm of self-defense, the notion of legal
preemption has been approved on the basis of necessity, immediacy, and proportionality.
Using a self defense against a perceived future threat to the US or its allies in the region, the
Bush Administration justified the war according to the international law. The controversial
“Bush Doctrine” of the National security strategy claimed:
“We must be prepared to stop rogue states and their terrorist clients before they are
able to threaten or use weapons of mass destruction against the United States and
our allies and friends”.9
This doctrine marks a departure from the prohibition of the use of force under international law,
starting from the Kellogg Briand pact, the establishment of the Nuremberg Charter, the
conclusion of the United Nations Charter and the establishment of the International Criminal
Court, all call avoidance to use force in international relations. Unlikely, The United States and
its allies had justified the war for preventive purposes, which gives them the right to act in
according to the international law. However, in the framework of the customary international law
which recognized self-defense as a legitimate basis to use force, it strongly urges to clearly
distinguish the reasons of self defense and aggression, according to the following statement:
“The safest plan is to prevent evil where that is possible. A Nation has the right to resist the
injury another seeks to inflict upon it, and to use force... against the aggressor. It may even
8
John Ikenberry “After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order After Major Wars”, Princeton University, 2001 9 ROBERT J. DELAHUNTY & JOHN YOO “The “Bush doctrine”: can preventive war be justified?”
anticipate the other’s design, being careful, however, not to act upon vague and doubtful
suspicions, lest it should run the risk of becoming itself the aggressor10
On the other hand, the United Nations charter clearly states in its foreword that the UN was
established “to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war”; and its substantive
provisions obligate member states to “settle their international disputes by peaceful means” and
to refrain from using force against each in a manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United
Nations (Article 2 (4)). Regarding the states’ traditional right to use force, the charter initiated a
collective security scheme in which the Security Council is authorized to “determine the
existence of any threat to the peace, or act of aggression” and to “decide what measures shall be
taken... to maintain international peace and security” (Article 39).11
International law has conceived the international community as a society of states as the law is
made by the states. In that society, it is the states, in their capacity as members of regional and
interstate organizations such as the UN Security Council and the General Assembly, that decide
when a situation necisitates a humanitarian intervention or preventive war, and ‘whether the
force deployed is appropriate and commensurate with the necessity’ 12 States are peers through
their common membership in the society of states, and since states are the self-professed agents
of military force in world politics, it would seem logical to conclude that the people who can
determine the legitimacy of military action by a state or collectivity of the states must be
representatives of states themselves which is the UN.13 After failing to gain the Security
Council’s approval, the United States, in its “Bush Doctrine” of national security, together with
the United Kingdom, Australia and a number of other states, launched the war on Iraq,. Many
international law experts believe that the move was illegal and amounted to a war of
aggression.14
Turkey and TGNA’s refusal of the Iraq war
Turkey, as a strategic partner with the US and a key player in the Middle East, was significant to
the US invasion to Iraq for two reasons. First: easily defeating Saddam from northern Iraq; as the
region’s dominant Kurdish population greatly oppose the regime. Second: low cost strategy,
since a two Frontlines will be heavy to Iraq forces to resist against the coalition forces. To
minimize the cost and casualties of the war, the Bush administration demanded from the NATO
member and strategic allay-Turkey, a military base, however the demand put the country in a
dilemma of either sticking with its ally or respecting its constitution and international law. As a
regional middle power, it was difficult to resist the demands of the superpower; United States.
10
Laurence Boisson De Chazournes, & Marcelo Gustavo Kohen (2010). International Law and the Quest for Its Implementation. Leiden: Koninklijke Bril NV. P. 394 11 David M. Ackerman Legislative Attorney American Law Division “International Law and the Preemptive Use of
Force Against Iraq” CRS Report for Congress 12
Franck, ‘Legality and Legitimacy in Humanitarian Intervention 13
Catherine Lu, “Just and unjust interventions in world politics, public and private”, Global Issues Series, Palgrave MacMillan edition 14 Duncan E. J. Currie LL.B. (Hons.) LL.M “Preventive War’ and International Law After Iraq” , Global Law;
International, Environmental and Transnational Law, 22 May, 2003
The United States and Turkey has been a long-time strategic ally and the two countries have
enjoyed a special relationship for more than a half century. Turkey supported US in a number of
international operations, for instance, Turkish troops fought alongside the US forces in the
Korean War in 1950. In the wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks, the Turkish government
reaffirmed its solidarity and in about a month, the Turkish Grand National Assembly voted 319-
101 to send troops to Afghanistan to assist the United States in its Global counter terrorism
War.15
Despite these longstanding relations with US, the 2003 US demands were unlikely to proceed on
the Turkish side regardless its pressure. According to the Turkish constitution, the parliament has
the last determination of such move in placing foreign troops in Turkey. Accordingly, the
government passed the American demands to the parliament to vote for. The parliament had
faced a wide range of moral, legal questions to deal with such as: Is the Iraq war just? What are
the justifications for intervention? Do the US legal justifications for the war enough to
necessitate an intervention and is it according to the international law of respecting the
sovereign, independent nations? In addition to the legal questions, the parliament had to consider
two more things before its decision. First: the special relationship of the two countries and the
consequences may inherently should they reject the demand. Second: the strong domestic
opposition against the war, including the government, the majority of Turkish politicians and
public opinion, who had seen the war as an aggression and a violation of United Nations Security
council’s resolutions. Considering all these dimensions, there were no easy answers for the
Turkish parliament to decide quickly.
