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Evaluation of the Qoliqoli Bill against the

available Evidence: Were the perceived problems

legitimate to warrant such a response?

Eroni Racule

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Introduction

The literature on policy cycle outlines five main stages of the policy cycle namely the

agenda setting stage, the policy formulation stage, the decision-making stage, the

implementation stage and the evaluation stage. Critics and commentators have labelled

the evaluation stage as crucial to the continued improvements, adjustments or

termination of the policy that is currently being implemented. This is to ensure its

continued relevance, efficiency and effectiveness in addressing its intended

objective(s).

“Evaluation can help policy makers…..practitioners, and…..managers identify where

improvements are needed, evaluate existing systems, and develop new policies and

services based on cumulative learning from failures and success” (Evans et al., 2013.

p.17).

However, the actual practice on the ground is not the ideal as most policies are not

evaluated. If there is an evaluation, the results can be interpreted to suit the agenda of

powerful actors within the policy universe. In addition, there are other determining

factors that dictate whether the evaluation results are actually utilised to improve or

terminate existing policies or even whether an evaluation (an objective one at that) of

the current policy is even possible at all. There are numerous factors at play during this

stage of the policy cycle and most if not all are somewhat embedded in some political

realm, interwoven in a web of complex relations between political actors, bureaucrats,

interest groups, funding and certain enabling factors within the larger policy universe. In

general, Fraenkel, Firth and Lal (2009) outlined three types of policy evaluation namely

the administrative, judicial and political evaluation. These are further divided into

subcategories.

For the purpose of the paper, the policy in question - The Qoliqoli Bill of 2006 - was

not implemented because it was not passed to become an Act as the Laisenia Qarase

government was removed by the Bainimarama led Military coup of December, 2006.

Hence, unlike most normative policy evaluation discourse which focuses on “how the

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policy has fared in action” (ibid p.178), the evaluation in this paper will focus on the

problem statement that led to the introduction of the Qoliqoli Bill. It will ascertain the

legitimacy of the problem statement by examining its claims against the available

evidence. The problem statement will be discussed in detail in the background section

of the essay. However, it is imperative to point out at this stage of the essay that the

Qoliqoli Bill was among a list of other initiatives - or proposed solutions - to address the

same underlying problem; that indigenous Fijians lagged behind other ethnic groups in

their socio economic development. Hence the essay will occasionally refer to these

other initiatives and not focus entirely on the Qoliqoli Bill alone as it is examining the

problem statement which is the common denominator for most of these initiatives.

Consequently, the essay will briefly peek into the agenda setting phase as this is where

the perceived problem emerged and the decisions to focus on the problem were also

made at this stage of the policy cycle. In addition, the paper will also determine if the

problem warranted such a response by comparing the evidence against the actions and

also comparing these to what has transpired since similar initiatives were implemented

since the 1987 coup. In general, the discussion and arguments presented in this essay

will be based on the presumption that the decision to create such a policy was based on

the structural approach where these policies were intended to maintain the privileged

positions of i Taukei elites in Fiji’s socio-economic and political arena.

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Background

The Qarase government introduced several controversial bills in the period leading up

to the 2006 elections, namely the Reconciliation, Tolerance and Unity Bill 2005; a bill

derived and adopted from the South African experience after apartheid. It was intended

to foster reconciliation between the perpetrators and the victims of the May 2000 coup

in Fiji. This was publicly opposed by the Fiji Military and other interest groups such as

the Fiji Law Society, the Fiji Human Rights Commission, the Fiji Labour party, NGOs

and others as it had a provision for immunity. It had the potential to free the perpetrators

of the 2000 coup who had been formally charged and also those that committed the

accompanying acts of lawlessness during that period (International Bar Association,

2005). The other controversial bill was the Qoliqoli Bill of 2006. The objective of this bill

was to return the ownership and regulation of all state owned coastal areas and the

surrounding seas to the indigenous landowning units.

