European Citizenship and Youth in Bulgaria - unipub

European Citizenship and Youth in

Bulgaria: A Qualitative Comparative

Analysis between Bulgarians and

Bulgarian Turks Research Article

Gianfranco Brusaporci Researcher at CESPOL, Université catholique de Louvain

[email protected]

http://www.suedosteuropa.uni-graz.at/cse/en/brusaporci

Contemporary Southeastern Europe, 2015, 2(1), 1-23

Contemporary Southeastern Europe is an online, peer-reviewed, multidisciplinary journal that publishes original,

scholarly, and policy-oriented research on issues relevant to societies in Southeastern Europe. For more

information, please contact us at [email protected] or visit our website at www.contemporarysee.org

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European Citizenship and Youth in

Bulgaria: A Qualitative Comparative

Analysis between Bulgarians and

Bulgarian Turks

Gianfranco Brusaporci*

European citizenship is a new concept, which has evolved with the process of European integration. Starting from the younger generations, the EU seeks to establish a modern and innovative view of citizenship through three fundamental elements - rights, identity and participation - that could lead to new ways of conceiving the relationship of institutions-citizens and citizens-citizens. The idea of European citizenship tends to overcome the historical idea of national states and national identity. It does this by reinforcing its supranational nature and developing an attitude of tolerance towards diversity and human/minority rights. Thus, to verify the impact European citizenship has on the younger generation in Bulgaria, this research is based on an inter-ethnic sample of 30 interviews (16 Bulgarians, 14 Bulgarian Turks) and applies a qualitative comparative analysis method. This research seeks to answer these two main questions: 1) How do young Bulgarians perceive the concept of EU citizenship? 2) How do young Bulgarians perceive the new European citizenship in regard to the inter-ethnic relations in their own country? The study suggests that the EU’s attempt to promote European citizenship is underachieving. On the one hand, young Bulgarian people tend to be well exposed to European citizenship, irrespective of their ethnic belonging. On the other hand, the majority of them are sceptical of the tangible value of European citizenship for the reinforcement of a more encompassing and shared notion of diversity and minority rights.

Keywords: citizenship, Bulgaria, youth, minority rights, ethnicity

Introduction

The debate on the concept of citizenship is often focused on daily political experiences and the perceptions of the relationship between states and people. Therefore, redesigning the concept of citizenship could lead to a new perception of both the state-society and institutions-citizens relations. In all European countries, the end of the Cold War saw trends of new liberalism processes, in which market borders moved from the national to the global level. The development of new technologies and transport, as well as increasing global

* Gianfranco Brusaporci is a researcher in Political and Social Sciences, enrolled in the joint Ph.D. program of “Diversity Management and Governance” at the New Bulgarian University in Bulgaria and a supervision-cotutelle with the Université Catholique de Louvain in Belgium. His research interests include multi-level governance and regionalism, cross-border cooperation, Euroregions and local democracy, ethnicity, ethnic and religious movements in a national or cross-border context, collective mobilizations on national and subnational levels, comparative politics and mixed-method research.

European Citizenship and Youth in Bulgaria: A Qualitative Comparative Analysis between Bulgarians and Bulgarian Turks

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issues (such as migratory flows from south to north, the greenhouse effect, the recent economic crises), have brought about the need to reinvent the concept of citizenship, which is pursued by the EU through a modern and innovative approach in a new democratic experiment. The concept of European citizenship represents a new goal, which is still evolving within the European integration process. The idea of European citizenship was introduced by the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 as complementary citizenship. Today, it represents a real democratic test, leading to the definition of a new concept of citizenship on the basis of a different organizational model. This model includes new institutions and a new system of governance that is completely different from the classic nation state. The EU strategy1 regarding European citizenship begins with young citizens. It could lead to a better understanding of the concept of European citizenship and increased tolerance regarding human and minority rights,2 but it is still underachieving. In fact, many people still do not know exactly what the concept of European citizenship means and, above all, how they could integrate it into their own daily lives. The development of a homogeneous approach to raising awareness and encouraging daily practices as part of a single policy could support the EU in promoting greater social cohesion among its citizens. This article contends that this new citizenship plays an innovative role, as observed by different scholars.3 Yet, it also seeks to analyse how effective this new concept is and to outline the perceptions and behaviours of young Bulgarians vis a vis this new institutional framework, which designs new rights and responsibilities for them. The first part of the article explains the new features involved in the concept of EU citizenship and the challenges it may face in the future. The concept of European citizenship is compared to the classic concept of citizenship, and the new features of this European experiment are presented. The meaning of citizenship is compared by its three key historical and conceptual elements: rights, identity and participation. The second part of the article analyses, based on an empirical framework and a sample of 30 semi-structured interviews conducted in Sofia, how young people in Bulgaria see this new approach, and,

1 European Commission, 2004. Making citizenship Work: fostering European culture and diversity through programs for Youth, Culture, Audiovisual and Civic Participation. (accessed: 09. February 2015); 2001. European Commission white paper - A new impetus for European youth. (accessed: 09. February 2015); 2013. Youth in Action Programme 2007-2013. (accessed: 09. February 2015). 2 See the Citizenship Programme 2007-2013, General objects and Priority themes of the Europe for citizens Programme; See also the Euro-Mediterranean co-operation - this Partnership promotes various training courses focusing on a broad notion of citizenship, beyond its European dimension: Participation and Intercultural Exchange, Human Rights Education and Citizenship and Citizenship matters – Participation of Women and Minorities. 3 Habermas, Jürgen. 1992. Citizenship and national identity: some reflections on the future of Europe. Praxis International; Bellamy, Richard / Castiglione, Dario and Josephine Shaw. (eds.) 2006. Making European Citizenship. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan; Magnette, Paul. 2003. European Governance and Civic Participation: Beyond Elitist Citizenship? Political Studies 51, 1-17; Bruter, Michael. 2005. Citizenship of Europe? The emerge of a Mass European Identity. London: Palgrave Macmillan; O'Neill, Paul and Susan Sandler. 2008. The EU citizenship acquis and the Court of Justice: citizenship vigilante or merely vigilant treaty guardian? Richmond Journal of Global Law and Business 7(3), 205-46; Moro, Giovanni. 2009. Cittadini in Europa. L’attivismo civico e l’esperimento democratico comunitario. Roma: Carocci.

Gianfranco Brusaporci

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in particular, their potential attitudes regarding the development of the EU project. The analysis rests on three main independent variables: awareness, daily practices and ethnic self-identification. Further, the research seeks to understand the correlation between these variables, as well as the role that the concept of EU citizenship plays in majority-minority relations and the intercultural perception in the country. This is because the features of diversity and inclusion are intrinsic to the very concept of European citizenship and could be conducive to the fostering of a new perspective on ethnic and social relations of people in Bulgaria, as well as in the Balkan area where EU enlargement is expected. Therefore, in order to understand the relevance and the combination of the variables, the article starts with a qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) to analyse the data collected in interviews with 30 young people - 16 Bulgarians, 14 Bulgarian Turks – who are professionals in different fields and students who are well educated and reside in the capital city of Sofia. The city of Sofia has been chosen because it has the highest percentage of tertiary education, 36.84%, and the highest percentage of resident students, 42.88%.4 In addition, the choice to select and compare a sample of young people of Bulgarian and Turkish ethnicity was determined by the fact that Bulgarian Turks form the largest minority group of the country and that they represent the historical antagonists who had dominated Bulgarian territory for five centuries. Today, there seems to be a peaceful dialogue between the two groups, but there are still some social tensions that re-emerge at times, such as during the protest of the Bulgarian nationalistic party Ataka in front of the mosque of Sofia in May 2011. How could European citizenship be perceived by the new generations in this context? It could be perceived positively in terms of new opportunities, new horizons of cultural, social, financial and political nature, but also negatively, with scepticism towards the European system as being alien and not adaptable to their own situation. Thus, the potential results of the sense of European citizenship in this sample of young Bulgarians in Sofia could be a good example for the whole country and the Balkan region. The link between young people and European citizenship could foster a crucial policy for a long-term European integration policy throughout the whole region. 1. The Innovative Nature of European Citizenship

1.1 A New Outlook European citizenship was introduced by the Maastricht Treaty (1992) and supplemented by the Amsterdam Treaty (1997). It is defined as complementary to the citizenship of any national member state. Its aim is to strengthen European identity by getting people to be more involved in the integration process. Thanks to the single market, citizens enjoy a number of rights in different areas like the free movement of goods and services, consumer protection and public health, equal opportunities and treatment, and access to jobs and social protection.

4 National Statistical Institute. 2011. Population and demographic processes. (accessed: 09. February 2015).


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Despite being innovative, the concept of European citizenship is criticized by some scholars because it was established with a top-down design5 and, in particular, for the so-called European democratic deficit and the lack of common European heritage. The European democratic deficit is expressed in several main points. There is not one demos that can legitimize the European institutions, there is no government voted for directly by the citizens, and the parliament is not the only legislative body, even if it has been voted for by the citizens since 1979. There are also some highly influential political actors who are not democratically legitimated, such as functionaries of the European institutions, private lobbies or experts. Furthermore, there is a reservation principle in European Council procedures, which does not allow people to check all the official documents issued. All these issues cast some doubts as to the real meaning of this new citizenship concept and they demonstrate how this democratic deficit is kept hidden from citizens and the public European debate. In 2006, Castiglione stated that the European Convention for a Constitution sought to overcome these problems by creating a European demos, but the paradox was that this project failed due to the demos itself, with the two referendums held in France and Holland in 2005. The concept of citizenship should be defined as “a principle of an individual belonging to a community based on his power to participate in the definition of the political regime and which is translated into a set of rights and responsibilities governing his relationship with the state and the community.”6 This concept, following the view of other scholars,7 involves three main theoretical elements: rights, identity and participation (legal, identity and political dimensions). All three elements and their evolution should be studied in order to explore the innovative nature of European citizenship.

1.2 Rights Rights are given to all citizens of a society who, generally, obtain their citizenship through two main, socio-cultural norms and historical experiences: by birth (ius soli) or by blood (ius sanguinis). In an ius soli system, citizenship is based on the place of birth, while in an ius sanguinis system, descent and heritage play a pivotal role in defining who is and who can become a citizen. In terms of European citizenship, some of the rights are given by residency (ius domicilii), such as the political right to vote for and stand as a candidate in European and municipal elections. The concept of ius domicilii could mark a new approach to citizenship even for migrants or people from non-EU countries who live in any of the member states. This approach, therefore, could lead to an innovative relationship between the state and the people of a society that is based on their residency and not on their nationality. Moreover, even if there is no classic democratic legitimacy between the citizens and a representative government in the EU and there is no effective constitution, a European citizen benefits from all of the following rights: to

5 Wiener, Antje. 2007. European Citizenship Practice. Paper at the EUSA - Tenth Biennial International Conference, Montreal, 17-19 May 2007. 6 Moro, Cittadini in Europa, 57. 7 Kymlicka, Will and Wayne Norman. 2000. Citizenship in Diverse Societies. Oxford: Oxford University Press.


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move and reside freely within the EU, to be protected by the diplomatic and consular authorities of any EU country when there are no diplomatic or consular authorities from the citizen's own country in a non-EU country, to sign a petition to the European Parliament and to complain to the European Ombudsman. The fact that these rights are established by a supranational citizenship, different from a national state, is already an essential innovation. The EU is the only international organism with this specific, trans-border status.8 It is not important whether the EU recognizes the member states as constitutive actors or not, as the innovative perspective is that it is the source of the European citizens' rights. Another innovative tool related to the evolution of rights is certainly the European Citizens' Initiative (ECI), which was included in the draft EU Constitution (2003) and later in the revised Treaty on European Union (Lisbon Treaty, 2007). Since April 2012, European citizens have been able to use this instrument. It gives citizens the right to directly engage in setting the legislative agenda for the EU. Once signatures supporting a policy proposal have been collected and verified from at least one million citizens of at least seven EU member states, the European Commission is obliged to consider that proposal. It can, but is not required to, respond by proposing new legislation. The ECI is the first transnational instrument of participatory democracy in world history. Finally, it is important to mention the “push and pull” legal role of the European Court of Justice (ECJ). In contrast to a common national justice system where judges rule on the basis of a constituted system of laws, the decisions of the ECJ may expand the legal framework of the EU, thus affecting the rights of citizens and the relationship between nation states and the EU. In the majority of cases, such rulings favour the EU, therefore empowering it. An example is the European Court of Justice’s expansion of the scope of non-discrimination and free movement principles, which cover new and not financially productive categories, after 19989 in the case of Martinez Sala.10 Thus, the innovative aspect in the legal dimension of the European citizenship is the possibility for the judgments of the ECJ to alter the conceptual framework of citizenship, as it typically happens in an international judicial system and not in a national one. 1.3 Identity The second element, identity, is often criticized due to the lack of a common European demos with a common consciousness of the citizens, which makes the legitimacy of the institutions and their future much weaker. As argued by

8 Bellamy, Richard and Alex Warleigh. 2001. Citizenship and Governance in the European Union. London, New York: Continuum, 3-4. 9 Bellamy, Castiglione and Shaw, Making European Citizenship; O'Neill and Sandler. The EU citizenship. 10 Court of Justice of the European Communities. 1998. Press release No 32/98, Case C-85/96, Martinez Sala v. Freistaat Bayern, E.C.R. 1-2691. (accessed: 09. February 2015).


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Schmidt in 2006, the European Union does not have only one demos, but multiple demoi11 that are the base of a “demoicracy.” The identity of European citizenship is based on the concept of diversity, while the national one is based on the concept of equality. The concept of European citizenship overcomes the dichotomy of inclusion and exclusion to embrace the idea of a cosmopolitan community that encompasses recognition and affirmation of the diversity of our society. In the EU, in fact, there is not one single language, one tradition, one history or one religion, but an awareness of living in a multicultural environment with different people of different backgrounds. Hence, Europeans are living in a society that supports the motto “United in Diversity.” This diversity represents the new perspective of European citizenship, in contrast to the dominant idea of an ethnic nation, which is even, to some scholars, characterized in historically multi-ethnic societies, such as the United States. Smith expresses the idea that modern nations tend to form based on a pre-modern, ethnic core that provides myths, symbols and memories; the WASPs (White Anglo-Saxon Protestants) were, indeed, the core in the USA.12 Others scholars have underlined that the common sense of cosmopolitanism of Europeans derives itself from the historic, painful and cruel heritage of the two World Wars and from the “never again” promise.13 Furthermore, according to Bruter (2005) and Magnette (2007), considering the evolution of technologies and current lifestyles, the conception of identity by each European citizen is no longer seen as traditional membership, but involves a process of continuous political and cultural transformation. This cultural transformation includes three different spheres: transformation of national identity, transformation of horizontal relations (living with people from different nationalities) and transformation of vertical relations (the relationship between people and the EU).14 One of the most significant contributions trying to explain the idea of a common European identity is certainly that of Habermas, who defines the concept as “constitutional patriotism” - the idea that political attachment ought to centre on the norms, values and, more indirectly, procedures of a liberal democratic constitution.15 He contrasts the previous national culture with the present, constitutional and normative conception of society linked to the European Union project. Bearing in mind this framework, European citizenship differs from the conception of national sentiment by evolving into a

11 A nation-state model of democracy presumes a single “demos” (citizenry) constituted by a

resilient collective identity, a common public sphere and a developed political infrastructure of associations and parties that serve as the social underpinnings of a legitimate and well-functioning democracy. Such a demos is strong at the national level, but weak in the EU. The EU has a new aptitude; it is characterized by more demoi.

12 Smith, Anthony D. 1986. The Ethnic Origins of Nations. Oxford: Blackwell. 13 Beck, Ulrich and Edgar Grande. 2006. L’Europa cosmopolita. Società e politica nella seconda modernità. Roma: Carrocci, 135. 14 Bruter, Citizenship of Europe?, 2-3; 2007. Magnette, Paul. 2007. How can one be European? Reflection son the Pillars of European Civic Identity. European Law Journal 13(5), 664-79. 15

Habermas, Jürgen. 1990. Die nachholende Revolution. Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp; Habermas, Jürgen. 1994. Citizenship and national identity: Some reflections on the future of Europe, in In the Condition of Citizenship, edited by Steenbergen, Bart van. New York: Publications Ltd.


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common constitutional sense. Thus, a strong awareness among the people of this meaning of European citizenship could spread a stronger democratic sense of tolerance, solidarity and social cohesion. In any case, despite Habermas successfully articulating the concept of “constitutional patriotism,” in trying to introduce the word patriotism into a series of principles, his argumentation is still too weak and abstract to support and justify a real sense of solidarity and belonging among citizens. His optimistic view of the landscaping of modern, pluralist societies by building an authentically shared, political culture is misplaced.16 The challenges that cultural diversity and pluralism face in contemporary states cannot be resolved through a normative approach that focuses solely on political legitimacy. Yet, the difficulties that surround the concept of “constitutional patriotism” advise that modern states will resist the building of a collective, political identity that could generate a genuine sense of solidarity. Thus, it seems that the modern concept of European citizenship relating to pluralist states faces more profound challenges, which cannot be simplified as part of an inevitable march of modernization or rationalization, as Habermas assumes.17 One of the challenges in building a basis for a collective identity will be the major participation of citizens at all levels of governance of the EU. A stronger relationship between civic engagement and empowerment, and therefore the development of a civic involvement and social solidarity,18 could be key to pursuing a trustful sense of democratic common will and constitutional patriotism. 1.4 Participation The third element, participation, refers to the link between who is representing and who is represented, the engine of the policy making process in any democratic body. Nowadays, the political crisis is related to the crisis of citizenship, in which our societies have difficulty legitimating politicians and the political arena, and the concept of citizenship itself becomes more and more “empty.”19 European citizenship, because of its new nature, could invigorate political legitimacy, allowing modern society to face the global problems that seem too vast to overcome. The gap between civic society and the democratic representative institutions has grown, and the historical process leading to the creation of a unique, common civic identity - the modern citizenship - has stopped.20 In this sense, participation, in particular, could play an essential role for the future of political legitimacy of societies. Thus, the key point of this part of the analysis addresses the innovative approach of European citizenship, in respect to the European policy making process, and will check if it is capable of facing the current lack of legitimacy.

16 Viroli, Marco. 2006. È possibile un patriottismo costituzionale europeo? MA-thesis. University of Trento, 3-4; Baumeister, Andrea. 2007. Diversity and Unit: The problem with Constitutional Patriotism. European Journal of Political Theory 6(4), 483-503. 17 Viroli, È possibile un patriottismo costituzionale europeo?; Baumeister, Diversity. 18 Putnam, Robert. 1993. Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 19 Donati, Pierpaolo. 1996. La cittadinanza democratica fra particolarismo e nuovo universalismo, in Multiculturalismo e democrazia, edited by Crespi, Segatori. Roma: Donzelli, 193; Rossi, Unico. 2000. La cittadinanza oggi. Elementi di discussione dopo Thomas H. Marshall. Working Paper 39. Siena: Università di Siena, 37. 20 Rossi, La cittadinanza democratica, 37-38.


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Further, regarding electoral participation in the European Parliament and the European Citizens' Initiative, there is another notion worth considering, “participatory democracy.” This consists of all the instruments and procedures that aim to involve citizens in defying public decisions and politics, trying to increase their influence in these public procedures.21 Concretely, this definition refers to legislative initiatives, procedures of deliberative democracy (like a forum or jury of citizens), consultations, participatory budgeting, etc. This participatory democracy is the new approach of the European Union, formally included in the Treaty of Lisbon, to face the crisis of representative democracy and its democratic deficit. Thus, the intent is prominent and innovative, but it still seems weak and not completely efficient. In fact, to implement this method of participation, the European institutions work with two main actors: individuals (for example, through online campaigns) and the civic society (lobbies, organizations, companies, etc.). However, they do not have specific criteria, particularly regarding the latter, for choosing their interlocutors and for measuring their respective political representatives’ roles (one organization could have 100 or 10000 members). In addition, 60% of the organizations involved in European round tables are private companies, while the majority of the other 40% are financed by EU funds and represent the civic sphere and workers in Brussels. This particular framework leads to pertinent criticism of “professionalising” civic activism, where the work of the European Union appears to be more oriented towards its own legitimacy and not towards measurable civic-political participation.22 Regardless of these critical aspects, participatory democracy was successful in some cases, as demonstrated by the 1992–1993 civic initiative of the Active Citizenship Network, which reached an important civil milestone by promoting the European Charter for Patients’ Rights. This experience can be considered in a positive light for the following reasons: 1) the relevance and sensibility of the problem 2) the specific know-how of the association and the use of the European Court jurisdiction (free movement and non-discrimination principles) 3) the confirmation of the communitarian legal supremacy, which gave a European dimension to the management of patients’ rights 4) the fact that the initiative was independent and based in locations different from the capital of Brussels 5) the role of citizens, who were not the target, but rather the first actors of a European civic initiative and, therefore, actors in the creation of European citizenship.23 Therefore, in this case, the civic bottom-up initiative from the Active Citizenship Network met a judicial top-down initiative from the European Court judgments in order to finally reach the European institutions. Hence, as Moro observed, yet another innovative feature of European citizenship is its incremental approach, where citizens can play a fundamental role. This is the case with the Active Citizenship Network initiative proven by its successful results.

21 Cotturri, Giuseppe. 2005. La democrazia Partecipativa, in Democrazia e Diritto 1, 27-40, 27. 22 Obradovic, Daniela. 2006. Civil and the social dialogue in European governance. Yearbook of European Law 2005 24, 261-329; Magnette, Paul. 2006. Le régime politique de l’Union Européenne. Paris: Les presses de Sciences Po, 225-6. 23 Moro, Cittadini in Europa, 137-141.


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2. European Citizenship and Young People in Bulgaria

2.1 The EU Youth Strategy The topic of European citizenship has gained considerable importance for both the Council of Europe and the European Commission over the past years. In their policies, the two institutions emphasize priority actions, particularly in the fields of education, training and youth: 1) Sustaining the role of youth organizations in the development of democratic participation; 2) Citizenship education and the participation of young people; 3) Access of young people to decision making.24 The Commission’s communication on youth participation, which was issued to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions in 2009, declares that, “Europe's future depends on its youth.”25 It formulates a new strategy for engaging young people in contributing to the EU project; the strategy is based on two key approaches: 1) Investing in Youth - putting in place greater resources to develop policy areas that affect young people in their daily lives and improve their well-being; 2) Empowering Youth - promoting the potential of young people for the renewal of society and for contributing to the EU values and goals. The Commission incentivizes greater collaboration in formulating the policies focused on youth and other policies such as those on education, employment, inclusion and health. This would be developed through initiatives promoting youth activities and youth work.26 The implementation of this cross-sectoral vision is especially supported by the Commission through different actions: The Youth-in-Action programme, Culture, Lifelong Learning, Progress, Media, Erasmus for Young Entrepreneurs, Competitiveness & Innovation Programme and Structural Funds.27 In general, the EU vision considers young people as essential players with an active role in constructing and creating Europe and its new concept of citizenship; they are committed to the European ideal of an open, inclusive and socially cohesive society. Notwithstanding all of these actions and political perspectives, many people (not only the youth) still do not know what the concept of European citizenship entails exactly, and, most importantly, they do not know how they can integrate this new concept into their daily lives. In 2010, although the majority (78%) of EU citizens claimed familiarity with the term “citizen,” the Eurobarometer calculated that still 22% had never heard of the term “citizen of the European Union.”28 Yet, 48% had declared that they are “not well

24 Dolejšiová, Ditta and Miguel Garcia López. (eds.). 2009. European citizenship - In the process of construction: challenges for citizenship, citizenship education and democratic practice in Europe, Strasbourg: Council of Europe, 5. 25 European Commission. 2009. The European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions - An EU Strategy for Youth. (accessed: 09. February 2015). 26 European Commission. 2009. The European Parliament. 27 European Commission. 2009. The European Parliament. 28 European Commission. 2010. European Union Citizenship Report 2010. Dismantling the obstacles to EU citizens’ rights. COM(2010) 603 final. Brussels: Published online 27. October 2010. (accessed: 09. February 2015). This survey concerns the citizenship of the European Union. Are you familiar with the term “citizen of the European Union”? Base: all respondents, % EU27.


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informed” of the rights that stem from this new concept.29 It is interesting to point out that citizens of the new member states were less likely to claim they had never heard the term (13%), compared to respondents from the EU15 (EU members prior to 1 May 2004) countries (24%). Citizens of the new member states were also more likely to indicate that they knew what the term meant (46%), compared to the older EU15 respondents (42%). Slovakia, Hungary and Finland, with 96%, 94% and 93% respectively, had the highest percentages of respondents declaring to be familiar with the term “citizen of the European Union.” On the contrary, Belgium (70%), Denmark (66%) and Germany (59%) had the lowest percentages of people claiming to be familiar with the term. In Bulgaria, the same statistics showed that 41% were familiar with the concept of European citizenship, 44% were familiar, but not sure about its meaning, and 11% had never heard of it. All these data are even more significant if we take into account that the electoral participation in the European Parliament is constantly decreasing with time, from 84% to 31% between 1979 and 2009.30 The EU needs to mobilize its citizens to achieve major democratic legitimacy, and it intends to start with young people. This paper shares Moro’s observation that one of the most innovative features of European citizenship is its incremental approach, through which citizens can play a fundamental role in the shaping of this new concept. It is also shared that the EU has the vital role of raising awareness and forming new attitudes among the young citizens, which leads to stronger participation on the EU level. Yet, this paper is going to verify the evolution of this new concept of citizenship and to try to understand young people’s perception of, and their behaviour with respect to, the new institutional framework, which designs new rights and responsibilities for them. 2.2 Young Bulgarians’ Perception of EU Citizenship: The Research Structure The aim of this empirical work, which is based on thirty semi-structured, English-language interviews, is to study the perceptions and attitudes of young Bulgarian people in regard to the new concept of European citizenship. The research purpose is also to discover how this new citizenship approach could facilitate inter-ethnic dialogue in the opinions of young people in Bulgaria. Thus, there are two main research questions posed by the article. The first one is: 1) How do young Bulgarians perceive the concept of EU citizenship? Is it perceived positively as an opportunity, a new way to improve their lives and perspectives for society, or rather negatively, as something artificial, imposed, useless, unequal or simply unattainable? The second question is: 2) How do young Bulgarians perceive the new European citizenship with regard to the inter-ethnic relations in their own country? Do they see it as a new framework in which to improve inter-ethnic dialogue and social integration between the different communities? Hence, even if the inter-ethnic dialogue between Bulgarians and Bulgarian Turks is a salient topic, which involves different stakeholders and historical issues (i.e. the historical role of the MRF party),

29 European Commission. European Union Citizenship Report 2010, 20. 30 European Commission. European Union Citizenship Report 2010, 17-8.


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could a new perception of European citizenship contribute to a new viewpoint on the cultural and social relations of young people living in Bulgaria? The research method applied in this paper is a comparative research design through the qualitative comparative analysis (QCA), which is a middle way between conventional qualitative and quantitative research approaches.31 QCA exemplifies some key strengths of the qualitative and quantitative approach. First of all, it considers each case as a complex entity, maintaining the concept of causality, which is typical for the qualitative approach. At the same time, it allows the researcher to produce generalizations by comparing a high number of cases through Boolean algebra, which represents the cases by using specific variables. The research performs a micro-level comparison of 30 cases of young Bulgarians in an attempt to understand the relationships and relevance of independent variables that influence the outcomes the most. The QCA, thus, links the combination of the variables with the outcome, offering “multiple conjunctural explanations.”32 This method deals with macro-social phenomena and macro-level units of analysis, but also with micro-level cases. Recently, there were the first micro-level applications of the QCA with individuals as units of analysis.33 Instead of the classic qualitative approach, the QCA enables a systematic comparison of a smaller number of individual cases, which preserves complexity and is as parsimonious as possible, underlining often-hidden, causal relationships on a micro-level.34 Moreover, considering the extensive primary information gathered though the qualitative technique, QCA allows for the data to be cut down, while their preserved complexity and diversity allows a systematic comparison of the cases through a small number of variables.35 The most appropriate strategy for this study is the multiple cases – most similar system design (MSSD).36 It is synchronic, so similar cases are compared in real time to highlight the combined variables related to the different outcomes. Cases that are chosen are as similar as possible, so as to observe and control for any external variances. The aim of MSSD presupposes a purposeful, rather than random, selection of the cases. It is, however, impossible to identify all factors relevant to outcome differences. Some findings of this research design may be over-determined and have several possible explanations that cannot be ruled out - a limitation that could be overcome

31 For QCA, see Ragin, Charles C. 1987. The Comparative Method. Moving Beyond Qualitative and Quantitative Strategies. Berkeley, Los Angeles: University of California Press.; Ragin, Charles C. 1991. Issues and Alternatives in Comparative Social Research. Leiden: Brill.; De Meur, Gisèle and Benoît Rihoux. 2002. L'analyse quali-quantitative comparée (AQQC-QCA): approche, techniques et applications en sciences humaines. Louvain-la-Neuve: Academia-Bruylant. 32 Ragin, Charles C. 2003. Making Comparative Analysis Count. COMPASSS Working paper Series 2003-10. Published online 10 September 2003. (accessed: 09. February 2015). 33 Lobe, Bojana. 2008. Integration of Online Research Methods. Ljubljana: Faculty of Social Sciences; Scherrer, Vanessa. 2006. Citoyens sous tensions. Analyse qualitative des rapports ŕ la politique et des configurations d'appartenances ŕ partir d'entretiens projectifs sur les proches. PhD-thesis. Paris: Institut d'Etudes Politiques de Paris. 34 Rihoux, Benoît and Bojana Lobe. 2009. The Case for Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA): Adding Leverage for Thick Cross-Case Comparison, in The Sage Handbook of Case-Based Methods, edited by Byrne, David and Charles C. Ragin. London: Sage, 474-476. 35 Rihoux and Lobe, The Case for Qualitative, 474-476. 36 For MSSD, see Przeworski, Adam and Henry Teune. 1970. The Logic of Comparative Social Inquiry. NY: Wiley-Interscience.


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with further research on a larger sample of young Bulgarians. Bearing this framework in mind, the attempt is to point out any differences across the selected cases that are capable of producing a similar outcome. The case selection is based on the features of age, education, gender, ethnicity, residence and knowledge of the English language. Among the 30 respondents selected, there were 14 males and 16 females. Out of this, 16 defined themselves as Bulgarians (7 males and 9 females) and 14 as part of the Turkish community (7 males and 7 females). The latter group is the largest minority in Bulgaria, forming 8.8% of the population or 588.318 people according to the latest census in 2011.37 The participants in the sample38 are between 21 and 30 years of age; they are students and professionals in different fields, all residing in Sofia (for at least 1 year), holding at least one Bachelor’s degree or in their last year of a BA. In order to create a more similar casing, similar classifications of residence and education were chosen. Also, to avoid the expected outcome being altered, the typology of the study (technical, human or social sciences) could have a certain influence on the knowledge of those who partook in the study. Although the number of cases is limited, it has been thoroughly selected and covers all the expected possibilities for our qualitative comparative analysis. Furthermore, the research has an important specificity regarding the youth’s perception of EU citizenship in Bulgaria, a country of interest to this study for a number of reasons. Bulgaria, together with Romania and afterwards Croatia, is one of the newest EU member states (acceded in 2007). Therefore, its social, legal and financial background linked to the EU can still be seen as “under construction” or not as consolidated as that of older member states. Furthermore, Bulgaria has not yet entered the Schengen area. Other relevant reasons for choosing Bulgaria as the country of analysis are as follows: According to the statistics of Eurofound, in 2010 Bulgaria had the highest

percentage of young people who were not in employment, education or train-ing (21.8%);

In the country, diverse minorities (Bulgarian Turks, Roma, Pomaks, Jewish, others) live peacefully together, even though some episodes of ethnic tension have created a more uncertain context. In May 2011, there was a protest of the Bulgarian Nationalist Party Ataka in front the Mosque of Sofia, and in the autumn, protests against the Roma communities were held in different cities;

There is a huge gap between young people and politicians in Bulgaria. Poli-ticians do not enjoy the confidence of the people and do not have high stand-ing with the public. One of the main reasons is the highly corrupt system, which keeps people distant from politics (i.e. the recovery of fake election ballots printed by GERB during the parliamentary elections in May 2013).

37 According to the Bulgarian National Statistical Institute – 2011 Population Census – these are the main ethnicities. The Bulgarian ethnic group has 5.664.624 persons and comprises 84.8% of the people who declared their ethnic identity on a voluntary basis. The Turkish ethnic group has the second largest population – 588.318 persons. It represents 8.8% of the population. The Roma ethnicity is traditionally the third one, numbering 325.343 persons, with a relative share of 4.9%. 38 The interviews took place from April 2012 to November 2012. (accessed: 09. February 2015).


13

Moreover, there is a deficit in the civic education of the young in the coun-try, which affects their trust in politics.39

This background could partly explain the research results and the answers of some interviewees. The economic crisis and the economic situation of Bulgaria (the lowest GDP per capita of all EU member states – Eurostat, 2012), for example, could play an important role in the perception of European citizenship of young people. This new citizenship could be considered to be an opportunity or, on the contrary, inequality compared to citizens living in other countries. At the same time, the inter-ethnic issue could influence the perception of European citizenship and diversity as a new and positive challenge, applicable to Bulgaria or, alternatively, as being irrelevant, useless and imposed. Having defined the casing and the selected cases, the following paragraphs present the combined independent variables (i.e. awareness, European daily practices and ethnic self-identification) and how they relate to the final outcomes. The first variable, awareness, aims to identify respondents’ knowledge of the term “European citizenship” and, in particular, the new nature of the concept. The second variable, daily practices, seeks to understand how European experiences40 are already part of the respondents’ lifestyle, and how young Bulgarians are changing their vertical and horizontal relationships in terms of belonging, and normative and civil participation. The last variable, ethnic self-identification, seeks to evaluate the level of attachment of people to their respective communities. This last variable represents a “litmus paper;” it is relevant in order to identify the possible connection between ethnic identity and European citizenship. In the study, the three variables are considered as binaries (high-low: 1-0). Although they do not permit a pure qualitative analysis of the data, they allow a more systematic analysis to focus on the chosen outcomes covering a larger general framework of our QCA. Awareness and daily practices are measured through the levels of three indicators - the three main elements of the citizenship concept described above namely, rights, identity and participation. Ethnic self-identification is evaluated through three other indicators: the level of declared self-identification, the links with one’s own and other communities, and the strict following of cultural traditions and practices of one’s own community. Some examples of the questions are: Do you know what the European Ombudsman is? Do you know anything regarding the diplomatic and consular protection of citizens of the EU abroad (Rights)? Do you feel more Sofianez,41 Bulgarian, European…, and why? Do you consider yourself cosmopolitan? Why? What do you think about the EU slogan “United in Diversity” (Identity)? Did you vote in

39 Krasteva, Anna and Tolya Stoitsova. (eds.). 2008. Parva godina evropejska Balgaria: izbori i obrazi. Sofia: New Bulgarian University. 40 European experiences are defined as familiarity/experience with the EU Programmes (Erasmus, Leonardo da Vinci, Youth in Action, etc.), friendship and communication with other European students, participation and involvement in European networks or associations, mobility and willingness to travel, willingness to know other European cultures, etc. 41 Sofianez is a term used to indicate an inhabitant of Sofia.


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the last European Parliament elections? Do you know what the ECI (European Citizens’ Initiative) is (Participation)? The second part of the interview is focused on ethnic self-identification (third variable), where the questions are more related to the respondents’ own community: Do you have a lot of friends belonging to other Bulgarian ethnicities? How important are cultural and religious traditions to you? 2.3 Young Bulgarians’ Perception of EU Citizenship: Data Analysis and Research Results The following paragraphs present the separate aspects of the variables and the indicators examined, followed by a presentation of the results obtained for the two research questions. As shown in Table 1, with regard to the first independent variable, awareness of the concept of European citizenship, it appears that young people, despite being well educated, are not very familiar with the meaning of European citizenship. Bulgarian respondents gave eight positive and eight negative answers, whereas Bulgarian Turks gave four positive and ten negative answers. Although awareness differs between Bulgarians and Bulgarian Turks, it can be argued that raising awareness of the new democratic concept of citizenship is still a challenge for the EU. The indicators show that the majority of the micro cases have a better knowledge of rights than of identity and participation, even though with some cases it is superficial. An example is that they know and appreciate the role of the Ombudsman and of the ECJ, but they do not know the terms and specific functions of these authorities. There is only one case where the respondent could give more details on them because of being directly involved in litigation against the State of Bulgaria. Conversely, there is rarely any detailed knowledge of the idea of a common European identity, which, although defined by the majority (almost 80% of the respondents) as real, is perceived as missing. Some say that EU citizens have a common identity due to the “interrelated historical, artistic and cultural experience,” while only two people stated they only have a common “system of law,” similar to Habermas’ assumption of “constitutional patriotism.” The last awareness indicator, knowledge of the mechanism of participation in the EU system, is also not well-known, even if a large number of respondents affirmed that European citizenship is an “evolving process” that can be improved and modified by citizens. Thus, paradoxically, respondents believe that they can influence the democratic evolution of this new concept, but they do not know how exactly. Many of them do not know about the European Citizens' Initiative (ECI) or the European public consultation. This problem is less evident, yet exists, among those young people who are active participants in the civic society and members of cross-border associations or NGOs (30% of all respondents). For instance, one respondent stated: “I know that ECI is an instrument which allows European citizens to express their will, but I do not know it in detail.” In these cases, and in a broader view, the research finds that young people live as active European citizens in their daily lives without actual awareness of their active participation. Awareness and daily practices seem to be two sides of the same coin; however, they are very different, one being vastly more perceptible than the other. Contrary to the focus of the EU strategy on raising awareness and promoting participation through actions, which mainly


15

support the daily practices of the European citizenship (for example through mobility, exchanges, etc.), young respondents declared that most of the information and knowledge that they have about EU citizenship is “derived from personal interests and studies.” This finding is confirmed by the results of the second variable, the daily practices, which are positive in twelve cases for the Bulgarians and in six cases for the Bulgarian Turks. Both results are more positive compared to awareness, even if for the Bulgarian Turks there is a lower predisposition to living inside the European framework every day. All interviews demonstrate that the European daily practices of the people mainly relate to identity and participation - second and third indicators - corresponding to what Bruter and Magnette describe as transformation of horizontal and vertical relations,42 which include living with people from different nationalities, travelling and having contact with other European citizens, and being involved in actions and activities correlated with a European cross-border level or, in some cases, with specific European topics. This sample, for example, includes two people who work as international affairs officers, for a bank and for a political party member, five members of cross-border associations who deal with various matters not related to European issues, and one person volunteering in a Bulgarian blog focused on European policies. It is interesting to point out that only two interviewees declared to be involved in local civic activities connected with Bulgarian issues. This confirms the study of Krasteva and Stoitsova of 2008 on the gap between young Bulgarian people and the country’s political system. In a way, it seems that European citizenship brings a new and optimistic civic will among the youth. The last indicator, rights, is seen as correlated with the other two because travelling, for example, to attend initiatives for transnational associations is clearly an indication of exercising the right of free movement in the EU. With regard to this right of free movement, some respondents expressed critical attitudes, saying “it is not justified that Bulgaria is not part of the Schengen area yet,” but they believe that the situation would change soon. At the same time, they believe in European rights concerning legal protection. Consider the answer: “the positive thing is that there is some sort of control over corruption and over the Bulgarian judicial system.” Even if people do not know the legal procedures for claiming their rights, they believe that they could easily understand them when needed. Eight respondents, four Bulgarians and four Bulgarian Turks, stated that “the best advantage of EU citizenship is exactly the opportunity to claim one’s rights on a higher level.” The Bulgarians connect this with a negative judgment of the Bulgarian system; the Turks connect this with greater protection of their human rights as a minority community. In addition, another relevant practice that the research illustrates is that the majority of the respondents, 24 out of 30 people, declared to vote conscientiously for the European Parliament, even if some of them do not know all the European bodies very well or the role of the European Parliament and the Commission. Therefore, with different levels and different modalities, all these assumptions confirm a change of the horizontal and vertical relationships of people and the EU towards a new thinking of their own concept of citizenship.

42 Bruter, Citizenship of Europe?; Magnette, How can one be European?


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The third variable, ethnic self-identification, is predominantly positive, with ten Bulgarians and eight Bulgarian Turks responding to have a strong sense of community for cultural and historical reasons. In Bulgaria, but also in Eastern countries in general, this has been reinforced by the collapse of communism as a system based on social differentiation, politicizing ethnic identities, movements and parties.43 A high number of respondents, 26 out of 30, declared to belong more to their own communities than to other identities, even though four people declared to feel more like citizens of the world, and six people to feel both their ethnic and European belonging. European identification is less prominent with the Turks, but, in general, it is not refused. Ten Bulgarian Turks declared that they would like to see Turkey as a member of the EU, while, on the contrary, only four Bulgarians agreed with such membership. Some Bulgarians explained their position by saying “Turkey is part of another culture,” “the ruling government is Islamist” or “Turkey is too large and would imbalance power on the Balkans and in the EU.” Still, others admitted the existence of historical tensions between the two countries, especially on behalf of the Bulgarian side. Considering the second indicator, the majority of the interviewees stated that they have interactions with people from the respective other ethnicity, although they did not have strong relationships with them. Four Bulgarian Turks also expressed their desire to live in Turkey in the future, and one of them wanted to attend the Erasmus Program in Istanbul next year. Finally, related to the last indicator, the interviewees who follow cultural practices declared that “it depends mostly on our family and our religion.” In this indicator, Islam plays a relevant role in distinguishing Bulgarian Turks. It is important to study the combination of the variables through the QCA, which will make possible an evaluation of the relevance of the three variables linking them to the results of the outcomes. Table 1: List of Cases and Outcomes

CASEID Awareness

(high-low)

Daily

Practices

(high-low)

Ethnic Self-id

(high-low)

Perception of

EU Citizenship

(Pro-Sceptical)

Perception of

Minority-majority

Relations and the

Intercultural

Dialogue

(Pro-Sceptical)

bg1 0 1 0 1 1 bg2 1 1 0 1 1 bg3 1 1 0 1 1 bg4 1 1 1 1 1 bg5 1 0 1 1 0 bg6 0 1 0 1 1 bg7 0 0 1 0 0 bg8 1 0 1 1 0 bg9 1 1 1 1 1 bg10 0 1 0 1 1 bg11 0 1 0 1 1

43 Bunce, Valerie and Maria Csanadi. 1993. Uncertainty in the Transition: Post-communism in Hungary. East European Politics and Society 7(2), 240-75; De Waele, Jean-Michel. 2004. Les clivages politiques en Europe centrale et orientale. Bruxelles: Éditions de l’université de Bruxelles.


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bg12 1 1 1 1 1 bg13 0 1 1 1 0 bg14 0 0 1 0 0 bg15 1 1 1 1 1 bg16 0 1 1 1 0 tr1 0 1 1 1 0 tr2 1 0 0 1 1 tr3 0 1 0 1 1 tr4 0 0 0 0 0 tr5 1 0 0 1 1 tr6 0 1 1 1 0 tr7 1 0 1 1 0 tr8 0 1 1 1 0 tr9 0 0 1 0 0 tr10 0 1 0 1 1 tr11 0 0 0 0 0 tr12 0 0 1 0 0 tr13 0 1 1 1 0 tr14 1 0 1 1 0

Source: Author’s own illustration Analysing the first research question (c), only six situations have a negative outcome; in all of them, the awareness (a) and the daily practice (d) are low.44

a . d . E + a . d . e c

The result occurs independently of the third variable, ethnic self-identification (e). So it could be minimized with the formula below:

a . d c

These assumptions are confirmed both for cases bg7, bg14, tr9, tr12 and for cases tr4 and tr11 (see graphic 1, pink rectangles) for Bulgarians and Bulgarian Turks. Thus, if a young person is neither familiar with the distinctive features of European citizenship nor with any European activities in his daily life, he tends to be sceptical or indifferent to the European Union and its new concept of citizenship; it does not matter if he has an ethnic sense of attachment or not. This could be explained with the lack of trust between the young Bulgarian people and their political system. In fact, some declared, “I am not interested in politics,” while others said, “Politicians do not care about people.” This cannot be overcome with new trust in Europe without awareness and daily practices. All of the other cases, which instead have a pro-inclination, have at least one positive variable of awareness or daily practices. In the same way, the third variable does not influence the outcome because it is individually neutralized by the other two. The presence of A or D indicates a positive outcome of C.

A + D C

44 Considering the variables and the outcomes, the positive result (1) is represented by capital letters: A, D, E (variables) - C, M (outcomes); on the contrary, the negative result (0) is represented by small letters: a, d, e (variables) - c, m (outcomes). The symbols are represented by “+” which means “or” and “.” which means “and.”


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Thus, if a young Bulgarian belonging to the Bulgarian ethnicity or to the Turkish one has awareness of the innovative aspects of the European citizenship concept – for example he knows the European rights, he is conscious of the multicultural sense of the EU or is already living with a European vision in mind, being part of European networks, travelling and participating in European Programmes – he tends to have a positive perception of European citizenship. During one interview, a Bulgarian student declared, “I really like to travel and to discover other European customs and traditions; they represent our long and fruitful history. In Europe, we do not have common national traditions, but each region has its particular ones. The EU should preserve and promote them.” The graphic below shows how variable awareness and daily practices can even individually bring a positive outcome.45 Graphic 1: Perception on EU Citizenship

Source: Author’s own illustration, Tosmana 1.2. Analysing this first research question, it can also be observed that a positive perception incentivizes the participation of young people, fostering a major personal motivation and strong belief in the future of the European integration process. On the contrary, a negative perception brings about a sceptical attitude and lower involvement of the person, physically and ideally, in the EU project (in terms of civic participation, propensity to know other European cultures, willingness to participate in EU Programmes, etc.). Finally, high

45 The graphic is made by the Tosmana program. The green colour represents a positive result (1), the pink colour represents a negative result (0), the white colour represents a case combination not covered by the research, and the double colour/green-pink represents a contradiction. These two last cases are not present in our research.


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ethnic self-identification, combined with both high awareness and high level of daily practices, represents the best combination with the highest propensity and motivation for involvement in the EU integration process. So, using the formula, it could be represented as:

A . D . E C

In fact the four cases, bg4, bg9, bg12 and bg15, could be seen as special cases because their combinations correspond to the highest pro-Europe civic activism and a higher spirit and sense of belonging to the EU, as one respondent said, “Europe is one great idea that will have a long future.” They also claimed to believe in a future federal system of the EU. Considering the second question (m), the possible outcomes are more articulate (see graphic 2). In this case, ethnic self-identification is the most relevant variable; as a matter of fact, the other two variables, “awareness” and “daily practices,” taken individually do not impact the final outcome. Actually, when the ethnic self-identification variable is positive, the outcome is positive only when both of the other two variables are positive. Thus, there is a positive perception of the role of the European citizenship in terms of a greater intercultural and ethnic dialogue only in these combinations: awareness 1, ethnic self-id 0 (bg2, bg3, tr2, tr5); daily practices 1 and ethnic self-id 0 (bg1, bg6, bg10, bg11, tr3, tr10 and bg2, bg3); awareness 1, daily practices 1 (bg2, bg3, bg4, bg9, bg12, bg15). So, synthesized, the result will be:

A . e + D . e + A . D M a . E + d . E + a . d m

Thus, when there is high ethnic self-identification, it corresponds to a negative perception, except in cases bg4, bg9, bg12 and bg15 with high awareness and high level of daily practices, which together are able to neutralize the ethnic sense of community of the people. These four cases can be explained with their proactive civil proneness, which gives them particular motivation and a marked positive attitude to the future and the role of the EU. In any case, many Bulgarian respondents (around 60%) separated European citizenship from the minority/inter-ethnic issue, explaining it as an internal and history-related problem. Some said, “the minorities should first be integrated into the Bulgarian community and then in the European one.” Others criticized the European motto “United in Diversity,” claiming, “it is too easy to say.” Still, others stated, “some situations are not understood by the western countries which do not experience strong intercultural problems.” A Bulgarian Turk respondent, instead discussed that “there is a paradox in the EU: it proclaims equality among people, but in a way this equality is only controlled by Germany and France.” Another Bulgarian Turk stated, “nowadays there are still violations against Muslims in some European countries” and harshly criticised the negotiations for the accession of Turkey to the EU. Concerning this topic, ten Bulgarians stated they were against the accession of Turkey to the EU. Whereas, on the contrary, all Bulgarian Turks declared to be in favour, even if they appeared more interested in the advantages of this accession (for example, the possibility to study and live in


20

Turkey) than in the actual idea of the European citizenship. An analysis of this question suggests that the sense of community and belonging outlines the opinion of young people, that European citizenship can be achieved only if they are fully involved as European citizens in terms of awareness and day-to-day life. The different cases can also be summarized in the diagram below. Graphic 2: Perception of the Minority Issue

Source: Author’s own illustration, Tosmana 1.2. Conclusion

The European Union is trying to keep up with the times and face today’s global challenges. Its new approach to European citizenship is innovative, regardless of the existing gaps and unresolved doubts, which are slowing down the evolution of European society and its political organization. Despite the complex panorama, this paper has tried to show that the concept of European citizenship with an elastic approach can be considered as evolution of national citizenship. In this regard, the EU is pursuing a modern and innovative approach with the three still developing key elements of the citizenship concept: rights, identity and participation. The most fragile aspect of this new citizenship appears to be the efficient promotion of the comprehensive and evolutionary meaning of its three fundamental elements in a modern day interpretation and the effective implementation of the existing instruments. The analysed sample suggests that the EU strategy geared to young people seems to have some success. Based on the data outlined in this article, it is working well in regard to the Bulgarian youth. Especially in terms of overall perception of the innovative


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nature of the concept, with 24 positive results out of 30, but insufficiently in regard to the new conceptions of ethnic and intercultural diversity and tolerance, where the positive cases are only 14. For the two dependent variables of the research, the Bulgarian ethnic majority has a better result with 14 and 10 positive cases (out of 16), compared to the 10 and 4 positive cases (out of 14) of the Turkish minority. Although it works with a limited number of cases, the research covers all possible combinations envisaged by the QCA analysis and leads to a double result, which involves both Bulgarians and Bulgarian Turks. On the one hand, they tend to be generally well disposed to European citizenship regardless of their ethnic belonging. This is favoured by their awareness of the new concept and by their behaviour, which already involves a European lifestyle, being part of European networks, travelling and participating in EU Programmes. Contrary to the first result, however, the majority of the respondents (16 people) are sceptical as to the particular value of European citizenship in terms of a larger and shared notion of diversity and minority rights. In other words, within this sample, the variable of ethnic self-identification is non-influential in studying the first outcome on the general perception of European citizenship, whereas it is relevant to the second one concerning the perception of European citizenship with regard to the minority issue. In this situation, only high “awareness” together with many “daily practices” could neutralize a high ethnic self-identification. This is due to one main factor; the awareness and the daily practices should be considered together as part of the same matter and the same strategy from the EU. The findings of the research could foster broader future research involving other Bulgarian cities or even other countries with similar conditions, such as new Eastern-European member states or other western Balkan countries, in order to measure their European inclination before their official EU accession. A more in-depth analysis of this study could stimulate the EU to design a new strategy that promotes awareness of the three elements - rights, identity and participation - of the new concept of European citizenship and that also assesses and improves the current situation in the Balkans, which are still very sensitive when it comes to ethnic issues. Bibliography Baumeister, Andrea. 2007. Diversity and Unit: The problem with

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Dražen Cepić and Marko Kovačić Research Fellow, University of Birmingham / Researcher, Institute for Social Research in Zagreb

[email protected] / [email protected]

http://www.suedosteuropa.uni-graz.at/cse/en/cepic_kovacic


Contemporary Southeastern Europe is an online, peer-reviewed, multidisciplinary journal that publishes original, schol-

arly, and policy-oriented research on issues relevant to societies in Southeastern Europe. For more information, please

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24

Civil Society Going Political:

The Crisis of Democracy and the Rise

of Participatory Political Parties in

Croatia

Dražen Cepić and Marko Kovačić

This paper debates the crisis of democracy and the importance of civil

society in bringing forth new, participatory models of democracy. This is

demonstrated in the case of Croatia following the results of the local

elections in the spring of 2013 when five newly founded political parties,

which shared strong ties to civil society, saw success. Building on the

existing literature on the crisis of democracy, the authors argue that the

low level of trust in political parties is not sufficient for explaining this

phenomenon. Seeking to provide a more comprehensive solution, the

authors introduce the factor of motivation by analysing the failures of

CSOs in establishing a dialogue with the government, as well as the

structural features of CSOs, thereby establishing a link between the

macro and micro level of analysis. The paper indicates similarities with

other post-socialist countries, allowing for speculation about possible

similarities between them.

Keywords: participatory democracy, crisis of democracy, civil society,

political parties, post-socialism

Introduction

In the last local elections in Croatia in May 2013, several recently founded

political initiatives caused an upset, winning a significant number of seats in

their respective municipalities and outperforming candidates from the

mainstream political parties. Despite origins in different parts of the country,

several of these more or less newly established parties share a number of

common traits. In addition to similarities in their names – ‘For the City’(Za

grad), ‘For Rijeka’ (Za Rijeku), ‘For Smart People and a Smart City’ (Za

pametne ljude i pametni grad), ‘Civic Option of the City of Osijek’ (Građanska

opcija grada Osijeka), ‘Srđ is Ours’ (Srđ je naš) - they also predominantly share

origins in the civil sector and grassroots movements. They place an emphasis

* Dražen Cepić is a research fellow at the International Development Department, University of

Birmingham. He received his PhD in social and political sciences from the European University

Institute in Florence in 2013. Before joining the University of Birmingham, he was a research

fellow at the Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Oxford and the New

Europe College-Institute for Advanced Study in Bucharest.

Marko Kovačić works as a researcher at the Institute for Social Research in Zagreb. He is a PhD

candidate in public policy at the University of Ljubljana. He holds an MA in Public Policy from the

University of Zagreb and an MA in Political Science from Central European University.

The authors wish to thank all interviewees who helped us to understand their political parties

better. We thank them for their time and patience. In addition, we owe a debt of gratitude to two

anonymous reviewers whose comments helped us to shape this paper into a coherent and

analytically sound unit.


25

on the model of participatory democracy, show a regional orientation and

liberal social values and transgress the traditional left-right divide. In this

paper, we will search for the conditions that led to their emergence, which

resulted in the proliferation of participatory democratic parties in Croatian

politics.

The crisis of democracy has surely been one of the most explored areas in the

field of social and political sciences for decades. A whole array of political

scientists has gone on to explore the loss of legitimacy and faith in democratic

institutions that have taken place since the 1960s. This is the period

characterized by the withdrawal of the welfare state, the emergence of new

social movements and economic crises, all of which followed the unprecedented

interval of the post-WWII economic growth. However, for the post-socialist

context of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), and Croatian politics

specifically, parliamentary democracy established after the decline of state-

socialism faced additional difficulties. The long transformation of the political

system from socialism to democracy and the lack of democratic culture1 – an

umbrella term referring to a whole series of phenomena that together resulted

in unresponsive democratically elected authorities – have made the democratic

functioning of political institutions incomparably more problematic than in

most countries in Western Europe.2 In such conditions, the emergence of new

political actors might seem a natural progression. Where, if not here, would you

expect a rise of new political initiatives advocating for a higher level of political

participation?

All of these factors created an opportunity for new political parties promoting

civic participation to emerge. In this paper, we will describe this trend by

presenting five political initiatives that emerged in five different cities: Zagreb,

the state capital, Dubrovnik, Split, Rijeka and Osijek, with the last three being

the largest cities after Zagreb. The crisis of democracy, however, did not

automatically lead to the above-mentioned trend. In our analysis, we point out

additional variables that set the wheels in motion, demonstrating why this

empty space in Croatian politics has been filled by the given actors, and why

Croatian civil society organizations (CSOs) presented an ideal candidate for

this quite unusual role. By defining the external circumstances (a high degree

of public support for the civil society, disappointment of the CSOs with the

possibilities to cooperate with the authorities) and the internal characteristics

of the CSOs (proactivity, adaptability and mobilization) that allowed them to

quickly adjust to the political game, we make an important contribution to the

debate on “the crisis of democracy”. At the same time, given its area

perspective, this paper contributes to scholarship on civil society in the CEE

and research on politics in post-socialist societies in general.

1 Almond, Gabriel A. and Sydney. Verba. 1963. Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations.

Boston: Little, Brown & Company. 2 Arato, Andrew. 1996. Civil Society, Transition and Consolidation of Democracy. Paper at the

International Conference Democratic Transitions in Latin America and in Eastern Europe:

Rupture and Continuity. Paris, 4-6 March 1996. (accessed: 11. February 2015); McAllister, Ian and

Stephen White. 2007. Political Parties and Democratic Consolidation in Post-Communist Societies.

Party Politics 13(197), 197-216; Merkel, Wolfgang. 2008. Plausible theory, unexpected results: the

rapid democratic consolidation in Central and Eastern Europe. International Politics and Society 2,

11-29.

Civil Society Going Political: The Crisis of Democracy and the Rise of Participatory

Political Parties in Croatia

26

The data from which we drew our conclusions were acquired through several

qualitative methodological techniques. The newly established parties were

analysed through a textual analysis of their statutes, programmes and

websites. Moreover, given that desk research can provide little insight into

party organizations, the motivation of actors and programme development,

data were also gathered using participatory observation. The authors of the

article were active in the core team of one of the parties for the entire duration

of the campaign for the May elections, during which time they participated in

party meetings and took part in various party activities. In order to understand

the motivation of actors and the organising principles of other parties, they also

conducted interviews with representatives of other parties, either during live

meetings or via email communication (the interviews were held in the period

between July 2013 and September 2013). The respondents were asked to

describe the circumstances under which they decided to switch from the civil

sector to the political arena, and also about the aspect of participatory

democracy in their decision-making patterns. A series of open-ended questions

depended on the respective interviewees and included questions such as: Please

describe the circumstances under which your party was created. What were the

motives for establishing a political party? How many founding members had

previous experience in civil society? Please specify in which CSOs they

participated. What is the main objective of your party? Please describe the

decision-making process in your party.

Can we assume that our findings from the Croatian case can be generalized to

other countries of the region (post-Yugoslav region, region of Southeastern

Europe, the post-socialist region) or even broader? On one hand, the results

seem strictly related to the specific circumstances and events of recent history

that shaped Croatian society into what it is today. Ideally, several other

country cases would be included in the research. This would allow us to draw

stronger conclusions about tendencies in participatory democracies in different

contexts, as well as about the strength and potential of civil society3 to cure the

ills of contemporary, representative democracies in environments that differ

from Croatia. However, the methodological approach of this study rendered

this almost impossible; methodology resting on in-depth interviews and

ethnographic research necessarily limited the number of cases. On the other

hand, in this paper we demonstrate the advantages of a case-oriented

approach, which is both historically interpretative and causally analytic.4 This

allowed us to consider our case as a distinct entity and to explore it as a

configuration of characteristics, not merely as a collection of variables.

The argument will be divided into three parts. In the first section, we will

briefly look at the authors and literature that discuss the participatory

3 For a better conceptualization of civil society see Diamond’s text (1994) on the concept of civil society, Kaldor, Mary. 2003. Global Civil Society. An Answer to War. Cambridge: Polity for

functions of civil society and Schmitter, Philippe C. 1997. Civil Society: East and West, in

Consolidating Third Wave Democracies: Themes and Perspectives, edited by Diamond, Larry /

Plattner Marc / Chu, Yunhan and Hung-mao, Tien. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press,

239-62 for the difference between civil society in the East and the West. 4 Ragin, Charles C. 1987. The Comparative Method: Moving Beyond Qualitative and Quantitative

Strategies. Berkley: University of California Press, 35.


27

solutions for the crisis of democracy. After providing the theoretical framework

of our study, we will move on to the empirical part of the research. We will

establish the object of analysis by presenting new political initiatives and their

ways of transcending problems of parliamentary democracy, which are

explained in the second section. Finally, before providing our concluding

remarks, we will analyse the broader social and political conditions that led to

this development.

1. The Crisis of Democracy and Participatory Politics

The crisis of democracy has for decades been one of the most explored areas in

the field of social and political sciences.5 A whole array of social scientists has

sought to explore the loss of legitimacy and faith in democratic institutions,

trying to explain the failure of democratic systems to deliver “government of the people, by the people, for the people.” Due to the fact that democratically

elected governments have gradually ceased to represent citizens’ interests, it has been said that the degree of trust in democratic systems has been

diminished on a grand scale.6 The democratic systems based on political

representation discussed here deviate from the original model of democracy,

instead focusing more on normative acts, institutions and procedures that may

not always be in correspondence with the needs and will of the people. At the

same time, the state of democracy seems almost indistinguishable from the

state of political parties, which are the main actors in the democratic political

arena.

As described in some of the classic studies of political science, most notably by

Lipset and Rokkan and Sartori,7 political parties are said to have two main

roles: expressive - representation of different social groups, expressing the

demands of their members and supporters, - and instrumental - as channels for

communication. In contemporary politics, however, as numerous authors have

noticed, both functions seem highly problematic. Nowadays, political parties

are, as the argument goes, more concerned with obtaining votes and mandates,

as well as figuring out the means of achieving these goals. Therefore, they are

often promising what people want to hear regardless of their ideology and point

of view. As a result of the decrease in the representative function of parties, the

aggregation and articulation of interests and their delivery to the political

system are becoming ever weaker.8

5 Instead of the word ‘decades,’ one might as well choose ‘centuries,’ as the critique of modern representative democracy has been a topic in numerous classical philosophical accounts, from

Rousseau and Marx to Max Weber and Schumpeter (see Bobbio, Norberto. 2005. Liberalism and

democracy. London: Verso and Held, David. 2006. Models of democracy. Cambridge: Polity).

However, in this account we focused primarily on the contemporary critiques. 6 Katz, Richard S. and Peter. Mair. 1995. Changing Models of Party Organization and Party

Democracy: The Emergence of the Cartel Party. Party politics 1(1), 5-28; Mair, Peter. 2006. Party

System Change, in Handbook of Party Politics, edited by Katz, Richard S. and William J Crotty.

London: Sage, 63-74. 7 Lipset, Seymour M. and Stein Rokkan (eds.). 1967. Party systems and voter alignments: Cross-

national perspectives. New York: Free Press; Sartori, Giovanni. 2005. Party types, organisation and

functions. West European Politics 28(1), 5-32. 8 Ravlić, Slaven. 2007. Transformacija predstavničke funkcije političkih stranaka. Zbornik Pravnog

fakulteta u Zagrebu 57(6), 979-1004.



28

Numerous accounts in contemporary social science have dealt with one of the

crucial issues of contemporary democracy: how to “rule in common for the common [in a just and democratic way].”9 The conventional definitions of

democracy, which restrict it to the mere electoral process, are in this view

simply too narrow. According to Pierre Rosanvallon, there is a need for “a more adequate account [that] would include the various ways in which the people are

able to check or hold to account their representatives or the government,

irrespective of the electoral process.”10 How can this be achieved? In

Rosanvallon’s theory of counter-democracy, there is only one solution to bring

back the trust in political institutions and improve the quality of democracy -

active citizenry where individuals demand more power in the decision-making

process. Oversight, prevention and judgment11 are necessary to utilize

democracy to its fullest potential, whereas political parties should return to

their fundamentals - interest aggregation and the articulation and delivery of

citizens’ demands into a political system.12 If those features were adopted, the

argument goes, the political systems would be more responsive and the

democratic deficit would decrease.

Attempts to face the ills of liberal democracies, by emphasizing the return to a

representational function and stressing a more intensive communication with

citizens, represent one of the most interesting theoretical issues in the

contemporary theory of democracy. However, if “citizen participation is both the heart of democracy and a mandatory part of many public decisions,”13 and

if individual freedom and personal development can only be achieved by the

permanent and direct inclusion of citizens into a policymaking process,14 then

the question emerges, how can this be achieved? Who are the political actors

ready to take over the assigned role? Finally, which mechanisms should the

participatory democratic parties, which demand deliberation, discussion,

higher citizen participation and involvement in the policy-making process,

implement to achieve these goals? These questions remained insufficiently

elaborated in the empirical (rather than normative) literature on participatory

democracy, whereas the analysis of this aspect represents the main theoretical

contribution of this paper.

9 Brown, Wendy. 2011. We Are All Democrats Now..., in Democracy in What State?, edited by

Agamben, Giorgio et al. New York: Columbia University Press, 44-57. 10 Rosanvallon, Pierre. 2008. Counter-democracy: Politics in an Age of Distrust. Cambridge

University Press. 11 The first refers to the various means whereby citizens (or, more accurately, organizations of

citizens) are able to monitor and publicize the behaviour of elected and appointed rulers; the second

refers to their capacity to mobilize resistance to specific policies, either before or after they have

been selected; the third refers to the trend toward the ‘juridification’ of politics when individuals or

social groups use the courts and especially jury trials to bring delinquent politicians to justice

(Rosanvallon, Counter-democracy). 12 This conception is also close to the idea of council democracy, which can be found in texts by

Hannah Arendt, Thomas Jefferson and F.W. Maitland. Council democracy is practiced on the local

level with the goal of enhancing community welfare. Instead of representatives being put forward

by those in power, managed by party organizations and excluding people at large from the exercise

of power, council democracy is conceptualized as a form of government where people meet in their

local communities, discuss local problems and some among them are chosen to participate in

assemblies higher up. Compare Mosley, Ivo. 2013. ´Council democracy' - reform must begin with the

local.’ (accessed: 11. February 2015). 13 Gastil, John and Peter Levine. 2005. The deliberative democracy handbook: Strategies for

effective civic engagement in the twenty-first century. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. 14 Held, Models of democracy, 263.


29

In the following sections, we will analyse the ‘deliberative movement’ among political parties by providing in-depth insight in the cases of participatory

democratic parties. However, instead of quantitative cross-country research, we

concentrate on the single country-case of Croatia, with a special focus on the

‘new wave’ of recently established political initiatives, which achieved success in the last local elections held in May 2013. What is the logic behind this case

selection? Even though the crisis of democracy represents a global

phenomenon, which can and should be studied in a large N, in this paper we

follow the argument put forth by Schmitter and Karl15 and Linz and Stephan.16

According to them, the legitimacy of democratic institutions should be studied

as entrenched within contextually specific socioeconomic conditions, state

structures and policy practices. The post-socialist context of Croatia represents

the political setting and local institutional tradition in which we observe the

object of our study. Our goals will, therefore, be twofold. On the one hand, we

seek to explain a local phenomenon by elucidating the deeper historical

conditions that led to its emergence. At the same time, however, we believe

that this local perspective can represent an important contribution to the

examination of ‘the participatory turn’ among political parties as part of the global process.

2. The Participatory Turn in Croatian Party Politics

The descending tendency of the degree of trust in democratic institutions that

was primarily established in the societies and politics of the advanced, Western

capitalist countries proved even more problematic in the post-socialist context

of Central and Eastern Europe. High levels of political corruption, devastation

to social capital during decades of authoritarian regimes, and political elites

broadly found to be unaccountable for their respective constituencies all

created conditions in which the crisis of democratic legitimacy was even more

noticeable than in their western counterparts.17 Recently, however, a new

political trend has emerged in Croatian politics that has demonstrated the

important healing potential for an otherwise seriously damaged health of

representative democracy. Even though they are formally unrelated and

15 Schmitter, Phillip C. and Terry L. Karl. 1991. What democracy is... and is not. Journal of

democracy 2(3), 75-88. 16 Linz, Juan J. and Alfred Stepan. 2011. Problems of democratic transition and consolidation:

Southern Europe, South America, and post-communist Europe. Cambridge: JHU Press. 17 Dahrendorf, Ralf. 1990. Reflections on the Revolution in Europe. New York: Times Books;

Markowski, Radoslaw. 1997. Political parties and ideological spaces in East Central Europe.

Communist and Post-Communist Studies 30(3), 221-54; Limongi, Fernando and Adam Przeworski.

1997. Modernization: Theories and facts. World politics 49(2), 155-83; Lijphart, Arend. 1999.

Patterns of democracy: Government forms and performance in thirty-six countries. New Haven,

CT/London: Yale University Press; Kitschelt, Herbert. (ed.). 1999. Post-communist party systems:

competition, representation, and inter-party cooperation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press;

Dimitrova, Antoaneta and Geoffrey Pridham. 2004. International actors and democracy promotion

in Central and Eastern Europe: the integration model and its limits. Democratization, 11(5), 91-112; Šalaj, Berto. 2007. Socijalni capital. Zagreb: Fakultet političkih znanosti; Merkel, Plausible

theory, 11-29; Merkel, Wolfgang. 2009. Transformacija političkih sustava. Teorije i analize. Zagreb:

Fakultet političkih znanosti; Roberts, Andrew. 2010. The quality of democracy in Eastern Europe:

public preferences and policy reforms. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Bohle, Dorothee

and Béla Greskovits. 2012. Capitalist diversity on Europe's periphery. Ithaca: Cornell University

Press.



30

emerged independently of each other, the five parties were frequently perceived

as being part of the same trend and sharing a similar political agenda. In this

section, we will present the five cases (the data gathered from the party

programmes and websites are complemented by the information given in the

interviews by the party representatives) and will conclude the section by

analysing ‘family resemblances’ between them.

2.1 For the City / Zagreb

The political party ‘For the City’ is a regional party that was founded in March

2013 in Zagreb by a group of young university graduates, most of whom

pursued postgraduate degrees abroad. Even though the party developed from

the Zagreb-based CSO ‘The Cyclists’ Union’, which was directed at improving

Zagreb’s cycling infrastructure, it soon broadened its scope of interests and

embraced a more general, green ideological platform. In the campaign for the

May elections, the emphasis was put on three main topics: the implementation

of sustainable transport solutions, the promotion of environmental topics and

the propagation of participatory democracy. In the local elections for the City

Assembly in May 2013, the party won almost 4% of the votes. Despite not

managing to cross the 5% threshold, the party won the sixth highest number of

votes; at the elections for the 17 city borough councils, it won 13 seats.18 After

the new local government was established, the party continued to promote

citizens’ participation in the decision-making processes. In addition to the web

platform, where citizens of Zagreb could write their proposals for improvements

in living conditions in Zagreb, the party representatives of the respective

counties opened Facebook groups and established blogs to enhance their

everyday communication with citizens.

2.2 For Smart People and a Smart City / Split

The political initiative ‘For Smart People and a Smart City’ caused the biggest

upset in the May local elections, winning 12% of votes for City Council.

Marijana Puljak, head of the initiative, became involved in politics before the

previous local elections when, together with her neighbours, she started

lobbying for the construction of a public elementary school, which in their

opinion the neighbourhood lacked. After a disappointing experience of

communicating with the city authorities, Puljak, an IT engineer who worked in

a bank, decided to run for a position in the council of the city borough of Žnjan, where she was elected in 2008. Encouraged by her success on the city borough

level, Puljak and her collaborators decided to run in the 2013 elections with a

programme based on the ‘Smart City’ platform, which has been implemented in a number of cities around the world. Puljak’s political initiative avoided topics

18The basic units of local government in Croatia are municipalities and towns that belong to 21

counties (administrative units and their assemblies, which have legislative power; zupanije).

Zagreb, the capital, has a special status and represents a territorial and administrative whole,

enjoying the status of a county. Lower municipal level units (gradske četvrti) are actually boroughs

(each has its assembly), which are further divided into local councils (mjesni odbori). While Zagreb

and Split have this system, smaller cities and municipalities do not have the middle level of local

government. In Rijeka, Osijek and Dubrovnik, urban local councils are called city boroughs, while

suburban and rural local councils are called local councils. See more in: Kregar, Josip / Đulabić, Vedran / Gardašević, Đorđe / Musa, Anamarija / Ravlić, Slaven and Tereza Rogić Lugarić. 2011. Decentralizacija. Zagreb: Centar za demokraciju i pravo Miko Tripalo.


31

of national importance in the campaign for the May elections, primarily

emphasizing local topics and advocating for citizen participation. The political

programme included various mechanisms for the enhancement of participatory

democracy: the introduction of citizen participation in the decision-making

processes through public discussions and workshops, permanent and

transparent communication with citizens via contact centres, as well as SMS

and email referenda, and the use of a pre-existing web platform where citizens

can send proposals that are then forwarded to the county governing bodies.

2.3 For Rijeka / Rijeka

The political party ‘For Rijeka’ was founded in 2006 as a regional political party

whose representatives have been selected for the City Council for two

consecutive terms, in 2008 and 2013. As in the previous two cases, it emerged

from the CSO ‘Free State of Rijeka’. Frustrated by the inertia and

incompetence of the local political parties, its members decided to become

politically active with three main political objectives: decentralization, with an

emphasis on the fiscal independence of the city of Rijeka, re-industrialization,

with the port of Rijeka having a central role in this process, and the promotion

of liberal social values (secularism and multiculturalism, as opposed to

Croatian nationalism). Participatory democracy is present primarily through

the empowerment of the local authorities by fostering a ‘council democracy’ and including citizens in the decision-making process.

2.4 Osijek Civic Option / Osijek

In the May elections, ‘Osijek Civic Option’ passed the 5% threshold and won

two seats in the City Council. Unlike other political initiatives discussed in this

context, the leading officials of the ‘Osijek Civic Option’ had prior experience in

mainstream political parties, but after several disappointments with this

experience, they decided to form a new political initiative. Most of the

members, however, have little political experience and are instead

professionals, entrepreneurs employed in the private sector and former civil

society activists. Besides advocating for transparency values, a more efficient

city administration and the development of entrepreneurial policies, ‘Osijek Civic Option’ put a substantial emphasis on stronger participation of the

citizens in decision-making processes. It did this through cooperation with local

CSOs and various forms of e-referenda (for instance, SMS referendum) on the

level of city boroughs.

2.5 Srđ is Ours / Dubrovnik

‘Srđ is Ours’ was founded in Dubrovnik a few months before the May elections.

This was a direct consequence of the failure of the CSO of the same name in

preventing the development of a tourist resort on the nearby Srđ hill, which

civil activists from Dubrovnik saw as a major environmental threat. The

tourist resort, which includes hotels, apartment houses and golf courses, had

been controversial since its official presentation almost 10 years ago. The

controversy stemmed from the environmental risks related to the development

of golf courses, the dangers of the ‘Spanish model’ of development of tourist infrastructure (the so-called ‘betonization’ and apartmanization of the coast)



32

and most of all, the non-transparent procedure through which the project was

permitted by the city authorities. In this sense, ‘Srđ is Ours’ clearly

demonstrates the specific pathway through which CSOs divert their activities

towards formal politics and political engagement; they do so by competing with

the very same political structures that were the direct cause of their political

involvement, through their unresponsiveness and lack of accountability

In spite of the independent origins of the five political initiatives described in

the previous sections – the interviews with representatives of the parties

revealed that all parties grew independently of one another, without the

interference of organizational learning from other contexts – the newly

established parties share a number of common traits (Table 1). One of the most

instantly recognizable shared traits of the political initiatives is the similarity

in the official names of their organizations. The names are syntagmatically

structured in an atypical manner different from other major political parties –

names of most political parties in Croatia consist of three components,

containing the attribute ‘Croatian,’ the noun ‘party’ and a third clause representing differentia specifica, e.g. the ‘Croatian People’s Party’ (Hrvatska

narodna stranka, HNS), the ‘Croatian Peasants’ Party’ (Hrvatska seljačka

stranka, HSS). They even differ from the names of mainstream political parties

on a semantic level, evoking an activist spirit and a new mode of political

subjectivity (‘For...’ or ‘...is ours’). In this section, however, it has been shown that the similarities between the initiatives transcend the mere formal level,

indicating a deeper analogy in the content of their political activity.

Table 1: Shared Characteristics of the Five Parties

For the

City

For Smart

People and

a Smart

City

For Rijeka

Osijek

Civic

Initiative

Srđ is

Ours

Civil Society

Background ++ ++ ++ + ++

Participatory

Democracy ++ + + + ++

E-communication ++ ++ + + +

Regionalization /

Decentralization + + ++ + +

Liberal Social

Values ++ + ++ + ++

Source: Authors’ own illustration

In a political context characterized by a low degree of trust in politics and a

high degree of contempt towards the political parties, emphasizing distance

from the mainstream political parties is surely unsurprising. However, an in-

depth analysis of the political parties, which constitutes the subject of this

analysis, indicates that all of the new parties have, to varying degrees, origins

in the organizations of civil society and very little experience in the frames of

formal politics. This, to move over to the second point, has led them to start

including practices typical for CSOs – horizontal, instead of vertical, decision

making processes and an emphasis on the values of participatory politics.


33

The ‘broadening of civic participation’ in representative democracy has become

a widespread catch phrase even among mainstream political parties. Yet, the

concrete mechanisms allowing citizens to take part in the decision making

processes distinguish the political initiatives we decided to include in the

‘participatory democratic’ camp from the merely rhetorical usage of the

concepts related to participatory democracy. Some of these mechanisms

include: e-referenda, SMS-voting, web platforms enabling the direct

participation of citizens in creating party programmes, proposals for

decentralization and bringing decision making processes to a lower level of

political participation. When looking at these parties, the use of all resources

that are available for effective communication with citizens is key in

transforming a passive mass of voters into involved and informed stakeholders.

As successful civic activists, who are responsible for mobilizing thousands of

citizens to achieve their objectives, the leaders of the five political parties put

great emphasis on their new modes of communication. In the context in which

they were about to compete for the elections, with financial and human

resources almost incomparably lower than for the major political parties,

communication via Facebook, Twitter and other forms of social media, as well

as viral marketing in general, proved critical for their campaigns. Besides

these communication channels, the programmes of all five parties put strong

emphasis on the need for regionalization and decentralization. This was due to

three factors: the excessive level of centralization of state administration in

Croatia, the values of participatory democracy and the fact that all five

initiatives emerged on a local level, and have so far competed solely in local

elections.

The content of their programmes represents a final point of convergence. All of

the political initiatives analysed in this paper share similar values regarding

human and civil rights, the protection of minorities (ethnic, racial and sexual)

and the principles of secularism– what we, somewhat inaptly, called “liberal social values.”19 Instead of alluding to the ideology of individualism in the

economic sense, we referred to liberalism as a social doctrine that advocates for

the need to emancipate individuals from authoritarian regimes, as well as

secular freedoms that enable citizens to resist rigid dogmas of religious

communities, which after 1990 gathered significant influence in the political

spheres in several CEE countries.

19 It could be argued that, given that the equality before the law, right to non-discrimination and

the separation of Church and State are guaranteed by the very constitution, promoting these

values merely amounts to stating the obvious. However, these attitudes should be understood in

the context of recent social and political changes in Croatia, which were strongly influenced by, as

some commentators called it, a ‘conservative revolution’ and intense activities of the Catholic Church and Church-related organizations. The referendum held in December 2013, which

approved changes to Croatia’s constitution in defining marriage as a union between a man and a woman, is taken as one of their most significant successes. This development can serve as a

reminder that secularization is a process that includes a diminishing public and political

importance of religious communities, rather than a unique constitutional arrangement.



34

3. Civil Society and New Party Development

In the previous section, we have pointed out a new trend that has emerged in

Croatian party politics. Our analysis demonstrated several traits that these

parties held in common. In the following paragraphs, we turn to the question of

how to explain the polycentric development that emerged in a similar period in

five different settings in Croatia. What are the circumstances and historical

assumptions of the Croatian political arena that have led to this phenomenon?

Finally, after more than 20 years of democracy and multiple party elections,

what made this moment in time suitable for such a development? We start the

analysis by discussing different hypotheses that provide answers to these

questions.

3.1 Trust and Mistrust: Civil Society vs. Political Parties

The crisis of democracy represents an obvious hypothesis for the question of

why the political situation resulted in the emergence of participatory

democratic parties. Diminishing trust in political institutions, the ideological

dislodging of traditional political parties, and a general impression that

institutions of democratic representation no longer manage to stand for

citizens’ needs and wishes seemingly turned political parties in the direction of higher democratic persuasiveness. There is an abundance of evidence

demonstrating that mainstream political parties, while focused on winning

elections by using empty rhetoric, failed to aggregate the interests of citizens

and represent their will in the political arena. As seen from Table 2, the

percentage of citizens tending not to trust any political party in Croatia has

exceeded 90% since 2009.

Table 2: Trust in Political Parties in Croatia

Date Tend not to

trust

Tend to

trust Don't know

10/2004 86% 7% 7%

06/2005 84% 11% 6%

10/2005 85% 8% 7%

04/2006 84% 11% 5%

09/2006 88% 7% 5%

10/2007 86% 8% 6%

04/2008 88% 9% 3%

10/2008 86% 10% 4%

06/2009 91% 7% 2%

11/2009 92% 4% 4%

06/2010 88% 8% 4%

11/2011 90% 6% 4%

05/2012 86% 12% 2%

11/2012 89% 7% 4%

05/2013 90% 9% 1%

Source: Eurostat, 2013.


35

As we argue in this paper, a space opened for some new actors to jump in and

take a slice of the political cake as a result of dissatisfaction with the

mainstream parties, their unresponsiveness and the high level of political

corruption. However, despite achieving record-low levels of trust in political

parties in May 2013, the crisis of democracy in Croatia is hardly a recent

phenomenon, with figures holding well above 80% at least since 2004.20 Even if

the crisis of democracy provided good conditions for the emergence of new

political parties, this factor alone cannot explain the rise of participatory

democratic parties in recent years.

A high level of trust in the CSOs provides an alternative explanation (still not

incompatible with the previously presented argument). Given the origins of the

new participatory democratic political parties in the civil society, it is

reasonable to assume the connection between the two factors. Indeed, while the

mainstream political parties suffered from the decreasing levels of trust, recent

trends show rising levels of trust in the CSOs. The high EU-fund absorption

capacities of CSOs,21 employment growth of 13.3% within the civil sector22 and

the CSOs’ activities, which are open for wide participation of citizens, have resulted in positive attitudes within society. Research on the support for CSOs

in Croatia (Table 3.) suggests that almost three quarters of the population have

a positive or very positive attitude - especially among the younger generation,

employed citizens and the urban population.23 Furthermore, support rose more

than 5% from 2007 to 2012 (a substantial growth even with the margin of error

of around 3%). However, the increase in support has been to some extent

cancelled out by the 1% increase in negative attitudes.

Table 3: Support for Civil Society Organizations 2007-2012

2007 2012

CSO work is very beneficiary for a society 33% 38,3%

CSO work is somewhat beneficiary for a society 38,5% 37,4%

CSOs are neither harmful, nor beneficiary for a society 25,7% 21,5

CSO work is harmful for a society 0,7% 1,6%

CSO work is very harmful for a society 0,2% 1%

No answer 1,9% 0,3%

N 1000 1004

Source: Franc, Renata / Sučić, Ines / Međugorac, Vanja and Stanko Rihtar. 2012. Vidljivost i javna

percepcija udruga u Hrvatskoj 2012. Zagreb: TACSO.

20 Even though there are no sound empirical data on the trust in parties before 2004, there are

some indicators that this trend is from an even earlier date, as for instance in Rimac, Ivan. 2000.

Neke determinante povjerenja u institucije političkog sustava u Hrvatskoj. Bogoslovska smotra

70(2), 471-84. 21 Ured za udruge Vlade RH. 2010. Izvješće s dana udruga. (accessed: 11. February 2015). 22 Ponoš, Tihomir. 2012. Bijeg s burze: Udruge u godinu dana zaposlile oko tisuću ljudi. Novi list.

