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Evaluation of the Qoliqoli Bill against the
available Evidence: Were the perceived problems
legitimate to warrant such a response?
Eroni Racule
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Introduction
The literature on policy cycle outlines five main stages of the policy cycle namely the
agenda setting stage, the policy formulation stage, the decision-making stage, the
implementation stage and the evaluation stage. Critics and commentators have labelled
the evaluation stage as crucial to the continued improvements, adjustments or
termination of the policy that is currently being implemented. This is to ensure its
continued relevance, efficiency and effectiveness in addressing its intended
objective(s).
“Evaluation can help policy makers…..practitioners, and…..managers identify where
improvements are needed, evaluate existing systems, and develop new policies and
services based on cumulative learning from failures and success” (Evans et al., 2013.
p.17).
However, the actual practice on the ground is not the ideal as most policies are not
evaluated. If there is an evaluation, the results can be interpreted to suit the agenda of
powerful actors within the policy universe. In addition, there are other determining
factors that dictate whether the evaluation results are actually utilised to improve or
terminate existing policies or even whether an evaluation (an objective one at that) of
the current policy is even possible at all. There are numerous factors at play during this
stage of the policy cycle and most if not all are somewhat embedded in some political
realm, interwoven in a web of complex relations between political actors, bureaucrats,
interest groups, funding and certain enabling factors within the larger policy universe. In
general, Fraenkel, Firth and Lal (2009) outlined three types of policy evaluation namely
the administrative, judicial and political evaluation. These are further divided into
subcategories.
For the purpose of the paper, the policy in question - The Qoliqoli Bill of 2006 - was
not implemented because it was not passed to become an Act as the Laisenia Qarase
government was removed by the Bainimarama led Military coup of December, 2006.
Hence, unlike most normative policy evaluation discourse which focuses on “how the
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policy has fared in action” (ibid p.178), the evaluation in this paper will focus on the
problem statement that led to the introduction of the Qoliqoli Bill. It will ascertain the
legitimacy of the problem statement by examining its claims against the available
evidence. The problem statement will be discussed in detail in the background section
of the essay. However, it is imperative to point out at this stage of the essay that the
Qoliqoli Bill was among a list of other initiatives - or proposed solutions - to address the
same underlying problem; that indigenous Fijians lagged behind other ethnic groups in
their socio economic development. Hence the essay will occasionally refer to these
other initiatives and not focus entirely on the Qoliqoli Bill alone as it is examining the
problem statement which is the common denominator for most of these initiatives.
Consequently, the essay will briefly peek into the agenda setting phase as this is where
the perceived problem emerged and the decisions to focus on the problem were also
made at this stage of the policy cycle. In addition, the paper will also determine if the
problem warranted such a response by comparing the evidence against the actions and
also comparing these to what has transpired since similar initiatives were implemented
since the 1987 coup. In general, the discussion and arguments presented in this essay
will be based on the presumption that the decision to create such a policy was based on
the structural approach where these policies were intended to maintain the privileged
positions of i Taukei elites in Fiji’s socio-economic and political arena.
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Background
The Qarase government introduced several controversial bills in the period leading up
to the 2006 elections, namely the Reconciliation, Tolerance and Unity Bill 2005; a bill
derived and adopted from the South African experience after apartheid. It was intended
to foster reconciliation between the perpetrators and the victims of the May 2000 coup
in Fiji. This was publicly opposed by the Fiji Military and other interest groups such as
the Fiji Law Society, the Fiji Human Rights Commission, the Fiji Labour party, NGOs
and others as it had a provision for immunity. It had the potential to free the perpetrators
of the 2000 coup who had been formally charged and also those that committed the
accompanying acts of lawlessness during that period (International Bar Association,
2005). The other controversial bill was the Qoliqoli Bill of 2006. The objective of this bill
was to return the ownership and regulation of all state owned coastal areas and the
surrounding seas to the indigenous landowning units.
