Financial Services Securitisation offerings and the importance of data quality in Asia Pacific

Financial Services

Finding the right balance.Securitisation offerings and the importance of data quality in Asia Pacific

Finding the right balanceSecuritisation offerings and the importance of data quality in Asia Pacific

Table of contents

1 Foreword 3

2 Thesecuritisationprocess 4

3 ThesecuritisationmarketinAsiaPacific 5

4 Duediligence 7

5 Applyingpastlessons 13

6 Conclusion 15

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1. ForewordAsset securitisation is one of the most complicated forms of financing for entities and among the fastest growing segments in the financial marketplace. In 2006, Asia Pacific’s securitisation transaction volume reached its highest levels since 2002, yet the Asia Pacific market is still diminutive compared to the United States and Europe.

Despite the considerable advancements in the market, many Asia Pacific issuers still face a range of accounting, tax, regulatory, technological and operational challenges. While regulations, laws and accounting principles are not standardised within the Asia Pacific region, the securitisation markets are rapidly evolving to emulate other mature markets. Until these fundamental challenges are comprehensively addressed, the process of securitising assets will remain challenging for issuers, investors and deal participants.

Raising capital through structured finance requires sound practices and reliable data supported by efficient operational infrastructures. Issuers with data integrity, proven structures, and prudent servicing techniques will be in the best position to succeed and contribute to the expansion of the Asia Pacific capital markets.

The historical reliability of securitisation structures within global markets is one reason demand for Asia Pacific securitisation products continues to grow. However, what would be the impact if a transaction did not run its full course as planned? If Asia Pacific was to experience a high profile securitisation failure, the effect would not be limited to the issuer but would impact the broader Asia Pacific market. Investors would likely reevaluate their interest in securitised products and may shy away from structured transactions all together if confidence in the process is lost. How can securitisation problems be prevented? Applying the appropriate balance of asset due diligence to securitisation programs and their risk mitigation techniques will go a long way to prevent an unforeseen crisis in a transaction.

In this report, Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu’s (DTT) Global Financial Services Industry (GFSI) group examines the advantages of conducting thorough due diligence in connection with a securitisation transaction through testing data quality, not only at the time of issuance, but also periodically throughout the transaction’s life. This report also discusses how employing advanced due diligence methodologies and techniques can avoid problems for investors and the market as a whole. Asia Pacific is not immune from performance and other concerns, and arrangers and bondholders should employ all available tools to protect the integrity of their transaction.

David C. Pulido Managing Director, Asia Pacific Securitisation Global Financial Services Industry Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu

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In its simplest form, securitisation is a method of funding receivables such as mortgage debts, leases, loans or credit card balances by creating freely tradable securities backed, and ultimately repaid, by these assets. The basic process starts when a company (the originator) generates assets either through its normal lending or acquisition operations, and subsequently transfers those assets to a special purpose entity (SPE). The SPE purchases the assets by simultaneously issuing tradable securities (typically bonds) to investors. As cash flows from the assets are collected, they are used by the administrator of the SPE to make principal and interest payments to the investors (bondholders). The success of securitisation in the mortgage market and investors’ appetite for asset-backed securities has expanded the application of this concept to other asset classes.

Countries in Asia Pacific have varying capital markets maturation levels. Japan, Australia and Korea account for approximately two-thirds of the total securitisation offerings and are regarded as the most advanced markets in the region1. Even within Japan, Australia and Korea, a secondary market has not developed fully despite these countries leading Asia Pacific in securitisation activity. The tradable securities created in these markets are for the most part held to maturity by asset-backed investors, unlike in the United States and parts of Europe where there is active secondary market trading.

2. The securitisation process

1 ‘Securitization to Grow in Asia-Pacific, Says BIS’, Hedge World News, 16 June 2006

Figure 1: Illustration of a typical securitisation transaction

Debt instrument Security ratings

Arranger

CashSecurities

Assetstransfer

Cash

Servicingagreement

Debt payments

Debtor Originator / Servicer

Investmentbank

Investors

Ratingagency

Source: Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu

SPE

4


3. The securitisation market in Asia PacificSecuritisation technology has been used successfully for over 25 years in the United States. Securitisation was broadly introduced in Asia Pacific in the late 1990s and has only become popular in recent years. More and more companies are recognising the benefits of securitisation techniques and are incorporating them into their evaluation processes for raising capital and managing risk. Governments have also sought to apply securitisation techniques to resolve the nonperforming loans within their respective countries or to fund budget deficiencies.