09. August 2012. (accessed: 11. February 2015). 23 Franc, Renata / Sučić, Ines / Međugorac, Vanja and Stanko Rihtar. 2012. Vidljivost i javna

percepcija udruga u Hrvatskoj 2012. Zagreb: TACSO, 31.



36

However, even if this sheds more light on the space created for the emergence

of new participatory democratic parties, it still does not explain the

mechanisms of the newly emerging trend. What was the actual motivation of

the actors in switching from civil society to formal politics? How can we

construct a macro-micro link when interpreting this phenomenon? In order to

explain this, as we demonstrate in the following section, it is necessary to take

into account the dynamics of the cooperation between civil society and political

authorities and the resulting disappointment of the activists. This can be

demonstrated through the case of the civic initiative ‘Right to the City’.

3.2 Right to the City (2005-2010): Failures and Lessons Learned

‘Right to the City’ (RTC) was created in 2005 by various Zagreb-based

organizations dealing with non-institutional culture, environmental issues and

the youth. As described by Teodor Celakoski, one of the leaders, “RTC is an initiative aimed against the management of space that goes against public

interest and excludes citizens from the decision making process in planning the

urban development in Zagreb.”24 This initiative, together with the CSO ‘Green Action,’ later became the most important actor in one of the biggest organized

activities of civil society in Croatia – the movement for the preservation of

Varšavska Street. This street, part of the pedestrian area in the city centre,

was supposed to be transformed into an access area for the underground

garage of a private shopping mall after a series of favouring.

A number of activities (protests, petition signing, performances and advocacy

events) took place between 2006 and 2010, with the climax of these efforts

occurring in 2010 with a series of protests. The “We won’t give Varšavska away!” protest gathered thousands of people in the centre of Zagreb to protest against the co-modification of the public space. Civil society activists believed

that all permits for the intervention in that public space were issued illegally

and at the harm of citizens of Zagreb. Mass rallies were organized that

protested the plans to start with the construction. The events culminated in

May 2010 when the activists tore down security fencing around the

construction site, just as the work was about to start. For more than two

months, the activists refused to leave the construction site and held a 24h/day

vigil, which lasted until special police forces arrested almost 130 activists and

allowed the construction work to continue.

The failure of the RTC to protect the pedestrian zone and to prevent the

construction of the shopping mall and the public garage had a profound effect

on the members of the Croatian CSOs. For if a civic initiative, which enjoyed

massive public support, had after five years of constant efforts succeeded in

neither catching the authorities’ attention nor earning a position in the decision-making process, then what is the purpose of civic engagement? If the

most organized and most numerous of initiatives could not win against corrupt

political elites, could this mean that the idea of civic organization had lost its

raison d’etre? Finally, what is there left to do, but enter the political arena and

24 Pulska grupa. 2012. Javni prostor mora biti dostupan bez komercijalnih barijera. (accessed: 11.

February 2015).


37

fight against those elites using their own weapons? Even though the leaders of

the initiative had not themselves become politically engaged, the RTC served

as a safe indicator – and a bitter reminder – of the scope of possibilities of civic

organization in Croatian politics.

Certainly, the deliberate turn in Croatian local politics cannot fully be clarified

by the history of the RTC. Due to the polycentric development of the five

parties explored in the paper, an aim to explain their emergence as a direct

consequence of the events related to RTC would be somewhat misleading. Even

if ‘Srđ is Ours’ in Dubrovnik was directly influenced by the RTC activists,25 and

the members of Zagreb-based ‘For the City’ were actively involved in the events

organized by the RTC, this had less of an impact in the other three cities.

Furthermore, the causal sequence appears to be far from unambiguous.

Although most members of ‘For the City’ participated in the RTC, the party

was not founded after the failure of the project in 2010 – despite the

disappointment with political elites. Some activists then founded the ‘Cyclists’ Union,’ which was transformed two years later into the political party. As for

the ‘Smart City’ and ‘For Rijeka’ parties, they were founded a few years before

the RTC experienced its final failure. However, even if the development of the

five parties was polycentric, and not the result of one single, causal chain of

events, the history of the RTC can still be considered as illustrative for the

pattern through which the CSOs felt motivated to enter the political arena,

adding a crucial part of the puzzle of the phenomenon under scrutiny.

In the cases of ‘For the City’ and ‘For Rijeka,’ which developed from interest-

based organizations (‘The Cyclists’ Union’ and ‘The Free State of Rijeka’), disappointment grew from the fact that despite years of dedicated work,

structured advocacy strategies, quality analyses and strong popular support –

similar to the case of the RTC – local governance failed to take these

organizations as serious policy actors. In the cases of ‘Smart City’ and ‘Srđ is

Ours,’ which emerged from grassroots movements fighting against a new

building project that would irreversibly destroy the urban and environmental

potential of the city (‘Srđ’) and demanding a new elementary school in the

neighbourhood (‘Smart City’), the interest aggregation was articulated through

informal civic initiatives, whose members became frustrated by the lack of

responsiveness of their local governments. However, despite the differences in

the initial level of institutionalization, all of these parties26 shared one crucial

factor. They all emerged as a result of the dissatisfaction with civic groups and

the level of dialogue they led with respective political authorities.

Even though the crisis of trust in political parties opened up space for new

political actors, and although a high degree of trust in CSOs by itself made

25 When the plans for the building project in Dubrovnik hinterland became visible, Dubrovnik

activists drew on the experiences and advice from RTC activists in Zagreb, who regularly visited

Dubrovnik to share their know-how with fellow activists (this was especially facilitated thanks to

the fact that some of them were born and raised in Dubrovnik and maintained connection to the

town). 26 The ‘Osijek Civic Initiative’ stands out from the pattern somewhat, as it was not developed from a CSO like the other four parties. However, given that members of the party participated in

different CSOs and that local authorities in all parts of the country showed a similar lack of

interest for the contributions of civil society, our hypothesis can still hold.



38

these organizations suitable candidates for filling the void, in the previous

paragraphs we showed that the disappointment over the failed communication

with authorities acted as a trigger for the transition from the civic to the

political sphere. However, what allowed them to transfer to politics with

success? In the final part of this section, we address this issue by focusing on

three properties they inherited from their civil society habitus: proactivity,

adaptability and mobilization.

3.3 Proactivity, Adaptability and Mobilization: Civil Society Going Political

The development of CSOs in Eastern Europe since the 1990s has been a topic

of much debate among social scientists, many of whose remarks have been

unambiguously disapproving. Among other things, CSOs in post-socialist

societies were criticized for their weak mobilization capacities,27 poor

organizational structures28 and their lack of grassroots organizing potential.29

The CSOs in Croatia, however, appeared to have avoided these pitfalls and, on

the contrary, demonstrated a series of successes in setting relevant issues on

the public and political agendas.

To name only a few examples, ‘GONG’ has played an important role in

campaigning for fair and free elections since its foundation in 1998. The

‘Franak’ association won much support through its efforts to protect small

debtors who were jeopardized by the depreciation of the euro in 2011 (similar

cases of Swiss franc debtors’ associations can be found in Hungary, Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina). Also, branches of numerous international

organizations successfully advocated for the rights and interests of various

social groups (‘Human Rights House,’ ‘Step by Step Foundation,’ ‘Friends of the

Earth’ and ‘Transparency International’). These achievements helped raise the

profile of the CSOs in the public sphere, which resulted in increasing levels of

recognition among the citizens, as demonstrated in the first part of this section.

The success of such activities on behalf of Croatian CSOs helped build a

reputation, which quite likely served as important symbolic capital for the

newly established parties. However, the civil sector background had an

additional impact on the trajectory of the five parties analysed in this paper.

Proactivity played an important role in gaining the public’s support for the newly established parties. The importance of proactive management has been

addressed as a staple characteristic of CSOs by several authors. The five

parties continued to use this method even after they switched to party politics,

thanks to which they began to open up topics that were later taken over by the

mainstream parties. For example, both ‘For the City’ and ‘Smart City’ built a

large part of their election campaign on the topic of empty and unused spaces

owned by the local municipalities (in their case, the City of Zagreb and the City

of Split). The two parties advocated for the distribution of the vast spaces in

public ownership (which was itself a relict of the state-socialist social and

27 Macijewski, Witold. 2002. The Baltic Sea Region: Culture, Politics, Societies. Uppsala: The Baltic

University Press. 28 Sloat, Amanda. 2005. The Rebirth of Civil Society The Growth of Women’s NGOs in Central and Eastern Europe. European journal of women's studies 12(4), 437-52. 29 Bernhard, Michael. 1996. Civil Society after the First Transition: Dilemmas of Postcommunist

Democratization in Poland and Beyond. Communist and Post-Communist Studies 29, 309-30.


39

economic structure) to the local entrepreneurs (the making of the so-called

entrepreneurial incubators), organizations and craftsmen, as a way of fostering

local production capacities and social economy.30 In contrast to mainstream

politicians, civic activists have been held in high regard regardless of their

respective political backgrounds for their proactive attitudes in putting new

topics on the political agenda.

Proactive attitudes were crucially associated with another important

characteristic of the CSO: its adaptability to different circumstances. Due to

intensive communication with citizens, largely enabled by the usage of social

media and other contemporary communication technologies, the civil society in

Croatia has been characterized by timely reactions to current issues. Closely

related to the previous pattern, this was achieved by focusing on the small-

scale issues relevant to ordinary people. This feature was especially present in

almost all of the analysed parties. Unlike mainstream political parties, which

remained focused on ideological left-right divides that largely corresponded

with historical, political and ethnic divides, the topics addressed by the CSOs

appeared to be more understandable to the average voter, whether this

concerned the construction of a school in a remote city neighbourhood in the

case of ‘Smart City’ or the protection of the urban landscape in the case of ‘Srđ

is Ours.’

Finally, citizen mobilization is key for successful CSO campaigns. In contrast to

mainstream political parties, which could easily survive the elections by

counting on a steady base of loyal party voters, the CSOs typically needed

broad citizen support. This allowed them to lead battles with the government

officials on equal footing. In order to achieve this, the CSOs were forced to stay

more open to the broader public than mainstream political parties, and to

create a sense of community ownership over the corresponding sets of ideas

and the means of their implementation. As a consequence, the notion of a

common challenge created solidarity among their members, which led to the

feeling of commitment in conducting a collective action.31 This was not

necessarily only in the field of social movements, as proposed by Tarrow, but

also in civil society in general.

Civil society is according to Putnam’s idea32 a factory of social capital. However,

besides the macro level of analysis – a sum of micro social relations that are

beneficial for democracy at large, as opposed to the societies where one ‘bowls alone’ – this notion can also be easily interpreted on the micro level of social

analysis. Through engagement in civil society, activists learn social skills and

the sense of community management necessary for mobilizing broader groups

of people. This can be seen in the experiences of the activists from the five

analysed parties. Even though a great majority of the activists involved in the

30 However, despite the relative simplicity of the implementation of this project, the mainstream

parties, in this case the Social Democratic Party of Croatia in power throughout the previous

decade, took over the idea and introduced it into their electoral platform. 31 Tarrow Sidney. 1998. Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics.

Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press. 32 Putnam, Robert D. 1993. Making democracy work: Civic traditions in modern Italy. New Jersey:

Princeton University Press; Putnam, Robert D. 2000. Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of

American Community. New York: Simon & Schuster.



40

parties had little or no political experience, their CSO background provided

them with positive predispositions for coping with their most serious challenge:

how to gather disappointed voters and convince them to trust them. At the

same time, thanks to their involvement in grassroots initiatives – including

acquaintanceships and friendships obtained during years spent working,

talking and meeting with members of their community – some of the parties we

analyse had a head start.

Years of unsuccessful dialogue between politicians and civil society, which in

the previous section we presented with the example of the social movement

‘Right to the City,’ surely played an important role in the transformation of

CSOs into political parties. The protests, where more than 130 peaceful

protesters were arrested, must have left great doubt and a deep impression on

many Croatian activists, even if the impact of the RTC has been less

immediate. In this sense, the disappointment of the civil activists with the

government’s lack of response provided a link between the macro level (crisis of

democracy, low degree of trust in political parties, high level of trust in CSOs)

and micro level of analysis (the motivation of the actors). However, in this

section we turned to the additional features that allowed the CSO actors to

take over this role, rounding up the scheme of the opportunity structure,33

which created a new social and political landscape. In the following paragraphs

we move to the concluding remarks.

Conclusion

The concept of active citizenship is in many ways crucial for the principles of

civil society. Conscientious citizens seeking to express their social and political

beliefs, and thereby to work on solving problems in their community, typically

tend to assemble in formal or informal groups with the aim to be heard and

represented. Such non-state organizations represent an inevitable part of

democratic societies worldwide, whose political spheres, in a narrow meaning,

are supplemented by all kinds of civil society initiatives. They thereby fulfil the

‘watchdog’ function. However, according to Rosanvallon’s theory described in the theoretical framework, the counter-democratic reform is to be achieved

precisely by (re-)introducing properties that are traditionally associated with

civil society to the political field, in a narrower sense. How is this to be

accomplished? In order to present one empirical possibility of such a proposal,

we have in this paper focused on the recent trends in Croatian local politics.

In our analysis, we described new political initiatives that advocate closer

contact with their constituencies and two-way communication with the voters.

This enabled them to endorse the wishes and needs of the citizens, all of whom,

to a greater or lesser extent, originated from CSOs. Transition from civil

society to formal politics is surely not an entirely uncontroversial step. Civil

society organizations are by definition supposed to be non-governmental and

apolitical. They are part of a sector that seeks to promote its ideas as a partner

of the democratically elected government. Direct political engagement – and

this is only one part of the problem – brings risk to the very same goals that

were meant to be achieved. Indeed, for Croatian CSOs, it took years of broken

33 Tarrow, Power, 85.


41

promises and being ignored by the authorities before they decided to act.

However, in the case of the participatory democratic parties analysed in this

paper, there was a move to formal politics. What has led to this? Why did the

CSO actors decide to enter a new field of political action that, in several

respects (habitus, political perspective), is quite opposite from the type of action

that they were used to in their previous careers?

The crisis of democracy presented the usual suspects. According to this

hypothesis, low levels of trust in the political parties and high support for the

civil sector motivated the CSOs to engage in party politics. However, an

additional trigger was needed. In this paper, we described how this process

took place. We demonstrated how disappointment with the non-transparency of

policy-making, suspicious priorities on the political agenda and simply not

being taken seriously caused these actors to considered their further actions in

the CSO sector unfeasible. They instead decided to enter the political arena. At

the same time, besides the aspect of motivation, we addressed three additional

properties – proactivity, adaptability and the mobilization capacity –

demonstrating how the organizational culture of the Croatian CSOs proved

important for shaping this political movement. Rather than leading to a

solution, we argue that the crisis of political legitimacy merely opened an

empty space that was filled by the actors with the best strategic positions. As a

result, the arena of formal politics was penetrated by a new sort of political

actor with an explicit aim to participate in the political game. Instead of being

a mere stakeholder in the policy-making process, this new actor’s goal was to govern. This established a new mode of political activity in Croatian politics

based on the participatory democracy modus operandi.

Apart from being a relatively recent phenomenon, the parties discussed in this

research still do not represent key players on the Croatian political scene. At

this moment in time, we cannot know if they will continue to grow and achieve

better results in the next elections, or if they will stagnate and perhaps fall

apart. Perhaps the five parties will merge, creating a strong alternative for the

national level. Alternatively, the trend will remain polycentric, with a further

proliferation of parties with a similar profile. Furthermore, we cannot be sure if

similar trends will appear in political contexts similar to the Croatian one. Will

other countries from CEE follow these footsteps or will this remain a lonely

trend? The sequel of this story indeed remains to be seen. However, in this

paper we have demonstrated a trend that, despite the focus on one single

country case, can serve to provide an interesting comparative perspective for

any future improvements in democracy. This holds especially true in the aspect

of participatory reforms of political parties, which still represent the main tool

of representative democracy. Even if the “golden era” of civil society in CEE is

indeed behind us,34 this case brings forth innovative ways in which civil society

continues to play a progressive role in the development of post-socialist

societies after several decades of democratic transformations.

34 Merkel, Plausible Theory.



42

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Fragmentation as a Silencing Strategy:

Serbian War Veterans against the State

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Lea David Postdoctoral Fellow, Haifa University, Israel

[email protected]

http://www.suedosteuropa.uni-graz.at/cse/en/david

Contemporary Southeastern Europe 2015, 2(1), 55-73




55

Fragmentation as a Silencing Strategy:

Serbian War Veterans against the State

of Serbia

Lea David*

Abstract: This article draws on Lev Grinberg’s notion of political space, understood as symbolic spheres in which political actors represent and

further their interests, identities and agendas. The political space notion

is designed to analyze and criticize political power and its dynamics in

cases such as the Serbian one, where governments do not rely on heavy-

handed control of civil society. I suggest here that following the wars of the

1990s, the democratic governments in Serbia have excluded the war

veteran population from the political space of representation, since gaining

control over this population was perceived as a crucial step in the attempt

to silence any public reckoning of the nation’s criminal past. Through the

case study of a decade-long “Per Diem Affair”, designated to alienate the war veteran population, I show how the mechanism of fragmentation has

served the ruling elite to close the political space for open debate regarding

the role of Serbia in the wars of the 1990s, first and utmost, in order to

maintain control over the narrative of the recent wars. This, I suggest,

comes as a result of the alteration in the role of the state: from being the

direct source of power to becoming a mediator between the opposing local

and international demands for particular national images and identities.

Keywords: Political space, Serbia, memory politics, war veterans,

fragmentation

Introduction

After struggling for years to gain social status and benefits, a group of Serbian

war veterans finally sued the state of Serbia at the European Court for Human

Rights in Strasbourg, claiming that the government had violated their rights

and discriminated against some of them. The lawsuit was launched because the

Serbian government only paid the long overdue wages to those war veterans

from the southern parts of Serbia1 who had held large protests in 2008

demanding their money. Though the European Human Rights Court ordered

for Serbia to pay around 17 million euro to veterans of the conflicts of the 1990s

proving that the state had deliberately discriminated against the veteran

population, in the appeal this decision has been suspended followed by the

explanation that not all domestic legal remedies have been exploited. I suggest

that this “Per Diem Affair” has proved to be an exemplary case of how a post-

* Lea David is a postdoctoral fellow both at the Anthropology Department and the Strochlitz

Institute for Holocaust Research at Haifa University. She explores how a contested past in

different conflict and post-conflict settings is managed through the clashes of the local and the

global memory cultures. She has been lecturing on the memory studies, conflict in the Former

Yugoslav countries and transitional justice at various Israeli Universities and Colleges. 1 Towns of Prokuplje and Kuršumlija.

Fragmentation as a Silencing Strategy: Serbian War Veterans against the State of Serbia

56

conflict state may disable major political actors to further their interests and

negotiate political and mnemonic agendas.2

In post-conflict states, where the past is disputable in multiple ways, memory

and memorial practices often become contested sites. Thus the politics of

memory is increasingly prominent when nation states – more precisely, their

ruling elites, which include both the decision making and policy execution

bodies – as well as other segments of societies, take an active role in forging

collective memories of the contested past. There seems to be a global

phenomenon in which post conflict nation-states, or, more correctly, their

ruling elites, are engaged in constructing and editing national images and

identities suitable not only for local purposes but also for international display

in ways more calculated than ever. States strategically not only choose how to

deal with the contested elements of their national past3 but, they apparently

also manage their difficult past with clear aims in mind: to portray the nation

in a more positive light in international arenas. Apart from the state, the

biggest mnemonic groups that employ memory to further both their ideal and

material4 are those which have directly experienced war, such as veterans,

refugees or witnesses of atrocities. Those, however, only have a chance to shape

the national memory if they command the means to express their vision. Most

importantly, narratives will be socially acceptable only if their vision is

compatible with social or political objectives and inclinations among other

important social groups, like political elites and parties.5

Those mnemonic clashes between different segments in society are always

revealed in political spaces, i.e. in symbolic spheres in which political actors

represent and further their interests,6 which appears to be crucial for

negotiating different political agendas. The political space for discussions and

representation is influenced by the internal tensions and local hostilities

between different societal segments. Drawing on the Grinbergian analytical

conceptualization of political spaces dynamics, I show here that the last

resource of legitimate representation channels for the already vastly

marginalized group of Serbian war veterans, was to be found in the “Per Diem Affair”, a decade long attempt to achieve legitimacy for the wartime spent in Kosovo in 1999. Through various sets of legal tools, such as road blockades and

hunger strikes, court appeals, negotiation with governmental representatives,

and finally, bringing the case to the European Court of Human Rights in

2 I conducted my fieldwork in Belgrade from 2009-2012. My research consisted of about 25 semi-

structured interviews with the veteran organizations’ representatives and several government

officials, together with the collection of rich archival data from the government databases and

numerous newspaper articles on the subject. 3 Rivera, Lauren. 2008. Managing "Spoiled" National Identity: War, Tourism, and Memory in

Croatia. American Sociological Review 73, 613-634; Roberman, Sveta. 2007. Commemorative

Activities of the Great War and the Empowerment of Elderly Immigrant Soviet Veterans in Israel.

Anthropological Quarterly 80, 1035-1064. 4 Jeffrey, Alexander. 2004. Toward a Theory of Cultural Trauma, in Cultural Trauma and

Collective Identity, edited by Alexander, Jeffrey / Eyerman, Ron / Giesen Bernard, Smelser / Neil

and Piotr, Sztompka. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1-31. 5 Kansteiner, Wolf. 2002. Finding Meaning in Memory: A Methodological Critique of Collective

Memory Studies. History and Theory 41(2), 179-197. 6 Grinberg, Luis Lev. 2010. Politics and Violence in Israel/Palestine, Democracy vs. Military Rule.

London: Routledge, 14.

Lea David

57

Strasbourg, the Serbian war veterans struggled to attain the minimum of

societal benefits – however, currently, without much success.

I show here that in order to maintain exclusivity over the narrative of the

1990s wars, and consequently political power over visions of the state future,

all ruling elites, regardless of their political affiliations, have used simple

tactics of allotting different privileges to different war veteran groups. This

helped to create a strategic and consistent fragmentation of the war veteran

population in Serbia, which consequently served the ruling elites in disabling

the war veterans’ participation in the political space. This was intended to mitigate their political power and weaken their struggle for their rights, but

also to reduce the financial burden which war veterans might impose on the

state budgets. However, this was also directed toward maintaining a

supremacy over the memory agenda. Disabling the war veterans’ representation in any public debate regarding the role of Serbia in the wars of

the 1990s was crucial for maintaining control over the recent wars' narrative.

The use of this strategy of fragmentation, I suggest, comes as a result of the

alteration in the role of the post-conflict state: from being the main source of

power to becoming a mediator between the opposing local and international

demands for particular national images and identities. This role shift brings to

the fore new strategies adopted and distributed by the ruling political elite

whose purpose is to control, regulate, design and create lifestyles between the

citizens and the state, by the use of power or authority in day-to-day

encounters.

Political Space

The political process of contestation needs to be understood in the light of the

dynamics of memory, both at the temporal and the spatial level, where memory

entrepreneurs operate within certain arenas of articulation. The term “arena” refers to social and political spheres in which various actors struggle for their

specific memories.7 However, this term proves to be vague and is defined only

in broad terms. Therefore, I find the term “political space”, as defined by Lev Grinberg, most relevant as it help us analyze dynamic processes of negotiation

between different political actors.

Grinberg made the political space concept a useful analytical tool due to its

ability to depict complex and multilayered encounters between the state and

civil society. This is contrary to other uses of this term where, for the most part,

“political space” remains an extremely abstract and elusive concept and its

substance is mostly unidentified. Bourdieu8 used the term “political field”, and defined it as a symbolic field of representations of social groups, arguing for its

autonomous character. One current definition in the Anglo European literature

on social movements defines political space in terms of a political opportunities

structure, which Charles Brocket9 has neatly summarized as “the presence of

7 Ashplant TG Dawson Graham and Roper, Michael 2000. The Politics of War Memory and

Commemorations. London: Routledge, 17. 8 Bourdieu, Pierre. 1991. Language and Symbolic Power. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University

Press. 9 Brockett, D. Charles. 1991. The structure of political opportunities and peasant mobilization in

Central America. Comparative Politics 23, 253-74, 254.


58

allies and support groups; the availability of meaningful access points in the

political system; the capacity of the state for repression; elite fragmentation

and conflict and the temporal location in the cycle of protest”. The most common use of the term is both figurative and taken for granted in connection

with the politics of the territorial state.10

Grinberg11 gives a more precise and useful interpretation by showing that the

political space is a symbolic sphere in which political actors, in this instance

memory entrepreneurs, represent and further the interests of specific groups in

society through the use and construction of language, narrative, discourse and

myth. It bridges tension between the state and civil society, since it mediates

conflicts between dominant and dominated groups.12

Grinberg13 analyzes mobilization of social movements, such as the J14 in Israel

and the Tahrir Square movement in Egypt, where he also takes into account

both the dynamic nature of encounters and the idea of a constantly changing

structure of opportunities. According to him, the political actors are

entrepreneurs whose primary task is to mediate between the particular groups

to which they belong. These actors demand social and economic rights, as well

as legitimization for the agendas of the groups they are identified with. Since

civil movements and organizations have a possibility to recruit support from

different social groups and to mould and change policies, there is a dynamic

opening and closing of the political space of representation, which is therefore

subject to perpetual change. According to Grinberg, this dynamic feature of

political space, due to its symbolic and non-autonomous character, provides us

with a set of conceptualization tools enabling us to assess preconditions to

possible social movements’ outbreaks through a number of parallel processes. Such processes include: constructing and propagating a specific national image,

largely generated by the dominant group; forming a system of symbols and

ceremonies; creating a differentiation process between those that belong or do

not belong to the nation, and finally defining common enemies, whether real or

imagined.14

The conceptual use of “political space” is of particular worth when analyzing processes such as transitions to democracy, mainly because this demonstrates

that the dynamics of the opening and closure of political space are influenced

not only by local power relations, but also by global power relations that shape

the power of different social groups within the nation-state.15 It is important to

stress, however, that having democratic rules of the game is not a guarantee

that political spaces will open to new identities, ideas, demands and agendas.

Contrary, they might be an effective tool that facilitates and legitimizes the

10 Dalby, Simon. 2005. Political Space: Autonomy, Liberalism, and Empire. Alternatives 30, 415–441. 11 Grinberg, Politics and Violence. 12 Grinberg, Politics and Violence, 14. 13 Grinberg, Luis Lev. 2013. The J14 resistance mo(ve)ment: The Israeli mix of Tahrir Square and

Puerta del Sol. Current Sociology 61(4), 491–509. 14 Guibernau, Monserrat. 2004. Anthony D. Smith on nations and national identity: a critical

assessment. Nations and Nationalism 10, 125-141. 15 Grinberg, Luis Lev. 2012. Resistance, politics and violence: The catch of the Palestinian struggle.

Current Sociology 61(2), 206-225, 26.

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59

closure of political spaces of representation16 as in case of Serbia presented

here. As there is always danger that political actors may try to close the

political space, barring entry to new identities, agendas and actors, one has to

ask under what conditions do they succeed in doing so? I will show here that

the analysis of political space in Serbia helps us understand the nature of the

encounter between both the state and war veterans that have participated in

the wars of the 1990s, as well as the ways Serbian governments are dealing

with Serbia’s contested past. I argue that one of the basic mechanisms

developed in order to maintain control over political spaces – as part of the

encounters between the state and civil society, to debate over the contested

nature of the 1990s wars – is to be found precisely in the fragmentation of the

war veteran population. The particular social setting, in which the entire war

veteran population has been neglected and alienated by both the ruling

political elite and the wider segments of civil society, forced war veterans to

reduce their memory agendas to the most minimal benefits they were entitled

to. Moreover, the use of the fragmentation strategy shows the shift in the way

in which the state, through its ruling elite, institutions and practices, uses and

distributes power. This functional alteration, from being the source of power to

becoming a mediator explains why memory has become extensively perceived

as a supplementary and easily accessible source of power.

The Post-Conflict Serbia: War Veterans Pushed to the Margins

Serbian participation in the wars of the 1990s was anti heroic, filled with

violence, atrocities and bloodshed. Moreover, to date, there is still no public

consensus in Serbia regarding participation in these wars, the national

narrative being contested in multiple ways. After the overthrow in the year

2000 and the fall of the Milošević regime, there was a great sense of optimism and enthusiasm in Serbia. The newly elected government heading the country

was willing to approach the European Union, and this was raising high

expectations for the country’s prospects. However, these expectations, which came mainly from the civil society, soon turned to disappointment. Early on

after the overthrow of the Milošević regime, it became clear that the newly

emerged political elites were deeply and inextricably linked to the politics of

the 1990s. Although many initiatives for taking responsibility for the

misconducts during the wars of the 1990s have been brought to the fore by the

civil society, the Serbian governments never took full, or even partial,

responsibility for their part in these wars, consistently refusing to engage in

any publicly transparent reckoning with the past.17 This is in spite of the fact

that, as a part of the democratization processes, the international community

conditioned Serbia’s financial well-being and its candidacy for the EU on facing

up to the nation’s criminal past. While Serbia did eventually collaborate with the International Criminal Tribune for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and

extradited many of its key figures, the process of facing its criminal past was

viewed as not only prohibitively expensive, but also politically undesirable, as

it would alienate huge segments of society. Those likely to feel aggrieved by

16 Grinberg, Luis Lev. 2014. Mo(ve)ments of Resistance, Politics, Economy and Society in

Israel/Palestine, 1931-2013. Brighton, MA: Academic Studies Press, 313. 17 Gordy, Eric. 2013. Guilt, Responsibility and Denial: The Past at Stake in Post-Milošević Serbia. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press; Subotić, Jelena. 2009. Hijacked Justice: Dealing

with the Past in the Balkans. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press.


60

any such public reckoning include not only those who participated first-hand in

the wars, but also the wider layers of society who supported the Milošević regime. The vast majority of the population wished to mourn over the lost wars

that were perceived by Serbians in general as being righteous.18 Due to this

polarization of Serbian society, all Serbian governments, from the very

beginning (including that of the assassinated president Djindjić), have looked

for ways to silence any public debate regarding the wars of the 1990s, rather

than accept any responsibility.19 It was deemed preferable to close political

spaces in order to avoid publicly dealing with the past, rather than to take

potential politically-damaging risks by openly confronting vast segments of the

society.

This silent vacuum was a product of an intentional blurring of the links

between the state and the army during the wars of the 1990s, as well as a

distortion of individual responsibilities and political aspirations. For the past

15 years in Serbia, there has been a tendency to blame the atrocities, allegedly

committed by Serbia, on the paramilitary formations, as if it had nothing to do

with official Serbian policy. However, it has been shown, predominantly

through the work of legal bodies such as the ICTY, investigative journalism

and research conducted by certain NGOs,20 that nearly all paramilitary units

not only actively combined forces and cooperated with the Milošević regime, but also were formed under the regime’s sponsorship. Moreover, the regime and the political elite made “deals” with these units by having specific rules; for example, paramilitary units were to go in first and “clean” the area (kill, burn and plunder), and only then the official Yugoslav army was to come in and

annex the territories. This, however, has never been publicly acknowledged by

any Serbian government to this day. This is, among other things, a direct

result of the fact that the majority of the current leadership has already held

some decision making position during the wars.21

But how did the ruling political elites succeed over time in closing political

spaces, preventing any new political actors from entering them, and thereby

avoiding any significant dealing with the past? In particular, how did they

manage to silence the veteran population that represents close to 10% of

Serbia’s entire population? This question becomes especially relevant when bearing in mind that the participants of the wars, such as veterans, refugees or

witnesses of atrocities, represent an inevitable factor in the post-war

reconstruction period as mnemonic groups, and that national “recovery” cannot be completed without addressing the suffering they have endured in past wars.

Thus in many senses, gaining control over the veteran population was a crucial

step in achieving control over political spaces, where any public reckoning with

the past might be possible.

18 Logar, Svetlana and Srđan, Bogosavljević. 2001. Viđenje istine u Srbiji. Reč 62, 7-34. 19 This, however, does not claim ideological homogeneity of the ruling political elites; rather, it

suggests that different ideological approaches were blended into a mutually accepted decision to

obfuscate the role of Serbia and its responsibility for the crimes conducted during the 1990s wars. Some politicians and smaller political parties did try to implement, at least partially, the idea of

acknowledging Serbia's responsibility (such as LDP), but their influence was marginal. 20 Particularly the Humanitarian Law Center. 21 Gordy, Guilt, 143.

Lea David

61

The situation in Serbia regarding the war veterans is drastically different from

that in Croatia or in any of the Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) entities.

According to a World Bank Study22 on Veterans in Bosnia, there are over

202,000 direct beneficiaries of current veterans’ programs in the two entities of the country, and if one considers extended family members at least one-third of

the population is directly affected by veterans’ affairs. According to data from the Registry of Veterans Affairs and the Census in 2011 of the Central Bureau

of Statistics in Croatia, the defenders/war veterans make up about 11% of total

population. In Serbia it has been estimated that the veteran population from

the wars of the 1990s numbers somewhere between 400,000 to 800,000

people.23 According to the Centre for War Trauma in Novi Sad, about 15% of

Serbia’s male population are veterans of the ex-Yugoslav wars. The centre

estimated that the overall number of people recruited in Serbia alone during

the wars of the 1990s was around 700,000, with at least 10,000 combatants

who fought in the various paramilitary units.24 The exact number is unknown,

and while certain lists exist, they are incomplete and secretive. However, while

in Croatia and both BiH entities (Republika Srpska and Federation of BiH) war

veterans have been in many ways a privileged segment of population, and

occupy a special place in collective memory, in Serbia that is not the case.

This is not only due to the fact that Serbia lost those wars and “there are no spoils to share”25 but also because the formal policy line regarding the wars is

that Serbia never officially participated in them; this contention is further

supported by terminology from the Milošević regime, saying those wars were de facto just “manoeuvres”, “armed conflicts” or “military exercises”. It is this stand, held by the ruling political elites, which has enabled a series of

additional tactical decisions to be taken – all of which were meant to hinder the

veteran population from organizing themselves around a unified meta-

narrative on the nature of Serbia’s participation in the 1990s wars. There has been no official narrative whatsoever, especially when trying to understand

how Serbia is positioned in relation to the five discrepant wars/armed struggles

of the 1990s (i.e. in Slovenia, Croatia, BiH, Kosovo and the NATO

bombardment). On the contrary, the post 2000 ruling elite, coming from a

variety of political parties, often has used “it belonged to different regime” excuses to escape from taking any direct responsibility for the wars. Apart from

sporadic state apologies, which were also highly instrumentalized,26 even the

ICTY decisions were used to individualize blame rather than to face the

national criminal past.

22 Gregson, J. Kendra. 2000. Veterans’ programs in BiH. World Bank Study (accessed: 8. April

2015). 23 Numbers vary greatly and are a contested topic, since there is no official institution that has

systematically collected data on veterans and related populations. There is no exact number of

people, neither of those officially recruited nor volunteers who belonged to various paramilitary

units, nor even the wounded or dead. 24 Beara, Vladan / Miljanović, Predrag and Boris, Popov. 2004. Zašto uopšte pomagati ratnim veteranima? Pojedinačni projekti u vezi istine i pomirenja u bivšoj Jugoslaviji i svetu. DoiSerbia

7(4), 47-49, 47. 25 Alimpić, Zoran. 2011. Deputy Mayor, interview conducted on 4. May. 26 Dragović-Soso, Jasna. 2012. Apologising for Srebrenica: The Declaration of the Serbian

Parliament, the European Union and the Politics of Compromise. East European Politics 28(2),

163-179.


62

Thus, forging a common collective memory project, that is not backed-up by the

state, has proved impossible. This fact is clearly apparent in the tremendous

number of different veterans’ unions existing. Indeed, for example, in the

Belgrade municipality alone, more than 60 such organizations operate

simultaneously. Currently, there are 22/24/25/40/5027 organizations –

depending on who is being asked – that are operating at the state, municipality

and district levels. There are many more who are active on the municipality or

district levels alone, which means that a few hundred organizations related to

the previous wars currently have or have had, at some point, some membership

and activity. The diversity between the groups is enormous, with each

organization being defined by any one of a number of different unifying

criteria, such as the fighters’ common origins (from the Krajina region, northern Herzegovina…), common battlefields (Slovenia, Kosovo…), belonging to a particular paramilitary or army unit (Yugoslav army, Scorpions…), a common status (invalids, families of deceased, missing, wounded…) and so on. The list is almost endless, and includes very different and sometimes even

opposing agendas. Notwithstanding this, each different positioning means first

and foremost a different veterans’ perception of what happened in the wars of the 1990s. It would be correct to argue that all Serbs fought for their homeland,

yet apparently it was not clear to anyone what that homeland was: was it

Yugoslavia or Serbia, and if so – in which borders? Some were forcibly

conscripted, while some were already serving in the Yugoslavian military at

the time of the wars, and were certain that they were defending the integrity of

Yugoslavia. Some saw the wars as a direct threat to Serbianism, and enlisted

in the sacred wars in the name of “The Great Serbia”; and some exploited the chaos so as to increase their personal wealth, symbolic or material, through

theft, shows of force and dubious businesses. For example, a Serbian who lived

and fought in Bosnia had nothing in common with a reserve soldier from Serbia

conscripted against his will to fight in Croatia, or with a Serbian policeman

who fought in Kosovo, or with “weekend warriors”.28 All ultimately fought

under the banner of “Serbian fighters”, and it is precisely here that the difficulty lies when trying to understand what Serbia was fighting for during

the wars of the 1990s.

It is crucial to understand the utmost importance of these veteran

organizations, against the backdrop of the war veterans’ ongoing struggle to recover their post-war lives, in the prevailing atmosphere of tacit or open

hatred toward them.29 While in Croatia and BiH veterans are not only provided

with a wide range of benefits and privileges and are in possession of significant

political power, but also enjoy status of heroes; in Serbia the veteran

population is generally neglected by society and typically lives in harsh

material conditions, deprived of any social status and positive attitude towards

27 Various numbers were mentioned: the President of the Army War Veteran claimed there are

22/24 state financed organizations while his Vice President talked about 40, the President of the

Fighters of the Wars of the 1990s mentioned 25, the President of the Serbian War Veterans spoke

of 50 such organizations; but they all claimed they ‘knew’ the exact numbers. 28 This expression describes volunteer fighters from Serbia who committed acts of theft as well as

war crimes, and essentially went to ‘fight’ in order to return with the spoils of war. 29 David, Lea. 2015. Dealing with the Contested Past in Serbia: De-contextualization of the War

Veterans Memories. Nations and Nationalism. 21(1), 102-119.

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63

its members. Additionally, “without being properly heard”30, the ICTY was

determining and re-writing their role in the wars of the 1990s, creating open

animosities among the wider society who continued to put blame on the

veterans. Thus it is not surprising that in Serbia of today, the frustration of

veteran populations, feelings of injustice and deception, are all directed toward

the state and not towards the ethnic groups they were fighting during the wars

of the 1990s.31 Thus for many, the veteran unions are their last resource and

refuge for addressing their financial and emotional problems.

Fragmentation and silencing of the veteran population: “Per Diem Affair” as the last resource of legitimate representations channels

Praising veterans of lost wars is neither popular nor economically rational.

Though many of the members of the ruling political elite themselves

participated the wars of the 1990s, ironically, political calculations, economic

depression and social instability were at the root of the political elite’s strategic decision to invest its resources in mechanisms that help closing political spaces

for new political actors, as the best possible solution for dealing with Serbia’s contested past. All governments have employed various techniques in order to

disassociate themselves from these veterans and to belittle their potential

united power. Not only did the ruling Serbian elites refuse to frame a unified

narrative that could gather all war veterans under one umbrella organization,

but they also actively encouraged veterans’ fragmentation to suppress their potential political influence and power. The most effective way of doing so was

found to be through allocating different rights and privileges to different

groups of veterans according to the place and time of their operations, thereby

further fragmenting the veteran population.

After the wars, the Law on Rights of Veterans, War Invalids and Families of

the Fallen Soldiers, from 1998 (amended in 2000 and 2005), was found to

rapidly become outdated and insufficient. According to this law, veterans

eligible for benefits are: “the Serbian and Montenegrin soldiers who participated in the wars between 1912 to 1918”; “participants in the anti-fascist

struggle in WWII in the allied troops and the participants of the army of the

Yugoslav kingdom”, “the participants at their army duty during the armed attacks after 17 August 1990” and “soldiers on duty that participated in any activity for purposes of defending sovereignty, territory and independence of

the Federal Yugoslav Republic.”32 Though certain privileges were statutory, in

practice the veteran population had to face enormous bureaucratic difficulties

even to get registered with the appropriate status. There is no official body in

charge of records of those who fought in the wars of the 1990s, and a significant

part of the veteran population were also refugees or internally displaced

persons, with these factors posing additional challenges to claiming veterans’ rights. Though obvious differences between the war veterans and the ruling

elites exist in both Croatia and Bosnia, veterans there provide a crucial

30 This perception was a general grievance in many of the interviews I conducted. 31 Marković-Savić, Olivera. 2012. Društveni položaj ratnih veterana u Srbiji – Studija slučaja. PhD-

thesis, Belgrade: University of Belgrade. 32 “Zakon o osnivnim pravima boraca, vojnih invalida i porodica palih boraca”, Službeni list SRJ br. 24/98, 29/98, 25/00, 101/05.


64

category of forging ethnic identities.33 In Serbia, however, the treatment of the

veteran population mostly depended upon the good will of the political

structures and of the bureaucrats at the local level. The veterans were often

dependent upon the sympathy of local politicians, or upon the self-interest of

these politicians who may be induced to act out of the hope of gaining the

veterans’ votes. For example, in Belgrade and nowhere else, veterans succeeded

in receiving a permanent reduction of 50% for communalities expenses.

However, also within Belgrade itself, there are significant differences between

various municipality districts in the attitude of the local government toward

veterans; only in the Čukarica district, for instance, do veterans receive

financial support on an annual basis, as this has been pre-planned in their

budget.34 While some districts have shown willingness to support veteran

unions, others ignored and obstructed them; nevertheless, the most common

attitude was simply not to interfere. This is overtly evident not only in the

illegal erection of monuments and memory plaques across both urban and rural

spaces, but also in the construction of illegal facilities, where, regardless of the

nature of the relationship between the local political structures and the

veterans, the local governments preferred to look the other way and avoid any

direct confrontation.

While it is true that the veteran population has succeeded in receiving some

privileges over the years, 35 these were all conditional upon them keeping

publicly silent, thus disabling their representation in any political space. Many

of the war veteran informants testified that they had to avoid any encounter

with the press in return for these social privileges. Veteran union

representatives said that when facing the state, they were frequently offered

certain personal benefits in return for “shutting down the protests and avoiding the press”,36 “directing their union members to vote for certain political parties/figures”37 etc. The President of Army War Invalids38 has illustrated this

policy of purposeful silencing of the veteran populations, by stating that in

2003, the veterans’ representatives made an agreement with Gordana

Matković the General Advisor of the former President of Serbia, Boris Tadić to

receive financial support in return for avoiding any public appearances.

The best example of the deliberate fragmentation and silencing of the veteran

population, which also best illustrates both the war veterans’ demand for the

legitimization of their agenda and their silencing and removal from all political

spaces, is to be found in the affair over per diem disbursement for the

participation in the wars. After war veterans had engaged in years of

unsuccessful protesting in their attempts to achieve social privileges, the “Per

33 Bojicic-Dzelilovic, Vesna. 2006. Peace on whose terms? War Veterans' Associations in Bosnia-

Hercegovina, in Challenges to Peacebuilding: Managing Spoilers During Conflict Resolution, edited

by Edward, Newman and Richmond, Oliver. Tokyo - New York - Paris: United Nations University

Press, 200-219; Soldić Marko. 2009. A land fit for heroes: Croatian veterans of the homeland war.

MA-thesis. Oslo: Oslo University. 34 Alimpić, Deputy Mayor, interview. 35 As opposed to, for example, the Bosnian veterans who enjoyed the increment of the budgetary

spending each year. See more in OSCE OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina (2012) The

Right to Social Protection in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Concerns on Adequacy and Equality. OSCE:

Sarajevo. 36 Vasiljević, Željko. “Army War Invalids”, interview conducted on 28 April 2011. 37 Milošević, Mile. “Serbian War Veterans”, interview conducted on 24 April 2011. 38 Vasiljević, “Army War Invalids”, interview.

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65

Diem Court Affair” in 2007 triggered some truly unexpected outcomes, inter alia, revealing the dynamics of the political space. This affair brought to light

the extent to which the ruling elite had been strategically oppressing the

veteran population in order to keep them from entering negotiations over the

nature of the 1990s wars. In the southern province of Serbia,39 two war

participants Slavko Maljević and Radomir Jovanović, who also happened to be

judges by profession, realized that the best way to achieve their social rights

was through suing the state for not paying veterans per diem in the fullest for

participating in the armed struggles in Kosovo in 1999. Since none of the state

army representatives appeared at court, over the course of several months,

those two veterans, followed by another 40 of their close friends and relatives,

won their cases and were granted serious sums of money.40 Though they had no

intention of representing a wider veteran population, the state refusal to even

acknowledge them proved to be very beneficial. A veteran explains: “He starts bragging in a bar that he won (at the court) and then, suddenly, that was not

enough. His wife also suffered emotional damage when he was in the war, and

he won again. Now everybody wants to appeal.”41 As a result, over the following

months, there was an avalanche effect, with an additional 2,500 lawsuits

having been filed. The sheer quantity of the lawsuits actually made the

veterans a visible entity in political space, but after this, all their rights were

denied. The Ministry of Defense then annulled all new processes, claiming that

“In the previous rulings, there had proved to be serious irregularities and abuses of position, in addition to the fact that the lawsuits could not be placed

due to the Statute of Limitations.”42

The discontent amongst the veterans was enormous, and they started accusing

and blaming each other for the situation. In the rise of the veterans’ struggle for the legitimization of their rights and after four months of strikes, daily

blockades of roads and governmental buildings and two weeks of persistent

hunger strikes, the veterans from the southern province of Toplice finally

succeeded in claiming their right to the same privileges that the judges and

their families had received. According to the agreement that was signed on 11

January, 2008 by the Minister of Justice Mirko Cvetković and the Minister of

Finance Dušan Petrović, veterans from the seven districts of Toplice province,43

who had fought in Kosovo in 1999, were to receive financial assistance in six

equal installments to the amount of 200,000 Dinars.44 However, as an

additional means of silencing the veterans' representation in political space,

the money was classified as “social welfare support for developing the Toplice

province”45 and not as war compensation. This unexpected victory was

explained by the veteran who I interviewed as another trick of the regime’s endemic: “The Tadić campaign was getting closer, then someone suggested –

we have an extra 2 millions of Dinars in the budget. Let’s give that money away in the south (of Serbia). We will spread it among those 10,000 veterans,

39 Opština Kuršumlija. 40 Around 600.000 Dinars per capita (approximately 6.000 Euros). 41 Vasiljević, “Army War Invalids”, interview. 42 Grujić, Jelena. 2008. Rezervisti Srbije: Južnjački inat i pare. Vreme, 21. August 2008 (accessed:

8. April 2015). 43 Kuršumlija, Lebane, Bojnik, Žitorađa, Doljevac, Prokuplje and Blice. 44 Around 2.000 Euros. 45 Grujić, Južnjački inat i pare.


66

and they will vote for us in the coming elections.”46 Naturally, the veterans

from other parts of Serbia saw in this agreement verification of their

entitlement to gaining exactly the same benefits. In the course of the next year,

veterans’ protests were held all across Serbia. However, neither the blockades

in the very center of Belgrade nor the hunger strikes brought about the desired

results. Excuses, prolongations and promises were all frequently used as part

of the strategic fragmentation, while constantly depriving the veterans of any

political power. For the Serbian government, these were just minor headaches.

As the protests lacked size, partly due to the freezing temperatures, these

attempts failed to bring about any serious results. Their representation was

denied, with media coverage being very sporadic and didn’t produce any empathy. It seemed as though the protests were taking place on the very

margins of society; not only did no one care, but the veterans were also openly

mocked: “That Milošević gang is allegedly having a hunger strike, but they actually just hang around, eat and make noise.”47 After a series of promises,

and even a governmental decision from April 2008 to pass a statute that would

systematically address the problem, in practice nothing happened, and the

appointed committee in charge of formulating the statute was never actually

convened. Numerous explanations were offered as to why the government was

not meeting the veterans’ demands. The Serbian Prime Minister48 stated that

the problem lies in the fact that the reimbursement would cost the state

“around 120 billion Dinars”,49 and that “in order to pay out so much money, it would first be necessary to pass a new law”. The Deputy Minister of Labor and Social Policy Miro Čavaljuga said that “if there are no clear criteria for granting the financial assistance to the reservists who were fighting in Kosovo,

tomorrow there may naturally appear other reservists who were placed, during

that period, in the military bases across Serbia, to ask for the same

privileges.”50

The prolonged attempts to silence and fragment the veteran population and to

ensure that their power remained limited eventually resulted in the

unprecedented decision on behalf of the veterans, to file a lawsuit against the

Serbian state with the European Court of Human Rights. Following the

decision of the Government of Serbia in January 2008 to pay wages to reserves

from seven municipalities in the south of Serbia, the outraged reservists51

brought the case to the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg on the

grounds of discrimination, article 14.52 According to Attorney Aleksić, while the government referred to these payments as “social welfare support”, they were paid exclusively to wartime reservists who were not asked to show any

documentation proving that they belonged to a socially underprivileged

category; in addition, the lists for this support were composed solely for the

46 Vasiljević, “Army War Invalids”, interview. 47 Vasiljević, “Army War Invalids”, interview. 48 Mirko Cvetković. 49 1.200,000 Euros. 50 Grujić, Južnjački inat i pare. 51 The case was filed on behalf of 8,500 reserves, under the name “Vučković and 29 others against Serbia”. 52 Gajin, Saša. 2013. Zabrana Diskriminacije – Član 14 Evropske konvencije, in Evropa ne stanuje u

Babušnici, edited by Lukić, Svetlana and Vuković, Svetlana. Beograd: Peščanik, Čigoja Štampa, 173-181, 174.

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purpose of paying wartime wages.53 Unexpectedly, on 28 August, 2012, the

European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg ruled in favor of the war

veterans and ordered Serbia to ensure the payment of war wages that were not

paid to these reservists for their service during the NATO intervention in 1999.

The Strasbourg court concluded that the payment of wartime wages to a

selected number of municipalities constituted discrimination against reservists

from other parts of Serbia. In October 2011, the court had delivered an

advisory opinion that Serbia was obliged to facilitate a peaceful settlement of

lawsuits relating to the payment of wartime wages by 16 December, 2011. The

court then concluded that the failure of the courts in Serbia to act upon a

number of lawsuits, which were filed by war veterans claiming wages,

constituted a violation of Article 6 Paragraph 1 of the Convention on Human

Rights. However, contrary to the war veterans expectations, on 25 March,

2014, the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights ruled that

Serbian veterans of the Kosovo war should pursue their cases in Belgrade

rather than Strasbourg, arguing that not all legal remedies have yet been

exhausted to win compensation for unpaid wartime allowances in their home

country, what should be done before taking their case to Europe.54

A moral and budgetary hole:55 The Strasbourg decisions

Although the above decision is a recent one, it has already further deepened

the existing gap between the state and the veteran population, showing at the

same time how the mechanism of fragmentation has been used to mitigate

veterans’ power and marginalize them. The unbearable feeling of the war veterans, who perceive themselves as having been betrayed by the state, was

very clear, both in the interviews I have conducted and in the wider literature,

which brings forth war veterans’ narratives.56 “The state is our enemy”57 and

“We are second class citizens in our own country”58 are some of the most

commonly expressed statements, which strongly emphasize the veterans’ frustration with the ways in which the state has treated them since their

return from the war. Veterans often stated that: “The state was serving its own interests (during the wars), never the interest of its people, never the interest

of the participants of the wars (…). The state imposed the war and the combatants are just cannon fodder, expendable goods, nothing else.”59

Moreover, such feelings of injustice, abandonment and betrayal are reinforced

through the combatants’ perceptions of society’s attitudes toward them. Statements such as: “They see in me a monster, they are afraid of me, they

53 N.N. 2013. Strazbur: Rezervisti traže odštetu. B92, 12 February 2013 (accessed: 8. April 2015). 54 Ristić, Marija. 2014. European Court Rejects Serbian War Veterans’ Case. Balkan

Insight, 25 March, 2014 (accessed: 8. April 2015). 55 A paraphrase of an article by Tončić, Bojan. 2013. Nadnice za Kosovski Učinak. Peščanik, 28.

May 2013 (accessed: 8. April 2015). 56 Such as Grujić, Jelena. 2006. Ratni veteran – factor nestabilnosti ili factor (u izgradnji) mira.

Termida 9(2), 33-37; Vladan, Beara and Miljanović, Predrag. 2006. Gde si bio, sine moj? Novi Sad:

Centar za trauma društva za zaštitu zdravlja ratnih veterana i žrtava ratova 1991-1999; Spirić, Željko (ed.). 2008 Ratna psihotrauma Srpskih veterana. Udruženje boraca rata od 1990 opštine Zvezdara: Beograd; Gojković, Drinka / Bašić, Natalija and Delić, Valentina, (eds). 2003. Ljudi u

ratu – Ratovanja I. Dokumentacioni centar Ratovi 1991-99: Beograd. 57 Vasiljević, “Army War Invalids”, interview. 58 Beara and Miljanović, Gde si bio sine moj?, 109-110. 59 Gojković / Basić and Delić, Ljudi u ratu – Ratovanja I, 8.


68

think I’m dangerous to live next to”60 – are often expressed, and reflect the

extensively adverse effect of perceived attitudes on all war veterans. One of my

informants61 told me the following story, saying that occurrences like it

“happen all the time”. He said that “every time a war invalid goes to the Veteran Administration Office, the clerk lady hates you pathologically for no

reason, she sees that you receive state money, more money than her, and she

hates you – and she is supposed to help you, to give you information, a service”. Regardless of the differences in their motivations for joining the war, the

manner of their participation or its duration, upon their return, the veterans

were all faced with animosity and even hatred from the wider Serbian society.

Society is not perceived as a source of support, but rather a source of further

alienation: “Society does not appreciate the fact that we went to war. Now they

mock us at the pub. They keep harassing us: Where are you warriors? Where

are you heroes, where are you robbers?”62 Even the Human Rights NGO sector

often treat war veterans as part of the problem, passively or actively promoting

highly negative images of the entire veteran population. In return, the Human

Right NGO sector is widely perceived by the veteran population as

“collaborators with the West” and “foreign mercenaries.”63 “Most of those NGO

organizations try to prove that the Serbs are guilty, that the veterans are

guilty, in order to justify the NATO aggression, banishment of the Serbs,

unification of the Republika Srpska with Bosnia, to justify the Kosovo

secession.”64 The president of “Association of the Families of Soldiers who Died in the Line of Duty During the 1990-1999 Wars of the Republic of Serbia”, mentioned the RECOM project – the civil initiative to promote truth on the

wars of the 1990s. In his words: “Yes, they (RECOM) called us. I would go to

Nataša Kandić65 but I am afraid the families of the fallen fighters will hang

her. They spent half million Euros per year! What truth? Whose truth?”66

This double neglect, both from the state and from the wider civil society, and

their inability to create an effective representation in political space, is also a

core reason why the international and domestic trials did not, except in the

high profile cases, enable the framing of war veterans in Serbia as “heroes”. While in both Bosnian entities and in Croatia, veterans are used to promote

master-commemorative narratives and foundation myths, in Serbia, they are

pushed aside as “unfit” for the current political aspirations. This is by no means to say that the veterans in Serbia have no support on the ground but

those voices are also marginalized, de-contextualized and set on the outskirts of

the public discourse.67

The absurdity is that though different veteran groups support a wide range of

ideological agendas; their solitude and overwhelming feeling of betrayal by the

state and society; provide them with fertile ground for creating a commonly

60 As it is greatly elaborated in Beara and Miljanović. 61 Vasiljević, “Army War Invalids”, interview. 62 Beara and Miljanović, Gde si bio? 63 Those expressions were often used to describe the most influential Serbian NGOs, especially

Humanitarian Law Center. 64 Vasiljević, “Army War Invalids”, interview. 65 The leader of the human rights fighters and the RECOM founder. 66 Paunović, Sava, “Association of the Families of Soldiers who Died in the Line of Duty During the 1990-1999 Wars of the Republic of Serbia”, interview conducted on 18. May, 2011. 67 David, Dealing with.

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shared social narrative of suffering. This is precisely where an understanding

of political space helps us in defining the shared identity, when some social

groups are excluded from the national community. Thus, though the appeal to

the Strasbourg court finally brought the veterans together, and the results

were to some degree in favor of promoting war veterans’ rights, it actually intensified the process of their alienation from the state and from wide parts of

society. The war veterans lost this court round, the Strasbourg court decision

labeled them as the official burden to society, as in the future, significant sums

of money were to be spent on them at the cost of other interest groups.

In addition, and contrary to what might be expected, the Strasbourg court

decision did not cause the opening of any political spaces where the national

past could be finally publicly addressed. To the contrary, it diminished the

possibility of conducting an open debate on the wars of the 1990s, and once

again, narrowed the war veterans’ struggle for representation in political space. The decision to harmonize the rights and benefits amongst different

veteran groups has only reduced the prism of contested issues of the 1990s

wars to finding a legally suitable formula for paying off the veterans. Now, via

the encounter between the veterans and the EU, all of the big questions on the

role and responsibility of Serbia in the 1990s wars were narrowed down to an

“inconvenient hassle”68 to the state budget, which at this point seems to be

unlikely to be ever paid at all. In other words, though war veterans perceived

the Strasbourg court decision as a sign of hope, in practice, it further confined

the possibilities of collectively debating the contested wars of the 1990s.

The shift in the role of the state

What seemed at the beginning like purposeless and unintentional

governmental practices, turned out to be strategic thinking – not always

synchronized, but at all times intentional and present. It seems safe to suggest

that fragmentation, overtly used by Serbian governments in post-war Serbia, is

a strategy of silencing that is meant to mitigate the power of war veterans and

disable their representation in the political space. “Silencing” means the closure of political space and the control of public debate. Thus, it seems that

the ruling elite “occupied”69 political spaces in order to maintain control over

the narrative of the 1990s wars, and thereby over the role of Serbia within it.

Serbia, like other post-conflict states, or more correctly, their ruling elites,

struggles to find ways to deal with the transitional justice mechanisms and

with the human rights demands forced upon them by the international

community while simultaneously responding to local demands to be

acknowledged as the righteous party in the conflict. Caught in between the

opposing international and domestic demands and defined by the power-

relations with the EU, the ruling political elites in Serbia provided limited or

no access to war veterans to political spaces where any open debate on the

recent wars could take place. Thus, the role of the state as the main memory

promoter, in the process of Europeanization, didn’t disappear but was altered.

68 My expression. 69 Grinberg, Politics and Violence.


70

Some researchers, such as Hobsbawm,70 Hirst and Thompson 71and Smith72

argued that the role of nation states in a wider context of globalization and

transition, stayed unchanged and that they still have a central function in the

propagation of power. Others claimed that the post transitional nation-states

no longer function as independent actors and that “their power is substantially limited due to the establishment of international institutions and the rise of

transnational organizations.”73 Kaldor74 asserted that this has shattered the

hegemony of the nation state. I suggest that the particular power relation

configuration inevitably alters the “traditional” role of the nation-state but it

does not necessarily mean that it also weakens it. The imbalance in power

between Serbia and the EU, expressed throughout the processes of

Europeanization, forces the post-conflict government to become artful and

canny when mediating between external and internal factors. This functional

alteration, from being the source of power to becoming a mediator and often a

gate keeper explains why memory is often treated as a supplementary source of

power. In addition to more traditional sources of power, such as social cohesion,

political stability, economical wealth, military capabilities, memory and the

representations of the past became increasingly valuable supplies for achieving

real and symbolic goals. Thus, in transitional, and more importantly, weak

states with troubled pasts, it seems unlikely that the ruling political elites will

open political spaces for public negotiation over their contested pasts, mostly as

such processes lead to uncertainty, instability and social chaos. Instead, the

ruling elites will create, find or adopt mechanisms to promote memory contents

that are simultaneously suitable for both international and domestic display,

even if it this comes at the expense of whole social segments, such as, for

example, the war veterans in Serbia. That is precisely why Gordy,75 referring

to the unwillingness of the Serbian governments to open a political space for

the public discussion regarding Serbia’s responsibility for the 1990s wars, rightly coined it “the ongoing persistence of an authoritarian political culture”.

Epilogue

As a response, and in their struggle to open political spaces of representation

for their interests and identities, the war veterans tried over years to produce a

symbolic language of power that enables articulations of social forces with state

authoritative policies. The outcome is that not only are the war veterans, as

the most significant mnemonic group, being reduced to a simple “budgetary matter”, but they are completely excluded from the process of reckoning with the past and getting Serbia accountable for the atrocities conducted in the

wars. The strategy of fragmentation, transparent in allotting different

privileges to different war veteran groups, was part of the government’s effort of resolving not only the high cost problem of Serbian war veterans, but more

70 Hobsbawm, Eric. 1993 Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality.

Cambridge University Press: Cambridge. 71 Hirst, Paul and Thompson, Grahame. 1996. Globalization in Question: The International

Economy and the Possibilities of Governance. Polity Press: Cambridge. 72 Smith, D. Anthony. 2001. Nationalism: Theory, Ideology, History. Polity Press and Blackwell

Publishing: Cambridge. 73 Guibernau, Monserrat. 2001. Globalization and Nation-state, in Understanding Nationalism,

edited by Guibernau, Monserrat and Hutchinson, John. Polity Press: Cambridge 242-268, 256. 74 Kaldor, Mary. 2004. Nationalism and Globalisation. Nations and Nationalism 10(1/2), 161-177. 75 Gordy, Guilt, 121.

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importantly – that of Serbia’s role in these wars. This was done through a low

cost solution, whereby the government could keep the veterans and the greater

public quiet. Disabling the war veterans from speaking their war-time stories

out loud, enables Serbia to continue blurring the facts, roles and

responsibilities for the atrocities conducted during the wars of the 1990s.76

Grinberg77 pointed out that “once certain marginalized groups have no access to political space in order to express themselves, and receive no recognition of

their claims, agendas, identities or ideas, they might initiate a movement of

resistance to the oppressing power.” He suggested that once all legitimate

channels of representations are being exploited and closed, massive resistance

and even violence are likely to burst out. Unfortunately, it might be that the

Serbian society is heading just there.

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Gender and Geopolitics in the

Eurovision Song Contest Introduction

Catherine Baker Lecturer, University of Hull

[email protected]

http://www.suedosteuropa.uni-graz.at/cse/en/baker





74

Introduction:

Gender and Geopolitics in

the Eurovision Song Contest

Catherine Baker* Introduction

From the vantage point of the early 1990s, when the end of the Cold War not only inspired the discourses of many Eurovision performances but created opportunities for the map of Eurovision participation itself to significantly expand in a short space of time, neither the scale of the contemporary Eurovision Song Contest (ESC) nor the extent to which a field of “Eurovision research” has developed in cultural studies and its related disciplines would have been recognisable. In 1993, when former Warsaw Pact states began to participate in Eurovision for the first time and Yugoslav successor states started to compete in their own right, the contest remained a one-night-per-year theatrical presentation staged in venues that accommodated, at most, a couple of thousand spectators and with points awarded by expert juries from each participating country. Between 1998 and 2004, Eurovision’s organisers, the European Broadcasting Union (EBU), and the national broadcasters responsible for hosting each edition of the contest expanded it into an ever grander spectacle: hosted in arenas before live audiences of 10,000 or more, with (from 2004) a semi-final system enabling every eligible country and broadcaster to participate each year, and with (between 1998 and 2008) points awarded almost entirely on the basis of telephone voting by audiences in each participating state. In research on Eurovision as it stands today, it would almost go without saying that Eurovision and the performances it contains have reflected, communicated and been drawn into narratives of national and European identity which were and are – by their very nature as a nexus between imaginaries of culture and territory – geopolitical. The expansion of Eurovision in some ways anticipated, in some ways paralleled, and in other ways outpaced a specific set of political, financial and cultural processes in the aftermath of the Cold War which aimed to produce a geopolitical reconfiguration of their own: the expansion of Euro-Atlantic institutions, chief among them the European Union (EU). In June 1993, the same year as Eurovision’s first phase of post-Cold-War expansion, the European Council (the council of EU heads of state) published its “Copenhagen

* Catherine Baker is Lecturer in 20th Century History at the University of Hull and specialises in the study of nationalism, conflict, narrative, and postsocialism. She is the author of Sounds of the

Borderland: Popular Music, War and Nationalism in Croatia since 1991 (Farnham: Ashgate, 2010) and The Yugoslav Wars of the 1990s (London: Palgrave Macmillan, in press), and the co-author (with Michael Kelly) of Interpreting the Peace: Peace Operations, Conflict and Language in Bosnia-

Herzegovina (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013). Parts of this introduction draw on her keynote speech at the “Visions of Europe in the Eurovision Song Contest” conference at the University of Copenhagen, 5.–7. May 2014.

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Criteria” for the accession of future members, making democratic institutions, the rule of law, human rights, minority rights protections and a market economy prerequisites for any future member states to join the EU. While vague, these criteria set the framework for the policy of “conditionality” that the EU would apply to future membership applications and enabled lobbying on matters including gender equality and LGBT rights to take place at an EU institutional level.1 The most visible symbolic expansion of Eurovision, the introduction of a semi-final in 2004 (meaning that low-scoring countries would no longer be forced to wait a year before participating again), coincided with a landmark in the EU enlargement process even more closely: the accession of Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia took place on 1. May 2004, and that year’s Eurovision semi-final and final were held between 12. and 15. May. The lists of new members in the two expansions were not an exact match. Malta and Cyprus, the two states outside eastern Europe to be included in the 2004 EU expansion, had started participating in Eurovision in 1971 and 1981 respectively; Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia had all started entering Eurovision in 1993 or 1994, and Latvia in 2000, while the Czech Republic would not start participating until 2007. Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, which also made their Eurovision debuts as sovereign states in 1993,2 plus Romania, which had been part of the 1993 Eurovision preselection process, were still each at varying distances from EU accession in 2004 (with Romania joining in 2007, Croatia in 2013, and Bosnia-Herzegovina signing a Stabilisation and Association Agreement with the EU in 2008 which as of the time of writing had still not come into force). The 2004 contest was (as I suggest elsewhere) nevertheless wide open to being read, so soon after the celebration of the EU’s expansion, as “Eurovision’s own ‘enlargement’”3 – not least in the context of where that year’s contest and the two previous editions had been held. Under EBU rules, winning the contest gives a broadcaster and country the right to host Eurovision in the following year: the victories of Estonia, Latvia and Turkey in 2001–3 thus led to Eurovision being held in these three countries in 2002–4, and Eurovision’s invitation to viewers to create geopolitical narratives around the staging and performances they see and hear thus turned its lens on each of these countries in turn. All three countries were part of spaces which throughout the 20th century, and indeed before, had been positioned on the geopolitical margins of Europe by multiple discourses of European identity that employed an “East”/“West”

1 Vermeersch, Pieter. 2004. Minority Policy in Central Europe: Exploring the Impact of the EU’s Enlargement Strategy. Global Review of Ethnopolitics 3(2), 3–19, 8; Swiebel, Joke. 2009. Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender Human Rights: the Search for an International Strategy. Contemporary Politics 15(1), 19-35, 24. 2 See Andjelić, this issue. 3 Baker, Catherine. 2008. Wild Dances and Dying Wolves: Simulation, Essentialization, and National Identity at the Eurovision Song Contest. Popular Communication 6(3), 173–89, 174. See also Sieg, Katrin. 2013. Cosmopolitan Empire: Central and Eastern Europeans at the Eurovision Song Contest. European Journal of Cultural Studies 16(2), 244–63, 245–6.

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division.4 Turkey’s opportunity to host the contest in 2004, and thus to temporarily situate Istanbul as the centre from which this performance of European and national identities would emanate, indeed pushed far beyond the EU’s own envisaged boundaries and into the most difficult geopolitical question that the EU of the early 2000s faced (whether and how the prospect of Turkish accession could be accommodated), with the legacies of historical discourses about the European belonging, or otherwise, of Turkey clearly visible in the near background.5 In the staging and organisation of all these contests (as one contributor to this issue, Paul Jordan, has already shown for Estonia6), and in the responses to them by commentators, journalists and fans, the idea of “Europe” as an imagined geopolitical space that nations could be positioned in relation to was not a static symbol but a resource – something that could be, and frequently was, strategically managed, actively contested and reshaped during the “three minutes” of each song (or longer when a country hosts the contest) in which “a peripherally constructed nation state is literally given centre stage”.7

Southeastern Europe in Eurovision Research

The argument that Eurovision is a setting through which states, broadcasters and performers communicate narratives of national identity beyond the nation, to an international audience, recurs throughout the research on Eurovision that by the mid-2000s was beginning to draw together as a subfield of its own in cultural studies. Indeed, many (though not all) of the best-known examples that help to prove that claim come from this very period, when the meanings of belonging to “Europe”, in Eurovision or outside it, were undergoing multiple forms of institutional and cultural renegotiation. Ivan Raykoff and Robert Deam Tobin’s 2007 edited volume A Song for Europe:

Popular Music and Politics in the Eurovision Song Contest was the first of several books which sought to draw together multiple researchers’ case studies into a wider argument about Eurovision in international politics and popular culture, and emphasised the importance of historical as well as contemporary

4 See, e.g., Wolff, Larry. 1994. Inventing Eastern Europe: the Map of Civilization on the Mind of the

Enlightenment. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press; Todorova, Maria. 1997. Imagining the

Balkans. Oxford: Oxford University Press; Neumann, Iver B. 1998. Uses of the Other: the “East” in European Identity Formation. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press; on music, Stokes, Martin. 1992. The Arabesk Debate: Music and Musicians in Modern Turkey. Oxford: Clarendon; Buchanan, Donna A. (ed.). 2007. Balkan Popular Culture and the Ottoman Ecumene: Music, Image,

and Regional Political Discourse. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield. 5 Solomon, Thomas. 2007. Articulating the Historical Moment: Turkey, Europe, and Eurovision

2003, in A Song for Europe: Popular Music and Politics in the Eurovision Song Contest, edited by Ivan, Raykoff, and Robert Deam Tobin. Aldershot: Ashgate; Christensen, Miyase and Christian Christensen. 2008. The After-Life of Eurovision 2003: Turkish and European Social Imaginaries and Ephemeral Communicative Space. Popular Communication 6(3), 155–72. 6 Jordan, Paul. 2011. The Eurovision Song Contest: Nation Branding and Nation Building in

Estonia and Ukraine. PhD-thesis. Glasgow: University of Glasgow; Jordan, Paul. 2014. Nation Branding: a Tool for Nationalism?. Journal of Baltic Studies 45(3), 283–303. 7 Stychin, Carl. 2011. Unity in Diversity: European Citizenship Through the Lens of Popular Culture. Windsor Yearbook of Access to Justice 29(1), 1–25.

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Eurovision research.8 Two other edited volumes – one edited by the musicologists Franco Fabbri and Dafni Tragaki, another edited by the performance scholars Karen Fricker and Milija Gluhovic – appeared in 2013.9 To this, one can add single-author works such as Philip Bohlman’s Music,

Nationalism, and the Making of a New Europe, in which Eurovision is an important case study,10 and an ever-growing number of research articles. Southeastern Europe has contributed both to the collaborative audiovisual text that is the Eurovision Song Contest and to frameworks for critically understanding it. The strategy of using the opportunity of a Eurovision performance to attempt to alter foreign perceptions of a nation was exemplified, Vesna Mikić and Marijana Mitrović have both argued, by the presentation of Serbia-Montenegro’s first Eurovision entry under that name in 2004, Željko Joksimović’s “Lane moje”, which marked Serbia’s “return” to Eurovision after an absence of 12 years and, even in the year of Ruslana and “Wild Dances”, came close to winning Eurovision itself.11 Joksimović’s embodiment of a modern and gentle Serbian masculinity which could combine elements of (reimagined) folk tradition into a result intelligible through, and appealing to, the conventions of “world music” presentation contributed to an effort on the part of the Serbian broadcaster to reshape foreign images of the country away from the stereotypes perpetuated during the Yugoslav wars.12 Three years later, the Serbian representative Marija Šerifović – selected, Shannon Jones and Jelena Subotić argue, as an “attempt to present [Serbia’s] liberal, tolerant and modern face to Europe at a time when the country’s EU application was in jeopardy”13 – won Eurovision with the ballad “Molitva” (“Prayer”) and a performance that certainly invited a queer subtext even if (with Šerifović not speaking publicly about her sexuality until 2013) it was not yet text. In the meantime, Croatian entries had experimented with similar practices of essentialised/simulated folklore as Ruslana or Joksimović, causing a domestic controversy in 2006 when Severina’s entry claimed to be based on song and dance from the Dinaric highlands and was arranged by Goran Bregović.14 Bulgaria, befitting or rather building on its position as the country

8 Raykoff, Ivan and Robert Deam Tobin. (eds). 2007. A Song for Europe: Popular Music and Politics

in the Eurovision Song Contest. Aldershot: Ashgate. For southeastern Europe, see particularly the chapter by Dean Vuletić (on socialist Yugoslavia), as well as those by Alf Björnberg (on ethnicity and folklore), Thomas Solomon and Matthew Gumpert (on Turkey). 9 Fabbri, Franco and Dafni Tragaki. (eds). 2013. Empire of Song: Europe and Nation in the

Eurovision Song Contest. Lanham, MD: Scarecrow; Fricker, Karen and Milija Gluhovic (eds). 2013. Performing the “New” Europe: Identities, Feelings and Politics in the Eurovision Song Contest. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 10 Bohlman, Philip V. 2010. Music, Nationalism, and the Making of the New Europe. London and New York: Routledge. 11 Mikić, Vesna. 2006. The Way We (Just Me, Myself and I) Were: Recycling National Identities in

Recent Popular Music, paper presented at the conference “Musical Culture and Memory”, Faculty of Musicology, University of Arts, Belgrade, 12.–14. April 2006; Mitrović, Marijana. 2010. “New Face of Serbia” at the Eurovision Song Contest: International Media Spectacle and National Identity. European Review of History 17(2), 171–85. 12 Mitrović, “New Face of Serbia”, 174. 13 Jones, Shannon and Jelena Subotić. 2011. Fantasies of Power: Performing Europeanization on the European Periphery. European Journal of Cultural Studies 14(5), 542–57, 550. See also Mitrović, “New Face of Serbia”. 14 Baker, Catherine. 2008. When Seve Met Bregović: Folklore, Turbofolk and the Boundaries of Croatian Musical Identity. Nationalities Papers 36(4), 741–64.


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where an “international marketing trend” for “Balkan” music in the 1990s world music market had originated,15 developed a Eurovision niche after 2007 of entries combining folk-style vocals and electronic music, before becoming one of several southeastern European countries that (temporarily?) stopped participating in 2014–15. A necessary instrument for understanding these strategies and performances, the critique of “self-exoticisation” or “self-orientalisation” in cultural production, also comes from the cultural studies and ethnomusicology of southeastern Europe.16 Writing in 2001, the film scholar Dina Iordanova pointed to a mode of “voluntary ‘self-exoticism”’ in 1990s Balkan cinema which, internalising and re-presenting “orientalist” constructions of the Balkans, meant that “the orientalisation of the Balkans cannot be declared a purely Western project”.17 The relevance of this observation for making sense of self-representation strategies in Eurovision was apparent well before the Romanian singer Elena Gheorghe, participating in what Alexander Kiossev has termed a “Balkan popular (counter) culture” of transnational south-east European pop-folk,18 sang during her Eurovision entry of 2009 that “the Balkan girls, they like to party like nobody, like nobody” (though on this occasion they also liked to start their weekend not with fruit brandy, as in many other pop-folk representations of “Balkan” hedonism, but “with gin, tonic and lime”).

Towards a Critical and Feminist Geopolitics of Eurovision

All these dynamics can be understood through the lens of “critical geopolitics”, an approach that – as Gerard Toal and Carl Dahlman write with reference to post-conflict Bosnia-Herzegovina – understands geopolitics as “always a culturally embedded practice operating across networks of power and […] a field of competing political constructions vying to describe the conditions within which states operate and what normative strategy best realizes state and national interests”.19 Within critical geopolitics, one object of study is the production of “geopolitical cultures”, involving the “borrowing, adapting and reworking [of] available discursive formations in the international arena”.20 The case studies above, and many others, show that Eurovision has been deeply implicated in these processes.

15 Buchanan, Donna A. 1997. Bulgaria’s Magical Mystère Tour: Postmodernism, World Music Marketing, and Political Change in Eastern Europe. Ethnomusicology 41(1), 131–57. 16 This point is further developed in Baker, Wild Dances and Dying Wolves. 17 Iordanova, Dina. 2001. Cinema of Flames: Balkan Film, Culture and the Media. London: BFI, 56. See also Dubravka Ugrešić’s extension of a critique of the Eurovision Song Contest towards the essentialisation of small nations in European literary marketing: Ugrešić, Dubravka. 2003. What is European in European Literatures?: European Literature as a Eurovision Song Contest. European

Journal of Women’s Studies 10(4), 465–71. 18 Kiossev, Alexander. 2002. The Dark Intimacy: Maps, Identities, Acts of Identification, in Balkan

as Metaphor, edited by Bjelić, Dušan I., and Obrad Savić. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 165–90, 184. See also Buchanan (ed.), Balkan Popular Culture and the Ottoman Ecumene; Archer, Rory. 2012. Assessing Turbofolk Controversies: Popular Music between the Nation and the Balkans. Southeastern Europe 36(2), 178–207. 19 Toal, Gerard and Carl Dahlman. 2011. Bosnia Remade: Ethnic Cleansing and its Reversal. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 12. 20 Toal and Dahlman, Bosnia Remade, 11–12.

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Yet, following Lorraine Dowler and Joanne Sharp, it is possible to search not just for a critical geopolitics but a feminist geopolitics, that is, “a lens through which the everyday experiences of the disenfranchised can be made more visible”, which moves its understanding of discourse beyond representation into the domain of everyday and embodied social practice.21 In the context of post-Cold-War Europe, Fiona Smith, for instance, used feminist geopolitics to study the “dominant neo-liberal scripts of post-Cold-War restructuring and the tropes of ‘East’ and ‘West’ underpinning reunification” – dynamics, again, in which the Eurovision Song Contest is embedded – by analysing narratives of women in post-reunification eastern Germany about the state and the politics of childcare.22 With these directions in mind, one can begin to ask: what would a feminist geopolitics, not just a critical geopolitics, of Eurovision look like? Gender, clearly, would be at the centre of such an analysis – taking account both of the multiple masculinities and femininities that have been performed on Eurovision stages in the contest’s many musical dramatisations of national and European belonging, and of the way in which attitudes to gender equality and “LGBT” rights became constructed as indicators of a country’s relationship to an imagined “Europe” or an imagined “West” in post-Cold-War international politics, producing the set of discursive practices that Éric Fassin has referred to as “sexual democracy” and Jasbir Puar, even more critically, as “homonationalism”.23 Understanding these latter dynamics at Eurovision requires attention not only to the politics of what is represented on stage but also analysis of the backstage politics within which Eurovision contests are hosted and organised – the framework through which Milija Gluhovic, for instance, evaluates the “tension over gender/sexuality versus cultural/religious identity in the service of a more progressive image of Europe” that surrounded human rights organisations’ campaigns on the issue of LGBT rights in Azerbaijan when Eurovision was held in Baku in 2012.24 Also at its centre, however, would be inequality and marginalisation as objects of analysis in their own right (and as dynamics to be overcome, not just critiqued).25 Eurovision as an institution exists within international asymmetries of power and also – or so a feminist geopolitics might hypothesise – is likely to contribute to them, even perhaps to create asymmetries of its own. The account of 1993 as a moment of postsocialist European integration given at the beginning of this introduction, for instance, would be incomplete if it did not recognise that, while the EBU was happy to begin welcoming new states into its space of performance, it was not prepared to accommodate them all at

once; the new participant broadcasters in 1993 first had to qualify through a

21 Dowler, Lorraine and Joanne Sharp. 2001. A Feminist Geopolitics?, Space and Polity 5(3), 165–76, 169. 22 Smith, Fiona. 2001. Refiguring the Geopolitical Landscape: Nation, “Transition” and Gendered Subjects in Post-Cold War Germany. Space and Polity 5(3), 213–35, 213. 23 Fassin, Éric. 2010. National Identities and Transnational Intimacies: Sexual Democracy and the Politics of Immigration in Europe. Public Culture 22(3), 507–29; Puar, Jasbir K. 2013. Rethinking Homonationalism. International Journal of Middle East Studies 45(2), 336–9. 24 Gluhovic, Milija. 2013. Sing for Democracy: Human Rights and Sexuality Discourse in the

Eurovision Song Contest, in Performing the “New” Europe: Identities, Feelings and Politics in the Eurovision Song Contest, edited by Fricker, Karen, and Milija Gluhovic. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 194–217, 195. 25 Dowler and Sharp, A Feminist Geopolitics?, 166.


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preselection event, held in Ljubljana, where Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia and Slovenia were successful but Estonia, Hungary, Romania and Slovakia were not. Eurovision organisers, indeed, continued to find it (or construct it as) difficult to accommodate the increased number of entrants into the format between 1994 and 2003 (on the grounds that thirty-plus entries would be too many for a one-night show). The initial solution of “relegating” countries with low-scoring track records caused tensions when the broadcasters of two countries that made large financial contributions to the costs of Eurovision (Germany and Italy) were not allowed to participate in Eurovision 1996 after their songs’ poor results in 1995. The rules were changed in 2000 so that France, Germany, Spain and the UK (as the four largest financial contributors to the contest) would automatically qualify for the Eurovision final every year. Even once the semi-final format of 2004 onwards allowed every interested broadcaster to send an entry every year, the automatic entry to the final of the so-called ‘Big Four’ remained, with Italy receiving the same privilege once it began entering again in 2011. Meanwhile, the participants in or on the margins of the region constructed as eastern Europe which recorded such successful results in the contests of 2001–8 – won by, respectively, Estonia, Latvia, Turkey, Ukraine, Greece, Finland, Serbia and Russia – were commonly perceived in western European media, reportedly even by some broadcasters, as having won their victories through ‘bloc’ or ‘political’ voting (the subject of an on-air diatribe by the then BBC Eurovision commentator, Terry Wogan, after Russia’s victory in 2008).26 The 2009 change to the voting format (so that points would now be given 50% on the basis of public voting and 50% on an expert jury again), followed by two successive wins for Northern/Western European states (Norway in 2009 and Germany in 2010) could persuasively signify (perhaps to the EBU’s relief) “that the Eurovision song [had] returned from one region in Europe to another”27 – at least until Azerbaijan’s victory in 2011 took Eurovision to Baku. The very structure of participation in Eurovision thus created a geopolitics of asymmetry based on disparities of economic power, with the conditionality of the acceptance of Europe’s southern and eastern peripheries never very far away. Here, however, one is still talking (albeit with some backstage context) about what ends up being seen on screen. An even deeper critical lens on Eurovision would interrogate it in the same way as critical studies of its fellow “mega-events”28 such as the Olympic Games – an international event which is also the subject of its own (indeed a larger) academic subfield, but where researchers have emphasised structural and material perspectives just as much as the

26 See Fricker, Karen. 2013. “It’s Just Not Funny Any More”: Terry Wogan, Melancholy Britain, and the Eurovision Song Contest, in Performing the “New” Europe: Identities, Feelings and Politics in

the Eurovision Song Contest, edited by Fricker, Karen and Milija Gluhovic. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 53–76, 55; Ulbricht, Sircar and Slootmaeckers, this issue. 27. Bohlman, Philip V. 2013. Tempus Edax Rerum: Time and the Making of the Eurovision Song, in Empire of Song: Europe and Nation in the Eurovision Song Contest, edited by Fabbri, Franco and Dafni Tragaki. Lanham, MD: Scarecrow, 35–56, 52. 28 Roche, Maurice. 2000. Mega-Events and Modernity: Olympics and Expos in the Growth of Global

Culture. London and New York: Routledge.