“For an act to provide for the transfer of the proprietary ownership of Qoliqoli
areas from the state to the Qoliqoli owners, for the establishment of the Qoliqoli
Commision with its powers and functions and for the regulation and management
of the fisheries resources within the qoliqoli areas and for related matters” (Fiji
Government, 2006).
These bills and a few others, were at the center of much public and parliamentary
debate and were inter alia part of a list of ultimatums that the Military imposed on the
Qarase government in 2006 which they were to adhere to, refusing which, they were to
resign from office.
These Bills and other nationalist initiatives formulated by the Qarase government
emanated from an affirmative action plan entitled, Blueprint for the protection of Fijian
and Rotuman Rights and interest, and the advancement of their development (Qarase,
2000). This blueprint document was presented to the Great Council of Chiefs in July,
2000 by the then interim Prime Minister Laisenia Qarase with the argument that the
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indigenous Fijians or i Taukei felt threatened and insecure in their own land. This was
compounded by the fact that their socio economic development lagged behind those of
the other ethnic groups (despite owning 80% of the land), particularly the Indo Fijians.
The document argued that this inequality needed to be addressed and their interest be
made paramount. In addition, the state needed to ensure the i Taukei’s equitable and
enhanced participation in all facets of socio economic development for the sake of the
future stability of the nation (ibid). This reasoning became the basis of most post-coup
initiatives of the Qarase government which institutionalised these affirmative action
plans, translating them into policies, acts and other legislations that would benefit the i
Taukei. As a side note, it is important to mention here that numerous commentators on
Fiji politics noticed a trend that
“....the main priority of the indigenous Fijian governments following both coups
was to stimulate indigenous entrepreneurship. Successful indigenous
businesses, it was believed, would lead to a reduction in the disparity between
the two ethnic groups and would eventually reconcile the two groups’
interests” (van Gelder et al., 2007. p339).
This blueprint document then became the basis of the Qarase Government’s 20 year
development plan with a theme of 50-50 by 2020; loosely translated to closing the
socio-economic gap and achieving equitable participation in the socio economic life of
the nation by the year 2020 (Ministry of Finance and National Planning, 2001. p. 18).
The Qoliqoli Bill of 2006, which was among these initiatives, was formulated to ensure
the direct and increased participation of the indigenous population in entrepreneurship.
This was to happen via the proceeds received for the use of their coastal areas and
fisheries resources. This intent was also based on the philosophy of an increased sense
of security that comes with transfer of ownership to them. These provisions were
stipulated in the Bill and the ultimate goal was for them to use this as a springboard to
launch into other business ventures ultimately evolving as fully fledged commercial
entities.
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Examining the Claims in the Problem Statement against the
available evidence
As mentioned earlier, the reasoning behind the introduction of the Qoliqoli Bill was
based on the need for increased participation of the i Taukei in entrepreneurship. There
were some merits to this claim as evident in the table below in that it confirms the fact
that most business professionals who either owned or operated business firms were
largely Indo Fijians.
Source: Ministry of Finance and National Planning, (2001).
These figures legitimised the claims and prompted government to continue to advocate
for the cause despite the numerous opposition to the bill.
Nevertheless, the bill is silent and vague on the powers that the indigenous land owners
have in managing their resource or how they can directly influence decisions regarding
the management of their resource except to say yes or no to proposed developments
plans for their land. Most of these powers were delegated to the Qoliqoli Commission, a
body that comprises appointees of the Minister and the I Taukei Affairs Board.
Furthermore, the distribution of lease monies, royalty payments and other fees collected
from levies imposed on users will be administered by the Taukei Land Trust Board
(TLTB) through the trustee accounts and in accordance with the provisions of the Native
Land Act (1961).