Companies consider securitisations for many reasons, principally to raise funds when other forms of financing are more expensive. However, in jurisdictions such as Hong Kong, Singapore and Japan, banks are actively lending at relatively low rates so companies are securitising assets for reasons other than a lower cost of funding. These reasons include regulatory capital relief, limiting exposure to bad debt, resolving nonperforming loan balances, and diversification of funding sources.

Securitisation activity and issuance volumes continue to increase in Asia Pacific. New asset classes are being introduced to securitisation and the financing structures are becoming more complex. Regardless of the asset class, the complexity of the structure or where the securitisation is being offered, due diligence is a key component in the overall fund raising process.

Figure 2: Asia Pacific securitisation environment

China

Thailand

Singapore

India

Indonesia

Malaysia

Philippines

Australia

New Zealand

Hong Kong SAR

Taiwan

South Korea

Japan

Developed market

Developing market

Securitisation regulations and laws in place, market is still maturing

Source: Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu analysis

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1970 United States

1975United States

1984 Australia

Japan 1986

1987Malaysia

1991 India

Japan

Hong Kong

Indonesia

SingaporeAustralia

1999Japan 1999 South Korea

2000South Korea

2003 Taiwan

China

2004Hong Kong 2004 Taiwan

2005China 2005 China

PhilippinesThailand

South Korea

First derivative on mortgage-backed security

created

First Asian and Japanese securitisation

First Asian mortgage-covered bond

(Cagamas Berhad)

First formal asset-backed securitisation rated &

announced

First securitisation - auto loan receivables (TISCO)

First securitisation (Zhuhai Highway Tolls)

First asset-backed security

First securitisation of receivables (Korean

Exim Bank)

First mortgage securitisation(Sanwa Bank)

First nonperforming loan securitisation

outside the U.S.

First collateralised loan obligation (KAMCO)

First non-mortgagesecuritisation - toll

receivables

First mortgage-backedsecuritisation (China Construction Bank)

First asset-backed securitisation (China Development Bank)

First mortgage-backed security issued (Ginnie Mae)

First mortgage-backed securitisation private placement program

1986 Singapore First mortgage bond (Hong Leong)

First mortgage-backed securitisation (National Housing Bank)

First securitisation (Bank of America)

First securitisation - auto loan receivables (PT Astra Sedaya Finance)

First securitisation - credit card receivables on USD tickets (Philippine Airlines)

First non-U.S. aircraft lease securitisation (Ansett Australia)

First mortgage-backed securitisation (KoMoCo)

First securitisation - CLO private placement (Industrial Bank of Taiwan)

First account receivables securitisation (World Peace Industrial)

First specific asset management plan (China Unicom)

Figure 3: Securitisation timeline

Source: Milken Institute 2005 Capital Access Index, MBS Research, Rating and Investment Information Inc., Fitch Ratings, Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu

1993

1996

1994

1996

1998 1998

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There are various due diligence activities that are undertaken prior to closing a transaction:

• corporate due diligence - involves evaluating whether a company fits an acceptable customer profile, and identifying i) concerns about the integrity of the company’s management, ii) issues regarding the company’s business, business plans or financial condition, iii) pending litigation, iv) contingent liabilities, or v) any other matters that could risk the capital or reputation of the bank.

• credit due diligence - assesses whether the deal is sustainable, even in situations where borrowers are under financial stress.

• legal due diligence - concentrates on compiling and reviewing relevant legal documentation to ensure compliance with applicable laws and regulations, and enforceability if contested.

• asset due diligence - involves determining whether information about the asset pool is consistent with the underlying assets.

• offering document due diligence

- cash flow modelling - involves determining whether the offering material disclosures on the collateral and/or bond cash flows, under various scenario analyses, are reflected accurately when applying the transaction payment waterfall structure.

- collateral stratification analysis - involves determining whether the offering material disclosures that segment the asset pool by various characteristics are consistent with the underlying assets.

The sections below focus on the asset due diligence process as it pertains to financial assets and the modelling of their projected cash flows in connection with a securitisation or similar structured transaction.