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“front-stage” action of the event.29 Olympics research includes studies of the international politics of representing the home nation,30 and indeed even some studies of sport as – gendered and ethnicised – performance,31 but also foregrounds the politics of space, security and exclusion far more than most research on Eurovision.32 The contests of 2008 (in Belgrade), 2009 (in Moscow) and 2012 (in Baku), however, created a public agenda around these questions for the first time, through discourses that placed state treatment of sexual and gender diversity under particular scrutiny: from the question-marks over the safety of foreign gay tourists at Eurovision 2008 in Belgrade after the far-right attack on Belgrade’s first Pride march in 2001,33 through the violent repression of a Pride march by Moscow police on the day of the Eurovision final in 2009, into the campaigns that sought to draw attention to compulsory urban clearance, arrests of opposition activists and state homophobia ahead of Eurovision 2012 in Baku.34 Like the International Olympics Committee (IOC) at Beijing 2008, the EBU in both 2009 and 2012 stood accused by its critics of complicity with the national promotional strategies of authoritarian regimes. Indeed, discourses about Eurovision and the Olympics not only paralleled each other but converged. For instance, Wogan’s successor as BBC commentator,

29 The “backstage”/“front-stage” distinction here follows Goffman, Erving. 1990 [1959]). The

Presentation of Self in Everyday Life. Harmondsworth: Penguin. 30 See, e.g., Hogan, Jackie. 2003. Staging the Nation: Gendered and Ethnicized Discourses of National Identity in Olympic Opening Ceremonies. Journal of Sport and Social Issues 27(2), 100–23; Traganou, Jilly. 2010. National Narratives in the Opening and Closing Ceremonies of the Athens 2004 Olympic Games. Journal of Sport and Social Issues 34(2), 236–51; Ellis, Cath. 2012. The Possessive Logic of Settler–Invader Nations in Olympic Ceremonies. Journal of Tourism and

Cultural Change 10(2), 105–23; Brownell, Susan. 2013. The Olympic Public Sphere: The London and Beijing Opening Ceremonies as Representative of Political Systems. International Journal of

the History of Sport 30(11), 1315–27; Arning, Chris. 2013. Soft Power, Ideology and Symbolic Manipulation in Summer Olympic Games Opening Ceremonies: a Semiotic Analysis. Social

Semiotics 23(4), 523–44; Biressi, Anita and Heather Nunn. 2013. The London 2012 Olympic Games Opening Ceremony: History Answers Back. Journal of Popular Television 1(1), 113–20; Closs, Stephens Angharad. In press. The Affective Atmospheres of Nationalism. Cultural Geographies, 31 Rinehart, Robert E. 1998. Players All: Performances in Contemporary Sport. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press; Kestnbaum, Ellyn. 2003. Culture on Ice: Figure Skating and Cultural

Meaning. Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press; Adams, Mary Louise. 2011. Artistic

Impressions: Figure Skating, Masculinity, and the Limits of Sport. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. 32 See, e.g., Boyle, Philip and Kevin D. Haggerty. 2009. Spectacular Security: Mega-Events and the Security Complex. International Political Sociology 3(3), 257–74; Falcous, Mark and Michael L. Silk. 2010. Olympic Bidding, Multicultural Nationalism, Terror, and the Epistemological Violence of “Making Britain Proud”. Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism 10(2), 167–86; Bulley, Dan and Debbie Lisle. 2012. Welcoming the World: Governing Hospitality in London’s 2012 Olympic Bid. International Political Sociology 6(2), 186–204; Miah, Andy and Beatriz García. 2012. The

Olympics: the Basics. London and New York: Routledge; Grix, Jonathan and Donna Lee. 2013. Soft Power, Sports Mega-Events and Emerging States: the Lure of the Politics of Attraction. Global

Society 27(4), 521–36; Boykoff, Jules and Pete Fussey. 2014. London’s Shadow Legacies: Security and Activism at the 2012 Olympics. Contemporary Social Science 9(2), 253–70. 33 Nixon, David and Nick Givens. 2011. Queer in England: the Comfort of Queer? Kittens,

Teletubbies and Eurovision, in Queer in Europe, edited by Downing, Lisa and Robert Gillett. Farnham: Ashgate, 41–56, 47. See also Mikuš, Marek, 2011. “State Pride”: Politics of LGBT Rights and Democratisation in “European Serbia”. East European Politics and Societies 25(4), 834–51; Nielsen, Christian Axboe. 2013. Stronger Than the State? Football Hooliganism, Political Extremism and the Gay Pride Parades in Serbia. Sport in Society 16(8), 1038–53. 34 Gluhovic, Sing for Democracy.


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Graham Norton, referred to Moscow 2009 as “the Beijing Olympics of Eurovision” while discussing the fate of the Pride march on air;35 the liberal fantasies of Conchita Wurst winning Eurovision as an act of defiance against, specifically, Putin’s Russia unfolded only a few months after the Sochi Winter Olympics, which had themselves been an occasion for imagining an inherently LGBT-tolerant west and a Russia that just as inherently was nothing of the kind. This Eurovision/Olympics convergence can lead us through and perhaps even beyond the discursive to enable Eurovision researchers to pose questions of security, policing and power: even if it took Moscow or Baku to make them enter the agenda, they deserve to stay part of it even in years when Eurovision host sites might be, on the face of things, much less problematised.

Eurovision after the Mid-2000s: the Politics of Expansion and Crisis Eurovision research is a field that – significantly – coalesced in the mid-2000s at a moment of apparent growth, when narratives about the expansion of the Eurovision Song Contest and the expansion of the borders and prosperity of Europe could comfortably feed off and into each other. By 2013, on the other hand, it was more than apparent that, as Karen Fricker and Milija Gluhovic noted in their introduction to Performing the “New” Europe, “the utopic hopes of European unity following on from 1989 have not materialized”.36 As of 2013, following the global financial crisis of 2008–, this was primarily the case in economic terms; in 2014, however, this crisis was joined by the diplomatic and military repercussions of the Russian annexation of Crimea and the conflict in Eastern Ukraine. Both developments invited reconfigurations of the meanings of “European” belonging and therefore reconstructions of the geopolitical imaginaries through which the Eurovision of the 2000s had been understood. After 2004, participation in Eurovision was restricted less by organisational limits on the number of entries that could compete but by the financial limits of whether broadcasters judged the costs of participation to be appropriate uses of their budget. These budgets, after 2008, would be reduced by governments recouping the money they had contributed to supporting failing banks, at the same time as the technical and promotional costs of participating in, let alone hosting, Eurovision continued to rise. The tension between the objective of national promotion and the financial liabilities of participation resulted, far more frequently than before 2008, in the decision not to take part: indeed, some of the very countries that had exemplified the “performance of national identity at Eurovision” argument in the 1990s and early/mid-2000s were not participating in the mid-2000s, including Croatia, (absent since 2014), Bosnia-Herzegovina (absent since 2013) and Turkey (absent since 2013). Serbia, absent in 2014, returned in 2015 to a contest which for the first time since 2002 would not feature the country that, perhaps more than any other, had epitomised the national promotional mode of the 2000s: Ukraine.

35 Jordan, The Eurovision Song Contest, 41. 36 Fricker, Karen and Milija Gluhovic. 2013. Introduction: Eurovision and the “New” Europe, in Performing the “New” Europe: Identities, Feelings and Politics in the Eurovision Song Contest, edited by Fricker, Karen and Milija Gluhovic. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 1–28, 5.

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Commenting on the “reinvigoration” of Eurovision through its 1990s–2000s enlargement, Katrin Sieg has argued plausibly that “[f]or many post-socialist countries, whose relation to Europeanness was ideologically, culturally or geographically tenuous, the ESC has become a stage where they can perform their imagined relationship to Europe as a ‘return home’ or demonstration of affinity”.37 Yet what sort of “home” would be being “returned” to after 2008, when the idea of Europe as a common political community was badly undermined both by northern European reactions to the bailouts of southern European banks and by attacks on intra-EU freedom of movement that threatened to undermine many EU citizens’ everyday experiences of European integration? With publics in Britain and Germany questioning why their governments were contributing to bailouts and publics in Greece, Spain and Portugal questioning why their governments were submitting to bailout conditions, the EU’s institutional myth of integration and common purpose had not, therefore, overcome power relations within the Union. One of the most revealing Eurovision-related texts from southeastern Europe in the 2010s was not even from Eurovision, but still about it:38 the 2011 song “Eurosong” by the Bosnian rap collective Dubioza Kolektiv, which – in terms that would certainly not have got past EBU rules against “political” content if the song had in fact been part of any Eurovision selection process – was cast as an address to elites in Germany, Italy, France, Britain and the European Parliament:

If you wanna meet me, Mr Sarkozy

You will have to learn my language, parlez-vous gipsy?

Don’t want to be annoying, please don’t get me wrong

I’m sick of being European just on Eurosong

Even within the constraints of the EBU’s stated ban on “lyrics, speeches, [and] gestures of a political or similar nature”39 – a rule which, as contributors to this issue confirm, has hardly prevented broadcasters and states using Eurovision for political communication – occasional narratives about the financial crisis have found their way into Eurovision. The Portuguese representatives in 2011, Homens da luta (pastiching the revolutionary songs of Portugal’s Carnation Revolution period after 1974), had been directly engaged in the “Geração à

rasca” (“Desperate Generation”) protests by young precarious workers in Portugal before being selected, on a public telephone vote, to represent Portugal at Eurovision (and were thus much more directly connected to the politics of resistance to austerity in Portugal than might have been visible to most of their Eurovision audience).40 The musician and satirist Rambo Amadeus, representing Montenegro with “Euro neuro” in 2012, was able to bring on stage not only simulated news tickers but also a Trojan horse to illustrate the song’s “monetary break dance”.

37 Sieg, Cosmopolitan Empire, 245–6. 38 Kappler, Stephanie. 2012. “Mysterious in Content”: the European Union Peacebuilding Framework and Local Spaces of Agency in Bosnia-Herzegovina. PhD-thesis. St Andrews: University of St Andrews, 1. 39 Dafni, Introduction, in Empire of Song, edited by Fabbri and Tragaki, 6. 40 Madeira, Cláudia. 2012. The “Return” of Performance Art from a Glocal Perspective. Cadernos de

Arte e Antropologia 1(2), 88-102, 98. On the Carnation Revolution and Eurovision, see also Pinto, Teixeira Luisa and Martin Stokes. 2013. “And After Love…”: Eurovision, Portuguese Popular Culture, and the Carnation Revolution, in Empire of Song, edited by Fabbri and Tragaki, 221–40.


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The second new geopolitical narrative with which imaginations of “Europe” in and around Eurovision have had to contend has been the discourse of a supposed “new Cold War” between Russia and the West. As Felix Ciută and Egbert Klinke note in their analysis of German media coverage of the 2006–8 Russian–German gas crisis, the invocation of a “new Cold War” “reproduces the symbolic order […] embedded in Cold War geopolitics, working with the same binaries that portray the identities of the protagonists and the bonds of interaction, conflict and in/security that structure their relationship: East / West, aggression / defence, authoritarianism / democracy, irrationality / rationality, and politics / economics”.41 A feminist geopolitics would note that – after years of discourse and policy that have constructed Western nations as sites of “sexual democracy” on one hand and Muslim-majority societies, as well as racialised immigrants and their descendants, as repositories of intolerance on the other – the imaginary of a “new Cold War” also contains a binary based on attitudes towards sexual and gender diversity. By the mid-2000s, central and eastern Europe in general had already, as Robert Kulpa argues, been positioned “as the European (homophobic) Other in the[se] emerging discourses of ‘homoinclusive EUropean nationhood’”,42 not least through the framing of several mid-2000s European Parliament resolutions about homophobia. However, the intensification of state homophobia and transphobia in Russia and especially the passage of a federal “anti-homopropaganda”43 law in June 2013 increasingly led to this framework being applied primarily versus Russia. Not only did many journalists and viewers interpret Eurovision through these discourses, but events at Eurovision produced new moments in which these discursive configurations would be reworked, with the controversies over Moscow 2009 and Baku 2012 followed by the perfect symbolic storm of a bearded drag queen, Conchita Wurst, winning Eurovision in 2014.44 Southeastern Europe, in contrast, is not currently near Eurovision’s geopolitical centre of gravity – potentially another sign that the “nation-building citizenship regime”, as Adrijana Zaharijević has described the policies of post-Yugoslav states in the 1990s, might (as Zaharijević suggests) have been replaced by yet another kind of postsocialist citizenship regime based on adapting states and their citizens to the neoliberal order.45 In this latter relationship between state, nation, media and public there might be less to be gained from the nation-promoting Eurovision strategies of the past. At the same time, however, the proposition that broadcasters and states actively use Eurovision to perform and promote national identity in relation to Europe

41 Ciută, Felix and Egbert Klinke. 2010. Lost in Conceptualization: Reading the “New Cold War” with Critical Geopolitics. Political Geography 29(6), 323-32, 325–6. 42 Kulpa, Robert. 2014. Western Leveraged Pedagogy of Central and Eastern Europe: Discourses of Homophobia, Tolerance, and Nationhood. Gender, Place and Culture 21(4), 431-48, 431. The term “EUropean” appears in the original to denote the centrality of the EU in these discourses: Kulpa, Western Leveraged Pedagogy, 431. 43 Wilkinson, Cai. 2014. Putting “Traditional Values” into Practice: the Rise and Contestation of Anti-Homopropaganda Laws in Russia. Journal of Human Rights 13(3), 363–79. 44 See Ulbricht, Sircar and Slootmaeckers, this volume. 45 Zaharijević, Adrijana. 2015. Dissidents, Disloyal Citizens and Partisans of Emancipation: Feminist Citizenship in Yugoslavia and Post-Yugoslav Spaces. Women’s Studies International Forum 49(1), 93-100, 96.

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within a specific geopolitical and historical context has not completely ceased to be valid for southeastern Europe. Macedonia, which (like Albania) has been competing in Eurovision without a break since 2004,46 corresponds to it most closely, and in 2013 Macedonian Radio–Television (MRT) even selected an entry which, titled “Imperija” (“Empire”) and performed by Esma Redžepova and Vlatko Lozanoski, would have showcased through its video the grandiose redevelopment and “antiquitisation” of Skopje’s urban space (the so-called “Skopje 2014” project, which drew a line of continuity between the current Macedonian state and ancient Macedonia).47 Apparently in response to media criticism in Macedonia, MRT withdrew the song less than a fortnight later and replaced it with another song by Esma and Lozano which retained the multilingual Macedonian/Romani nature of the first song but avoided Skopje 2014 associations. In 2014 itself, on the other hand, MRT stayed well away from the ancient past.48 Moreover, the fantasy of an eroticised, homosocial Macedonian air force that was presented in the preview video for Tijana Dapčević’s entry “To the

sky” – displaying a homoeroticism which was likely drawing not only on the iconic cinematic masculinity of the Top Gun pilot,49 but also on the homoerotic aesthetic of contemporary post-Yugoslav pop-folk videos directed by Dejan Milićević and others50 – did not make its way into Tijana’s live performance at Eurovision. The director of the video, Mert Asllani, did, however, carefully arrange the establishing shot of Tijana’s pilot love interest so that the Macedonian flag and EU flag on his uniform could both be seen – a much more subtle geopolitical narrative of Macedonian nationhood than “Imperija” had provided, and certainly not a narrative that met the same reception as “Imperija” had done. Outside southeastern Europe, too, the potential to communicate specific narratives of collective identity through Eurovision remains – whether applied for transient purposes or as part of a longer-term communicative strategy. The 2014 Polish entry “My Słowanie” (“We Slavs”) by Donatan and Cleo was a “self-consciously ‘Eastern’ and ‘Slavic’” performance, with women in sexualised folk costume miming rural domestic work through sexually suggestive movements. Musically, it resembled south-east European pop-folk in combining “hip-hop

46 Slovenia, likewise, has participated without a break since 2001. Montenegro began competing as an independent country in 2007 and, though absent in 2010–11, has participated in every year since 2012. 47 See Graan, Andrew. 2013. Counterfeiting the Nation?: Skopje 2014 and the Politics of Nation Branding in Macedonia. Cultural Anthropology 28(1), 161–79. 48 Unlike the Italian representative in 2014, who (unexpectedly for a song referencing high-heeled shoes, pavements, trains and traffic jams) performed “La mia città” (“My City”) in a laurel-wreathed costume inspired by Imperial Roman victory parades: Gloyn, Liz. 2014. Classical Reception at Eurovision 2014. Lizgloyn, 12. May 2014 (accessed: 14. April 2015). 49 See Jeffords, Susan. 1994. Hard Bodies: Hollywood Masculinity in the Reagan Era. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 16–17; Stahl, Roger. 2010. Militainment, Inc.: War,

Media, and Popular Culture. London and New York: Routledge, 28. 50 See “Eurovicious”. 2014. Queer as Turbofolk (Part II): Body Politics. Balkanist, 25. September 2014 (accessed: 14. April 2015). One gendered spectacle here precludes another: the erotic fantasy of the all-male pilot squadron in a state of partial undress means that (unlike her parodic portrayal of a female Partisan – when not portraying several male and female newsreaders from different Yugoslav republics, or Severina – in her 2005 video “Sve je isto, samo njega nema”) the viewer is not invited to picture Tijana in uniform herself.


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beats with Eastern-sounding folk motifs (think accordions and violins)”,51 while lyrically it represented a hyper-essentialised association between the Polish nation, Slavic descent, feminine beauty and (hetero)sexuality, implicitly exclusionary of any non-Slavic belonging to the Polish national whole. The Armenian entry of 2015, meanwhile, had to be interpreted in the context of the Armenian state’s long-term commemorative strategy to ensure international remembrance of the centenary of the Armenian Genocide52 – drawing the Eurovision Song Contest into the international politics of genocide recognition even though the songwriting team only described the song’s message in the vaguest possible terms as relating to universal “values of love and peace” over time.53 The group of Armenian singers assembled for the 2015 contest, known as Genealogy, contained five musicians from the Armenian diaspora in different continents plus a sixth (Inga Arshakian, who had also been part of the Armenian entry in 2009 with her sister Anush) who still lived in Armenia. The song was initially titled “Don’t Deny” and its video, released in March 2015, depicted the singers both in present-day and sepia-toned early-20th-century settings (during the song’s instrumental break, as traditional Armenian stringed instruments play, the room where the sepia family photographs are being taken is suddenly seen with empty chairs).54 Although the Armenian broadcaster later changed the song’s title to “Face the Shadow”, its chorus (still based around the phrase “don’t deny”) and video still enabled it to stand as part of a much larger, state-led initiative that was able to use nation-branding techniques to campaign against genocide denial. However these aims were going to be fulfilled in live performance, the Armenian example showed that Eurovision, in some cases, was continuing to be the “valuable stage for conducting everyday politics among European nations as a form of state identity branding and status signalling”55 that it had very visibly become by the 2000s (and perhaps had always been). In other cases, however, that value was no longer so self-evident, making the geopolitical space imagined by Eurovision’s organisers appear – at least in 2015 – as even more of an abstraction than the idea of “Europe” would be itself. The “bridge” being built to Australia (as per the 2015 contest’s slogan “Building Bridges”), which would send an entry in 2015 as a one-off celebration of the 60th contest, was a bridge that passed silently over Ukraine, where the director-general of the national broadcaster NTU stated that war and the high costs of preparing a competitive Eurovision performance meant that (reportedly for only one year) Ukraine was unable to take part: “We understand

51 Kaneva, Nadia. 2015. Mediating Post-Socialist Femininities. Feminist Media Studies 15(1), 1-15, 2. 52 Eurovision was not the only site at which the Armenian state integrated transnational showbusiness into this campaign: in April 2015 the government also co-operated with a visit by the US celebrities Khloe and Kim Kardashian (as well as Kim’s husband Kanye West and their daughter North), who were able to meet the Armenian prime minister Hovik Abrahamyan as well as lay flowers at the Armenian Genocide Memorial Complex in Yerevan. 53 N.N. 2015. About Genealogy. Eurovision.tv (accessed: 14. April 2015). 54 Brey, Marco. 2015. Armenia: Watch the Video of “Don’t Deny”. Eurovision.tv, 12. March 2015. (accessed: 11. April 2015). 55 Jones and Subotić, Fantasies of Power, 544.

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that Eurovision is a prestige contest. But we have no right to make a bad performance. And we have no money for a good one”.56 The papers in this issue explore different dimensions of the contradictions between frontstage and backstage, between representation and materiality, at various historical moments since the end of the Cold War, when Eurovision expanded to accommodate a much greater amount of southeastern European participation than it had done in 1961–92 when its only participant from the region was Yugoslavia. Approaching the nexus of gender and geopolitics at Eurovision from various disciplinary and methodological standpoints, they all demonstrate that as apolitical as Eurovision organisers and many participants may state the contest is – indeed, as depoliticised as Eurovision organisers might sometimes appear to strive to make it – the structure of Eurovision as a musical competition between nations makes it impossible to exclude politics from the event. Neven Andjelić’s paper sets what quickly became a well-known moment in Eurovision history, the 1993 entry from Bosnia-Herzegovina selected and performed while the siege of Sarajevo was still ongoing, in the context of the Yugoslav and Bosnian music industries and the politics of Eurovision in the early 1990s. Paul Jordan, in another interview-based study, documents the complexities of national identification behind four significant Eurovision entries from Ukraine since 2004, showing the extent to which representations and essentialisations of the nation are actively produced – and contested. The other two papers explore political and media discourses to show some of the routes through which Eurovision has contributed to contemporary geopolitical visions that hierarchically re-imagine a “West” and “East” supposedly divided by attitudes to sexuality and gender identity. Jessica Carniel’s case studies include two Eurovision kisses between women (or rather one, between Krista Siegfrids and a backing vocalist in Eurovision 2013, which actually took place, and another much-anticipated kiss, between the members of t.A.T.u. in 2003, which ultimately did not), as well as the politics of state homophobia in Azerbaijan. Finally, Alexej Ulbricht, Indraneel Sircar and Koen Slootmaeckers compare voting patterns and media discourses in the 2007 and 2014 contests, both of whose winners – Marija Šerifović and Conchita Wurst – departed from heteronormative conventions of gender expression. Their findings point to some noticeable discursive shifts between 2007 and the present day, but also to discursive continuities. If in 2007 the mainstream tabloid press of Germany and the UK attributed Šerifović’s victory to eastern European “bloc voting” rather than the triumph of tolerance that they projected on to Conchita’s victory in 2014, what might this suggest about developments in geopolitical imaginaries of sexual and gender diversity between then and now? One thing, however, is constant in both their cases: the extent to which a hierarchical “West”/“East” division structures geographical imagination in these two countries, and indeed beyond.

56 N.N. 2014. Ukraine Withdraws from Participating in Eurovision 2015. Euromaidan Press, 19. September 2014 (accessed: 14. April 2015).


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Conclusion

Eurovision research, now a flourishing subfield of its own, will likely continue to explore its key domains of performance, media discourse and fan cultures whatever changes the contest undergoes from year to year. Within and around these priorities, there is also scope for its lens to continue to widen, following perhaps the agendas mapped out by feminist geopolitics or contemporary Olympics research, but without having to dispense with its recognition of the pleasures of Eurovision as a televisual – and live – event. Current Eurovision research is, indeed, already acknowledging that, as Fricker and Gluhovic write:

there is a wide discrepancy between a European citizenship proclaimed in

official EU discourses and the actual lack of rights experienced by many

ethnodiasporas, migrants, and refugees from non-European and Eastern

European countries, which raises many questions about the politics of

belonging and non-belonging and the cultural identity of the “new” Europe – questions that are vital for the future of the European continent.57

Sustained engagement is therefore necessary with the material and discursive dynamics of exclusion within current and historical imaginations of gender, geopolitics and “Europe”. Indeed, already Eurovision researchers are interrogating the limits of Eurovision as a multicultural space: Karen Fricker, for instance, argues that Eurovision is demonstrating “positive progress towards a contest that more accurately reflects the mingling of nationalities, ethnicities, and cultural traditions that is the reality of today’s Europe”,58 whereas Katrin Sieg is less optimistic, suggesting that even the many Eurovision performances by Afro-Europeans since the 1990s (but very rarely before) “obscure more fraught axes of racialized difference prevailing in their respective contexts”.59 These, as Ioana Szeman notes, include but are not limited to the marginalisation of Roma.60 For Sieg, Eurovision still exhibits a lack of examination of “the relationship between contemporary conditions of globalized migration and commerce […] and the colonial past”.61 One might, for instance, ask whether it could be conceivable for a Eurovision performance ever to stage the kind of critique that queer and trans people of colour have made of the new sexually diverse nationalism in many European countries, which in this view incorporates gays and lesbians into the nation while putting racialised immigrants under suspicion of not sharing the reframed national values.62

57 Fricker and Gluhovic, Introduction, 19. 58 Fricker, “It’s Just Not Funny Any More”, 75. 59 Sieg, Katrin. 2013. Wii Are Family: Performing Race in Neo-Liberal Europe. Theatre Research

International 38(1), 20-33, 28. See also Ahmed, Sara. 2012. On Being Included: Racism and

Diversity in Institutional Life. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2012. 60 Szeman, Ioana. 2013 “Playing with Fire” and Playing it Safe: With(out) Roma at the Eurovision

Song Contest?, in Performing the “New” Europe, edited by Fricker and Gluhovic, 125–41. 61 Sieg, Wii Are Family, 28. 62 See, e.g. Haritaworn, Jin. 2010. Queer Injuries: the Racial Politics of “Homophobic Hate Crime” in Germany. Social Justice 37(1), 69–89; El-Tayeb, Fatima. 2012. “Gays Who Cannot Properly Be Gay”: Queer Muslims in the Neoliberal European City. European Journal of Women’s Studies 19(1), 79–95. See also Puar, Terrorist Assemblages; Puar, Rethinking Homonationalism.

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Perhaps it goes without saying that it could not; but, as when anything seems to go without saying, it is always worth thinking through the reasons why. Eurovision as an institution has always operated with discourses of “bringing Europe together”, in parallel with political discourses of European integration even though institutionally separate.63 Its geopolitical imaginations of where Europe starts and ends have always been flexible, often expanding, but also subject to fragmentation and absences from within: the contest’s own on-screen maps of Europe, becoming increasingly less “coherent” after 2006 and tending to vanish from screen altogether after 2009, are tantalisingly suggestive of the difficulties of coherently defining this space.64 At the same time, the show and the event are structurally dependent on performances of cultural differences and thus cannot escape the wider politics of representation within which they unfold. To what extent can Eurovision organisers, Eurovision performers, and participants in cultures around Eurovision reshape the elements of those politics that have silencing and marginalising effects? Maybe the question is still not asked enough; but there is room to try.

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National Promotion and Eurovision:

from Besieged Sarajevo to the

Floodlights of Europe Research Article

Neven Andjelić

Senior Lecturer, Regent’s University London

[email protected]

http://www.suedosteuropa.uni-graz.at/cse/en/andjelic





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National Promotion and Eurovision:

from Besieged Sarajevo to the

Floodlights of Europe

Neven Andjelić*

The Eurovision Song Contest, as an important part of the entertainment

industry, has offered European countries a platform for national

promotion. The original format has developed over 60 years and has come

under scrutiny and criticism as allegations of block voting, politics and

nationalism have been raised. It has also been argued that similarity of

cultures, linguistic connections, and close national identities, rather than

national interests and politics, are what actually bring countries together

in this competition. This study has two focuses in an attempt to determine

what role the contest has had for participating countries and how they

have used it. The first focus is on analysing historical incidents at the

competition when countries have attempted to politicise the contest. The

second focus and the main part of the study is a thorough investigation

into the organisation of the first Bosnian-Herzegovinian delegation to

participate in Eurovision, their escape from besieged Sarajevo and their

participation at the contest in Ireland in 1993. After taking into account

the history of the contest and the specific case study of Bosnia-

Herzegovina in 1993, the conclusion is that, although cultural similarities

exist, the politics of national promotion do also play an important role in

the competition and, in countries sending such entries, actually influences

audiences at home towards stronger national pride and self-identification.

Therefore, one might argue that the festival has been hijacked from the

entertainment industry by political leaderships, especially those that have

based their legitimacy on nationalism. Hence the success stories coming

from the “New Europe”.

Keywords: Eurovision, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Yugoslavia, Music, Politics,

Nationalism, Identity

*Neven Andjelić is Senior Lecturer in International Relations and Human Rights at Regent’s University London. He is also an expert member of the Council of Europe’s Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities. Neven is Visiting Professor at

the University of Bologna. Originally from Sarajevo, he was a journalist in pre-war Sarajevo where

he was a leader in the anti-war movement. After the first year of war he left Sarajevo and settled

in London. He worked for CNN for 15 years and was also working at several British universities.

He was a Fulbright Visiting Scholar at UC Berkeley in 2006/2007. He received his DPhil from the

University of Sussex. Neven’s main publication is Bosnia-Herzegovina: The End of a Legacy

(London: Frank Cass, 2003).

Neven Andjelić

95

Introduction

A perception held by many Eurovision Song Contest commentators is that

geopolitics, close relationships between neighboring countries and secret trade

deals are in the background of the voting results. The states that used to make

up Yugoslavia are frequently mentioned in these terms. Interviews with people

who have participated in Eurovision in various roles, however, give the

impression that this is not the case: all the interviewees for this paper who

were involved in the contest as participants, organizers, jury members,

producers or editors claim no or very little connection to politics. The general

view among these professionals is that similarity of cultures, close ties between

neighboring nations, shared identities and languages are factors that make

juries, and indeed people, more likely to vote for each other. Despite this strong

opinion, the politicisation of the contest has to be investigated to be able to

draw conclusions.

This paper will show whether the professionals involved in the contest are

right or possibly unaware of the widespread practice of the political use of

Eurovision for the purposes of national self-promotion. The claims of

“Eurovision politics” often originate in the west and are supported by bloc voting stating that former Soviet republics offer mutual support to each other.

Former Yugoslav countries are another bloc. The fact that all former Yugoslav

republics awarded Serbia 12 points when it won the competition in 2007 might

support this argument. However, even Albania awarded a point to Serbia on

this occasion. Therefore the result might also support the argument that

cultural similarities account for neighbors giving each other points. This is not

a practice introduced into the competition by “easterners” or the “New Europe”,

but one that already existed, as the Scandinavian bloc or the “special relationship” between Greece and Cyprus might confirm.

Considering these facts and arguments, this paper first briefly investigates the

history of the Euro vision Song Contest in search of incidents or practices of

political involvement or politicised participation in the contest. The second and

the main part of the paper is a specific case-study which aims to provide

insight and in-depth knowledge of operations within a national Eurovision

contest team. The focus is on the participation of Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1993,

using a series of Research interviews providing invaluable material about the

background of this participation in particular and the Eurovision Song Contest

in general. It is then possible to offer a conclusion about whether competition,

participation and voting in Eurovision is actually a reflection of politics or

whether it based on norms of cultural similarities and close identity links. It is

also possible to draw a conclusion that participation in the competition and

voting simultaneously reflect politics and norms of cultural similarities and

identity linkages.

The case study presented in this paper is qualitative, based on interviews with

members of the delegation from Bosnia-Herzegovina that competed in

Eurovision in 1993. The interviewees were speaking with a time-lag of more

than two decades, and intervening events have certainly influenced their

judgements and memories to some extent. It is possible, however, to draw

National Promotion and Eurovision: from Besieged Sarajevo to the Floodlights of Europe

96

certain conclusions based on their interpretations and opinions, whether they

are unanimous or even when they disagree on some points.

The members of the first delegation of Bosnia-Herzegovina interviewed for this

study have followed very different paths since 1993. Milan Stupar, a long-

serving senior music producer at Television of Bosnia-Herzegovina (previously

named TV Sarajevo), was the Head of Delegation in 1993. He eventually left

Sarajevo and joined his family in Montenegro, where he helped set up a local

television station and some festivals in Budva. Ismeta Dervoz, who was behind

the idea of joining the competition and getting approval from the bosses of

Radio-Television of Bosnia-Herzegovina (RTVBiH), was awarded a “Crystal Star by the Irish Culture Minister and the EBU (European Broadcasting

Union) as the best Head of Delegation.”1 Thus there is a contradiction that the

Bosnian delegation actually had two Heads; Stupar was more senior in the

hierarchy in Sarajevo, but Dervoz was the real executive behind the whole

process. She was also the Bosnian broadcaster’s commentator for Eurovision from this contest onwards. Dervoz had contacts with the Eurovision Song

Contest ever since she, with the band Ambasadori, had represented Yugoslavia

in 1976. In the meantime she had become a music producer at RTVBiH and

was the driving force in getting the country to participate in the contest when

Bosnia-Herzegovina gained independence. She followed her professional career

with political engagement as a deputy in the state parliament on behalf of the

Party for Better Future (Stranka za bolju budućnost).

Muhamed Fazlagić, the lead singer of the Bosnian entry in 1993, had been on the fringes of the Sarajevo music and fashion world prior to the war. He was

known among his friends and, by now, fans as Fazla. He later emigrated to the

USA, together with his wife Sanda, who had been his girlfriend at the time of

the contest in 1993. Fazla, however, remains strongly connected to Bosnia-

Herzegovina and was an unsuccessful candidate of the Party for Bosnia-

Herzegovina (Stranka za BiH) at the elections in 2014. Erliha Bičakčić, a backing vocalist in 1993, remained in Sarajevo for a long time after the war

until she took up a position at the Council of Europe in Strasbourg. Vesna

Andree Zaimović, who subsequent to 1993 would be involved with the Eurovision Song Contest in several capacities, was a pioneer in setting up the

“Djeca pjevaju hitove” (“Children are Singing Hits”) competition in besieged Sarajevo, a format which was to be found much later globally in the form of Pop

Idol and similar shows. role in 1993, She was later involved in the music world

and the Eurovision Song Contest as a journalist, editor, producer, musician,

public relations manager, national jury member and jury chair. She resides in

Sarajevo and runs a web portal. Fionnuala Sweeney, the presenter of

Eurovision 1993, is now one of the leading newscasters at CNN.

Most of the interviewees are long-standing friends of mine while I have known

all of them for more than ten years if not twenty. Therefore the interviews

could have been conducted in an unorthodox fashion. They were thorough and

detailed conversations (by phone, e-mail or Facebook private messages)

between people who had full confidence in each other.

1 Ismeta Dervoz, research interview conducted by e-mail and telephone, 7. January 2015.

Neven Andjelić

97

Nations, Politics and Eurovision

Public interest in the domestic politics of Eurovision Song Contest participants

is not a novel development. The competition was open to non-democracies from

the outset, and in “1961 the first representatives of fascist Spain and

communist Yugoslavia shared the stage.”2 The first Yugoslav participant,

Ljiljana Petrović, “later recalled that ‘the appearance of Yugoslavia aroused much interest [...] as the first socialist country at the festival...’”3 Fazla,

commenting on representing Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1993, similarly said: “You become a picture of your own country during this few days and your behavior

and act determine whether the judgement about your country is going to be

positive or negative.”4 This statement received an indirect confirmation in 2012

when the German jury’s spokeswoman, Anke Engelke, actually addressed the political system in that year’s host country, Azerbaijan. While delivering the results she said: “Tonight nobody could vote for their own country. But it is

good to be able to vote. And it is good to have a choice. Good luck on your

journey, Azerbaijan. Europe is watching you.”5

The “New Europe” often uses the contest as an opportunity for self-promotion.

One BBC producer, for instance, already considered in 2005 that “former

Eastern bloc countries saw the contest as a way of gaining visibility, albeit

briefly, in the international arena.”6 Academic authors are of no dissimilar

opinion. “While Eurovision is marked by international politics,” argues Dean Vuletić, “it can also be a force in politics too.”7 This was certainly realized by

many nations, and Catherine Baker describes an attitude at Croatian

Television that “treated Eurovision as a deliberate site of political and cultural messages about what Croatia was and was not.”8

These arguments about politics and the Eurovision Song Contest could be

divided into two groups: the first group of arguments are about songs with

some political connotations, and the second are about political voting patterns,

discreet alliances, praise or criticism of some political issue, and attempts at

national promotion. In fact, both kinds of political involvement in the

Eurovision Song Contest have a long history. While The Guardian claimed in

2005 that “[o]nly rarely has a song carried a political message: Portugal’s 1974 entry, After Goodbye, was the coded signal to launch a coup against the

country’s rightwing dictatorship, and Bosnia-Herzegovina funneled the trauma

of war into The Whole World’s Pain in 1993”,9 this claim was obviously wrong:

2 Deniz, José Miguel Galván. 2005. Eurovision Shows Political Side. BBC News Online, 14. March

2005 (accessed: 20. April 2015). 3 Vuletić, Dean. 2007. The Socialist Star: Yugoslavia, Cold War Politics and the Eurovision Song

Contest, in A Song for Europe: Popular Music and Politics in the Eurovision Song Contest, edited by

Raykoff, Ivan and Robert Deam Tobin. Aldershot: Ashgate, 83–98, 87. 4 Vele, Faruk. 2015. Muhamed Fazlagić Fazla: Bosna će nadživjeti sve svoje grobare. Kliker, 4.

January 2015 (accessed: 20. April 2015). 5 Streader, Pete. 2013. Eurovision’s Top Ten Worst Moments. The Copenhagen Post, 16. May 2013

(accessed: 19. April 2015). 6 Galván Deniz, Eurovision Shows Political Side. 7 Vuletić, The Socialist Star, 97. 8 Baker, Catherine. 2010. Sounds of the Borderland: Popular Music, War and Nationalism in

Croatia since 1991. Farnham: Ashgate, 201. 9 Lynskey, Dorian. 2005. What Will Terry Wogan Think. The Guardian, 19. May 2005 (accessed:

20. April 2015).


98

the politicisation of the Eurovision Song Contest can be found in songs and

what they symbolize and represent, whether this is to the country itself, to

other countries in general or to some specific country.

One would struggle to define what a political song is. It usually depends on

lyrics but it also depends on interpretation. When Great Britain was at war

with Argentina in 1982, for instance, the Spanish entry was a tango melody,

and this choice was interpreted as political.10 The Portuguese Eurovision entry

in 1974, though non-political in its lyrics and melody, ’’was chosen as a signal for the start of that year’s Carnation Revolution.11 Ukraine in 2005 and

Georgia in 2009 were both told their songs were “too political”.12 The

Eurovision executive supervisor in 2005, Svante Stockselius, described the

Ukrainian entry as “a political song so we cannot allow this”, and the song’s lyrics had to be changed.13 Georgia not only boycotted the competition in

Moscow in 2009 after the rejection of its entry “We Don’t Wanna Put In” but went as far as staging an alternative festival, the “AlterVision Open Air Song Contest”. Political messages have also been sent by simple participation or boycotts. “Austria decided to stay at home for political reasons” in 1969 because that year’s host country, Spain, was under the rule of Franco’s dictatorship,14

while Turkey boycotted, and Yugoslavia also failed to broadcast, the contest

held in Israel in 1979.15 Thus the competition has often had political dynamics,

and songs have often carried some political connotations, whether in lyrics,

melodies, or contexts that were to be read into the performance. The contest

might have been described as “the kitschy extravaganza in which viewers

crown the best pop song,”16 or “the cheesiest, campest and arguably most ridiculous of all music competitions,”17 meaning we are considering “the trashiest, splashiest event on the global pop calendar.”18 However, it was also

political.

Yugoslavia and the Geopolitics of Eurovision in 1990–93

The Eurovision Song Contest of 1990 took place in a country, Yugoslavia, that

was about to dissolve, while many songs celebrated European unification. Only

six months earlier, the Berlin Wall had symbolically fallen. In Zagreb, an

Austrian song “Keine Mauern mehr” (“No more walls”) came tenth while the Norwegian entry also referenced the end of European divisions with

“Brandenburger Tor” (“Brandenburg Gate”) but still came last in the competition. The German entry in 1990, “Frei zu leben” (“Free to live”), comes

10 Galván, Deniz. Eurovision Shows Political Side. 11 Davison, Phil. 1994. Carnation Revolution Withers. The Independent, 25. April 1994 (accessed:

20. April 2015). 12 N.N. 2015. Eurovision Hosts in Political Row. BBC, 8. March 2005 (accessed: 20. April 2015). 13 N.N. Eurovision Hosts in Political Row. 14 N.N. Eurovision Song Contest 1969. Eurovision.tv (accessed: 20. April 2015). 15 N.N. Eurovision Song Contest 1969; Eurovision.tv, Wikipedia contributors, Eurovision Song

Contest 1979 (accessed: 20. April 2015). 16 Kaufman, David. 2006. Quest for a Homeland Gains a World Stage. The New York Times, 16.

April 2006 (accessed: 20. April 2015). 17 Denham, Jess. 2014. Eurovision 2014 Voting: Why Is It So Political?. The Independent, 1. May

2014 (accessed: 20. April 2015). 18 Donadio, Rachel. 2014. Hamster Wheels, Sequins and Yes, a Lot of Singing. The New York

Times, 9. May 2014 (accessed: 20. April 2015).

Neven Andjelić

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within this group of songs celebrating European unity too.19 The winning song

in 1990 itself strongly reflected current trends in European politics and

integration, with a title in Italian, “Insieme: 1992” (“Together: 1992”), lyrics partly in English (“Unite, Unite Europe”) and celebrating the forthcoming European Single Market, Maastricht Treaty and the creation of the European

Union. The title of the Yugoslav song, “Hajde da ludujemo” (“Let’s go crazy”) might have been an irony or just an example of how much Yugoslavia was out

of touch with current trends in Europe.20 As Yugoslavia had been participating

in the contest for three decades, “Yugoslavia’s distinct Cold War character,” as Vuletić observes, “found expression at Eurovision.”21 In the early 1990s, this

era and character, and indeed the state, were coming to an end.

Geopolitics played an obvious role in the 1990 competition. Yugoslavia, a

federation with eight television centres, all state-owned and all having the

status of official state broadcasters, had first to decide on the host city. The

country’s federal system was reflected in the fact there was no central

broadcaster for the whole country and it became clear, once more, that

particularistic interests were being placed above the common interest. This

was not a unique situation, as the Swiss and Belgian examples (where there

are also multiple broadcasters able to participate in Eurovision) are not very

dissimilar. Thus the competition was staged in the Croatian capital, Zagreb,

because the winning song had come from Croatia in the previous year. The

contest was not affected by the growing Yugoslav political crisis but was

affected by some technical problems. The main issue was the choice of

presenters. Surprisingly, given the ethnic problems in society, the issue was

the age of presenters and not their ethnic background.

“The 1990 [Eurovision Song Contest] ESC took place on 5. May, a day after the

anniversary of Tito’s death and, coincidentally, on the birthday of Karl Marx; perhaps more meaningful for the time, however, was that it also fell on the

Council of Europe’s Europe Day.”22 In the background, however, were the first

ever multiparty democratic elections in Croatia. The second round of the

elections was to take place the day after Eurovision and would bring into power

the nationalist Croatian Democratic Union (Hrvatska demokratska zajednica –

HDZ). Its leader, Franjo Tudjman, became notorious for his calculation that

five and a half Serbs were editing and presenting the main news on Croatian

television.23 If he had been in power at the time of the Eurovision Song Contest,

the ethnicity of presenters might have been an issue.

Yugoslavia survived for another year, and television bosses came up with an

interesting solution for choosing a representative for Eurovision in 1991. A

kind of “mini-Eurovision” contest was organised in Sarajevo with

representatives from each of eight television centres, i.e. federal units. The

show was known as “Jugovizija” and the winner was decided by jury votes from each of the republics and provinces. Votes were traded between television

19 N.N. Eurovision Song Contest 1990. Eurovision.tv. (accessed: 20. April 2015). 20 N.N., Eurovision Song Contest 1990. 21 Vuletić, The Socialist Star, 84. 22 Vuletić, The Socialist Star, 94. 23 Lilić, Miroslav. 2011. Posljednji televizijski romantik. Politika Plus, 24. May 2011 (accessed: 20.

April 2015).


100

centres and did not necessarily reflect political alliances; close business deals

between music managers, television producers and members of the juries were

of greater importance. Two managers confided in me that they had organised a

system that would benefit a particular singer. On this occasion, the singer in

question finished very close to the top but did not win the contest, as someone

along the line did not respect a pre-agreed voting pattern.24 “Jugovizija was a

competition that replaced a festival where a song was chosen for Eurovision,” Milan Stupar describes. “The voting system was similar to the Eurovision contest. I managed to organise ‘smaller’ centers to vote for each other and stopped domination by Belgrade, Zagreb and Ljubljana. Thus, the voting was

agreed but there was no politics in it. It was based on professional interests.”25

The winning entry in 1991, however, shows the opposite. The song came from

Serbia and was awarded maximum points by the juries from Belgrade (rules

allowed juries to vote for their own competitor), Novi Sad and Pristina, with

some points awarded by the Montenegrin jury. Thus it reflected political

alliances and the situation in Yugoslavia in 1991. One might conclude that

both practices – voting based on professional interests and voting based on

politics – were actually coexisting at the end of Yugoslavia. The Serbian jury,

however, also awarded some points to the Croatian song and to others who

were not politically allied to Milosević’s camp. It might have been the case that

music managers from Belgrade took advantage of the regime controlling

several centres and got their song to win the national competition; this would

have meant music using politics to achieve its own aims, and not the other way

around. The song, “Brasil” by Bebi Dol, received just one point at the Eurovision Song Contest and thus marked the end of the state.

Yugoslavia dissolved in the same year. Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia and

Bosnia-Herzegovina eventually became independent states, while Milošević controlled Serbia and Montenegro, retained the name of Yugoslavia, and

attempted to continue the legacy of the former state. On a more trivial level,

they sent an entry to the 1992 competition as Yugoslavia, while the newly

independent countries did not meet the deadline for participation. They were

preoccupied with wars on their territories, as Serbia and Montenegro

pretended not to have anything to do with these conflicts.

The new Croatian leadership paid attention to state promotion during the war,

and under nationalist leadership the songs were carefully chosen to send a

message to the outside world. Croatia’s first ever entry was in 1993, alongside two other former Yugoslav states, Slovenia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. The

Croatian song “Don’t ever cry” was understood as “a rare expression of patriotism in the lyrics of a Eurovision song,”26 and “an opportunity to propagate a Croatian perspective on the war: Don’t Ever Cry contained an appeal to angels for peace, a prayer for an 18-year-old boy called Ivan and as

much English as was then permissible,”27 and the messages “peace, give us

24 I was personally involved in the entertainment industry in Yugoslavia and was well aware of

these schemes. I am not prepared, however, to produce names or affiliations of the managers in

question. They would not go on record with this information as it would be the end of their careers. 25 Milan Stupar, research interview conducted by telephone, 5. January 2015. 26 Vuletić, The Socialist Star, 97. 27 Baker, Sounds of the Borderland, 201.

Neven Andjelić

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peace, sky of love” (mir, daj nam ti, daj nam ti nebo ljubavi). The Croatian head

of delegation, quoted by Catherine Baker, justified the choice of the song: “It was wartime, every promotion of Croatia in the world was more than

welcome.”28

Bosnia-Herzegovina in the Eurovision Song Contest 1993

The song representing Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1993 also sent an important

message to the world, just by virtue of participating during the war. When the

multiethnic country declared independence, its cosmopolitan capital of

Sarajevo was put under siege by Bosnian Serbs’ forces in April 1992. Many Serbs left the city and joined the besieging forces but a significant number

stayed within the city, together with the Bosniaks, Croats and others who

either belonged to minorities or did not belong to any ethnic group. The war in

Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the siege of Sarajevo in particular, attracted huge

media attention. The citizens’ human suffering, without electricity, water or gas supplies and under almost permanent sniper and rocket fire, received

much sympathy from the international community. Although this did not mean

support for a particular political system, Sarajevo became a symbol of the

multi-culturalism that Europe was embracing. The city was dominated by

Bosniak nationalist politicians, but non-Bosniaks were not only tolerated but

included in many aspects of life of the besieged city. This did not mean there

were no discrimination and crimes against non-Bosniaks, but discrimination

was not a general public policy of the government.

At Eurovision in 1993, Muhamed Fazlagić - Fazla sang “Sva bol svijeta” (“All

the pain in the world”), clearly a message to the world from the besieged city. The song was heard after more than a year in which Sarajevo had been under

an international media spotlight. The stories had been told already, and

journalists were searching for new angles to narrate the same tale of the

destruction of a European capital city at the end of the twentieth century.

Participation in the Eurovision Song Contest provided such an opportunity,

and in this context the lyrics of the song worked well.

First, Bosnia-Herzegovina, together with several other post-communist

countries, had to qualify. The qualifying competition was held in Ljubljana, and

Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and the hosts of the pre-selection, Slovenia,

proved that previous Yugoslav experience was invaluable as they qualified at

the expense of Estonia, Slovakia, Romania and Hungary. Fazla describes a

“tense atmosphere” at the pre-selection. “We gave ten points to Croatia.

Ksenija Urlicic, the head of the Croatian delegation, insisted on reciprocal

voting and the exchange of ten points but she did not honor the word. We voted

first and awarded the Croats ten points but they did not give anything to us.

They did not want us to qualify.”29

This competition had coincided with the beginning of war between Croats and

Bosniaks. Many refugees from Bosnia-Herzegovina were being rounded up by

Croatian authorities and sent back to fight on the side of the Bosnian Croats,

28 Baker, Sounds of the Borderland, 201. 29 Muhamed Fazlagić, research interview conducted on Facebook, 8. January 2015.


102

while Bosniaks were suffering increasing persecution in Croatia. The voting

pattern between Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina at the pre-selection clearly

reflected politics and war. While officially Croats and Bosniaks were fighting

against Serbs together, the reality was that by 1993 it was a war of all against

all. In addition it shows a dose of naivety on Bosniaks’ part. Firstly, the delegation in 1993 was not a delegation of Bosniaks but a Bosnian delegation.

However, Bosniaks did dominate in the delegation and in the politics of the

Sarajevo government. While the policies of Sarajevo government and the army

were primarily in the interests of Bosniaks, they also reflected a multiethnic

character, if often only in form. The Bosnian delegation, therefore, was more

open to regional cooperation. The Croatian delegation, on the other hand, had

firm nationalist aims presented to them by their government which firmly

controlled national television, and the head of their delegation, Ksenija Urličić, was close to the political leadership of the country.

Ismeta Dervoz also describes “regional cooperation. The head of the Croatian delegation gave Bosnia-Herzegovina zero points. I gave Croatia 10 points. It

remained like this for years.”30 No such “exchange”, however, took place in the final. Bosnians had clearly learnt the lesson from Croats that in war, like in a

song competition, everything is allowed in order to achieve one’s aim. The aim was obviously country promotion and drawing global attention to the war in

Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The importance of the Eurovision Song Contest is recognized in national

broadcasters’ behavior. Croatia had attempted to participate immediately after international recognition in 1992 but was late with the application. Bosnia-

Herzegovina was recognised in April 1992 and Ismeta Dervoz “initiated the process of joining the EBU [European Broadcasting Union] which would enable

participation at the Eurovision Song Contest.”

A very small team organized the process of selecting the song. Sarajevo was

“under siege, radio-television building was semi-destroyed, there was no

electricity.”31 War and the siege are the main features in memories of the

Bosnian participants at the competition. “A competition was announced. It was

wartime and Sarajevo was under siege. Therefore it was of limited appeal. War

atmosphere prevailed. Nothing was like before,” says Milan Stupar, who was to lead the delegation to the ESC in Ireland.32 “In such an atmosphere,” says Ismeta Dervoz, “it was almost logical the winning song was the one that sent a

message [about] what was going on in the heart of Europe.”33 This firmly

connects the competition and national promotion. While Eurovision in

politically stable countries might be mainly business, countries experiencing

not only turbulent politics but actual violent conflict use the opportunity for

self-promotion and to attract attention to their most immediate needs.

Nevertheless, there was the question of how to select a song in the middle of

the war. “Authors themselves chose who would sing their songs,” says Dervoz.34

30 Dervoz, interview. 31 Dervoz, interview. 32 Stupar, interview. 33 Dervoz, interview. 34 Dervoz, interview.

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The state broadcaster’s television signal could not reach even the whole of the territory controlled by government forces. Therefore it was only Sarajevo

songwriters who could offer songs for the competition. “It is more a curiosity that one song was delivered from Konjic on VHS tape by channels unknown to

anyone.”35 The contestants reflected the fact Sarajevo was under siege.

Communications were cut off. “The invitation was sent by word of mouth to all authors and singers who happened to be in Sarajevo,” explains Dervoz.

Fazla describes how he “was playing billiards when I was told about the contest.” One author offered him a song, but the leading songwriter made another offer, and they entered the competition together instead. “Forty-seven

songs were entered. Twelve were chosen by editors at the Television.”36 Dervoz

remembers “eleven songs were in the competition. We broadcast a television show on 27. February. It was minus 17 degrees in the Radio Television

building. We will never know how many people actually saw the show.”37

Erliha Bičakčić was surprised when Fazla asked her to join the team. “I thought he was joking,” before inquiring “how do you imagine leaving the city?”38 The only way out was to run across the airport runway, which was

controlled by the United Nations forces.

“We did this all to defend our professional and human dignity,” confides Dervoz. “There were no combinations about ethnic backgrounds of participants. Politicians did not understand what we were doing. Most of them thought we

did not stand a chance to reach Ljubljana and especially Ireland later.”39 The

winner was decided by a jury made up of television music editors and

songwriters. “To cut it short, I won with twice as many votes as the second placed,” Fazla provides the details.

Sarajevo was under siege and mainly without electricity, with no

communications to the outside world. “Ham-radio operators helped us to apply

for the competition and to contact colleagues abroad,” explains Dervoz.40 The

siege provided another obstacle for the team. The only way out was to run

across the airport runway and dodge sniper fire. “The whole team had to run across the airport runway in order to escape the besieged city. We did it at 3 or

4 o’clock in the morning,” describes Milan Stupar.41 “We took a risk and all

eleven members of the team ran across the runway.”42 Bičakčić also remembers

the exit well: “We were attempting to leave for three nights but UNPROFOR [United Nations Protection Force] caught us and returned to the city. Once you

are caught, they shower you with lights and you have to throw yourself

immediately into mud to avoid sniper fire. We managed to cross to the other

side on the third night only.”43

35 Dervoz, interview. 36 Fazlagić, interview. 37 Dervoz, interview. 38 Erliha Bičakčić, research interview conducted by e-mail, 7. January 2015. 39 Dervoz, interview. 40 Dervoz, interview. 41 Stupar, interview. 42 Dervoz, interview. 43 Bičakčić, interview.


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“As soon as I stepped into the mud in Dobrinja [a Sarajevo suburb next to the airport], I lost my shoes. Thus I reached Igman (mountain on the outside of the

siege of Sarajevo) in February literally barefoot,” Fazla describes the difficulties.44 “It took us three days to reach Zagreb,” says Bičakčić.45 Dervoz

stresses the “lack of financial means, no travel visas. The Embassy [of Bosnia-

Herzegovina] in Zagreb took care of us and organized our journey to Ljubljana.

[…] Everything that we needed, costumes for singers, money to stay, participation fees, was donated by friends, colleagues, successful citizens of

Bosnia-Herzegovina from the whole of Europe.”

The team attracted plenty of attention because of the war at home. The ethnic

element of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina provided for a not uncommon

explanation of the post-Yugoslav wars. This was reflected in questions in

Millstreet, where the contest was organized. “There were 20 TV crews waiting for us. We held a press conference immediately. One of the questions was how

had it come about that a Serb is the head of the delegation.” Milan Stupar had worked as the “head of music production for 25 years” and “[t]herefore it was normal, pre-assumed I would lead the delegation,” he explained in an interview.46 Ismeta Dervoz puts the number of TV and press crews at 70. “The interest in our press conference was unprecedented. The BBC provided

coverage of our team in the main news. Everyone was apparently surprised by

‘these cultivated, professional, well prepared, non-aggressive Bosnians’.”47 “All major media companies, including BBC and CNN,” describes Erliha Bičakčić, “broadcast lengthy reports about our team and interviewed all of us. However, they paid special attention to Fazla and Sanda. Their love story was of interest

to them.”48

Sanda is not a name that could lead to conclusions about her ethnic belonging,

while Fazla’s name Muhamed clearly described him as Bosniak. Regardless of Sanda’s ethnicity, which I refused to ask about, she and Fazla made a good story for international journalists showing this side of multi-culturalism that

had been preserved in Sarajevo. This was another way of telling a story about

the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina by pointing to youth, their lives and loves, like

any other young people anywhere in the world; it was just that they had been

caught up in the war. Stereotypes and clichés came forward regardless, and

they proved that the West was not immune from similar behavior some of their

journalists ascribed to those in the Balkans. “Given the circumstances we came from,” Fazla explains, “it was logical we attracted huge attention from media

who were interested in our motives and aims for participating in the Eurosong.

I think we articulated the then situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina very well.”49 “A French journalist, however, claimed Fazla, being blond-eyed and blond-haired,

tall and handsome, was not a Muslim from Bosnia. He said that I certainly

lived abroad,” confides Ismeta Dervoz, “because I spoke English and French and wore a mini-skirt.”

44 Fazlagić, interview. 45 Bičakčić, interview. 46 Stupar, interview. 47 Dervoz, interview. 48 Bičakčić, interview. 49 Vele, Muhamed Fazlagić Fazla.

Neven Andjelić

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Patriotism was certainly part of the mission, as Dervoz concluded: “I realised then that all our efforts came through and we did a great thing for Bosnia-

Herzegovina.”50 “We were proud and happy following the show. This feeling I still bear in my heart,” Erliha Bičakčić shows her emotions. “We cried when the

connection was established with Sarajevo to get the results of the votes of the

jury.”51 “Back in Sarajevo, there was electricity. Thus they watched the show and took pride in our participation,” described Milan Stupar.52 The presenter of

the competition, Fionnuala Sweeney, stated during the show: “This was a particularly difficult link that we have been trying to establish whole day but

thankfully it came through, just about.”53 Now a leading political journalist at

CNN, Sweeney remembers twenty-two years later:

What stands out in my memory from that night was that when the juries were

calling in from their respective countries with their votes, there was a huge

round of applause when the Bosnian call came through. The applause was in

recognition of the difficulties of trying to get through live from a warzone and

also in appreciation that the jury had indeed got through. ... Everybody in the

arena that evening welcomed the distant, crackly phone line announcing the

votes of the jury in Sarajevo.54

In addition to media attention, everyone showed sympathies for the Bosnian

team. The question might be whether this was reflected in the voting patterns.

“There were no pre-agreed voting arrangements,” says Stupar. “No cheating. There might have been some votes for Bosnia-Herzegovina out of sympathy but

nothing was arranged.”55 Dervoz is of the same opinion, stating “the voting showed there was no regional cooperation.”56 This was shown in Millstreet by

“a big round of applause from the audience,” the presenter of the show recalls.57

They showed this kind of appreciation only for those scoring the highest

numbers of points. Thus, the question might be: was it political, or just an

expression of human appreciation? “Their song had a message in keeping with the times its countrymen and women were experiencing,” remembers Fionnuala Sweeney. “It was also a big moment for them because they had travelled at some risk to get to Ireland to compete in the contest.”58

Conclusion

This special appreciation for the Bosnian delegation in Ireland might be

described as a human response to the efforts and struggle they had to go

through in reaching Millstreet. However, the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina had

been making headlines across the world for more than a year and very diverse

interpretations and explanations had been offered to viewers. Therefore

showing a warm welcome to the team from Sarajevo, the city under siege, was

also a political statement of support. The official government side in Sarajevo,

50 Dervoz, interview. 51 Bičakčić, interview. 52 Stupar, interview. 53 Eurovision Song Contest. 1993. Youtube, 22. January 2012 (accessed: 20. April 2015). 54 Fionnuala Sweeney, research interview conducted via e-mail, 19. January 2015. 55 Stupar, interview. 56 Dervoz, interview. 57 Sweeney, interview. 58 Sweeney, interview.


106

though dominated by the Muslim nationalist Party of Democratic Action

(Stranka Demokratske Akcije – SDA), was still multiethnic; the head of

delegation immediately attracted questions about his ethnicity, and the media

interest in the simple love story of Fazla and his future wife was material

deemed interesting enough by the news desk editors of the global media. Even

when organizers’ or the audience’s intentions are not strictly political, if they are perceived to be political they become political. There is a reasonable

expectation on the organizer and the audience to be aware of the possible

political perceptions of participating in Eurovision. It therefore becomes

possible to say that participation is a political statement or the competition is

used for political purposes: the promotion of a country at the Eurovision Song

Contest is a political purpose of participation.

This leads to the renewed question of whether the Eurovision Song Contest is

politicised by competitors, national broadcasters and the ordinary public. It is

certainly an entertainment, as a former singer, delegation member, head of

delegation and chair of the national jury testified.59 Another former jury

member, jury chair, a musician on stage at one contest and PR for the

participant at another contest, who has also reported on Eurovision and been

an ordinary member of the audience on one occasion, says “it is a huge industry that offers a great chance for success but the team has to come to the

competition prepared for exploiting success.”60 It seems everyone involved

professionally is of a similar opinion, as another former music producer with 25

years’ experience argues along the same lines.61

Many commentators, those who observe from the outside (which might provide

them with objectivity, but also deprive them of inside knowledge), see it as

“highly political, albeit flavored with a hefty dose of camp.”62 Duncan Watts,

while on sabbatical in Europe from Columbia University, explained in his New

York Times column:

It’s just a game, after all, and the outrageous bias in the voting is as

entertaining as the songs themselves. But it does offer an unexpected glimpse of

how ordinary Europeans perceive one another. More than anything, it seems,

blood is thicker than water, and not just in the Balkans.63

Watts saw a “pointed rejection of Western Europe” in the contest’s voting patterns that “might even be seen as a poignant metaphor for contemporary Europe as a whole.”64 Thus there is more to the competition than pure

entertainment.

When it comes to former Yugoslavia, Eurovision has worked as a reconciliation

tool “suggesting that memories of war and ethnic cleansing can be set aside with surprising ease when it comes to the serious business of winning a singing

contest.”65 However, one of the leading experts on the competition offers a

59 Dervoz, interview. 60 Vesna Andree Zaimović, research interview conducted by telephone, 26. December 2014. 61 Stupar, interview. 62 Rachel Donadio, Hamster Wheels. 63 Watts, Duncan J. 2007. The Politics of Eurovision. The New York Times, 22. May 2007 (accessed:

20. April 2015). 64 Watts, The Politics of Eurovision. 65 Watts, The Politics of Eurovision.

Neven Andjelić

107

different view. “It was not reconciliation that led to awarding votes to neighbouring countries. It is a reflection of a common cultural space, common

language, common media space,” explains Vesna Andree Zaimović. “Pop-

Culture is extremely regional. There is mutual identification with a culture

that is common. It creates mechanisms of liking.”66 In this view, it is a sincere

taste in music and culture that creates voting patterns:

The press in the former Yugoslav countries was of huge importance. It created

regional tastes. The tabloid press was read widely across the societies of the

former Yugoslavia. It was this tabloid press and women’s magazines that contributed the most to the common media space. Internet came in later.67

Thus one might come to the conclusion that a commonality of cultures,

languages, and tastes creates spaces in which similarity of identities is

mutually recognized. The Eurovision Song Contest only provides a platform for

the public acknowledgement of these recognitions.

This connection to cultures is especially reflected in the system of casting votes

by telephone, which has provided the opportunity for three different kinds of

votes. Expert juries have been replaced by an exercise in democracy with very

few rules. One group of votes reflect people’s voting intentions and support, which nicely references ideals of liberal democracies in post-Cold War Europe.

Another kind of voting, meanwhile, came from diasporas, after the forces of

globalization, borderless Europe and integration inspired millions to become

migrants and move abroad. This vote is partly patriotic when cast for their own

country but it is also a sign of reintroduction of self-dignity, of revenge against

a new country whose society often did not recognise the skills and qualities of

migrants. A Serbian professor or Bosnian television presenter working as a

plumber in London does this for financial reasons but often blames the host

country for this. “Those who finally crowned their struggle for freedom with

victory in Eastern Europe have become almost overnight, losers,” analyses Boris Buden.68 It is the Eurovision Song Contest that provides migrants,

“overnight losers” as Buden describes them in a different context, with

recognition of their own nation as equal or even better than a west European

country.

These voting patterns, however, resulted in votes often ignoring rich nations

and the competition’s traditional powerhouses. The rule was therefore changed in 2009 and half of the votes again come from national juries while the

“democracy” of tele-voting accounts for another half. The current model of the

Eurovision Song Contest is a combination of democratic rules combined with

meritocracy based on political-economic power. A minor digression into the end

of Communism provides a telling example. Polish communists offered

democratic elections in 1989 but preserved an uncontested half of

parliamentary seats for themselves. The rule changes at Eurovision have not

solved the problem of mysterious results. It has finally been recognized there

were some suspicions about the operations of national juries as “allegations

66 Andree Zaimović, interview. 67 Andree Zaimović, interview. 68 Buden Boris. 2010. Children of Postcommunism. Radical Philosophy 159 (accessed: 20. April

2015).


108

that oil-rich Azerbaijan […] trying to buy votes” became too difficult to handle. Since then, the names of jury members have finally become public.69

Not everyone has been happy with the change. “Turkey has sat out Eurovision since 2013 to protest this change, which diluted the power of the Turkish

diaspora vote,” claimed Duncan Watts in the New York Times. As an insider

and expert, Andree Zaimović, however, explains: “It is expensive to participate. This is based on the number of viewers from each country. Therefore, the more

populous the country, the more expensive it is to participate. This is why

Turkey stopped their participation.”70 While boycotts of the contest have been

political in the past, they have become more often caused by economic reasons

over the recent years. Poorer countries, even those with smaller numbers of

viewers and therefore responsible for a smaller financial contribution as a

Eurovision participant, simply could not afford further participation. This has

been the case for Bosnia-Herzegovina and for many countries in the

neighboring region.

Finally, the issue of organized voting patterns cannot be ignored. “SIM cards are playing an important role,” Andree Zaimović explains. “It is estimated that only one to two percent of viewers actually vote. Smaller countries award the

same number of points as big ones. Thus a couple of hundred of SIM cards can

change the voting result of a smaller nation.”71 This usually comes in addition

to preparatory efforts prior to the contest. “Regional promotion campaigns are bringing in the votes. It requires investment and it is not necessarily restricted

to one region only.”72 “The Eurovision Song Contest is a competition of production teams and machines with enormous resources and means that are

necessary for victory,” says Ismeta Dervoz. “Teams of voters are easily

organized in countries that participate if one has enough money and teams

capable to create an infrastructure.”73

One might conclude that the contest itself might lack quality but is certainly

entertaining enough for Europe. There might be differences in perceptions of

the competition, and the continent’s division on old and “New Europe” is often reflected in this understandings. "New Europe" tends to give more importance

to it as a means of national promotion and national pride. Votes are often given

to allies and neighbours but this is not necessarily political; more often it has

been a reflection of similarity in cultures. Yet, there is politics in the

Eurovision Song Contest, as has been proven throughout its sixty-year history.

“It is a job for professionals,” as Ismeta Dervoz stated. “[It is] a huge business. It is a national interest too, of course.”74

69 Watts, The Politics of Eurovision. 70 Andree Zaimović, interview. 71 Andree Zaimović, interview. 72 Andree Zaimović, interview. 73 Dervoz, interview. 74 Dervoz, interview.

Neven Andjelić

109

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From Ruslana to Gaitana: Performing

“Ukrainianness” in the Eurovision Song Contest Research Article

Paul Jordan Research Associate, Södertorn University

[email protected]

http://www.suedosteuropa.uni-graz.at/cse/en/jordan





110

From Ruslana to Gaitana: Performing

“Ukrainianness” in the Eurovision Song Contest

Paul Jordan*

This article considers how the Eurovision Song Contest (ESC) has come to

be used as a platform for the politicisation of national identity in Ukraine.

Ukraine can be described as an amalgam of regions with different ethno-

linguistic, economic, cultural and political profiles. The rhetoric concerning

some Ukrainian Eurovision entries illuminates these complexities and as

such sheds light on the construction of Ukrainian nationhood in a post-

Soviet context. In particular this paper uses interviews with key decision

makers involved with the Ukrainian selection process in the Eurovision

Song Contest and examines the rhetoric surrounding four Ukrainian

Eurovision entries which have generated considerable interest and

controversy both in the country itself and within the wider context of the

European media. Eurovision presents an opportunity for Ukraine to

present a unified national identity to a global audience. The question is

however, which Ukraine and for what purpose?

Keywords: national identity, Ukraine, nation-building, nationalism,

Eurovision Song Contest

Introduction

This article considers how the Eurovision Song Contest (ESC) has come to be

used as a platform for the politicisation of national identity in Ukraine. If

Eurovision entries can be seen as a reflection of the state-centric nature of

national identity, then the discussions that they engender within the state can

provide a unique insight into how that identity is both constructed and

contested. The narrative of the nation rarely speaks with a straightforward

voice and in the case of Ukraine the way in which nationhood is defined is far

from simple. Ukraine presents an interesting case study given the geopolitical

position of the country, between Russia and Europe, and the acute cultural and

political discourses that this engenders. In particular this paper uses

interviews with key decision-makers involved with the Ukrainian selection

process in the Eurovision Song Contest and examines the rhetoric surrounding

* Paul Jordan is a postdoctoral researcher working on issues of nationalism, history, identity

politics, international relations and nation branding in relation to Central and Eastern Europe. He

defended his PhD thesis, The Eurovision Song Contest: Nation Branding and Nation Building in

Estonia and Ukraine at the University of Glasgow in September 2011. He is a founding member of

the Eurovision Research Network (ERN) which is an association of academics, broadcasters,

journalists, and other individuals and organisations with an interest in sharing ideas, dialogue,

and resources around the Eurovision Song Contest (ESC). Paul is a regular pundit on the ESC for

the UK media and has appeared on the BBC News, Sky News and the documentary film, The

Secret History of Eurovision.

Paul Jordan

111

four Ukrainian Eurovision entries which have generated considerable interest

and controversy both in the country itself and within the wider context of the

European media. Eurovision presents an opportunity for Ukraine to present a

unified national identity to a global audience. The question is, however: which

Ukraine, and for what purpose?

Research that aims to scrutinise any part of identity can only be an inexact

process, since identities themselves are dynamic. The methodology used to

investigate issues such as national identity needs to be appropriate and an

awareness of the potential limitations of the research design is necessary. The

use of qualitative interview research, as done in this study, continues to be a

subject of debate; indeed, it has been asserted that the data gathered using

qualitative methodology is hardly distinguishable from journalism.1 Yet, the

value of qualitative interviews lies in the fact that they place emphasis on the

way in which individuals interpret their social reality; interviews capture and

deconstruct meanings attached to social phenomena by particular actors at

specific moments in time. They therefore add an invaluable additional

perspective to the study of identity construction and the meanings attached to

such identities.2

This paper analyses perspectives on the ESC and the nation from “above”, namely by using the viewpoints of political figures, opinion leaders and

individuals involved with the ESC in Ukraine in order to ascertain what

visions of the national political community or nation state were propagated

through it. Much of the emphasis of my research is on official representations

of the country rather than being totally focussed on public opinion, of which

this paper therefore does not claim or aim to be completely representative. The

majority of the data for this article was collected by carrying out in-depth

interviews both at an elite/political level and public level in Ukraine in 2007–8

as part of my doctoral research. I conducted 28 interviews in total, 16 of which

were with so-called elite level respondents. The elite level can loosely be

defined as politicians, journalist, television executives and opinion leaders.

Respondents were initially asked about their sense of national identity and the

image of Ukraine more generally. I then went on to explore their views on the

Orange Revolution and the Eurovision Song Contest itself, since these two

events presented an opportunity for the country to manage its own image on its

own terms for the first time since independence. Among the people interviewed

as part of my original research were the Executive Producer of the 2005 ESC as

well as the Head of CFC Consulting, a PR firm based in Ukraine which

orchestrated Ukraine’s debut in the contest and oversaw the selection of several of the country’s representatives. Moreover, other respondents were drawn from a large sample using a snowballing technique, an established

method for sampling and in this case, the only practical means of gaining

access to these elites. The elite level does, however, provide only one

perspective. Much of the recent literature on issues of nationhood and

nationalism in the post-Soviet region has stressed the need to examine issues

1 Strauss, Anselm and Juliet Corbin. 1998. Basics of Qualitative Research: Techniques and

Procedures for Developing Grounded Theory. 2nd ed. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 28. 2 Snape, Dawn and Liz Spencer. 2003. The Foundations of Qualitative Research, in Qualitative

Research Practice: A Guide for Social Science Students and Researchers, edited by Ritchie, Jane

and Jane Lewis. London: Sage, 1–23, 3.

From Ruslana to Gaitanaп іerforming “Ukrainianness” in the Eurovision Song Contest

112

at the “ordinary” level. Rogers чrubaker, in his work on Transylvania, argues that a perspective from “below” is needed if we are to truly understand the nature of identity processes in these countries:3

Ethnicity and nationalism could best be understood if studied from

below as well as above, in microanalytic as well as macroanalytic

perspective. From a distance it is all too easy to “see” bounded and homogenous ethnic and national groups, to whom common

interests, perceptions, intentions and volition can be attributed. Up

close, on the other hand, one risks losing sight of the larger contexts

that shape experience and interaction. The study of large- and mid-

scale structures and processes remains indispensible, but I came to

believe that it must be complimented by research pitched at a level

close to everyday experience if one is to avoid unwarranted

assumptions of “groupness” and capture the way ethnicity actually “works”.4

I therefore also undertook a selection of public-level interviews in order to gain

an overview of opinions relating to Ukraine’s representation through the ESC. Whilst carrying out the research I was affiliated with the Kyiv-Moyhla

Academy, a university in Kyiv. I was able to access a large network of students

within a short space of time, many of whom had been active in the Orange

Revolution of 2004–5, which was why they were specifically chosen. I also

interviewed members of the general public. However, as stated earlier, rather

than seeking to explore public opinion, this research aimed to investigate key

debates with specific actors in Ukraine who have been involved in both the

organisation of the ESC and the selection of Ukraine’s official representatives. As such, the narratives between the two groups of respondents reveal

interesting insights into the construction and contradictions of Ukrainian

nation-building in the post-Soviet period.

Deconstructing “Ukrainianness” Attempting to define and encapsulate what the essence of Ukrainian national

identity is far from simple. Ukraine can be described as an “amalgam of regions” with different ethno-linguistic, economic, cultural and political

profiles.5 Ukraine itself can be seen as a “study in ambiguity”.6 The rhetoric

concerning some Ukrainian Eurovision entries illuminates these complexities

and as such sheds light on the construction of Ukrainian nationhood in a post-

Soviet context. An examination of representations of Ukrainian national

identity through participation in the ESC raises interesting questions

concerning the way nationhood is both constructed and challenged.

3 Brubaker, Rogers. 2006. Nationalist Politics and Everyday Ethnicity in a Transylvanian Town.

Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, xiv, 9. 4 Brubaker, Nationalist Politics, xiv. 5 Wolczuk, Kataryna. зеез. Catching up with “Europe”?п Constitutional Debates on the Territorial–Administrative Model in Independent Ukraine. Regional and Federal Studies 12(2), 65–88, 65. 6 Subtelny, Orest. 2000. The Ambiguities of National Identity: the Case of Ukraine, in Ukraine: the

Search for a National Identity, edited by Wolchik, Sharon L., and Volodymyr Zviglyanich. Lanham,

MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1–10, 6.

Paul Jordan

113

A debate on nationhood raises many questions concerning the identity and

legitimacy of the nation state, since nation states are modern fictions with clear

political intentions disguised as ancient myths but without any old

mythological background.7 Discussions concerning national identity and

statehood in turn pose the question of what a nation actually is. Benedict

цnderson famously described the nation as an “imagined community”, a construction of the post-industrial age.8 Anderson argues that the nation is

imagined since members of even the smallest nation will never know most of

their fellow members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of

each lives the image of their communion.9 In order to keep a state together in

the modern world, populations have a shared feeling of belonging, bound

together by loyalty toward the same institutions, symbols and values. However,

as Pål Kolstø argues, creating a common identity does not necessarily imply

that all inhabitants of the nation state must have the same ethnic identity.

National identity may, and in many cases, must be political rather than

cultural.10

Discourses on nation-building set the agenda for inclusion or exclusion from a

particular nation-state. Titular citizens of ethnic states hold membership

automatically through their ethnic affiliations, whereas citizens from non-

titular groups can be seen as (more or less explicitly) members of a second

order.11 Ralph Grillo argues that nation states are not natural entitiesр “they clothe and enclose an existing or developing political and economic

framework”.12 John Keane sheds further light on this issue by arguing that,

historically, the nation did not refer to the whole population of a region but

only to those classes which had developed a sense of identity based upon

language and history and had begun to act upon this.13 If the nation is

constructed then logic dictates that national identity is too. National identity

“infuses citizens with a sense of purposefulness, confidence and dignity by allowing them to ‘feel at home’”.14 A nation is a named human population

sharing a historic territory, common myths and historical memories, a mass

public culture as well as a common economy and common legal rights and

duties for all members.15 What constitutes a national identity in a country with

populations with differing understandings and interpretations of recent

history, language and culture is therefore problematic. Arguing, like many of

the modernist theorists, such as Brubaker, that national identity is

constructed, I also assume that it is a learned attribute. What is it that makes

someone Scottish, Irish, British or Ukrainian? As such, identities can be

7 Fornas, Jonas. 2011. Signifying Europe. Bristol: Intellect Press, 18. 8 Anderson, Benedict. 2006. [1983]. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of

Nationalism. London: Verso, 5. 9 Anderson, Imagined Communities, 6. 10 Kolstø, Pål. (ed.). 1999. Nation-Building and Ethnic Integration in Post-Soviet Societies: an

Investigation of Latvia and Kazakhstan. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1. 11 Semyonov, Aleksei. 2002. Estonia: Nation-Building and Integration: Political and Legal Aspects,

in National Integration and Violent Conflict in Post-Soviet Societies: the Cases of Estonia and

Moldova, edited by Kolstø, Pål. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 105–58, 106. 12 Grillo, Ralph. жоне. “Nation” and “State” in Europe: Anthropological Perspectives. London:

Academic Press, 8. 13 Keane, John. 1995. Nations, Nationalism and European Citizens, in Notions of Nationalism,

edited by Periwal, Sukumar. Budapest: Central European University Press, 182–207, 182. 14 Keane, Nations, 186. 15 Smith, Anthony D. 1999. Myths and Memories of the Nation. New York: Oxford University Press.


114

contested. Whilst there is inevitably a tolerance of difference, that difference or

diversity is only tolerated by mainstream governments responsible for nation-

building if it does not compromise or threaten the sense of self of the titular

population, or their ownership of the nation.

As the Soviet Union disintegrated, it forced changes in the political space and

the identities within the new Soviet successor states. The rediscovery of the

national self represents a symbolic break from the past which in turn aids the

development of the new independent state. As in other Soviet successor states,

after the passage to independence, ruling elites embarked on a process of

forging a national identity by (re)constructing the discursive boundaries of

nationhood.16 Nation-building in the post-Soviet region was therefore fraught

with tensions, complexities and contradictions. Nation-building in the post-

Soviet context essentially represented the competition for power in which the

various national elites in the region sought to “naturalise” their own particular model of state institutions and gain legitimacy for their own claims to power.

They did this by invoking a particular vision of what constitutes the national

political community and by propagating this amongst the population through

speeches, interviews and within the wider media. The aim was to create and

impose, from above, a new “imagined community” (to use цnderson’s term) amongst the state’s population. Further to this the dimensions of state and

nation-building also involve deciding who “belongs”, essentially in terms of citizenship on the legal level. There is also a cultural dimension of nation-

building projects which draw upon various cultural “raw material” such as language, ethnicity and religion. Language is a key part of the nation-building

process, a further way of distancing the republics from their Soviet past.

In Ukraine, language has played a symbolic role in terms of nation-building,

and the implementation of one official state language (Ukrainian) is therefore a

clear signal of the direction of nation-building in the country. However, unlike

in other former Soviet republics such as the Baltic States, Ukrainian nation-

building is not so easy to categorise. Kataryna Wolczuk’s assertion that Ukraine is an “amalgam of regions” means that these regions have different understandings of what constitutes a national culture and identity and indeed

nation-building. For western Ukrainians, it implies breaking with Russia, and

for others in the East less so. There are paradigms of post-colonialism,

propagated by “Ukrainophiles” who subscribe to a post-colonial view of their

Soviet past, enmeshed with discourses of oppression and forced Russification.17

On the other hand, the situation in Ukraine is further complicated by the

presence of Russophone Ukrainians as well as ethnic Russians. Whilst Ukraine

might be seen in the same vein as other bi-national states such as Belgium or

Canada, the boundaries in Ukraine are far more blurred. Rigid distinctions

between a Russian speaking east and Ukrainian speaking west Ukraine do not

necessarily tell the full story regarding Ukrainian identity. This ambiguity or

complexity of Ukrainian identity is exemplified strongly in the capital, Kyiv,

16 Wolczuk, Kataryna. зеее. History, Europe and the “National Idea”п the “Official” Narrative of National Identity in Ukraine. Nationalities Papers 28(4), 671–94. 17 Wilson, Andrew. 1998. National History and National Identity in Ukraine and Belarus, in

Nation-Building in the Post-Soviet Borderlands: the Politics of National Identities, edited by Smith,

Graham / Vivien Law / Andrew Wilson / Annette Bohr and Edward Allworth. Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press, 23–47, 40.

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where Ukrainians “commute” between identities.18 However recent anecdotal

evidence suggests that the Ukrainian language has and is becoming more

widely spoken and its use more politicised following the armed conflict in

Eastern Ukraine and the Russian annexation of Crimea.19 The rudimentary

East/West divide therefore may not be sufficient in conceptualising discourses

on national and linguistic identity in Ukraine which speak with more than one

voice. However there are some broad generalisations which can be made: the

west, which tends to be Ukrainian-speaking, views the Soviet past and identity

differently to the east. In 2005, only 6% of Ukrainians in the west saw

themselves as “Soviet”, compared with жн% in the east.20 An examination of the

rhetoric concerning portrayals of Ukraine through the prism of the ESC sheds

further light on these identity questions.

Judy чatt argues that Ukraine cannot be considered to be a “nation state” in the conventional sense of the word, given the sizeable Russian speaking

population who have deep historical roots to the territory and also the fact that

Ukrainians themselves are far from homogeneous in terms of how they

perceive their own identity.21 In the Ukrainian case, language is not

necessarily a marker of identity. Miss Ukraine 2005 did not speak Ukrainian

yet still identified very much as a Ukrainian rather than Russian.22 Moreover,

Batt points to the fact that many in Ukraine are also bilingual and there is an

element of fluidity in terms of language, which in turn makes the boundaries

blurred and subject to change. In the 1990s and early 2000s presidents Leonid

Kravchuk and Leonid Kuchma promoted a sense of nationhood which was not

based on ethnic criteria.23 Despite the implementation of only one official state

language, Ukrainian, both Kravchuk and Kuchma accepted the use of Russian.