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This bill in my opinion would favour the chiefs more than the common i Taukei. The
social structure of the i Taukei - an inheritance from the colonial past - ensures that the
chief remains at the apex, is revered and is the custodian of ancestral land. This was
institutionalised in various legislations and in particular the Native Land Act (1961)
making them the chief beneficiaries of any form of payments received for the use or
development of customary land or coastal area as proposed in the Qoliqoli Bill. The
distribution of lease or any proceeds derived from the use/development of native land or
coastal area were as follows; 25% to TLTB as administrative fees, 5% to the village
chief, 15% to the clan chief and 10% to the tribe chief. In most instances, this would be
the same person holding all three titles which translates to 30% of the proceeds. The
other 45% would then be shared by the masses in the clan (Sakai, 2014).
Furthermore, it is difficult to determine how the communal ownership of land (as
proposed in the Qoiliqoli Bill) would directly translate to increased indigenous
entrepreneurship. As mentioned above, the proceeds from TLTB is not enough to make
a significant impact on an ordinary i Taukei’s aspiration towards entrepreneurship due to
the uneven distribution formula embedded in TLTB’s legislation. For instance, a payout
of $100,000 would mean TLTB receiving $25,000, the chief receiving $30,000 (if he
holds all three titles) and if there were 100 members of the clan, they would have to
share the remaining $45,000 which translates to $4500 per adult. This is not enough to
begin a business let alone sustain one’s subsistence livelihood
De Soto (2000) (cited in Goldfinch, 2015) proposed the establishment of individually
titled property rights to improve one’s chances in overcoming underdevelopment. In my
opinion, this approach can have mixed results if implemented in Fiji’s communally
dominated land owning system. Firstly, the title alone cannot guarantee the issuance of
a loan from most financial institutions here in Fiji as one’s ability to repay would also be
assessed and becomes part of the pre-conditions. Most poor indigenous landowners
living substance lives would fail this assessment. On the other hand, those clans with
larger land masses will benefit as the redistribution of titles to individual owners would
allow these individuals to sell, lease or put it up for mortgage minus the restrictive and
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archaic distributive legislations of the TLTB. Nevertheless, this system is exposed to
exploitation particularly with land owners who are not well educated absent the
guidance and advice of TLTB. On the other hand, those with little land will not make
much out of this arrangement as the ratio of land area per member will be small. Hence,
a redistribution of land titles will result in smaller pockets of land that are not conducive
for large scale commercial activities.
The Agenda Setting Phase and the Subjective Construction of the problem.
The problem statement needed no formal introduction to the agenda setting stage of the
policy cycle as it swiftly moved from the public to the formal agenda in a short period of
time. This acceleration was also perceived as a reaction to the 2000 crisis and the
political powers saw this as an opportunity to enact certain legislation that would favour
their ethnic group and fellow kinsmen. This would also boost their chances of staying in
power as the bill would appeal to the emotions of the largely gullible i Taukei masses
who would now rally together and vote them back into power (for their second term in
office after a closely contested 2002 elections) after their divided votes in the 1999
elections saw the Chaudhry led Labour Party rising to power (see Durutalo, 2007).
In reality, some of these affirmative action plans - in my opinion - were tailored to benefit
the elites more than the ordinary i Taukei. Firstly, this was clearly evident in the order of
how these initiatives entered the formal agenda; the ones that would benefit all i Taukei
such as the compulsory savings scheme and improved rural infrastructure were moved
down the priority list in favour of the more controversial ones favouring the elites such
as the Qoliqoli Bill and the Reconciliation, Tolerance and Unity Bill. Secondly, the timing
also proved suspicious as it abruptly entered into the formal agenda on the eve of the
2006 general elections.
“The Bill was a political move by the government in preparation for the
next elections” Ema Druavesi, Soqoqo ni Vakavulewa ni Taukei (SVT)
party secretary (Kikau, 2006.p1).
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Hence, this paper argues that the problem was subjectively constructed and the
proposed ready-made solution was prescribed with very little consideration on the real
impact it would have on the intended target group. This is consistent with Cobb, Ross
and Ross’s mobilization model of agenda setting where the issue is placed on the
formal agenda without any engagement with other actors in the policy subsystem. The
Labour party who were the co-governing partner in the multi-party executive branch
were snubbed and not consulted prior to the tabling of the bill. There was a general
assumption by the government that this was the best way forward and it attempted to
justify these actions arguing that it would benefit the indigenous population, promoting
this bill in the local and overseas media and condemning anyone who speaks out
against it.