“For an act to provide for the transfer of the proprietary ownership of Qoliqoli

areas from the state to the Qoliqoli owners, for the establishment of the Qoliqoli

Commision with its powers and functions and for the regulation and management

of the fisheries resources within the qoliqoli areas and for related matters” (Fiji

Government, 2006).

These bills and a few others, were at the center of much public and parliamentary

debate and were inter alia part of a list of ultimatums that the Military imposed on the

Qarase government in 2006 which they were to adhere to, refusing which, they were to

resign from office.

These Bills and other nationalist initiatives formulated by the Qarase government

emanated from an affirmative action plan entitled, Blueprint for the protection of Fijian

and Rotuman Rights and interest, and the advancement of their development (Qarase,

2000). This blueprint document was presented to the Great Council of Chiefs in July,

2000 by the then interim Prime Minister Laisenia Qarase with the argument that the

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indigenous Fijians or i Taukei felt threatened and insecure in their own land. This was

compounded by the fact that their socio economic development lagged behind those of

the other ethnic groups (despite owning 80% of the land), particularly the Indo Fijians.

The document argued that this inequality needed to be addressed and their interest be

made paramount. In addition, the state needed to ensure the i Taukei’s equitable and

enhanced participation in all facets of socio economic development for the sake of the

future stability of the nation (ibid). This reasoning became the basis of most post-coup

initiatives of the Qarase government which institutionalised these affirmative action

plans, translating them into policies, acts and other legislations that would benefit the i

Taukei. As a side note, it is important to mention here that numerous commentators on

Fiji politics noticed a trend that

“....the main priority of the indigenous Fijian governments following both coups

was to stimulate indigenous entrepreneurship. Successful indigenous

businesses, it was believed, would lead to a reduction in the disparity between

the two ethnic groups and would eventually reconcile the two groups’

interests” (van Gelder et al., 2007. p339).

This blueprint document then became the basis of the Qarase Government’s 20 year

development plan with a theme of 50-50 by 2020; loosely translated to closing the

socio-economic gap and achieving equitable participation in the socio economic life of

the nation by the year 2020 (Ministry of Finance and National Planning, 2001. p. 18).

The Qoliqoli Bill of 2006, which was among these initiatives, was formulated to ensure

the direct and increased participation of the indigenous population in entrepreneurship.

This was to happen via the proceeds received for the use of their coastal areas and

fisheries resources. This intent was also based on the philosophy of an increased sense

of security that comes with transfer of ownership to them. These provisions were

stipulated in the Bill and the ultimate goal was for them to use this as a springboard to

launch into other business ventures ultimately evolving as fully fledged commercial

entities.

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Examining the Claims in the Problem Statement against the

available evidence

As mentioned earlier, the reasoning behind the introduction of the Qoliqoli Bill was

based on the need for increased participation of the i Taukei in entrepreneurship. There

were some merits to this claim as evident in the table below in that it confirms the fact

that most business professionals who either owned or operated business firms were

largely Indo Fijians.

Source: Ministry of Finance and National Planning, (2001).

These figures legitimised the claims and prompted government to continue to advocate

for the cause despite the numerous opposition to the bill.

Nevertheless, the bill is silent and vague on the powers that the indigenous land owners

have in managing their resource or how they can directly influence decisions regarding

the management of their resource except to say yes or no to proposed developments

plans for their land. Most of these powers were delegated to the Qoliqoli Commission, a

body that comprises appointees of the Minister and the I Taukei Affairs Board.

Furthermore, the distribution of lease monies, royalty payments and other fees collected

from levies imposed on users will be administered by the Taukei Land Trust Board

(TLTB) through the trustee accounts and in accordance with the provisions of the Native

Land Act (1961).