This can be seen as in stark contrast to paradigms of nationhood in the Baltic

States, for example, which emphasise that knowledge of the titular nationality

is the marker of belonging to the national community. The ongoing armed

conflict in Eastern Ukraine and the government-initiated “United Country” campaign suggests that a new process of nation-building is taking place in

Ukraine.

Nation-building in Ukraine was slow and piecemeal. This is reflected by the

fact that a new constitution was adopted in June 1996, making Ukraine the

last former Soviet republic to do so. Under Kuchma, the country’s relationship with Russia improved, the two countries being seen as strategic partners whilst

at the same time Ukraine drew closer to Europe. In reality this dual-vector

approach did little to advance Ukrainian nation-building. Ukrainian political

elites essentially walked a tightrope between emphasising EU integration

whilst balancing the demands of the Russian government.24 Wolczuk deems the

18 Kuzio, Taras. 2001. Nationalising States or Nation-Building?: a Critical Review of the

Theoretical Literature and Empirical Evidence. Nations and Nationalism 7(2), 135–54, 154. 19 Author interviews conducted in November 2014. 20 Velychenko, Stephen. 2007. Ukraine: EU Member or a Second Belarus?, in Ukraine, the EU and

Russia, edited by Velychenko, Stephen. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 1–26, 2. 21 Batt, Judy. 1998. National Identity and Regionalism, in Contemporary Ukraine: Dynamics of

Post-Soviet Transformation, edited by Kuzio, Taras. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 57–59, 57. 22 Velychenko, Ukraine, 10. 23 Kuzio, (ed.), Contemporary Ukraine, 1. 24 Krushelnycky, Askold. 2006. An Orange Revolution: a Personal Journey through Ukrainian

History. London: Harvill Secker, 78.


116

policies of the жооеs to be “declarative Europeanisation” in that lip service was paid to the idea of Ukrainian integration with European structures such as the

European Union but little else in reality.25 Kuchma highlighted the EU as an

aspiration, but did little in practice to move Ukraine towards that goal, nor did

the EU embrace Ukraine as a prospective member. Arguably Ukrainian nation-

building has further problematized given the “junior partner” role that Ukraine played in governing the USSR.26 It is this legacy and the fact that Ukrainians

did not inherit a more uniform understanding which has had an impact upon

the formation of a congruent national identity in the post-Soviet era as well as

nation-building itself. A significant question therefore emerges: what kind of

Ukraine has been promoted by participating in the ESC?

The Eurovision Song Contest in Context

The political, economic and social realities of Europe as well as understandings

and definitions of what Europe is as a geographical, political and cultural

entity have shifted since the collapse of communism. Europe has become a

transitory site of competing flows of power. Since its inception in 1956, the

Eurovision Song Contest (ESC) has served as a platform for cultural exchange

between European countries and has reflected the wider geopolitical discourses

which these competing flows of paper have engendered. The original idea

behind the contest, and still its defining feature today, is that nations (whose

television companies are active members of the European Broadcasting Union)

submit original songs which are performed and televised live. This is followed

by telephone voting and since 2009, jury voting, to determine the “best” European song of the year. Although officially the Eurovision Song Contest is a

non-political event, its history can be seen as part of the Cold War process of

fashioning Europe as a unified bloc.27 In this context, the “Europe” referred to here is the West; the ESC can be seen as an event uniting western European

countries in terms of popular culture and one which, with the exception of

Yugoslavia, did not include any communist nations. The event also represents

a mirror image of the development of the European Union in that both have

continued to expand their memberships eastwards since the fall of communism,

the event has therefore reflected the changing map of Europe. Daina Eglitis

argues that amongst post-communist countries there was a desire to embrace

the political, social and cultural traditions of Western Europe.28 Thus

participation in the event can be seen as confirmation of a nation’s European, or more specifically, western European, identity and culture.

Eligibility to participate in the ESC is not determined by geographic inclusion

within the continent of Europe, despite the inference in the title of the

competition. Rather, entry to the event is dependent upon the national

broadcaster being a full and active member of the EBU. Several countries

which are outside the “natural” boundaries of Europe, the Ural Mountains to

25 D’цnieri, іaul and Taras Kuzio. (ed.). зее7. Aspects of the Orange Revolution. Stuttgart: Ibidem-

Verlag, 217. 26 Kuzio, (ed.), Contemporary Ukraine, xii. 27 Fricker, Karen and Ronit Lentin. 2007. Part of the Show: the Global Networking of Irish

Eurovision Song Contest Fans, in Performing Global Networks, edited by Fricker, Karen and Ronit

Lentin. Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 139–62. 28 Eglitis, Daina Stukuls. 2002. Imagining the Nation: History, Modernity, and Revolution in

Latvia. University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 8–12.

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the east and the Mediterranean Sea to the south,29 have competed; Israel since

1973, Azerbaijan since 2008 and Morocco appeared in 1980. In addition,

Turkey and Russia, which are both transcontinental countries with most of

their territory outside of Europe, have competed since 1975 and 1994

respectively. Thus Europe, as a socio-political construct,30 is not only mirrored

in the ESC but effectively reinforced. The integration of Eastern European

countries into the competition led to various qualification systems being

introduced from 1993–2003 before live semi-finals began in 2004. Since the

1990s the number of competing countries has nearly doubled (from 22

participants in 1990 to 43 in 2011), and new entrant countries have come to

dominate the Contest. Six out of twelve winners in 2001–12 were former

communist countries which entered Eurovision after the fall of the Berlin Wall.

Turkey, Greece and Finland, on the periphery of Western Europe, also won

during this period. These developments have provoked consternation amongst

some Western European countries and media who have viewed this as unfair

domination. These anxieties echoed, and were fuelled by, larger tensions within

Europe about Westward migration, and perceived differing levels of economic

and cultural development between Western and non-Western European

nations.31 The failure of the Netherlands to reach the final in 2005 was held up

in the Dutch media as an example of how power within the EU has shifted

eastwards.32 The 2007 Eurovision Song Contest semi-final, where all ten

qualifiers came from east of the Danube, inflamed the passions of critics and

arguably paved the way for further changes to the organisation of the contest.

In 2009 the EBU re-introduced a jury vote, which had originally been

abandoned in 1998, combining the jury vote in equal proportions with the

public telephone vote. Such a move can be seen as evidence of the EBU desire

to continue to expand the competition whilst at the same time providing

reassurance to long-standing (western) participants that their concerns were

being addressed whilst at the same time ensuring that the funding for the

competition continues to be secured.33 The ESC has therefore become a

platform on which the wider geopolitics of Europe is played out.

Articulating Nationhood, Nationality and Nationalism in the


The ESC is a stage where national identity and the politics of identity are

performed not just through the songs but also the way in which the individual

contests are staged. Throughout its history the ESC has served as a platform

for performing essentialised narratives of national identity,34 and this can even

be seen in the choice of outfits for performers; a folk dress for Sweden in 1958,

29 Outhwaite, William. 2006. The Future of Society. Oxford: Blackwell, 109 30 Made, Vahur. 2003. Estonia and Europe: a Common Identity or an Identity Crisis?, in Post-Cold

War Identity Politics: Northern and Baltic Experiences, edited by Lehti, Marko and David J. Smith.

London: Frank Cass, 181–96, 183–4. 31 Fricker, Karen and Milija Gluhovic. 2013. Introduction: Eurovision and the New Europe, in Per-

forming the “New” Europe: Identities, Feelings and Politics in the Eurovision Song Contest, edited

by Fricker, Karen and Milija Gluhovic. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 1–28 32 Browne, Anthony. 2006. How Song Contest Defeat Clouds Dutch Eurovision. The Times, 24. May

2005 (accessed: 07. May 2015). 33 See also Ulbricht, Sircar and Slootmaeckers, this issue. 34 Baker, Catherine. 2008. Wild Dances and Dying Wolves: Simulation, Essentialization, and

National Identity at the Eurovision Song Contest. Popular Communication 6(3), 173–89.


118

a kilt of the UK in жолл and traditional costume for цlbania in зеел. Ruslana’s “Wild Dances”, which represented Ukraine in зее4 was a modern take on the ancient Carpathian Hutsul culture which had been widely suppressed during

the Soviet era. Estonia, also in 2004 – the same year it had become a member

of the EU – entered a song which was performed in the Võru dialect. Thus the

Contest has acted as a platform for the representation of ethnic cultures and

national and minority identities within a pan-European context.

Eurovision can be considered a platform for the reproduction of certain

narratives of the nation in the sense that singers are encouraged, according to

the rules, to reflect the national identity or the culture they represent.35

However this reflection of national identity is questionable given the fact that

there are no set rules regarding the nationality of the performer or songwriter.

It also raises further questions regarding who decides on each entry and what

is deemed to be representative of a particular nation and what is not. National

entries in Eurovision represent essentialised narratives of national identity,

and their selection as a national song for Europe involves numerous choices

and decisions about what is appropriate for representing the nation.36 A

question then arises: which version of national identity is being communicated

and for what purpose? This paper argues that, in the case of Ukraine, it is

typically a small, elite circle that has made these decisions.

National musical style is an ideological construct connected to the rise of

nationalism in the 19th and 20th centuries.37 A central tension therefore

emerges between the apolitical ideals behind Eurovision and the reality of the

content of the show both in terms of music and also broadcasting. Switzerland,

the founding Eurovision nation, exemplifies the construction of national

identity through the way it has presented itself on the Eurovision stage.

Switzerland last won the contest in 1988, when Céline Dion, a French-

Canadian, took the prize with a song written by a Turkish songwriter, Atilla

Şereftuğ. In recent times the country has opted for a girl band from Estonia, Vanilla Ninja, in 2005 and an international group, Six4One, in 2006. The entry

in 2006 was written by the German songwriters Ralph Siegel and Bernd

Meinunger. The group itself consisted of six performers from countries across

Europe: Malta, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Sweden, Switzerland, Israel and Portugal.

Switzerland as a united country representing its national identity in the

Eurovision Song Contest is therefore a construct. The group Six4One can be

considered to be reflective of the complexities concerning Swiss identity.

Despite the continuous flagging of the apolitical nature of the ESC by the

European Broadcasting Union, the event is used by competing countries as a

stage upon which the politics of protest are performed, as demonstrated by a

number of incidents since the 1970s. After the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in

1974, Greece withdrew from the contest in 1975 when it was announced that

35 Gumpert, Matthew. 2007. “Everyway That I Can”: Auto-Orientalism at Eurovision 2003, in A

Song for Europe: Popular Music and Politics in the Eurovision Song Contest, edited by Raykoff,

Ivan and Robert Deam Tobin. Aldershot: Ashgate, 147–158, 148. 36 Baker, Wild Dances and Dying Wolves. 37 Björnberg, Alf. 2007. Return to Ethnicity: the Cultural Significance of Musical Change in the

Eurovision Song Contest, in A Song for Europe: Popular Music and Politics in the Eurovision Song

Contest, edited by Raykoff, Ivan and Robert Deam Tobin. Aldershot: Ashgate, 13–24.

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Turkey would enter, and neither country took part in the same contest until

1978.38 The Greek entry of жо7л, “Panaghia Mou, Panaghia Mou” (My Lady,

My Lady) was a direct protest against the Turkish invasion. The lyrics included

references to napalm ruins and fields of refugees. At the time of the 1993

contest, the war in the Balkans was raging on, and this was given particular

attention in the songs from Bosnia Herzegovina and Croatia which reflected

the turmoil in each countryп the чosnian entry was entitled “Sva Bol Svijeta” (“All the World’s Pain”) and the Croatian effort “Don’t Ever Cry”.39 At the 2000

contest, the Israeli representatives, Ping Pong, waved Syrian flags during

rehearsals. Israel and Syria were officially in a state of war at the time and

Israel’s then Deputy Education Minister, Shlomo Yahalom, called for the

group’s participation to be banned claiming that they failed to represent national values.40

In 2009, a series of disputes between Armenia and Azerbaijan unfolded

throughout the live broadcasts of the semi-finals and final. During the semi-

finals, an introductory “postcard” leading into the цrmenian performance depicted, amongst other monuments, a statue located in Stepanakert, capital

city of the unrecognized Nagorno-Karabakh Republic, which constitutes a part

of Azerbaijan. The statue was built in Soviet times to celebrate the Armenian

heritage of the area. The delegation from Azerbaijan complained to the EBU

that the video clip was unacceptable based on the fact that Nagorno-Karabakh

is a part of Azerbaijan, and it was subsequently edited out for the broadcast of

the final. In retaliation, the presenter of the Armenian votes held up a

clipboard with the monument’s picture on it multiple times as she read off the votes, and in the background a screen in the capital’s main square could also be seen to display the disputed monument.

In August 2009, the BBC reported that several people had been questioned in

Azerbaijan after their votes for Armenia were traced by mobile phone service

providers. According to the ччC “one man was accused of being unpatriotic and a “potential security threat” after he sent a text backing цrmenia’s song […] the Azerbaijani authorities said people had merely been invited to explain why

they voted for цrmenia”.41 The issue was investigated by the EBU and, whilst

they found no evidence to pursue the affair, a clause preventing telecom

communication providers from disclosing personal information was added to

the rules of the contest. Thus the ESC has regularly acted as a platform for

political protest, highlighting the contested nature of the construction of

nationhood in a post-communist contest.

38 Gambaccini, Paul. 1998. The Complete Eurovision Song Contest Companion. London: Pavilion,

69. 39 See цndjelić, this issue. 40 N.N. 2000. Israel Flagging in Eurovision Row. BBC News Online, 11. May 2000 (accessed: 07.

May 2015). 41 N.N. 2009. Azerbaijanis in Eurovision Probe. BBC News Online, 18. August 2009 (accessed: 07.

May 2015).


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Selling Ukraine to Europe

Ukraine made its debut in the Eurovision Song Contest in 2003, a decade later

than some other former Soviet republics such as Estonia, Russia and

Lithuania. Ukraine’s participation in Eurovision reflects the country’s arguably slow approaches to economic reforms in the 1990s as well as other state-

building exercises, namely European integration. CFC Consulting, a private

marketing and public relations organisation based in Kyiv, engineered

Ukrainian participation in the ESC with the aim of improving the

international image of the country.

When we started with the idea of having Ukraine in the Eurovision

[…] what we had in mind was how to use it to work on improving

the image of Ukraine internationally […] I remember when we had to present the entire project of Eurovision to the vice Prime Minister

of Ukraine […] we had to draft all the positive benefits Ukraine

would get should we actually win the contest. So it was on the back

of our minds from the very beginning, how to use this television

musical project for the benefit of Ukraine’s image […] the idea that we had to be there [in Eurovision], it was a good opportunity to

showcase Ukraine […] so we teamed up with the National TV Company of Ukraine, we have helped them […] to secure Ukraine’s participation […] firstly it was the broadcasting rights in 2002 and in 2003 we had the first singer from Ukraine.42

This raises interesting questions concerning nation-building processes in

Ukraine, given that the country was being promoted internationally by a

private organisation. Thus the narrative of Ukrainian identity sold to a wider

European audience was controlled by a select group of elites in the country. I

will now draw upon four very different acts which have represented Ukraine in

the ESC. What “official” representations of national identity have been presented through hosting and participating in the ESC? Who ultimately took

the decisions on how Ukraine would be represented? What debates did these

representations elicit and how contested were they?

Ruslana’s Wild Dance

The song “Wild Dances” performed by the Ukrainian singer Ruslana in зее4 is said to be derived from Hutsul songs and rituals from the Carpathian region of

western Ukraine. Ruslana’s performance drew upon various “ethnic Ukrainian” motifs and victory in Eurovision arguably boosted self-esteem and the image of

the country. The song which features traditional drums and the Hutsul alpine

horn, the trembita, immediately connects with Ukrainian tradition; the various

incantations in the song carries associations with Hutsul culture and the

Carpathian region of Ukraine.43 However, what is perceived by audiences as

Hutsul may be in fact be references to a more generic European folk sound.44

42 Myroshnychenko; Vasyl, partner at CFC Consulting. Interview, Kyiv, 5. December 2007. 43 іavlyshyn, Marko. зеел. Envisioning Europeп Ruslana’s Rhetoric of Identity. Slavic and East

European Journal 50(3), 469–85, 475. 44 Yekelchyk, Serhy. зеже. What Is Ukrainian about Ukraine’s іop Culture? The Strange Case of Verka Serduchka. Canadian–American Slavic Studies 44, 217–32.

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Transferred to the Eurovision stage, this essentialised depiction of a local,

western Ukrainian culture comes to be seen not as a local representation but as

a national one; speaking on behalf of Ukraine as a whole. Further analysis of

the song itself reveals interesting insights into the nature of this construction

of identity. The song was performed in both English and Ukrainian and not

Russian. The absence of this effectively shows that the performance of Ruslana

was an ethnic Ukrainian narrative of national identity. Ruslana’s sexualised and almost militant style led her to be dubbed Xena: Warrior Princess, by UK

commentator Terry Wogan. Ruslana was not only “wild” for the purposes of the

performance of her song; she also projected this image in the promotional

material for her song, even sharing a cage with wolves. “Wild Dances” therefore

served to sexualise and exoticise a particular narrative of national identity

whilst simultaneously presenting Ukraine, or more specifically, the Carpathian

mountains, which inspired the performance, as being at the heart of Europe.45

Ruslana was selected internally as the Ukrainian representative for the ESC in

2004 and promoted internationally by CFC Consulting. This publicity strategy

involved Ruslana appearing in a number of other countries prior to the contest,

usually featuring as an interval act in the various televised selections across

Europe. In representing Ukraine as a nation-state, Ruslana’s performance raises interesting questions about how nationhood is defined and affirmed

through Eurovision:

We didn’t have any national selections here so it was pretty much the decision of CFC and the National TV Company of Ukraine and

we came up with Ruslana […] her act and her performance was very ethnic but it was very particular to special rituals in Western

parts of Ukraine, from the mountains […] it was very Ukrainian […] it was an act itself which did a great deal for promoting Ukraine the country.46

It is interesting to note that Myroshnychenko appears to suggest that this

western Ukrainian style is perhaps more organic than something reflecting the

eastern influences in the country. “Wild Dances” is therefore a product of a small elite circle that decided and disseminated understandings of what

constitutes national culture in Ukraine, and promoted that message to the rest

of Europe. “Wild Dances” ultimately had little to do with the folk traditions of

east-central Ukraine, by far the most populous area of the country.47 Thus the

constructed nature of national identity in Ukraine and the underlying power

relations behind it are revealed.

In terms of how interview respondents read Ruslana’s performance, most highlighted the crude divisions between east and west Ukraineр “there is a division between eastern western Ukraine […] It’s like a struggle […] therefore Ruslana can’t be seen as representing all Ukraine”.48 This is a notion which

another respondent touched upon. Professor Valentin Yakushik from the Kyiv-

Moyhla цcademy emphasised that Ruslana “does not represent the whole of

45 Baker, Wild Dances and Dying Wolves. 46 Myroshnychenko, interview. 47 Yekelchyk, What Is Ukrainian about Ukraine’s Pop Culture?. 48 Anne, interview, Kyiv, 18. December 2007.


122

Ukraine, in the east she is foreign to them with the Carpathian culture”.49

Ukrainians who saw the performance in ethnicised terms drew a strong

distinction between East and West, Ukrainian and Russian. It is also worthy of

note that that many of the public-level respondents for this paper came from

the Kyiv-Mohyla цcademy, which embodies a “nationalising” tendency within Ukraine in the sense of upholding the use of Ukrainian language over Russian

and promoting a clean break with the Soviet past. Despite the connotations

some attached to the song, it was not necessarily perceived in adversely ethnic

terms by Russian-speaking Ukrainians. Alexander Feldman, in an article

taken from a Russian-language newspaper in Ukraine, Den (Day), highlights

the issue of language and “Ukrainianness” and appears to be representative of the general trend:

The new nation has acquired new symbols that embody its success

on the international arena: the footballer Andriy Shevchenko,

Ruslana Lyzhychko and boxing champions the Klitchko brothers.

No matter what language they speak, no matter where they were

born and where you work at this time, it is important that they feel

themselves to be Ukrainian.50

The discourse concerning Ruslana reflects the complexities and difficulties in

defining Ukrainianness, which is complicated further by the apparent absence

of a linguistic divide that exists in other post-Soviet states. The journalist

Mykola Kniazhyts’kyi argues that, regardless of language or narratives of identity, figures such as Ruslana present an opportunity for Ukrainians to

build a common identity and can act as an antidote to what he calls the

“national inferiority complex” in Ukraine.51 It is interesting to note that some

Western Ukrainian “purists” objected to the alleged corruption of traditional Carpathian musical styles, thereby further highlighting the complexities of

identity.

The debates surrounding Ruslana’s narrative of national identity and

traditional Carpathian music reached the UK, with the BBC reporting that

Ruslana’s Eurovision victory had triggered a folk revival in Ukraine. However there was comment from one Carpathian musician that the authenticity of

Carpathian music was in danger of being lost as a result of the increased

commercialisation of the traditionп “I think it would be better for the world to see the real authentic music, in its natural surroundings”.52 It is interesting to

note that Ruslana’s selection as Ukrainian representative at Eurovision took

place when Leonid Kuchma’s allegedly “pro-Russian” regime was still in power. Ruslana presented a narrative of Ukraine which was exotic and sexualised; a

wild country in need of exploration. цrguably Ruslana’s performance was a

highly competent piece of PR and one which was directly orientated towards a

wider European market. Ruslana therefore represents the contested nature of

encapsulating Ukrainian national identity; the narratives of identity which can

49 Yakushik, Valentin. Interview, Kyiv, 19. December 2007. 50 Fel’dman, Oleksandr. 2004. Вѕд держави до нацѕі. Den, 21. September 2004 (accessed: 07. May

2015). 51 Pavlyshyn, Envisioning Europe, 482. 52 Alexandra, cited in Fawkes, Helen. 2004. Eurovision Triggers Ukraine Folk Revival. BBC News

Online, 1. September 2004 (accessed: 07. May 2015).

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be discerned from her Eurovision performance are questioned in the west of

Ukraine amongst the people who can arguably understand it the most. The

rhetoric concerning Eurovision 2005 in Kyiv and the selection of Greenjolly as

Ukrainian entry to the ESC sheds even further light on the contentious and

politicised nature of performing Ukrainian nationhood.

A Revolutionary Eurovision: Kyiv 2005

In the immediate aftermath of Ruslana and Ukraine’s victory in the зее4 Eurovision Song Contest, explicit references were made to the connotations

that the event would have for Ukraine’s image and standing in the world, both in the Ukrainian media and by Ruslana herself. The event was afforded

significance given that it provided Ukraine with the opportunity to host a

major cultural event for the first time since independence and a medium with

which to control its own image on its own terms. The winning performer,

Ruslana, declared at a press conference immediately after the event that “all of us are making a positive image of Ukraine. I want my country to open up

before you with friendship and hospitality […] I would like you to forget about Chernobyl”.53 Thus from the outset the victory was linked to the international

image of Ukraine and as such it was seen as an opportunity to present a

different view of the country to the rest of the world. The hosting of the 2005

Eurovision Song Contest in Kyiv took on even greater significance following the

political protests which took place across the country at the end of 2004, which

became known internationally as the Orange Revolution.

By 2004 Ukraine was said to have slipped into an increasingly authoritarian

state with widespread corruption which went largely unchallenged by the

Kuchma government.54 The first vote was held on 31 October 2004 and since

neither candidate, the pro-Western Viktor Yushchenko or the pro-Russian

Viktor Yanukovych, had surpassed 50% of the vote (they received (39.9% and

39.3% respectively) the election passed to a second round. On 21 November the

second round of voting took place, which appeared to show that Yanukovych

was the victor. In the immediate aftermath, widespread protests took place

against the apparent falsification of the election results. Reports emerged of

corruption, voter intimidation and electoral fraud. When it emerged that the

opposition candidate Victor Yushchenko had been poisoned with dioxin, it

served as a rallying call to people, and effectively the presidential election came

to be seen as being “stolen”.55 People took to the streets of Kyiv with orange

flags, banners, and symbols representing their opposition to the government.

Later, counter-protests from pro-Yanukovych supporters, with blue as their

emblem, emerged. In crude terms, the Orange Revolution can be seen as a

clash between east and west. However, as Velychenko points out, not all

western regions were 100% pro-Yushchenko nor were all regions 100% pro-

53 Butler, Daren. 2004. Ukraine’s Ruslana Wins Eurovision Song Contest. The Moscow Times, 17.

May 2004. (accessed: 07. May 2015). 54 D’цnieri, іaul. (ed.). зеже. Orange Revolution and Aftermath: Mobilization, Apathy, and the

State in Ukraine. Washington DC: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1. 55 D’цnieri (ed.), Orange Revolution and Aftermath, 81, 99.


124

Yanukovych in the east.56 Thus the Orange Revolution can be seen as a further

reflection of the wider difficulty in succinctly defining Ukrainianness.

The Orange Revolution was of notable interest to western observers for several

reasonsп firstly, Ukraine’s strategic positioning, essentially a border between Russia and the European Union. At one point the geopolitical shift appeared to

be so monumental that Ukrainian membership of the European Union began to

be discussed in the context of continuing enlargement. Moreover the Orange

Revolution in Ukraine brought unprecedented publicity for the country,

presenting a positive image of Ukraine; a country which made the transition to

democracy through peaceful means. An analysis of the 2005 Eurovision Song

Contest offers a potentially rich set of insights into the nature of the “Orange Revolution” and its accompanying debates on Ukrainian nation-building and

Ukraine’s place in Europe more generally.

The Orange Revolution became a platform for other expressions of protest

namely through music. Ukrainian bands performed for the hundreds of

thousands of people who were gathered in Kyiv’s Maidan Nezalezhnosti

(Independence Square). The reigning Eurovision champion Ruslana also

became heavily involved in the proceedings and went on hunger strike in

protest against what she saw as a stolen election and later went on to become a

politician herself as a member of parliament for Yushchenko’s ruling Nasha Ukrayina (Our Ukraine) party.57 The political turmoil caused by the Orange

Revolution also meant that the preparations for the 2005 contest were

seriously hampered. The delays were so significant that in March 2005 the

European Broadcasting Union threatened to move the event from Ukraine

unless immediate action was taken. Given the involvement of the newly-elected

President Yushchenko, who actively intervened in the preparations for the

competition, the importance of hosting the competition in order to enhance

Ukraine’s international standing is plain to see.58

Given that the Eurovision Song Contest was taking place in a country which

only months before had become the focal point of the world’s attention as a

result of political protests, it is perhaps unsurprising that the contest that year

was tinged with political rhetoric. The slogan for the competition in 2005 was

“цwakening”р this along with the selection of the band Greenjolly, who had been active in the political protests, as the Ukrainian Eurovision entry that

year meant that the contest was highly politicised and, as such, highly

contested. The insights of Svante Stockselius, the EBU Executive Supervisor,

and Juhan Paadam, the Executive Producer of Eurovision 2002 in Tallinn and

a member of the EBU Reference Group in 2005, are crucial in understanding

the way in which Eurovision was used as a political platform for Yushchenko’s government. According to Paadam, Yushchenko initially intended to make a

lengthy political speech at the contest itself:

56 Riabchuk, Mykola. 2007. Ambivalence or Ambiguity?: Why Ukraine is Trapped Between East and

West, in Ukraine, the EU and Russia, edited by Velychenko, Stephan, 70–88, 85. 57 Krushelnycky, An Orange Revolution, 294. 58 Jordan, Paul. 2011. The Eurovision Song Contest: Nation Branding and Nation Building in

Estonia and Ukraine. PhD-thesis. Glasgow: University of Glasgow, 169.

Paul Jordan

125

President Yushchenko wanted to come to the show and have a

speech for forty minutes. I think the EBU had a strong word and

explained that it was a TV show. The president agreed to come and

give the award [trophy to the winner] which is ok as it was a

revolution situation, democracy won and so on. But they could have

used any celebrity for the final, the Klitchkos were there. They had

their president.59

Svante Stockselius asserts that the Yushchenko government “tried to influence it [Eurovision] more than they were supposed to”.60 Yushchenko’s appearance at Eurovision was a brief affair; however, the fact that he went on to the stage

is significant. In the history of the Eurovision Song Contest, such a move was

unprecedented, and it took place despite the continuous reinforcement from the

European Broadcasting Union that the contest was a non-political event.

Another issue which was highly politicised in 2005 was the selection of the

Ukrainian candidate. In autumn 2004, the National Television Company of

Ukraine (NTU) announced that it was to host a national selection for the first

time. The Ukrainian national final comprised 15 rounds, where each week five

songs were presented to the audience and the winner put through to the grand

final, which was to be held in February зеек. цni Lorak, one of Ukraine’s most popular singers and a vocal supporter of Viktor Yanukovych, was one of the

acts who had competed in the qualifying rounds. However, controversy arose

when four “wildcards” were entered into the national selection programme at the request of the Deputy Prime Minister, Mykola Tomenko. One of these was

a pro-Yushchenko political anthem by the band Greenjolly, a group from the

Ivano-Frankivsk region in Western Ukraine. The group’s entry, “Razom nas

bahato, nas ne podolaty” (“Together we are many, we cannot be defeated”), went on to win the competition and were to represent Ukraine in the Kyiv final.

Largely seen as a political coup, the actions were highly controversial with both

competing artists and the public alike.

They [Greenjolly] did nothing before and nothing after. It was

purely political I don’t think that one song of Greenjolly can represent the whole country.61

I really don’t think the people voted for it, I seriously doubt it […] I was at the first national channel listening and reporting […] I don’t know. They tried to link Ukraine and the revolution with

Eurovision but I don’t think it was the right decision.62

The decision to insert a band from the Orange Revolution into the national

selection at a late stage was one which was not seen as appropriate by the

majority of respondents and therefore highlights a disparity between the

political elite at the wider public just months after a new government was

elected. Such actions on behalf of politicians and management at NTU were

59 Paadam, Juhan. Interview, Tallinn, 2. November 2007. 60 Stockselius, Svante, email, 3. October 2008. 61 Natalia. Interview, Kyiv, 19. December 2007. 62 Olena. Interview, Kyiv, 13. December 2007.


126

seen as a throwback to the pre-revolutionary corruption which was supposed to

have been suppressed as a result of Yushchenko’s rise to power.

Further controversy ensued when the EчU rejected Greenjolly’s song as it contravened the rules of the Eurovision Song Contest which state that political

messages are banned. The original lyrics of the song “Razom nas bahato, nas ne

podolaty” include direct references to Yushchenko and the political situation at

the time of the Orange Revolutionр “No to falsifications... No to lies. Yushchenko – yes! Yushchenko – yes! This is our president – yes, yes!” The mention of Yushchenko as President in the chorus of the song was dropped,

and more generic phrases were introduced in Englishп “We won't stand this (no), revolution is on, ’cause lies be the weapon of mass destruction […] цll together we’re one, all together we’re strong, God be my witness, we waited too long”. The entry then was allowed to proceed to the Eurovision finals, having

become a non-specific call for greater democracy. It is interesting to note one of

the points made by the respondent above; that Greenjolly cannot be seen as

representative of the whole of Ukraine. Thus Greenjolly acts as a mirror for the

frustrations of a Yanukovych supporter, which Natalia identified herself as;

neither Greenjolly nor Yushchenko represent the Ukraine with which they

identify. Greenjolly’s participation in the ESC therefore represents a specific

political narrative, that of the ruling elite, the Orange Revolution government.

Despite the delays to the organisation of the contest, the 2005 ESC was a

success for NTU. Closer reading of the broadcast sheds further light on the way

in which Ukrainian elites chose to present the country to an international

audience. A cursory glance of the scenes depicted in the postcard images shown

between each national performance suggests that this was an event in which

the eastern urban regions of Ukraine were not the point of focus. Many of the

images depicted non-descript rural regions whilst others focussed on Kyiv and

in particular western Carpathian traditions. The significance of Eurovision

itself was routinely flagged; the preparations of the host city were shown

regularly, along with scenes of the semi-final which had been held two days

prior to the event. Two postcards in particular appear to depict elements of

eastern Ukraine, namely mining and steelworks. However the ratio of these

two segments compared to images of Kyiv or of the Ukrainian countryside is

very small and appears to serve a point in hand; this was not a contest for

promoting Eastern Ukraine. Moreover the scenes were disjointed and

seemingly incoherent; shots of ballet were intermingled with fishing, weddings

and shipping. The ambiguity of the scenes depicted are a metaphor for

Ukrainian national identity itself; difficult to encapsulate in a limited

narrative. The clips shown directly before the Ukrainian entry were scenes

from the Orange Revolution, featuring protesters, tents and banners bearing

Yushchenko’s name as well as shots of the president’s inauguration. It was undoubtedly a political message depicted through Eurovision. Moreover the

actual performance of “Razom nas bahato, nas ne podolaty” included direct and

explicit references to the Orange Revolution, contravening the EBU rules

governing political messages in ESC entries. The song, like “Wild Dances” the preceding year, featured lyrics in both English and Ukrainian. At the start of

the performance the two backing dancers wore handcuffs, symbolising the

stifling of democracy which had been such a driving force for protestors in

Ukraine. As the performance culminated, the handcuffs were broken. Again

Paul Jordan

127

this can be seen as a metaphor for Ukraine: as a result of the protests described

in the song, the country was now free.

Eurovision was big news in the popular press in Ukraine in 2005. In a special-

edition magazine, the Executive Producer of the 2005 event, Pavlo Grystak,

highlighted the importance of the event for Ukraine in the wake of the Orange

Revolutionп “I want to thank you for your support and your trust in us”. This was followed by Ruslana herself who wrote that Ukraine is “a modern European country with an ancient past”. Such articles have highlighted the

political relevance of hosting Eurovision but they also reveal interesting

insights into the way Ukraine was being promoted at the time. Neither

magazine presented any information regarding eastern Ukraine. The Hutsul

and Carpathian regions were focussed on but the east of the country was not.

These articles were written in the immediate aftermath of the Orange

Revolution and so reflect the mainstream political discourse at the time:

othering of eastern influences. The discourses reflect how contentious and

contradictory narratives of national identity and symbolism are in Ukraine. If

we consider Ukraine to be a divided country, these divisions appear to have

been airbrushed, Ukrainian national identity is therefore represented in the

international arena by specific, elite-driven narratives of identity. Ruslana,

Greenjolly and the 2005 ESC itself can be seen as manifestations of this.

Verka Serduchka: From Ukraine with controversy

The character of Verka Serduchka, played by the comedy actor Andrii Danylko,

was selected as Ukrainian representative in the ESC by a mixture of jury and

public votes. Whilst the character was well known both in Ukraine and Russia,

this decision to send the act to represent Ukraine on the Eurovision stage was

met with anger, with many believing that such an act was “vulgar and grotesque” act would be damaging to Ukraine’s international image.63 A

Ukrainian Member of Parliament, Taras Chornovil, called on Ukrainians to

boycott the event, stating that the selection of Serduchka would not be

perceived by other European countries as “normal” and that it would bring shame upon the Ukrainian international image:64

All these hermaphrodites have never been accepted anywhere.

Therefore I think that this will be a serious embarrassment factor

and the world will see us as complete idiots.65

The entry was called “Dancing Lasha Tumbai” and was performed in English,

German, Russian and Ukrainian. Further controversy erupted when the lyrical

content of the song was analysedр “Dancing Lasha Tumbai” bore a phonetic resemblance to “Russia goodbye”, a further ode to the Orange Revolution of 2004–ек. Serduchka’s claim that “lasha tumbai” was Mongolian for “whipped cream” was dismissed by the Mongolian Embassy in Moscow, suggesting that

the ambiguity had deliberate political connotations. The lyrics also make

63 Fawkes, Helen. 2007. Eurovision Act Angers Ukrainians. BBC News Online, 2. April 2007

(accessed: 07. May 2015). 64 Taras Chornovil in Korrespondent, 14. March 2007. 65 N.N. 2007. Чорновилп Сердючка опозорит Украину. Fraza. 13. March 2007 (accessed: 07. May

2015).


128

reference to Maidan Square, where the political demonstrations of the Orange

Revolution took place. For pro-Russian Ukrainians and Russian nationalists

alike, the performance represented Ukrainian nationalism at its most vulgar.

In Ukraine, nationalists rejected Serduchka as a parody of the Ukrainian

nation. The character is said to be based on Soviet-era train conductors as well

as a caricature of middle aged women and is therefore a manifestation of

Sovietness which speaks to a larger post-Soviet space. Like most people moving

from the Ukrainian-speaking countryside to Russian-speaking cities,66

Serduchka uses a mixture of Ukrainian and Russian, reinforcing provincialism

thus conveying a reflexive irony towards Ukrainian nationhood.67

Serduchka’s linguistic transnationalism can be seen as a reflection of the disconnection between elite and public national identities, in that the

Ukrainian state imposed one official state language, Ukrainian, despite the

norm in many cities of commuting between languages. The choice of outfit,

with a silver star as the headpiece, ridicules a failed Soviet utopia and a parody

of the Soviet past,68 arguably arousing consternation amongst Russian

nationalists. The controversy Serduchka engendered is therefore a curious one;

by mimicking Sovietness, it links Ukraine to its past which is arguably what

some Ukrainian elites, namely from the west of the country, have been trying

to move away from since independence. Further reading of the performance,

which mixes languages frequently, often interchanging between Russian and

Ukrainian, suggests that the character of Serduchka may be entirely

representative of Ukraine, a country with often ambiguous national and

linguistic identities. Serduchka was seen as denigrating Ukrainians on

multiple levels – their folk culture, linguistic identity, and representations of

femininity.69 For Ukraine’s political elites the image of the country is paramount and Eurovision therefore is a platform which promotes a certain

narrative of the nation, the debates surrounding Serduchka exemplify this. The

rhetoric concerning Serduchka reflects wider debates in Ukrainian society with

regard to minority rights and the way the relationship with neighbouring

Russia is imagined given that the apparent parody of Soviet rule and the

timing of the performance, with ambiguous lyrics, which came at a particularly

tense time in Russian–Ukrainian relations.

Interpreting Ambiguity: a View from the Field

For many post-Soviet Russian speakers, Sovietness represents what Svetlana

чoym has called a “common place” (nostalgia for the past, before the unpredictability of the transition to a market economy).70 The 2007 Ukrainian

performance, parodying both the Soviet and post-Soviet eras (Serduchka the

character, the Soviet star headdress versus the ambiguous “Lasha Tumbai” /

“Russia Goodbye”), can be read on multiple levels. The responses from those interviewed in Ukraine provide an insight into the wider debates on Ukrainian

66 Yekelchyk, What Is Ukrainian About Ukraine’s Pop Culture?. 67 Miazhevich, Galina. 2012. Ukrainian Nation Branding Off-Line and Online: Verka Serduchka at

the Eurovision Song Contest. Europe–Asia Studies 64(8), 1505–23, 1513 68 Miazhevich, Ukrainian Nation Branding. 69 Yekelchyk, What Is Ukrainian About Ukraine’s Pop Culture?, 217. 70 Boym, Svetlana. 1994. Common Places: Mythologies of Everyday Life in Russia. Cambridge, MA:

Harvard University Press.

Paul Jordan

129

nationhood as well as a lack of congruence of national identity. Many expressed

a disconnection between the image that the act portrayed and the Ukraine they

felt should be showcased. One issue which manifests itself strongly in the

interviews is that the image of Ukraine is important; respondents care about

what the world thinks about their country, even when viewed through the gaze

of Eurovision. When questioned about their views on Serduchka representing

Ukraine in the ESC many respondents immediately returned the question;

“What is your opinion on this man?”71 Other respondents were more confident:

I think the image is not very positive, Eurovision maybe promotes

Ukraine but most of the people don’t like this singer Verka. He is a

man or a woman, we don’t understand. Ukraine is not Verka Serduchka and I don’t want to associate Ukraine with this, it’s shameful for Ukraine to have such a representative.72

Many other respondents flagged the fact that the artist himself, Andriy

Danylko, identifies as heterosexual, publicly at least, as well as the parodist

nature of the performance. Serduchka’s obvious masculinity beneath an unflattering female stage costume suggests that it was, unlike the Danish

entry that year (the drag act DQ), not commodity camp, even though it may be

been interpreted this way by foreign audiences. The repeated re-inscription

that Serduchka’s creator is heterosexual, as well as the general tone of the responses, provides an insight into social attitudes in Ukraine. Other

respondents were more pragmatic in their view:

I think they [critics of Serduchka] were taking the competition too

seriously, they thought that if Verka goes to the competition then

everyone would think Ukraine is a strange country, full of

transsexuals who dress up like women. This is too conservative.

These are people who take it too seriously. Eurovision is a fun

competition, in 2006 those monsters [Lordi] won. It’s a song competition but it’s also about the show, costumes and the entire

show. She did well so why not?73

I think they were scared that Europeans would not take Serduchka

or understand the humour. Ukrainian humour is a bit different

from European and English, it’s not as liberal or straightforward and people were afraid that there would be shame for the country.74

Closer reading of these responses suggests that there is a subtle rift between

the public and political elites in Ukraine regarding image, a reflection of a

wider public disconnection with the Orange Revolution government at the time.

Verka Serduchka’s “shameful” performance therefore shows the post-imperial

inferiority complex that some Ukrainians still suffer.75 In particular the use of

the term “hermaphrodite” by the politician Taras Chornovil demonstrates that

71 Valentin. Interview, Kyiv, 19. December 2007. 72 Anne, interview. 73 Volodymyr. Interview, Kyiv, 16. December 2007. 74 Olena, interview. 75 Donchenko, Evgeniya. N.D. Ukrainian Cindarella. WAVE: International Youth Magazine, no. 8.

(accessed: 07. May 2015).


130

the image Serduchka presented to Europe through the ESC was peripheral to

the heteronormative construction of national identity in Ukraine.

Performing Multiculturalism: Gaitana in ESC 2012

The nature of the discourse surrounding Verka Serduchka revealed unique

insights into ideals of masculinity in a post-Soviet context. The selection of the

singer Gaitana as Ukrainian representative in the 2012 ESC provoked further

controversy both in the country and across the wider media in Europe. The

singer, who is of Congolese descent, won the right to represent Ukraine after

winning the national selection, which consisted of 50% public telephone votes

and 50% jury. Gaitana is the first non-white performer to represent Ukraine in

the ESC. The song Be My Guest was an up-tempo number. Closer reading of

the lyrics of the song suggest that it sought to promote Ukraine as an open and

welcoming country to visitors:

Welcome! Stay with me, Be my friend, You are free, To live your life,

To share your love with world, You can count on me, Darling, I'm

your friend, I'll do anything for you, From the bottom of my heart, I

wish you, I wish you the best, You can be my guest, People be my

guest, Now you can be my guest!

Ukraine was indeed welcoming guests in 2012 as the host of the UEFA

European Football Championships. This presented Ukraine with an

opportunity to present a positive international image through both the gaze of

the international media and the tourists who would inevitably travel to the

country as spectators of the event. The song “Be My Guest” takes on significance when striking counter-narratives concerning underlying racism

amongst Ukrainian football fans are taken into account. Former English

football player Sol Campbell urged fans not to travel to the country because

they “could end up coming back in a coffin”.76 The Foreign Office advised fans

of African-Caribbean or цsian descent to take “extra care” when travelling to Ukraine. However, others such as Yuri Bender, a journalist in Kyiv, argued

that the allegations of racism in Ukraine had been sensationalised and were no

more acute in Ukraine than in other countries.77

Regardless of the truth of the matter, Gaitana’s participation in the ESC, wearing a traditional Ukrainian headdress, the vinok, represented a

performance of Ukrainian multiculturalism. However, this representation of

multiethnic Ukraine did not sit well with some political elites in the country.

Yuri Syrotyuk of the Freedom Party condemned the selection of Gaitana as the

Ukrainian ESC entry on the grounds that she was “not an organic representative of Ukrainian culture”п78

Millions of people who will be watching will see that Ukraine is

represented by a person who does not belong to our race […] The

76 Harding, Luke. 2012. Euro 2012 Turning Into PR Disaster for Ukraine as Racism Fears Scare off

Fans. The Guardian, 28. May 2012 (accessed: 07. May 2015). 77 Harding, Euro 2012. 78 Zhuk, Alyona. 2012. Racist Comments about Gaitana Stir Controversy. Kyiv Post, 21. February

2012 (accessed: 07. May 2015).

Paul Jordan

131

vision of Ukraine as a country located somewhere in remote Africa

will take root.79

Syrotyuk later claimed that he was merely criticising the lack of transparency

in the Ukrainian selection process. However the rhetoric engendered by

Gaitana’s selection reveals a more hard-line, nationalising element to

Ukrainian nation-building which had not been so apparent in, for instance,

Estonia, which won the ESC in 2001 with a black performer, Dave Benton.

This is curious given the restrictive citizenship policies in place in Estonia

towards the Russian-speaking minority. If Russians were to a certain extent

excluded from political life then it is not improbable that a black immigrant

would be too. This was not the case. Syrotyuk’s comments also fail to take account of the complex nature of the construction of Ukrainian identity. As

highlighted earlier in this article, many in Ukraine have fluidity in terms of

identity, and the narrative of Ukrainian nationhood does not speak with a

linear voice. Interestingly, the rhetoric from Syrotyuk was not necessarily

internalised by the Ukrainian public and all mainstream political parties and

several high-profile figures, including Ruslana, spoke out condemning such

comments. Gaitana herself spoke of her shame that the comments brought:

I was in tears, it was extremely hurtful. I was ashamed also because

of the image these comments would give to Ukraine. My country is

Ukraine, it is beautiful and people should visit and be our guest. I

am a Ukrainian as well as African girl. I am both.80

Arguably Ukraine is a multi-ethnic state, given its sizeable Russian speaking

population; however, like many post-communist states, the country does not

have an established black community. The response from Gaitana is therefore

rather uniqueр it is unlikely that such rhetoric (“I am a Ukrainian as well as

African”) would be repeated by a black чritish performer for example. The discourse from the singer is interesting in that she appears to almost justify

her existence as a Ukrainian. The attempt by political elites to argue that one

person does not represent Ukrainianness opens the door to questions

concerning what actually constitutes organic national identity in the Ukrainian

context. The furore that Gaitana’s entry into the ESC engendered therefore highlights a lack of congruence between Ukrainian nation-building and

multiculturalism in a post-Soviet context.

Conclusion

This article has examined the rhetoric concerning four Ukrainian entries in the

ESC. As such the ESC represents a site where cultural struggles over the

meaning of nationhood are performed. In the Ukrainian case the ESC is a

highly politicised event and has continued to reflect nationalist antagonisms in

the country. The ESC is a stage where the sensitivities of national identity in

Ukraine are performed. The Ukrainianness performed through entries such as

Ruslana and Greenjolly is that of an elite-level, western Ukrainian narrative of

79 Karpyak, Oleg. 2012. Ukraine’s Eurovision Entry Gaitana “цshamed” by Racism. BBC News

Online, 23. May 2012 (accessed: 07. May 2015). 80 Gaitana. Interview, Baku, 15. May 2012.


132

nationhood which arguably does not represent significant proportions of the

country. On the other hand, Verka Serduchka and Gaitana highlight the

contested nature of identity politics in Ukraine and exemplify the battleground

that Ukraine has become in terms of representing a unified narrative of that

identity. The nationalist antagonisms presented through Eurovision reflect the

wider discourses of the Ukrainian political scene. The ESC upholds the notion

of the nation-state as the primordial framework for identity, in-line with

nationalist discourses on statehood thus the ESC itself can viewed as a

platform for nationalism itself. The somewhat conflicting narratives on

nationhood in Ukraine reflect the overall ambiguity and complexity in defining

what Ukrainianness constitutes.

Ukrainian entries have continued to reflect narratives of identity and domestic

politics. The Ukrainian entry for the ESC in зеж4, “Tick Tock”, was essentially a metaphor for the tensions which are on-going as a result of the armed conflict

in Eastern Ukraine and the Russian annexation of Crimea. Ukraine withdrew

from the ESC in 2015 citing the on-going turmoil in the country as one of the

main reasons as well as financial pressures facing the national broadcaster.81A

process of nation-building is taking place in the country as it comes to terms

with destabilised borders and displaced internal migrants. Given the country’s previous record in the contest, if and when Ukraine ever returns to ESC it is

likely the domestic politics of the country will be performed on the

international stage. A comment from one respondent concerning Ukrainian

Eurovision entries provides a fitting closing remark to this article. The

Ukrainian narrative of identity at Eurovision can be seen as a metaphor for

wider political developments in the country, developments which, like

Ukrainian nation-building, are continuing to unfold.

In 2004 Ukraine was really wild, she was fed up with everything

but she was very positive and energetic so she produced Ruslana

and she produced the revolution. In 2005 she was so optimistic

about the future but not really professional so she produced

Greenjolly, Orange Government. In 2007 she is so cynical about

everything so she produced this chaotic democracy […] Verka Serduchka.82

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Skirting the issue: finding queer and

geopolitical belonging at the

Eurovision Song Contest Research Article

Jessica Carniel Lecturer in Humanities, University of Southern Queensland

[email protected]

http://www.suedosteuropa.uni-graz.at/cse/en/carniel





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Skirting the issue: finding queer and

geopolitical belonging at the


Jessica Carniel

This article examines how the ideological boundaries of East and West are built, maintained and challenged through the performance of sexual and other politics in the Eurovision Song Contest (ESC). It argues that the contest is a useful prism through which to examine and understand contemporary European debates about sexual politics, and the role that this plays in defining the borders of modern Europe and its conditions of belonging. The contest itself offers an important site for belonging to the European community both to states on the eastern margins and to queer communities throughout Europe. It examines examples of performances that have challenged sexual politics, such as the Finnish entry from 2013, as well as state responses to the queer dimensions of the contest, such as those from Russia and Azerbaijan. It concludes that different states may challenge the ESC rules on political gestures depending on their own status within the European community as well as the extent to which that gesture challenges or reaffirms “European” ideology. Keywords: sexual politics, human rights, Eurovision Song Contest

Introduction

It is widely acknowledged that, despite its glittery, wind-machined appearance, the Eurovision Song Contest (ESC) is a highly political event. Although the Eurovision Song Contest rulebook explicitly states that “No lyrics, speeches, gestures of a political or similar nature shall be permitted during the ESC”,1 various political messages have been encoded into songs and performances over the years, and enacted through the fairly entrenched voting blocs, which are based upon historical relationships, geographical proximity, transnational connection and ethno-religious affinity. Indeed, Eurovision has as much been a site for acting out the contentious geopolitics of post-WWII and post-Soviet Europe as it has been commercially imagined by the European Broadcasting

Jessica Carniel is a Lecturer in Humanities at the University of Southern Queensland, Australia, where she teaches on the history of Western ideas, ethics and human rights. Her broad research interests include Australian and global immigration, cosmopolitan cultures, sporting communities and identities, cultural studies and gender studies. She has published widely on gender and ethnic identities in literature and sports cultures in multicultural Australia. An avid Eurovision fan since childhood, thanks to Australia’s multicultural broadcaster SBS, she is interested in how the ESC has proliferated as a site for queer and cosmopolitan identities, and how Eurovision fans have emerged as a genuine and important fan subculture in Australia due to post-WWII immigration and the processes of cultural globalisation and telecommunications. 1 European Broadcasting Union. 2014. Rules of the 59th Eurovision Song Contest. Eurovision,1.2.2. (accessed: 17. April 2015).

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Union (EBU) as the song that unites Europe. Yet it could be argued, as this article contends, that in recent years this geopolitical tension has been further charged by the politics of social justice. Russia’s controversial “anti-gay laws”, in which it is illegal to spread so-called “gay propaganda”, has caused the nation to be a site of global protest, especially as Russia hosted such high-profile international events as the Winter Olympics in 2014 and the Eurovision Song Contest in 2009. Furthermore, the expansion of the event into the eastern margins of Europe, where legacies of Soviet ideologies intersect with contemporary Islam, has also fuelled tension over the role that liberal sexual politics play in defining modern Europe. Given the much-documented strong gay fan base for the Eurovision Song Contest, as well as its reputation for high camp, this article argues that the event has become an effective site for understanding contemporary European debates about gay rights and identity politics. This has been achieved in a manner that has somehow effectively skirted around the European Broadcasting Union’s ideas and rules about what constitutes political gestures and political causes. However, eluding these rules and regulations is dependent upon the status of the entrant’s state in “Europe” and the extent to which their political statement contributes or detracts from Europe’s defining and dominant ideologies. The article also explores how this movement is enacted in specific geopolitical dimensions that perhaps further exacerbates the political and socio-cultural divide between eastern and western Europe. Defining the borders of Europe through Eurovision

The very origins of the Eurovision Song Contest belie its political significance. Modelled on the Italian San Remo Festival, the ESC was conceived with the intent of uniting the nations of post-war Europe; its more prosaic intention was to promote the European Broadcasting Union’s Eurovision distribution network.2 The first contest, held in Switzerland in 1956, comprised seven EBU nations: Switzerland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Belgium, France, Italy and the Federal Republic of Germany. Although Denmark, Austria and the United Kingdom were also part of the network and did screen the contest, they did not register in time to participate.3 This post-WWII, Cold War historical context of Eurovision’s origins places the contest firmly within an implicit set of Western European values. The fact that the Soviet bloc established its own song contest in 1977, the Intervision Song Contest,4 only serves to reinforce the symbolic status of Eurovision as a Western European cultural (and implicitly political) event. The history of Eurovision and its participants nonetheless presents a significant challenge to binary understandings of the East and the West and to

2 O’Connor, Kennedy John. 2005. The Eurovision Song Contest: the Official History. Sydney: Carlton Books, 8. 3 O’Connor, The Eurovision Song Contest, 8. 4 Raykoff, Ivan and Robert Deam Tobin. 2007. Introduction, in A Song for Europe: Popular Music

and Politics in the Eurovision Song Contest, edited by Raykoff, Ivan and Robert Deam Tobin. Aldershot: Ashgate, xvii.

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the implicit values within this.5 The list of contestants and founding nations of the EBU paints a specific portrait of post-war “Europe” that is also firmly located within an historical alignment of Europe with the West, but as the contest has evolved and the list of EBU member nations has grown the implicit meanings of “Europe” and “Europeanness” in Eurovision have shifted significantly. Many newcomers to the Eurovision audience are often astounded to see entries from countries such as Israel and Azerbaijan, as these nations do not fit into their idea of what constitutes “Europe”. Even when the EBU eligibility is explained,6 this membership can still be understood as different or distinct to “actual” membership in Europe and its community, revealing particular cultural, linguistic and religious assumptions about what constitutes a European nation.7 EBU membership is seen as an economic or commercial relationship, which results from considering television as a business enterprise in addition to a cultural venture. Television and radio broadcasting, as well as the arts and popular culture more broadly, are important sites of cultural exchange that can foster a sense of shared identity, community and citizenship.8 Karen Fricker and Milija Gluhovic argue that the ESC specifically is an ongoing and historical “symbolic contact zone”9 for European countries that facilitates these processes of exchange and communal identity formation. The very concept of “Europe” itself has historically shifting borders that suggest an ongoing interplay between the persistent binary of its eastern and western reaches. As Etienne Balibar states, “Europe has never been a closed

space since it emerged as a historical reality and will never become one”; its borders are “arbitrary”.10 Geographically, the European and Asian continents are conjoined, virtually indistinguishable, which Balibar has described as the “un-limited character of the European ‘continent’”.11 This is illustrated further in the post-Cold War era as “Europe” expands to incorporate Turkey and former Soviet states that are geographically proximate but are considered by some to be ideologically different on the basis of assumptions about historical and cultural specificity. Even the mythology of Europe suggests an ambiguous cultural origin and geographical identity. Anthony Pagden’s wry account of Europe’s Eastern origins perhaps illustrates this best: “an abducted Asian woman gave Europe her name; a vagrant Asian exile gave Europe its political and finally its cultural identity; and an Asian prophet gave Europe its

5 Fricker, Karen and Milija Gluhovic. 2013. Introduction: Eurovision and the “New” Europe, in Performing the “New” Europe: Identities, Feelings and Politics in the Eurovision Song Contest, edited by Fricker, Karen and Milija Gluhovic. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 17. 6 For an explanation of admission guidelines for the EBU, see European Broadcasting Union, Admission, 2015 (accessed: 8. April 2015). See also the explanation for Eurovision participation provided on the Eurovision website: Eurovision.tv Which Countries Can Take Part?, 2015.

(accessed: 8. April 2015). 7 See, for example, discussions of such perceptions in the popular press, many of which focus on the perennially popular question of why Israel is a Eurovision contestant: Denham, Jess. 2014. Eurovision 2014 Voting: Why is it So Political?. The Independent, 1. May 2014 (accessed: 15. April 2015); Westbrook, Caroline. 2012. It’s the Eurovision Song Contest, not the European Song Contest. Metro, 24. May 2012 (accessed: 15. April 2015). 8 Fricker and Gluhovic, Introduction, 2. 9 Fricker and Gluhovic, Introduction, 3. 10 Balibar, Etienne. 2009. Ideas of Europe: Civilization and Constitution. Iris 1(1), 3–17, 6–7. Original emphasis. 11 Balibar, Ideas of Europe, 6. Original emphasis.

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religion”.12 Furthermore, the processes of colonisation and immigration have led to the permeation of various European cultures across the world, which arguably further expands the reaches of “Europe”, its culture and its ideologies. This has in turn influenced the reach and appeal of the ESC. As Ivan Raykoff highlights, the Middle Eastern contingent of the ESC is a natural result of French colonialism and British presence in the region during the formative years of the EBU,13 while Eurovision’s Australian audience is the result of significant waves of post-war European migration and a government policy of multiculturalism that facilitated transnational cultural connection through the establishment of a dedicated multicultural broadcaster, SBS, which subscribes to EBU content. Despite the apparent arbitrariness of European borders observed by Balibar, and by extension the borders of the EBU, there is resistance against incorporating historical differences into its definition. The distinction between East and West lingers in the political and cultural imaginary, which is in turn reflected and challenged by the Eurovision Song Contest. Ivan Raykoff and Robert Deam Tobin argue that the contest provides literal and figurative access to an ideal of post-war, modern European society that is “democratic, capitalist, peace-loving, multicultural, sexually liberated and technologically advanced.”14 This provides a significant challenge for the newer European states that are seeking belonging within the European community, or older states seeking to maintain their status in a changing social and political environment, while simultaneously developing and maintaining an individual national culture and identity that may at times be at odds with those modern European values outlined above by Raykoff and Tobin, particularly around issues of sexuality. Éric Fassin’s appropriation of Samuel Huntington’s “clash of civilisations” thesis as a sexual clash of civilisations clearly indicates the importance of gender and sexual politics in understanding modern geopolitical affiliations, particularly within Europe.15 The idea that sexual politics are an important ideological boundary has also been taken up in Jasbir Puar’s concept of “homonationalism”, which addresses the normalisation of queer politics and identities into nationalist discourse and its utilisation in delineating the boundaries between the progressive West and the oppressive ‘other’.16 While this other is increasingly stereotyped as Islamic in post-9/11 discourses, Conor O’Dwyer’s examination of gay rights movements in Poland highlights how other historical and socio-political differences are also at play. Specifically, the tension between the liberal West and post-communist East can also result in a potential backlash against European Union (EU) expectations. O’Dwyer found this clash of norms to be productive in the Polish context, but warns that in

12 Pagden, Anthony. 2002. The Idea of Europe from Antiquity to the European Union. Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 35. 13 Raykoff, Ivan. 2007. Camping on the Borders of Europe, in A Song for Europe: Popular Music and

Politics in the Eurovision Song Contest, edited by Raykoff, Ivan and Robert Deam Tobin. Aldershot: Ashgate, 1-12, 2. 14 Raykoff and Tobin, Introduction, xviii. 15 Fassin, Éric. 2010. National Identities and Transnational Intimacies: Sexual Democracy and the Politics of Immigration in Europe. Public Culture 22(3), 507–29, 509. 16 Puar, Jasbir. 2013. Rethinking Homonationalism. International Journal of Middle East Studies 45(2), 336–9.


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other places could result in a threat to minority rights.17 The announced revival of the Intervision Song Contest in 2014 in partial response to the victory of Conchita Wurst underlines two key issues: there is an ongoing sense of ideological affinity amongst the former Soviet states, and sexual politics plays an important role in defining these boundaries.18 Sexual politics has thus become a means of redefining ideological borders and is, quite literally for some political and economic organisations such as the EU and Council of Europe, a condition of belonging in “Europe”, as will be discussed later in relation to Azerbaijan. As such, attitudes to sexuality expressed and performed at Eurovision as a significant site of cultural exchange are charged with political value that can be the cause of tension or, more optimistically, harnessed positively. As Milija Gluhovic observes, “this European cultural performance can serve as a productive locus of tension over gender/sexuality versus cultural/religious identity in the service of a more progressive image of Europe.”19 The soft and hard politics of the ESC

Despite the contest’s rule against political statements and gestures, European politics have played an important part of the culture of the ESC. For example, amongst the more notorious characteristics of the ESC is the practice of collusive or bloc voting, in which certain culturally and politically aligned countries “swap” votes with one another.20 In some instances the underlying reason is regional, such as amongst the Scandinavian nations. In others, such as the Eastern bloc, regional affiliations may be further influenced by other historical connections, such as an ongoing sense of political or cultural affinity in the post-Soviet Eastern margins, while the German-Turkish bloc reflects the effects of migration flows on communities’ sense of cultural identity and loyalty.21 In rarer instances, arguably minimised by changes to voting rules and practices that allow for popular votes from audiences, countries may be either “punished” or “rewarded” with votes in relation to current political issues. Eurovision has also been the launching pad for the political careers of several contestants: Norway’s 1966 contestant, Åse Kleveland, later became the minister of culture; Ireland’s winner, Dana, became a member of the European Parliament in the late 1990s; and the 2004 winner Ruslana also

17 O’Dwyer, Conor. 2012. Does the EU Help or Hinder Gay-Rights Movements in Post-Communist Europe? The Case of Poland. East European Politics 28(4), 332–52, 333. 18 Barlett Paul. 2014. Bearded Lady Spurs Russia to Revive Soviet-Era Song Contest. Eurasianet.org, 23. May 2014 (accessed: 15. April 2015). 19 Gluhovic, Milija. 2013. Sing for Democracy: Human Rights and Sexuality Discourse in the

Eurovision Song Contest, in Performing the “New” Europe: Identities, Feelings and Politics in the Eurovision Song Contest, edited by Fricker, Karen and Milija Gluhovic. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 194–217, 195. 20 Ginsburgh, Victor and Abdul G. Noury. 2008. “The Eurovision Song Contest: Is Voting Political or Cultural?”. European Journal of Political Economy 24(1), 41–52, 42. 21 For research into the various voting blocs, see Christensen, Miyase and Christian Christensen. 2008. The After-Life of Eurovision 2003: Turkish and European Social Imaginaries and Ephemeral Communicative Space. Popular Communication 6(3), 155–72; Dekker, Anthony. 2007. The Eurovision Song Contest as a “Friendship” Network. Connections 27(3), 53–8; Spierdijk, Laura and Michel Vellekoop. 2006. Geography, Culture, and Religion: Explaining the Bias in Eurovision Song

Contest Voting. Twente: Department of Applied Mathematics, Faculty of EEMCS, University of Twente. Memorandum No. 1794.

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secured a seat in the Ukrainian parliament after actively endorsing the Orange Revolution, and has been an activist on various human rights issues. Politics have also not been entirely absent from the songs themselves. Italy’s winning entry in 1990, “Insieme: 1992”, sung by Toto Cutugno, was one of several songs in the early 1990s that sought to invoke the changing face of Europe with the fall of the Berlin Wall and the dismantling of the USSR.22 While the politics of “Insieme: 1992” were probably soft enough to be palatable for audiences and passable to auditors, producers requested that Ukraine revise the overtly political lyrics of their 2005 entry, perhaps unsurprisingly as it was also the anthem of the Orange Revolution.23 Although not overtly political in its actual performance, Portugal’s entry in the 1974 competition was used as a secret signal to begin the coup known as the Carnation Revolution. In the same year, Gigliola Cinquetti’s “Sì” was subject to censorship in her home state of Italy as a referendum on a liberalised divorce law was due to be held, and it was feared that the song could be interpreted as a political statement in favour of the laws, thus influencing voters.24 Although applauded by the Israeli president for their contribution to the nation and to peace,25 Noa and Mira Awad’s 2009 Israeli entry, “There Must Be Another

Way”, courted controversy due to Awad’s Arab ethnicity and the use of Arabic in the song. Also including lyrics in English and Hebrew, the song provides no direct political commentary but is thematically preoccupied with peace and respect for humanity. Iceland’s 2014 entry, Pollapönk’s “No Prejudice”, also sought to draw attention to respect and social justice and succeeded in a much less controversial manner. These examples illustrate how broad commentary on ideologies core to “European” human rights and social justice can slip past the ESC rules and regulations, while songs relating to specific political situations are subjected to greater scrutiny. The politics of kissing: performing gender politics on the Eurovision

stage

Eurovision’s gender politics have gained prominence since the 1990s and are arguably increasingly important as human rights issues pertaining to sexuality have increased in global importance, and the ESC’s queer audience have garnered more attention. Various scholars have observed that Dana International’s winning performance of “Diva” for Israel in 1998 symbolised Eurovision’s “coming out”. Prior to this, Eurovision’s gay appeal, while present, was considered closeted.26 Eurovision’s camp aesthetic, which remains a large

22 Raykoff, Camping on the Borders, 44. 23 Heller, Dana. 2007. t.A.T.u. You! Russia, the Global Politics of Eurovision, and Lesbian Pop. Popular Music 26(2), 195–210, 203. 24 Wolther, Irving. 2012. More Than Just Music: the Seven Dimensions of the Eurovision Song Contest. Popular Music 31(1), 165–71, 168. 25 Webb, Glen. 2009. Israel: Noa & Mira to Moscow with Einaiych. Eurovision,tv, 2. March 2009

(accessed: 15. April 2015). 26 Cassiday A., Julie. 2014. Post-Soviet Pop Goes Gay: Russia’s Trajectory to Eurovision Victory. The Russian Review 73(1), 1–23, 8; Motschenbacher, Heiko. 2013. “Now Everybody Can Wear a Skirt”: Linguistic Constructions of Non-Heteronormativity at Eurovision Song Contest Press Conferences. Discourse and Society 24(5), 590–614, 593; Singleton, Brian / Karen Fricker and Elena Moreo. 2007. Performing the Queer Network: Fans and Families at the Eurovision Song Contest. SQS: Journal of Queer Studies in Finland 12–24, 12, 19 (accessed: 15. April 2015).


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part of its appeal to its gay audience, has become increasingly overt in recent years. Ukraine’s Verka Serduchka is considered by many to be a pinnacle of Eurovision camp that at once plays with gender politics, by virtue of its drag queen artist, and the harder politics of Ukrainian tensions with Russia.27 Yet the camp aesthetic does not completely contain the appeal and importance of Eurovision for the gay and queer communities of Europe. As Peter Rehberg observes, Eurovision “certainly provides the opportunity for queer people to experience a feeling of belonging on both the national and transnational level, which is rendered more complicated or foreclosed in other cultural mainstream contexts and the public sphere in general.”28 In short, it is a site where the idea of “European citizen” is open to those otherwise marginalised. As equality on the grounds of sexual orientation increases in importance throughout Europe and the world, such politics begin to permeate the concerns of the songwriters and performers, just as they have been preoccupied with other political trends, such as, in the early 1990s,the aftermath of the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. Finland’s Krista Siegfrids’s performance of “Marry Me” in the 2013 ESC provides a significant text for examining the gender politics of Eurovision and its role in instigating debate about significant issues in queer human rights and social justice. In her live performance, Siegfrids is surrounded by female backup dancers dressed as male wedding attendants, who later reveal bridesmaid dresses under their suits. Two female backup singers dressed in highly stylised, 1940s-inspired outfits accompany her. This ostensible paean to the heterosexual institution of marriage is subverted by a kiss shared between Siegfrids and one of the backup singers. (Such public kisses between women are referred to popularly and in the media as “lesbian kisses”, regardless of the sexual orientation and identities of the women involved. Use of the term to refer to kisses between women seeks to draw upon this popular discourse, but is acknowledged to be misrepresentative and problematic.) The live performance contrasts against the official music video for the song, in which Siegfrids aggressively pursues her recalcitrant boyfriend with the assistance of her leather-clad female friends, one of whom Siegfrids slaps suggestively on the bottom as she passes her to enter the awaiting car. While certainly more heteronormative than the live performance, Siegfrids’s slap on her friend’s behind suggests the possibility of a more fluid sexuality, even as she pursues marriage to a man; conversely, the slap occurs in the presence of male onlookers, which could also suggest a performance of queer sexuality for a male gaze. While the live performance of “Marry Me” was derided by some as too kitsch, it was nevertheless a pointed statement regarding gay marriage rights throughout Europe. The kiss was a highly publicised dimension of Siegfrids’s performance. According to the rules of the ESC, the stage performance at the finals must be identical to the dress rehearsals. The kiss was thus a known element of the performance, featured in press coverage of the rehearsals, and one that had passed the scrutiny of the officials despite complaints from more conservative

27 Rehberg, Peter and Mikko Tuhkanen. 2007. Danzing Time: Dissociative Camp and European Synchrony. SQS: Journal of Queer Studies in Finland 12, 43–59 (accessed: 12. April 2015). 28 Rehberg, Peter. 2013. Taken by a Stranger: How Queerness Haunts Germany at Eurovision, in Performing the “New” Europe: Identities, Feelings and Politics in the Eurovision Song Contest, edited by Fricker, Karen and Milija Gluhovic. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 178–93, 178.

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countries that the kiss broke the ESC rule regarding political statements. In response to these complaints, Siegfrids stated, “I don’t think ‘Marry Me’ is political. It’s about love and tolerance. But gay marriage is not allowed in Finland and that’s wrong. I wanted to make a statement about that.”29 The Turkish and Greek media disagreed that the kiss was not political, citing the rule about political gestures and bringing the contest into disrepute in their criticisms of her actions.30 Turkey cancelled its broadcast of the event, citing poor ratings, while gay activists outside of Turkey claimed it was due to the media furore over the kiss.31 Siegfrids’s statement was in response to the failure of a Finnish marriage equality bill in 2012, which the Finnish parliament eventually passed in December 2014 by a narrow vote of 102 in favour and 92 against. The act removed the distinction between same-sex unions and heterosexual marriage, affording same-sex couples equal rights in adoption and shared surnames.32 Prior to this change, Finland was the only country in the Nordic region to have maintained conservative marriage laws, although registered partnerships between same-sex couples had been permitted since 2002.33 While Scandinavia holds, in the global imaginary, a reputation for being more socially progressive than other parts of Europe, Finland’s stance on homosexuality had, until the passing of the 2014 bill, been slightly more conservative in comparison to its Nordic neighbours. This is due in part to conservative, often religious-based aspects of traditional Finnish culture and to Finland’s geopolitical status as a boundary between progressive Scandinavia (and by extension the West) and Soviet Russia. As Jens Rydstrom explains, Finland’s geography placed it in a precarious political position during the Cold War, with significant repercussions for its internal politics, including its approach to social issues, such as gay rights.34 Homosexuality was constructed as a foreign concept – specifically “something that was done in Sweden”35 – much in the same way that is has continued to be constructed as a foreign import in Russian discourse about homosexuality.36 Siegfrids’s onstage kiss is evocative of fellow Eurovision contestants t.A.T.u, an established Russian pop act who gained global notoriety for their faux lesbian antics both on stage and in their music videos prior to their appearance as contestants in the 2003 ESC at Riga. Comprised of Lena Katina and Yulia Volkova, t.A.T.u emerged in the 1990s as a contrived girl band that deliberately played with faux lesbianism as a commercial ploy that was openly

29 Wyatt, Daisy. 2013. Eurovision 2013 to Feature First Lesbian Kiss in Protest Against Lack of Gay Marriage Legislation. The Independent, 17. May 2013 (accessed: 15. April 2015). 30 Glennie, Alasdair and Laura Cox. 2013. Finnish Entrant Krista Siegfrids Stokes Controversy in Eurovision with On-Stage Kiss During ”Lesbian Wedding”. The Daily Mail, 18. May 2013 (accessed 15. April 2015). 31 Morgan, Joe and Dan Littauer. 2013. Turkey Cancels Eurovision Song Contest over Lesbian Kiss, GayStarNews, 16. May 2013. (accessed: 17. April 2015). 32 Rosendahl, Jussi and Anna Ercanbrack. 2014. Finland Votes to Legalize Same-Sex Marriage. Reuters, 28. November 2014 (accessed: 17. April 2015). 33 Jussi and Ercanbrack, Finland Votes to Legalize Same-Sex Marriage. 34 Rydström, Jens. 2011. Odd Couples: a History of Gay Marriage in Scandinavia. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 63. 35 Rydström, Odd Couples, 63. 36 Baer, Brian James. 2011. Queer Russia: Othering the Other of the West, in Queer in Europe:

Contemporary Case Studies, edited by Downing, Lisa and Robert Gillett. Farnham: Ashgate, 3.


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acknowledged in Russia by both the performers and their management.37 In 2003, they gained success beyond Russia with their single, “All The Things She

Said” and its follow-up, “Not Gonna Get Us”. They were selected to represent Russia in the 2003 ESC in the hopes that an internationally-recognised act still experiencing global popularity would secure a Eurovision victory.38 While t.A.T.u were bookmakers’ favourites to win and did achieve third place, their unprofessional behaviour in the lead-up to the contest, such as arriving late to the required dress rehearsals in Riga and insolent attitudes in press conferences, marred their reputations with contest officials and voters prior to their lacklustre and off-key performance at the finals. Unlike Siegfrids at Malmo, t.A.T.u did not kiss during their 2003 ESC performance. Beyond some handholding and a moment where Katina and Volkova knelt down together at the back of the stage and gazed at one another, t.A.T.u’s notorious antics were almost entirely absent. Although the performers were full of bluster in the days leading up to the contest, they were ultimately compliant with its rules and expectations when it came to the performance itself. Nevertheless, t.A.T.u attributed their loss to homophobia rather than to a poor performance that could not be saved by votes from an existing fan base. Yet, this rationalisation was at odds with Eurovision’s famed queer fan base and its significance for these gay viewers, even though t.A.T.u had been subject to homophobic criticisms throughout their career.39 Furthermore, such claims are undermined by t.A.T.u’s use of lesbianism as a spectacle of (male) heterosexual fantasy rather than a political statement. While t.A.T.u were not entirely apolitical – they were notoriously outspoken on the US involvement in Iraq and frequently articulate a strong Russian nationalism – their gender politics are rendered suspect by their exploitation of the image of lesbian desire as commercial product. As Heller observes, t.A.T.u were designed to be both titillating and offensive to everyone, including feminists and gay activists.40 While Siegfrids and t.A.T.u may hold acts of faux lesbianism in common, they differ significantly in terms of political intent. Even in performances where they did kiss and touch one another intimately, making statement on gender issues was never t.A.T.u’s intent, whereas it is central to Siegfrids’s 2013 performance, even if she denies that the act or statement is “political” by her understanding. In their analysis of queer public kissing, Charles E. Morris and John M. Sloop insist that same-sex kissing should be seen as “at once cultural representation and a political imperative.”41 Where straight kissing reaffirms heteronormative values and behaviour, same-sex kissing performed in public spaces disrupts these norms and “constitutes a paramount political performance”.42 Morris and Sloop focus on male-on-male kissing in their research, arguing that women kissing is far more tolerable in mainstream

37 Heller, t.A.T.u. You!, 203. 38 Heller, t.A.T.u. You!, 203. 39 Heller, t.A.T.u. You!, 203. 40 Heller, t.A.T.u. You!, 201. 41 Morris, Charles E., and John M. Sloop. 2006. “What Lips These Lips Have Kissed”: Refiguring the Politics of Queer Public Kissing. Communication and Critical/Cultural Studies 3(1), 1–26, 2. Original emphasis. 42 Morris and Sloop, “What Lips”, 3.

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society; they do not suggest that it is normalised but that it has been appropriated into male heterosexual fantasy, thus does not have the same political impact as two men kissing. Such an argument may rest upon context and audience. While not all Eurovision viewers are gay men, their prevalence within the audience alters the reception of the performance, which by Siegfrids’s own admission is targeted at a social issue of direct relevance to them, albeit not necessarily for the purpose of gaining votes. Placed within the camp pantomime of a wedding, Siegfrids’s relatively chaste kiss does not aim at titillating the straight male gaze (nor even the queer female gaze); it is a political performance that seeks to disrupt the idea that the institution of marriage itself, and the desire to enter into it, is the sole domain of heterosexuality. Conversely, t.A.T.u objectify lesbian sexuality for the purpose of fulfilling heterosexual male fantasy, and in doing so reaffirm heteronormative values. Their faux lesbian performance was political only inasmuch that its contrivance strikes out at Western identity politics, as Heller argues, and illustrates how such a politics had not developed in Russia as it had in the West.43 As Brian James Baer observes, homosexuality in Russia is “inscribed with Western hegemonic claims”;44 within this particular discourse, to align with gay identities and activism, therefore, is to align with Western ideology and to abandon Russianness, although some activist movements in post-Soviet Russia do work to legitimate homosexuality within this idea of Russianness and vice versa.45 The politics of t.A.T.u’s Eurovision performance is thus couched in the more traditional terms of national identity and foreign relations than sexual politics. Their song selection and performance was emblematic of Russia’s relationship with the West. By singing in Russian and flouting the contest rules in the lead-up to the event, t.A.T.u (and Russia) alienated their non-Russian voting audiences and articulated an historical Russian defiance of and disdain for dominant Western culture and politics.46 Declaring themselves “Russian body and soul”, the open secret of the inauthenticity of t.A.T.u’s performance of lesbianism becomes a joke at the expense of pop music marketing as a product of the West itself, and a statement of “Russian immunity and superiority”.47 Nevertheless, as Julie Cassiday has argued, t.A.T.u signify the beginning of Russia’s “gay trajectory” throughout the 2000s, culminating in Dima Bilan’s 2008 homoeroticised performance of “Believe”, in which he was accompanied by a virtuoso violinist and a champion figure-skater, both of whom were male. Expanding upon Yana Meerzon and Dmitri Priven’s contention that Russia developed a deliberate strategy for winning Eurovision, Cassiday argues Russia “went gay” throughout the 2000s for the purpose of winning a contest renowned for its gay audience and camp aesthetic. While Meerzon and Priven provide a useful analysis of Russia’s shifting geopolitics and its strategic use of international events like the ESC to promote a specific image of a modern,

43 Heller, t.A.T.u. You!, 208. 44 Baer, Queer Russia, 3. 45 Baer, Brian James. 2002. Russian Gays/Western Gaze: Mapping (Homo)Sexual Desire in Post-Soviet Russia. GLQ: A Journal of Lesbian and Gay Studies 8(4), 499–521, 503–4. 46 Heller, t.A.T.u. You!, 203. 47 Heller, t.A.T.u. You!, 208.


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post-Soviet Russia, they fail to tease out concepts used in their analysis, such as “progressive” and “tolerant”, in light of Russia’s reputation for social and cultural oppression, particularly in relation to gender issues. Furthermore, they overlook the camp dimensions of Eurovision and its gay fan base, which responded to the “seductive spectacle of masculine virtuosity and vanity”48 in Bilan’s ESC performance. As a consequence, Meerzon and Priven’s analysis of recent entries such as Bilan and the Buranovo Grannies in 2012, as well as the earlier performance by t.A.T.u, is fairly conservative, failing to acknowledge how ideas of tradition, nostalgia and wholesomeness hark back to more conservative and heteronormative gender politics. Such dimensions are explored more successfully in Cassiday’s analysis of camp and queerness in Russia’s Eurovision acts from t.A.T.u to Bilan. She emphasises that the gay trajectory evident in the entries of the 2000s had little to do with the reality of Russian LGBT identities and politics, as the increasing queerness of Russia’s Eurovision entries is in stark contrast to the increase in state-sanctioned homophobia that occurred at the same time. Russia has abandoned or perhaps completely reversed its strategy of queer performance since Bilan’s 2008 victory; performances since then, such as Bilan’s reprise of “Believe” at the 2009 ESC opening ceremony in Moscow and the Buranovo Grannies of 2012, have exhibited “blatant heteronormativity”.49 Eurovision and homonationalism: redefining ideological boundaries

between the West and the rest

Russia’s strategic deployment of the gay trajectory highlights the importance of sexual politics to not just to Eurovision victory but also to Western socio-political identity. Jasbir Puar’s conceptual framework of homonationalism is useful for understanding how and why such a gay trajectory would be useful for securing a victory from Western European audiences. Short for “homonormative nationalism”,50 the concept denotes how acceptance or tolerance of previously marginalised sexualities has become a criterion for legitimating national sovereignty in both domestic and global discourses. Puar developed the term out of frustration with traditional constructions of the nation as heteronormative,51 which did not adequately reflect the complex interactions between queer politics, nationalism and global relations. She argues that homonationalism is “a facet of modernity and a historical shift marked by the entrance of (some) homosexual bodies as worthy of protection by nation-states, a constitutive and fundamental reorientation of the relationship between the state, capitalism, and sexuality.”52 It produces particular narratives of progress and modernity that can be used to delineate and evaluate political difference within and between nation-states based upon their attitudes to queer identities and the access queer subjects have to civil and human rights. In other words, homonationalism has become a way of distinguishing between the liberal, democratic West and the rest. Homonationalism’s more cynical corollary “pinkwashing” refers to the strategic

48 Cassiday, Post-Soviet Pop Goes Gay, 15. 49 Cassiday, Post-Soviet Pop Goes Gay, 17. 50 Puar, Jasbir K. 2007. Terrorist Assemblages: Homonationalism in Queer Times. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 38. 51 Puar, Rethinking Homonationalism, 336. 52 Puar, Rethinking Homonationalism, 337.