Due diligence process

Company management considering securitisation should appreciate that it is a highly complex and intricate process which will affect many parts of their business. The securitisation due diligence process has matured over time. The objective is to help assess accuracy of the information that will be disseminated to investors to enable prudent investment decisions. When taken at face value, the concept and techniques of conducting due diligence for a securitisation appear to be common sense. However, during the execution process there are numerous potential pitfalls which must be carefully managed if they are not to have a wider impact. As mentioned previously, securitisation is one of the most complex forms of financing for companies. The arrangers, rating agencies, legal advisers and investors attempting to analyse the transaction all need to cope with the complexities of a securitisation.

4. Due diligence

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Asset due diligence developed primarily in the United States. As securitisation techniques have expanded to other jurisdictions, arrangers have followed the United States’ due diligence market practice and incorporated local conventions. There are still pockets within less developed capital markets where these precautions have not been fully embraced. However, as markets mature, asset due diligence methods should also develop.

Due diligence origins

The origins of securitisation due diligence in the United States stem from the Securities Act of 1933 (the Act). The Act imposes penalties and direct liability on any person who offers or sells financial instruments using offering materials which contain an untrue statement of a material fact or omit a material fact necessary in order to make the statements, in light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading.*

The Act also provides a statutory due diligence defence if the seller can show it did not know, and “in the exercise of reasonable care” could not have known, of the material misstatements or omissions.* The “exercise of reasonable care” does not specify what steps should be taken to preserve such a defence, if needed. The financing community has addressed this requirement, in part, by contracting a qualified independent third-party to perform certain aspects of the overall due diligence process. Arrangers of securitisation transactions hire qualified professionals to perform certain procedures that involve accessing the originator’s books, records and files to test the information on the originator’s system against the information in the offering materials.

* United States Securities Act of 1933 §11

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Asset due diligence approach

A typical asset due diligence engagement covers a wide range of review procedures. An arranger needs to understand the mechanics of the structure, the risks of the transaction, and the potential returns offered by the securities. The following sections outline asset due diligence.

Database

The originator produces a data extract containing details for the pool of assets being securitised2. The originator, together with the arranger, determines the number of records and the selection method (i.e. which assets and which attributes to test). The accuracy of such information may determine investor confidence and ultimately impact the efficiency of execution.

Attribute selection

The attributes selected for testing are restricted by the type of data stored in the originators’ systems. For many first time issuers, reassembling historical records may be required. Data assemblage projects are very common in many parts of Asia Pacific where asset origination processes are not designed with a securitisation strategy in mind and do not capture the necessary data records in the course of normal business practice. Data records typically need a minimum of three years of performance history for analysts to make meaningful sense of the information. Securitisation is one segment of the financial markets where analysts examine the portfolio’s historical performance metrics to understand and predict behaviour. The originator works with various transaction parties to make the final determination as to which attributes will be tested.

A common result of conducting asset due diligence is the implementation of controls to detect inaccurate data in the normal course of business at origination. These undertakings provide a practical solution for improving the quality of information on future issuances and reporting outstanding securitisation activities.

Record selection

A majority of securitisations contain a large number of assets that make it unfeasible and uneconomical to test each record. The results of testing a manageable sample of a large pool of assets with homogenous characteristics, such as residential mortgages, credit card receivables or hire purchase loans, can provide an indication as to the quality of the entire population of assets. In the case where the assets are not homogenous, such as commercial mortgages, corporate loans, and small and medium business loans, testing the entire pool of assets selected for securitisation is the norm.

There are a number of sampling techniques that may be applied in the due diligence process. The type of assets securitised will likely affect the selected sampling methodology3.

Local market conventions have been established that may impact the sample methodology selected. For example, in the United States and Japan, random sampling is the more common method for testing. In Europe, Southeast Asia and Australia, statistical sampling techniques are used. The number of records selected will vary depending on the required precision and error rates.

2 The arranger assembles a financing package from information contained within the originator’s system. The information is provided to certain deal participants to analyse the merits of an investment opportunity.

3 Sample methodologies: Representative sampling may be either statistical or non-statistical. It involves the selection of itemsfromapopulationinordertoexamineevidenceforthoseitemsandtomakeinferencesaboutthecharacteristicsof the population as a whole based on the characteristics of the selected items. Statistical sampling techniques have an advantage by quantifying precisely the assurance obtained. Employing monetary significance techniques may be coupled to capture a larger segment of the overall value.