Lessons of the past - A political Evaluation
The Qoliqoli Bill of 2006 had its fair share of political evaluation as commentators from
all aspects of Fijian society had something to say about the bill. The deputy leader of
opposition at that time Bernedette Round Ganilau described the bill as a joke
“…because a large mass of land is lying idle in the country while Fiji continues to import
food valued at over 180-million US dollars” (Radio New Zealand International, 2006).
The Fiji Hoteliers association also raised their concerns threatening to withdraw their
operations from Fiji if the Bill was passed in its current form. The Fiji Law society cited
loop holes within the bill where state sovereignty could be compromised as native land
owners could enact their own legislation within their own Qoliqoli areas. The Fiji Labour
party through its leader stated that they were not consulted at all in the formulation of
the bill despite being part of the multiparty government. They saw this as another
political tool that will drive the two races further apart. (Kikau, 2006). Nevertheless,
prominent I Taukei academic, Dr Tupeni Baba supported the Bill stating that the return
of this resource was long overdue since Fiji’s session to Great Britain (Baba, 2006 p.2).
The Qarase government rejected all critics of the bill and justified their actions by citing
the genuine economic disparity that exists between the two ethnic groups.
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However, history has taught us that most of these affirmative action initiatives were
abused by the certain elite groups within the indigenous population. The National Bank
of Fiji collapsed as indigenous Fijians took advantage of the relaxed lending policies in
the name of empowering Fijians. Fijian Holding Limited (FHL) was given a $20million
loan which was converted to a grant by the Qarase government, most Fijian elites took
loans from the Fiji Development Bank and National Bank of Fiji to purchase shares in
these commercial entity at the expense of other ordinary indigenous people. Laisenia
Qarase himself was convicted of corruption charges having facilitated the purchase of
Class A shares (which has a higher dividend return than class B shares) for his family
members (as the Director of FHL) at the expense of the other indigenous Fijians (Pacific
Media Centre, 2015).
Conclusion
To conclude, the problem statement leading to the tabling of the Qoliqoli Bill of 2006
had some legitimacy as evident in the census report of 1996. This was used by the
government to justify the bill in light of the numerous objections and grievances against
it. The Qoliqoli Bill was also viewed by certain elements as a political ploy by Qarase’s
government to win more votes in the upcoming elections.
However, it was difficult to ascertain whether the claims in the problem statement would
be resolved by the bill. While examining the bill, it was difficult to see how the re-
possession of lands in the coastal areas will eventually lead to increased
entrepreneurship for indigenous Fijians. This was due to the fact that the TLTB will
continue to administer the distribution of proceeds gained from the land. It was evidently
clear that the bill was tailored to benefit an elite few and at the same time increasing the
political mileage of Qarase’s ruling Soqoqo Duavata ni Lewenivanua (SDL) party.
In addition, it can also be noted that the manner in which the issue entered the agenda
setting stage and how it was fast tracked to the formal agenda without the involvement
of certain members of government was suspicious. Additionally, the fact that there were
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prescribed solutions already in place is also questionable and goes to prove the
structural nature (approach) of the bill with an underlying motive; to maintain the status
quo and ensure that an elite group of native Fijians continue to benefit at the expense of
their fellow i-Taukei. Lastly, lessons from Fiji’s history indicates that these types of
initiatives are largely political in nature and tend to be exploited by an elite few who
were either of chiefly descent or well educated commoners who occupied respectable
positions in Fiji’s private and public sector. They were privy to some inside information
and knew how to manipulate the loop holes of the systems to their advantage. Finally,
the perceived problem that the Qoliqoli Bill was intended to address was legitimate but
the prescribed response was questionable as it will only benefit certain elite members of
the indigenous Fijian society and not all.
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