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appeal to queer-friendliness through marketing strategies; applications of this term to the Israel–Palestine conflict demonstrate the political implications of this appeal and its connections to homonationalist discourse.53 While homonationalism is useful for explaining how discourses of human rights and tolerance are used to differentiate between the liberal, progressive West and the rest, pinkwashing is an apt descriptor for Russia’s strategic appeal to liberal sexual politics in its attempt to secure a Eurovision victory and begin to lay the groundwork for its series of high-profile international events, such as the Winter Olympics and the upcoming 2018 FIFA World Cup. Arguably, however, recent controversies regarding homosexuality and human rights in Russia, such as the furore surrounding the Sochi Winter Olympics in 2014, suggest that Russia, having secured hosting rights for these events, currently has little need of the pinkwashing tactic but may return to it, depending on the international climate. Homonationalism can and should be seen as an extension of Orientalist discourses and conservative imperialist thought, particularly in the post-Cold War, post-9/11 climate of global Islamophobia. While there has been a shift in the focus of anxieties from Communism to religious and cultural difference, such anxieties nevertheless symbolise the West’s ongoing desire or need to define itself against an ideological other. The boundaries between the Western self and its shifting other, as well as the role of homonationalism within this, becomes particularly relevant as the EBU expands to include Muslim-majority nations, such as Turkey and Azerbaijan, alongside the growth of Muslim populations within other European states through the processes of immigration and settlement. Within some homonationalist discourses, pro-LGBT agendas have been co-opted into anti-Muslim sentiment in order to create a further ideological boundary between the West and the Islamic world; whereas in older colonialist/Orientalist discourses the practice of homosexuality was considered a mark of lack of civilisation in Middle Eastern nations, in the homonationalist reiteration of this tradition it is now oppression of these sexualities and rights that signify this lack.54 Homonationalism, as an extension or continuation of the Orientalist tradition that is concerned with issues of social justice, can also serve to highlight the imperialist dimensions to humanitarian and human rights discourses that serve to promote Western interests, including those pertaining to sexuality.55 Examining the intersections and contradictions between local LGBT activism in Azerbaijan and the deployment of human rights and sexuality discourses by foreign activists during the 2012 ESC at Baku, Gluhovic explores how sexuality discourse is used to construct and emphasise an image of a progressive (western) Europe that is at odds with the Eastern “margins”, which are in turn constructed as less progressive and, in some cases, oppressive. Even within

53 Puar, Rethinking Homonationalism, 337–8. 54 Gluhovic, Sing for Democracy, 196–7. 55 Gluhovic, Sing for Democracy, 198. For a more detailed discussion of the connections between humanitarianism and ideological interests, see: Barnett, Michael. 2013. Empire of Humanity: a

History of Humanitarianism. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press; Barnett, Michael and Thomas G. Weiss. 2008. Humanitarianism in Question: Politics, Power, Ethics. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press; Fassin, Didier. 2012. Humanitarian Reason: a Moral History of the Present Times Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.


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these Eastern European states, gay-friendliness is used to delineate important regional differences and to signify increased allegiance with Europe and its values; although there were several dissenting voices within Western press, particularly from exiled Azeris, some activists in Azerbaijan sketched a picture of an Azeri society that was relatively tolerant to homosexuality in comparison with its neighbours such as Iran. Iran, in turn, characterises Azerbaijan’s still relatively conservative attitudes to homosexuality as permissive, and as a degradation of morality resulting from their increased Westernisation and desire to construct themselves as a European nation.56 In fact, Azerbaijan’s hosting of Eurovision caused significant strain on the relationship between the two countries; Iran withdrew its ambassador from Azerbaijan after clerics criticised the event and characterised it as a “gay parade”, leading to the misunderstanding that a specific pride parade would be held as part of the event.57 Azerbaijan’s official position on homosexuality is a useful barometer of its shifting position within the international community, although its acceptance and tolerance at a grassroots or societal level is more complex than the laws might suggest. The nation’s original laws against homosexuality were residual of its Soviet membership rather than pre-Soviet Azeri legal tradition. In Soviet discourse, Muslim-majority states, such as Azerbaijan, were sites of “Eastern” (homo)sexual perversion due to their bathhouse cultures.58 The elimination of such practices with the expansion of Soviet ideology into these zones was part of Russia’s “civilising mission”,59 and reflects the same Orientalism that permeates current Western human rights discourse.60 Anti-sodomy laws were introduced in Azerbaijan in 1923, with similar laws passed in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan in 1926 and 1927 respectively as a result of Soviet expansion.61 Just as anti-sodomy laws were a mark of Soviet membership, repeal of these laws was a condition of European membership, because the Council of Europe requires its member states to assure certain human rights and democratic standards. In order to join the Council in 2001, Azerbaijan reviewed its criminal code, which included the excision of the anti-sodomy article. It should be noted, however, that expansion of gay and lesbian rights into equal civil rights and anti-discrimination policy does not feature amongst Azerbaijan’s further commitments to the Council and its various human rights projects.62 Reluctance to progress on these issues is perhaps a more accurate reflection of attitudes to homosexuality in Azerbaijan than the change to legislation suggests. In 2010, Azeri officials in the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) boycotted debates about same-sex marriage and

56 Kotecha, Hema. 2006. Islamic and Ethnic Identities in Azerbaijan: Emerging Trends and

Tensions. Baku: Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, 28. 57 Jussi and Ercanbrack, Finland Votes to Legalize Same-Sex Marriage. 58 Healey, Dan. 2003. What Can We Learn From the History of Homosexuality in Russia?. History

Compass 1(1), 1–6, 2. 59 Healey, What Can We Learn, 4. 60 Gluhovic, Sing for Democracy, 198. 61 Dan, Healey. 2002. Homosexual Existence and Existing Socialism: New Light on the Repression of Male Homosexuality in Stalin’s Russia. GLQ: a Journal of Lesbian and Gay Studies 8(3), 349–78, 357. 62 Council of Europe. Azerbaijan: Member State (accessed: 17. April 2015).

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discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation.63 As the chair of the parliamentary committee on social policy stated on the matter, “Yes, we have declared integration with European structures as our priority, but we must also protect our national and cultural values.”64 Azerbaijan was again in the PACE spotlight in May 2012 in the lead-up to the Baku ESC when the assembly adopted a resolution on Azerbaijan’s human rights situation in response to the furore surrounding the contest, including a condemnation of radical Islamist threats against the participants of the ESC and the LGBT community while “strongly support[ing] the secular identity of Azerbaijan and its free choice of foreign policy orientation”. The resolution also noted that the “violation of Azerbaijani citizens’ rights and freedoms goes against [the] goal” of using “the Eurovision Song Contest in Baku to promote Azerbaijan”.65 Thus, despite decriminalisation for the purpose of attaining membership in a European governing body, Azeri attitudes to homosexuality, as well as broader human rights breaches, highlight the tenuous nature of membership in this political community. Viewed through a homonationalist lens, it could be argued that states like Azerbaijan can adhere superficially to particular requirements in order to attain membership but will remain on the margins of that community until “European values” permeate beyond political and economic structures. Alternatively, Azerbaijan could use its pre-Soviet history of non-heteronormative practices, as discussed above, to redefine ideas about sexuality within an Azeri cultural context that affirms national identity while aligning with “European values”. The stance articulated by these politicians reflects the significant residual intolerance to homosexuality that remains in Azeri society. Several factors combined, specifically religion, international relations and history, can be used to understand these attitudes. Islam is the dominant religion in the otherwise secular state,66 but it is important not to fall into the trap of simply dismissing Islam as a monolithic entity with singular views and impacts. Religion is complicated by regional politics and history; in the case of Azerbaijan, the practice and influence of Islam is complicated by its relationships with Russia and Iran discussed above. It is important to emphasise that religious conservatism, while present in Azerbaijan, appears to be more frequently associated with anxiety about Iranian regional influence rather than an accurate reflection of Azeri religious views.67 Conversely, as previously discussed, Iran decries Azerbaijan’s permissiveness on this issue, evidenced by its decriminalisation and tolerance of the gay culture associated with Eurovision, as a negative sign of their Westernisation and abandonment of Islamic values. Such attitudes were exemplified by the diplomatic furore

63 Littauer, Dan. 2012. The Truth about Gay Life in Azerbaijan outside of the Eurovision Song Contest. PinkNews, 27. May 2012 (accessed: 17. April 2015). 64 Littauer, The Truth about Gay Life. 65 PACE. European Parliament Resolution on Azerbaijan, 2012/2654(RSP) (accessed: 12. April 2015). 66 Cordier, De Bruno. 2014. Islamic Social Activism, Globalization and Social Change: a Case Study of Hajji İlgar İbragimoğlu and the Cüma Ehli in Baku, Azerbaijan. Journal of Muslim Minority

Affairs 34(2), 136. De Cordier reports an increase in declaration of Muslim identity in Azerbaijan since 1998. 67 Kotecha, Islamic and Ethnic Identities in Azerbaijan.


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caused by the Baku ESC.68 The legacy of the Soviet era must be acknowledged for playing a significant role in stigmatising homosexuality in the Caucasus, which is perhaps now strengthened by some anti-gay discourses in global circulation. As with other national contexts, the result of this combined history, religious presence and contemporary international relations is that, while homosexuality is legal in Azerbaijan, it does not follow that it is socially acceptable. As the Azeri author Alekper Aliyev explains,

People here don't mind, as long as it's not in their family. There are several

openly gay celebrities in Baku who have money and bodyguards, and they are

safe. But nothing will change for the majority of gays, particularly in the

provinces. This society will never accept them.69 Such an observation not only demonstrates the power of socio-economic status in providing protection to marginalised groups but also the gulf between legislative and societal change and between decriminalisation and substantive protection of civil rights. While homosexuals in Azerbaijan have the same age of consent as heterosexuals, and can openly serve in the military, they are not protected by anti-discrimination laws, do not have access to marriage or civil unions, and do not have equal access to adoption and IVF. Azeri activists’ refuting of the presence or extent of oppression within their society can, like Russia’s gay trajectory, be seen as an act of pinkwashing, but one motivated more by self-preservation than strategic marketing ploys, as they seek to maintain what rights and tolerance they do have within that society. Gluhovic goes as far to suggest that international attention to queer human rights and civil rights issues can be counterproductive for local activism, with particular ramifications for individuals within those local movements.70 According to Gluhovic, many Azeri activists distanced themselves from the Sing for Democracy campaign, which sought to highlight human rights abuses in Azerbaijan throughout the ESC event.71 He suggests that this distancing may have been from fear and intimidation, particularly given the threats circulating the local LGBT community; to protest could jeopardise their already tenuous place within Azeri civil society. This demonstrates the complexities of how and why homonationalist discourses can be deployed differently within a particular national context and within international contexts. Local Azeri activism for civil and human rights is (arguably) acceptable within the bounds of nation itself and can be used to argue for a modern, European Azeri national identity, but to participate in an international movement to condemn abuse of those rights is, to some officials, to align with foreign political values and therefore against the nation and state. For nations relegated discursively to be on the “margins” of “Europe”, like Azerbaijan, participation in Eurovision, let alone winning and hosting the competition symbolises belonging within the European community and, as a

68 ILGA-Europe. 2013. Azerbaijan, in ILGA-Europe Annual Review 2013. Brussels: ILGA-Europe, 55. 69 Newman, Dina. 2011. Eurovision 2012: Azerbaijan’s Gays Not Welcome at Home. BBC News

Online, 15 September 2011 (accessed: 17. April 2015). 70 Gluhovic, Sing for Democracy, 211. 71 Gluhovic, Sing for Democracy, 209–10.

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consequence, the West. It is also for many an important nation-building exercise. Conversely, Murad Ismayilov argues that, despite the various economic and political opportunities it offered, Eurovision actually interfered with Azerbaijan’s processes of nation-building and national identity formation, including its negotiation of a post-Soviet European identity within the West.72 Specifically, he argues that the everyday encounter with the diverse, middle-class Eurovision tourists necessitated a “re-appraisal of the many imaginaries […] the compatibility of values, habits and traditions [… of the] national cultural Self and the European – Western – Other.”73 The implication is that this re-appraisal would result in an emphasis of differences between the national Self and the Western Other rather than an affirmation of Azerbaijan’s Europeanness. While the LGBT dimensions of this encounter are relegated to a footnote in Ismayilov’s discussion, he does suggest that Western visitors’ “particular understanding of gender” would be amongst the more trivial reactions.74 Nevertheless, many have observed that the international spotlight on human rights issues in Azerbaijan, and the related PACE resolution on the matter, exacerbated this difference in the political realm. It jarred Azerbaijan’s political belonging to the European community as much as Eurovision affirmed Azerbaijan’s pop-cultural belonging. Western and Eastern perspectives on the encounter are important to consider: for the West it highlighted the importance of human rights issues, including equal rights for LGBT citizens, in delineating its ideological borders and conditions of belonging; and for the East (as represented here by Azerbaijan) it highlighted the ongoing force of colonial and Orientalist discourses in Western European dealings with its Eastern fringe. Conclusion

As this exploration of several of the Eurovision performances and events has demonstrated, some of the more interesting explorations are occurring at the boundaries of East and West in both the soft politics of the ESC and the harder politics of nation-states and the organisations and institutions to which they belong. Despite its official rules against political statements in performances, there is still space on its stage (and in its staging) for political expression, albeit conditionally. While direct commentary or incitement on political issues in specific national contexts is censored, such as the Ukrainian entry of 2005, there remains room within this rule for broader statements that help to establish the ideological boundaries of “Europe” as a whole, without drawing explicit attention to its specific internal divisions, as can be seen in the cases of Toto Cutugno in 1990 and Noa and Mira in 2009. Krista Siegfrids’s on-stage kiss, while intended as a statement on the specific situation of Finland, is thus acceptable as it reinforces a broad liberal sexual ideology that has increasingly become part of the definition of modern Europe. Russia’s announced revival of the Intervision Song Contest demonstrates the importance of sexual politics in defining the ideologies of contemporary “Europe” and the reluctance of the more conservative states to be complicit with this, and it will warrant further investigation as this competition develops alongside Eurovision.

72 Ismayilov, Murad. 2012. State, Identity, and the Politics of Music: Eurovision and Nation-Building in Azerbaijan. Nationalities Papers 40(6), 833–51, 834. 73 Ismayilov, State, Identity, and the Politics of Music, 835. 74 Ismayilov, State, Identity, and the Politics of Music, 837.


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Eurovision is, by its very nature of bringing together diverse nations and cultures in an event that celebrates “Europe”, political. The various social, political and cultural concerns of the European citizenry find a place on its stage, which is a platform for nation building in its various overt and covert ways, and for requesting and expressing belonging to the European community. As discussed above, the modern tradition of Eurovision offers queer audiences an important opportunity to experience belonging to Europe. Perhaps ironically, this is an experience of Eurovision shared by both gay communities in Western Europe and the Eastern countries in which dominant social discourses about homosexuality are oppressive. The soft and hard political dimensions of the event are experienced differently according to a nation’s security in its belonging to Europe. In the case of the international concerns about Azerbaijan as a host, it demonstrates the very hard political limitations the nation faced for thinking about its identity as a Muslim state and as member state of Europe. For Finland, on the other hand, its membership in the progressive West, and the Nordic region more specifically, affords performers like Siegfrids the luxury of depoliticising their actions; while decried on the margins, the EBU’s approval of the so-called “lesbian kiss” implicitly established that in some cases and for some countries it was acceptable to reflect current concerns on the ESC stage. Importantly, Siegfrids’ kiss was acceptable because it re-affirmed equality as an important part of “European” – and by extension EBU – ideology. Even as the Eurovision Song Contest seeks its song to unite Europe, it remains a prism through which the EBU’s and the community’s shifting boundaries and power relations can be examined. Bibliography Baer, Brian James. 2002. “Russian gays/Western gaze: Mapping (homo) sexual

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Rydström, Jens. 2011. Odd Couples: a History of Gay Marriage in Scandinavia. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.

Singleton, Brian / Karen Fricker and Elena Moreo. 2007. Performing the Queer Network: Fans and Families at the Eurovision Song Contest. SQS: Journal

of Queer Studies in Finland 12, 12–24 (accessed: 17. April 2015). Spierdijk, Laura and Michel Vellekoop. 2006. Geography, Culture, and

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Queer to be kind: Exploring Western

media discourses about the “Eastern bloc” during the 2007 and 2014 Eurovision Song Contests Research Article

Alexej Ulbricht Teaching Fellow, SOAS, University of London, UK

[email protected]

Indraneel Sircar Postdoctoral Research Assistant, Queen Mary University of London, UK

[email protected]

Koen Slootmaeckers PhD Candidate, Queen Mary University of London, UK

[email protected]

http://www.suedosteuropa.uni-graz.at/cse/en/ulbricht_sircar_slootmaeckers





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Queer to be kind: Exploring Western

media discourses about the “Eastern bloc” during the 2007 and 2014

Eurovision Song Contests

Alexej Ulbricht Indraneel Sircar Koen Slootmaeckers*

This article examines the voting results and Western European media

coverage of the 2007 and 2014 Eurovision Song Contests. The Austrian

drag act Conchita Wurst (the alter ego of an openly gay man) won in 2014,

whilst Serbian entrant Marija Šerifović, portrayed in Western European

media as lesbian at the time, won in 2007. We first explore the extent to

which there was an East-West voting divide in both contests. In 2014,

while there was some elite hostility against Conchita in Eastern Europe,

the popular support was on a similar level to that in Western Europe. In

2007, we find no significant geographic divide in support for Šerifović. However, when we examine mainstream UK and German media coverage

during and after both contests, we find strong anti-Eastern European

discourses that are at odds with the similarity in the public voting. We

employ the concept of homonationalism to interrogate inconsistent

Western media discourses: the East was depicted as a site of homophobia

and the West as a site of tolerance in 2014, whilst the queer aesthetic /

identity of Šerifović was largely overlooked in 2007.

Keywords: homonationalism, queer politics, xenophobia, voting

behaviour, Eurovision

Introduction

When Eurovision is accused of being “political”, this usually refers to voting based on national blocs. The 2014 edition, however, seemed to have become

political in a more complex way. Austria’s entrant, drag act Conchita Wurst, challenged heteronormative gender conventions through her performance, and

faced hostility both in the run up to the event and after winning. This hostility

was widely reported, and tended to be ascribed to a group of countries

collectively represented as Eastern European. There was concern whether

Conchita would fare less well at the competition due to widespread homophobia

in Eastern Europe, and the competition was stylised into a political contest

about the status of LGBT rights.

* Alexej Ulbricht is a Teaching Fellow in the Department of Politics & International Studies at

SOAS; University of London.

Indraneel Sircar is a Postdoctoral Research Assistant at the School of Politics and International

Relations, Queen Mary University of London. His research focuses on Europeanization in the

Western Balkans.

Koen Slootmaeckers is a PhD candidate at the School of Politics and International Relations,

Queen Mary University of London and a research affiliate at Leuven International and European

Studies (LINES) at KU Leuven, University of Leuven (Belgium).

Queer to be kind: Exploring Western media discourses about the “Eastern bloc” during the 2007 and 2014 Euro-vision Song Contests

156

We want to critically interrogate this discourse connecting Eastern Europe and

LGBT rights. We will be arguing that it is not really the result of a sincere

commitment to LGBT liberation, but rather builds on a longer-standing anti-

Eastern European discourse. In 2014, this discourse was combined with a

homonationalist discourse to construct a particular picture of a backward,

homophobic Eastern Europe and a progressive LGBT-friendly Western Europe.

We will contrast the media coverage and voting related to Conchita with

Serbia’s 2007 winning entry Marija Šerifović. Although Šerifović only came out publicly in 2013,1 her sexuality “was not secret to [Serbian] tabloids”2 as far

back as 2004 (when the tabloid Kurir published a story that she had revealed

her sexuality to her father),3 and she was described as lesbian by media outside

Serbia at the time of the 2007 ESC.4 We identified the 2007 Serbian entry as

an appropriate comparative case, instead of other drag acts, such as Verka

Serduchka (Ukraine, 2007 runner-up), for three primary reasons. First, we

focus on winning acts, as these allow for sufficient media coverage to make a

more informed analysis. Second, the Serbian victory in 2007 led to widespread

Western media accusations of Eastern bloc voting. Third, both Conchita and

Šerifović were identified as non-heterosexuals, contrary to Verka, who is an act

performed by a heterosexual man.

We employ a mixed-methods approach to ground our observations about a

particular schema of representation in the context of actual voting behaviour.

Our focus is not confined to the politics inherent to Eurovision itself, but rather

the way the event serves as a platform for particular political discourses. Thus,

we seek to reveal the inconsistencies in how Eurovision results are represented

by media in two particular Western European countries, Germany and the UK

(both of which are part of the ‘big five’ funders that do not need to qualify for the main event), despite evidence of similar televoting behaviour across the

East-West divide. Rather than providing an exhaustive account of all media

coverage in these countries, we have focused on examples that illustrate

particularly well the way that Eurovision is reported on, allowing us to present

a rich and textured picture of the way Eurovision is represented.

In the next section, we situate our study within the study of Eurovision, and we

outline the concept of homonationalism. In the subsequent section, we clarify

the terminology we use in regards to “Eastern Europe” and “Conchita”. We then turn to an analysis of voting results in the 2007 and 2014 contests, with a

particular focus on East-West bloc voting. Next, we analyse the predominant

discourses in German and British media in relation to Conchita’s participation and victory in 2014, followed by a comparison with 2007. This section

particularly illustrates the depiction of unfair bloc voting whilst ignoring the

lesbian and ethnic minority identity of Marija Šerifović in 2007. We then offer

1 N.N. 2013. Marija Šerifović otkriva: lezbijka sam, seks sa devojkom je divan! Telegraf, 27.

November 2013 (accessed: 12. April 2015). 2 Bieber, Florian. 2014. It Ain’t So Queer: The Success of Conchita Wurst Across Continental Divides. Balkan Insight, 16. May 2014 (accessed: 12. April 2015). 3 N.N. 2004. Tata, ja sam lezbijka! Kurir, 24. August 2004 (accessed: 31. March 2015). 4 Greer, Germaine. 2007. Go, Marija! Eurovision’s Triumphant Lesbian Gypsy. The Guardian, 21.

May 2007 (accessed: 12. April 2015).

Alexej Ulbricht Indraneel Sircar Koen Slootmaeckers

157

conclusions on how a homonationalist framing allows us to be critical in

reflecting Western respect and tolerance for LGBT individuals.

The Eurovision Song Contest as European Homonationalism

Over the years, the Eurovision Song Contest has become more than an annual

showcase, revealing something about the countries that participate in the

event, and the complex relationships amongst them. The spectacle of a

European-wide televised event has pushed countries, particularly in Eastern

Europe, to streamline the complexities of their national identities in order to

present a simplified and stereotypical version during the contest.5 The event

has been used as an opportunity for nation branding in parts of the post-Soviet

space for the purpose of creating an image of a “return to Europe”,6 sometimes

with the aid of Western European brand consultants.7 These diverging currents

of simplified national stereotypes on the one hand and a return to a multi-

ethnic European ideal on the other have necessitated uneasy, “corrective” Eastern European representations of cosmopolitanism.8 As a result,

Europeanization through Eurovision is limited, and countries can choose which

aspects of European practices to incorporate through an à-la-carte process of

“political imagination”.9 The tensions in these processes can allow for more

“bottom-up” constructions of the nation that are sometimes at odds with

traditional representations.10

More importantly, representations around the Eurovision contest are especially

salient in the contestation, confirmation, and problematisation of sexualities,

particularly in demarcating the divide between Western and Eastern Europe.

For example, resonant with the aforementioned process of “political imagination,” Russia has sought to produce new forms of “camp” in its entries to the contest that nonetheless protect and perpetuate traditional ideas of

heteronormativity.11 On the other end of the “divide”, commentators have argued that the Eurovision Song Contest press conferences show evidence of a

shift from national heteronormativity to a transnational (European)

expectation that non-heteronormative individuals should be treated with

greater respect and tolerance.12 We situate our analysis within the literature

which critically examines attempts to negatively represent the Eastern “other” unwilling or unable to accept European notions of gender and sexuality, such

5 Baker, Catherine. 2008. Wild Dances and Dying Wolves: Simulation, Essentialization, and

National Identity at the Eurovision Song Contest. Popular Communication 6(3), 173–89. 6 Jordan, Paul. 2011. The Eurovision Song Contest: Nation Branding and Nation Building in

Estonia and Ukraine. PhD-thesis. Glasgow: University of Glasgow. 7 Jordan, Paul. 2014. Nation Branding: a Tool for Nationalism?. Journal of Baltic Studies 45(3),

283–303. 8 Sieg, Katrin. 2013. Cosmopolitan Empire: Central and Eastern Europeans at the Eurovision Song

Contest. European Journal of Cultural Studies 16(2), 244–63. 9 Jones, Shannon and Subotic, Jelena. 2011. Fantasies of Power: Europeanization on the European

periphery. European Journal of Cultural Studies 14(5), 542–57. 10 Iglesias, Danero Julien. 2015. Eurovision Song Contest and Identity in Moldova. Nationalities

Papers 43(2), 233-247. 11 Cassiday A. Julie. 2014. Post-Soviet Pop Goes Gay: Russia’s Trajectory to Eurovision Victory. The

Russian Review 73(1), 1–23. 12

Motschenbacher, Heiko. 2013. “Now Everybody Can Wear a Skirt”: Linguistic Constructions of Non-Hetero-Normativity at Eurovision Song Contest Press Conferences. Discourse and Society

24(5), 590–614.


158

as the “frenzied fixation” by Western media and NGOs on LGBT rights in Azerbaijan preceding and during the 2012 contest in Baku.13 To do this, we

employ the notion of homonationalism.

In order to understand how nation-states are increasingly defined by their gay-

friendliness or homophobia, Jasbir Puar developed the concept of

homonationalism,14 which is “a facet of modernity and a historical shift marked by the entrance of (some) homosexual bodies as worthy of protection by nation-

states, a constitutive and fundamental reorientation of the relationship

between the state, capitalism, and sexuality.”15 In recent years, an idealised

Europe has become increasingly connected with LGBT rights, and “gay-

friendliness””.16 This narrative can be understood as homonationalist in the

sense that it has been built upon the back of the (Eastern) Other, which is

constructed as not yet modern, trying to catch up with the West (i.e. “Europe”), or where progress has yet to arrive. In a recent article, Francesca Ammaruto

has studied the political use of LGBT rights in what she calls the “Pink

Agenda”, which works by “creating and promoting lines of fractures between presumably queer-friendly and homo-transphobic countries both within and

outside the European borders,”17 in order to create and reinforce (Western)

European exceptionalism in the fields of LGBT rights and human rights more

broadly. This agenda deepens the already problematic East-West distinction,

as it presents the “homophobic East” as a place that is trying to catch up with

the West, and at the same time “dragging progress down” (as perceived in the “West”).18

Before proceeding further, it is important to clarify how we use the term

“Eastern Europe”. Moreover, given the notion of homonationalism, it is also

important to link this concept to understandings of “heteronormativity” and “homophobia”. These terminological issues will be explored in the next section.

Clarifying terminologies: Where is Eastern Europe? Who is Conchita?

We will be using the term Eastern Europe in the same way as the German and

British press, that is, referring to the countries that make up former

Yugoslavia, the European and Caucasian ex-Soviet Republics, as well as the

former Warsaw Pact members (excluding East Germany). The term does not

therefore include various participant countries that lie (in the) East of Europe,

such as Greece, Turkey, Cyprus, and Israel. The term is associated with former

13 Gluhovic, Milija. 2013. Sing for Democracy: Human Rights and Sexuality Discourse in the

Eurovision Song Contest, in Performing the “New” Europe: Identities, Feelings, and Politics in the Eurovision Song Contest, edited by Karen, Fricker and Gluhovic, Milija. Basingstoke: Palgrave

Macmillan, 209. 14 Puar, K. Jasbir. 2007. Terrorist Assemblages: Homonationalism in Queer Times. Durham, N.C.:

Duke University Press; Puar, K. Jasbir. 2013. Rethinking Homonationalism. International Journal

of Middle East Studies 45(2), 336–39. 15 Puar, Rethinking Homonationalism, 337. 16 Ayoub, M. Philippe and Paternotte, David, (eds.). 2014. LGBT Activism and the Making of

Europe: A Rainbow Europe?, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 17 Ammaturo, Romana Francesca. 2015. The “Pink Agenda”: Questioning and Challenging European Homonationalist Sexual Citizenship. Sociology (in press). 18 Mizielińska, Joanna and Kulpa, Robert. 2011. “Contemporary Peripheries”: Queer Studies, Circulation of Knowledge and East/West Divide, in De-Centring Western Sexualities: Central and

Eastern European Perspectives, edited by Kulpa, Robert and Mizielińska, Joanna, 11–26.


159

Communist countries, with Slavs, and at least implicitly with being part of a

Russian cultural sphere. As such, we acknowledge that it is a problematic and

simplifying term that glosses over and denies great cultural differences as well

as local conflicts in order to create a unified sphere that takes its semiological

coherence from a Cold-War-era conception of everything Eastern as Russian.

However, we will be using it repeatedly in the course of this paper, since the

way Eastern European countries are represented in British and German media

is precisely such a rendering. That is, when talking of the representation of

Eastern Europe one has to use the term, as it is usually not even possible to

give it more specificity, since those that employ it have nowhere specific in

mind. Nonetheless, we will endeavour to problematise and destabilise the term

even while we use it, precisely by looking more closely at the way in which

Eastern Europe is talked about when reporting on Eurovision.

We also need to reflect on how to refer to Conchita Wurst, a drag act performed

by a gay man, Tom Neuwirth. As this paper focuses on media coverage of the

Eurovision act, we will refer in the remainder of the paper to Conchita using

either her name or a feminine pronoun. Before we can continue with the

analysis, we must also clarify the position of the drag act in a wider

heterosexual matrix.19 Whilst it is beyond the scope of the article to unravel the

current academic debate on whether drag acts challenge the binary gender

system,20 we want to draw attention to certain aspects of drag in relation to the

idea of heteronormativity. We use Samuel Chambers’ conceptualisation of heteronormativity as a regulatory practice,21 which is “the expectation of

heterosexuality as it is written into our world […]. It means that everyone and

everything is judged from the perspective of straight.”22

The subversive potential of drag in this regard is that it can challenge, call into

question, and undermine the presumption of heterosexuality; to expose the

internal structure of heteronormativity.23 Conchita, for example, challenges

heteronormativity by denaturalising the gender system. Indeed, by appearing

as a woman with a beard, she blurs the fixed distinction between the two

genders, therefore illuminating the underlying structures of heteronormativity

(as the strict distinction between sexes/genders is essential to assume opposite-

sex attraction).24

Although often used interchangeably, heteronormativity is distinct from

homophobia.25 Contrary to heteronormativity that designates both the political

power and social structuring effects of heterosexuality as a norm, homophobia

suggests a reduction to the individual. Taking homophobia, rather than

19

See Butler, Judith. 1999. Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity. New York:

Routledge. 20 For a good overview of this debate, see Rupp, J. Leila / Taylor, Verta and Shapiro I. Eve. 2010.

Drag Queens and Drag Kings: The Difference Gender Makes. Sexualities 13(3), 275–94. 21 Chambers, A. Samuel. 2003. Telepistemology of the Closet; or, The Queer Politics of Six Feet

Under. Journal of American Culture 26(1), 24–41. 22 Chambers, Telepistemology of the Closet, 26. 23 See Chambers, A. Samuel. 2007. “An Incalculable Effect”: Subversions of Heteronormativity. Political Studies 55(3), 656–79. 24

Chambers, An Incalculable Effect. 25 Chambers, An Incalculable Effect, 664.


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heteronormativity, as a political problem, it is implied that the solution can be

found in changing individual attitudes.

Although it is clear that Conchita departs from the heterosexual norm, the

media struggle to classifying her according to the known LGBT categories, i.e.,

she is often described along the lines of transgender or gay identities, ignoring

the performativity of the act. More interesting for this paper, however, is that

opposition to Conchita is almost always described as homo- or transphobia. By

doing so, the heteronormative system seeks to uphold its norms by, first,

explicitly marking Conchita’s departure from the norm, and second, making

the opposition to Conchita a personal problem that needs to be eliminated,

reducing her subversive potential.

In order to better understand the context in which the Western discourses

analysed below are operating, we will examine the voting behaviour in the two

song contests under study in the next section. We will first look at the 2014

competition and then compare the results with the 2007 competition.

Voting in the 2007 and 2014 Eurovision Song Contests

The long-standing song contest certainly lends itself readily to complex

quantitative analyses of voting behaviour, particularly using social network

methods.26 These analyses have identified different voting blocs and different

voting patterns, like intra-bloc countries’ “favouritism”,27 or voting alongside

cultural and linguistic proximity.28 Unlike these past studies, we will employ

more modest quantitative techniques in examining the voting patterns for the

two song contests under study in this article. We will focus on two voting blocs,

Eastern European countries and the other countries, as outlined above. Using

the geographic demarcation explained in the previous section, there were 16

countries from “Eastern Europe” out of the 37 participants (including Austria) in 2014, and 21 of the 42 participants were from Eastern Europe (including

Serbia) in 2007.

Whereas the data for the 2007 event only comprises the points awarded based

on the televote results,29 the 2014 data is much more detailed, and contains the

ordinal ranking of the national televote, ordinal rankings of the national juries,

ordinal rankings by individual jurors, and the points awarded by each

country.30 Thus, we have an unprecedented level of transparency in the scoring.

For the comparison between 2007 and 2014, we are limited to an analysis of

the awarded points.

26 See e.g., Blanglardo, Marta and Baio, Gianluca. 2014. Evidence of Bias in the Eurovision Song

Contest: Modeling the Vote using Bayesian Hierarchical Models. Journal of Applied Statistics

41(10), 2312–22; Ginsburgh, Victor and Noury, G. Abdul. 2008. The Eurovision Song Contest: Is

Voting Political or Cultural?, European Journal of Political Economy 24(1), 41–52; Yair, Gad. 1995.

“Unite Unite Europe”: The Political and Cultural Structures of Europe as Reflected in the

Eurovision Song Contest. Social Networks 17(2), 147–61. 27 Blanglardo and Baio, Evidence of Bias in the Eurovision Song Contest. 28 Ginsburgh and Noury, The Eurovision Song Contest. 29 N.N. 2007. Eurovision Song Contest 2007 Final. Eurovisiontv (accessed: 12. April 2015). 30 N.N. 2014. Grand Final Full Results. Eurovisiontv (accessed: 12. April 2015).


161

We first examine whether there is an Eastern bias in the overall vote against

Conchita. The average points given to Austria from Eastern European

participants were 5.38, whilst they were 10.20 for the rest of the countries.

Only San Marino, Poland, Armenia, and Belarus gave Conchita “nul points” of the 36 countries voting (Austria could not vote for itself). We conducted an

independent-samples t-test, and found that the average overall points given to

Conchita significantly differed between Eastern European and other

participants (t=4.022, df=34, p < 0.001). This is further corroborated by looking

at the ordinal rankings for Conchita.31 Again, there is evidence of a statistically

significant difference of average rankings at all conventional levels (t=3.240,

df=34, p=0.003). We are 95% confident that the average ranking given to the

Austrian entry was between 1.5 and 6.4 places lower from Eastern European

countries compared with her ranking elsewhere. These findings confirm that

there was a negative “Eastern bias” in the average points given to Conchita overall.

When we focus only on the jury voting in 2014, however, the picture becomes

more interesting.32 The average ranking of Conchita by juries was 7.14, with a

significant difference (t=3.798, df=33, p=0.001) in average ranking between

Eastern European countries (11.60) and the other countries (3.80). Thus,

Eastern European national juries ranked Conchita significantly lower on

average. There are three important observations to add to this analysis. First,

the standard deviations (SD) of national jury rankings for both groups are

quite different, i.e., compared with non-Eastern European countries (SD =

3.694) there is a high degree of variation amongst Eastern European national

juries (SD = 8.166). That is, Eastern European national juries were not

uniformly pro- or anti-Conchita. Secondly, given the overall popularity of the

Austrian entry across all participating televoters (see below), there were

substantial discrepancies between the public vote and national juries,

particularly in parts of the former Soviet Union: Armenia (24th in national jury,

2nd in televote); Azerbaijan (24th in national jury, 3rd in televote); and Belarus

(23rd in national jury, 4th in televote). Third, this gap between the public and

national jury is not confined to Eastern Europe. Despite the high-profile

antipathy towards Conchita from Russia, the Austrian entry placed 3rd in the

televote but only 11th in the national jury. However, in Germany, Conchita was

placed 1st based on the televote, but the national jury placed her 11th – the

same as its Russian counterpart.

We then turn to a comparison of the voting between the 2007 and 2014

contests, for which we can only use the televote results (as explained above). In

order to compare the two events, we convert the televoting rankings of the 2014

Austrian entry into points.33 From this it follows that, based on televoting only,

Conchita received a remarkable 9.0 out of a maximum 12 points on average. In

fact, every country would have given the Austrian entry at least five points

except for Estonia, which would have given three points. We then sub-divided

31 For rankings, “1” denotes the highest rank, “2” as second, and so on. Thus, lower numbers denote

a more positive assessment. 32 The ranking from Georgia was nullified by the organisers and is therefore not included in the

analysis. 33 The televote scores from Albania and San Marino were excluded due to unspecified issues.

Consequently, these countries are not included in the analysis.


162

the votes by geographic bloc, and found that the average points based on

televotes only was 7.6 points within the Eastern bloc and 10.2 points outside

Eastern Europe. A difference found to be statistically significant via an

independent-samples t-test (t=3.827, df=32, p=0.001). We are thus 95%

confident that Eastern European televoters gave Conchita between 1.2 and 4.0

points less on average compared with televoters elsewhere, if we converted the

rankings into points.

Turning to the votes for Marija Šerifović in 2007, we find that the average number of points was 7.59 amongst the 39 countries that gave a televote,34 with

Eastern European countries giving 8.40 points on average and other countries

giving 6.74 points. The difference between the two blocs was not statistically

significant, however (t=1.444, df=37, p =0.157). We, therefore, do not have

sufficient evidence to conclude that there was significant bloc voting (or intra-

bloc favouritism) in 2007.

Thus, looking at the televoting in the two contests, we find that there was no

statistically significant difference between Eastern European and other

countries in the average points given to the 2007 Serbian entry, whilst the

televoters outside Eastern Europe gave Conchita significantly higher points

than Eastern European publics in 2014. However, if we convert the discrepancy

in average scores into ordinal rankings, Eastern European televoters, on

average, placed Conchita only between 0.9 and 2.8 places lower than televoters

elsewhere (95% Confidence Interval). Thus, although the difference is

significant, it is not particularly important. In other words, Eastern European

televoters did rank Conchita significantly lower than televoters elsewhere, but

the gap is not that stark.

Drawing together the results from the above analysis, we find that overall,

there was indeed an “Eastern bias” against Conchita. However, if we divide the

televote and jury voting, the picture is more complex, which corroborates voting

analyses conducted soon after the event.35 First, although Eastern European

televoters did rank Conchita lower on average, the difference is not substantial,

and the Austrian entry seemed to enjoy public support across Europe. Second,

although given 12 points by its Balkan neighbours, there was not enough

statistical evidence to conclude that Eastern and non-Eastern Europeans voted

significantly differently on average for Marija Šerifović in 2007. Third, there is a noticeable gap between national juries and televoters in Eastern Europe in

2014, with the former being more negative towards Conchita on average,

especially in some of the former Soviet republics. However, there was also a

substantial gap between the televote and national jury ranking in Germany.

With these results in mind, we will now turn to the media coverage on

Conchita and how it contributed to the creating of the homophobic other

(Eastern Europe), in an attempt to highlight Western Europe’s “progressiveness” in accepting non-heterosexual subjects.

34 Serbia could not vote for itself, and Albania and Andorra relied on backup national juries. 35 Renwick, Alan. 2014. Eurovision: a Continent Divided in its Sexual Attitudes?. Politics at

Reading (accessed: 12. April 2015).


163

Rise like a phoenix: reporting Conchita as a triumph of LGBT rights

The announcement that Conchita would be representing the country at

Eurovision garnered considerable media attention. This attention further

increased after some hostile reactions, both within Austria and from other

parts of Europe. And whilst Austrian negative reactions were reported (mainly

in Austria itself),36 it was negative reactions from Eastern Europe that went on

to receive far more attention across Europe. The form that the hostilities took

is interesting in and of itself, and is certainly worthy of media attention, but we

are more concerned with the particular form this media attention took.

The story of hostility against Conchita is reported across the board in both

Germany and the UK. Bild wrote of Conchita being “mobbed” by other ESC countries.37 The Daily Mail reported “a barrage of homophobic and transphobic attacks.”38 The BBC reported that “Conchita recently fac[ed] a transphobic backlash online, as conservative protesters in Russia, Armenia and Belarus

branded the contest a “hotbed of sodomy.”39 The Independent ran a story

entitled “Conchita Wurst faces transphobic backlash for ‘unnatural’ lifestyle.”40

However, whilst there was initially mention of trans- and homophobia both

within Austria and in Eastern Europe, a narrative soon emerged that shifted

the focus onto Eastern Europe and identified it as the primary locus of

homophobia today. Thus, the Reuters report on Conchita’s selection stated: “her entry has highlighted Europe’s geographical divide on attitudes to homosexuality. Unlikely to raise much controversy in the West, her appearance

has prompted criticism by some in the East where anti-gay rhetoric remains

more common.”41 In a similar vein, Der Spiegel wrote that “it fits into the developments of the last few months that the most inhuman comment on the

young Austrian, who dared laugh in the face of common gender markers, came

from Russia.”42

These sentiments all tie into a larger narrative that portrays Eastern Europe

as in various ways culturally backward and in opposition to the progressive

values of Western European society. This narrative intensified as the

competition drew nearer, and Conchita’s participation became stylised as part of a cultural conflict with Eastern Europe in general and Russia in particular.

For instance, the New Statesman published a story entitled: “Can a bearded

36 For example Kurzel, Julia. 2013. Conchita Wurst: “Ein Bart alleine reicht nicht”. Kurier, 17.

September 2013 (accessed: 12. April 2015); N.N. 2014. Song Contest: auch Strache beleidigt

Conchita Wurst. News, 7. May 2014 (accessed: 12. April 2015). 37 N.N. 2014. ESC- Länder stänkern gegen den Travestie-Künstler. Bild, 6. May 2014 (accessed: 12.

April 2015). 38 N.N. 2014. Bearded Austrian Drag Queen Splits Opinion Ahead of Eurovision Performance with

Song Rise like a Phoenix. Daily Mail, 7. May 2014 (accessed: 12. April 2015). 39 Griffiths, Jane Sarah. 2014. Eurovision 2014: the Ones to Watch Out For. BBC News Online, 6.

May 2014 (accessed: 16. January 2015). 40 Denham, Jess. 2014. Eurovision 2014: Conchita Wurst Faces Transphobic Backlash for

“Unnatural” Lifestyle. The Independent, 28. April 2014 (accessed: 12. April 2015). 41 Brooks, Derek. 2014. Bearded Austrian Drag Queen to Take on Eurovision. Reuters, 28. April

2014 (accessed: 12. April 2015). 42 Zylka, Jenni, 2014. ESC-Kandidatin Conchita Wurst: Küsschen, liebe Schwulenhasser. Der

Spiegel, 8. May 2014 (accessed: 12. April 2015).


164

Austrian drag queen give Putin the bird?”43 The article writes that the

petitions and protests about Conchita:

illustrate the ever more stark cultural differences within Europe and the

widening gulf in attitudes to homosexuality. Whatever you think of the

song, [...] a vote for Wurst on the night is another vote against Russian

homophobia and transphobia, and a win would send out a strong message

of defiance eastwards.

In a similar, but plainer, expression of the same message, the IB Times article

“Ten reasons why Austrian drag queen Conchita Wurst must win” listed as its first two items: “1. It will upset the Russians”; and “2. It will upset homophobes in Eastern Europe.”44 It was thus hardly surprising to find the Daily Telegraph

refer to the 2014 contest as “the most political Eurovision yet”.45

The contest became elevated to a representation of the current state of LGBT

rights in Europe. The battle lines were clearly drawn between the progressive

West and the reactionary East. After the competition, Der Spiegel wrote that

Conchita had “turned the competition into a referendum about what society accepts in Europe and what it does not.”46 The same article goes on to say that

Conchita “split the Entertainment- and Economic Community along its

invisible value border between East and West.” The German state radio broadcaster Deutschlandfunk hit a similar tone in a commentary (itself notable

for exhibiting considerable unease with LGBT identities) stating that “[l]ike all politics, the body politics displayed here has certain geographic referents. And

so the vote count of the Grand Prix unwittingly provided the opportunity to

draw a European map of sexual repression and behavioural norms anew.”47

The major weekly Die Zeit wrote: “How does the West defend its values? By letting the incomparable artistic figure Conchita Wurst win the Eurovision

Song Contest.”48 That is, Conchita is seen to have won the contest despite

Eastern homophobia, rather than the win belying the idea of a homophobic

East.

The fact that a number of public figures in Eastern Europe were outspoken in

their criticism after Conchita won did not help any move towards a more

nuanced analysis. Western media outlets were quick to pick up on this vocal

disgust, which seemed to vindicate the previous narrative of a homophobic

East. There is no denying the homophobic content of these statements; to give

just a few examples: Russian nationalist politician Vladimir Zhirinovsky said of

the result “There’s no limit to our outrage. It’s the end of Europe. It has turned

43 Calvocoressi, Thomas. 2014. Can a Bearded Austrian Drag Queen Give Putin the Bird?, New

Statesman, 28. April 2014 (accessed: 12. April 2015). 44 Sim, David. 2014. Eurovision 2014: Ten Reasons Why Austrian Drag Queen Conchita Wurst

Must Win. IB Times, 9. May 2014 (accessed: 16. January 2015). 45 Merz, Theo and Hayes, Kat, 2014. The Politics Behind the Eurovision Song Contest. The Daily

Telegraph, 9. May 2014 (accessed: 16. January 2015). To be fair to the Telegraph. it attributes this

as much to the conflict between Russia and Ukraine. 46 Frank, Arno. 2014. Dragqueen siegt beim Eurovision Song Contest: Conchita’s Liebesgrüße nach Moskau. Der Spiegel, 11. May 2014. (accessed: 15. January 2015). 47 Ulrich – Müller, Burkhard. 2014. Warum ausgerechnet Conchita Wurst gewann.

Deutschlandfunk, 11. May 2014 (accessed: 12. April 2015). 48 Kümmel, Peter. 2014. Europa’s bärtige Königin. Die Zeit, 15. May 2014 (accessed: 12. April

2015).


165

wild. They don’t have men and women any more. They have ‘it.’”49 Russia’s vice premier, Dmitry Rogozin, released a tweet claiming the Eurovision result

“showed supporters of European integration their European future – a bearded

girl.”50 The deputy leader of the Russian Communist Party, Valery Rashkin,

was quoted as saying that “the last Eurovision results exhausted our patience

[…]. We cannot tolerate this endless madness.”51 Some religious leaders even

went so far as blaming Conchita for causing flooding in south-east Europe.52

This all seems to fit neatly into the established narrative. Conchita’s win can

serve both as inspiration for the LGBT community across Europe and

demonstrate the persistent homophobia of Eastern Europe, as exemplified by

its political, cultural, and spiritual leaders. It was a triumph of Western values.

However there are two principal problems with this reading. Firstly, Conchita

won, and she won with a large number of points from Eastern European states.

How does this fit into the narrative? If the people of Eastern Europe helped

vote Conchita to her win, how can we describe them as homophobic, at least in

this regard?53 Statements made by (high-profile) individuals are deemed to be

more representative than the decisions made by millions of people. But

secondly, and in contrast to this, statements critical of Conchita made by (high-

profile) individuals in Western Europe were not treated in the same way. When

Terry Wogan, the former host of the British broadcast of Eurovision, called

Conchita a “freak show”,54 this was not taken to be indicative of a general

homophobic tendency in the United Kingdom, nor when German rapper Sido

kicked off a barrage of online abuse directed at Conchita.55

We are not saying that homophobic comments by politicians and protests

should not be reported on, but we are suggesting that there is a dubious

operation here where this homophobic attitude becomes constructed as an

essential feature of Eastern Europe. Moreover, there is a certain elision from

simply reporting critically on these things to using the event as part of a

“culture war” in which the West – regardless of its practice – is marked as

progressive, and the East – regardless of its practice – is marked as

reactionary.

49 Davies, Caroline. 2014. Conchita Wurst Pledges to Promote Tolerance After Jubilant Welcome

Home. The Guardian, 11. May 2014 (accessed: 16. January 2015). 50 Hodgson, Claire. 2014. Conchita Wurst’s Eurovision Win Slammed by Russia as Politician Brands it “the End of Europe”. The Daily Mirror, 11. May 2014 (accessed: 17. January 2015). 51 McCormick, Patrick Joseph. 2014. Russia to Revive Soviet Eurovision Alternative to Protest Gay

“Madness” of Conchita Win. Pink News, 29. July 2014 (accessed: 12. April 2015). 52 N.N. 2014. Conchita Wurst Caused Balkan Flood After Eurovision Win, Say Church Leaders.

The Daily Telegraph. 22. May 2014 (accessed: 12. April 2015). 53

More specifically, while the fact that Conchita did well with televoters in Eastern Europe does

not prove an absence of homophobia (nor for that matter does her success with Western European

televoters), it does suggest that there is no reason to presume homophobia. 54 Day, Aaron. 2014. Terry Wogan Says Conchita Wurst Made Eurovision a “Freak show”. Pink

News, 3. November 2014 (accessed: 12. April 2015). 55 Wrusch, Paul. 2014. Hass auf Conchita Wurst bei Facebook: “Die gehört in die Gaskamer”. Taz,

14. May 2014 (accessed: 12. April 2015).


166

Some queers are better than others: Serbia 2007 versus Austria 2014

As seen above, the voting behaviour in 2014 suggests that there was elite

hostility towards Conchita in Eastern Europe, but little difference in the

popular vote between East and West. By contrast, there seems to be no

statistically significant geographic divide in 2007. Before looking into this

further, it is worth looking briefly how the 2007 Serbian victory was reported.

One would imagine that there might be parallels in the reception of both

Conchita and Marija Šerifović, since both acts represented a form of queer identity. Like Conchita, Šerifović’s performance can be seen as being

strategically designed as queer.56 However, this was not how the performance

was read in most media outlets, and the way the Western media reported on

the Serbian win was in fact quite different to the reactions to the Austrian win.

The form that these differences take is quite instructive in terms of identifying

what is problematic about the discourse around Conchita.

When Marija Šerifović won the contest for Serbia in 2007, despite being

portrayed in Western European media as a lesbian, there was no concern in

Western media about how her sexuality might result in a lack of votes from

homophobic Eastern European populaces, nor for the homophobic abuse she

might receive. Unlike Conchita, neither Šerifović nor her sexuality was

reported on much at all in the run-up to the competition. And in the aftermath,

the major talking points were seen to lie elsewhere.

While some of the reactions after her win talked positively about her lesbian

and Romany identity,57 there was nothing like the proclaimed triumph of

LGBT rights after Conchita’s win – rather, Šerifović’s win was explained in terms of receiving neighbourly votes.58 Bloc voting or political voting was in

fact the major talking point in most outlets after the event. Bild bemoaned the

low placing of Germany’s entry Roger Cicero (rank 19) and said: “Instead of rewarding our swing-king with points, the Eastern European states once again

traded points with one another.”59 The article also stated “Grand-prix-anger

against the voting-mafia from the east” and listed a number of “experts” (who happened to be involved in the German production of Eurovision), asserting

that there was no chance for Germany because the Eastern states were giving

their points to each other. The paper complained that licence fees were being

used for a competition in which there was no chance of winning and which did

not provide sufficiently strong songs. The following day, Bild’s title page read:

“Lowly cheating at the grand-prix: millions of German viewers outraged; East-

Europeans hand each other the points; Schlagerstar Nicole: ‘Germany should quit’.”60

56 Aston, Elaine. 2013. Competing Femininities: a “Girl” for Eurovision, in Performing the “New” Europe: Identities, Feelings, and Politics in the Eurovision Song Contest, edited by Fricker, Karen

and Gluhovic, Milija. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 163-177, 174. 57 We found just one amongst the major outlets: Greer, Go, Marija! 58 Hastings, Chris. 2007. Eurovision Faces Overhaul After Vote Fiasco. The Daily Telegraph, 20.

May 2007 (accessed: 19. January 2015). 59 N.N. 2007. Grand-prix Wut nach Platz 19 für Roger Cicero: warum mag uns eigentlich keiner?

Bild, 13. May 2007 (accessed: 12. April 2015). 60 N.N.,‘Warum mag uns eigentlich keiner?’.


167

This suggestion was reported by the BBC, together with complaints from

several other sources. The BBC cited the Liberal Democrat MP Richard

Younger-Ross demanding a change in the voting system, because the current

modus operandi was both “a joke” and “harmful to the relationship between the peoples of Europe”.61 He insisted that either the rules needed to change or the

UK should withdraw. The article ended with the BBC DJ Paul Gambaccini

bemoaning political voting and stating “Now with the public voting instead of the panel voting it is really extensive.” Another article detailed complaints

from the head of the Maltese Eurovision contingent accusing several countries

of bloc voting and demanding that phone voting be scrapped in certain

countries until it could be monitored more closely.62 The same article finished

with Terry Wogan (then still the BBC commentator on Eurovision) stating how

aggrieved he was by political voting, saying: “It’s a pity it’s not about the songs anymore. There’s a definite Baltic bloc and a Balkan bloc, and they’ve been joined in recent years by a Russian bloc.”

So we can once again see an anti-Eastern European narrative at work in most

of the reporting. The idea that this was a triumph for LGBT rights was almost

completely absent from the reactions. In fact, Der Spiegel even went so far as

claiming the win was politically reactionary, suggesting that Šerifović’s win was to be regretted as it served as a “fig leaf for anti-European resentment” in Serbia.63 The larger accusation though was that Eastern European

participation in the contest was somehow duplicitous, and rigged against

Western states.

Thus, there is a very peculiar understanding of democracy in the discourse

around the 2007 event. The outcome of a democratic vote was challenged

because it produced what was seen to be an illegitimate result (even though it

is not clear how any deliberate illicitness would actually be executed). But the

only supposedly legitimate result was a Western European win. Thus when

Norway won two years later, after the reintroduction of juries, this was seen as

a triumph of process, even though it was less democratic. We might also ask

why it is that the supposedly political voting of Eastern European states was

seen negatively whereas the mobilisation to vote politically for Conchita in the

West was seen as positive. After all, one of the consistent complaints about

supposed bloc voting was that the contest was “no longer about the music.”

Conclusion

This all suggests that what we really encounter in reporting on Eurovision is a

prevalent xenophobic discourse directed against Eastern Europeans that

manifests itself differently at different times. In 2014, this combined with a

homonationalist discourse to result in a specific narrative around Conchita.

What we can see in the context of reporting on Eurovision is the mobilisation of

the value of tolerance for intolerant ends. That is, support for LGBT rights and

anti-homophobia are rallied around, but they are rallied around in order to

61 N.N. 2007. MP Demands Eurovision Vote Change. BBC News, 15. May 2007 (accessed: 12. April

2015). 62 N.N. 2015. Malta Slates Eurovision’s Voting. BBC News, 14. May 2007 (accessed: 12. April 2015). 63 Haas, Daniel. 2007. Eurovision Song Contest 2007: Den Westen ins Gebet nehmen. Der Spiegel,

12. May 2007 (accessed: 19. January 2015).


168

denigrate a particular identity: Eastern Europeans. In this discursive move,

Eastern Europeans are presented as backwards and Other, whereas the West

can present itself as the site of enlightened tolerance.

More broadly speaking, this discourse fits into the kind of operation of power

where one part of the world is consistently portrayed as the site of injustice,

and the other part is portrayed as being in the position of righting these

wrongs.64 This discourse is not limited to a split between Europe and Africa

and Asia, which is what most of the literature focuses on.65 Rather, we can see

that within Europe as well, the East is presented as persistently backward, in

need of reform, and not quite up to (Western) European standards. As

discussed above, a similar trend is identified in the context of LGBT politics,66

with homonationalism and the Pink Agenda only but two theoretical frames to

analyse this phenomenon.

We can see this operation in the reporting of Conchita. Homophobic statements

by individual figures in the West, be they Austrian politicians or Terry Wogan,

were not seen as the expression of a generalised homophobia. Even though

heteronormative discourse is still dominant within Western Europe, the idea

that it is the locus of a flourishing of queer rights is not questioned. In the

context of Eurovision, we can even see that there have been concerted efforts,

in Germany for instance, to de-queer the contest throughout the 2000s.67

However, this has not tarnished Germany’s image or led to people questioning its record on LGBT rights.

As mentioned above, in the build-up to the 2012 event there were questions as

to whether Azerbaijan’s bad record on LGBT rights made it a suitable host for Eurovision. While one could link this to the same anti-Eastern European

discourses we have outlined, what is more interesting is the shift that happens

from the kind of invocation in 2012 to that in 2014. In 2012, assessments of an

on the ground situation regarding LGBT rights were tied up with a

homonationalist discourse that constructed East and West in a particular way.

In 2014, we witnessed the positing of a particular attitude within Eastern

European populaces, for which a quantitative analysis of the 2014 Eurovision

voting gives little actual evidence, which is then used for grounding a

homonationalist discourse. That is, we are operating on a purely

representational level.

What is particularly insidious about this is that Western European states have

contributed to the very situation in which the attitudes of Eastern Europe can

be read in a way that allows them to be portrayed as homophobic. If voting in

64 Spivak, C. Gayatri. 2004. Righting Wrongs. South Atlantic Quarterly 103(2/3), 523–81. 65 Mohanty, T. Chandra. 1988. Under Western Eyes: Feminist Scholarship and Colonial Discourse,

in Third World Women and the Politics of Feminism, edited by Russo, Ann and Lourdes, Torres.

Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 51–79; Gayatri C. Spivak, Can the

Subaltern Speak?, in Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture, edited by Nelson, Cary and

Grossberg, Lawrence. Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1988, 271–313. 66 Ammaturo, The “Pink Agenda”; Ayoub and Paternotte, LGBT Activism; Mizielińska and Kulpa,

Contemporary Peripheries; Puar, Terrorist Assemblages. 67 Rehberg, Peter. 2013. Taken by a Stranger: How Queerness Haunts Germany at Eurovision, in

Performing the “New” Europe: Identities, Feelings, and Politics in the Eurovision Song Contest,

edited by Fricker, Karen and Gluhovic, Milija. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013, 178–93.


169

2014 had been carried out purely by popular vote, there would have been little

discrepancy between East and West. Elite figures within Eastern Europe may

have still expressed their disgust, but this would be operating on the same level

as statements by some public figures in Western Europe (although whether

this would have led to both of these being reported in the same way is

debatable). It is only the partial reintroduction of the jury system that allowed

for the perception of a substantive divide between East and West on Conchita,

by allowing elite hostility to directly affect the outcomes. That is, the very

system brought in to counter the supposedly illicit behaviour of Eastern

European publics resulted in the creation of another illicit behaviour. Eastern

Europe is thus made to seem illegitimate both when it votes democratically (an

expression of tribalism) and when it gives its points by jury (an expression of

bigotry).

The homonationalist discourse regarding Conchita has a double function: it

reinforces the idea of (Western) European exceptionalism in the field of LGBT

rights; and it constructs Eastern European deficiency in terms of individual

(but shared) homophobia. By situating its concern in terms of individual

attitudes that need to be changed, the West can avoid challenging its own

heteronormativity. This discourse, furthermore, proves an easy fit with longer-

standing anti-Eastern European discourse in the West of Europe, which

likewise denigrates one locale whilst presenting the other as a site of

enlightened progressivism. What these discourses share is a profound distrust

of the Other and a profound blindness to the limitations of the West. What they

show is a severely anti-progressive tendency at the heart of progressive politics.

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The 2014/2015 Croatian Presidential

Election: Tight and Far-reaching

Victory of the Political Right Election Analysis

Dražen Lalić and Marijana Grbeša Professor, Faculty of Political Sciences, University of Zagreb / Assistant Professor, Faculty of

Political Sciences, University of Zagreb

[email protected] / [email protected]

http://www.suedosteuropa.uni-graz.at/cse/en/lalic_grbesa Contemporary Southeastern Europe, 2015, 2(1), 45-54




45

The 2014/2015 Croatian Presidential

Election: Tight and Far-reaching

Victory of the Political Right

Dražen Lalić and Marijana Grbeša*

Keywords: Croatia, presidential election, election campaign, Ivo Josipović, Kolinda

Grabar-Kitarović

Introduction

The presidential election that was held in Croatia on the last Sunday of 2014

(first round) and the second Sunday of 2015 (second round)1 resulted in a tight

victory for Kolinda Grabar-Kitarović, the candidate of the right-wing Croatian

Democratic Union (Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica, HDZ) and another seven

right-wing parties, over the incumbent Ivo Josipović, the candidate of the

governing Social Democratic Party (Socijaldemokratska partija Hrvatske, SDP)

and another sixteen parties of the left and centre. Although presidential

competencies in Croatia, which is a parliamentary democracy, are not

extensive,2 the presidential election provoked great interest not only in the

country, but also internationally.3 Such interest should be attributed to the fact

that Croatia, the youngest member of the EU,4 has been facing serious

economic and social difficulties for more than six years, and that its

* Dražen Lalić is a sociologist and a political scientist. He is a Professor at the Faculty of Political Sciences, University of Zagreb. He is the author of numerous scientific papers and ten books, most

of them in the field of sociology of sports, sociology of politics and political communication. He has

been engaged as a political analyst in a number of Croatian and foreign media.

Marijana Grbeša is an Assistant Professor at the Faculty of Political Sciences, University of

Zagreb. She received her PhD at the Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Ljubljana. Her

research interests include political communication, political marketing and mass media research.

She was the Head of School of Journalism and the Vice-Dean for Science and International

Relations at the same Faculty. She provides political analysis for the leading Croatian newspapers. 1 The President of Croatia is elected to a five-year term, with the whole country serving as one

constituency. He or she is elected by a majority of votes. If no candidate succeeds in winning more

than fifty percent of votes in the first round, the winner is the candidate who wins the majority of

votes in the second round. In this election, the first round was held on 28 December 2014 and the

second round on 11 January 2015. 2 According to the Croatian Constitution, the President represents and acts on behalf of the state at

home and abroad; he ensures the regular and orderly functioning and stability of the government;

he grants pardons; he cooperates in the formulation and implementation of foreign policy; he is the

Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and has other authorities proscribed by the Croatian

Constitution and laws. Although key powers are vested in the Croatian Government, the President

is the only national officeholder elected by a general vote and therefore he or she has a great

amount of legitimacy and important symbolic meaning. See Ustav Republike Hrvatske. Zakon.hr

(accessed: 23 March 2015). 3 For instance, on 17 January 2015 in an article titled “Barbie Wins,” The Economist wrote that

“Mr. Josipovic lost largely because the Social Democratic-led government had failed to drag Croatia

out of recession,“ and that the election was a “test of how voters feel ahead of a general election later this year. The answer: they are fed up.”, in N.N. 2015. A New Croatian President: Barbie

Wins. The Economist, 17 January 2015. (accessed: 22 March 2015). 4 Croatia joined the European Union on 1 July 2013.

The 2014/2015 Croatian Presidential Election:

Tight and Far-reaching Victory of the Political Right

46

governments have not been able to address these problems adequately.

Besides, the presidential election is regarded as mere foreplay to the more

pressing and important upcoming November parliamentary election. The

parliamentary election will primarily be a competition between the country’s

two ideological rivals, the SDP and the HDZ, although their primacy might be

challenged by new political options that have started to emerge recently as a

consequence of the country’s poor economy and the general loss of trust in

established political elites.

There are three reasons to consider the latest presidential election an

important event for Croatia. First, this election represents the discontinuation

of the last decade’s trend of declining voter turnout.5 The turnout in the second

round of the election was 59.1%, which is significantly higher that the turnout

in the final rounds of the presidential election in 2009 (50.1%) or the

presidential election in 2005 (51%). It was also just slightly lower than the

turnout in the second round of the 2000 presidential election (60.9%), when

democratic enthusiasm was widespread because the nationalist HDZ – after 10

years in power – lost the parliamentary election that was held just a few weeks

before the presidential election.

Second, this is the first time in the history of Croatia’s presidential elections

(six elections were held so far) that the incumbent who was running for the

second term lost the election. Ivo Josipović lost to Kolinda Grabar-Kitarović

despite the fact that he was, according to the public opinion polls, the most

popular Croatian politician. He had significant lead in the polls and was

predominantly portrayed as the certain winner of the election.6 Finally,

Kolinda Grabar-Kitarović is the first woman to be elected to the Croatian

Presidency. Grabar-Kitarović, who declares herself a “modern conservative,” has made an impressive political career and was, among other things, the

Croatian Minister of Foreign Affairs from 2005 to 2008 and the Assistant

Secretary General for Public Diplomacy at NATO from 2011 until she was

elected President of Croatia. However, Grabar-Kitarović is not the first woman

to hold one of the country’s leading positions. From the middle of 2009 until the

end of 2011, the Prime Minister of Croatia was HDZ’s Jadranka Kosor,

although she was not elected Prime Minister, but succeeded her predecessor,

Ivo Sanader, after he surprisingly resigned. By electing Grabar-Kitarović,

Croatia has joined a relatively small group of countries whose presidents are

women.7

5 The turnout in the first European Parliament election was only 20.8%, which was the second

lowest turnout in the history of the European elections. In 2014, the turnout in the same elections

was 25.2%, which was one of the lowest scores in that election. 6 For instance, in November 2015 he had 53.1% of the support in the polls compared to Grabar-

Kitarović's 37.7% (the scores refer to the second round and the potential choice between these two

candidates). Crobarometer, Ipsos Puls, November 2015. 7 Croatia became the 11th country in the world whose president is a woman.

Dražen Lalić and Marijana Grbeša

47

The Context

The social context of the presidential election was unfavourable for the

incumbent Josipović, a distinguished university professor and a renowned

composer of classical music. This context was primarily determined by six

years of economic crisis, i.e., a recession in which the country’s GDP

cumulatively dropped by 13% and investments decreased by 40%.8 According to

the information of the Croatian Bureau of Statistics,9 in November 2014

Croatia had 312,330 unemployed people and the unemployment rate was at

19.2%. Although the crisis in Croatia has been particularly present in the

realm of the economy, it should be regarded as an “overall crisis,”10 manifesting

itself in other realms of life. It has been very deep and conditioned by several

factors: the global economic crisis, the crisis in transition (post-communist)

countries of Eastern and Central Europe, and finally by the structural

disruptions of the Croatian economy and within Croatian society in general.11

During the last six years of the crisis, both the HDZ’s and the SDP’s

administrations have failed to introduce reforms necessary to overcome the

country’s economic perils.12 However, the failure to introduce required reforms

has for the most part been blamed on the SDP, partly because the public

memory of the HDZ’s ignorance about reforms and hefty corruption has mostly

faded.13 In the months preceding the presidential election, the SDP was losing

voters while HDZ support was constantly growing in the polls, along with the

support of the newly established Party for Sustainable Development (Održivi razvoj Hrvatske, ORaH), which has been attracting dissatisfied voters of the

left.14 Such disappointment with the Government among the citizens has been

a burden for Josipović, whose general lack of intervention was widely

acknowledged, but did not seem to reflect on his public image until the election

campaign. He was mostly criticised for not addressing the incompetence and

inefficiency of the Government and for not undertaking actions that were

within his presidential powers and that might have urged the Government to

be more accountable and effective. Prime Minister Zoran Milanović’s arrogant

and offensive communication style was not helpful either; his detachment from

the public and a bad economic record have led to the lowest government

approval rating in Croatian history.15 Addressing the damage that Milanović’s

bad image may cause to Josipović, columnist Ivanka Toma wrote: “HDZ’s

8 Šonje,Vladimir. 2014. Mijenjati se ili nestati: tri godine vlade Zorana Milanovića iz ekonomskog

kuta. Političke analize 5(20), 3-14. 9 Državni zavod za statistiku (accessed: 23 March 2015). 10 Veselica,Vladimir. 2012. Svekolika hrvatska kriza. Zagreb: Školska knjiga. 11 Lalić, Dražen. 2014. Pet kriznih godina . Zagreb: Izdanja Antibarbarus. 12 The HDZ-led coalition governed from the beginning of 2004 until the end of 2011, and the

coalition of the left center led by the SDP has been governing since the beginning of 2012. 13 Ivo Sanader, the former president of the HDZ and the Prime Minister of Croatia from 2004 until

2010, was sentenced to eight and a half years in prison for corruption. Several other HDZ officials

shared a similar fate and the party itself was convicted for using secret funds. If the sentence is

confirmed, the party will have to pay around four million euros in penalties. 14 According to the regular monthly survey of the Promocija Plus agency, in December 2014 right

before the beginning of the campaign, the HDZ was supported by 26.7% of respondents, the SDP by

21.9% and ORaH by 14.6%. Exactly one year earlier, in December 2013, the SDP was supported by

24.3% of respondents, the HDZ by 21.1% and ORaH had not yet been established. N.N. 2014. Javno

mnijenje - CRO Demoskop. Promocija Plus. (accessed: 23 March 2014). 15 See: Grbeša-Zenzerović, Marijana. 2014. Je li za loš imidž Milanovićeve vlade kriv Kennedy?

Političke analize 5(20), 39-44.



48

campaign against Ivo Josipović is chamomile tea compared to what Milanović

has been doing to him.”16

Finally, the presidential election was held in an atmosphere of intense political

clashes and social tension. These involved severe political conflicts that have

been present in Croatia for a couple of years now and that are mostly related to

ideological issues and attitudes towards the Croatian Homeland War (1991 –

1995), its actors and consequences. For instance, in October 2014, a group of

Croatian war veterans started to demonstrate in front of the Ministry of War

Veterans, demanding the resignation of the Minister Predrag Matić. Their

demonstration soon turned into a camping protest that lasted throughout the

whole presidential campaign and that has still not been terminated. In the

course of the campaign, other social protests emerged as well, although much

smaller in scale. These have been mostly related to the eviction of people from

their homes, mainly due to their inability to pay their mortgages. Activists of

the Human Wall (Živi zid), a non-governmental organisation whose main

objective is to obstruct the evictions by building a human wall in front of the

peoples’ homes, have been particularly vociferous. They are led by a 25-year-old

student Ivan Vilibor Sinčić, a political rookie who managed to collect the ten

thousand signatures required by law to become a presidential candidate, and

who consequently joined the group of four candidates who competed for the

title of the fourth President of Croatia. Thus, the presidential election in

2014/2015 was a competition between the incumbent Josipović and his three

challengers: the HDZ’s Grabar-Kitarović, the rebellious leader of the Human

Wall Sinčić, and Milan Kujundžić, the candidate of the rigid right-wing

coalition led by the Croatian Dawn – The Party of the People (Hrvatska zora -

stranka naroda).

The Campaign

Ivo Josipović entered the campaign with a seventeen% lead in the polls.17 His

public image was uninterruptedly favourable throughout his entire

presidential term, despite the country’s pathetic economy and the growing

public discontent with the Government and its performance. For most of the

run up and the first part of the campaign, the majority of the media perceived

Josipović as the uncontested winner. On 8 November 2014, one of the leading

Croatian columnists wrote: “Ivo Josipović is definitely going to win the

elections and remain the Croatian president for another term. Kolinda Grabar-

Kitarović is losing – no Pantovčak18 for her.”19 So, the prevailing perception

was that this is going to be a rather boring campaign and an easy victory for

Josipović. Accordingly, Grabar-Kitarović was perceived as an underdog with no

actual chances to win the election. However, contrary to the dominant

16 Toma, Ivanka. 2015. HDZ-ova kampanja protiv Josipovića je kamilica prema onome što mu radi Milanović. Večernji list, 3 January 2015. 17 According to Ipsos Puls, in November 2014 Ivo Josipović was winning 42.7% in the polls, Kolinda

Grabar-Kitarović 25.8% and Milan Kujundžić 6.7%. Ivan Vilibor Sinčić had not yet declared his

candidacy and was not even considered a candidate. Crobarometer, Ipsos Puls, November 2014. 18 The residence of the Croatian president. 19 Modrić, Sanja. 2014. Šteta novca, Josipović pobjeđuje. Novi list, 8 November 2014.


49

predictions and the poll results,20 the first round ended in a tie: Josipović

received 38.5% of the votes to Grabar-Kitarović’s 37.2%. Ivan Vilibor Sinčić

won 16.4% of the votes, which is a weighty score given that he was previously

completely unknown to Croatian voters, while the rightist Milan Kujundžić

was left well behind with only 6.3% of the votes. In the second round of the

election, Josipović’s rate of approval gradually dissolved – it dropped from 60%

in September 2014 to 46% in December 2014.21 Finally, on 11 January 2015,

Josipović lost the election to Grabar-Kitarović by an extremely narrow margin -

49.3% to 50.7%.22 The reasons for Josipović’s defeat to a challenger, who was at

least in the first round given little to no chance of winning, should be, in

addition to the political and social circumstances and Josipović’s own lack of

delivery, looked for in the campaign itself.

The campaigns of both front-running candidates, Josipović and Grabar-

Kitarović, were quite weak in terms of strategy. This was mostly visible in the

clumsy attempts of both candidates to find the right message capable of

striking a cord with the electorate. Josipović campaigned on a rather abstract

and complicated request for constitutional changes that would encourage

necessary reforms, and he was unable to translate his program into simple,

coherent messages. In addition, the perceived lack of delivery made his

messages sound less credible. The overall impression was that he was

indifferent and passive, and that in five years he did not do much for the

citizens. His approval rating remained stable and his image positive until his

indolence was pushed on the campaign agenda, first by his opponents and later

by the media. The perception that he failed to deliver was consequently

intensifying towards the end of the campaign.

Grabar-Kitarović, on the other hand, was wandering from a Sarah Palin-like

“hockey mom” campaign,23 pledging to have paedophiles chemically castrated,

to messages addressing the victims of the communist regime in World War II

and “the dictatorship” of Tito. Her campaign was initially focused on

conservative, right–wing voters. However, towards the end of the campaign,

her rhetoric became less ideologically divisive, more balanced and focused on

the economy and people’s every-day problems, probably in an attempt to reach

for the voters at the centre of the political spectrum and the undecided: “We

have 318,000 unemployed, 32,000 people with blocked accounts, 1.6 million

people live on the verge of poverty and 30% of them are children. They all want

a better life.”24 Her forte towards the end of the campaign included attacks on

the Milanović government and Josipović’s inactivity: “Croatia does not need a

new constitution – it needs a new government instead of this incompetent

one”25 and “Josipović would now like the new beginning. What was he doing for

the last five years?”26 The HDZ provided strong organisational support to

20 According to IPSOS Puls, in December 2014 Ivo Josipović was winning 46.5% in the polls and

Grabar-Kitarović 34.9%. 21 Ipsos Puls, Crobarometar, 2014. 22 She won by 32,509 votes. 23 See: Wasburn, Philo C. and Mara H. Wasburn. 2011. Media coverage of women in politics: The

curious case of Sarah Palin. Media, Culture and Society 33(7), 1027–1041. 24 Kolinda Grabar-Kitarović in an interview for Večernji list, 9 January 2015. 25 Kolinda Grabar-Kitarović at a rally in Rijeka, Večernji list, 7 January 2015. 26 Kolinda Grabar Kitarivić in an interview for Jutarnji list, 9 January 2015.



50

Grabar-Kitarović’s campaign and canvassed all over the country to summon

supporters and attract new voters. According to a number of commentators, the

HDZ’s impressive party discipline, which resulted in a huge mobilisation of

supporters, was decisive for Grabar-Kitarović’s victory: “Kolinda Grabar-

Kitarović owes her success to her own character and to the army-like

functioning of her party.”27

The campaign slogans on both sides were very vague and unoriginal. Josipović

was offering “The right path” and Grabar-Kitarović was pledging “For a better

Croatia.” The advertising was equally pale and modest. Several billboards

featuring smiling photos of the candidates and their slogans were hardly

motivating. Each candidate had a few, rather unimpressive, television ads

(Josipović five and Grabar-Kitarović two) that were well below the standards of

production set in previous national and local campaigns. Both teams relied

heavily on digital technology, especially social media – YouTube, Facebook and

Twitter in particular.

Ivan Vilibor Sinčić, a student of electrical engineering, presented himself as the

spokesperson of the deprived. He insisted on populist appeals and avoided

questions that would position him ideologically on any side of the political

spectrum. His social appeals and strong anti-elitist rhetoric resonated well

with the politically disenchanted and economically exhausted voters, turning

him almost overnight into a prospective political star. The media labelled him

“the moral winner of the first round” and “the biggest surprise of the

elections.”28 He had no advertising campaign and relied mostly on media

attention. The votes he received were, for the most part, an expression of

resentment towards the despised political elites. Milan Kujundžić, a renowned

doctor and the candidate of the right-wing coalition, campaigned on rigidly

conservative messages with a strong nationalist slant. His performance and

rhetoric became increasingly aggressive towards the end of the campaign,

which probably pushed away some of his voters. His prospects additionally

dropped with the appearance of the young Sinčić, who was more successful in

articulating antipathy towards the two dominant parties, the SDP and the

HDZ. He campaigned with slogans “Milan Kujundžić - Our President” and

“New Croatia.” Sinčić and Kujundžić also relied on social media.

The expenditure limit for presidential elections in Croatia is set at 8 million

kunas (somewhat more than 1 million euros) per candidate in the first round

and an additional 1.6 million kunas in the second round. The candidates’ preliminary campaign reports showed that even the two frontrunners spent

much less than that.29 This is probably due to the economic crisis and restricted

campaign resources, but also due to the fear that in meagre circumstances

voters would disapprove of lavish campaign spending. Final reports indicate

that Josipović and Grabar-Kitarović spent more than that after all (7.9 million

27 Lovrić, Jelena. 2015. Kolindi je najviše pomogao HDZ, ali i SDP-ova Vlada. Jutarnji list, 12

January 2015. 28 Večernji list, 3 January 2015; Jutranji list, 29 December 2014. 29 Kolinda Grabar- Kitarović and Ivo Josipović reported that they spent 3.9 million kunas and 5.8

million kunas respectively. See N.N. 2015 Koliko su potrošili Grabar Kitarović i Josipović?. Gong, 6

January 2015 (accessed: 22 March 2015). Ivan Vilibor Sinčić and Milan Kujundžić reported that

they spent 120,000 kunas and 391,000 kunas respectively.


51

kunas and 8.1 million kunas respectively), but they still did not hit the

ceiling.30

Given the previous research that suggests that Croatian election campaigns

are highly Americanised,31 it may be argued that this campaign represents

certain regression in terms of the Americanisation and especially

professionalisation of Croatian election campaigns. Nevertheless,

Americanisation is still reflected in the presidential debates organised by the

three major national television channels - commercial RTL, Nova TV and the

public Croatian Television (HTV). Altogether nine debates were held between 9

December 2014 and 9 January 2015. Organisation of debates in Croatia

depends completely on television channels, which set all the rules – they decide

on the candidates who will participate and independently define the design of

the debate. Until recently, Croatia had very strict regulation of the media

representation of the candidates. All candidates, regardless of their strength,

had to be given equal time in the media, including in presidential debates.

However, in 2014 changes were introduced that liberated this segment, and

media outlets now enjoy complete autonomy in deciding whom they want in

their program.32 Extreme provisions – such as severe restrictions, on the one

hand, or complete autonomy, on the other – come as a consequence of the

generally defective campaign regulation in Croatia, which has been subject to

heavy criticism not only from national experts, but also from international

institutions, such as the OSCE. In the 2014/2015 presidential election, there

were only four candidates and they all had equal treatment in the debates. In

the campaign, which was not especially information rich, debates provided a

useful platform to inform the voters about candidates’ positions and programs.

They were especially useful in introducing “outsiders” Sinčić and Kujundžić to

the voters. Although the data is still not available, given the change in the

public opinion polls in the last three weeks of the campaign and a generally

very weak advertising campaign, it may be suggested that the debates had

some impact on voters’ opinion. Finally, an important segment of the campaign

consisted of media reports. Josipović and Grabar-Kitarović were equally visible

in the media, as opposed to Kujundžić and Sinčić, who were significantly less

present.33 Although conclusive evidence is still not available, preliminary

analyses suggest that the press favoured Ivo Josipović in the first round of the

election. In the second round of the election, the media reports became more

balanced and the number of stories advocating Kolinda Grabar-Kitarović

increased. Yet the most challenging feature of the media reports, which will

certainly translate into a number of academic articles, is the gender framing of

Grabar-Kitarović. At the very beginning of the campaign, an anonymous

offending dossier appeared in which she was labelled “Barbie,” giving her a

nickname that would stick to the end of the campaign. Even a superficial

30 N.N. Koliko su potrošili Grabar-Kitarović i Josipović? 31 See: Kunac, Suzana, Lalić, Dražen and Martina, Andrijević. 2013. Tihi glas, ujutro u Americi:

izborna kampanja 2011. u Hrvatskoj. Politička misao 50(2), 75-97; Lalić, Dražen and Suzana Kunac. 2010. Izborne kampanje u Hrvatskoj. Zagreb: FPZ. 32 Narodne Novine. 2014. Provisions on the actions of media with a national licence in Croatia

during an election campaign. (accessed: 23 March 2015). 33 Conclusive data are still not available, but a preliminary analysis conducted at the Faculty of

Political Sciences suggests that the ratio between the number of articles published in the first

round that mention Josipović or Grabar-Kitarović and the number of articles that mention Sinčić or

Kujundžić is about 2:1 in favour of the former two.



52

glance at the reports suggests that the main indicators of the gendered

reporting were vehemently present: she was commonly referred to as

“Kolinda,” rather than Grabar-Kitarović, she was questioned about her

emotions, looks and the role of her husband and his “strange” choice to look

after the children while his wife was pursuing a professional career, and

finally, she was subjected to chauvinistic remarks addressing her competency

and professional independence.

Conclusion: Implications of the Presidential Election

In conclusion, we examine four trends that will be affected by the presidential

election and the victory of the HDZ’s Kolinda Grabar-Kitarović. The first trend

refers to the probable change of focus in foreign policy from the region to the

West, primarily towards the United States and the European Union. While

Josipović was focused on the region, Grabar-Kitarović, who has strong

professional links with the United States and the EU, clearly advocated for a

shift in foreign policy in the campaign. In this respect, Grabar-Kitarović said:

“There will be no more mentioning of the region, the basis for politics with our

neighbours are resolved issues.“34 The political right warmly greeted such a

change of focus.

The second trend refers to the intensification of political divisions that have

been mostly visible in the actions of the two conflicting parties, the HDZ and

the SDP. These divisions are a reflection of the different social cleavages that

have become more prominent in recent years.35 Aware of the dangers of such

deep social and political rifts, the winner of the election, Kolinda Grabar-

Kitarović, exclaimed “No more divisions!” in her victory speech and called for

national unity. However, the understanding of “national unity” that is being

reinforced by the HDZ and other parties on the right is predominantly

traditional and nationalistic, and for some citizens evokes traumatic memories

of the past HDZ governments. Contrary to Grabar-Kitarović, the SDP’s Prime

Minister Zoran Milanović has been repeatedly presenting his Manichean

understanding of the political situation in the country. For instance, he has

said “The choice is clear: it is either us or them. Good or bad, light or

darkness.”36 No matter how they communicate about the schisms, the two

biggest parties evidently reinforce political divisions in Croatia. The nature of

these divisions is primarily linked to Croatian history (the Second World War

and the Homeland War) and ideological divisions (nationalism, conservatism

and liberalism), and only to a lesser degree to constructive contemporary

discussions about the economy and other mundane issues, which is why they

will be very difficult to overcome.

34 Körbler, Jurica. 2015. Prvi nastup prve hrvatske predsjednice. Jutarnji list, 15 February 2015. 35 Zakošek, Nenad. 1998. Ideološki rascjepi i stranačke preferencije hrvatskih birača, in Birači i

demokracija: utjecaj ideoloških rascjepa na politički život, edited by Kasapović, Mirjana / Šiber, Ivan and Nenad Zakošek. Zagreb: Alineja, 11-50; Bagić, Dragan. 2007. Društveni rascjepi i stranačke preferencije hrvatskih birača u izborima za Hrvatski Sabor 2003. Godine. Politička

misao XLIV(4), 93-115. 36 N.N. 2015. Ili Mi ili Oni, Izbor je Jasan. Dobro ili Loše, Svjetlo ili Tama. 24 Sata. (accessed: 23

March 2015).