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Due diligence

Comparisons/recomputations

Dataextract

Cash flow re-engineering and collateral disclosure

tie-out process

Originator

Initialdatabaseextract

Finaldatabaseextract

Preliminaryoffering

circular (Red)

Final offering circular(Black)

Agreed upon procedures

report3

Offeringcircular

exceptions

Databaseexceptions

Sourcedocumentation

Tie-out process

Corrections2

Source: Deloitte Touche TohmatsuNote 1. Process will vary depending on asset class.Note 2. Corrections are limited to sampled assets and characteristics.Note 3. Limited to parties who take responsibility for the sufficiency of such procedures.

Cash flowprojectionsand collateral information

Corrections2

Figure 4: Typical asset due diligence process1

Findings

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Fieldwork

The due diligence provider compares the record and attribute data selected from the extract to the physical records (source documents) maintained at the asset processing service centre. As markets develop, source documents are more commonly provided as soft copies stored on image systems.

Offering document due diligence

Depending on the type of asset class being securitised, the offering materials may contain cash flow models and collateral stratification analyses to assist investors in making meaningful sense of the assets and the timing of their cash flows. This tie-out process involves a qualified independent third-party to recompute stressed investor and rating agency scenarios disclosed in the offering materials, such as hypothetical decrement tables, weighted average lives, yields and discount margins. The collateral stratification analyses in the offering materials are also recomputed and tied-out to the final database provided by the originator.

Agreed upon procedures report

The output of asset due diligence by a qualified third-party is an agreed upon procedures (AUP) report4. The AUP report is provided to the issuer, arranger and the originator detailing the findings of the comparisons5. The AUP report can identify errors (exceptions) on an attribute by attribute basis (the sampled assets that were found not to be in agreement with the corresponding source documents). These exceptions are typically corrected in the originators’ systems.

System considerations

Whereas the process flows of an originator’s system are not generally within the scope of due diligence, it should have the following functionality:

• identification of securitised versus non-securitised assets

• production of periodic reports for preparation of stratification tables, cash flow modelling and repayment analysis

• system design to enable auditing and cleansing techniques to avoid extract-related errors being reported

• integrated data from multiple systems.

If elements of the above system requirements are not achievable, it can impact the due diligence, deal closing process, servicing and investor reporting.

Post closing due diligence

It is quite common to continue due diligence procedures after the transaction closes. When investors make their securitisation bond purchases they rely on the arranger to provide them with accurate information. Post closing, the arranger is no longer providing information and is no longer a key party within the process. The investor is solely relying on the servicer of the assets, which in most cases, is the originator and/or the bond trustee. The periodic investor reports being generated are likely sourced from the same i) information systems, ii) business processes, and iii) employees who collected the data extract used in the initial due diligence.

4 AUP reports are often mistakenly referred to as “comfort letters” within the securitisation community. However, comfort lettersarenotpermittedforsecuritisationtransactionsundergenerallyacceptedauditingstandardsandarenotissuedinconnection with securitisations.5 The parties must agree to the procedures and take responsibility for the sufficiency of such procedures.


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Investors are not typically privy to the AUP report that was issued in conjunction with the closing of the transaction. Therefore, the investors may not know how many exceptions are found during the due diligence process and whether there are control deficiencies within the originators’ business environment.

It is important to note that the investors are initially exposed to risk at the time of funding, however, the most critical period in the transaction is yet to occur - the collection and application of cash. The due diligence process should not cease upon initial funding. In fact, it should continue until the investor is repaid all of what is owed. The scope level and frequency for conducting post-closing due diligence can be modified depending on the results of the previous due diligence and the investor’s familiarity with the servicer over time.

Asia Pacific

As mentioned, Asia Pacific has varying capital markets maturation levels. For issuers in a developing market, especially a first time issuer, a relatively high number of exceptions will likely be reported. This may raise concerns regarding the reliability of the information of the underlying assets and any modelling assumptions used on the pool of assets. As issuers become more comfortable with the due diligence process, controls are implemented to prevent or detect inaccurate data in the normal course of business, and consequently, the number of exceptions reported tends to fall.