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This bill in my opinion would favour the chiefs more than the common i Taukei. The

social structure of the i Taukei - an inheritance from the colonial past - ensures that the

chief remains at the apex, is revered and is the custodian of ancestral land. This was

institutionalised in various legislations and in particular the Native Land Act (1961)

making them the chief beneficiaries of any form of payments received for the use or

development of customary land or coastal area as proposed in the Qoliqoli Bill. The

distribution of lease or any proceeds derived from the use/development of native land or

coastal area were as follows; 25% to TLTB as administrative fees, 5% to the village

chief, 15% to the clan chief and 10% to the tribe chief. In most instances, this would be

the same person holding all three titles which translates to 30% of the proceeds. The

other 45% would then be shared by the masses in the clan (Sakai, 2014).

Furthermore, it is difficult to determine how the communal ownership of land (as

proposed in the Qoiliqoli Bill) would directly translate to increased indigenous

entrepreneurship. As mentioned above, the proceeds from TLTB is not enough to make

a significant impact on an ordinary i Taukei’s aspiration towards entrepreneurship due to

the uneven distribution formula embedded in TLTB’s legislation. For instance, a payout

of $100,000 would mean TLTB receiving $25,000, the chief receiving $30,000 (if he

holds all three titles) and if there were 100 members of the clan, they would have to

share the remaining $45,000 which translates to $4500 per adult. This is not enough to

begin a business let alone sustain one’s subsistence livelihood

De Soto (2000) (cited in Goldfinch, 2015) proposed the establishment of individually

titled property rights to improve one’s chances in overcoming underdevelopment. In my

opinion, this approach can have mixed results if implemented in Fiji’s communally

dominated land owning system. Firstly, the title alone cannot guarantee the issuance of

a loan from most financial institutions here in Fiji as one’s ability to repay would also be

assessed and becomes part of the pre-conditions. Most poor indigenous landowners

living substance lives would fail this assessment. On the other hand, those clans with

larger land masses will benefit as the redistribution of titles to individual owners would

allow these individuals to sell, lease or put it up for mortgage minus the restrictive and

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archaic distributive legislations of the TLTB. Nevertheless, this system is exposed to

exploitation particularly with land owners who are not well educated absent the

guidance and advice of TLTB. On the other hand, those with little land will not make

much out of this arrangement as the ratio of land area per member will be small. Hence,

a redistribution of land titles will result in smaller pockets of land that are not conducive

for large scale commercial activities.

The Agenda Setting Phase and the Subjective Construction of the problem.

The problem statement needed no formal introduction to the agenda setting stage of the

policy cycle as it swiftly moved from the public to the formal agenda in a short period of

time. This acceleration was also perceived as a reaction to the 2000 crisis and the

political powers saw this as an opportunity to enact certain legislation that would favour

their ethnic group and fellow kinsmen. This would also boost their chances of staying in

power as the bill would appeal to the emotions of the largely gullible i Taukei masses

who would now rally together and vote them back into power (for their second term in

office after a closely contested 2002 elections) after their divided votes in the 1999

elections saw the Chaudhry led Labour Party rising to power (see Durutalo, 2007).

In reality, some of these affirmative action plans - in my opinion - were tailored to benefit

the elites more than the ordinary i Taukei. Firstly, this was clearly evident in the order of

how these initiatives entered the formal agenda; the ones that would benefit all i Taukei

such as the compulsory savings scheme and improved rural infrastructure were moved

down the priority list in favour of the more controversial ones favouring the elites such

as the Qoliqoli Bill and the Reconciliation, Tolerance and Unity Bill. Secondly, the timing

also proved suspicious as it abruptly entered into the formal agenda on the eve of the

2006 general elections.

“The Bill was a political move by the government in preparation for the

next elections” Ema Druavesi, Soqoqo ni Vakavulewa ni Taukei (SVT)

party secretary (Kikau, 2006.p1).

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Hence, this paper argues that the problem was subjectively constructed and the

proposed ready-made solution was prescribed with very little consideration on the real

impact it would have on the intended target group. This is consistent with Cobb, Ross

and Ross’s mobilization model of agenda setting where the issue is placed on the

formal agenda without any engagement with other actors in the policy subsystem. The

Labour party who were the co-governing partner in the multi-party executive branch

were snubbed and not consulted prior to the tabling of the bill. There was a general

assumption by the government that this was the best way forward and it attempted to

justify these actions arguing that it would benefit the indigenous population, promoting

this bill in the local and overseas media and condemning anyone who speaks out

against it.