53

The third trend refers to the strengthening of the political right in general and

the HDZ in particular. The results of the presidential election have indicated

that the voters in Croatia are divided into two camps that are pretty much

equal in size. However, they are very different in terms of their behaviour and

discipline. The first one gathers enthusiastic voters of the right, marshalled by

the HDZ and its mighty electoral machinery. The enthusiasm of the HDZ

voters has recently been encouraged by several of the party’s subsequent

victories – in the European Parliament elections in April 2013 and May 2014,

in local elections in May 2013, and finally in the presidential election in

January 2015. On the other side, the voters of the left are relatively weakly

motivated. Their political enthusiasm has been disturbed by the defeat of the

most popular politician of the left, Ivo Josipović, and before that by the defeats

in the European and national elections; most importantly, the voters have been

impacted by the loss of trust in the SDP and the Government of the left centre.

Given the idea that presidential elections are considered foreplay to the

parliamentary elections and the continuous climb in the polls, it may be argued

that the HDZ has a fair chance of winning the forthcoming parliamentary

election. Its chances seem even stronger if we take into account its

demonstrated efficiency in mobilising voters, which should be primarily

attributed to the strong party organisation and its efficient canvassing.

The fourth trend refers to the fragmentation of the political left. The SDP and

other parties of the governing coalition, which have failed to drag the country

out of the crisis, have been progressively losing voter support. Newly

established parties, ORaH and the Human Wall, have benefited the most from

such a development. Nevertheless, ORaH, whose ratings were rapidly

increasing before the presidential election, started to lose its support right after

the election, probably because it advocated for Ivo Josipović.

In the weeks following the election, the Government introduced certain

measures to alleviate the situation of socially disadvantaged citizens (for

instance, those who have loans in Swiss francs, impoverished citizens who

cannot pay their utilities, workers in bankrupt companies). However, all these

measures are predominantly regarded as mitigation of the consequences of the

crises, rather than a solution for overcoming its structural causes. The repeated

attempts of Zoran Milanović to achieve some kind of agreement with ORaH,

which still has relevant support in the polls, have failed. The leader of this

party, Mirela Holy, who used to be a member of the SDP and who left the party

because of disputes with Milanović, refuses any kind of partnership with her

former boss. On the other hand, the Human Wall, which is now the third most

popular party in Croatia, right after the HDZ and the SDP,37 with its robust

anti-elite rhetoric is hardly a potential partner for the governing SDP.

Given all these trends, the HDZ has significant chances to win the next

parliamentary election in Croatia. However, this party too, has not

demonstrated a willingness to undertake the reforms ignored by the SDP.

Therefore, it may be expected that the ideological divisions between groups of

political actors that are not prone to reform, in a country severely devastated

37 According to Ipsos Puls, in January 2015 the HDZ was winning 27.6% in the polls, the SDP

21.2%, the Human Wall 12.5% and ORaH 12.2%.



54

by an economic crisis, will continue to decisively determine the political and

social life of Croatia.

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Sata. 6 February 2015 (accessed: 6 February 2015).

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March 2014).

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Milanovića iz ekonomskog kuta. Političke analize 5(20), 3-14.

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Ustav Republike Hrvatske. (accessed: 23 March 2015).

Veselica,Vladimir. 2012. Svekolika hrvatska kriza. Zagreb: Školska knjiga. Wasburn, Philo C. and Mara H. Wasburn. 2011. Media coverage of women in

politics: The curious case of Sarah Palin. Media, Culture and Society 33(7),

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Zakošek, Nenad. 1998. Ideološki rascjepi i stranačke preferencije hrvatskih

birača, in Birači i demokracija: utjecaj ideoloških rascjepa na politički život edited by Kasapović, Mirjana/ Šiber, Ivan and Nenad Zakošek. Zagreb: Alineja, 11-50.

Bargaining Chips: Examining the role

of Economic Crisis in Serbian

Minority-Majority Relations Research Article

Laura Wise Joint MA Candidate in Southeastern European Studies at the Universities of Graz and Belgrade

[email protected]

http://www.suedosteuropa.uni-graz.at/cse/en/wise





23

Bargaining Chips: Examining the role

of Economic Crisis in Serbian

Minority-Majority Relations

Laura Wise*

Contemporary ethnic bargaining theory claims that minority

ethnopolitical mobilization is best understood through the influence of a

third-party actor, whose signals can determine whether a minority will

radicalise against or accommodate the position of the state majority. It is a

dynamic approach, which Erin Jenne argues goes beyond the limits of

explaining minority actions using purely structural features of a group,

including economic status. This article questions to what extent, if any, do

shifts in the economic status of a minority, host-state and kin state affect

the ethnic bargaining game, particularly in times of crisis. It uses a

comparative case study of the Albanian and Hungarian minorities in

Serbia since 2006, in order to explore whether or not the differences

between their mobilization activities can be adequately explained by

expanding Jenne’s ethnic bargaining model to include structural economic differences. It concludes that although inclusion of economic status as an

additional piece in the ethnic bargaining puzzle does expand the levels of

analysis, ultimately it does not address other limitations of using the

model to understand minority mobilization.

Keywords: ethnic bargaining, minority mobilization, Serbia

Introduction

In ‘Ethnic Bargaining: The Paradox of Minority Empowerment’, Erin Jenne

claims that an effective way to understand the ethnopolitical mobilization of

minority groups is through the relationship between a minority ethnic group,

the state which hosts them, and an external actor which engages with the host

state on the minority’s behalf.1 Using case studies from Central and Eastern

Europe, Jenne develops and tests a rational choice strategic model in order to

explain and predict fluctuations in the political behaviour of minority groups in

the region. The study argues that the importance of a lobby actor will influence

a minority to radicalise or accommodate the actions of the host state, even

when to do so would be counter intuitive. Advocating a dynamic theoretical

approach, Jenne argues that this work goes beyond the limits of explaining

minority actions using purely structural explanations, of which the economic

features of a group are included as a possibly influential condition for conflict.

This article does not advocate treating economic disparities between minority

and majority as a mono causal condition; on the contrary, it suggests that

* Laura Wise is a Joint MA Candidate in Southeastern European Studies at the Universities of

Graz and Belgrade. She holds an Bsc (Econ) in International Politics from Aberystwyth University

and an MA in Comparative Ethnic Conflict from Queen’s University Belfast. Her research interests include ethnic conflict management, minority mobilisation, and comparative politics. 1 Jenne, Erin. 2007. Ethnic Bargaining: The Paradox of Minority Empowerment. Ithaca: Cornell

University Press.

Bargaining Chips: Examining the role of Economic Crisis in Serbian Minority-Majority Relations

24

expansion of the ethnic bargaining approach to include economic opportunity-

structures, group features, and interpretation of economic signals, is a

necessary adaptation for a model which places such a strong emphasis on

rationality.

This article draws from theoretical debates regarding the role of economics in

ethnic mobilisation, and questions to what extent, if any, do shifts in the

economic status of a minority, host state and lobby actor affect the ethnic

bargaining game, particularly in times of crisis. The central contention is that

the unwillingness of ethnic bargaining scholarship to critically engage with

economic arguments reduces its explanatory value as a theoretical approach.

This article applies the ethnic bargaining model to comparative cases of the

Albanian and Hungarian national minorities in the rump-Yugoslav state of

Serbia, with assessment of their fluctuating mobilization from 2006 to 2013.

These case studies are placed within the context of the global economic crisis of

2008, in order to further expand the model by exploring the potential effect

that reduced economic wellbeing across all levels of the nexus has on the

bargaining game. In doing so it examines how ethnic bargaining approaches

can be scrutinised through the inclusion of this important structural feature,

and why it has been neglected in previous research. The first section of this

paper focuses on how economic issues have been engaged with by scholars of

minority bargaining. It then outlines how economic features could be included

into the ethnic bargaining approach, in order to answer some criticisms of the

existing rational-choice model. The final part of the paper explores how this

could be conducted, through application of an economic ethnic bargaining

model to the chosen cases studies, before discussing the issues that are raised

by conducting such an exercise.

1. Economic Ethnic Bargaining

The many differences in the minority groups to which mainstream economic

theories of mobilization may apply has provoked a wealth of empirical studies

and debate, albeit predominantly between theories of relative depravation or

wealth.2 This indicates that rather than being contradictory (for example,

wealthy versus impoverished minority groups as being more or less likely to

mobilise), the relationship between economics and ethnic marginalisation

exhibits a variety of case-specific features.3 However, the central thesis of both

approaches is relatively similar; that minority groups are motivated to

radicalise against the centre by the prospect of achieving economic advantage

through political mobilisation along ethnic lines, and that the decision to do so

is a rational one based upon cost-benefit analysis of the minority’s position in the state. When minority-majority relations are conceptualised as a bargaining

game, existing ethnic bargaining literature has interpreted economic theories

as falling within these categories of relative wealth and deprivation. Earlier

developments have conceptualised minority behaviour as a bargaining game

2 Collier, Paul and Anke Hoeffler. 2004. Greed and grievance in civil war. Oxford Economics Papers

56(4), 563-95. 3 Han, Enze / O’Mahoney, Joseph and Christopher Paik. 2014. External kin, economic disparity,

and minority ethnic group mobilization. Conflict Management and Peace Science 31(1), 46-69, 50.

Laura Wise

25

between minority groups and the state majority,4 with Rogers Brubaker

introducing the term ‘triadic nexus’ to emphasise the role that third party actors (such as a national minority’s kin state) has on the outcome of such a

bargain.5 All of these studies briefly mention previous theories of structuralist

influences, of which economic status is sometimes included as one of many,

alongside aspects such as group size, territorial location, and salience of

minority identity. However, they predominantly discuss the strategic

mechanisms of minority-majority bargains, rather than alternative theoretical

approaches to minority mobilization. Jenne’s work comprehensively discusses the value of a bargaining model against more structuralist arguments, and

concludes that whilst economic explanations of minority behaviour do not lack

value, they should not be treated in isolation as an influential factor.6 A

discrepancy between value indicators in the preceding case studies makes it

possible to discredit economic explanations in the specific cases, but the lack of

consistency indicates that there is merit in re-evaluating the role that

economics could play in minority bargaining.

This scrutiny is not to suggest that these theories are applied to the cases at

face value, as in several of the cases Jenne isolates specific economic factors,

such as the influence of market reforms as a signal of policy intent to

peripheral regions.7 In fact, it is in this more specific analysis of economic

features, that the possible contribution of economic theory to ethnic bargaining

becomes tentatively apparent, as the relationship between structural

influential factors and minority mobilization may be more complex than a

cursory treatment of economic theories can demonstrate.

2. Exploring Ethnic Bargaining in Serbia

With this opportunity in mind, this paper attempts to integrate considerations

of minority disparities and economic interpretation into the ethnic bargaining

game, without risking causal isolation or overemphasis. Adapting the core

ethnic bargaining hypothesis is necessary, so as to suggest how minority

groups may interpret economic signals from other game players.

By understanding that perceptions of negative or positive disparities in the

economic status of a minority and majority could incite mobilisation, it is

suggested that efforts made by external lobby actors to reduce these differences

are attempts to influence the accommodation of minority actors. For relatively

wealthy minority groups, unwillingness of a lobby actor to provide economic

assistance or direct policy towards external kin could be interpreted as an

indicator that radical claims, framed as protection against exploitation by an

economically-weak centre, would not be supported. Therefore they would

accommodate the host state, even if it would leave the minority unprotected

from future economic downturns affecting the centre. Similarly, relatively

deprived groups could interpret host-state or third-party investment as a

4 Chandra, Kanchan. 2001. Ethnic Bargains, Group Instability and Social Choice Theory. Politics

and Society 29(3), 337-62, 338; see also, Cetinyan, Rupen. 2002. Ethnic Bargaining in the Shadow

of Third-Party Intervention. International Organization 56(3), 645-77, 646. 5 Brubaker, Rogers. 1996. Nationalism Reframed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 67. 6 Jenne, Ethnic Bargaining, 186. 7 Jenne, Ethnic Bargaining, 153.


26

method of reducing economic disparity and encouraging integration, for

example, through improving access to higher education to enable employment

in the public sector.8 The deprived minority’s response could reasonably be expected to de-radicalise from existing claims framed as economic grievance, as

support from a third party reduces the need for mobilising against the centre in

order to address certain inequalities, even if the minority remains economically

marginalised by policies of the host state.

This hypothesis, that supportive and unsupportive economic signals from an

external lobby actor can influence the accommodation of a national minority

within a host state, aims to explain conditions for de-radicalisation within

dynamic bargaining games of either a triadic or quadratic nexus. International

institutions proposing inequality reduction strategies, such as the World Bank

and non-governmental organisations, may also signify policy intent to increase

the integration of marginalised groups into formal participation structures, or

demonstrate an unwillingness to support the economic activities of increasingly

radical groups which threaten the stability of a host state. Exploring quadratic

level bargaining would address concern that triadic ethnic bargaining models

do not adequately reflect the influence that international organisations can

have in issues of communal politics,9 and that by increasing the levels of

analysis, the potential influential factors increase, making it more possible to

discern the complexity of minority mobilisation within a wider context.10

Focussing on bargaining between the minority and its host state reduces the

triadic or quadratic nexus to a dyad, and emphasises the importance of

domestic relations and economic conditions, both material and perceived. If

third-party attempts to reduce horizontal equalities are a contributing factor to

de-radicalisation, then the same signals made by the host state could be

interpreted in a similar way by minorities. As Jenne’s model treats host state movements as either being repressive or non-repressive, radicalising policies

could be those which limit minority participation in majority-dominated

structures of economic advantage, such as a lack of state investment in

minority-language university education. Policies which neglect horizontal

inequalities could be interpreted as repressive, minorities will radicalise

against only if they perceive that there is potential support for mobilization

from a lobby actor. For relatively wealthy groups, exploitative signals from the

centre could also be interpreted as repressive, as although this would enhance

the economic networks between the state and the minority, it could be

engagement which exists to benefit the majority whilst constraining the

minority from utilising resources for mobilisation.

An important factor is the reliance these hypotheses make on the minority

interpreting these signals as such. Cetinyan’s perfect information strategic

model assumes an ability of all players to access the information which would

8 Stein, Jonathan P. 2000. National Minorities and Political Development in Post-Communist

Europe, in The Politics of National Minority Participation in Post-communist Europe, edited by

Stein, Jonathan P. New York: EastWest Institute, 1-30, 9. 9 Smith, David J. 2002. Framing the National Question in Central and Eastern Europe: A

Quadratic Nexus? The Global Review of Ethnopolitics 2(1), 3-16. 10 Cordell, Karl and Stefan Wolff. 2009. Ethnic Conflict. Cambridge: Polity Press, 42.

Laura Wise

27

allow them to correctly interpret the true intent of another actor.11 However,

Brubaker argues that interpretation of the triad contributes to spirals of

radical minority mobilisation.12 Jenne treats minorities as actors which must

navigate the various behaviours of other actors in order to infer the credibility

of intent which such behaviour could indicate.13 It is entirely possible for

minorities to misinterpret signals of economic assistance from a lobby actor as

support to strengthen the group’s bargaining power for future autonomy, secession, or irredentism, when in fact the policy was intended to reduce the

appeal of trans-border economic migration. Alternatively, a regionally

concentrated minority could interpret host state investment as a positive step

in reducing inequalities, whilst the reality of improved infrastructure is

implemented to facilitate resource extraction with minimal local redistribution.

The final methodological issue is the aspect of crisis. Jenne argues that ‘the majority and lobby actor preferences can change suddenly due to economic

shocks’,14 and that this complicates the minority’s ability to update its awareness and perception of the other actors’ intent towards minority groups. This idea is implicitly rooted in the belief that economic shocks, such as a

crisis, can shift state and international level actors’ priorities due to a concern for their own economic prosperity and stability, which could lead to a reduction

in the availability of resources to be allocated for de-radicalising minorities at

risk. Rather than isolate the factor of economic crisis in order to hypothesise,

the following case studies are conducted within a time frame of a global

economic crisis, in order to observe how an economically-framed bargaining

game is further complicated by such a crisis.

This case study explores the integration of economics into ethnic bargaining by

attempting to understand the minority groups’ fluctuations in mobilization through the relevant economic theories, and assessing the relationship between

the perceived economic statuses of the actors, the way that moves in the game

are framed in economic terms, and the minorities’ responsive behaviour.

The analysis begins at a transitional event, as Jenne’s model assumes that the vulnerability which could be felt by a minority during a period of state

transition means that ‘the minority prefers concessions to equal treatment’, and therefore the minority will express demands that require both the majority

and the external lobby actor to respond with signals of either accommodation or

repression (the majority) or support or non-support (the external lobby actor).15

The choice of Serbia as a transitional host state makes it possible to begin the

analysis in 2006, which was the year that Montenegro declared independence

and formally ended the two-nation federation previously known as the Federal

Republic of Yugoslavia. For minorities in the rump state, this transition could

have demonstrated an opportunity to redefine their relationship with the state

centre, and their position within domestic institutional structures. It could also

have provoked a sense of insecurity, as the state had lost a significant

11 Cetinyan, Ethnic Bargaining, 646. 12 Brubaker, Nationalism Reframed, 68. 13 Jenne, Ethnic Bargaining, 45. 14 Jenne, Ethnic Bargaining, 45. 15 Jenne, Erin. 2004. A Bargaining Theory of Minority Demands: Explaining the Dog that Did Not

Bite in 1990s Yugoslavia. International Studies Quarterly 48(4), 729-54, 734.


28

proportion of territorial influence, and may have moved to secure its dominance

over the remaining area of control.

Serbia has also been chosen due to the acute affects the global economic crisis

has had on its economy. The consequences of the negative growth suffered by

its main trading partners eventually affected Serbia’s growth through decreased demand,16 and by 2009 Gross Domestic Product had dropped by 3.5

per cent from the previous year,17 Household Consumption fell by 2 percent,

with a significant decrease in Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) from 7.3 per

cent of GDP for 2005 to 2009, to 4 percent between 2008 and 2012.18 This shift

in the economic condition of the host-state means that the possible effects of a

reduction in the prosperity of the centre may have on an ethnic bargaining

game can be examined. The current analysis ends in 2013, however, continued

fiscal reform under the Serbian Progressive Party’s rule, as required by the International Monetary Fund, would be valuable to include in future research,

as it could raise minority perceptions of their treatment under continued

austerity.

The minority cases have been selected both for their suitability and positions in

the existing literature. The non-violent cases of Hungarians in Vojvodina and

Albanians in Preševo both have a varying number of relational fields of nationalizing actors, presenting aspects of a triadic game between the minority,

majority, and the minority’s external lobby actor, or a quadratic game between all of the above, but with international organisations as an additional field

open to discursive interpretation. The Hungarian case also expands on

previous research undertaken by ethnic bargaining scholars, whilst the

Albanian case engages with a group largely under-examined by minority

mobilization studies.19 Regarding economic theories, each case is specifically

relevant to investigation of different theoretical understandings of why

minorities would radicalize or de-radicalize.

Vojvodina is one of the most economically advanced and ethnically diverse

regions in Serbia, with Hungarians only constituting a majority in the

municipalities of Bečaj, Bačka Topola, Mali Iđoš, Subotica, Ada, Kanjiža, Senta and Čoka.20 When understanding minority mobilization through an economic

lens, it is difficult to establish the Hungarian minority as an actor which may

act according to advanced regionalism expectations, when such a region is

inhabited primarily by the majority group whose economic disparities from the

minority are under consideration. This study focuses on the economic status of

16 Bertelsmann Stiftung. 2012. BTI 2012 — Serbia Country Report. Gütersloh: Bertelsmann

Stiftung, 17. 17 Gligorov, Vladimir. 2014. Serbia: Early Elections, then Reforms. The wiiw Balkan Observatory

(accessed: 20 September 2015). 18 USAID Serbia. 2014. Abbreviated Country Development Cooperation Strategy: Fiscal Years 2013-

2017. Belgrade: USAID, 12. 19 Future research could extend to the Bosniak national minority in south-west Serbia, as a group

which exhibits similar structural features to Albanians, and whose bargains have also involved

quadratic level actors. See Vrbensky, Ratislav. 2008. Can development prevent conflict? Integrated

area-based development in the Western Balkans – theory, practice and policy recommendation.

London: Centre for the Study of Global Governance (LSE). 20 Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia. 2012. 2011 Census of Population, Households and

Dwellings in the Republic of Serbia: Ethnicity. Belgrade: Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia.

Laura Wise

29

municipalities where Hungarians constitute a relative majority with over 25

per cent of the population, in order to account for this regional distribution. By

doing so the Hungarian municipalities can be understood as relatively wealthy

compared to the centre, albeit by a slight margin, as all of the municipalities,

with the exception of Čoka, were classified in 2006 as being highly developed or within the national average.21 This assessment remained the same in 2012,22

and thus the Hungarian minority can be expected to behave according to the

wealthy minority group hypothesis.

It is easier to establish why relative deprivation is the most applicable

economic hypothesis for the shifts in mobilization of the Albanian population in

Serbia. Concentrated as a relative or total majority in the southern areas of

Preševo, Bujanovac and Medveđa, all three municipalities were classified as being either highly undeveloped or devastated areas in 2012.23 As with the

Hungarian municipalities, this classification had not changed from 2006. In

2009, the official average rate of unemployment in Albanian municipalities was

39 per cent;24 however, local officials claimed that unemployment was

estimated to be around 60 and 80 percent respectively.25 This disparity

between data highlights the challenge of establishing the precise nature of the

economic situation of minority actors, but as according to work on economics

and Russian regionalism by Yoshiko Herrera, the minority’s perception of its

economic status in relation to the centre is more important than the specific

nature of the disparity and relationship.26

3. Hungarians in Vojvodina

Prior to the moment of transition in 2006, the first organisation of the

Hungarian minority was the formation of the Democratic Community of

Vojvodina Hungarians (DCVH)27 after Vojvodina’s constitutional right to regional autonomy was dissolved in 1989. In April 1992 the DCVH adopted a

memorandum which presented the concept of Hungarian ‘personal autonomy, a local Hungarian government, and a regional Hungarian government with

special [minority] status’,28 but a provisional Hungarian National Council was

not established until the end of the decade.29 Autonomy for Vojvodina was only

partially restored by the so-called “Omnibus Law” in February 2002.

21 Avlijaš, Sonja and Goran Radosavljević. 2014. Defining Criteria for Underdeveloped

Municipalities. Centre for Advanced Economic Studies, Belgrade: CEVES, 23 November 2006

(accessed: 20 September 2015), 44. 22 Ministry of Regional Development and Local Governance, Republic of Serbia. 2012. Uredba o

utvrđivanju jedinstvene liste razvijenosti regiona i jedinica lokalnih samouprava za 2012. Godinu.

Regionalni Razvoj (accessed: 20 September 2015). 23 Ministry of Regional Development: Uredba o Utvrđivanju jedinstvene liste. 24 Serbia Investment and Export Promotion Agency. 2009. The Average Unemployment Rates in

Serbia in 2009 (by municipality). SIEPA (accessed: 20 September 2015). 25 International Crisis Group. 2006. Southern Serbia: In Kosovo’s Shadow. Belgrade, Pristina:

International Crisis Group, 7. 26 Herrera, Yoshiko M. 2005. Imagined Economies: The Sources of Russian Regionalism.

Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 27 Kerenji, Emil. 2005. Vojvodina since 1988, in Serbia Since 1989, edited by Ramet, Sabrina P. and

Vjeran Pavlaković. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 350-80, 359. 28 Kokai, Peter. 2010. About the Autonomy Efforts of the Hungarian Community Living in Serbia.

South-East Europe International Relations Quarterly 1(3), 1-9, 2. 29 Kokai, About the Autonomy Efforts, 3.


30

By 2006, the Hungarians of Vojvodina had reached an advantageous

bargaining position. Although provincial autonomy had not been fully restored

to the constitutional status of 1974, the historical and institutional precedent

for regional self-governance was still there, something not possessed by other

minorities in Serbia. They also became the first minority in Serbia to have a

kin-state in the European Union (EU) when Hungary became a member in

2004, presenting the perception of greater access to economic benefits for

Hungarian kin located outside of the bloc, particularly through initiatives such

as the National Responsibility Programme.30

3.1. Minority Bargaining between 2006 and 2013

Following Montenegro’s independence in 2006, Article 182 of the new Serbian constitution established Vojvodina’s status as an autonomous province within Serbia’s borders. This autonomy enabled provincial institutions to regulate matters including education, urban planning, healthcare, agriculture and

infrastructure; additionally, it stated that the seven percent of the Serbian

central budget should be allocated for Vojvodina.31 The lack of claims expressed

by the Hungarian minority at this time suggest that during the period of

transition they were content with developing the senior positions held in

government at the next local and national elections. Meanwhile, stable trade

relations between the kin and host-state were being consolidated, particularly

co-operation between joint-owned small and medium sized businesses, most of

which were located in Vojvodina.32

The first explicitly stated claim on Jenne’s spectrum of minority mobilization, which ranges from affirmative action to secession or irredentism,33 occurred

during the run up to the May 2008 national and provincial elections. The

Hungarian Coalition, comprised of the Alliance of Vojvodina Hungarians

(VMSZ), Democratic Fellowship of Vojvodina Hungarians (DZVM) and

Democratic Party of Vojvodina Hungarians (DSVM) parties, contested the

election with an underlying goal of ethno-territorial autonomy for the

Hungarian majority municipalities in North Bačka and North Banat,34 a goal

which had been explicitly stated in January by the leader of the VMSZ, István

Pástor.35 After the polls, however, Pástor quickly backtracked, declaring that

due to a lack of political will ‘it would be a multi-ethnic region, not a Hungarian

region.’36 This shift in mobilization could be attributed to the

underperformance of the Hungarian Coalition in the election,37 rather than any

30 Butler, Eamonn. 2007. Hungary and the European Union: The Political Implications of Societal

Security Promotion. Europe-Asia Studies 59(7), 1115-144, 1127. 31 Republic of Serbia. 2006. Constitution of the Republic of Serbia, Article 183: Competences of

Autonomous Provinces. Vlada Republike Srbije (accessed: 20 September 2015). 32 N.N. 2007. Hungary, Serbia sign business memorandum. Budapest Business Journal, 8

November 2007 (accessed: 20 September 2015). 33 Jenne, Ethnic Bargaining, 40. 34 Zuber, Christina Isabel. 2012. Ethnic party competition beyond the segmented market.

Nationalities Papers 40(6), 927-44, 936. 35 N.N. 2008. Ethnic Hungarians could back Tadić, with strings attached. B92, 8 January 2008

(accessed: 20 September 2015). 36 N.N. 2008. Vojvodina Hungarians still seeking autonomy. B92, 3 June 2008 (accessed: 20 Sep-

tember 2015). 37 Zuber, Christina Isabel. 2011. Beyond Outbidding? Ethnic party strategies in Serbia. Party

Politics 19(5), 758-77, 758.

Laura Wise

31

sudden economic shifts which occurred during that time period. The kin-state

response to the territorial claim was wholly unsupportive, with the Hungarian

foreign minister openly rejecting the possibility.38

By 2010 the idea of territorial autonomy had been quietly abandoned, and the

VMSZ branded itself as a regional party seeking full autonomy for the province

as a multi-ethnic region.39 The minority was enabled to pursue cultural, rather

than territorial, autonomy by moves made by both the centre and the kin-state.

The Serbian Law on National Minorities in 2009 elicited promises of financial

support from the Hungarian government for the work of the National Minority

Council, and encouragement of Hungarians to collect enough signatures to hold

elections for the body.40

Additionally, in 2008 the Assembly of Vojvodina adopted a new statute for the

province, establishing decentralization which included designating Novi Sad as

the provincial capital, and opening a representative office in Brussels to

encourage external investment.41 Decentralisation at this level, despite being

multi-ethnic, could be interpreted by an economic ethnic bargaining model as a

radical move, as Hungarian representatives held significant influence and key

positions in the Assembly, and therefore could better protect the regional

budget from exploitation by the centre, whilst campaigning for greater

investment in Hungarian majority municipalities. However, this was also prior

to the economic crisis, and whilst Serbia was less economically advanced than

the minority’s kin-state, there were no serious economic shocks which could

push the minority to radically readdress their position within the state. The

statute also reaffirmed the participation of Hungarian majority municipalities

within the current borders of Serbia.

The issues of autonomy and economic wellbeing were more clearly linked at the

end of 2008, when the VMSZ declared the republic’s constitution to be ‘unacceptable’, claiming that the stipulation to allocate seven percent of the

budget had not been respected since the constitutional referendum in late

2006.42 This became a re-occurring statement of grievance prior to

parliamentary debates over the annual budgetary issues, particularly following

the fiscal measures introduced by Serbia as part of its response to the global

economic crisis. In the VMSZ’s opposition to the 2011 drafting of a public property bill, Pástor acknowledged the state’s restricted financial situation, but

argued that there was a ‘discriminatory’ imbalance in the allocation of funding to the Vojvodina Capital Investments Fund.43 The following year changes

proposed by the Vojvodina Assembly to the Law on the Budget System, which

argued that previous changes did not follow the constitutional allocation of 7

38

MTI. 2008. Göncz downplays talk of autonomy for Vojvodina Hungarians. Politics.hu, 12 December 2008

(accessed: 20 September 2015). 39 Zuber, Ethnic party competition, 936. 40 MTI. 2009. Sólyom welcomes Serbian law on ethnic council. Politics.hu, 11 December 2009

(accessed: 20 September 2015). 41 Autonomous Province of Vojvodina. 2008. Statute of the Autonomous Province of Vojvodina,

Article 3: Territory of the AP of Vojvodina. vojvodina.rs (accessed: 20 September 2015). 42 N.N. 2008. Constitution "unacceptable" for Hungarian party. B92, 20 December 2008 (accessed:

20 September 2015). 43 N.N. 2011. SVM leader accuses govt. of discriminating Vojvodina. B92, 21 August 2011 (accessed:

20 September 2015).


32

per cent of the state budget to the province, were rejected by the Serbian

government.44

Despite the economic crisis impacting Hungary more severely than Serbia, 45 in

2010 the kin-state remained financially committed to supporting the cultural

autonomy of Hungarians in Vojvodina by supporting the VMSZ minority

education programme.46 Amendments made to the Act on Hungarian

Nationality in 2010, which enabled non-Hungarian citizens to achieve dual

citizenship through naturalization, and thus greater trans-border movement,

employment and other economic benefits, could have been interpreted as a

signal that the kin-state was utilising a trans-border citizenship regime to

redefine its borders.47 An assertion from the Hungarian government that ‘this legislation does not create room for the conferring of citizenship en masse’,48

and the ongoing positive relationship between the host and kin states, enabled

the minority to correctly interpret that this support for their freedom of

movement was intended to booth consolidate their position within Serbia, and

deter illegal economic immigration into Hungary.49

Contention between the centre and the minority remained minimal until July,

when the Constitutional Court declared that twenty provisions of the law on

Vojvodina’s jurisdictions were invalid within the Serbian constitution, including the opening of a provincial office in Brussels. The minorities of the

province condemned the decision, perceiving it to be moving towards an

abolition of Vojvodina’s autonomy, and the VMSZ reneged on a prior suggestion that it would be part of a future coalition government.50 This refusal of the

leading Hungarian minority party to join the central government demonstrates

the importance of provincial autonomy to the Hungarian minority, and that the

development of a National Minority Council was not a substitution.

The move elicited muted response from the minority kin-state, with Hungary

choosing to improve its relationship with the new government following the

2012 elections. However, the dispute over Vojvodina’s competencies continued into 2013, and in May the Vojvodina Assembly passed a declaration which

accused the central government of violating the province’s autonomous status.51 Whilst the issue does not cleanly fit into the minority claims

spectrum, as it is neither a purely Hungarian issue, nor a newly advanced

claim, the minority’s contestation of the court’s decision persisted regardless of continued of kin-state investment into the region. This behaviour is in line an

44 N.N. 2012. MPs discuss Vojvodina’s budget. B92, 22 November 2012 (accessed: 20 September

2015). 45 ISAC Fund. 2013. Serbia and Hungary: Political and Economic Perspectives. Belgrade: Friedrich

Ebert Stiftumg, 26. 46 MTI. 2010. Government to give funding to ethnic Hungarian party in Vojvodina. Politics.hu, 16

August 2010 (accessed: 20 September 2015). 47 Ragazzi, Francesco and Kristina Balalovska. 2011. Diaspora Politics and Post-Territorial

Citizenship in Croatia, Serbia and Macedonia. Working Paper. Edinburgh: University of

Edinburgh. 48 Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 2010. Act on Hungarian Citizenship (accessed: 20 September 2015). 49 Butler, Hungary and the European Union, 1127. 50 Barlovac, Bojana. Court ruling on Vojvodina divides Serbia. Balkan Insight, 17 July 2012

(accessed: 20 September 2015). 51 N.N. Declaration on Vojvodina adopted. B92, 21 May 2013 (accessed: 20 September 2015).

Laura Wise

33

economic ethnic bargaining idea that whilst the minority perceives there to be

little support for radicalisation from the triadic or quadratic levels, the most

profitable course of action is to strengthen existing autonomy mechanisms

within the state structure, even though they perceive the centre to be curtailing

their economic capabilities.

3.2. Economic Ethnic Bargaining

The shifts in mobilization by the Hungarian minority can be tentatively

understood in terms of economic theories of wealthy regionalism, but doing so

raises several analytical concerns. Despite the classification of almost all the

Hungarian majority municipalities as being of higher than or in line with

average levels of development, this assessment is not supported by

unemployment rates. A vast disparity existed in 2009 between municipalities

such as Subotica, with a below national average rate of 19 percent, and Mali

Iđoš, which with an unemployment rate of 47 per cent, was experiencing higher unemployment than in the devastated Albanian majority areas52 This disparity

continued to remain until the end of the bargaining game, with Ada

experiencing dramatic drops in unemployment from above to below the

national average, whilst in all other Hungarian municipalities unemployment

increased.53 The unevenness between the economic wellbeing across the area

where claims are made by the minority representatives, with the VMSZ

performing well electorally in all of these municipalities, shows that extent to

which conditions must be bracketed in order to treat the minority according to

a specific economic theory in a bargaining situation.

The second concern raised by the Hungarian case is the proportion of claim

making which is framed around the status and resources of a multi-ethnic

institution. Initially, the persistent attempts to protect the central budget

allocation for the region corresponds with ethnic bargaining, as the unequal

reciprocation by the centre to reflect the net contribution from the region is a

key driver for radicalisation away from an exploitative host-state. However, the

complication with such a theory in this case is that the regional contribution is

multi-ethnic, despite the high development of Hungarian majority

municipalities. Whilst the minority contention can be understood due to the

high levels of participation of Hungarian representatives at the regional level,

as that is the mechanism through which they can exercise the greatest agency

over financial and economic resources, it also demonstrates the difficulty of

applying a broad economic theory of mobilization to the specific experiences of

one minority in the bargaining game.

Stability between the kin and host states, and the relative lack of quadratic

level engagement with the region, means that economically framed moves by

external actors to influence the minority’s behaviour are more subtle than perhaps they would be if the minority was treated as a relatively deprived

group. Throughout the game, the triadic level actor does encourage the

minority’s economic wellbeing within the current state boundaries, through investment, support for cultural autonomy, minority education and freedom of

52 Serbia Investment and Export Promotion Agency. 2009. The Average Unemployment Rates. 53 Serbia Investment and Export Promotion Agency. 2013. Municipalities database, SIEPA

(accessed: 20 September 2015).


34

labour movement across the kin-state borders. It is difficult, however, to

ascertain to what extent these efforts contribute to the minority’s behaviour, particularly as the VMSZ rarely expressed economic claims aside from the

annual budget dispute.

4. Albanians in the Preševo Valley The first significant moment of mobilization in the Preševo Valley occurred when Albanian leaders conducted a referendum in 1992, in which the

population voted for unification with the formerly-autonomous region of

Kosovo.54 This vote was never transformed into material attempts to unify the

Valley and Kosovo, but the referendum is often referred to by Albanian

politicians when making claims against the state.

In January 2000 the Liberation Army of Preševo, Medveđa and Bujanovac

(UÇPMB) launched an insurgency campaign from the Preševo Valley, aiming to unify with an internationally-backed Kosovo. The conflict ended in May

2001, and governance of the Valley fell under the Čović Plan to disband the UCPMB, and assert the territorial integrity of Serbia.55 The self-titled

Albanian Councillors of Preševo Valley signed a declaration in January 2006 which committed them to seek the “unification of Preševo Valley with Kosovo in case of possible change of [Kosovo’s] borders”.56 However, the councillors

suggested that they would wait for regional developments to facilitate this

change, rather than use force.

By May 2006, Albanians were concentrated in some of the most economically

devastated parts of Serbia, complaining of high unemployment rates, exclusion

from public employment, under-developed healthcare and other infrastructure,

and lack of access to education in Albanian.57 These factors determine that the

group will be studied according to theories of relative deprivation, and whether

shifts in their actual or perceived economic relationship with the centre, their

kin-state of Kosovo, and the large number of international agencies interested

in the stability of the Preševo Valley, affect the Albanian minority’s radicalisation or accommodation of the Serbian state.

4.1. Minority Bargaining between 2006 and 2013

Following Montenegro’s independence in May 2006, Albanian protestors in June called for decentralization and establishment of a self-administered

region of the three municipalities in the Preševo Valley.58 Legitimised as a

genuine minority claim with support from the President of the leading minority

Party for Democratic Action (PVD), Riza Halimi, it was met with silence by the

Serbian government and other actors in the bargaining game. The call for

decentralization was repeated in the autumn of 2006, when the PVD urged

54 Kosovar Institute for Policy Research and Development. 2012. Autonomy for the Northern Part of

Kosovo: Unfolding Scenarios and Regional Consequences. Policy Paper. Pristina: KIPRED, 9. 55 Churcher, Bob. 2003. Preshevo/Kosovo Lindore – A Continuing Cause For Concern Working

Paper. Camberley: Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, 6. 56 Huzka, Beata. 2006. Decentralization of Serbia – the Minority Dimension. Center for Policy

Studies Brief. Budapest: Central European University, 1. 57 International Crisis Group, Southern Serbia: In Kosovo’s Shadow, 7. 58 N.N. 2006. South Serbia Albanians want self-administration. B92, 15 June 2006 (accessed: 20

September 2015).

Laura Wise

35

Albanians to boycott a national referendum on accepting the new constitution

of Serbia.59

However, by January 2007, OSCE and European state ambassadors had

convinced the four main Albanian party leaders Riza Halimi, Ragmi Mustafa

(Democratic Party of Albanians), Jonuz Musliu (Movement for Democratic

Process) and Skender Destani (Democratic Union of the Valley) to form ‘the Albanians of Preševo Valley’ and break a fifteen-year boycott of parliamentary

elections by running as a coalition.60 This was facilitated by the Republican

Electoral Commission, who reduced the signature requirement for minority

party registration from 10,000 to 3,000, making minority contestation more

achievable.61 There were also reports of pressure exerted by Hashim Thaçi, the

Prime Minister of Kosovo, on the more radical leaders to integrate.62 The final

Albanian coalition succeeded in winning one parliamentary seat for Halimi,

who consequently became the first ethnic Albanian Member of Parliament in

the post-Yugoslav Serbian republic.

The first claim framed in economic terms was the reaction of Albanians to the

Ahtisaari plan, which in March 2007 argued that re-integration of Kosovo into

Serbia was not possible, and advocated instead for an independent, majority-

Albanian state backed by the international community.63 According to ethnic

bargaining theory, this signal from the quadratic level to the kin-state could be

interpreted by the minority as an opportunity for radicalisation, and in

September the leaders of the Albanian parties in Preševo issued a declaration supporting the plan, condemning the ‘sluggishness’ actions of the government

run Coordination Body for Preševo, Medveđa, and Bujanovac, and blaming the state for instability in the area which threatened ‘economic development’.64

The Albanians’ concern that regional instability was hampering development became evident when Kosovo eventually declared independence in February

2008. Kosovo authorities immediately introduced stricter border and customs

controls to emphasise their statehood, regardless of the consequences for

ethnic-kin in Preševo, where cross-border trade effectively ceased.65 Whilst this

negative economic signal from the kin-state did not prevent a ‘Coalition for Preševo Valley’ successfully running in the May parliamentary elections, a second economic effect of the independence led to a shift in the minority

mobilization, after the Serbian Ministry of Education stopped recognising the

accreditation of diplomas issued in Kosovo in August. Minority party leaders

59 N.N. 2006. Albanian Leader in Preševo Valley Calls for Boycott. B92, 14 October 2006 (accessed:

20 September 2015). 60 International Crisis Group, 2007. Serbia: Maintaining Peace in the Preševo Valley. Belgrade:

International Crisis Group, 6. 61 However, this decision was inexplicably reversed one month before the 2008 national and

provincial elections. OSCE, ODIHR. 2007. Republic of Serbia Parliamentary Elections: Election

Observation Mission Report. Warsaw: OSCE, 6. 62 International Crisis Group, Serbia: Maintaining Peace in the Preševo Valley, 6. 63 Ahtisaari, Martti. 2007. Report of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General on Kosovo’s Future Status. UN Security Council, 26 March 2007 (accessed: 20 September 2015). 64 N.N. 2007. Valley Albanians back Ahtisaari plan. B92, 30 September 2007 (accessed: 20 Septem-

ber 2015). 65 Lazic, Nikola and Amela Bajrovic. 2008. Kosovo Woes For South Serbia Traders. Balkan Insight,

28 February 2008 (accessed: 20 September 2015).


36

protested to Belgrade, threatening to withdraw Albanian participation from the

Coordination Body if the decision was not reversed, as failure to do so would

prevent many Albanian students in Preševo to seek employment in Serbia using their qualifications.66 The threats were dismissed, and responsibility for

encouraging Albanians to de-radicalise was left to international actors such as

USAID who, alongside the Coordination Body, signed an investment

memorandum with the mayors of Preševo, Bujanovac and Medveđa, whilst the French ambassador to Serbia pledged EU assistance to tackle regional under-

development.67

International efforts by donors and the OSCE to re-integrate the Albanian

representatives into the Coordination Body were successful in March 2009,

despite the unresolved issues of inhibited cross-border trade, and Serbia’s unrecognition of Kosovo-issued diplomas. Once again, the accommodation

lasted only a few months before the assembly of the municipalities sent the

government a proposal which reaffirmed the January 2006 declaration for

establishing regional autonomy, proportional representation of Albanians in

public institutions, and calling to reverse the diploma recognition decision.68

This followed a denouncement, by the mayor of Bujanovac, of a drastic cut in

the annual municipality budget allocated by the Coordination Body, and the

perception that despite state investment in ‘infrastructural development, which had contributed to improving the quality of living…economic development projects had been lacking’.69 The perceived awareness minority actors had of

their worsening economic status as a result of kin-state actions, and repression

by the centre through exclusion of diploma holders and underemployment in

the public sector, could have influenced the group to radicalise their claims

again, despite lack of support from their kin-state, and ongoing international

assistance to improve regional economic development.

These latest claims preceded moves made by the government to visibly make

progress on regional development beyond infrastructure projects. After years of

stalled progress, in October 2009 bilingual branches of Nis University opened

in Medveđa, with support from USAID and the OSCE,70 whilst at the start of

2010, 4.3 million euros were allocated to the Coordination Body from the

central budget for infrastructure development. The Coordination Body’s director highlighted that this was a ten percent increase from the previous

year, stating that ‘the fact that the Coordination Body is one of the few state institutions that has received more money than it did last year, despite the

economic crisis, clearly indicates that southern Serbia is a strategic priority of

the government’.71 Meanwhile, the government of Albania took steps to

establish economic cooperation with the region, through assisting Coordination

66 Lazic, Nikola. 2008. Ban on Kosovo Diplomas Angers South Serbia Albanians. Balkan Insight, 13

October 2008 (accessed: 20 September 2015). 67 N.N. 2008. US Aid Pledge Signed in Southern Serbia. Balkan Insight, 17 November 2008

(accessed: 20 September 2015). 68 N.N. 2009. Ethnic Albanians push for “region” in south. B92, 3 August 2009 (accessed: 20

September 2015). 69 N.N. 2009. South Serbia Mayor Complains of Budget Cuts. Balkan Insight, 25 May 2009

(accessed: 20 September 2015). 70 European Commission. 2009. Serbia 2009 Progress Report. Brussels: European Commission, 19. 71 Lazic, Nikola. 2010. Money to South Serbia for Economic Development. Balkan Insight, 3

February 2010 (accessed: 20 September 2015).

Laura Wise

37

Body projects, and encouraging private investment from Tirana, with the Vice-

President urging leaders in the Preševo Valley to establish an Albanian National Council.72

This support appears to follow the hypothesis that perceived investment from

both the state and external lobby actors effectively promotes accommodation of

the minority, as in June 2010 the Albanian National Council was finally

formed by successful elections. It represented a huge step for the cultural

autonomy of the Albanian minority, but also for the attempts by other actors in

the bargaining game to reduce calls of more radical, territorially based claims.

However, regional economic underdevelopment was still a prominent concern

for Albanian leaders, with the high unemployment rates and lower than

average wages becoming a more pressing issue as the Coordination Body

announced that donor assistance was ‘slowly drying up’73 and the delayed

effects of the economic crisis on the central state became clearer. The minority

could have perceived an economically weakened centre as a less formidable

opponent to bargain with; however, they appear to have understood that a

worsening economic state for the state as a whole would lead to reduced

budgets for expenditure at multiple levels of governance. Therefore, rather

than framing claims in economic terms, the next discernible move made by the

minority was a mass boycott of the 2011 population census, which they

protested would marginalise Albanians by refusing to include citizens living

abroad,74 an important aspect for an economically depressed region which had

experienced steady and significant labour migration.

The opening of a multi-lingual department of economics in Bujanovac, and a

joint Coordination Body and U.K investment project for small and medium

enterprises, were efforts by the state between October 2011 and April 2012 to

further address development issues other than infrastructure. This investment

may have contributed to a quiet period of minority claim making, with only a

partial, radical, boycott of the May 2012 presidential and parliamentary

elections, and a brief verbal conflict over the removal of a UÇPMB memorial in

2013. Although the minority did attempt to use the Brussels Agreement

proposals for an Association of Serb Municipalities in Kosovo to for claims of an

equivalent arrangement in South Serbia, they received minimal support from

the Kosovo Assembly, which passed legislation supporting Albanian civil

rights, but within the existing state borders.75 These flare-ups between the

minority and the state between 2012 and 2013 seem to be actions driven by

radicals, and not claims made by legitimate representatives of the group.

4.2. Economic Ethnic Bargaining

This exploratory case study of Albanians in the Preševo Valley indicatively supports the inclusion of economic theories into ethnic bargaining analysis of

72 N.N. 2010. Albanian FM: Relations with Serbia improving. B92, 13 March 2010 (accessed: 20

September 2015). 73 Riberg, Marcus and Bojana Barlovac. Pace of Integration in South Serbia ‘Not Satisfactory.

Balkan Insight, 20 April 2011 (accessed: 20 September 2015). 74 Pekusic, Biljana. 2011. Serbian Bosniak and Albanian minorities to boycott census. SETimes, 8

October 2011 (accessed: 20 September 2015). 75 Republic of Kosovo Assembly. 2013. Resolution on the Rights of Albanians in Presheva, Bujanoc

and Medvegja (accessed: 20 September 2015).


38

minority mobilization. The relative deprivation of the minority is regularly

referenced by actors alongside and independently of other issues when

expressing radical claims, whilst appearing to respond temporarily to efforts

made by other game players to improve the economic condition of Albanians.

The quadratic level of ethnic bargaining is also supported by the minority’s confidence in international actors’ involvement through direct regional investment, aid, joint projects with state institutions, and the influence that

international institutions and foreign governments could have on the status of

their kin-state.

Throughout the period of analysis, triadic and quadratic level actors display

awareness of a need for strong signals of commitment to investment and

economic integration following periods of minority radicalization, such as the

renewed claims for regional self-governance in 2009. It also demonstrates how

economic investment and integrationist political institutions in the region are

intricately linked, with the role of the Coordination Body as a decentralised,

cooperative institution between the central state and local minority leaders,

whilst also providing a degree of minority agency over economic governance

structures, within a structure which enhances existing borders and the legacy

of the Čović Plan.

Conclusion

This paper has explored a way in which ethnic bargaining as a dynamic theory,

could be developed in order to acknowledge the potential influence of economic

structures for minority mobilization. The subsequent case studies demonstrate

that it is possible to expand previous ethnic bargaining models to include a

quadratic level of analysis and contextual features of the circumstances in

which a bargaining game is taking place, such as a global economic crisis. By

doing so, it has addressed concerns that a triadic bargaining game does not

effectively account for the influence and participation of international players,

such as international organisations or non-kin states, in relations between a

host-state and national minorities. The Albanian study in particular has raised

the need to be aware of the participation of secondary kin-states, when they

display greater interest in the economic wellbeing and integration of a minority

abroad than the primary lobby actor. Emphasising the discursive

interpretation of economic status and moves by minority players also

contributes to the dynamic nature of existing ethnic bargaining theories,

ensuring that despite arguing for inclusion of a structural feature, the

constructivist roots of bargaining theory are not distorted.

Although the case studies demonstrate minority behaviour which appears to

support economic ethnic bargaining hypotheses, they also raise issues

regarding the need for bracketing minority features, a reliance on observing

the dominant ethnic voice, and the complications that arise when minority

claims are expressed through multi-ethnic institutions. The limitations of the

two indicative case studies means that further and more extensive research is

required to establish how these could be addressed, or whether these are

necessary features of ethnic bargaining models which limit the applicability of

the theory to specific minority behaviour. Whilst in both cases claims were

expressed in economic terms, and moves made by other players to reduce

Laura Wise

39

minority radicalisation through financial means can be observed, the case

studies also demonstrate that relative economic difference between a minority

and the centre is a significant but not necessary feature of mobilization.76

Therefore, this paper concludes that the possibilities of ethnic bargaining

theory remain open for discussion and engagement, particularly through the

use of case studies beyond the area of Central and South-Eastern Europe. It

welcomes the contribution that ethnic bargaining models make to dynamic

theories of comparative ethnic conflict, but also suggests that it could be

developed to address the existing limitations it relies on in order to retain a

predictive capacity.

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Introduction: The Politics of Numbers

in the Post-Yugoslav States

Soeren Keil Reader, Canterbury Christ Church University

[email protected]

Valery Perry

Lecturer, Sarajevo School of Science and Technology

[email protected]

http://www.suedosteuropa.uni-graz.at/cse/en/introduction





43

Introduction: The Politics of Numbers

in the Post-Yugoslav States

Valery Perry and Soeren Keil*

Introduction: The Merits and Pitfalls of Counting Populations

Since 1991, every country in the former Yugoslavia has either held, or has at-

tempted to hold, a census. The most recent efforts occurred in or around 2011,

reflecting both the interest of harmonizing with the European Union’s (EU)

own 2011 census round, as well as the need for accurate data in a region that

has experienced significant population flux in the past generation. Macedonia’s 2011 census was cancelled during the enumeration period due to objections

related to the counting procedure, but grounded in politics related to the Mace-

donian and Albanian populations, and representation provisions in the Ohrid

Framework Agreement that ended the violent conflict in the country in 2001.

Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) collected data for the first time since the war in

2013, but as of this writing (October 2015) the results have not been finalised.1

Kosovo’s census results have been contested by Belgrade, with a number of

Serb majority municipalities in Kosovo boycotting the census while other mi-

norities have also questioned the results.

In the former Yugoslavia, censuses are clearly not about the simple number of

persons in a household or their education; the number of people in a municipal-

ity; the numbers of people employed; the percentage of people who drive or take

public transportation to work; or other such information common to census

taking in other parts of the world (including most EU Member States). In this

region, the census very often becomes focused squarely on sensitive identity

questions related to one’s ethnicity, one’s nationality, one’s religious affiliation, and one’s mother tongue. Interest in these sensitive questions is not purely

academic, but based on either existing required quotas and representation re-

quirements and local level budgeting decisions, or on the aspirational politics of

groups seeking to ensure greater formal mandated participation in power

structures, at either the local or state level. As Simon and Piché argue, “[t]he statistical representation of diversity is a complex process which reveals the

foundations of societies and their political choices. Thus there is a gap between

the apparent ethnic and racial diversity in most countries in the world and the

way these societies perceive themselves […].”2 The link between a defined

group and a defined piece of territory is not unique to the former Yugoslavia;

* Valery Perry is an independent researcher and consultant based in Sarajevo. She is a Senior

Associate in the Democratization Policy Council, and is teaching conflict analysis and resolution at

the Sarajevo School of Science and Technology.

Soeren Keil is Reader in Politics and International Relations at Canterbury Christ Church

University in the United Kingdom. His research interests include the political systems of the post-

Yugoslav states, EU enlargement policy and conflict resolution in divided societies. 1 Some basic preliminary data has been released such as the overall number of people residing in

the country, but no actual breakdown of all the information has yet been released. It is expected

that these data will be available later in 2015. 2 Simon, Patrick and Victor Piché. 2011. Accounting for Ethnic and Racial Diversity: The Challenge

of Enumeration. Ethnic and Racial Studies 35 (8), 1357-65, 1357.

Introduction: The Politics of Numbers in the Post-Yugoslav States

44

Benedict Anderson notes in his study of identity construction and consolidation

in Southeast Asia that, “[i]t would be unwise to overlook the critical intersec-

tion between map and census.”3 These questions of who lives where and who

rules where, and who is a majority or a minority, and who is constituent or not

constituent, were at the core of the power struggles and led to violent conflict in

the region in the 1990s. While the violence ended, the concerns about such is-

sues, by people but especially by political parties both shaping and shaped by

these dynamics, continues.

Public Policy, Identity and Contestation

This special issue aims to explore these issues by looking at the census experi-

ences of each country that has emerged from the former Yugoslavia. While each

case study presented has its own focus and structure, a number of themes

emerge that demonstrate a certain cohesion among the cases.

One theme is the link between demographics and public policy, including polit-

ical participation. Some of the cases ensure certain minimal representation of

minorities based on the count of a minority in a certain area; reaching a

threshold guarantees a certain level of representation or number of seats. In

some cases this provides primarily for representation and certain rights (often

language rights) at the local level, while in others state-level rights and repre-

sentation is confirmed as well. As the discussions in Croatia demonstrate, local

issues do not only reflect questions of minority rights protection, but can also

link into previously unresolved issues related to the violent conflict that erupt-

ed in the country in the early 1990s. Similarly, discussions in Bosnia have

demonstrated how important censuses can be in a system that is dominated by

power-sharing quotas and positive discrimination for minorities. This link be-

tween representation and numbers creates a context in which everybody – and

every body – counts, leading to incentives to ensure the highest possible num-

ber of one’s own group, to in turn ensure the highest possible representation.

While a census is typically aimed at being a “snapshot” of the people residing in a country at the time of the enumeration process, these political incentives

create motivation to ensure that this snapshot is enlarged, to include diaspora

who have been out of country for short- or long-periods of time. Discussions on

including the diaspora have not only contributed to problems during the census

process in Macedonia, but have also been present in Bosnia and Kosovo. This

competition for numbers is further expressed through often organized efforts to

ensure that individuals declare “cleanly” as members of just one identifiable

group, or speak one primary mother tongue; persons of complex or mixed herit-

age, or those who seek not to declare are often expected to “take sides” to en-

sure greater numbers of one group or the other. The fact that sensitive, identi-

ty-focused questions are not in fact required by the EU has not removed the

political allure of categorizing citizens in this manner. Censuses remain key

instruments of ethnic engineering,4 of creating a certain type of polity, in which

3 Anderson, Benedict. 1991. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of

Nationalism. London: Verso (Excerpt from Chapter 10), 249. 4 On ethnic engineering, see Stiks, Igor. 2006. Nationality and Citizenship in the Former

Yugoslavia: From Disintegration to European Integration. Southeast European and Black Sea

Studies 6(4), 483-500.

Valery Perry and Soeren Keil

45

different groups live, have rights and enjoy political and societal participation,

while others (those not counted, or not fitting the previous pattern) remain

marginalized. This is nowhere truer than in the post-Yugoslav states. In turn,

this means that those organizing a census become political actors, engineering

questionnaires and methodologies according to which the population is catego-

rized, and deciding who is and is not counted.5

Another theme that runs through several of the contributions reflects the fact

that these challenges related to identity are not unique, and have been evident

in census efforts in the region for over a century. This is particularly visible in

the discussion of identities such as “Muslim”, which have changed in numerous countries, including Bosnia and Montenegro, where the dominant category has

become “Bosniak.” Identities have changed at various times in each country’s history, as new census responses have been available; while a person could

remain the same as an individual between two separate census periods, their

available identity options could in fact change, meaning that in one census they

could be offered a different range of ethnicity or nationality options than in

another, being left to consider which “box” is more appropriate for them to tick (if any). Another example of this form of identity change would be the rise and

fall of the category “Yugoslavs” which played a key role in the 1950s in Yugo-

slavia, when Tito was trying to promote a common identity for all Yugoslav

peoples. Nowadays, this identity does not feature anymore in censuses – and

like the state, Yugoslavs seem to have disappeared. Florian Bieber has recently

analyzed how different processes have affected the construction of national

identities in the post-Yugoslav states. He highlights processes of state-

dissolution, nation-state-building, the reification of national identities and the

emergence of new categories as key elements that influenced the development

of census categories in these states.6

A third theme in these articles is contestation, as certain aspects of nearly all

of these censuses have been contested by various groups claiming pressure,

over- or under-counting, or flawed data collection methods.7 Once group rights

have been identified and enshrined in public policy, the importance of the count

makes it obvious that results will often be challenged, as tangible budgetary or

political participation rights are based on these numbers. This environment

also increases the ethnic stakes of what is – to people outside of the region –

often believed to be a purely technical exercise. All country studies in this spe-

cial issue mention different forms of contestation. Some of these contests are

based on questions such as whether to include the diaspora, while others evolve

around socio-economic factors. For example, Roma in most countries are per-

manently undercounted because of lack of permanent residence, low literacy

rates and social exclusion, which makes their participation in census exercises

5 Nobles, Melissa. 2000. Shades of Citizenship: Race and the Census in Modern Politics. Stansford:

Stansford University Press; See also Kertzer, David and Dominique Arel (eds.). 2002. Census and

Identity: The Politics of Race, Ethnicity and Language in National Censuses. Cambridge and New

York: Cambridge University Press. 6 Bieber, Florian. 2015. The Construction of National Identity and its Challenges in Post-Yugoslav

Censuses. Social Science Quarterly 96(3), 873-902, 880. 7 On the issues of census contestation in the post-Yugoslav states see Visoka, Gëzim and Elvin

Gjevori. 2013. Census Politics and Ethnicity in the Western Balkans. East European Politics 29(4),

479-98.


46

particularly difficult. Other contests arise out of the question of refugees and

displaced persons. Should these individuals be included in the censuses of the

countries where they are refugees, or should they be included in the censuses

in the countries where they originally come from (and supposedly will return

to)? How would data reliability be affected if they were included in both? What

if this group of people is not included in any of the censuses because of their

“in-between” status? These are but some of the questions which have resulted in contestation of censuses in the post-Yugoslav states.

Contributions

The contributions in this special issue confirm that in the countries of the for-

mer Yugoslavia, censuses are never simply technical. Since censuses in the

post-Yugoslav states have not only been used as tools of ethnic engineering, but

also as mechanisms to assess countries’ preparedness and convergence with

EU standards and regulations, the articles in this special issue are organized

according to the countries’ EU integration process, starting with Slovenia,

which joined in 2004, followed by Croatia which became an EU Member State

in July 2013. This is followed by the article on Montenegro, which became a

candidate country in 2010 and shortly afterwards opened membership negotia-

tions with the EU. It is perceived by many as the most advanced country of the

non-EU Western Balkans, in terms of its progress towards eventual member-

ship. The following article discusses Serbia, which became a candidate country

in 2012 and opened negotiations on membership in 2014. Macedonia, which is

discussed in the following paper, has been an EU candidate country since 2005,

but has so far been unable to open membership negotiations due to the ongoing

name dispute with Greece. Finally, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo are

discussed, neither of which have official candidate status, though Bosnia signed

a Stabilisation and Association Agreement with the EU in 2008, and is also

part of the visa liberalization process, which allows its citizens visa free entry

into the Schengen area of the EU. Kosovo has so far not formally signed any

Agreements (SAA) with the EU on its path towards membership, although it is

currently engaged in negotiations on a SAA. The last contribution provides a

broad overview of census in the region.

Damir Josipovič’s article on Slovenia provides a historical overview of the cen-

sus on the territory of Slovenia, post-Yugoslavia’s first “success story”. He shows how even during the Yugoslav period, there were differences in territori-

al enumeration units and methodology that can make longitudinal comparisons

difficult. He reviews the way in which certain new census methods were tested

in Slovenia in this time; a trend that continued after the fall of Yugoslavia as

Slovenia has now in fact moved away from “classic” census techniques and to-

wards a register-based system of data collection. Josipovič also touches on the

country’s own controversy concerning the “erased” persons, namely the approx-

imately 30,000 people who were living in Slovenia and were essentially erased

from the population register for failing to apply for Slovenian citizenship in

time. What Josipovič demonstrates persuasively is the fact that even in a small

state that is considered relatively ethnically homogenous, and which escaped

the Yugoslav break-up with little violence on its own territory, controversies

surrounding population censuses and questions about who is being counted and

who is not, and which categories are used, remain.


47

Anna-Lena Hoh’s article examines Croatia’s census in 2011 to determine whether or not this country provides a good example in terms of the application

of EU norms to a candidate country seeking to meet accession requirements.

While the technical aspects of the census were broadly viewed as meeting the

needed requirements, the inclusion of sensitive ethnicity/nationality questions

in a semi-closed manner can be viewed as a weakness. Further, she explains

how the linkage between certain political participation rights for minorities

and census results have increased inter-group tensions, particularly with the

Serb minority.

Ivan Vuković’s contribution on Montenegro provides a broad historical over-

view of the country’s 20th century experience of independence, its incorporation

in various south Slav polities, and then its renewed independence in 2006. The

options available to citizens in censuses in this time reflect the various political

interests of the ruling regime, and as such while the actual population struc-

ture had not changed in noticeable ways, the manner in which people declared

themselves in the numerous censuses held in these various constructs did fluc-

tuate significantly. His detailed review of ongoing political dynamics and the

census results of 2003 and 2011 demonstrate the interplay among the respons-

es of citizens, meanings of identification, political party development and evolu-

tion, and broader political strategies. He also highlights very clearly how cen-

suses can be used as tools of nation-building and reflect ongoing political issues

in a country that is still trying to find the meaning of Montenegrin nationhood,

now that it has found Montenegrin statehood.

Mina Djurić-Nikolić and Laura Trimajova look at the two most recent censuses

in Serbia (2002 and 2011), analyzing the results and related politics in this

heterogeneous state. They discuss the impact of census boycotts in Kosovo, but

also responses among Hungarians (primarily in Vojvodina), Albanians in

southern Serbia, among Bosniaks and the Roma. They survey the political dy-

namics evident during these two enumeration periods, and the policies of guar-

anteed representation thresholds among various minority groups. They con-

clude that many minorities still contest Serbian censuses and feel insufficiently

integrated into the census project and the state more generally.

Roska Vrgova provides an overview of the consistently contentious census ex-

perience in Macedonia – the only country in the region in which the latest cen-

sus failed. She outlines the historical context for debates on demography and

population, and the impact of built-in quotas in the Ohrid Framework Agree-

ment, which has reinforced the belief that every person counted matters.

Vrgova also reviews the role of the census in identity consolidation through

public policy – a theme repeated in several of the contributions. She concludes

that although the most recent attempt to hold a census in 2011 failed due to

technical issues over who is counted and how the results will be used, this fail-

ure in fact reflects deeper political issues between the Macedonian and the

Albanian population. Because political representation and certain group rights

are linked to representative figures from the census, each census exercise be-

comes a form of political mobilization and a ‘game of numbers.’


48

Valery Perry looks at the 2013 census in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) – the

first since the war that displaced half of the pre-war population. Twenty years

after the end of the war, Bosnia continues to face significant political challeng-

es and obstacles, most of which are driven by the nature of ethno-national par-

ties operating in the ethno-national system devised and confirmed at Dayton.

As the results of the census are not expected to be available until late 2015

(and some doubt this timeframe), she focuses on unanswered policy questions

related to Bosnia’s census, and questions the nature of the notion of “constitu-

ent peoples” if the census reveals that there are more “Others” than there are of a constituent group (the Croats). As is the case in Macedonia, Perry also

highlights how the link of group rights is connected to absolute (and relative)

numbers revealed by the census, making the count a powerful tool around

which political and religious elites mobilize, often manipulating and undermin-

ing what, in essence, should be a technical counting exercise.

Mehmet Musaj explores Kosovo’s contentious experience with censuses, includ-

ing the boycott of the 1991 census by Albanians following Kosovo’s rescinded

autonomy by the Milošević regime as Yugoslavia began to disintegrate, and the

2011 census boycott by Serb municipalities in the north, as well as by some

Serbs in parts of the south. He also examines the sensitive nature of the census

and the consequences of relying on other data sources as he explains current

controversies concerning the much smaller numbers of minorities as enumerat-

ed in 2011, and the impact that this could have on local budgeting and minority

representation. Population censuses, Musaj argues, cannot only be a way to-

wards ensuring a minority is properly represented and enjoys sufficient rights,

but it can also be a way of scaling back minority rights and funding for minori-

ty communities if in fact certain minorities are demonstrated to be smaller in

numbers than previously assumed.

Pieter Everaers gives a practitioner’s view of the censuses in the region, grounded in his years of experience with EUROSTAT, including, most recently,

as the EUROSTAT Director. He looks at the countries that participated in the

2011 census round, looking at the EU’s role in supporting the development of appropriate census infrastructure and processes, and broad methodological

consistency to ensure a solid basis for comparison among EU states. Reflecting

on the pervasive interest in the sensitive (and, from the EU’s point of view, optional) identity questions, he acknowledges the political dynamics of identity-

based census campaigns, but notes that the nature of such optional questions

can at best be used as an independent variable, and that absolute interpreta-

tion of responses to these sensitive questions should be avoided, since they

were either non-compulsory questions or people had the option to ‘not declare’.

In the conclusion, Soeren Keil poses a number of questions related to policy

issues and the censuses. He argues that censuses are always more than just a

technical counting exercise. Discussions in Western Europe focused on regional

funding, infrastructure support and long-term policy planning, and were often

as contested and heated as questions over identity, religion and mother tongue

in the post-Yugoslav states. However, Keil demonstrates that identity-related

questions in an area in which identity is still in flux, and in which fundamental

demographic changes have recently taken place, prevent any focus on more

policy-oriented discussions. In their EU integration process, all of the countries


49

will have to concentrate on issues such as economic development, sustainable

infrastructure planning, and budgeting within the strict rules of the most re-

cent EU agreements, and hence policy discussions should be at the forefront of

the debates about the results of the censuses. Instead, discussions over who is

counted and how remain of key importance in all countries (even those that

have joined the EU), and demonstrate unconsolidated nation-building and

state-consolidation projects.

While the 2011 census round is over, it is clear that the ramifications of the

results will continue for some time. Croatia, an EU member state, will continue

to grapple with ensuring it meets its human rights obligations concerning its

Serb minority (mostly located in the east of the country), and political dynamics

that can at times favor nationalist rhetoric and illiberal policy. It is difficult to

imagine a scenario in Bosnia in which the results of the sensitive questions are

released without contestation, and the policy implications of the count remain

woefully unclear. That the success of Macedonia’s Ohrid Agreement continues

to be threatened by the manner and methodology of a count, and the fears of

how resulting numbers will be used, suggests that the foundations of the peace

in that country are still rather fragile. Kosovo’s count remains incomplete due to the ongoing conflict with Serbia, both in broad terms regarding its declared

independence, and in targeted terms related to Belgrade’s continued role in

and among the Serb majority municipalities. Even if countries begin to follow

Slovenia’s model, moving away from a decennial special enumeration process

and towards the concerted collection of data from various registries, the contro-

versies and conflicts surrounding the politics of demography, territory and rep-

resentation will likely continue as long as the countries of the region remain

heterogeneous and seek to identify appropriate means of political participation

that are grounded in various definitions of group identity.

Bibliography:

Anderson, Benedict. 1991. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin

and Spread of Nationalism. London: Verso.

Bieber, Florian. 2015. The Construction of National Identity and its Challenges

in Post-Yugoslav Censuses. Social Science Quarterly 96(3), 873-902.

Kertzer, David and Dominique Arel (eds.). 2002. Census and Identity: The Poli-

tics of Race, Ethnicity and Language in National Censuses. Cambridge and

New York: Cambridge University Press.

Nobles, Melissa. 2000. Shades of Citizenship: Race and the Census in Modern

Politics. Stansford: Stansford University Press.

Simon, Patrick and Victor Piché. 2011. Accounting for Ethnic and Racial Diver-

sity: The Challenge of Enumeration. Ethnic and Racial Studies 35(8), 1357-

65.

Stiks, Igor. 2006. Nationality and Citizenship in the Former Yugoslavia: From

Disintegration to European Integration. Southeast European and Black Sea

Studies 6(4), 483-500.

Visoka, Gëzim and Elvin Gjevori. 2013. Census Politics and Ethnicity in the

Western Balkans. East European Politics 29(4), 479-98.

The 2013 Bosnia and Herzegovina

Census: Waiting for Results and

Counting the Questions

Research Article

Valery Perry

Lecturer, Sarajevo School of Science and Technology

[email protected]

http://www.suedosteuropa.uni-graz.at/cse/en/perry Contemporary Southeastern Europe, 2015, 2(2), 50-64




50

The 2013 Bosnia and Herzegovina

Census: Waiting for Results and

Counting the Questions

Valery Perry

Bosnia and Herzegovina held its first post-war census in autumn 2013,

over two decades after the final 1991 Yugoslav census, following a war

that displaced nearly half of the population, and killed approximately

100,000 people. The long delay was related to several reasons including

the post-war reconstruction, the efforts to either support or obstruct the

return of persons to their pre-war homes as guaranteed in the Dayton

peace agreement, and pervasive ethno-political agendas. Such agendas

were often based on the practical reality of who, from what constituent

group, lives where. As of August 2015, the results have not been released.

This article therefore reviews BiH’s experience in the recent census, and poses a number of policy relevant questions about how the data could be

used.

Keywords: Bosnia and Herzegovina, census, state-building, nation-

building, power sharing

Introduction

Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) held its first post-war census in 2013, after

years of controversy and delay. The technical process rolled out over two weeks

in October, and the subsequent data processing has continued through early

2015. While there had been some anticipation – and concern – that the results

would be ready around the same time as the 2014 October general elections, it

appears that the final results will not be announced until late-2015.

In the absence of anything other than the most preliminary data shared to

date, as of August 2015 it is impossible to discuss the results that might be

released. However, there are significant policy questions looming in terms of

how the data may be used to make or affect public policy. It is not clear how the

results will be used; how several non-mandatory questions will be analyzed or

utilized; or whether independent researchers and analysts will have access to

the data for independent study. Further, as of the time of writing it is unclear

how contradictory references in many laws that refer to the census might be

interpreted or implemented. Only once the results are fully and officially re-

leased, and once these policy questions are answered, will the lasting impact of

the 2013 census be known.

Valery Perry is an independent researcher and consultant based in Sarajevo. She is a Senior

Associate in the Democratization Policy Council, and is teaching conflict analysis and resolution at

the Sarajevo School of Science and Technology. She has worked for organizations including NATO

SFOR, the OSCE, the Public International Law and Policy Group (PILPG), IMPAQ International

and the UN Office on Drugs and Crime.

Valery Perry

51

This article will briefly review BiH’s contentious recent census history and the broad conduct of the 2013 census,1 and will then focus on the potential impact

of laws that alternately require policy to be based on the 1991 census or the

“last” census.

Why Count?

The author recalls a comment from friends sometime in 2004 mocking a com-

mercial for laundry detergent that asserted that a very specific number of

washing machines broke down each year due to using soaps that led to build-

up. They scoffed, “how would anyone know that when we do not even know how many people live in this country?” While this was a joke, it demonstrated a certain truth – Bosnia had not had a census since before the war. Countries

need to know how many people live in it to make policy decisions. The U.S.

constitution – the world’s shortest (excluding amendments) – includes a re-

quirement for a decennial census (Article 1, Section 2), while this is supple-

mented by many other data collection methods, a proper census is still held

every ten years, and forms the basis for important congressional seat allocation

decisions. The EU also requires that its members collect census data, with the

last census round held in member states – and some prospective member states

– in 2011.

Data on a country’s individuals and households, potentially including basic economic data, family size, employment status, educational attainment, agri-

cultural data and other information – can help to inform a range of public poli-

cy decisions ranging from urban and infrastructural planning, school construc-

tion/expansion, social service provision and legislative re-districting. Some

countries are beginning to move away from regular, broad-based, interview-

style censuses, instead aggregating data from other existing public databases

of information. For example, Slovenia now gathers information in this way2, as

do a number of other countries.

While talking about statistics cause many people’s eyes to glaze over, some elements of data collection can be quite controversial, as they can influence the

distribution of public resources, or can establish the number of various groups

of citizens in a society according to racial, ethnic, religious or linguistic affilia-

tions. The questions posed, the manner in which they are asked (or not asked)

and the coding and aggregating of data all allow for differences in interpreta-

tion, analysis and presentation. The technical can quickly become political.

This has particularly been the case in colonial and post-colonial regions, in

fragile, heterogeneous societies, and in countries rebuilding in the wake of war

and population displacement.3 The way in which former colonial masters or

new domestic leaders seek to categorize their populations has not only had

contemporaneous implications, but lasting historical consequences as well.

1 A review of key issues in BiH’s recent census history can be found in Valery Perry. 2013. The

2013 Census in Bosnia and Herzegovina: A Basic Review. Democratization Policy Council Policy

Note 3. October 2013 (accessed: 30 October 2015). 2 See Josipovic, this volume. 3 Kertzner, David I. and Dominique Arel (eds.). 2002. Census and Identity: The Politics of Race,

Ethnicity, and Language in National Censuses. Cambridge University Press.

The 2013 Bosnia and Herzegovina Census: Waiting for Results and Counting the Questions

52

Anderson has noted, “The fiction of the census is that everyone is in it, and that everyone has one – and only one – extremely clear place. No fractions.”4 In

some cases being counted is seen by various groups as the priority, while in

others not participating in the count is viewed as preferable in terms of long-

term policy options. While the role of groups in mobilizing can have significant

implications, such processes diminish the space for individuals and their own

possibly complex and layered identities, subsuming what might be considered

as a personal choice into a social statement.

As demonstrated by the articles in this special issue, censuses have garnered

particular controversy and interest in the countries of former Yugoslavia. It is

not a coincidence that those countries that experienced the most difficult vio-

lent conflict and displacements, and which even at peace exhibit many looming

questions about who “belongs”, have experienced the most census angst. Sever-

al of these cases are explored by Visoka and Gjevori, who review the 2011 cen-

sus processes in several Western Balkan countries (Albania, Kosovo, Macedo-

nia, Montenegro and Serbia), assessing whether they can be considered a full

or partial success, or, in the case of Macedonia, a failure.5 As BiH’s census re-

sults have not been released as of the time of writing, it is too soon to defini-

tively determine whether the 2013 census can be considered a success. Howev-

er, the long period of time without a census, the failure to organize one in 2011,

the continued controversy concerning the sensitive questions and the lack of

agreement, not to mention the adopted policies on how to use census data, once

again reflects the problems that pervade every aspect of BiH political, social

and even economic life: The lack of agreement on the state, the nature of the

state, the nature of citizenship and a common vision for the present and the

future.

Controversial Counting in BiH

For nearly two decades after the war, BiH continously relied on census data

from the 1991 census – the final count in Yugoslavia – which itself was often

read together with previous censuses conducted in the 19th and 20th centuries

in the Ottoman Empire, the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, and social-

ist Yugoslavia.6 Throughout the 20th century, Bosnia has faced census chal-

lenges and constraints related (among other factors) to the presence of the

three main groups in the territory, the competing claims regarding the notion

of ethnicity, nationality and religious affiliation, as well as language/mother

tongue.

The other contributions in this collection confirm the controversies about one’s proclaimed ethnicity, nationality, and what this might mean for a polity. In

Bosnia, one of the key issues of contention for decades has been on how to cate-

gorize and count Bosnia’s Muslims; the categorization of Croats and Serbs has

4 Anderson, Benedict. 1991. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of

Nationalism. London: Verso, (Excerpt from Chapter 10, Census, Map, Museum,) 244-5. 5 Visoka, Gezim and Elvin Gjevori. 2013. Census politics and ethnicity in the Western Balkans.

East European Politics, 479-98. 6 Raible, Elizabeth. 2008. Dilemmas of the Projected 2011 Census of Bosnia and Herzegovina:

Enumerating Ethnic Cleansing, Refugee Return, and National Identity. MA/MPA thesis, Indiana

University.

Valery Perry

53

been in comparison rather straightforward. Miller describes the approach of

the Communist Party during the inter-war and wartime periods, noting

measures that began to recognize this group as a group in their own right;

measures likely taken in part to secure support for the party by this important

demographic: “…although in 1948 Muslims were only allowed to register on the census as Muslim-Serbs or -Croats, they were able to register with organiza-

tions (such as the Communist Party or Women’s Anti-Fascist Front) as Mus-

lims. In 1953 Muslims did not have qualified options on the federal census ei-

ther, leading many to register as Yugoslavs, but by 1961, a category for “Mus-

lim in the ethnic sense” (Musliman u etničkom smislu) was made available.

Though not granting full national affirmation, the category was popular, draw-

ing approximately 842,200 individual registrants in Bosnia alone (25.7% of the

republic’s population). Analysis of the statistical shifts between the two census-

es suggests that a large portion of these had likely chosen Yugoslav in 1953. In

the 1971 census, the category “Muslim (in the national sense) first appeared as an option on the Yugoslav census, with 1,482,430 people (39.6%) in Bosnia se-

lecting it as the best description of their national identity.”7 In the last Yugo-

slav census in 1991, the option “Muslim” (Musliman) was also available (select-

ed by 43.38% of the population in Bosnia), as was “Yugoslav” (selected by 5.5%). Other variants of responses, including the label “Bosniak,” were varied and rare (reflecting fewer than 0.04% of respondents as Muslim-Bosniak,” or “Bosniak- Muslim”).8 This issue remained a foremost concern among some ac-

tivists in the run-up to the 2013 census, as there were fears that Bosniaks

might respond that they are “Bosnian” or “Muslim,” in either case decreasing the number in the category of “Bosniak.”9

While historically and politically interesting, for policy purposes in general,

and in the wake of the massive wartime displacement in particular, the need

for a census in BiH was appreciated for years.10 During the three-and-a-half

year war, approximately 100,000 people were killed and 2 million (half of the

entire population) were internally displaced or refugees.11 The returns process

was uneven, with people alternately deciding to either reclaim their property

and stay, or to reclaim their property and sell, building their lives in a new

post-war location. There have been many efforts to estimate the impact of the

war, ranging from ad hoc assessments based on voter registers, informal con-

firmation of mostly homogenous communities and other “finger in the wind” approaches. Political parties and politicians follow such population trends as it

helps them to target their generally monoethnic campaigns. Scholars have also

developed their own models.12 Government agencies and the civil service, very

often bound by positive discrimination hiring regulations aimed at ensuring

7 Miller, Brenna. 2014. Competing Muslim Identities in the 1971 Yugoslav Census. Paper presented

at the Association for the Study of Nationalities World Convention. Columbia University, New

York. 8 Zavod za Statistiku Republika Bosne I Herzegovine. 1991. Etnicka Obiljezja Stanovnistva.

Rezultati za Republiku (accessed: 01 November 2015), 10. 9 Perry, The Census in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 10 Perry, The Census in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 11 Toal, Gerald and Carl T. Dahlman. 2011. Bosnia Remade: Ethnic Cleansing and its Reversal.

Oxford University Press. 12 See for example, Bochsler, Daniel. 2013. The Distribution of Ethnic Identities in Post-War Bosnia

and Herzegovina: A New Estimation Approach. CIS Working Paper 81.


54

some staffing heterogeneity, have continued to use the 1991 census as their

benchmark (see below).

In 2002 and 2003 a counting exercise in the Federation (FBiH) provided a fore-

shadowing of the dynamics of counting exercises, in terms of process, politics

and social pressures. A “Federation-wide social mapping exercise” was held in

2002 in the Federation’s ten cantons, organized by the Federation government. It is interesting to note that this experiment is known by few, and the results

seem to have been quickly shuffled aside. Markowitz studied this exercise look-

ing both at these results as well as the information provided in marriage regis-

ters. She notes in particular the choices made in providing respondents with

options on how they would like to declare themselves; rather than semi-open

response options that could allow for a wide range of responses (as in 1991),

“the FBiH population was now grouped into four categories only,” the three constituent peoples and the Others.13 She relates anecdotes of enumerator

pressure on respondents to elicit the “right” identity responses, and assesses

the exercise as an exercise in hardening the identities according to the new

post-war politics and reality: “the FBiH population survey, administered under government auspices only six years after the end of a war waged on the princi-

ple of ethnic cleansing, pushed familiar but slippery notions into fixed catego-

ries so that citizens (were) identified in the census along the exclusivistic, tri-

partite scheme agreed upon by their (nationalist) leaders and inscribed as the

constitutional base of the state.”14 While it was clear that in the preparation

and conduct of the 2013 census there would be a similar potential for subtle

persuasion or overt manipulation, beyond some civic discussions on the matter

of the sensitive questions,15 there was little effort by the BiH authorities or

international supporters/donors to engage in de-escalating these issues. It was

evident through interviews with technical experts and others that the main

priority was to simply organize a census, and that the decisions on the sensi-

tive questions would be left to the local level, and based on a commitment to

“local ownership”.16

While an imperfect exercise in the Federation entity, the country as a whole

still needed to capture this basic data. The United Nations Development Pro-

gram (UNDP) and the Delegation of the European Commission in BiH drafted

a paper in 2005 sketching out many issues that were seen as imperative in a

BiH census. At the time, there were hopes that with proper planning and prep-

aration, a census could be held in or around 2010. There was particular appre-

ciation for practices and rules allocating certain political representation rights

to groups according to pre-war data, to provide for “positive discrimination” aimed at taking steps to promote return and try to reverse the results of ethnic

cleansing. “The key threat remains the impact of the results on the proportion-

13 Markowitz, Fran. 2007. Census and Sensibilities in Sarajevo. Comparative Studies in Society and

History 49(1), 40-73, 45. 14 Markowitz, Census and Sensibilities, 47. 15 See Perry, The Census in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 16 Author interviews and discussions in Sarajevo, 2013. This myopic focus on the technical played

out in Macedonia as well. Friedman recounts his interaction with international observation

mission members who “told me they were quite surprised when they discovered that they were embroiled in highly charged political issues, as opposed to a mechanical statistical exercise,” in Friedman, Victor A. 2001. Observing the Observers: Language, Ethnicity, and Power in the 1994

Macedonian Census and Beyond. New Balkan Politics 3/4 (accessed: 01 November 2015).

Valery Perry

55

ality guarantees embedded in the Dayton Accords and subsequent agreements,

and the associated domestic political reaction. It should be noted, however, that

the 2002 ‘Agreement on the Implementation of the Constituent Peoples’ Deci-

sion of the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina’ specifically en-

shrines representation of the constituent peoples in the members of the Gov-

ernment after the completion of Annex 7”.17 Neither then, nor today, was there

agreement on a set of objective and agreed upon indicators that would conclu-

sively enable parties to agree that Annex 7 was completed.