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Overall, companies have used securitisation as a very successful funding tool. However, there are various reasons securitisation transactions may not run their full course as planned. Securitisation markets have experienced fraud, originator/servicer bankruptcy, substandard credit performance, poor underwriting, inadequate collection methods and other setbacks. Although due diligence does not guarantee the performance of a securitisation transaction, creating a carefully designed due diligence program could reveal weaknesses or other anomalies that would otherwise lead to problems. Detecting a minor questionable finding does not mean the transaction will not be completed, or necessarily perform poorly or fail later. The preferable outcome is that the issue can be traced to a particular factor and can be resolved before closing, allowing the transaction to proceed as designed. The due diligence program may also lead to more comprehensive forensic examinations that could uncover deceitful practices. In the event more serious matters arise, detecting them earlier improves the probability of satisfactory resolution.

Below are two examples of securitisations that did not have the desired outcome. Each had its own unique circumstances. It is unknown precisely what type of due diligence was conducted prior to closing or post-closing. In hindsight, certain due diligence measures could have been implemented that may have prevented or lessened the severity of losses6.

Credit card bank

A credit card bank used securitisation as a major component of its funding strategy. When the credit card bank ran into capitalisation issues and was investigated by the regulators, it was determined that credit losses were being misclassified as “fraud losses,” which misled investors to believe credit losses were within acceptable levels and not a serious concern. The reality was that the bank was issuing cards and extending credit to people with very poor credit, and credit losses were far more serious than had been reported.

After the capital shortfall was uncovered, the regulators worked to determine the best solution for the securitised portfolio. After many attempts to sell the portfolio, the regulators believed it would be less costly to shut down the securitised portfolio than to absorb the loss in sale price. The decision was detrimental to the securitisation bondholders.

The lesson from this example is that the regulators’ role focused on protecting deposits and not the securitisation investments, therefore, it was the bondholders who were impacted. This decision remains controversial within the securitisation investor community. This event also had a much broader impact on several affinity cards issued by the bank that were tangled in the receivership.

5. Applying past lessons

6 Remarks and observations in these securitisation examples are solely based on the circumstances as publicly reported.


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Specialty finance company

A specialty finance company was established to purchase charge-off credit card receivables and other nonperforming assets from financial institutions during the savings and loan crisis in the United States. It purchased uncollected judgments and loan charge-offs from banks that were seized by the regulators in the process of liquidating their assets. After the savings and loan crisis came to an end, the finance company reinvented itself by purchasing nonperforming and restructured consumer loans from banks that had exhausted collection efforts. Delinquent credit card debt in the United States was increasing rapidly. Banks were selling a significant number of delinquent loans because it was less expensive to sell these loans than to try to collect them. The finance company faced little competition in this environment, and used securitisation as its funding mechanism for the purchases of these charged-off receivables.

After seeing these early successes, many other firms copied the finance company’s business model. Some of the resulting securitisation transactions performed very poorly. In the aftermath, some investors alleged that collection statistics had been inflated by misclassifying certain cash receipts and borrower delinquency statistics had been misstated by certain “re-aging” practices.

Asia Pacific – not immune

During its relative short history, securitisation has not been without its share of problems, as shown in the previous examples that occurred in the United States. Since the United States has the longest history of securitising assets and the largest issuance volume, it is understandable that the securitisation examples listed above occurred within its capital markets. Investors in the United States have learned from these lessons and have employed due diligence methodologies and techniques to avoid issues. Asia Pacific should adopt similar strategies.


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6. ConclusionThe key theme highlighted in this report is that data quality matters. The same principles of data quality and due diligence apply regardless of where the transaction is executed.

At the launch of a transaction, bondholders analyse the offering materials with the belief that they are complete and accurate. However, bondholders’ risk begins at the time of funding. Post-closing, i) the arranger is no longer associated with the transaction, ii) the servicer is likely controlled by the originator and may not be aligned with bondholders’ risks, and iii) the trustee may also have limited duties delineated in the trustee indenture and may not have the flexibility nor the responsibility to conduct examinations.

• Arrangers should exercise reasonable care to protect themselves by:

- completing all areas of corporate, legal, credit and asset due diligence, and investigating any peculiar findings fully

- assessing whether the data within offering materials is complete, accurate and verifiable

- conducting certain procedures to reinforce the reliability of the data of the underlying assets and any modelling assumptions used on the pool of assets and the related bond structure.