Lessons of the past - A political Evaluation

The Qoliqoli Bill of 2006 had its fair share of political evaluation as commentators from

all aspects of Fijian society had something to say about the bill. The deputy leader of

opposition at that time Bernedette Round Ganilau described the bill as a joke

“…because a large mass of land is lying idle in the country while Fiji continues to import

food valued at over 180-million US dollars” (Radio New Zealand International, 2006).

The Fiji Hoteliers association also raised their concerns threatening to withdraw their

operations from Fiji if the Bill was passed in its current form. The Fiji Law society cited

loop holes within the bill where state sovereignty could be compromised as native land

owners could enact their own legislation within their own Qoliqoli areas. The Fiji Labour

party through its leader stated that they were not consulted at all in the formulation of

the bill despite being part of the multiparty government. They saw this as another

political tool that will drive the two races further apart. (Kikau, 2006). Nevertheless,

prominent I Taukei academic, Dr Tupeni Baba supported the Bill stating that the return

of this resource was long overdue since Fiji’s session to Great Britain (Baba, 2006 p.2).

The Qarase government rejected all critics of the bill and justified their actions by citing

the genuine economic disparity that exists between the two ethnic groups.

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However, history has taught us that most of these affirmative action initiatives were

abused by the certain elite groups within the indigenous population. The National Bank

of Fiji collapsed as indigenous Fijians took advantage of the relaxed lending policies in

the name of empowering Fijians. Fijian Holding Limited (FHL) was given a $20million

loan which was converted to a grant by the Qarase government, most Fijian elites took

loans from the Fiji Development Bank and National Bank of Fiji to purchase shares in

these commercial entity at the expense of other ordinary indigenous people. Laisenia

Qarase himself was convicted of corruption charges having facilitated the purchase of

Class A shares (which has a higher dividend return than class B shares) for his family

members (as the Director of FHL) at the expense of the other indigenous Fijians (Pacific

Media Centre, 2015).

Conclusion

To conclude, the problem statement leading to the tabling of the Qoliqoli Bill of 2006

had some legitimacy as evident in the census report of 1996. This was used by the

government to justify the bill in light of the numerous objections and grievances against

it. The Qoliqoli Bill was also viewed by certain elements as a political ploy by Qarase’s

government to win more votes in the upcoming elections.

However, it was difficult to ascertain whether the claims in the problem statement would

be resolved by the bill. While examining the bill, it was difficult to see how the re-

possession of lands in the coastal areas will eventually lead to increased

entrepreneurship for indigenous Fijians. This was due to the fact that the TLTB will

continue to administer the distribution of proceeds gained from the land. It was evidently

clear that the bill was tailored to benefit an elite few and at the same time increasing the

political mileage of Qarase’s ruling Soqoqo Duavata ni Lewenivanua (SDL) party.

In addition, it can also be noted that the manner in which the issue entered the agenda

setting stage and how it was fast tracked to the formal agenda without the involvement

of certain members of government was suspicious. Additionally, the fact that there were

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prescribed solutions already in place is also questionable and goes to prove the

structural nature (approach) of the bill with an underlying motive; to maintain the status

quo and ensure that an elite group of native Fijians continue to benefit at the expense of

their fellow i-Taukei. Lastly, lessons from Fiji’s history indicates that these types of

initiatives are largely political in nature and tend to be exploited by an elite few who

were either of chiefly descent or well educated commoners who occupied respectable

positions in Fiji’s private and public sector. They were privy to some inside information

and knew how to manipulate the loop holes of the systems to their advantage. Finally,

the perceived problem that the Qoliqoli Bill was intended to address was legitimate but

the prescribed response was questionable as it will only benefit certain elite members of

the indigenous Fijian society and not all.

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