The lack of clarity on the questions that should be asked, and the ways that

data might be formally or informally used, led to continued political delays on

census organization in BiH. Serb politicians were most interested in moving

forward with a count including identity-based questions, to presumably demon-

strate the post-war “facts on the ground” in terms of demographic shifts. Bos-

niak and Croat parties were for years less supportive of such a process, with

Bosniaks fearing the publication of any data that might be used as justification

to “end” return, and Croat concerns about likely declines in their population

throughout the country.18 Positions on the issue remained polarized and dead-

locked for years, like many policy and reform concerns. In 2011, the EU decided

to connect the unfreezing of BiH’s EU Stabilization and Association Agreement

(SAA) and the country’s ability to formally apply for EU candidacy status, to three goals: the adoption of a Law on State Aid, (adopted in February 2012);

demonstration of credible progress in making the constitutional reforms needed

in light of the European Court of Human Rights decision in the Sejdic and

Finci vs. Bosnia and Herzegovina case;19 and the adoption of a state law on

census.

The Law on the Census of Population, Households and Dwellings in Bosnia and

Herzegovina in 2013 was ultimately adopted on February 3, 2012, without pub-

lic consultation or a public comment period. It was quickly made clear that a

political compromise had been worked out, which, while politically expedient,

could be difficult to translate in terms of implementation and practical policy

implications. To balance concerns regarding the sensitive identity issues, ques-

tions on “ethnicity/nationality” and “religion” were included as non-obligatory

questions, while a question on “mother tongue” – a potential proxy for identity

– was included as an obligatory question.

It is important to point out that relevant EU guidelines for member states or

prospective member states clearly delineate that such subjective questions are

not required, ultimately the decision to include these questions was made solely

by BiH’s politicians.20 The United Nations Economic Commission for Europe

17 BiH Census: Proposed Way Forward. A paper by the United Nations Development Progreamme

(UNDP) and the Delegation of the European Commission (EC) to Bosnia and Herzegovina, July

2005. 18 Zvijerac, Predrag. 2015. Nakon popisa – kaos. Dnevni List, 11 January 2015, 8-9. 19 This was in fact actually dropped from the list of requirements to unfreeze the SAA in autumn

2014. Bassuener, Kurt / Perry, Valery / Vogel, Toby and Bodo Weber. 2014. Retreat for Progress in

BiH? – The German-British Initiative. Democratization Policy Council Policy Paper, November

2014 (accessed: 01 November 2015). 20 There is a detailed EU legislative framework on census data collection, including: Regulation

(EC) No. 763/2008; Regulation (EC) No. 1201/2009; Regulation (EU) No. 519/2010; and Regulation


56

(UNECE), in cooperation with EUROSTAT drafted the non-binding Conference

of European Statisticians Recommendations for the 2010 Censuses of Popula-

tion and Housing.21 This UNECE/EUROSTAT guidance includes recommenda-

tions for the organization and conduct of censuses that suggest that certain

“non-core topic areas” reflecting ethnic/national/cultural characteristics (e.g., ethnicity, language, and religion) should be handled in an appropriately sensi-

tive manner. Additional guidance is related to data monitoring and protection,

with particular attention to minority groups, and the engagement of various

minority groups in census preparations to build confidence in the process.22 In

addition, the Statistical Committee of the UN published guidelines entitled,

Principles and Recommendations for Population and Housing Censuses, Rev. 2,

in 2008 to assist the many countries organizing censuses in 2010 and 2011.

Their recommendations also urged maximal flexibility of response in the event

a country decides to ask identity-related questions. On issues related to lan-

guage, countries are urged to collect data with a focus on functionality; for ex-

ample, asking about the language one spoke at home in one’s early childhood; the language most frequently spoken in one’s home at the time of the census; and the ability to speak multiple languages; guidance aimed at measuring lin-

guistic functionality, and to avoid the use of language as an oversimplified

proxy for ethnicity.23

Following the adoption of the Law, planning, logistics and technical support

efforts moved forward. A budget of 46,489,665 KM was allocated, with funds

coming from BiH, the EU and various donors.24 A slogan was agreed (“My Step to the Future”) after considerable debate among the entities as there was oppo-

sition by the Republika Srpska to including “BiH” or “Bosnia and Herzegovina” in the census slogan. In light of the work that needed to be done, initial plans

to hold the census in April 2013 were scrapped, and October 2013 set as the

new census date. The BiH and entity statistics agencies were engaged to begin

intensive planning and coordination. An International Monitoring Operation

(IMO) was established by the European Commission, the Council of Europe

and the BiH Council of Ministers to monitor all phases of the census operation

to ensure quality and public confidence in the process.

It quickly became clear that any hopes that the census would be more technical

than political were unfounded. Nearly all attention fell squarely on the three

sensitive identity questions. The intense focus on these issues reflects the role

of census data in constructing and solidifying identities, “the ways in which the

census is used to divide national populations into separate identity categories:

racial, ethnic, linguistic or religious”.25 The development of the census ques-

tionnaire was contentious, as initial plans envisioned limited “closed” questions

(EU) No 1151/2010; and an Annex to Regulation No. 763/2008 that provides a list of required

census topics. Eurostat’s, EU Legislation on the 2011 Population and Housing Censuses —

Explanatory Notes provides further guidance. 21 See also Pieter Everaers contribution in this issue. 22 United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE). 2006. Conference of European

Statisticians Recommendations for the 2010 Censuses of Population and Housing. United Nations,

95-6. 23 Principles and Recommendations for Population and Housing Censuses, Rev. 2 (2.156). 24 See BiH Agency for Statistics. 25 Kertzer and Arel, Census and Identity, 2.

Valery Perry

57

for the sensitive questions, rather than an open-ended response option. A semi-

open compromise option was ultimately adopted for the final form, as a result

of pressure by civic groups and others.26 Quite late in the process, a question

related to the issue of one’s entity citizenship was added (though respondents could opt to not declare); the purpose or possible implications of this question

were not explained.27 A pilot census was held from 1-15 October 2012, leading

to immediate “leaks” focused solely on the questions regarding the respondents’ identity declarations. While unfounded, this even further increased the politici-

zation of the census environment, and a number of efforts to influence, shape or

direct respondent responses to the three sensitive questions were initiated by

the three constituent communities. Such efforts were particularly active among

Bosniak activists, who feared that Bosniaks might be especially prone to re-

spond instead as “Bosnian”, demonstrating that the census was, as throughout

the 20th century, still the most complicated for the country’s Bosniaks – let

alone for Bosnians or those citizens who rejected any identity labels.28 Diaspora

groups also became involved seeking a counting process that would include

non-resident BiH citizens as well.29 At no point was a clear public statement

made by anyone in the international community – including the EU or individ-

ual members states funding the census – noting that the three controversial

questions were not required by BiH to meet EUROSTAT standards or potential-

ly secure future EU-related funding; nor was there an international statement

clearly noting the international standards in this regard. The appropriate BiH

institutions and authorities also failed to explain to citizens that the focus on

the subjective identity questions had absolutely nothing to do with BiH’s “EU path”.

While campaigns aimed at influencing citizen responses to the identity ques-

tions were well underway throughout 2013, the absence of a widespread, offi-

cial information campaign by the statistics agencies allowed for misinformation

to spread. The IMO noted this in its 14th assessment report: “Unfortunately, these campaigns and rumors were not contradicted by an efficient official

communication campaign and systematic official relations.”30 In fact, several

IMO reports had noted concerns about the lack of preparation for public out-

reach. The public campaign only began in the weeks before the census was to

begin, and made no effort to actively counter the abundant misinformation, or

to educate citizens on their rights with regards to responding to sensitive ques-

tions. Some NGOs sought to fill this gap in the period just before the census

began, through the launch of a website to facilitate irregularities during enu-

26 Perry, The Census in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 27 Perry, The Census in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 28 Perry, The Census in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 29 N. N. 2013. Ticic: Diaspora Will Not Be Enumerated. FENA, 22 February 2013 (accessed: 01

November 2015).

As a compromise, a supplemental form was available online for Diaspora respondents to print, fill

in and mail (form P-1IN), but this was separate from the official census process, and not considered

a part of the official census. This is not unique to BiH; the articles on Kosovo and Macedonia in this

volume explore this issue as well. 30 Steering Committee of the International Monitoring Operation (IMO) on the Population and

Housing Censuses in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Thirteenth Assessment Report, 27 September-18

October 2013, 7.


58

meration, and the publication of booklets and a policy paper.31 As reports of

pressure, problems, and questionable planning and training grew, on 2 October

(one day after the start of the count) the coalition Jednakost called for a boy-

cott.32 However, calls for boycotts or delays went unheeded, and the census

went ahead as scheduled.

Broadly speaking, the October census unfolded relatively smoothly, and there

was no “Macedonia scenario” that might have completely undermined or shut down the process.33While BiH officials, international community representa-

tives and census experts generally viewed the 2013 enumeration process as a

success, some voices have assessed it as questionable at best, and botched at

worst. The IMO concluded that while there were some problems, the enumera-

tion had been conducted largely in accordance with international standards:

“In conclusion, the SC [Steering Committee] considers that despite some exter-

nal pressure, the census enumeration was carried out smoothly and in accord-

ance with the international standards”.34 However, there were immediately

voices who pointed out irregularities, either systematically or anecdotally.

(There was no “script” used in the enumeration interview process, leading to many different interview experiences.) The NGO ‘Zasto Ne?’ reported that they had received more than 850 complaints online (Popismonitor.ba) or by tele-

phone from 45 municipalities throughout the country. Complaints ranged from

pressure to declare in one way or another on the sensitive questions, improper

handling and storage of forms, and enumerator behavior that either indicated

poor training or a concerted effort to manipulate data.35 Unfounded speculation

on the numbers of the country’s various ethno-national groups began promptly,

with politicians and activists alike claiming data proving one point or anoth-

er.36

Preliminary results were released in November 2013 in accordance with the

Law. The preliminary results include very basic data on the population, house-

holds and dwellings, broken down by municipality, with the caveat that data

could be subject to change once full data processing is completed. The total

number of people enumerated was 3,791,622; 585,411 fewer than in 1991. Of

these, 62.55% responded in the Federation, 35% in the RS, and 2.45% in

Brcko.37 At the time of this writing it is unclear when the final results of the

census will be publically available. In its 20th assessment visit in November

2014, the IMO noted progress in a number of technical areas, such as the elec-

31 For example, the NGO Zasto Ne? developed the web site, www.popismonitor.ba to provide basic

information on the census, and to provide a mechanism through which respondents’ complaints about the census process could be gathered. The NGO ACIPS published a policy paper on the topic

of the census, entitled: The Purpose of the Census: A Guide for Citizens. 32 Jukic, Elvira M. 2013. Bosnian NGOs Call for Boycott of Census. Balkan Insight, 3 October 2013

(accessed: 01 November 2015). 33 The 2011 census in Macedonia was stopped during the enumeration process due to ongoing

controversies. See Vrgova article in this volume for more information. 34 Steering Committee, Thirteenth Assessment, 8. 35 N.N. 2013. Civic Monitoring Reveals Numerous Irregularities in BiH’s 2013 Census. Zasto Ne?,

22 October 2013 (accessed: 01 November 2015). 36 Irwin, Rachel / Halimovic, Dzenana / Bjelalac, Maja / Hunterer, Drazen and Mladen Lakic. 2013.

Bosnian Census Risks Deepening Ethnic Rifts. Institute for War and Peace Reporting, 6 December

2013 (accessed: 01 November 2015). 37 The data is available here.

Valery Perry

59

tronic database, but pointed out many tasks that remain if the results are to be

finished by mid-2015, as they had hoped.38 As of this writing (August 2015),

there are hopes that the results could be released by the end of the year. How-

ever, this could be difficult, as there is fundamental disagreement between the

entities on how to define the resident population in BiH, and, in turn, which

collected forms should and should not be counted. The RS seeks a narrow defi-

nition of resident, insisting on residents living, working and studying in BiH in

order to be finally included in the count. The Federation seeks a broader defini-

tion of residence, to potentially encompass more people who may live, work or

study in another country for certain periods of time.39 This again reflects an

interest in manipulating numbers to get the results desired by policy-makers.

In the case of the RS, they favor a restrictive framework that would not include

people who have left or who reside outside of that entity more than they reside

in it (namely minority returnees). Within the Federation, both Bosniaks and

Croats have an interest in a broader count, the Bosniaks to both demonstrate

their plurality throughout BiH, and to potentially increase the number of Bos-

niak returnees counted in the RS, and the Croats to ensure that their final

count – as the smallest of the three peoples – is as high as possible, relying if

necessary on Bosnian Croats living, working and studying in neighboring Croa-

tia or elsewhere. The impact of the war on displacement, and policy differences

related to displacement and return, remain central and core disagreements.

Lack of a Consistent and Harmonized Legal Framework

In addition to ongoing technical, processing and analysis questions, there are a

number of outstanding issues related to the future potential influence of the

census on public policy.40 The Law that provided for the census did not include

reference to how the data collected might be – or must be – used to develop

public policy. This leads to numerous questions: Will responses to optional,

non-compulsory questions be used in policy-making? At what levels of govern-

ment (state, entity, canton, municipality) can/might the data be used in policy-

making? Will information on questions be aggregated? If so, how? It is particu-

larly interesting to consider the role that the census data could potentially play

in affecting various laws aimed at ensuring a certain “positive discrimination” in hiring practices. Two of these main outstanding questions are considered

below.

Which Census?

First, there are many references to census data in state and entity legislation,

and even in the entity constitutions. However, the language used is not con-

sistent, leaving ample room for interpretation.41 For example, the words “na-

tional” (nacionalni) and “ethnic” (etnički) are seemingly used interchangeably.

Of more concern is the use of either “the last census” or “the 1991 census” as a reference point.

38 Steering Committee, Thirteenth Assessment. 39 Vukic, Uros. 2015. Rezultata popisa jos ni na vidiku. Nezavisne Novine. 25 May 2015, 4. 40 Perry, Valery. 2014. How Will the Results of the BiH Census be Used? Democratization Policy

Council Blog, 19 December 2014 (accessed: 01 November 2015). 41 This review is based on a memorandum entitled: References to the Census in Selected List of

State- and Entity Level Laws, drafted in December 2013. This reference document, together with

links to the noted laws, is available here.


60

A number of state-level laws and institutions reference the “last” census when setting out the needed ethnic demographic structure of each body. The state-

level Law on Civil Service in the Institutions of BiH states that, “The structure of civil servants within the civil service shall generally reflect the national

structure of the population of Bosnia and Herzegovina in accordance with the

last census,” and that, “Civil servants nationality is based on a voluntary dec-

laration in accordance with this Law.” The Law on Administration of BiH simi-

larly notes the requirement for “an appropriate ethnic structure” that reflects the last census, as does the Labor Law in the Institutions of BiH. The Law on

the Intelligence and Security Agency of BiH, the Law on Auditing Institutions

of BiH, the Law on the Service for Foreigners’ Affairs all reference the “last census” when providing guidance on the needed demographic structure of these bodies.

This is not, however, consistent. The Law on State Border Service references

the 1991 census, with a high degree of specificity: “Structure of police officials, civil servants and other employees within the SBS shall in general reflect the

national structure of the BiH population according to 1991 census pursuant to

the following criteria: Representation of any of BiH constituent peoples at all

levels shall in no event constitute more than 2/3 or less than 1/10 of the total

number of the SBS staff. This provision shall not apply to the representation of

Others, who shall, in any event be entitled to the representation according to

1991 census and the above criteria.” The Law on the Protection of Personal

Data similarly notes the 1991 census when noting the employee structure of

that Agency. The Framework Law for Primary and Secondary Education also

references the 1991 census when considering school board composition. “The composition of the school board must reflect the national structure of students

and parents, school staff and local community, as it is recorded at a relevant

time, in principle according to the census of the BiH population from 1991.”

However, inclusion of the words “in principle” can also potentially provide a certain leeway in interpretation and implementation. The Law on Rights of

National Minorities notes that national minorities’ participation in public office and public services should be proportional, based on their representation in the

“latest” census data.

A review of a number of laws at the level of the Federation entity shows a ten-

dency to specifically reference the 1991 census, though there are again excep-

tions. At the highest level, the Federation constitution notes the following:

“Published results of the 1991 census shall be appropriately used for all calcu-

lations requiring demographic data until Annex 7 is fully implemented.” Sever-

al other articles and amendments in the entity constitution repeat this. How-

ever, even within this constitution there is inconsistency. Article VI.3, Amend-

ment 104, on issues of municipal governance, notes, “The municipal mayor and

the president of the municipal assembly in a municipality or municipal assem-

blies of multiple national composition may not be from the same constituent

group, or the group of others, except in those cases in which one constituent

group composes more than 80% of the population, referring to the last census

in Bosnia and Herzegovina.”

Valery Perry

61

The Law on Civil Service in the FBiH, the Law on Employees in the Civil Ser-

vice Organs in FBiH and the Law on Police Officers in FBiH each reference the

1991 census until such time as Annex 7 is implemented. However, in terms of

the employment structure foreseen by the Law on Auditing the Institutions of

FBiH, the “last census” is referenced.

In the RS, the entity constitution notes the 1991 census, also noting Annex 7

implementation as a benchmark: “As a constitutional principle, such propor-

tionate representation shall be based on the 1991 census until Annex 7 is fully

implemented, in accordance with the Civil Service Law of Bosnia and Herze-

govina. This general principle shall be further regulated by specific legislation

of the Entities.” However the Law on Public Servants, the Law on Local Self-Governance and the Law Regarding the Protection of National Minorities each

reference the “last census”.

The District of Brcko, always a unique example, is again unique in its approach

to this topic. The Statute of the Brcko District, the Law on Civil Service, the

Law on Police Officials, the Law on Elections, and the Law on Public Admin-

istration all reference that the structure or composition of the population

should be taken into account in employment, without any mention of any cen-

sus.

This review does not consider every existing mention of the census in laws at

any level of government; it is simply indicative of the kind of language used,

and the variance that exists. However, by including key laws related to the civil

service, elections and national minorities, it does demonstrate the potential for

policy disagreements once the results of the census are finalized. In the absence

of a harmonized approach to the data, would it be possible for one entity to

continue to use the 1991 census as the reference point for civil service hiring

goals, while the other uses the 2013 census? Could each entity statistics agency

independently manipulate and interpret the data independently, publically

issuing different analyses resulting in different policy proposals? Further, it

demonstrates the sensitivity of linking public policy to the ill-defined imple-

mentation of Annex 7. There is no concrete guidance that will signal when the

return process will be “done.” There is also no political agreement on what the “successful fulfillment” of Annex 7 might look like. This guarantees that census numbers will always be questioned and contested by those who believe that

there is still the potential for more refugee returns – whether this might mean

Croats or Bosniaks to the RS, or Serbs to the Federation.

Which Questions?

The second challenge is even more fundamental. Regardless of the language

used in the various laws noted above, the intent is clear: to ensure that civil

service and specific government bodies (generally) reflect the ethnic or national

structure of the population in either the 1991 or the last census. Whether or

not the 1991 or 2013 census is used as a reference point, the question remains

how such population structure would be measured based on the 2013 data,

since the question on ethnicity/nationality was not mandatory. When being

enumerated, respondents were not told how this information might be used, or

whether it would be used at all. It has been noted that international expert


62

guidance on such matters recommends that non-mandatory responses on such

sensitive matters be used as an explanatory or independent variable.42

There is some possibility that the mandatory “mother tongue” question would be used as a proxy for nationality/ethnicity. However, this would be problemat-

ic in many ways, most notably because citizens were not told that this data

would be used in such a way when compelled to respond. It is also possible to

imagine that, in the absence of such clear demographic data on the population

structure, the clear results from 1991 would continue indefinitely. However,

this has not been stated, and laws have clearly not been revised to reflect such

an approach. It is similarly unclear how the question on one’s “entity citizen-

ship” (19.1) might be used, and how this information might influence policy-

making (this question was not optional, but did have a “do not declare” option).

Concluding Remarks

As of this writing it is still unclear when the results will be released. The In-

ternational Monitoring Operation visited BiH in December 2014 for its 20th

assessment mission, and urged the authorities to release the data by mid-2015;

as with many other hoped-for deadlines, this one has come and gone. There has

been some confusion as to whether the results may be published gradually, or

in one formal release.43 Much is uncertain.

There is no doubt that accurate census data is needed in BiH – as in any coun-

try – to effectively develop public policies, budgets and other planning mecha-

nisms. Whereas the necessity of a census was certainly clear; it is less clear

whether the identity-centered questions were necessary at this stage in the

country’s consolidation. The nature of post-war BiH – and the continued

squabbling over peoples, quotas and the meaning of constituency and citizen-

ship – means that it is highly improbable that any of the groups will be satis-

fied with the outcome.

The question remains: how will census data be used in policy-making, of the

“mundane,” day-to-day kind, or potentially in the larger constitutional deliber-

ations? There is speculation that efforts by the country main Croat party lead-

ers to seek constitutional protections (in the entity and/or the state) could be

motivated in part by a desire to lock in changes prior to the release of data on

how many Croats remain in the country. There are uncomfortable ongoing dis-

cussions on what it would mean if an aggregated count of the country’s “Oth-

ers” might be larger than the count of one of the constituent peoples. (These discussions of constituency and citizenship have garnered further energy

through some past and pending decisions by the European Court of Human

Rights.44) Confirmation of Serb majorities in the Republika Srpska (potentially

42 See Everaers’ article in this volume. 43 Dragojlovic, Mladen. 2014. Experts: BiH Census Key to Ease Ethnic Tension, Violence. SETimes,

5 December 2014 (accessed: 01 November 2015). 44 In the now famous Sejdic-Finci vs. Bosnia and Herzegovina case, the European Court of Human

Rights in 2009 found that the BiH constitution discriminated against the country’s non-constituent

peoples (the “Others”) by restricting the ability to run for certain state-level offices to only those

who declare as Bosniak, Croat or Serb. In 2014, the Court ruled in the Zornic vs. Bosnia and

Herzegovina case that the plaintiff was discriminated against for refusing to declare as a member

Valery Perry

63

measured through both the sensitive questions and the entity citizenship re-

sponse) and relatively low rates of Bosniak return could fuel future secession

rhetoric.45

The year 2015 stands to be a difficult one for Bosnia and Herzegovina. Nearly a

year after the October 2014 general elections, the coalitions at all levels are

unstable and, to date, broadly ineffective.46 The country’s economic situation remains dire, as an unfriendly investment atmosphere, together with the high

costs of doing business and an overburdened public administration, fuelled

patronage, continue to take a financial toll on an already strapped population.

While there is much talk of the need to focus on socio-economic issues, the poli-

tics of identity remain a constant theme in political discourse and strategy. The

census results will be released in this environment, and will contribute to it.

Whether or not they play a role in crafting more effective public policies and

contribute to social stability and confidence, or are added to the already large

toolbox of divisive political rhetoric, remains to be seen.

Biliography

Anderson, Benedict. 1991. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin

and Spread of Nationalism. London: Verso.

Bassuener, Kurt / Perry, Valery / Vogel, Toby and Bodo Weber. 2014. Retreat

for Progress in BiH? – The German-British Initiative. Democratization Poli-

cy Council Policy Paper, November 2014 (accessed: 01 November 2015).

Bochsler, Daniel. 2013. The Distribution of Ethnic Identities in Post-War Bos-

nia and Herzegovina: A New Estimation Approach. CIS Working Paper 81.

Delegation of the European Union (EU) to Bosnia and Herzegovina and Euro-

pean Union Special Representative (EUSR) to Bosnia and Herzegovina.

2014. International Monitoring Operation BiH Census: Creation of the Elec-

tronic Database Completed, but Preparation for Remaining Steps Should In-

tensify. Europa.ba, 21 November 2014 (accessed: 01 November 2015).

Dragojlovic, Mladen. 2014. Experts: BiH Census Key to Ease Ethnic Tension,

Violence. SETimes, 5 December 2014 (accessed: 01 November 2015).

Eurostat. 2011. EU Legislation on the 2011 Population and Housing Censuses –

Explanatory Notes. 2011 Edition. Eurostat, European Commission.

Friedman, Victor A. 2001. Observing the Observers: Language, Ethnicity, and

Power in the 1994 Macedonian Census and Beyond. New Balkan Politics 3/4

(accessed: 01 November 2015).

Irwin, Rachel / Halimovic, Dzenana / Bjelalac, Maja / Hunterer, Drazen and

Mladen Lakic. 2013. Bosnian Census Risks Deepening Ethnic Rifts. Institute

for War and Peace Reporting, 6 December 2013 (accessed: 01 November

2015).

of any particular ethnic group, preferring to declare as a citizen of the country. Another case, Ilijas

Pilav vs. Bosnia and Herzegovina, is pending decision, and again looks at the issue of requirements

of declared constituency in standing for public office. 45 Toal, Gerard. 2014. ‘Republika Srpska Will Have a Referendum:’ The Rhetorical Politics of Milorad Dodik. Nationalities Papers 41(1), 166-204. 46 Keil, Soeren and Valery Perry. 2015. Back to Square One? An Analysis of the 2014 General

Elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Electoral Studies 38, 82-136.


64

Jukic, Elvira M. 2013. Bosnian NGOs Call for Boycott of Census. Balkan In-

sight, 3 October 2013 (accessed: 01 November 2015).

Kertzner, David I. and Dominique Arel (eds.). 2002. Census and Identity: The

Politics of Race, Ethnicity, and Language in National Censuses. Cambridge

University Press.

Keil, Soeren and Valery Perry. 2015. Back to Square One? An Analysis of the

2014 General Elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Electoral Studies 38, 82-

136.

Miller, Brenna. 2014. Competing Muslim Identities in the 1971 Yugoslav Cen-

sus. Paper presented at the Association for the Study of Nationalities World

Convention. Columbia University, New York.

Markowitz, Fran. 2007. Census and Sensibilities in Sarajevo. Comparative

Studies in Society and History 49(1), 40-73.

N. N. 2013. Ticic: Diaspora Will Not Be Enumerated. FENA, 22 February 2013

(accessed: 01 November 2015).

. Civic Monitoring Reveals Numerous Irregularities in BiH’s 2013 Census.

Zasto Ne?, 22 October 2013 (accessed: 01 November 2015).

Perry, Valery, 2013. The 2013 Census in Bosnia and Herzegovina: A Basic Re-

view. Democratization Policy Council Policy Note 3. October 2013 (accessed:

30 October 2015).

. 2014. How Will the Results of the BiH Census be Used? Democratization

Policy Council Blog, 19 December 2014 (accessed: 01 November 2015).

Popismonitor.ba. 2013. Gradanskimonitoring pokazao brojne nepravilnosti u

provodenjupopisa u BiH. Popismonitor.ba. 23 October 2013 (accessed: 01

November 2015).

Raible, Elizabeth. 2008. Dilemmas of the Projected 2011 Census of Bosnia and

Herzegovina: Enumerating Ethnic Cleansing, Refugee Return, and National

Identity. MA/MPA thesis, Indiana University.

Statistical Committee of the UN. 2008. Principles and Recommendations for

Population and Housing Censuses, Rev. 2.

Steering Committee of the International Monitoring Operation (IMO) on the

Population and Housing Censuses in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Thirteenth

Assessment Report, 27 September - 18 October 2013.

Toal, Gerard. 2014. ‘Republika Srpska Will Have a Referendum:’ The Rhetori-

cal Politics of Milorad Dodik. Nationalities Papers 41(1), 166-204.

. Carl T. Dahlman. 2011. Bosnia Remade: Ethnic Cleansing and its Rever-

sal. Oxford University Press.

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the Delegation of the

European Commission (EC) to Bosnia and Herzegovina. 2005. BiH Census:

Proposed Way Forward. July 2005.

United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE). 2006. Conference

of European Statisticians Recommendations for the 2010 Censuses of Popu-

lation and Housing. United Nations, 95-96.

Visoka, Gezim and Elvin Gjevori. 2013. Census politics and ethnicity in the


Vukic, Uros. 2015. Rezultata popisa jos ni na vidiku. Nezavisne Novine, 25 May

2015.

Zvijerac, Predrag. 2015. Nakon popisa – kaos. Dnevni List, 11 January 2015, 8-

9.

The 2011 Census in Croatia- A (partial)

role model for the Western Balkans? Research Article

Anna-Lena Hoh

PhD Candidate, Maastricht University

[email protected]

http://www.suedosteuropa.uni-graz.at/cse/en/hoh





65

The 2011 Census in Croatia – A (partial) role model for the Western

Balkans?

Anna-Lena Hoh

Within the framework of EU enlargement, the population and housing

census is a pre-condition for EU membership. The 2011 census in Croatia

was conducted according to EU regulations1 and considering this, it should

present a good example for the region. However, there are some aspects

which are not addressed by EU regulations, but are of importance when

looking at censuses in the Western Balkans: the so-called sensitive issues

(ethnicity, language and religion2). Answers to these questions are not

required by the EU; nonetheless all Western Balkan countries have

included these questions in their censuses. In Croatia, the census results

are used to determine political participation by proportional

representation of ethnic minorities, and this has led to ethnic tensions3.

This article looks into the historical perspective of censuses in Croatia, as

well as the EU conditionality of census-taking in the Croatian census of

2011. In addition, the practice of linking political participation to census

results will be taken into account, before finally posing the question of

whether the 2011 census in Croatia can really be taken as a role model for

census-taking in the Western Balkans.

Keywords: Census-taking, Ethnicity, EU conditions, proportional

representation

Introduction

Census-taking in Croatia has taken place long before the European Union (EU)

existed. However, under the acquis communautaire, it is now part of the

accession process. Regarding Croatia’s accession process, compliance with EU

conditions has not always been a strong point4. Nonetheless, Croatia has been

seen as the undisputed leader in the region in terms of both progress towards

EU accession and its capacity for policy-making and implementation. It is

regarded as the “poster child” of the Western Balkans,5 securing EU

membership in July 2013.

* After her Research Master in Social and Cultural Sciences and a Master in Human Geography,

focussing on Europe’s Borders, Governance and Identities, together with her current PhD supervisors, Anna-Lena Hoh applied successfully for a Dutch research talent grant for the project

“Europeanization of census taking in the Western Balkan”. 1 Eurostat. 2014. 2011 Population census framework- Factsheet on population censuses in the

Enlargement countries. (accessed: 23. October 2015). 2 Kertzer, David and Arel, Dominique. 2002. Census and Identity: The Politics of Race, Ethnicity,

and Language in National Censuses: Cambridge: University Press. 3 Pavelic, Boris. 2014. Croatia’s Language Dispute Leaves Minorities Nervous. BalkanTransitional

Justice, 12 August 2014 (accessed: 23. October 2015). 4 Roter, Petra and Ana Bojinović. 2005. Croatia and the European Union: A Troubled Relationship. Mediterranean Politics, 10(3), 447-54. 5 Börzel, Tanja. 2013. When Europeanization hits limited statehood- The Western Balkans as a test

case for the transformative power of Europe, in European Integration and Transformation in the

The 2011 Census in Croatia – A (partial) role model for the Western Balkans?

66

Since its independence in 1991, Croatia has conducted two censuses: the first

in 2001 and the second in 2011. The basic concept of census-taking is to gain

information about a state’s population and certain aspects of their living

standards. It is “a massive continuing national enquiry, a key anchor for much of the official statistical system”6. It provides information for national statistics

and helps to formulate policies accordingly; it is used for example as a tool for

the collection of taxes and the distribution of subsidies and national account

systems. On average, countries connected to the United Nations Economic

Commission for Europe (UNECE) conduct a census every ten years; the last

was the 2010 census round7. Within the EU the decennial collection of

population data is mandatory8. By categorizing the population according to

statistical variables the census helps to create social reality9 and identifies the

hard lines of the population, which has consequences for social and political

rights10.

According to the Croatian Bureau of Statistics,11 all relevant EU regulations

were transposed in the 2011 census and its results were widely accepted. Even

though Croatia has been an EU member state since July 2013, at the time of

the census Croatia was still a candidate country, therefore the intense control

measures which EU members need to comply with during census-taking were

not yet in place. However, while the census data of 2011 have been accepted

overall, there were some contestations of the results12. Most criticism had to do

with the count of the Serb minority, as the number of this minority continues

to have an important role in political disputes three years after the census13.

The aspect of the Serb minority opens up the question of the so-called sensitive

census aspects, which look at ethnicity, language and religion14. Questions

regarding these aspects are not required by EU rules and are non-core aspects

considering the UNECE census recommendations, but still were included in all

the censuses in the Western Balkans in the 2010 census round. In the Western

Balkans these are often connected to the proportional representation of ethnic

minorities in political participation, such as special representatives in the

Western Balkans: Europeanization or Business As Usual?, edited by Elbasani, Arolda. Routledge:

Chapman & Hall, 180. 6 Cook, Len. 2004. The quality and qualities of population statistics, and the place of the census.

Area 36(2), 111-23, 111. 7 This covers all the censuses conducted in the time period from 2005 up to 2014. United Nations

Statistics Division. 2013. 2010 World Population and Housing Census Programme. (accessed: 23

October 2015). 8 European Parliament and Council of the European Union. 2008. Regulation (EC) No 763/2008 of

the European Parliament and the Council of 9 July 2008 on Population and Housing Censuses.

Official Journal of the European Union. 9 Kertzer and Arel, Census and Identity, 36. 10 Ruppert, Evelyn. 2007. Producing Population. CRESC Working Paper 37; Urla, Jaqueline. 1993.

Cultural Politics in an Age of Statistics: Numbers, Nations, and the Making of Basque Identity.

American Ethnologist 20(4), 818-43. 11 Croatian Bureau of Statistics. nd.-a. Census 2011 - First Results (accessed: 23. October 2015). 12 Pavelic, Boris. 2012 Croatia Sees Population Drop Over Decade. Balkan Insight, 18. December

2012 (accessed: 23. October 2015). 13 Pavelic, Croatia’s language dispute. 14 This article focuses foremost on the Serb minority in Croatia. Nonetheless other minorities, such

as the Italians and Roma are of importance as well. However with regard to the census the Serb

minority is most often mentioned and including other minority groups in this research is beyond

the scope and the focus of this article.

Anna-Lena Hoh

67

Parliament or the use of minority languages15. This policy linkage leads to the

politicization of censuses.

This article assesses the impact of EU conditions on census-taking in the

enlargement process, as well as the practice of linking political participation to

census results. It relies on the single case study of Croatia and focuses on the

2011 census, because the aspect of census-taking has only been regarded as an

issue of importance for EU accession after the 2000 census round. It concludes

by assessing whether the 2011 census in Croatia meets the EU requirements

for census-taking and consequently whether it can be taken as a role model for

censuses in the other Western Balkan countries.

Censuses in the Western Balkans

The practice of census-taking is believed to be over 6000 years old16. It has been

described as the historical origin of the term ‘accountability’17, and censuses are

labeled as a “social contract with society”18. Census-taking is a major statistical

exercise and the “costs to poll and compile data on each person and household

in a country can be enormous”19. Therefore, an ever-increasing statistical

capability and infrastructure is required20. The difficulties and challenges of a

census are to be found in the different steps of the process, including the

formulation of the census questionnaire, the collection of the census data and

the compilation of the data. The population and housing census helps to

provide an overview of the living conditions of the population, and gives an

overview of a country’s statistical infrastructure. The population figures are used for, and in tandem with, other important statistics, such as a country’s GDP per capita. However, critical aspects can arise when conducting a census,

including, among others, the definition of who to count, where, when (and

whether or not to include the diaspora), and how to address sensitive aspects in

a country (such as ethnicity, language and religion).

As an international practice, censuses have been conducted in the Western

Balkans long before the countries were even considered a future territory for

EU enlargement. However, the quality of these censuses is questionable21. The

last census in Yugoslavia took place in 1991:

“Once the totalitarian structures were removed and Yugoslavia dissolved,

the issues of ethnic belonging, geographic placement, and group size

15 Petričušić, Antonija. 2002. Constitutional Law on the Rights of National Minorities in the Republic of Croatia. European Yearbook of Minority Issues 2, 607-29. 16 United Nations Economic Commission for Europe. 2006. Conference of European Statisticians

Recommendations for the 2010 Censuses of Population and Housing. New York and Geneva:

United Nations Publication. 17 Bovens, Mark. 2007. Analysing and Assessing Accountability: A Conceptual Framework.

European Law Journal 13(4), 447-68. 18 Eurostat, and Romanian National Institute of Statistics. 2012. Conference on Population and

Housing Census. Paper presented at the Conference on Population and Housing Census,

Bucharest. 19 Tickle Miller, Terri. 2002. The Census Online: Internet Census Resources for Eastern Europe

and the Former Soviet Union. Slavic & East European Information Resources 3(4), 51-63, 51. 20 Cook, The quality and qualities of population statistics, 121. 21 Visoka, Gëzim and Elvin Gjevori. 2013. Census politics and ethnicity in the Western Balkans.

East European Politics, 1-20.


68

became important tools of inter-ethnic conflict/bargaining in the setting of

new borders, minority rights, and representation schemes. Measuring

group size, identifying ethnicity, mapping ethnic geography, and then

allocating rights again became one of the most important and delicate

processes in the Balkans in general and Western Balkans in particular.”22

Although the history of the Balkans makes it increasingly difficult to collect

information on sensitive issues (of ethnicity, language and religion), the politics

of numbers still play an important role in the region23.

The problem of counting ethnicity

As Urla24 has shown through the example of the Basques in Spain, censuses

can map ethnic identities through the selection of different options in

constructing a census questionnaire and subsequent census categories and

aggregation practices. This is also described by Kertzer and Arel25: “[The] examination of the relationship between the census and the formation and

evolution of collective identities, as we have seen, involves us in the messy

process of politics. We witness the struggle among a multiplicity of actors over

that most basic of powers, the power of name, to categorise, and thus to create

social reality.”

Ethnicity, language and religion are sensitive issues which make up a part of a

social structure and its categories26. “The census […] emerged as the most

visible, and arguably the most politically important, means by which the states

statistically depict collective identities”27. Through the categories of the census,

identities and the aspects of differentiating identities, such as ethnicity,

language and religion, become increasingly visible and influence the actual

census-taking28. Thus, the consciousness of ethnic divisions can increase due to

the census, and this in itself can affect the process of census-taking29. This is

especially problematic in situations where certain political rights are granted if

a group makes up a certain percentage of the population: “In polities where the ability to influence political representation, local governance, budgetary

policies, education policies, and cultural policies is dependent on a group’s share of the total population, census-taking becomes inextricably connected to

population politics”30.

In the Western Balkans the concept of ethnicity has been very important,

particularly in the 20th century. For example, in Yugoslavia ethnic tensions

were appeased by using “a complex state structure based on national and

22 Visoka and Gjevori, Census Politics, 6. 23 Visoka and Gjevori, Census Politics. 24 Urla, 1993. Cultural Politics in an Age of Statistics. 25 Kertzer and Arel, Census and Identity, 36. 26 Kertzer and Arel, Census and Identity. 27 Kertzer and Arel, Census and Identity, 3. 28 Kertzer and Arel, Census and Identity; Ruppert, Evelyn. 2011. Population Objects: Interpassive

Subjects. Sociology 45(2), 218-33; Urla, Cultural Politics in an Age of Statistics; Yanow, Dvora.

2003. Constructing "Race" and "Ethnicity" in America: Category-making in Public Policy and

Administration: M.E. Sharpe. 28 Visoka and Gjevori, East European Politics. 28 Visoka and Gjevori, Census Politics, 3.

Anna-Lena Hoh

69

historical group characteristics”31. However, to do so, information was needed

on the population of the various ethnic groups. Therefore, it has been vital to

include questions on the sensitive identity issues in the census. As mentioned

above, in the 2010 census round all Western Balkan countries included these

questions in their census questionnaires32. The censuses became part of a

highly politicized process, “which revealed the unstable and contested nature of

citizenship, ethnic belonging, and a weak civic identity”33.

Since the political change towards the EU in 2000, Croatia has made major

steps with regard to minority rights34. Of particular importance was the

Constitutional Law on the Rights of National Minorities of 200335. Since the

creation of this law, Croatian minorities are entitled to more rights if they

make up more than a certain percentage of the population: “Members of

national minorities, in accordance with Article 19 of the Constitutional Law [on

the Rights of National Minorities], constituting more than 1.5 % of the total

population of the Republic of Croatia are guaranteed a minimum of one and a

maximum of three representative seats for the members of that national

minority”36. Further, representation in local governmental bodies depends on

the population numbers (the threshold is 15%)37, and if a certain minority

makes up more than 30% in a local self-governed unit the “equal official use of the minority language and script must be stipulated by the statute of a local or

regional self-government unit in compliance with the provisions of the Minority

Language Law”38. The political representation of minority groups and their

language rights are therefore directly linked to the results of the census.

Census taking in Croatia – the historical perspective

The Croatian Bureau of Statistics provides a very good overview of the

historical censuses on the territory of Croatia39. According to their website, the

first census “covering the territory of the present-day Republic of Croatia”40

dates from 1746 and 1754. However, these were incomplete as they did not

count gentry and clergy, and the “[p]opulation was enumerated according to the affiliation of holdings to particular noblemen or towns.”41 The next census

was in 1857, but it too was incomplete42. However, these data are used to

indicate changes in the population, and the population numbers are used for

comparison with the census data of 1869, 1880, 1890, 1900 and 191043. From

then on censuses have been held relatively regularly every 10 years, with an

31 Minority Rights Group International. 2003. Minorities in Croatia, 7. 32 Eurostat, 2011 Population census framework- Factsheet. 33 Visoka and Gjevori, Census Politics, 2. 34 Tatalović, Siniša. 2006. National Minorities and Croatian Demoracy. Politička misao, 43(5), 45-

59, 46. 35 Additional also “laws regulating education and the official use of of the languages and the alphabets of national minorities” have been implemented. (see Tatalović, National Minorities, 46.) 36 Petričušić, Constitutional Law, 617-18; see also Tatalović, National Minorities. 37 Petričušić, Constitutional Law. 38 Petričušić, Constitutional Law, 615. 39 Croatian Bureau of Statistics. n.d-c. Census of Population, Households and Dwellings 2011,

Frequently Asked Questions (accessed: 23. October 2015). 40 Croatian Bureau of Statistics, Frequently Asked Questions. 41 Croatian Bureau of Statistics, Frequently Asked Questions. 42 Croatian Bureau of Statistics, Frequently Asked Questions. 43 Šterc, Stjepan and Ivan Crkvenčić. 1996. The population of Croatia. GeoJournal, 38(4), 417-24.


70

interruption in 1941 due to the war44. Due to the historical developments the

sources for the population data by Šterc and Crkvenčić45 derive from the

“statistical population censuses of the former Yugoslavia (i.e. of Serbia, as the

central statistical bureau of the former Yugoslavia was located in Belgrade and

it was there that census regulations were determined, data was compiled and

stored, etc.).” At the last census of Yugoslavia in 1991, the population of Croatia was about 4,784,265, living on “56,538 km 2, or 84,62 persons per square kilometre.”46

As a result of the recent war (1991-1995), there have been two major

population flows47. The first was in 1991, resulting from the establishment of

Serb Krajina, Western Slavonia and Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western

Sirmium by the Yugoslav People’s Army and the Serb rebels48. This led to

approximately 84,000 Croats fleeing from regions under Serb control, and

70,000 displaced Serbs settling in the Danube region49. The total estimated

number of displaced people during the war varies between 430,000 and

700,00050. “By mid-1995, the figure had decreased to 591,123 registered IDPs

[internally displaced persons] and refugees (mostly ethnic Croats), whereas a

year later, due to the flight of ethnic Serbs, it increased to 688,169.”51 This

increase was a consequence of military operations in the summer of 1995 which

caused the second major population flow. This “was four years later [than the

first population flow] when the Croatian government seized control over the

Serb-occupied territory during two rapid military operations, Flash and Storm,

in May and August 1995 respectively.”52 Serbs leaving these territories found

refuge in Serbia (about 300,000) and in the Republika Srpska in Bosnia (about

40.000)53. By September 2009, about “34% of Serb minority refugees had been

officially registered as officially returned to Croatia.”54 After the war the

difficult relationship between Croatia and its Serb minority continued: “The deterioration of the relationship between Croatia and its Serb minority could

be traced to the first days of the Croatian democracy. The victory of the right

wing HDZ [Croatian Democratic Union, in Croatian: Hrvatska Demokratska

Zajednica] in the 1990 elections had far-reaching consequences for the

relations of the Croatian state vis-à-vis the Croatian Serbs which,

consequently, greatly influenced the Serb minority perceptions regarding the

44 Croatian Bureau of Statistics, Frequently Asked Questions. 45 Šterc and Crkvenčić, The population of Croatia, 422. 46 Šterc and Crkvenčić, The population of Croatia, 417. 47 Blitz, Brad. 2003. Refugee Returns in Croatia: Contradictions and Reform. Politics, 23(3), 181-91,

182. 48 Barić, Nikica. 2008. The Rise and Fall of the Republic of Serb Krajina (1990-1995), in Croatia

since independence: war, politics, society, foreign relations, edited by Ramet, Sabrina P. / Clewing,

Konrad and Reneo Lukic. Muenchen: Oldenbourg; Djuric, Ivana. 2010. The Post-War Repatriation

of Serb Minority Internally Displaced Persons and Refugees in Croatia—Between Discrimination

and Political Settlement. Europe-Asia Studies, 62(10), 1639-60. 49 Blitz, Refugee Returns, 182. 50 Djuric, The Post-War Repatriation, 1640. 51 Živić, 1999, in: Djuric, The Post-War Repatriation, 1640. 52 Blitz, Refugee Returns, 182. 53 Djuric, The Post-War Repatriation, 1640. 54 Djuric, The Post-War Repatriation, 1639.

Anna-Lena Hoh

71

nature of the emerging state”55. The census outcome clearly shows the effects of

these population flows and refugee returns.

As noted, Croatia has conducted two censuses (in 2001 and 2011) since its

independence. The 2001 census, according to the European Commission, was

“in line with the UNECE/Eurostat recommendations for the 2000 censuses of population and housing in the ECE region.”56 The Croatian censuses cannot be

directly compared, due to “the different statistical definition of the total population used in the 2011 Census”, which “was partly changed according to

the international standards.”57 (This will be discussed more below.) In

comparison to the 2001 census, where Eurostat assisted the Croatian Bureau of

Statistics with the census, Eurostat was less involved in 2011. Nonetheless, the

2011 census was, in most aspects, in line with the EU regulations on census-

taking: “Since the Republic of Croatia is a candidate for the membership in the

European Union, the Census is, in terms of definitions and classifications, fully

harmonised with the EU Regulation on population and housing censuses”58.

However, both censuses were disputed by the Serb minority59. “Since many Serbs either fled Croatia during the war or were driven out, the number of

Serbs living in Croatia declined so that while Serbs accounted for just over 12%

of the population in 1991, they constituted just 4.54% of the population in 2001,

according to the official census results”60. These numbers have been used to

show the difficult re-integration of Serb refugees in Croatia after the war. “At that time [the 2001 census], 89.63% of the population was ‘Croat’ out of total population of 4,437,460”61, whereas in 1981 only 75.08% of the population of

Croatia declared themselves as ‘Croat’ (out of a total population of 4,601 469)62. (For a complete overview of the Croatian population by ethnicity from

1991 to 2011 see table 1 on page 15.) This reflects the idea of consolidating an

ethnically homogenous state since independence63. This process has also been

termed “ethnic engineering”64.

55 Koska, Viktor. 2012. Framing the citizenship regime within the complex triadic nexuses: the case

study of Croatia. Citizenship Studies 16(3-4), 397-411, 405. 56 European Commission. 2006. Screening report Croatia, 9. 57 Croatian Bureau of Statistics. n.d-b. Census of Population, Households and Dwellings 2011 -

Notes on Methodology (accessed: 23. October 2015). 58 European Statistical System. 2011. Republic of Croatia: First results of the Census 2011.

(accessed: 23 October2015). 59 Hipkins, Dominic. 2002. Croatia: Serb Fury Over Census Result. Global Voices, 14 June 2002

(accessed: 23 October2015); Minority Rights Group International. 2008. World Directory of

Minorities and Indigenous Peoples. Croatia: Overview. (accessed: 23. October 2015); Pavelic,

Croatia Sees Population Drop; One of the aspects this article is neglecting is the focus on the Roma

community in Croatia. In the 2011 census, 16,975 people declared themselves ‘Roma’ (Croatian Bureau of Statistics, 2006-2014a). This is a group which is vulnerable to undercount and further

research would be necessary to investigate the implications of the census on their living situation. 60 Ramet, Sabrina. 2008. Politics in Croatia since 1990, in Croatia since independence: war, politics,

society, foreign relations, edited by Ramet, Sabrina P. / Clewing Konrad and Reneo Lukic

Muenchen: Oldenbourg, 40. 61 Ramet. Politics in Croatia, 40. 62 Croatian Bureau of Statistics. 2006-2014b. Population By Ethnicity, 1971-2011 Censuses.

(accessed: 23. October 2015). 63 Barić, The Rise and Fall of the Republic of Serb Krajina; Blitz, Refugee Returns. 64 Koska, Framing the citizenship; Štiks, Igor. 2010. The Citizenship Conundrum in Post-Communist Europe: The Instructive Case of Croatia. Europe-Asia Studies 62(10), 1621-38.


72

One of the problems related to this is the Constitutional Law on the Rights of

National Minorities, which links the proportional representation of ethnic

minorities to political participation and to “the official use of a minority's language and script if it makes up more than a third of the population in a

particular area.”65 To implement this provision, the country needs to know the

numbers of the minority in the population. Even though in Croatia this is not

as influential as the Dayton66 and the Ohrid Framework67 agreements68, there

are now ethnic tensions in some of the districts where minorities have the right

to certain privileges.

The principle of EU conditionality

When the EU extended the membership perspective in 2000 they pronounced

support for the Western Balkan region, with this support associated are the

“obligations en route”69 to EU membership. The support of the EU towards the

Western Balkans has developed from a post-war stabilizing approach towards

EU enlargement. Therefore, EU rules and practices have to be implemented by

the candidate countries. As part of the acquis communautaire, census taking is

one of the requirements which need to be implemented.

The instrument of conditionality “is the principle mechanism available to the EU to bring about change in the domestic opportunity structure of political

actors”70 and to “press for democratic reforms and to monitor compliance with its core political values”71. With the EU setting the agenda for membership the

“instrument of EU conditionality is not always, strictly speaking, democratic,

based as it is on an unequal and asymmetric relationship of imposition,

pressure, control and, partly, threats”72. To achieve this, the EU uses

incentives, which are seen as an essential driver of “democratic institutional change” which need to be strong enough to compensate for eventual perceived

loss of power or popularity.73

With regard to census-taking one needs to make the distinction between the

often addressed democratic conditionality and the compliance with the acquis

communautaire.74 Democratic conditionality is the first criterion for accession

and focuses on the political transformation towards democratization and (EU

65 Pavelic, Croatia’s Language Dispute. 66 Sarajlić, Eldar. 2010. A Citizenship Beyond the Nation-State: Dilemmas of the 'Europeanisation'

of Bosnia and Herzegovina. CITSEE Working Paper Series, 371. 67 Visoka and Gjevori, Census Politics, 12. 68 See on this topic also the contributions by Valery Perry on Bosnia and Roska Vrgova on

Macedonia in this special issue. 69 Trbovich, Ana. 2008. A Legal Geography of Yugoslavia's Disintegration: Oxford University Press,

USA, 365. 70 Noutcheva, Gergana. 2012. European Foreign Policy and the Challenges of Balkan Accession:

Conditionality, legitimacy and compliance. Taylor & Francis, 18. 71 Noutcheva, Gergana and Senem Aydin-Düzgit. 2012. Lost in Europeanisation: The Western

Balkans and Turkey. West European Politics, 35(1), 59-78, 59. 72 Anastasakis, Othon. 2008. The EU’s political conditionality in the Western Balkans: towards a more pragmatic approach. Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 8(4), 365-77, 366. 73 Noutcheva and Aydin-Düzgit, Lost in Europeanisation, 59. 74 This has also been called acquis conditionality by Schimmelfennig, Frank and Ulrich Sedelmeier.

2005. The Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe. Cornell University Press, 211.

Anna-Lena Hoh

73

member) state building.75 It comprises the Copenhagen criteria, and includes,

for example, the aspect of minority rights.76 The acquis conditionality is

regarded more as a technical approximation, to “promote[…] a growing body of laws, agreements, resolutions, declarations, and juridical decisions and

take[…] part during the negotiations on the 35 chapters and more than 80,000

pages of legislative text.”77 Census-taking is part of the chapter on statistics,

and encompasses the UNECE recommendations on the population and housing

census78 and the EU regulations on the census.79 This process is meant to

harmonize data on the population and housing censuses across Europe, to be

able to compare the data of the member states. Nonetheless in the area of the

census the outcomes are not always as expected, when considering, for

example, the aborted census in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.80

This example shows that the technical issue of census-taking is in fact highly

politicized. Even though the UNECE recommendations advise not to, and the

EU regulations do not require asking for sensitive issues such as ethnicity,

religion and language, all the Western Balkan countries included questions

addressing these in their census questionnaires, at times with negative

effects81.

The EU conditions for census-taking

The whole process of census-taking is a major exercise: starting with the census

law, the preparation of methodology and the questionnaires the selection of the

enumerators, and the data collection process itself; then the data aggregation

and if applicable a post-enumeration survey, to test the quality of the census;

and finally the publication of the data. In every step of this exercise, there are

aspects which require special attention. Even though census taking is only a

small part of the acquis chapter on statistics, it is one of the most challenging

tasks of the national statistical offices, because these data are used as the

75 Keil, Soeren. (ed.). 2013. State-building in the Western Balkans: European approaches to

democratization: Routledge. 76 Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier. The Europeanization of Central And Eastern Europe, 211;

European Commission. (2014-a). Conditions for membership. (accessed: 23. October 2015). 77 Anastasakis, The EU’s political conditionality, 367. 78 United Nations Economic Commission for Europe. 2006. Conference of European Statisticians

Recommendations for the 2010 Censuses of Population and Housing. 79 Commission of the European Communities. 2009. Commission Regulation (EC) No 1201/2009 of

30 November 2009 implementing Regulation (EC) 763/2008 of the European Parliament and the

Council on population and housing censuses as regards the technical specifications of the topics

and of their breakdowns. Official Journal of the European Union; European Commission. 2010.

Commission Regulation (EU) No 519/2010 of 16 June 2010 adopting the programme of the

statistical data and of the metadata for population and housing census provided for by Regulation

(EC) No 763/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council. Official Journal of the European

Union; Commission of the European Communities. 2010. Commission Regulation (EU) No

1151/2010 of 8 December 2010 implementing Regulation (EC) No 763/2008 of the European

Parliament and of the Council on population and housing censuses, as regards the modalities and

structure of the quality reports and the technical format for data transmission. Official Journal of

the European Union. 80 On the tenth day of the enumeration process, the Macedonian Parliament annulled the earlier

adopted Census Law in effect cancelling the planned census owing to political disagreements, poor

preparation and high expectations of irregularities yielding suspicions of potentially incorrect

census results (Daskalovski, Zhidas. 2013. Census taking and inter-ethnic relations in Macedonia.

Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 13(3), 1-15). It was suspected that the insecurity

regarding the methodology of the census would “have […] an effect on the numbers of the majority Macedonians and the minority Albanians” (Daskalovski. Census taking, 2). 81 Eurostat, 2011 Population census framework- Factsheet.


74

backbone for other statistical equations and for selecting survey frames. As

mentioned above, in the Western Balkans these numbers are also used to

ensure the political representation of minorities.

As the rules and regulations of census taking stated in the UNECE

recommendations are only recommendations, the EU has formulated more

concrete rules on census-taking. These are given in the statistical

compendium,82 which refers to the EU regulations on the population and

housing censuses.83 The EU cannot oblige candidate countries to comply with

the legal rules (yet), because those countries are (or were in the case of Croatia)

not yet member states. However, the UNECE recommendations are in fact very

similar and should ideally be taken into account by the candidate countries in

the Western Balkan region. The main difference of interest with census-taking

in the Balkan region is in regard to the sensitive questions of ethno-cultural

characteristics. These questions are not required by the EU while the UNECE

lists these as ‘non-core’. Even so, these questions are part of the census questionnaires in the Western Balkans and are already causing tension.84

The 2011 census in Croatia

The Croatian census of 2011 was conducted without any major problems and is

“in terms of definitions and classifications, fully harmonised with the EU

Regulation on population and housing censuses.”85 As described above, Croatia

had already conducted a census in 2001, which, according to the European

Commission, was in line with the UNECE/Eurostat recommendations for the

2000 censuses.86 However, the census results cannot be compared due to

different statistical definitions of the total population, mainly with regard to

refugees and the diaspora: “Firstly because the intention of staying was not

collected in the 2001 Census, and, secondly, due to the fact that the 2001

Census included in the total population persons absent for longer than a year

who returned to their residence on a seasonal or monthly basis (these persons

are not included in the total population in the 2011 Census)”87.

The 2011 census was carried out “according to the Conference of European Statisticians [the UNECE] Recommendations for the 2010 Censuses of

Population and Housing.”88 The census law was adopted by the Croatian

Parliament in July 2010 and the census data were collected from 1 to 28 April

in 2011.89 The census law outlines the deliverables for the census data

82 European Commission. 2014-b. Statistical requirements compendium. Luxembourg: Publications

Office of the European Union. 83 Commission of the European Communities. 2010. Commission Regulation (EU) No 1151/2010;

European Parliament and Council of the European Union. (2008). Regulation (EC) No 763/2008 of

the European Parliament and the Council of 9 July 2008 on Population and Housing Censuses.

Official Journal of the European Union. 84 some examples: Daskalovski, Census taking; Perry, Valery. 2013. The 2013 Census in Bosnia and

Herzegovina. DPC, Policy Note (New Series #3); Visoka and Gjevori, Census Politics. 85 European Statistical System. 2011. Republic of Croatia: First results of the Census 2011. 86 European Commission, Screening report Croatia, 9. 87 Croatian Bureau of Statistics. Census of Population, (accessed: 23. October 2015). 88 Croatian Bureau of Statistics. 2011. Census of Population, Households and Dwellings 2011, First

Results by Settlements. Zagreb. 89 Croatian Bureau of Statistics. n.d. Census -Notes on Methodology; Croatian Parliament. 2010.

Decision on the adoption of the act on the Census of Population, Households and Dwellings in the

Anna-Lena Hoh

75

collection, as well as the costs of the census. These were covered by the

Croatian government. Some of the tasks related to ensuring the correctness of

the census, such as the Post Enumeration Survey, were funded by the EU

through the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA).90 The statistical

office in Croatia had the knowledge of the previous census and knew what to

expect; it had the experience and capacity to conduct the 2011 census without

major external support. “The first results of the Census were obtained by a

direct summing up of census units (persons, households and dwellings) at the

lowest spatial unit level. The results were then aggregated at the level of

higher spatial units, that is, for settlements, towns, counties and the City of

Zagreb as well as for the whole of the Republic of Croatia.”91

Although, the census probably played only a minor role in the whole accession

process, the overall acceptance of the census data was a good sign. The EU

Progress Report for 2011 states that, “[g]ood progress has been made in the

area of statistics. A good level of alignment has been achieved.”92 On the first

view it seems as if Croatia has been fully compliant with the implementation of

the EU rules of census taking. However, it has been stressed that the

alignment has been foremost with regard to the “terms of definitions and classifications.”93 Looking at the questionnaire,94 it includes questions on

ethno-cultural characteristics – questions which are not required by the EU.

Regarding the question on ethnicity, the questionnaire provides an answer box

for people who declare themselves as ‘Croat’, a box for ‘not-declared’, and an open field for other ethnic declarations. According to the UNECE

recommendations “questionnaires should include an open question and

interviewers should refrain from suggesting answers to the respondents” and “[r]espondents should be free to indicate more than one ethnic affiliation or a combination of ethnic affiliations if they wish so.”95 In this regard the Croatian

questionnaire is not in line with the recommendations. Including the box for

‘Croat’ does not reflect the idea of an open question, which can lead to measurement errors during the enumeration process. Also, this questionnaire

suggests that only one ethnic affiliation is possible. Almost the same issues

hold for the questions regarding language (‘mother tongue’ in the Croatian census questionnaire) and religion. With regard to the question on religion

there has been criticism by the media, as census takers were suspected of not

(or wrongly) declaring the religious preference of Serb residents.96 Considering

these issues, the census questionnaire of Croatia should be assessed critically

and improved before the next census round in 2020.

Republic of Croatia in 2011. Zagreb. (accessed: 23. October 2015); Eurostat, 2011 Population

census framework- Factsheet. 90 Eurostat, 2011 Population census framework- Factsheet. 91 European Statistical System, Republic of Croatia: First results of the Census 2011. 92 European Commission, Croatia 2011 Progress Report. 93 European Statistical System, Republic of Croatia: First results of the Census 2011. 94 Republic of Croatia and Croatian Bureau of Statistics. 2011. Personal questionnaire Census 2011.

(accessed: 23 October2015). 95 United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, Conference of European Statisticians

Recommendations for the 2010 Censuses of Population and Housing. United Nations 96. 96 N.D. 2011. Census takers sanctioned for not taking down orthodox religous preferences. Croatian

Times, 04 April 2011 (accessed: 23. October 2015).


76

At the time of the 2011 census, Croatia was already relatively well advanced in

the accession process and did not consider the census as a major obstacle before

accession. By the time of the census in 2011, the progress of Croatia’s accession was tangible.97 In the Progress Report of 2011, the same year as the census, the

accession date of July 2013 was already stated.98 Even so, it has been argued

that EU conditionality varies in effectiveness throughout the different stages of

the accession process.99 The population and housing census of 2011 was

“harmonised with international standards that define the joint rules for the

collection of data on population and housing and prescribe definitions that

countries are obliged to apply in their censuses in order to provide the

international comparability of data.”100 Even though candidate countries do not

need to comply with the EU regulations (yet), the Regulation (EC) No 763/2008

of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 July 2008 on Population

and Housing Censuses and the Commission Regulation (EC) No 1201/2009 of

30 November 2009 implementing Regulation (EC) No 763/2008 are mentioned

as two of the most important documents for international standards, together

with the UNECE recommendations.101 Eventhough the EU has more means to

steer the compliance of countries through conditions during the accession

process, in terms of the census, the check-ups on whether rules and

recommendations were implemented were not as thorough (in comparison to

member states and other accession countries), though in general the results of

the 2011 census were accepted (and are available on the website of Eurostat).

In the next census round the check-ups of the EU will be more thorough, as

Croatia now has EU member state obligations.

The implications of counting ethnicity in Croatia

Croatia has had problems with xenophobia and integration of its Serb and

Roma communities.102 Mostly as a result of the war, the relationship between

Croats and the Serb minority was difficult:103 “[A]fter the military operation

Storm, and a mass exodus of Serb refugees from Croatia to neighbouring

republics, Croatia implemented a set of discriminatory practices that de facto

excluded them [Serb refugees] from state membership and impeded their

sustainable return.”104 The Croatian policy towards Serb returnees after the

war has been described as “hesitant”105 and citizenship criticized as a tool for

97 European Commission, Croatia 2011 Progress Report. 98 European Commission, Croatia 2011 Progress Report, 4. 99 see for example: Rechel, Bernd. 2008. What Has Limited the EU's Impact on Minority Rights in

Accession Countries? East European Politics & Societies 22(1), 171-91; Steunenberg, Bernard and

Antoaneta Dimitrova. 2007. Compliance in the EU enlargement process: The limits of

conditionality. European Integration online Papers, 11. 100 Croatian Bureau of Statistics, Census of Population, Households and Dwellings 2011, First

Results by Settlements. Zagreb, 8. 101 Croatian Bureau of Statistics, Census, First Results by Settlements. Zagreb, 9. 102 Minority Rights Group International. 2008. World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous

Peoples – Croatia; Ramet, Sabrina and Marius Søberg. 2008. Challenges facing Croatia since

Independence (An Introduction), in Croatia since independence: war, politics, society, foreign

relations, edited by Ramet, Sabrina P. / Clewing, Konrad and Reneo Lukic,. Muenchen:

Oldenbourg. 103 Barić, The Rise and Fall of the Republic of Serb Krajina; Djuric, The Post-War Repatriation;

Leutloff-Grandits, Carolin. 2008. Croatia's Serbs Ten Years after the End of the War, in Croatia

since independence: war, politics, society, foreign relations, edited by Ramet, Sabrina P. / Clewing,

Konrad and Reneo Lukic. Muenchen: Oldenbourg, 141-67. 104 Koska, Framing the citizenship regime, 401. 105 Leutloff-Grandits, Croatia's Serbs, 157.

Anna-Lena Hoh

77

“ethnic engineering.”106 By comparing the census results from 1991 and 2011

(see table 1), the Serb minority decreased from a population of 581,663 in

1991107 to just 186,633 in 2011.108 Apart from the Serb population, other

minority groups also decreased in numbers. For example, whereas in 1991

there were 22,355 people who declared themselves Hungarian in the census, in

2001 there were only 16,595.109 Looking at the table from the Croatian Central

Bureau of Statistics, the biggest minority groups after the Serbs in the census

of 1991, were ‘others’ with 3.91%. In another source these are specified as ‘Yugoslav’ (2.22% of the total population) and ‘Muslim’ (0.91% of the total population). These categories are followed by undefined (anonymous) categories

such as ‘no national declaration’ (1.53% of the total population) and ‘unknown’ (1.32% of the total population).110 The definition of the categories, even though

they seem rather small, can affect the population count. In the table of the

Croatian Central Bureau of Statistics, in 2011 the biggest minorities were

formed by ‘Bosniaks’ (0.73% of the total population), ‘regional affiliations’ (0.64% of the population)111 and ‘not declared’ (0.62% of the total population).112

The most important reason for this decrease is probably the war, but also

nationalist policies and migration to urban areas, as well as abroad.113

However, there is also the probability that minorities are vulnerable towards

being undercounted – particularly the Roma. The changes might also be a

result of the formulation of the census question on ethnicity, as it strongly

encourages the ticking of the box ‘Croat’. Another reason of undercount could be due to the fear of discrimination, leading people to not state their ethnicity,

but to opt for other options, such as ‘not-declared’.114

Table 1: Population by Ethnicity, 1991-2011 Censuses

106 Koska, Framing the citizenship regime; Štiks, The Citizenship Conundrum. 107 Šterc and Crkvenčić, The population of Croatia, 418. 108 Croatian Bureau of Statistics. n.d. Census of Population, Households and Dwellings 2011, 3.

Population by Ethnicity, 1971 - 2011 Censuses. (accessed: 23 October 2015). 109 Minority Rights Group International, Minorities in Croatia, 5. 110 Šterc and Crkvenčić, The population of Croatia, 418; Looking at the table on page 418, also in

1991 “regional affiliations” was quite a strong category chosen by 0.95% of the population. 111 When looking at the detailed classification table of the 2011 census, these are presumably

people declaring themselves as “Istrian” or “Dalmation” (see: Croatian Bureau of Statistics. 2006-

2014a. Population By Ethnicity – Detailed Classification, 2011 Census. (accessed: 23 October 2015). 112 Croatian Bureau of Statistics. n.d. Census, Population by Ethnicity, 1971 - 2011 Censuses. 113 Minority Rights Group International, Minorities in Croatia, 12. 114 Minority Rights Group International, Minorities in Croatia, 14.

1991 Census 2001 Census 2011 Census

Number % Number % Number %

Republic of

Croatia

4.784.265 100 4.437.460 100 4.284.889 100

Croats 3.736.356 78,10 3.977.171 89,63 3.874.321 90,42

Albanians 12.032 0,25 15.082 0,34 17.513 0,41

Austrians 214 0,00 247 0,01 297 0,01

Bosniaks1) … … 20.755 0,47 31.479 0,73

Bulgarian 458 0,01 331 0,01 350 0,01

Montenegrins 9.724 0,20 4.926 0,11 4.517 0,11

Czechs 13.086 0,27 10.510 0,24 9.641 0,22

Hungarians 22.355 0,47 16.595 0,37 14.048 0,33

Macedonians 6.280 0,13 4.270 0,10 4.138 0,10

Germans 2.635 0,06 2.902 0,07 2.965 0,07

Poles 679 0,01 567 0,01 672 0,02


78

Source: Croatian Bureau of Statistics. 2006-2014b. Population by Ethnicity, 1971–2011 Censuses.

[As a]result of external pressure from the EU, as part of the accession process

constitutional changes in 2002 improved the legal situation of the Serb

minority.115 However, the Serbs still dispute both census results since Croatian

independence,116 as they see it as the continuation of ethnic cleansing and link

it to the difficult return of Serb refugees.117 As described above, the

constitutional changes of 2002 link the implementation of minority rights with

the outcome of the census results of 2001.118 Population politics are still visible

in the current legislation, where political participation depends on the

proportions of the population and official use of a minority language is allowed

if in a particular area the minority makes up more than a third of the

population.119 Census results can lead to tensions: There were about 20

municipalities in Croatia where Serbs make up more than 30% of the

population, meaning that Cyrillic script could be introduced as an official

language. This caused major protests and even a referendum on changing the

constitution to increase the needed threshold.120 The tensions were especially

visible in the city Vukovar, which in 1991 “was besieged and part demolished by the Yugoslav Army and Serbian paramilitaries during Croatia’s war of independence, becoming a symbol of independence.”121 Now, it is one of the

municipalities which could introduce Cyrillic script, and where most of the

protests took place.122 This shows that in spite of the existing constitution,

which is protecting minorities, a part of Croatian society does not support the

acceptance (and integration) of ethnic minorities. While the referendum on

constitutional change was blocked by the Constitutional Court,123 it

nevertheless shows that including the sensitive categories in the census

115 Koska, Framing the citizenship; Petričušić, Constitutional Law. 116 Hipkins, Croatia: Serb Fury Over Census Result; Minority Rights Group International. 2008.

World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples; Pavelic, Croatia Sees Population Drop. 117 Hipkins, Croatia: Serb Fury Over Census Result. 118 Petričušić, Constitutional Law, 615. 119 Pavelic, Croatia’s Language Dispute; Petričušić, Constitutional Law. 120 Milekic, Sven. 2014. Croatia Referendum Ruling Less Clear Than it Seems. Balkan Insight, 13

August 2014 (accessed: 23 October 2015); Pavelic, Croatia’s Language Dispute. 121 Pavelic, Boris. Croatia to Introduce Cyrillic Script to Vukovar. Balkan Transitional Justice, 03

January 2013 (accessed: 23 October 2015). 122 Jergović, Miljenko. 2013. Der kroatische Kampf um Vukovar. Bundeszentrale für politische

Bildung, 30 April 2013 (accessed: 23 October 2015). 123 Pavelic, Croatia’s Language Dispute.

Roma 6.695 0,14 9.463 0,21 16.975 0,40

Romanians 810 0,02 475 0,01 435 0,01

Russians 706 0,01 906 0,02 1.279 0,03

Ruthenians 3.253 0,07 2.337 0,05 1.936 0,05

Slovaks 5.606 0,12 4.712 0,11 4.753 0,11

Slovenians 22.376 0,47 13.173 0,30 10.517 0,25

Serbs 581.663 12,16 201.631 4,54 186.633 4,36

Italians 21.303 0,45 19.636 0,44 17.807 0,42

Turks 320 0,01 300 0,01 367 0,01

Ukrainians 2.494 0,05 1.977 0,04 1.878 0,04

Vlachs 22 0,00 12 0,00 29 0,00

Jews 600 0,01 576 0,01 509 0,01

Others2) 152.803 3,19 21.801 0,49 18.965 0,44

Regional

affiliation

45.493 0,95 9.302 0,21 27.225 0,64

Not declared 73.376 1,53 79.828 1,80 26.763 0,62

Unknown 62.926 1,32 17.975 0,41 8.877 0,21

Anna-Lena Hoh

79

questionnaire and linking them to proportional representation in political

participation and language rights can cause political and especially ethnic

tensions. By linking political participation and mandate representation quota’s with the census results, it is very likely that the census will be politicized and

its results disputed. This also raises the question of the use of the census

results and whether it will ever be possible to leave these sensitive questions

out of the census questionnaire. The current legislation has sparked protests124

and discussion around the aspect of minority rights, but also around the aspect

of ethnicity.

Conclusion

The 2011 census in Croatia can be regarded as the most complete census in the

history of Croatia. This shows that Croatia had the needed structures and

capabilities of conducting such a large scale project. It was in line with most

EU regulations and most of the UNECE recommendations. This does not come

as a complete surprise, considering that in the same year the census was taken

the accession date for EU membership was set. The census was not regarded

as a major obstacle considering that the overall process of census-taking went

smoothly.

Although the core aspects of census-taking as part of the acquis conditions by

Eurostat are regarded as simply technical, by opting to ask for ethno-cultural

characteristics the census becomes connected with issues regarding minority

rights and therewith could be part of the political conditions. By the time of the

serious EU approximation of Croatia “the major problems for minorities had

already been resolved.”125 Therefore, it seems as if the possible politicisation of

the census categories was never considered to be a major problem. So far these

aspects have been neglected by the EU, and there is no general EU guideline.

The EU regulations on the population and housing census do not even mention

this aspect, but refer to the UNECE recommendations. With regard to the

sensitive ethno-cultural aspects, the Croatian census (questionnaire) is not in

line with international recommendations. As mentioned above, on the one hand

the collection of this data is connected to the political representation and

protection of ethnic minorities. On the other hand, however, the possible

implementation of some of the minority rights sparked protests, and a rise of

ethnic intolerance has been observed in Croatia.126

Can the census in Croatia serve as a role model for the other Western Balkan

countries? Croatia certainly seems to have the statistical infrastructure to

conduct a census. This cannot be stated for all the countries in the Western

Balkans and is one of the aspects where Croatia can be taken as a role model.

Following the general lines of EU regulations, it can to a certain extent be

regarded as a good example. On the one hand there are good aspects, such as

124 Milekic, Croatia Referendum; Pavelic, Croatia Sees Population Drop; Pavelic, Croatia’s Language Dispute. 125 Glüpker, Gitta. 2013. Effectiveness of EU Conditionality in the Western Balkans: Minority

Rights and the Fight Against Corruption in Croatia and Macedonia. Journal of Contemporary

European Research 9(2), 223-41, 237. 126 Milekic, Sven. 2015. Croatian Politicians ‘Fuelling Hatred of Serbs’. Balkan Transitional

Justice, 15 June 2015 (accessed: 23 October 2015).


80

the availability of the data, the organization of the census (for example the

allocation of a census budget, the collaboration and integration of the EU rules

etc.) Whether Croatia follows upon the rules after its EU accession remains to

be seen in the next census round (2020). On the other hand, there are various

problems with regard to sensitive issues, such as ethnicity, which in other

Western Balkan countries may cause even more problems than in Croatia, as

has been shown by the aborted census in Macedonia.127 The EU should not

underestimate the effect these aspects can have on the census, but also the

social and political position of ethnic minorities in the region. This also links to

the question: if political participation is connected to census results will it ever

be possible to overcome the construction of the ethno-cultural concepts (and

therewith the politicization of the census) in countries with contentious recent

histories? Not only is this important in the Western Balkans, this paradox has

been also identified with regard to discrimination in other European

statistics.128 The collection of sensitive data via surveys such as in the

Netherlands could be considered a possible solution, but whether this actually

solves the problem should be the subject of further research.

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Kosovo 2011 Census: Contested Census

within a Contested State Research Article

Mehmet Musaj Independent Researcher

[email protected]

http://www.suedosteuropa.uni-graz.at/cse/en/musaj





84

Kosovo 2011 Census: Contested Census

within a Contested State

Mehmet Musaj*

This paper analyzes the census in Kosovo in 2011 with specific focus on

the political implications and ethnic minority rights. A key conclusion is

that this census highly influences public policy-making, and with regard to

minority rights, the census data, in comparison to previous estimates and

Kosovo Constitutional provisions, is not favorable to ethnic minorities.

Expressing a lower number of minorities in total terms, the 2011 census

explicitly reduced the representation of minorities at the central and local

institutions, and consequently affected budget allocations. However, we

must be aware that to some extent, because of the full boycott in the North

by local Serbs, and the partial boycott in the South by the Roma and Serb

communities, comparisons are limited and the data needs to be analyzed

with care.

Keywords: Kosovo, census, state institutions, Western Balkans,

minorities, identities.

Introduction

After the fall of communism in Europe, the countries of the region entered into

a new stage of transformation, where the transition to democracy has often

been a difficult path. Yugoslavia, a socialist federation constituted by six

republics (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia

and Slovenia) and two autonomous provinces (Kosovo and Vojvodina),

experienced the most tragic transition in comparison to other ex-communist

countries. Indeed, rather than a “routine" and peaceful transition, the ex-

Yugoslav republics fell victim to nationalist appeals, and instead of

proclaiming democratic principles, descended into violent conflict. Four ethno-

national wars emerged, accompanied by a considerable number of victims,

material and moral damage, and a significant number of internally and

externally displaced persons.1 Without a doubt, this displacement of persons

and depopulation2 during the Yugoslav wars reflected a project of ethnic

cleansing, and has effectively contributed to the idea and reality of state

homogenization. Recent history in the region of Yugoslavia suggests that

identity serves as an enduring political tool for the ambitious usurpation of

* Mehmet Musaj is an independent researcher. In 2015 he defended his second MA thesis at the

University of Zagreb, Faculty of Political Science. Previously, he obtained an MA at the University

of Sarajevo/University of Bologna on Democracy and Human Rights. 1 Carter Johnson notes that throughout history, in the most extreme cases censuses have been used

to identify ‘the enemy’ based on ethnic belonging, followed by targeted killing. See: Johnson, Carter. 2008. Partitioning to Peace Sovereignty, Demography and Ethnic Civil Wars. International

Security 32(4), 140-70. 2 See Lukic, Tamara / Rastislav, Stojsavlevic / Durdev, Branev / Nad, Imre and Bojan Dercan. 2012.

Depopulation in the Western Balkan Countries. European Journal of Geography 3(2), 6-23.

Mehmet Musaj

85

power and strategic resources.3 Likewise, for reasons both intended and

unintended, language, culture and ethnic belonging have seemingly become the

most significant ‘trump card’ for citizens, and, especially for their politicians.

In this highly politicized context, in 1991 Yugoslavia conducted a population

census which was fully boycotted by Albanians in Kosovo. At that time

Kosovars started to build a parallel institutional system inside of Serbia. The

Kosovar parallel life continued through mid-1999, when after the 1998-1999

war and international military intervention, Kosovo began a period under the

administration of the United Nations until February 2008 when Kosovo

declared its independence. During the period of international administration,

Kosovo did not conduct any census on population and housing. Only after EU

recommendations and facilitation, Kosovo finally conducted a census in 2011

after thirty years (the last non-boycotted census was in 1981).

This paper considers the Kosovo 2011 census paying specific attention to

political implications and ethnic minority rights. A key conclusion is that this

census has significantly influenced public policy-making, and with regard to

minority rights, the census data, in comparison to previous estimates and

Kosovo Constitutional provisions, is unfavorable to ethnic minorities.

Expressing a lower number of minorities in total terms, the 2011 census

explicitly reduced the representation of minorities at the central and local

institutions, and consequently has affected budget allocations. However, due to

the full boycott in the North by local Serbs, and the partial boycott in the South

by the Roma and Serb communities, comparisons are limited and data needs to

be analyzed with care.

Theoretical discussion: censuses and identity construction

The emergence of the modern state has been characterized by features such as

territory, government and population, wherein the need to have a clear picture

of their territories and peoples evolved to become a primary concern of the

modern state. Therefore, as mentioned by Kertzer and Arel, states became

involved in representing their population at the cumulative level based on

identity criteria, hence the census developed as the most evident, and perhaps

the most politically important means by which states statistically illustrate

collective identities.4 In this respect, censuses have played a crucial role in the

construction of identities, with specific emphasis on cultural, racial, linguistic

and religious dimensions. Furthermore, in political terms, censuses have

served as a tool for the construction of identities which have not existed in the

past. In Anderson’s words (as cited in Kertzer and Arel), the census was conceptualized as a useful tool by the colonial state to impose a ‘totalizing, classificatory grid’ on its territory, allowing governments to differentiate between ‘peoples, regions, religions, languages.’5

3 Caytas, Joana D. 2012. The Role of Identity in the Outbreak of the Yugoslavian Wars. Small

Wars Journal, 01 August 2012 (accessed: 30 October 2015). 4 Kertzer, David I. and Dominique Arel. 2002. Censuses, identity formation, and the struggle for

political power, in Census and Identity: The Politics of Race, Ethnicity, and Language in National

Censuses, edited by Kertzer, David. I. and Dominique Arel. Cambridge: University Press, 1-42. 5 David and Arel, Census, Identity, 5.

Kosovo 2011 census: Contested Census within a Contested State

86

Another category of identification which can have political implications is

ethnicity – a multidimensional category that encompasses linguistic, religious,

historical and territorial aspects, and which necessarily has a subjective

dimension.6 Alternatively, as Koller has framed it, even if it is based on self-

identification, confessing one’s belonging to an ethnic group is in itself a form of

collective action. Those who indicate their ethnic affiliation, differentiating

themselves from the majority group in a certain country, can experience certain

disadvantages, social exclusion and different forms of discrimination.7

Particularly in the second half of the twentieth century, the categorization of

populations based upon their language, ethnic and national belonging, has

been considered to be very important in public policy–making. However,

Goldscheider rightfully raises a question - what would we know about ethnicity

if we only had the census definition or categories? If our only text about ethnic

divisions and categories in a society came from official documents, what would

be missing?8 Further, Goldscheider emphasizes that if our entire knowledge

about certain ethnicities stemmed merely from census classification and

categorization, we would have lost the point and consequently our

understanding of the political, social and cultural connotation of ethnicity

would be inaccurate.9 However, for political (and often practical) reasons, the

official counting and acknowledgement of ethnic groups remains important for

governments due to issues such as political representation, elections and

power-sharing and the (re) distribution of public goods within a society.

Additionally, in Limenopoulou’s words10, the power of numbers seems to be

significantly important for ethnic and/or minority communities in relation to

political settlements which may include mechanisms such as territorial

autonomy and various levels of self-determination.11

In the following section, the multinational character of the Ottoman legacy, as

illustrated from the censuses of the First Yugoslavia, (the Kingdom of Serbs,

Croats and Slovenes) that emerged after World War I, and communist

Yugoslavia (Second Yugoslavia), the federal state that emerged after World

War II, will be explored. Then the very ethnic categorization and politicized

context of the censuses will be considered in light of the break-up of the

Yugoslav federation towards the end of the 20th century. This historical review

is brief for reasons of space; however it is important to introduce key trends

and characteristics.

6 Haug, Werner. 2009. Ethnic, Religious and Language Groups: Towards a Set of Rules for Data

Collection and Statistical Analysis. Open Society Institute (accessed: 30 October 2015). 7 Koller, Inez.Z. 2012. Ethnic Minorities and Censuses (accessed: 30 October 2015). 8 Goldscheider, Calvin. 2002. Ethnic categorizations in censuses: comparative observations from

Israel, Canada, and the United States, in Census and Identity: The Politics of Race, Ethnicity, and

Language in National Censuses, edited by Kertzer, David.I. and Arel Dominique. Cambridge

University Press, 71-91. 9 Goldscheider, Ethnic categorizations,72. 10 Limenopoulou, Katerina. 2004. The politics of ethnic identity in the Balkans in a post

Communist power vacuum. Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)

(accessed: 30 October 2015). 11 See here also Pieter Everaers’s contribution in this volume.