Although some of the Turkish government members endeavor to support the American demands,
however a great number of the high ruling elites including the president opposed openly the war.
President Sezer; as a former judge, insist that Turkey should act according to international law.
The president persisted that a UN Security Council resolution was necessary to support the
United States, and that in its absence, the president urged the government not to facilitate U.S.
led operation in Iraq without international legitimacy on many occasions, including in National
Security Council meetings. The opposing leaders also included the speaker of the parliament
Bülent Arinç, who clearly voiced his resistance more than once 16
While the government was backing the motion to support the US mission, however, most of its
statements released showing the need for international legitimacy. For instance After the national
security summit meeting on 17 January 2003 at the Presidential Palace, in which several high
level government decision makers (President Sezer, Prime Minster Gül, Foreign Minister Yakis,
Defense Minister Gönül and Chief of Staff Özkök) was determined that '...without a second UN
Security Council decision [after Resolution 1441], it would be difficult to obtain a mandate from
the Parliament...' which seemed that they were not convinced with the American demands. The
15
Michael Rubin, A comedy of errors: American-Turkish Diplomacy and the Iraq War, Middle East Forum 16
Hasan B. YALÇIN, Making Sense of 1 March: A Proactive Strategy of Avoidance, Perception: journal of International relations, 28 (1), Spring 2003, pp. 155-183
second meeting on 31st January, the National Security Council recommended to the government
that Turkey should act in accordance with article 92 of the constitution which stipulate
international legitimacy 17. Instead of military intervention, the meeting also recommended to
seek peaceful means to resolve the issue.
Beside the top leaders of the government, there are many other important institutions opposed
the war, and these in institutions include the military, which play a great role in the foreign
policy, and the opposition leaders. Opposition members argued the Iraq war lacked legitimacy
and that participating in it would equal participation in a crime. The interesting was that the
secularist party (CHP) used religion (invading a Muslim nation) to convince the ruling party
against approving such a motion.18 The chief of staff also urged the government of the necessity of
the harmony between the positions of the Turkish Armed Forces and the Gül government. 19 Not
only most of the Turkish politicians and leaders concerned the Iraq war as illegal, but also the
public opinion was greatly against the war as this encouraged the moral of some of the
parliament’s intention to vote against the war. About 90% of the Turkish population were
absolutely against as a number protests took place before the parliament’s decision, demanding
to respect the constitution and the international law. On the other hand, most of the Turkish
academicians, civil society activities and the opinion makers were in consensus the need for
adoption of a UN Security Council resolution to respect the international law.
Turkey’s decision to refuse the war was also encouraged by the uging voices of the international
community. The United Nation, the European Union and many other great powers have made
statements urging to respect the United Nations’ resolutions regarding Iraq. Russia argued that
the activities of the international inspectors in Iraq must be continued before going to war, and
this was endorsed by the EU, China, France, Mexico and Pakistan. The US arguments for war
was further weakened by the 14 February 2003 report of the Executive Chairman of the United
Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) Hans Blix, to the
UNSC, who acknowledged a utmost cooperation from the Iraq government with the inspectors.
The report has come to dismiss some of the United States’ earlier claims that Iraq wasn’t
cooperating enough with the inspectors. Meanwhile, France and Germany presented an
alternative proposal for strengthening the inspections after the report, however, Colin Powell
rejected the proposal, insisting that continued inspections would not bring about disarmament.20
The US decline of UNMOVIC report, and France and Germany’s proposal had further
strengthened Turkey’s position on the war and encouraged to the members of the parliament to
vote against the war.