• Bondholders should be empowered to protect their investment and not leave asset performance to chance. They should insist on rights for themselves within the transaction documentations to:

- allow periodic scheduled due diligence

- permit unscheduled due diligence

- permit servicing platform site inspections and review the collateral files and records.

For arrangers, due diligence should be a key component of the financial instrument placement process and should be methodically designed using leading practices. For bondholders, post-closing due diligence should be a regular tool utilised in their portfolio management process. For corporations, implementing proper controls within the corporate level will lead to efficient transaction execution. Finding the right balance of due diligence will allow securitisation to continue to expand in Asia Pacific and be an effective, efficient and reliable funding tool.


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About GFSI

The Global Financial Services Industry group consists of the Financial Services practices organised in the various member firms of Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu. There are dedicated Financial Services member firm practices in more than 40 countries, employing over 1,500 partners and 17,000 financial services professionals between them.

GFSI has a specific focus on the banking, securities, insurance and asset management sectors of the financial services industry. GFSI continually assesses market and industry trends, and helps local practices develop specialised services that are tailored to meet their clients’ needs, such as actuarial services, capital markets, risk management, and regulatory consulting.

About Deloitte

Deloitte refers to one or more of Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, a Swiss Verein, its member firms, and their respective subsidiaries and affiliates. Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu is an organisation of member firms around the world devoted to excellence in providing professional services and advice, focused on client service through a global strategy executed locally in nearly 140 countries. With access to the deep intellectual capital of approximately 135,000 people worldwide, Deloitte delivers services in four professional areas—audit, tax, consulting, and financial advisory services—and serves more than 80 percent of the world’s largest companies, as well as large national enterprises, public institutions, locally important clients, and successful, fast-growing global growth companies. Services are not provided by the Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu Verein, and, for regulatory and other reasons, certain member firms do not provide services in all four professional areas.

As a Swiss Verein (association), neither Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu nor any of its member firms has any liability for each other’s acts or omissions. Each of the member firms is a separate and independent legal entity operating under the names “Deloitte,” “Deloitte & Touche,” “Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu,” or other related names.

About Deloitte Member Firms in Asia Pacific

Deloitte member firms in Asia Pacific have over 20,000 people providing audit, tax, consulting and financial advisory services across Australia, Brunei, China, Guam, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Macau, Malaysia, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, New Zealand, Northern Mariana Islands, Pakistan, Palau, Papua New Guinea, the Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand and Vietnam.

With access to the deep intellectual capital of approximately 135,000 people worldwide, Deloitte member firms in Asia Pacific serve some of the region’s largest companies, as well as large national enterprises, public institutions, locally important clients, and successful, fast-growing growth companies.

For more information, please visit www.deloitte.com and use the global site selector to locate the individual Asia Pacific member firm websites.


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Asia Pacific Contacts

Asia Pacific Securitisation Contacts / Editorial Board

Location Leader Telephone Number Email

Global Frank Dubas +1 212 436 4219 [email protected]

Asia Pacific David Pulido +81 3 6213 1818 [email protected]

Australia Graham Mott +61 2 9322 7970 [email protected]

China Maria Xuereb +852 2852 1008 [email protected]

India Padmanabh Vora +91 22 2285 4330 Ext 401 [email protected]

Japan Masaji Hirata +81 3 6213 3161 [email protected]

Malaysia Eugene Wong +60 3 7723 6563 [email protected]

New Zealand Patrick Heslin +64 3 474 8635 [email protected]

Singapore Ai Phing Cheng +65 6530 5518 [email protected]

South Korea Munhyun (Richard) Kang +82 2 6676 2030 [email protected]

Taiwan Philip Chen +886 2 2545 9988 Ext 1221 [email protected]

Thailand Chavala Tienpasertkij +66 2 676 5700 Ext 5093 [email protected]

Contributors/Editors/Reviewers

Location Contact Telephone Number Email

China Joyce Yen +852 2852 6547 [email protected]

Japan Karen Grieve +81 3 6213 3298 [email protected]

Japan Jade Shopp +81 3 6213 1976 [email protected]

United Kingdom Simon Stephens +44 20 7303 2930 [email protected]

United States Parkson Young +1 808 543 0788 [email protected]


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Financial Services Securitisation offerings and the importance of data quality in Asia Pacific

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