17
Ramazan Gözen “Causes and Consequences of Turkey's Out-of-War Position in the Iraq War of 2003”, Turkish Yearbook of International Relations, 2005, 36, pp. 73-99. 18
Zeyne p Taydas¸ Özgür Özdamar, “A Divided Government, a n Ideological Parliament, and an Insecure Leader: Turkey’s Indecision about Joining the Iraq War” Social Science Quarterly, March 2013, pp. 155-183 19
Hasan B. YALÇIN, Making Sense of 1 March: A Proactive Strategy of Avoidance, Perception: journal of International relations, 28 (1), Spring 2003, pp. 155-183 20
Alex J Bellamy “ Feature — Legality of the use of force against Iraq” , international Law and the war with Iraq
Turkey’s parliament reluctance to approve the US demands was also encouraged by the United
States’ failure to secure the support of the UNSC members and the regional partners in the war
as this was also another evidence of the lack of international consensus and legitimacy for
military action against Iraq. The failure arose, moreover, not from a threatened veto by one or
two recalcitrant nations, but because there was no broad alliance favoring action, nor was there
an urgent humanitarian crisis to be averted or imminent threat to prevent such as might have
justified the action. Therefore, the lack of UNSC consensus and international support cast doubt
in the US and British governments’ claim, and It also reflected a widespread concern that
military action was being taken too soon, not as a last resort. While US was selling the notion
that Sadam Husein was not only a threat to the US, but also to the international peace, however,
as a neighbor country, Turkey perceived quite differently; Iraq wasn’t an imminent threat to the
national security of Turkey, instead Turkey had been one of Iraq’s major trading partners.
Therefore, as US was attempting to convince to cooperate, Turkey was reluctant, and was trying
to find a way of avoiding.
Since there was no international consensus on the Iraq war, Turkey while keeping its long
relations with US, tried to resolve the issue peacefully as it moved to explore the possibilities of
a non-military solution through international organizations, without being dragged into regional
instability. Turkey pursued a multi-dimensional policy based on five different tracks to prevent a
war in the region. These tracks were: negotiating with the Iraqi government, having joint efforts
at the UN and NATO level, forming contacts with the other UN Security Council members,
meeting with the regional countries, and finally negotiating with the US.21. Attempting to
prevent an illegal war on Iraq, the Turkish government every possibility. On a regional level,
then Prime Minister Abdullah Gül started his first visit to Syria, Egypt and Jordan, and then his
second went to Saudi and Iran to look at least other ways to prevent a war on Iraq. As result of
Turkey’s effort, foreign ministers from six Middle Eastern countries (Egypt, Turkey, Iran,
Jordan, Syria, and Saudi Arabia) met in a summit, called the “Meeting of the Foreign
Ministers of Iraq’s Neighboring Countries,” in Istanbul on 23 January 2003 with the aim
of preventing Washington from launching a war to overthrow Iraqi President Saddam
Hussein.22 The group urged neighboring Iraq countries to continue cooperating with the UN
inspections, and publicly stated that "military strikes on Iraq might further destabilize the Middle
East region". 23
Therefore, despite their country’s strategic alliance with the United States, Turkey’s leaders,
found it difficult to disregard the United Nations Security Council resolutions, the international
law and norms.
21
Hasan B. YALÇIN, Making Sense of 1 March: A Proactive Strategy of Avoidance, Perception: journal of International relations, 28 (1), Spring 2003, pp. 155-183 22
Murat YEŞİLTAŞ, “SOFT BALANCING IN TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY: THE CASE OF THE 2003 IRAQ WAR”, Perceptions: Journal of International Affairs, 14(1), Spring-Summer 2009,pp.25-51 23
George Joffé, “Iraq and its environment before March 2003”, an article submitted to Iraq Inquiry, 5 November
2009
Conclusion
The aim of this article was to study the Turkish Grand National Assembly’s denial to collaborate
with the United States in 2003 Iraq war, despite its strong and long relations with the US. The
study uses that decision to understand the Turkish parliament’s influence on the foreign policy
on one hand and to contribute normative based foreign policy analysis. The study argues that the
Turkish parliament voted against the motion because of its illegitimacy according to the Turkish
constitution and violated the international law.
The analysis of this study shows that foreign policy could raise questions of morality in
international relations. This could be done by reference to the individual responsibility of a state,
but even extend to the functions of multinational organizations, such as the United Nations. On
close examination of the Iraq war case, despite some other states’ violation of the norm of
sovereignty and international law, Turkey as an individual state come up with a foreign policy
based on morality and respecting the international law. Generally, the Iraq war showed that the
foreign policy is not necessarily based on national interest as it always has consequences for
others, it is a perpetual ethical challenge.
.
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