Mehmet Musaj

87

Censuses in Yugoslavia before 1991

Since 1921, Yugoslavia has, to some extent, regularly organized censuses. The

intention here is not to analyze the details of all of them, but to emphasize the

characteristics that are most related to the categorization of ethnicities and

nationalities.12Ethnicity has been taken into account in some regards in the

Yugoslav censuses in 1921 and 1931- but at that time, ethnic categories were

not clearly classified because of the mixture of language, religion and ethnicity.

For instance, Serbs and Croats were both indexed as speakers of Serbo-

Croatian and cannot be differentiated on a linguistic basis; all Orthodox

Christians are not necessarily Serbs, nor are all Catholics necessarily Croats;

neither are all Muslims Slavs.13 This lack of clarity in ethnic classification

continued even in censuses held post-World War II, in 1948 and 1953.

However, ethnic categorization was more clearly tabulated in the 1961

Yugoslav census and subsequently there was a clearer indexing of identities

and somewhat less ambiguity.14

Concerning ethnic belonging, it is interesting how the former Yugoslavia

introduced two categories with regard to minorities. The first category was

known as ‘nation’ (narod) and included Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, Montenegrins

and Macedonians, with the ‘right’ to statehood in their own republic. The

second category was known as nationalities (narodnosti) and included among

others Albanians, Hungarians, Italians and Turks, whose main ‘national bodies’ live outside Yugoslavia in kin states. Roma and Vlachs were classified as minority groups without any affinity to other states, and ‘Yugoslavs’ who were classified as a special ethnic group in the censuses.15 Declaring oneself as

‘Yugoslav’ was mostly a response among people for whom ethnic identity did not play any crucial role, leading them to elect to not identify using historical

terms; this often included supporters of the national unity of Yugoslavia, and

children from ethnically mixed marriages.16 Generally, throughout the

Yugoslav censuses notions such as ‘ethnic minority’, ‘nationality’ or ‘ethnic membership’ were used as synonyms and without clarity or nuance. Another important aspect, with regard to ethnicity in Yugoslav censuses is the

categorization of ‘Muslim.’ In the 1961 census, ‘Muslim’ was conceptualized as applicable merely to persons of Yugoslav origin, and not to other people of the

Islamic faith such as Albanians and Turks.17 Apparently ‘Muslim in an ethnic sense’ in the Yugoslav census was itself a form of ethnic engineering by the

Communists in Yugoslavia, who had a special focus on ethnic relations in

Bosnia.

With regard to the ethnic and national composition of Yugoslavia before 1991,

it is interesting to compare the 1971 and 1981 censuses. Compared to 1971, the

total number of inhabitants considerably increased by 1981, in all six republics

12 Many of the other articles in this special issue provide additional historical background. See for

example the discussion in the contributions on Slovenia and Montenegro in this special issue. 13 Hammel, E. A. / Mason, Carl and Mirjana Stavanovic. 2010. A fish stinks from the head: Ethnic

diversity, segregation, and the collapse of Yugoslavia. Demographic Research 22(35), 1097-142,

1102. 14 Hammel, A fish stinks from the Head. 15 Werner, Ethnic, Religious and Language. 16 Hammel, A fish stinks from the Head, 1105. 17 Hammel, A fish stinks from the Head.


88

and the two autonomous provinces. According to the Yugoslav census of 1981,

the country had 9.20% more inhabitants than in 1971, with the greatest

increase in Kosovo (24.47%) and the smallest in Vojvodina (3.87%) and Croatia

(3.95%).18 It is important to note that despite the increased overall population,

the numbers of some nationalities and/or ethnicities were lower. For instance,

in 1981 there were 98.000 Croats and 7.000 Serbs fewer than in 1971, but at

the same time, there was an increasing affiliation with the category of

‘Yugoslavs’; according to the data from the 1981 census, the total number of people declared as ‘Yugoslav’ soared from 273.077 in 1971 to 1.215.000 in 1981, with an increase of 450%.19 These changes do not suggest massive population

shifts, but changes in the way individuals chose to self-identify.

The Yugoslav Census of 1991: Kosovar Contestation

During the history of Yugoslav censuses, there is no doubt that the 1991

Yugoslav census remains one of the most controversial, reflecting not just the

census taking process and its methodology, but the changing political

dynamics. Problems related to the conduct of censuses can be of varying

nature, but politically motivated interferences are always the most

problematic. Haug noted that a significant problem relates to the way in which

censuses are conducted and the political climate during a census operation.20

The problems listed by the author include the challenges of countries with a

high degree of illiteracy, communication problems, the lack of confidence in

enumerators and the state bodies, inadequate data protection or even direct

attempts to pressure or manipulate the conduct of field operations.21 In this

regard it is critical to mention that the Yugoslav census of 1991 was conducted

on the eve of the dissolution of the Yugoslav federation, when the sparks of the

inter-ethnic wars were beginning to appear on the horizon. For example, the

census was conducted after the abolishment of Kosovo’s autonomy by Serbian

authorities, ultimately leading to Kosovo’s development of its own parallel institutions. Therefore, not only was the 1991 census boycotted by the

Albanians in Kosovo; the census was contested within the framework of an

increasingly contested (Yugoslav) state. In this political context, as Bookman

(as cited in Limenopoulou) writes, and as particularly evident in Bosnia, all

three main groups were using population statistics to strengthen claims that

their peoples deserved more territory and political power.22

Concerning Kosovo, due to these political factors springing from the boycott of

the 1991 census and the 1998-1999 war, it has been difficult to calculate the

exact population since the 1981 census, which was the last regular census

conducted in Kosovo within the Yugoslav federation. However, Brunborg has

conducted some useful investigation with regard to Kosovo’s population evaluations in 1997, 1998 and 1999. For example, she notes that the Federal

Statistical Office of Yugoslavia used the so-called cohort component method

18 See Stankovic, Slobodan. 1982. Yugoslavia’s Census 1981 – Final Results. Open Society Archives,

03 October 1982 (accessed: 30 October 2015). 19 Stankovic, Yugoslavia’s Census. 20 Werner, Ethnic, Religious and Language. 21 This is characteristic for Albanians in Kosovo and Macedonia who were encouraged and

motivated by their political leadership to boycott the Yugoslav census of 1991. 22 Limenopoulou, The politics of ethnic identity, 4.

Mehmet Musaj

89

where a population for a certain area is projected by age and sex, based on the

demographic component of mortality, migration and fertility; therefore, in spite

of the boycott the size of the population of Kosovo can be estimated based on

the 1981 census applying this methodology.23

There are other separate population estimates made about Kosovo during this

period of tension throughout the 1990s, such as estimates for 1995 by Huizi

Islami (1997), a 1998 estimate by UNHCR (1999), the Federal Secretariat of

Information (1998) and Blayo et al. (2000).24 In addition, after the 1998-1999

war, a significant demographic survey was conducted by the UNFPA (United

Nation Population Fund) in the period between November 1999 and February

2000.25 Therefore, there is and has been available data, though methods and

results often remain contested. A thorough review of the various data is beyond

the scope of this article except to note that the data from all of these estimates

often provide no or very limited information on the ethnic composition of the

country, and represent different methodological approaches.

The Kosovo Census of 2011

Like most other countries in Europe, in 2011 Kosovo conducted a Population

and Housing census.26 For Kosovars, this was the first internationally

recognized census since 1981. According to the Kosovo Agency of Statistics

(Agjencioni i Statistikave të Kosovës, ASK)27 the census was organized in full

accordance with the international recommendations prepared by the UN

Economic Commission for Europe in cooperation with the European Union

Office of Statistics (EUROSTAT)28.

Table1. Kosovo 2011 official census results by ethnic or cultural background

Figures %

Albanian 1.616.869 92.9%

Serbs 25.532 1.5%

Bosniaks 27.533 1.6%

Turks 18.738 1.1%

Roma 8.824 0.5%

Ashkali 15.436 0.9%

Egyptian 11.524 0.7%

Gorani 10.265 0.6%

Other 2.352 0.1%

Total population 1.739.825 100%

Source: ECMI Kosovo: Minority Communities in the 2011 Kosovo Census Results: Analysis and

Recommendations, 2012.

23 Brunborg, Helge. 2002. Report on the size and ethnic composition of the population of Kosovo, 14

August 2002 (accessed: 30 October 2015), 1-18, 6-8. 24 Helge, Report on the size and ethnic composition. 25 See UNFPA (United Nation Population Fund), SOK (Statistical Office of Kosovo), IOM

(International Organization for Migrations). 2000. Demographic, social, economic situation and

reproductive health in Kosovo following the 1999 conflict. Statistical Office of Kosovo (accessed: 30

October 2015). 26 Appendix 1 - you can see the results of the census 2011 for all municipalities and natural growth

for the period 01 April - 31 December 2011. 27 Kosovo Agency of Statistics (Agjencioni i Statistikave të Kosovës, ASK). 2012. Rezultatet

përfundimtare të regjistrimit të popullsisë 2011[Final Results of 2011 Census]. Prishtina. 28 The International Monitoring Operation (IMO) noted that, the 2011 Kosovo Census was

conducted in a relatively successful manner and resulted in figures that can be relied on.


90

The legal basis for the 2011 census was the adoption of the Census Law in

2010, wherein the status of resident was defined as all persons who had

permanently lived in Kosovo for 12 months before the census and who intended

to remain in Kosovo for over a year afterwards, as well as recognizing those

who were temporarily absent from Kosovo and were abroad for less than 12

months for different reasons, including work, study, travel or medical

treatment.29 However, the Law also included provisions for a supplementary

list for all persons living and working abroad (Diaspora), and who could not be

considered as residents, with all information about this group of people to be

provided by the person themselves, or by their family members.30

This definition of the concept of resident was not fully accepted by the wider

public, many of whom wanted the Diaspora formally counted. For example the

Kosovo Academy of Science and Arts (Akademia e Shkencës dhe Arteve të

Kosovës, ASHAK) strongly contested this definition by noting that all persons

who have not been in Kosovo for more than 12 months would not be included,

and in this way the real demographic conditions of Kosovo would not be

presented and the rights of “our countrymen living abroad will be violated.”31

This debate is in fact a deliberation between de facto and de jure meaning of

population. While the de facto population includes all persons present in the

country at the time of the census, the de jure population includes the total

population of a country that could be “home” and resident in the country, even if away at the time of the census.32 As Kosovo has a substantial Diaspora

population living and working abroad for short- or longer periods of time, this

distinction is relevant. According to Brunborg, the Yugoslav censuses

historically have tended to follow the de jure concept33, despite the fact that for

international comparisons purposes, the de facto definition is recommended by

the United Nations.34

It is important to emphasize again that this census was conducted within a

considerably politicized atmosphere. Indeed, the 2011 Kosovar census was

completely boycotted and contested by the Kosovo Serbs in the Northern part of

the country, as well as partially in the Southern part, by both the Serb and

Roma35 communities. This boycott was based upon the contestation of Kosovar

29 Kosovo Assembly. 2010. Law on Population and Housing Census. Law No. 03/L-237, Art.3.1.1 30 Kosovo Assembly, Art.3.1.2 31 Collaku, Petrit. 2011. Kosovo Academy Seeks Delay to Census. Balkan Insight, 02 March 2011

(accessed: 30 October 2015). 32 Helge, Report on the size and ethnic composition, 4. 33 Helge, Report on the size and ethnic composition; As Brunborg mentioned: the Yugoslav censuses

adopted the de jure concept, which means that every inhabitant had to be enumerated in their

place of permanent residence, even when at the time of census he/she was absent from that place

due to any reason (travel, education or field work, temporary work abroad, compulsory service in

the army, medical treatment, penal service, imprisonment, etc.). 34 Helge, Report on the size and ethnic composition; After dissolution of the Yugoslav federation,

ethnic composition became very important indicator. The size of an ethnic group was perceived as a

threat to the others, a fear magnified by the fact that a range of political relations are built upon

this criterion. 35 Roma are usually Romani-language speakers. They live both in the Serbian-majority area (north

of the Ibar River in the northern municipality of Mitrovica and in Serbian enclaves scattered

around Kosovo) as well as in the more southern areas of Kosovo (Bhabha et al 2014, p.8).

Thereby, they have boycotted the census as well.

Mehmet Musaj

91

statehood by Serbia since the proclamation of independence in 2008. Therefore,

the Serb community in Kosovo was strongly influenced by appeals of official

authorities in Belgrade to boycott, emphasizing that Kosovo is not a recognized

state, and hence Kosovar institutions had no right to conduct any kind of

census. In this politicized context, the Serbian parliament’s committee for Kosovo called on Kosovo Serbs not to take part in the census, saying Kosovo

institutions had no authority to carry out a head count.36 Furthermore, Serbia’s minister for Kosovo and Metohija declared that Kosovo's Albanian-led

institutions were preparing ‘a census theft’ in order to make the world believe that fewer Serbs live in Kosovo than is the case. The minister stated that

250,000 Serbs had been displaced from Kosovo since the 1990s and that the

Serbian government maintains that only the UN can carry out a census in

Kosovo.37 Additionally, proposals that suggested Serbia would conduct a census

within the entire territory of Kosovo were presented as well. Miladin

Kovacevic, Deputy Director of the Serbian Statistical Office emphasized that

the constitution obliges the office to carry the population census out in the

entire territory of the country, including Kosovo (which Serbia does not

recognize as independent).38 The first census conducted in post-independent

Kosovo was therefore challenged and contested on two levels, externally by the

Serbian authorities in Belgrade, and internally by the local Serbs.

However, while Kosovo did successfully conduct the census in 2011 in spite of

the principal contestations noted above, the results of this census produced a

range of dissatisfied reactions, particularly with regard to minorities. From

this perspective the census explicitly influences the government’s policy-

making and distribution of public goods, and the results are therefore

consequential. After the publication of the census results by the Kosovo Agency

of Statistics (ASK), the Kosovar Institute for Advanced Studies (Instituti për

Studime te Avancuara, GAP),39 made inquiries on the census data, and the

implications that the data may have on public policies.40 For instance, it is

important to understand how the population of a municipality impacts the

distribution of government grants. According to the Law on Local Government

Finance (Law n.03/L-049), the government grants for municipalities are based

upon four criteria: the total population; the number of minorities; if the

national minorities make up a majority; and geographical size. Therefore,

reflecting municipal population differences from before and after the 2011

census, the government is required to reframe the distribution of grants for all

municipalities. Specific concerns are related to the four Serb municipalities in

the North, which as previously noted boycotted the census en bloc. Therefore,

since there are no official census data for the North, it is unclear upon which

criteria the government would distributes grants.41 For the other Serb

36. Barlovac, Bojana. 2011. Kosovo Serbs at Loggerheads Over Census. Balkan Insight, 30 March

2011 (accessed: 30 October 2015). 37 N.N. 2011. Serbia Postpones Census. Balkan Insight, 01 April 2011 (accessed: 30 October 2015). 38 Barlovac Bojana. 2011. Serbia to Include Kosovo in 2011 Census. Balkan Insight, 06 January

2015 (accessed: 30 April 2015). 39 Institute for Advanced Studies (GAP). 2012. Population Census Data and their Impact on Public

Policies, 1-17. 40 Appendix 2 summarizes the differences between previous estimates and 2011 census data. 41 It is important to emphasize that the Northern Serb municipalities have continued to receive

substantial financial assistance from Belgrade.


92

municipalities in the rest of Kosovo, the census data of 2011 could also be

affected by the partial Serb boycott.

Another important issue is employment in local administration and/or the civil

service. In 2008 the government of Kosovo issued a decision (no.10/46) on the

size of local administration, which noted that the minimal number of

employees in all municipalities must be 55 in municipalities with over 100,000

inhabitants, with one civil servant per 620 citizens; and in municipalities with

fewer than 100,000 inhabitants, the proportion must be one civil servant per

780 citizens, while not dropping below 55. Thereby, using this formula in light

of the results of the 2011 census it appears that at the local level there are 3111

civil servants more than the government decision of 2008 recommends.42

Another aspect of interest regards the discrepancies between the numbers of

voters. In this respect comparing the total number of voters with the data from

the 2011 census, in some cases the number of registered voters in a

municipality exceeds the total number of inhabitants.43 It remains unclear how

the government will update or implement policies based on such census data.

Another important dimension of the census data is related to minorities, whose

rights and obligations became a very sensitive issue in the post-Communist era

and the dissolution of the multinational state. Concerning minority issues, the

Kosovo 2011 census is of particular interest because of political implications, as

the results from the 2011 census may directly influence on power-sharing in

political institutions, budget distribution, and other fields of public life in

Kosovo.

The European Centre for Minority Issues Kosovo (ECMI) prepared a useful

analysis of minorities’ concerns emanating from the Kosovo 2011 census. According to the 2011 census results, the proportional number of minorities in

Kosovo proves to be 7%, which is lower than the previous estimates of 10-12%.

Thereby, this lower percentage, in addition to leading to voices of

dissatisfaction from among the minorities, carries a set of political implications

since various minority rights and provisions in Kosovo, are related to the total

number of the minority population. Likewise, according to the Constitution of

Kosovo and the Law on Local Self-Governance, in municipalities where at least

10% of the residents belong to non-majority communities, the position of

Deputy Chairman of the Municipal Assembly for Communities must be

reserved for a representative of these communities. Similarly if such a

condition is met, there shall also be a Deputy Mayor for Communities. The new

numbers can therefore lead to significant changes. For instance, according to

previous estimates made by ECMI Kosovo and the OSCE Mission in Kosovo, in

the municipality of Obiliq, non-majority communities comprised 11-18% of the

municipality’s total population, but according to the 2011 census they amount

to approximately 7-8%. This percentage falls under the official threshold to

42 Institute for Advanced Studies, Population Census, 8. 43 Institute for Advanced Studies, Population Census; This might happen because of two basic

reasons: first, the dead persons are not completely removed from voters’ rolls; and second, because of discrepancies between census data and voter rolls with regard to Kosovan diaspora.p.8

Mehmet Musaj

93

nominate a Chairman of the Municipal Assembly for Communities and a

Deputy Mayor for Communities.44

Further provisions with regard to the total number of minorities are related to

the Law on the Civil Service, wherein a minimum of 10% of civil service

positions in central level institutions should in principle be reserved for

minority communities. Again, new 2011 numbers could lead to changes. For

instance, according to the census data the total number of the Turkish

community in the municipality of Lipjan is 2%, while previous estimates had

ranked that community in amount of 6-7%. Language is another important

aspect, as municipalities in which at least 5% of the population consists of a

non-majority community speaking a language different than the official

languages (Albanian and/or Serbian) this language must have the status of

official language in that municipality. Additionally, in accordance to the total

number of non-majority communities in Kosovo, there are also reserved places

for students belonging to non-majority communities within Kosovo’s public universities.45

Moreover, according to the Constitution of Kosovo (art.96), non-majority

communities form part of central state institutions, and constitutional

provisions guarantee twenty seats in the Kosovo Parliament for all minority

communities, of which ten are reserved for the Serb community, while at the

Government level non-majority communities are represented by two ministers

and four vice ministers.46 As of the time of writing, changes on the ground

resulting from the implementation of policies based on the new census numbers

have not been observed; the potential future implications remain unclear.

Conclusion

As argued throughout this article, in countries like Kosovo that have emerged

after the collapse of communism in Europe, the conduct of censuses can be a

very politicized issue, wherein nationalist rhetoric with specific emphasis on

ethnicity is a well-known and crucial driver of political demands. The very

nature of political polarization is expressed by the boycott and contestation in

the North of Kosovo by local Serbs, whose aim is to contest the state per se,

primarily encouraged from their homeland’s official structures in Belgrade. Others have argued that as the census was contested partially by the Roma

and Serb community in the South as well, it may be classified as an extensively

contested census.47

Therefore, censuses cannot be considered as a simple bureaucratic and

administrative tool of enumeration. In particular this article has tried to

illustrate the political importance of censuses in the process of public policy-

making, especially in relation towards national minorities. The article

44 European Centre for Minority Issues Kosovo [ECMI Kosovo]. 2012. Minority Communities in the

2011 Kosovo Census Results: Analysis and Recommendations, 2012. European Centre for Minority

Issues Kosovo, 3. 45 ECMI, Minority Communities. 46 Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo. 2008. 47 Visoka, Gëzim and Elvir Gjevori. 2013. Census politics and ethnicity in the Western Balkans.

East European Politics 29 (4), 479-98.


94

introduces several issues that the government has to reframe based on the

results of the 2011 census, the most prominent being related to municipal

budget allocations. On the other hand, the government and local authorities

will have to carefully scrutinize and possibly cut the number of employees in

the public administration; something that will have an impact not only on

minorities, but on general employment and patronage. The mismatch between

the data from the census and voter lists further illustrates the challenges of the

count, and in particular the definition of a resident. The discrepancies can be

great - according to the results of 2011 census, in twelve municipalities the

number of voters exceeded the total number of the population.48 There is

clearly a need for more cooperation between the Kosovo Agency of Statistics

and the Civilian Registration Office. The minorities in Kosovo have found

themselves in a very disadvantageous situation following the release of

numbers showing smaller minority populations than previously estimated (a

deviation from 10% to 7%). The full implications remain unclear, but could be

manifest in a loss of some political and/or functional positions throughout local

and state institutions, which may translate into lower budgetary funds.49

In closing, it is clear that while the contestation and boycott of censuses is not

new, it does reflect the still conflicted nature of the region emerging from the

‘aggressive’ break-up of the Yugoslav federation. Censuses have been boycotted

in the past, such as the Yugoslav census of 1991, and continued to be contested

to various extents. Disagreement on whether a census should count the

number of people resident in a country at the time of the enumeration, or

include the often substantial Diaspora populations, also reflect the historical

legacy of regional politics, emigration and identity-building. Ethnic and racial

identity can be reflected in and constructed through censuses, and the data

may then be variously used in public policy. The long-term implementation of

the results of the 2011 census in Kosovo will demonstrate the impact of

population changes, census methodology and adherence to constitutional and

human rights principles, as the still relatively young state continues to shape

as a polity.

48 GAP, Population Census, 8-9. 49 It is important to note that this can be partially explained by the Serb and Roma boycott, and

demonstrates that census data should never be used to provide absolute figures. Until now there

have not been any additional efforts to employ different methodologies to estimate the numbers of

peoples that boycotted the census.

Mehmet Musaj

95

Appendix 1

Population census 2011 and natural growth for the period 01 April - 31 December 2011

Municipality Population Fertility Mortality Natural growth

Deçan 40.019 562 113 449

Gjakova 94.556 1.327 335 992

Gllogoc 58.531 983 167 816

Gjilan 90.178 1.165 335 831

Dragash 33.997 583 156 427

Istog 39.289 541 132 409

Kaçanik 33.409 500 122 378

Klina 38.496 740 120 620

Fushë Kosova 34.827 573 123 450

Kamenica 36.085 349 150 199

Mitrovica 84.235 1.243 356 887

Leposaviq 13.773 92 130 -38

Lipjan 57.605 951 164 787

Novobërda 6.729 45 30 15

Obiliq 21.549 315 66 249

Rahovec 56.208 1.014 151 862

Peja 96.450 1.351 320 1.031

Podujeva 88.499 1.251 236 1.015

Pristina 198.897 2.922 605 2.317

Prizren 177.781 2.640 552 2.087

Skenderaj 50.858 848 131 718

Shtime 27.324 426 58 369

Shtërpca 6.949 74 46 28

Suhareka 59.722 1.165 214 951

Ferizaj 108.610 1.636 361 1.275

Vitia 46.987 700 161 539

Vushtrri 69.870 1.033 233 800

Zubin Potok 6.616 52 58 -6

Zveçan 7.481 54 76 -23

Malisheva 54.613 1.149 118 1.031

Junik 6.084 71 12 59

Mamusha 5.507 92 10 82

Hani i Elezit 9.403 145 25 120

Graçanica 10.675 63 67 -4

Ranillug 3.866 25 37 -12

Partesh 1.787 21 23 -2

Kllokot 2.556 17 19 -2

Total 1.780.021 26.719 6.014 20.705


96

Source: Kosovo Agency of Statistics [Agjencia e Statistikave të Kosovës ASK], 2013.

Appendix 2

The difference between the data presented in “Annex I” of the Law on Local Government Finance on the overall number of population and minorities compared with the census data

Municipality

Number of

population

according

to the Law

on Local

Government

Finance

Number of

population

according

to the

census

Difference

Number of

minorities

according to

the Law on

Local

Government

Finance

Number

of

minorities

according

to the

census

Difference

Deçan 40.400 40.019 - 381 294 550 +256

Gjakovë 115.000 94.556

Gllogoc 60.000 58.531 - 1.469 0 45

Gjilan 100.348 90.178

Dragash 35.000 33.997 - 1.003 12.935 13.559 +624

Istog 44.000 39.289 - 4.711 2.646 3.085 +439

Kaçanik 33.000 33.409 - 409 4 36 +32

Klinë 44.000 38.496 - 5.504 1.863 1241 -622

Fushë K. 33.682 34.827 + 1.145 3.730 4511 +781

Kamenicë 49.581 36.085 - 13.196 4.670 1864 -2.806

Mitrovicë 90.000 71.909 - 18.091 0 2199 +2.199

Leposaviq - - - - - -

Lipjan 69.115 57.605 - 11.510 4.952 3112 -1.840

Novobërdë 9.899 6.729 - 3.170 2.785 3192 +407

Obiliq 26.000 21.519 - 4.481 3.360 1655 -1.705

Rahovec 63.000 56.208 - 6.792 1.953 944 -1009

Pejë 115.000 96.450 - 18.550 12.650 8.334 - 4316

Podujevë 117.000 88.499 - 28.501 735 849 +114

Prishtinë 388.561 198.897 - 189.664 4.961 4146 -815

Prizren 214.963 177.781 - 37.182 30.077 31.682 +1.605

Skenderaj 56.000 50.858 - 5.142 366 109 -257

Shtime 28.000 27.324 - 676 560 858 +298

Shtërpcë 11.000 6.949 - 4.051 3.438 3167 +271

Suharekë 80.000 59.722 - 20.278 471 575 +104

Ferizaj 111.000 108.610 - 2.390 3.367 4193 +826

Viti 46.458 46.987 + 529 293 258 -35

Vushtrri 75.000 69.870 - 5.130 2.615 960 -1655

Zhubin P. - - - - - -

Zveçan - - - - - -

Malishevë 52.000 54.613 + 2.613 28 54 +26

Hani i E. 10.000 9.403 - 597 0 44 +44

Mamushë 6.000 5.507 - 493 0 820 -

Junik 9.600 6.084 - 3.516 0 4 -

Kllokoti 4.542 2.556 - 1.986 1.205 763 -

Graçanicë 18.642 10.675 - 7.967 2.670 2517 -153

Ranillug 4.955 3.866 - 1.089 0 170 -

Partesh 5.217 1.787 - 3.430 0 0 0

Source: Institute for Advanced Studies –GAP: Population Census Data and their Impact on Public

Policies 2012.

Mehmet Musaj

97

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Rezultatet përfundimtare të regjistrimit të popullsisë 2011[Final Results of

2011 Census]. Prishtina.

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the struggle for political power, in Census and Identity: The Politics of Race,

Ethnicity, and Language in National Censuses, edited by Kertzer, David. I.

and Dominique Arel. Cambridge: University Press, 1-42.

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Dercan. 2012. Depopulation in the Western Balkan Countries. European

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Census, Identity, and the Politics of

Numbers: The Case of Macedonia Research Article

Roska Vrgova

Researcher, University of the Basque Country

[email protected]

http://www.suedosteuropa.uni-graz.at/cse/en/vrgova





107

Census, Identity, and the Politics of

Numbers: The Case of Macedonia

Roska Vrgova

A census is a statistical procedure which can provide detailed information

on demographic characteristics including the fluidity (or stability) of

identities with which a population identifies in a given period of time. A

census also represents a political process which can play an essential role

in ethnic politics, especially when power is distributed on the basis of

numbers. As such, censuses often have results that are contested, and the

case of Macedonia is no exception. This article provides an overview of the

census taking processes in the years following Macedonia’s independence in 1991, the dynamics and the challenges of the process itself and

implementation of the results, and potential implications for the creation

of identities. The author shows how census politics in Macedonia has been

used as a political tool both in inter- and intra-ethnic relations, presenting

ethnic political elites as true defenders of the interests of their respective

communities. Moreover, it shows how the census taking process has

generated tensions, fear, lack of trust, and reification of ethnic

demographics. The author demonstrates that there is a lack of political

will on the part of policymakers to move forward in conducting a new

census and creating relevant policies that will enhance the lives of

individuals.

Keywords: Macedonia, census, identity, politics of numbers, ethnic

relations

Introduction

A population census is just one example of a statistical tool a country may use

in order to count its population and identify and map trends in its economic,

political and social reality during a defined period of time. However, many view

censuses as significant. As Arel argues, censuses do not simply reflect social

reality; rather, they play a key role in its construction. This proves to be

especially true in cases where censuses divide the population along ethnic,

racial, linguistic and religious lines.1 Censuses play a significant role in ethnic

politics, as their results can directly affect the distribution of power and the

allocation of public goods, making it fundamentally a political process and an

“exercise of social power, with potential to change policy outputsг”2

Roska Vrgova holds an M.A. in Human Rights and Democracy from the University of

Bologna/Sarajevo, and she currently specialises in international election observation and

international assistance at the Basque Country University. Her past research has explored topics

such as, intra-party democracy, minority representation, government accountability, transparency

of institutions, as well as EU integration. 1 Arel, Dominique, and David I Kertzer. 2001. Census and Identity the Politics of Race, Ethnicity,

and Language in National Census. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 5. 2 Simmons, Beth A. and, Kelley G. Judith. 2014. Politics by Number: Indicators as Social Pressure

in International Relations. American Journal of Political Science 59(1), 1-56, 5.

Census, Identity, and the Politics of Numbers: The Case of Macedonia

108

Macedonia has a substantial Albanian minority, so “the game of the ethnic numbers has been running wild”3 in the past as well as today; census taking

has never failed to be a source of contestation both among inter-ethnic groups

and, more recently, among factions of the same ethnic group (although for

different reasons, as explained below). As Friedman notes in his observations,

the experts observing the Macedonian census in 1оо4“thought they were going to be overseeing the technical aspects of a statistical exercise,” but were instead “shocked by the level of political passion their very exercise reignitedг”4 As

Ademi5 from the Democratic Union for Integration (Bashkimi demokratik për

integrim - DUI) states, “the inability to agree6 on who is to be counted, in

particular how to approach the counting of the classical Diaspora7, and the

Diaspora8 who remain attached in one or more ways to Macedonia, persists in

being an obstacle in conducting a census”г The signing of the Ohrid Framework

Agreement (OFA), which ended a short armed conflict between the Macedonian

army and Albanian paramilitary forces (National Liberation Army-NLA),

granted to any minority constituting over зе% of the country’s population the right to guaranteed representation in Parliament, as well as other privileges

with regard to employment in the public administration, military, education

system, and other sectors. Since its independence in 1991, Macedonia has held

four census operations, of which only two (1994 and 2002) have been relatively

successful. The 1991 census was boycotted by the Albanian minority, and the

2011 census was stopped due to methodological inconsistency and controversy.

Bearing in mind that different methodologies would have yielded different

results, some representatives9 of political parties still doubt whether a mutual

agreement between the ruling coalition of Internal Macedonian Revolutionary

Organization - Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity (В а ш а а а ц а а ац ја - Д а а а ја а а ац а - VMRO-DPMNE) and DUI was ever

reached prior to the start of the 2011 census.

The biggest challenge in overcoming the negative census dynamics has been

and still is the low level of trust among the communities.10 Moreover, since the

census is used for political purposes by the different political parties, and in

light of the lack of trust in the State Statistical Office, due to the complaints on

lack of representation of different ethnic groups at the institutions,11 these

dynamics have strengthened divisions among ethnic groups, without achieving

much progress in minimizing tensions or negotiating a solution acceptable to

3 Cohen, Roger. 1994. Macedonia Census Just Inflames the Disputes: Counting ethnic groups in a

land of countless enmities. New York Times, 17 July 1994 (accessed: 26 October 2015). 4 Friedman, 1996, 94, as cited in Dominique and Kertzer, Census and Identity, 19. 5 Personal interview with Abdylaqim Ademi, Minister of Education, Secretary General of DUI,

Skopje, 13 October 2014. 6 Implying the inability of the ruling Macedonian-Albanian coalition partners, in this case VMRO-

DPMNE and DUI. 7 When complete families have permanently moved out of the country. 8 Diaspora populations in which members of families frequently live abroad to earn a living, but

regularly return to visit their close or extended families, have attachment to the country, and have

not given up their Macedonian citizenship. 9 Personal interview.Remenski, Frosina, Vice President of SDSM, Skopje, 14 October 2014. 10 Personal interview with Abdylaqim Ademi, Minister of Education, Secretary General of DUI,

Skopje, 13 October 2014. 11 Ademi, Interview.

Roska Vrgova

109

all groups. This article discusses how the politicization of census taking

influences intra- and inter-ethnic relations, and the effects and consequences

such processes have, both on the construction of identities and on the

consolidation of democracy in Macedonia. First, an overview of the national

context is provided. The debate is situated and analyzed in section two through

the prism of census and identity politics, including an account of how political

elites interact and negotiate, and what kind of approaches they employ to

balance the institutional frameworks of post-OFA Macedonia. Sections three

and four give an overview of census processes since Macedonia’s 1оо1 independence, including recent initiatives. The article concludes with several

observations with regards to how census taking has affected the creation of

identities, the approach and discourse that different stakeholders have

employed at different times and the potential entry points for compromise in

holding a new census in the near future.

Background: Macedonian Contemporary History, Cleavages, and

Political Systems

Modern Macedonia emerged in 1945 as one of the six constitutive republics of

the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Following the dissolution of

Yugoslavia, the country declared independence on 8. September 1991, and

experienced a relatively peaceful transition, although its transformation to a

multi-party democracy was (and remains) incomplete. A small-scale violent

conflict in 2001 clearly demonstrated contested political views and agendas, but

was much shorter and less intense when compared to other regional wars. The

ethnic differentiation of the country is present in the country’s 1оо1 Constitution, which, in its Preamble defines Macedonia as the independent

state of the “Macedonian people, in which full equality as citizens and permanent co-existence with the Macedonian people is provided for Albanians,

Turks, Vlachs, Roma and other nationalities living in the Republic of

Macedoniaг”12 From the moment of adoption of the Constitution, the language

in the Preamble prompted many political disputes; while ethnic Macedonians

found these provisions satisfactory, the Albanian ethnic group found them

problematic. In the first decade after independence, Albanians openly

expressed dissatisfaction with their political and social status, and the

inequality of the distribution of economic, cultural and political resources.

Their main political and social demands included wider official use of the

Albanian language, decentralization of political power, proportional

representation in public administration, and preservation of the Albanian

cultural identity.

During the first decade of independence, Macedonia witnessed increasing

mobilization and mounting grievances of the Albanian community related to

their political status, and differences between the Albanians and the

Macedonians about the nature of the state and the role of the Albanians in it.13

The discontent led to the eruption of a small-scale violent conflict between the

12 Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia, Preamble, 1991. (accessed: 26. October 2015). 13 Brunnbauer, Ulf. 2004. Fertility, families and ethnic conflict: Macedonians and Albanians in the

Republic of Macedonia, 1944–2002. Nationalities Papers: The Journal of Nationalism and Ethnicity

32(3), 565-98, 565-66.


110

Macedonian army and the NLA in 2001, which lasted for six months, from

February until August, when the OFA was signed. The main goal of the OFA

reforms has been to accommodate the grievances of the Albanian ethnic group

and to address the ethnic Albanian demands for equal representation, while at

the same time preserving the unitary character of the state in order to alleviate

the concerns of the Macedonian majority, who feared a “federalisation” of the country and its eventual disintegration.14 The census, as some authors claim,

was at the core of the conflict, as ethnic Albanian politicians have long upheld

the view that ethnic Albanians constituted a significantly higher percentage of

the population than the 22,8% recorded in the census of 199415; thus they felt

that they deserved privileges which were not acknowledged by the state.

The constitutional amendments prescribed in the OFA, adopted in November

2001, institutionalized non-discrimination and equal treatment of all under the

law. The non-discrimination principle was to be applied in particular with

respect to employment in public administration and public enterprises,

including access to public financing for business development.16 It confirmed

what the Law on Local Self-Government of 1995 already guaranteed – the

official status of languages spoken by at least 20 percent of the population of a

given municipality.17 (However, language appeals appeared again following the

1994 census. Albanians claimed that they constitute more than one third of the

population, therefore the Albanian language should become a second official

language state-wide.18) The OFA introduced a system of double majorities—a

majority of all deputies, as well as of the ethnic Macedonian population and

majority support from all minority communities jointly—for key areas of

legislation. The Agreement introduced a programme of decentralization and

local self-governance, cleared the way for a multi-ethnic representative police

force,19 and ensured representation of ethnic minorities at the Constitutional

Court, the Ombudsman, and the Judicial Council. Additionally, authorities

were required to take measures to correct imbalances in the composition of the

public administration through recruitment of members from under-represented

communities, with special emphasis put on the police services.

The Macedonian–Albanian relationship has been a significant feature of

Macedonian politics.20 Following the OFA, Macedonia introduced a political

system based on power-sharing determined through an informal rule that the

government would be composed of a multi-ethnic coalition. Although there has

14 O’Flynn, Ian, and David Russellг (edsг) зеекг Power Sharing: New Challenges for Divided

Societies. London: Pluto Press, 108. 15 Jovanovski, Vlado. 2001. Features: On the Brink of Peace. Transitions Online, 11. July 2001.

(accessed: 26. October 2015). 16 Ohrid Framework Agreement. 2001. Art. 4. (accessed: 26. October 2015). 17 Law on Local Self-Government of 1995 (Official gazette of R. Macedonia, No. 52/1995, Arts. 88-

89. The recognition of languages of smaller ethnic communities are subject to the municipal

council’s decisionг 18 Daftary, Farimah and Eben Friedman. 2008. Power-Sharing in Macedonia?, in Settling Self-

Determination Disputes: Complex Power-Sharing in Theory and Practice, edited by Weller, Marc

and Barbara Metzger. Leiden: Brill, 265-305, 270-71. 19 Bieber, Florian. 2005. Partial Implementation, Partial Success: The Case of Macedonia, in Power Sharing: New Challenges for Divided Societies, edited by O’Flynn, Ian, and David Russell. London:

Pluto, 107-22. 20 Reka, Armend. 2008. The Ohrid Agreement: The Travails of Inter-ethnic Relations in Macedonia.

Human Rights Review, 55-69, 55.

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been a broad coalition including Macedonian and Albanian parties since the

first free elections in 1991, one can argue that this undefined quota provides for

greater flexibility, but also carries a risk of inadequate protection if some of the

parties decide to break up this informal agreement, which is observed by

tradition rather than law.21 However, “the numerical strength of ethnic Albanians in the Macedonian polity and the structure of its party and electoral

systems guarantee significant representation of ethnic Albanian parties in the

national parliament and makes their participation in a coalition government at

least highly likelyг”22

The OFA further stipulates that the consent of a majority of deputies

representing all non-dominant groups is needed in several areas of legislation:

culture, education, personal documents, use of language, use of symbols, as

well as local governance.23 The OFA has been criticized for its favourable

treatment of one minority group (the Albanians) over others, since they are the

only group whose share of the population is so substantial, although the

smaller ethnic groups have also benefited from these terms, especially in

regards to their “post-Ohrid constitutional status and their empowerment on

the municipal level.”24 The numerical 20 percent threshold has become the

basis on which groups can lay political and administrative claims, which has

led to further contestation of census issues, becoming “a source of permanent

tension between Macedonian and Albanian partiesг”25

Census, Ethnicity, Identity, and the Politics of Numbers

In countries26 where calculations of ethnic populations are used for the

distribution of power or obtaining certain privileges, the census process is

highly politicized. This is also the case in other Western Balkan states, such as

Croatia and Serbia.27 Ethnic population numbers matter in the distribution of

power, resources, local governance, local finance policies, education, and

cultural policies in Macedonia as well. The OFA, as stated above, defined the

20 percent threshold as critical for the entitlement of certain privileges. In such

a political environment it is impossible for the census to transcend politics.

Rather “since census politics is expressed in numbers, the pursuit of

entitlement translates into a contest for achieving the ‘right’ numbersг”28

Identity politics is a game of numbers,29 and groups fear a change of

proportions that will put them into a disadvantageous position, becoming a

minority in the territory30 in which they have already secured certain rights.

21 Ian and Russell, Power Sharing, 115. 22 Weller, Marc and Barbara Metzger. (eds.). 2008. Settling Self-Determination Disputes: Complex

Power-Sharing in Theory and Practice. Leiden: Brill, 434. 23 Decisions related to the structure of the municipality, and policies affecting particular

communities require a double majority of the majority councillors, and those representing the

smaller communities together. 24 Armend, 2008. The Ohrid Agreement, 56. 25 Brunnbauer, Fertility, families and ethnic conflict, 567. 26 Turkey, Austria in the 19th century, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, are a few cited in Dominique and

Kertzer, Census and Identity,114, 119. 27 See the contributions on Serbia and Croatia in this volume for more detail. 28 See the contributions on Serbia and Croatia in this volume. 29 Dominique and Kertzer, Census and Identity, 30. 30 Dominique and Kertzer, Census and Identity, 30.


112

The perception of a volatile environment contributes to making census taking a

process of political negotiation, rather than objective assessment.31 The

analysis below aims to analyse how the politics of numbers influences the

“ways in which and conditions under which the practice of reification, and powerful crystallization of group feeling, works,”32 accompanied by an

examination of the discourse and “processes through which they become institutionalized and entrenched in administrative routinesг”33

Census Processes in Macedonia (1991-Present)

The first census taking processes in Macedonia took place in the 15th century,

when the Ottoman authorities registered only tax payers and the male

population. The first modern census was conducted in 1921, however there is

also census data from the 19th century. Following World War II, the country

conducted eight more censuses, with the last successfully completed census in

2002.34 This makes Macedonia the only country in Europe that still has not

conducted a census in more than 10 years. (Bosnia and Herzegovina held its

first post-war census in 2013, but as of this writing the results have not been

released.) The former director of the State Statistical Office (SSO) Doncho

Gerasimovski stated that the SSO of Macedonia has the capacity to conduct a

census immediately, but the political will is lacking.35

It has been said that one of the basic mathematics rules in census taking is

that two and two rarely add up to four.36 Just as Petar Goshev, leader of the

Democratic Party in 1994 stated, if we take into consideration the claims of size

of all the ethnic groups living in Macedonia, “claims of modest Macedonians that 1.350.000 Macedonians live here, claims of Albanians as Naser Ziberi for 1

million to 1.2 million of Albanians, 400.000 Serbs according to claims made by

a great number of Serb political demographers, 300.000 Vlachs of Greek

descent, according to some Greek political demographers, 150.000-200.000

Turks according to the claims by representatives of the Turkish nationality,

220.000 Roma according to statistical data given by Faik Abdi, and around two

million Bulgarians according to Bulgarian political demographic estimates,”37

then the total sum of the population would likely be 5,4 to 5,6 million

inhabitants - two or three times the actual number. This is to be expected, as

the question of numbers has disproportionate importance, as different ‘ethnic or religious groups are competing for the political, material and symbolic

resources linked to control of the stateг’38 Numbers do matter, as they imply

potentially great political consequences, accompanied with great fear. An

31 Dominique and Kertzer, Census and Identity, 20. 32 Brubaker, Rogers. 1996. Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the

New Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 11. 33 Tilly, 1998 as cited in Brubaker, Rogers. 2004. Ethnicity without Groups. Harvard University

Press, 60. 34 State Statistical Office of the Republic of Macedonia (accessed: 26 October 2015). 35 P.R. 2014. Gerasimovski: Ako ima politichka volja, kje ima I popis [Gerasimovski: If there is

Political Will, there will be a Census], Utrinski Vesnik, 20. July 2014 (accessed: 26. October 2015). 36 Editor’s Noteг 1оо4г Macedonia More Than Mathematics: A Census In Six Languages.

Transitions Online, 09. May 1994 (accessed: 26. October 2015). 37 Editor’s Note, Macedonia More Than Mathematics. 38 Courbage, Youssef and Ronald Wilkens. 2003. Censuses, elections and population: The case of

Macedonia. Population, 58(4-5), 429-450, 429.

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example of one of the Macedonian collective fears is that “Macedonians will eventually become a minority by ‘demographic swamping’, due to the high reproduction rate of the ethnic Albanian populationг”39 Albanian fears are

related to being undercounted. Although the general opinion among Albanians

is that they comprise at least 25% of the population,40 there is an additional

fear, as claimed by some experts, that this might not in fact be the case. The

implication of this would be the loss of certain legal privileges if it were

confirmed that their number is indeed less than the minimum 20%, especially

in particular geographic areas.

Some experts warn about the danger of making policies without up-to-date

data.41 There are estimates from the World Bank that over 447.000 citizens

have left the country. Eurostat published that from 1998 to 2011, some 230.000

Macedonians have registered in various EU countries.42 Additionally the

Australian Bureau for Statistics in 2012 published data that the total number

of Macedonians has increased from 83.978 in 2006 to 93.570 in 2011.43. For a

country with a population of 2 million, these numbers are significant. The

following sections review the country’s post-Yugoslav census history.

Census taking in 1991

Following the dissolution of Yugoslavia the country created a Constitution

which defines it as primarily the state of the Macedonian people, in which full

equality as citizens and permanent co-existence with the Macedonian people is

provided for Albanians, Turks, Vlachs, Roma and other nationalities living in

the countryг According to Daskalovski, this put the “ethnic Macedonians in a

superior position vis-à-vis the rest of the population”,44 and as result the

Albanian minority found this formulation discriminatory.45 During this period

the Albanians were attempting to address the Albanian interest in autonomy;

accompanied with independence for Kosovo, the federalisation of Macedonia

into an Albanian and a Macedonian entity, within a bilingual state.46 While the

interest in increased autonomy has been a key interest of many Albanian

parties for some time, the strategy of framing this demand in terms of

federalism has been increasingly evident in the post-Ohrid period, whereas

prior to the conflict the main focus of the Albanian parties was recognition of

the Albanians as a second constituent nation, as well as language and

39 Institute for War and Peace Reporting. Balkan Crisis Report, No.21, 17. April 1999, and Balkan

Crisis Report No. 509, 30. July 2004. 40 Editor’s Note, Macedonia More Than Mathematics. 41 Chomovski, Gorazd. 2014. Intervju, Abdulmenaf Bedzeti: Dodeka so brojkite si igrame politika,

popis ne moze da se sprovede. Faktor, 28. June 2014 (accessed: 26. October 2015). 42 Eurostat Demographics (accessed: 26. October 2015). 43 N.D. 2012. Skoro 100.000 Makedonci ziveat vo Avstralija [Almost 100.000 Macedonians Live in

Australia], Utrinski Vesnik. 21. June 2012 (accessed: 26. October 2015). 44 Daskalovski, Zhidas. 2002. Language and Identity: The Ohrid Framework Agreement and

Liberal Notions of Citizenship and Nationality in Macedonia. Journal on Ethnopolitics and

Minority Issues in Europe, Issue 1, 1-32, 25. 45 Brunnbauer, Fertility, families and ethnic conflict, 567. 46 Neofotistos. O. Vasiliki. 2010. Postsocialism, Social Value, and Identity Politics among Albanians

in Macedonia. Slavic Review 69(4), 882-902, 882.


114

education rights in the country.47 The Macedonian leadership was strongly

promoting the idea of a unitary – not federal - state.

The Albanians boycotted both the referendum for independence from

Yugoslavia, and the census in 1оо1г Friedman writes that the census ‘was carried out in an atmosphere of distrust and animosity’г48 The boycott was

observed in municipalities with a large Albanian population: Debar, Gostivar,

Kichevo, Kumanovo, Ohrid, Skopje, Struga, Tetovo, and Titov Veles.49 Albanian

political leaders claimed that they would be deliberately undercounted, and

complained about the lack of census forms in Albanian. On the one hand they

were calling for a boycott, but on the other they appealed to Roma and

Macedonian Muslims participating in the census to declare themselves as

Albanians.50 They did not recognize the census results, and the SSO instead

estimated the numbers in the boycotting areas using statistical projections

based on data from the 1981 census, the natural growth of the population

during the inter-census period, migration, and other statistical data.51

According to the census results of 1991, Macedonia had a population of

2.033.964. Macedonians comprised 65,3%, Albanians 21,7%, Turks 3,8%, Roma

2,6%, Serbs 2,1%, and Others 4,6%.

During the 1991 census, people living abroad for over a year were included in

the results whereas in 1994 they were not included. At that time, the Albanian

leadership was claiming that they make up 40% of the total population,

accompanied with similar unfounded claims by other ethnic groups, namely the

Serbs, the Turks, Roma, Greeks, and Egyptians.52 Dr. Ahrens, a German

diplomat with the rank of Ambassador and head of the Working Group for

Human Rights and Minorities within the International Conference on Former

Yugoslavia (ICFY), called for an extraordinary census in Macedonia to be

supervised by the international community.

Census taking in 1994

The 1994 census was also highly contested. The usual inflated estimates of the

different ethnic groups continued, and again the most disputed question was

the percentage of the Macedonian and the Albanian populations. The main

grievances of the Albanians during this period were again the lack of status as

a constituent people.53 Among the political demands during this period were

guaranteed representation of ethnic Albanians in all state institutions;

improved secondary and higher education in the Albanian language; state-

subsidized Albanian language media; strong government decentralization that

47 Bieber, Florian and Keil Soeren. 2009. Power-Sharing Revisited: Lessons Learned in the

Balkans?. Review of Central and East European Law 34, 337-60, 345, 357. 48 Friedman, Victor. 2002. Observing the Observers: Language, Ethnicity, and Power in the 1994

Macedonian Census and Beyond. New Balkan Politics 3/4, 5. 49 Antonovska et al. 1991, as cited in Daskalovski, Zhidas. 2013. Census taking and Inter-ethnic

Relations in Macedonia. Southeast European and Black Sea 13(3), 365-79, 8. 50 Friedman, Eben. 2002. Political Integration of the Romani Minority in Postcommunist

Macedonia. Southeast European Politics 3(2-3), 107-126, 113. 51 Antonovska et al. 1991, as cited in Daskalovski, Census Taking, 8. 52 N.D., Macedonia More Than Mathematics. 53 N.D., Macedonia More Than Mathematics.

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would allow municipalities to manage their own affairs,54 and representation in

administration, the army, and the judiciary.55

The 1994 census started on June 21, funded with $2.5 million56 from the

European Commission (EC) and the Council of Europe, and it was observed by

the International Census Observation Mission (ICOM), also called the Group of

Experts. As Friedman notes, many members of the ICOM team, including some

of the highest ranking, were “quite surprised when they discovered that they were embroiled in highly charged political issues, as opposed to a mechanical

statistical exercise, and they expressed confusion and dismay over the complex

ethnic situation they encounteredг”57

The primary complaint prior to the census taking in 1994 was the lack of

census forms in languages other than Macedonian. The insistence of

Macedonian radicals to have the census only in Macedonian, the complaints of

the ethnic groups were by amending the Census Law, and finally the census

form was available in Albanian, Turkish, Serbo-Croatian, Romany and

Wallachian.58 Another complaint was related to Article 30 of the Law which

envisaged that an enumerator shall be appointed for each enumeration

districtг”59 The Albanians claimed that in practice this resulted in the

appointment of enumerators of mostly Slavic origin.60 Menduh Tachi, Vice

President of the then main ethnic Albanian political force, the Party for

Democratic Prosperity (Partia për prosperitet demokratik – PDP)) stated that,

“the census was politicized by the Macedonian Government and has only created confusion”г He complained that the Albanian representation in census commissions was 12.8%, while the Albanian community was much larger.61

During the pre-census period “there were serious behind-the-scenes

negotiations with the Albanian members of parliament, who threatened to call

for a boycott despite the presence of the ICOM and the expenses already

incurredг”62 According to the 1994 census results, Macedonia had a population

of 1.945.932, out of which Macedonians comprised 66,6%, Albanians 22,7%,

Turks 4%, Roma 2,2%, Serbs 2,1%, and others 0,5%.63 All Albanian parties

declared the result to be illegitimate,64 saying there were not enough Albanian

experts employed by the SSO and involved in processing the data. Hence,

“representatives of the ethnic Albanian community in Macedonia continued to challenge this number, claiming deliberate undercountingг”65 Although PDP

leaders promised to do their own count, they did not, and the completion of the

54 Mickey W., Robert. 1995. Macedonia: Unstable in a Stable Way. Transitions Online, 30 January

1995 (accessed: 26 October 2015).

55 Roger, Macedonia Census, 8. 56 Roger, Macedonia Census, 8. 57 Friedman, Observing the Observers. 58 N.D., Macedonia More Than Mathematics. 59 Roger, Macedonia Census, 8. 60 Roger, Macedonia Census, 8. 61 Roger, Macedonia Census, 8. 62 Friedman, Observing the Observers. 63 State Statistical Office. (accessed: 26 October 2015). 64 Robert, Macedonia. 65 Brunnbauer, Ulf. 2004. (Re)writing History: Historiography in Southeast Europe after Socialism.

Mu nster: Lit, 567.


116

census seemed to put to rest many speculations about the ethnic composition of

the country.66 However, in the period to follow, tensions increased; the

grievances of the Albanian ethnic group ultimately escalated into armed

insurgency in 2001.

The 2002 Census

The 2002 census took place in still volatile conditions, following the violence in

2001. The enumeration took place from 1-15 November, and it was again

disputed by the Macedonians, the Albanians, and the smaller ethnic groups.

The census was conducted by 11.000 people, with registration forms available

in six languages, Macedonian, Albanian, Turkish, Vlach, Romani, and Serbian.

Additionally, 50 experts from 26 European countries monitored the process.67

The final census results were published a year later, and according to them

Macedonia in 2002 had a population of 2.022.547, out of which Macedonians

comprised 64,2%, Albanians 25,2%, Turks 3,9%, Roma 2,7%, Serbs 1,8%, and

others 0,7%.

The results showed an increase of the Albanian ethnic group from 22,7% to

25,2%, and a decrease of the Macedonians from 66,6% to 64,2%. Although the

international community assessed the census results as “a fair and accurate statistical analysis,”68 the process and the outcome of the census provoked

speculation and dissatisfaction among several parties. The Albanian parties

believed that the official figure of 25% represented undercounting; while

Macedonian nationalists believed it was too high69, claiming the real number of

Albanians was less than 15%.70 The census results were also disputed by the

Turks and the Serbs, who rejected the decrease in the number of Turks and

Serbs; the Turks claimed that their real percentage is 5,15% rather than

3,85%, while the Serbs claimed that the announced numbers represented an

attempt at their elimination.71

Among other speculations was that the percentage, primarily of the Albanian

ethnic group, was agreed upon even prior to the start of the census, among the

new winners of the 2002 elections. Such claims also came from officials of

VMRO-DPMNE, as Nikola Gruevski, then President of the party, said he based

his claims on the fact that the State Census Commission (SCC), was totally

excluded from the process of analyzing the data. Other developments fed

skepticism; the President of the SSO, Blagica Novkovska, was removed from

the position in the middle of the post-census period; the President of the SCC,

Zoran Krstevski resigned; and the results were delayed for seven months.

Recalling the census in 2002, Krstevski announced that there were no political

reasons for his resignation, but that he simply was not convinced that the

66 Robert, Macedonia. 67 Alagjozovski, Robert and Biljana Stavrova. 2003. Macedonia’s Census Opens New Doors.

Transitions Online, 08 December 2003 (accessed: 26 October 2015). 68 Alagjozovski and Stavrova, Macedonia’s Census. 69 International Crisis Group. 2004. Macedonia: Make or Break. ICG Europe Briefing, 03 August

2004, 5. 70 Gjorgjevski, Branko. 2006. Albancite se pomalku od 15 otsto od naselenieto vo Makedonija [The

Albanians are less than 15% of the Macedonian population. Dnevnik, 18 March 2006 (accessed: 26

October 2015). 71 Alagjozovski and Stavrova, Macedonia’s Census.

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census results were valid.72 Apostol Simevski, head of Census Data Processing,

gave assurances that there was no room for abusing census materials or for

falsifying data, because “the methods of control and the computer programs immediately reveal every mistakeг”73

Ultimately, the census results were recognized by all government coalition

partners as the basis for negotiation. If we exclude the claims referring to the

Albanians, for being undercounted (as perceived by the Albanians), or over

counted (as perceived by the Macedonians); as well as the claims for

undercounting of other smaller ethnic groups the 2002 census could be

considered as relatively successful, because the results were ultimately

endorsed and accepted by all groups.

The Cancelled Census in 2011

The census in 2011, initially scheduled for April, was postponed until October

due to early elections in June. This census-cycle revealed that in addition to the

issues of who is to be counted and how, the chosen time period for enumeration

could also be controversial. A year prior to holding the census, the Albanian

political parties claimed that in case the census was held in April, this “will create an artificially reduced number of Albanians, since many ethnic

Albanians live abroad during this periodг”74 The preferred timing for the

Albanian parties was July, when the emigrants come back to Macedonia for

holidays; otherwise they threatened to boycott the census. Smaller ethnic

groups also threatened to boycott the census when it was announced that the

census-takers would be drawn from the two largest communities in each area.75

The smaller groups such as the Macedonian Muslims, Serbs, Turks, and

Vlachs, complained that the larger ethnic groups tried to assimilate them and

offer money or false promises to make them declare themselves as, for example,

Albanian or Roma.76 There were also mutual accusations between Albanians

and Macedonians, the former claiming that the Macedonian majority on the

census commissions had arranged the criteria in order to underestimate the

number of Albanians in the country, whereas the latter argued that the census

was being falsified in Albanian-dominated areas in order to exaggerate the true

number of Albanians.77

According to official information from the SSO, the census was envisaged to

include only the resident population, in accordance with Eurostat standards

72 Jordanovska, Meri. 2009. Popis od 2002: Kolku Albanci ziveat vo Makedonija [Census 2002: How

many Albanians Live in Macedonia], Nova Makedonija, 14 August 2009 (accessed: 26 October

2015). 73 Alagjozovski and Stavrova, Macedonia’s Census. 74 Lutovska, Klaudija. 2010. Prikazna za dva popisi [A Tale of Two Censuses], Southeast European

Times in Skopje, 13 December 2010 (accessed: 26 October 2015). 75 Andersen, Uffe. 2011. Year 1 for the Balkans?. Transitions Online, 03 May 2011 (accessed: 26

October 2015). 76 Uffe, Year 1. 77 Marusic Jakov, Sinisa. 2014. Macedonia PM Makes New Push For Census. 17 July 2014



118

aiming to avoid double registrations of emigrants.78 The readiness of the SSO

in 2011 was assessed as very good by Eurostat,79 however the institutions faced

misunderstandings among the local census commissions and enumerators in

regards to the methodology. Namely, the issue in regards to methodology was

the documents used for verification of the resident population, and whether

only original IDs were acceptable. (There were also reports that people had

registered via Skype.) This aroused suspicions of potential irregularities.80 In

an interview, Gjorchev of VMRO-DPMNE, stated that although the

Government ensured equal multi-ethnic representation of enumerators (there

was a total number of 16.000 enumerators, out of which 10.000 were

Macedonian, 4.000 Albanian, and 2.000 others), in order to enhance trust in the

census, the continued debate over different methodologies, as well as different

approaches among the different regional census commissions and their

presidents, led to the decision to stop the census.81 To the question of whether

there was clear agreement prior to the start of the census on the methodology

and the scope, Gjorchev neither confirmed nor denied the claims, stating that

“there was an agreement to conduct a censusг”82 An agreement to hold a census

was possible, but the devil was clearly in the details.

The census lasted for 10 days, and it was halted upon the collective resignation

of all members of the SCCг In a statement, the commission said “there are no basic preconditions for continuation of the censusг”83 A clear and detailed

explanation and report in regards to the planned budget of 14 million euros

(851.569.900 MKD) provided from the state budget, was never officially

conveyed to the public.84 However, in a recent interview the former President of

the SSO, Novkovska, announced that Eurostat has published data85 which

states that the country spent a total amount of 2.86 million out of the budgeted

14 million Euros.86

Ongoing Debates and Future Prospects for Censuses in Macedonia

The year 2014 brought yet more buoyant debate, and the apparent involvement

of ruling parties, civil society, and academia. Whether this implies a higher

chance for successful planning and implementation is difficult to predict. The

urgency to conduct a census was stated by the Council of Europe in 2013.87

Although EU officials seemed to be in favor of using an alternative approach of

78 Chomovski, Gorazd. 2014. Intervju Novkovska Za sleden popis se potrebni podgotovki od

najmalku edna godina. [The Preparation for a Census will last at least a year]. Faktor, 09 July

2014 (accessed: 26 October 2015). 79 Gorazd, Intervju Novkovska. 80 Mitevska M. Aleksandra. 2013. Ima li klima za nov popis [Is there a climate for a new census],

Utrinski Vesnik, 12 June 2013 (accessed: 26 October 2015). 81 Gjorchev, Vlatko, Member of Parliament of VMRO-DPMNE, Skopje, 14 October 2014. 82 Gjorchev, Interview. 83 Marusic, Jakov Sinisa. 2011. Macedonian Census Commission Resigns. Balkan Insight, 11

October 2011 (accessed: 26 October 2015). 84 Delimitov, Kostadin. 2014. Popis nekogas kje ima no so poinakov “recept” [Some day there will be a census but according to a different “recipe”), ем July зе14 (accessed: 26 October 2015). 85 European Commission. 2011. Population Census Framework Factsheets on Population Censuses

in the Enlargement countries (accessed: 25 October 2015). 86 Gorazd, Intervju Novkovska. 87 Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly. 2013. Post-monitoring dialogue with “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (accessed: 25 October 2015).

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counting the population by using administrative registries,88 the ongoing wire-

tapping scandal which revealed conversations related to electoral fraud,89 put

census taking high on the agenda again, as it is considered as one of the

preconditions for creating a credible electoral list of voters.

In April 2014, Macedonia held both Presidential and Parliamentary elections.

Five minutes after the closing of the ballot boxes, the opposition (Macedonian)

SDSM declared that they did not recognize the elections. As officials from the

party stated, they found the fact of 1,800,000 eligible voters as very

problematic, and suspected manipulation of the numbers.90 Since the country

does not have up to date census data, it is hard to confirm whether the

‘cleaning’ of the election lists was in fact done properly for the latest Parliamentary elections held in April 2014.91 The President of SDSM also

claimed, that “the phantom voters that the opposition warned about during the last elections have multiplied during these electionsг”92 They claim that no

institution addressed their complaints, so the only option, which the party had,

was rejecting the elections.93 They conditioned their return to Parliament (they

won 34 out of 123 seats) with several requests including formation of a

technical government, creating conditions for separating the party from the

state institutions, independent media regulation, cleaning the electoral lists,

and conducting a census.94 The party maintains that a new census would show

how current voter lists are packed with people who are deceased or ineligible to

vote, mostly because they have left the country.95 They state that a potential

census will question the turnout in many municipalities during the last

elections.96

Following the elections, and the demands of the opposition, the ruling coalition

of VMRO-DPMNE and DUI came up with several proposals for conducting a

census. Namely, VMRO-DPMNE is in favor of conducting an administrative

census, where the results are received by aggregating and cross-referencing

data from existing state institutions and registers.97 Prime Minister Gruevski

proposed installing devices on border crossings that would record entries and

exits of citizens for the purposes of the census. Gjorchev of VMRO-DPMNE,

states the party’s position is clear and they want a European census conducted

according to the criteria of Eurostat and the United Nations (UN).98 Any other

solution would be unacceptable to the party.

88 European Commission. 2014. The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Progress Report

(accessed: 25 October 2015). 89 Center for Research and Policy Making. 2015. Saving Democracy in Macedonia: What to do After

the Wire-tapping Scandal. Policy Brief 34, (accessed: 25 April 2015). 90 Personal Interview. Remenski, Frosina, Vice President of SDSM, Skopje, 14 October 2014 91 Remenski, Interview. 92 Andersen, Uffe. 2014. What’s in a Number? Transitions Online, 22 July 2014 (accessed: 25

October 2015). 93 Remenski, Interview. 94 Dimeska, Frosina. 2014. Propadna obidot za pocetok na krajot na politichkata kriza. [Attempt to

start and end the political crisis failed]. Makdenes, 24 June 2014 (accessed: 25 October 2015). 95 Uffe, What’s in a Number?. 96 Some municipalities, such as the municipality of Aerodrom, had a turnout of 97%. Remenski,

Interview. 97 Marusic, Macedonia PM. 98 Gjorchev, Interview.


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DUI, the coalition partner of VMRO, finds the proposal for an administrative

census acceptable only if it includes citizens who live abroad.99 The unofficial

DUI proposal is to conduct a census that will include all the citizens of

Macedonia who live in the country and abroad. They suggest processing the

results in two tables: one that will register the citizens that are present in

Macedonia during the time of census taking, and another that will register the

citizens who have Macedonian citizenship and have entered the country in the

period of 12 months prior to the census. They suggest the data from the first

table to be used for planning and policy-making for the upcoming 10-year

period in the field of demographic, economic, educational, and other policies,

whereas the numbers of the second table to be used for determining the rights

of the ethnic communities. The party claims this would not endanger any

policy, and at the same time the country will be able to fulfill its obligations

towards the EU.100 Moreover such an approach would make a distinction

between people who have families in the country and are absent during the

year due to work, and the ’classic’ diasporaг Although DUI is aware that this breaches the provisions of Eurostat, due to the specificities of the country they

consider their proposal is of utter importance, since they are “emotionally attached to the ethnic rights”101, as many Albanians work outside of the

country but keep their Macedonian passport and visit their families regularly.

However, the party agrees with any proposed methodology of the coalition

partner VMRO, as long as they agree on the scope of the census.

Besides the political parties, civil society has also been engaged in promoting

the idea of the census. A group of organizations launched a campaign called

Popis Sega (Census Now).102 They claim that Macedonia must not be held

hostage by political elites who cannot find a common ground for census-taking.

Their aim is to inform and educate all citizens through round tables organized

in several bigger cities in the country. They try to emphasize that the census is

a statistical operation which is needed in order to create relevant policies, and

they suggest, that the political side of it should be resolved through political

negotiation.103 From the side of academia104 there have been ideas and efforts

towards an electronic census that will use data from already existing registers.

Although Prime Minister Gruevski announced the use of some census-taking

software, to date, there have not been any steps towards implementation.

While there is continued debate there is still no defined timeframe for the next

census. The budget for 2015 does not envisage costs for conducting a census.105

99 Trajkovska, Mariela. 2014. DUI saka popis, ama po svoj terk. [DUI wants their tailor-made

census], Dnevnik, 27 June 2014 (accessed: 25 October 2015). 100 The unofficial proposal of DUI was presented to the author during a personal interview with

Abdylaqim Ademi. 101 Ademi, Interview. 102 Official website of the coalition of organizations Popis Sega [Census Now]. (accessed: 25 October

2015). 103 Personal Interview, Bejkova, Biljana. NGO Info Center, part of the Coalition Census Now,

Skopje, 10 October 2014. 104 Rashkovski, Dragi. n.d. Sistem I uredi za sproveduvanje na popis na naselenie [System and

Devices for Conducting Census of Population], registered as G07C 13/00 in the field of physics,

section for device for checking, device for voting. PhD. Patent. 105 Ministry of Finance. 2015. Budget of the Republic of Macedonia (accessed: 25 October

2015).

Roska Vrgova

121

Officially there is a will to conduct a census, but both sides maintain very hard

positions, with little room for compromise. The proposals by DUI are

entrenched in the requests of the Albanians dating from 1994, whereas VMRO

insists on strictly following the EU and UN standards. The EU standards106 are

contradictory to the requests of the Albanians, so the prospects for a political

compromise are questionable. The involvement of the opposition is also

debatable, as they would accept a direct interaction only upon the fulfillment of

their five requests.107 In the meantime, their approach is giving key proposals,

and communication with the ruling coalition through media.108

Conclusion

The census issue is present in almost all fields of cohabitation and existence in

Macedonia, as it is intimately related to both the practical and symbolic sides

of ethnic politics. As evident in all census processes in Macedonia from 1991

until today, the main issues have been the methodology and the scope of the

census, while the real problem remains the complete politicization of the

census and lack of political will for compromise.

Based on the assessment of some international organizations109 regarding

emigration, it is reasonable to suspect that both of the main ethnic groups fear

that they have decreased in number. Keeping in mind that political elites

define their electorates on an ethnic basis, any decrease of what is thought to

be the ‘real number’ of relevant groups would be considered a betrayal of the

interests of their group. This dynamic additionally contributes to a hardening

of collective identities generated by the political rhetoric of the elite, thus

creating an ‘us against them’ discourse which exacerbates the fear of assimilation, and heightens instincts to fight for group preservation and power.

Although this persists to be the general picture painted by media, and shared

by the majority of the public, it is worth acknowledging the recent appearance

of different civic initiatives which have managed to mobilize people of different

ethnicities and generations, who have jointly gathered to express their

dissatisfaction with the current system through different protests throughout

2015.

Still, finding an entry point for compromise acceptable for all sides is not an

easy task. As Ademi stated, the biggest issue remains the trust among the

ethnic groups; but based on experience, he concludes that this is

surmountable.110 “It is important for the public to have census data, but in

order to avoid speculations, distrust, and manipulation, we need full

involvement, and participation of all sidesг”111 This opens a door for the

potential development of civic initiatives, to involve a broader public across

ethnic lines, and to refocus the debate from one that is purely political to one

106 Eurostat. (accessed: 25 October 2015). 107 Remenski, Interview. 108 Remenski, Interview. 109 The World Bank, Eurostat, and the Australian Bureau for Statistics – for more details check the

introduction, Census Processes in Macedonia (1991-Present) above. 110 In a personal interview, Abdylaqim Ademi pointed out that the inclusion of all parties, led to

find acceptable solutions in regards to the Election Law. 111 Ademi, Interview.


122

focusing on essential issues such as the development of policies and strategies

on up-to-date data, in order to create bottom-up pressure for a political

compromise. There is clearly a need for civic strategies that will unite the

otherwise often antagonistic groups, in a vision for a better quality of life for all

residents. At the same time, ethnic Albanian politicians have to do their share

by “strengthening their loyalty to the state by promoting not only the interests of their ethnic kin but also policies and practices that will make their country

stronger, more efficient and less prone to clientelism and patronage,”112 while

the Macedonians should prove their willingness to amplify the participation of

all ethnic groups in all fields of public life. In the meantime, it remains

uncertain when a new census will take place, whether it will show that there

has been a change in the local demography of the country, and what this might

mean for the country’s futureг

The recent revelations about wire-tapping and large-scale electoral fraud have

further raised questions not only about the willingness of the government and

the opposition to work together, but also raise new issues in the relationship

between Albanians and Macedonians. Since these revelations question the very

nature of Macedonian democracy, it can be expected that the fall-out from

these and the consequent investigations will take significant time, and further

postpone outstanding discussions on a new attempt to hold a census.

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Population Censuses in Montenegro – A Century of National Identity

“Repacking” Research Article

Ivan Vuković Lecturer, University of Montenegro

[email protected]

http://www.suedosteuropa.uni-graz.at/cse/en/vukovic





126

Population Censuses in Montenegro - A

Century of National Identity

“Repacking”

Ivan Vuković

Montenegro’s recent political history has been extremely turbulent. Within less than a century, this country lost and regained internationally

recognized state independence. Moreover, it was a part of three rather

different “Yugoslav” state projects. At the same time, albeit without significant demographic shifts, the declared ethnic/national composition of

the Montenegrin population changed radically. The focus of this paper is

on the interaction between Montenegro’s dynamic political development and the constant reconfiguration of its ethnic/national structure. It

concludes that the varying outcomes of the population censuses in

Montenegro have actually mirrored political changes which the country

has undergone throughout the observed period. It also finds that, because

of the proliferation and, in particular, participation in government of

nationally-oriented party organizations, census results in recent years

have become politically salient to the extent that they began to influence

the very character of the political game in Montenegro.

Keywords: Montenegro, census, national identity

Introduction

Among the countries of the Balkan region, Montenegro has had a very dynamic

contemporary political development. For nearly four decades before World War

I (WWI), the Montenegrin principality/kingdom existed as an independent,

internationally recognized state. Subsequently, as part of the 1918

establishment of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes (Kraljevina Srba,

Hrvata i Slovenaca, KSHS),1 Montenegro was annexed by Serbia and thus

erased from the world’s political map. It reappeared as a separate political entity in 1945, as one of the six constituent republics in the newly created

socialist Yugoslav federation (Federativna narodna republika Jugoslavija,

FNRJ).2 When, at the beginning of the 1990s, the era of brotherhood and unity

of its peoples came to a bloody end, Montenegrins decided to continue living in

a joint state with Serbia (Savezna republika Jugoslavija, SRJ).3 However, less

than a decade and a half later, they chose to leave the state union and, through

the May 2006 referendum, re-established the independent state of Montenegro.

Lecturer in Political Science, University of Montenegro. The author holds a PhD in Political

Science from Central European University. His research interests include comparative politics,

democracy and democratization, hybrid regimes, and the Western Balkan region. 1 The KSHS was renamed the Kingdom of Yugoslavia (Kraljevina Jugoslavija, KJ) in 1929. 2 In 1963, with the adoption of a new constitution, it was renamed the Socialist Federal Republic of

Yugoslavia (Socijalistička federativna republika Jugoslavija, SFRJ). 3 SRJ was reconstituted as a loose federation and renamed the State Union of Serbia and

Montenegro (Državna zajednica Srbija i Crna Gora, SCG) in February 2003.

Ivan Vuković

127

Put differently, a few generations of Montenegrin people, without changing

their place of residence, alternately lived in a sovereign country, an unnamed

province of the Yugoslav kingdom, a republic with all statehood attributes in

the socialist Yugoslavia, a political unit of the federal unions with Serbia, and,

once again, in an independent state.

Considering its turbulent recent political history, one should not be surprised

by the scope of change of the country’s ethnic/national composition as defined by censuses during this period. In the first population census organized in

Montenegro, in 1909, people were asked to self-identify in relation to language

and religion.4 In the next one, conducted by the KSHS authorities in 1921, the

questions were similarly structured, only this time, the answers were used as

the basis for the creation of a list of a total of fourteen “nationalities” of the newly founded state. The fact that the term “Montenegrin“ was absent from this list clearly reflected the nature of the aforementioned political change that

had taken place in Montenegro three years earlier.5 On the other hand, in all

the censuses that took place in the post-World War II (WWII) period,

Montenegrins constituted the largest national group in Montenegro. Still,

compared to the censuses organized in the socialist Yugoslavia (1948, 1953,

1961, 1971, 1981, and 1991), the number of people self-identifying as

Montenegrins dropped significantly in the last two (2003 and 2011).6

At the same time, the percentage of Serbs in the population of Montenegro also

varied considerably, from over 90% in 1921, to less than 2% in 1948, to the

current 28.7%. Thus, as the number of declared Serbs grew, the number of

declared Montenegrins declined and vice-versa. The share of Muslims in the

Montenegrin population dropped from 13.2% in 1971 – the year when they

were officially recognized as one of the Yugoslav constituent nations – to the

current 3.3%.7 Bosniaks appeared in the 2003 census as a separate national

group and eight years later amounted to 8.6% of the overall population.

Finally, just like the country after which they were named, Yugoslavs in

Montenegro – standing at 5.6% in 1981 – practically disappeared (0.3%) as a

national group in the 2003 census.8

Furthermore, mirrored in the population censuses subsequent to the collapse of

Yugoslavia, the course of Montenegro’s political development has been greatly

influenced by their results. As a consequence of the escalating political crisis in

the socialist federation in the late 1980s / early 1990s, the most salient political

issues in the constituent republics became those related to ethnic/national and

religious identity. The first multi-party elections in Montenegro, organized in

December 1990, took place at the moment when the nationalist euphoria across

Yugoslavia reached its peak. Strongly influencing the political atmosphere in

4 The results showed that close to 95% of the Montenegrin population consisted of Orthodox

Christians who spoke the Serbian language. 5 Montenegrins, predominantly Serbian-speaking Orthodox Christians, were officially incorporated

into the Serbian national corpus. The results of the census are available (in Cyrillic) here. 6 The overall percentage of Montenegrins in the country’s population went down from 90.6 in 1948 to 43.1 in 2003, and to 44.9 in 2011. For the complete results of the three censuses, see here (1948),

here (2003), and here (2011). 7 Muslims first appeared as a separate ethnic/national group in Montenegro in the 1961 Yugoslav

census (see the results here). The results of the 1971 census are available here. 8 Their number in the 2011 census was 0.2%.

Population Censuses in Montenegro - A Century of National Identity “Repacking”

128

Montenegro, it gave rise to the emergence of numerous national parties in the

country. The pro-Serbian oriented People’s Party (Narodna stranka, NS), and,

in a coalition, the Albanian Democratic League in Montenegro (Demokratski

savez u Crnoj Gori, DSCG) and the Bosniak Party of Democratic Action

(Stranka demokratske akcije, SDA) took part in the 1990 elections. In the years

that followed, more party organizations claiming to represent the political

interests of various national groups were established in Montenegro.9 Their

political rhetoric and ambitions have to a great extent been founded upon the

results of the last two population censuses.

Throughout its recent political history, Montenegro’s fluid ethnic/national composition both determined and, lately in particular, has been determined by

its internal political dynamics. Departing from this general premise, the main

ambition of this article is to contribute to a better understanding of the

interplay between the radical political changes and the diverging census

outcomes in Montenegro. Towards that goal, the following stages in the

country’s political development will be analyzed: the inter-war years (1918-

1941) during which Montenegro and Montenegrins did not exist in political

terms; the post-WWII decades of Montenegrin political and national

emancipation in the socialist Yugoslavia; and the most recent (post-SFRJ)

period leading to the 2006 renewal of Montenegro’s state independence.

The post-WWI years

After the First World War, albeit fighting along the victorious Allies,

Montenegro lost its state sovereignty that had been internationally recognized

at the 1878 Berlin Congress. Instead of joining the newly created Yugoslav

state as one of its constitutive parts, Montenegro was first annexed by Serbia

and as such incorporated into the Kingdom of Serbs, Slovenes, and Croats. On

24. November 1918, at the moment when Montenegro’s King Nikola I Petrović and his government were still in exile,10 under the heavy presence of the

“liberating“ Serbian military in the country, a so-called Great People’s Assembly (Velika narodna skupština) convened in Podgorica to “legitimize” the unconditional integration of Montenegro into Serbia.

Even though a vast majority of Montenegrins wanted their country to become a

part of the “first Yugoslavia“, a considerable number stood up against the manner in which the integration had been carried out. Any union with

neighboring South Slav states, they believed, was supposed to be based on the

principles of equality and respect for the Montenegrin sovereignty.11 As it

became obvious that such political status was unlikely to be bestowed upon the

9 Among the (former) parliamentary parties, these include: the Democratic Union of Albanians

(Demokratska unija Albanaca, DUA), the Serbian People’s Party (Srpska narodna stanka, SNS),

the Croatian Civic Initiative (Hrvatska građanska inicijativa – HGI), the Democratic Serb Party

(Demokratska srpska stranka, DSS), the Albanian New Democratic Power - FORCA (Nova

demokratska snaga, FORCA), the Albanian Alternative (Albanska alternativa, AA), the Bosniak

Party (Bošnjačka stranka, BS), the Albanian Coalition “Perspective“ (Albanska koalicija

“Perspektiva“, AKP), and the New Serb Democracy (Nova srpska demokratija, NOVA). 10 The rulers from Petrović-Njegoš family had governed Montenegro since 1697. 11 Pavlović, Srdja. 2003. Who are Montenegrins? Statehood, Identity and Civic Society, in

Montenegro in Transition: Problems of Identity and Statehood, edited by Bieber, Florian. Baden-

Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 83-106, 89.

Ivan Vuković

129

Montenegrins, their disillusionment with the state of affairs moved swiftly

from vocal protest to armed uprising.12 However, by the end of 1919 the

military campaign against the unification was largely neutralized and the

“Montenegrin Question“ was brought to a political end.13 The aforementioned

absence of a specific “Montenegrin“ denomination in the aftermath of the first Yugoslav census held two years later symbolized “an inglorious conclusion of Montenegro’s period of independence“.14 In a way, this was anticipated with the

following remark by Savo Fatić, vice-president of the Great People’s Assembly, made on the occasion of the November 1918 proclamation of the state

unification of Serbia and Montenegro: “We are no longer Montenegrins, but Serbs.”15

Within the politically centralized Kingdom in which the territory of

Montenegro comprised only 2% of the population, its political, cultural and

national role remained “marginal.”16 The volume of central government grants

for investments in Montenegro – to mention just one of the indicators of its

status in the KSHS – was smaller than the amount of war reparations which it

should have received after WWI.17 Therefore, as they were “forced to recognize that the regime was failing to address economic and social ills which had

placed Montenegrins near the bottom of the heap in the new Yugoslav state,”18

many of those who had wholeheartedly supported the decisions of the

Podgorica Assembly soon became disillusioned. The scale of popular discontent

in Montenegro during the 1920s and 1930s is perhaps most convincingly

demonstrated by the fact that the number of people killed, arrested, detained,

and tried was “several dozens of times higher in percentage” when compared to the population in any other part of the KSHS.19

The next Yugoslav census conducted in 1931 coincided with the adoption of a

new constitution that was to legalize the earlier introduction of personal

dictatorship by King Aleksandar. Followed by a brutal campaign against his

political opponents, the Law on Royal Rule and Supreme State Administration

(Zakon o kraljevskoj vlasti i vrhovnoj državnoj upravi) was passed in January

1929 as a response to the escalation of the prolongued political crisis in the

Kingdom.20 Determined to uproot popular attachment to the historical regions

within the country and symbolically unite them under its new name (the

12 Morrison, Kenneth. 2009. Montenegro: A Modern History. London/New York: I.B. Tauris, 43. 13 Officially established on 1 December 1918, the new Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes

received international recognition a month later, at the Paris Peace Conference. 14 Morrison, Montenegro, 46. 15 Popović, Milorad. 2011. Njegoš i crnogorska nacija. Cetinje: Otvoreni kulturni forum, 145. 16 Rastoder, Šerbo. 2003. A Short Review of the History of Montenegro, in Montenegro in

Transition: Problems of Identity and Statehood, edited by Bieber, Florian. Baden-Baden: Nomos

Verlagsgesellschaft, 107-38, 133. 17 Roberts, Elizabeth. 2007. Realm of the Black Mountain: A History of Montenegro. London: Hurst

& Co, 184. 18 Roberts, Realm of the Black Mountain, 337. 19 Roberts, Realm of the Black Mountain, 207. 20 Basically, the crisis was a result of the dissatisfaction of other Yugoslav peoples – first and

foremost Croats – with the Serb domination in the political affairs of the joint state. As noted by

Ramet, Serbian officials “aspired to nothing else than political, economic, and cultural hegemony within the new state and saw strict centralism as a 'logical’ solution.” See Ramet, P. Sabrina. 2006.

The Three Yugoslavias: State-Building and Legitimation, 1918-2005. Washington, D.C.: Woodrow

Wilson Center Press, 37.


130

Kingdom of Yugoslavia), the King strictly prohibited the public display of

tribal, i.e. national, symbols.21 In view of that, one should not be surprised by

the lack of questions about ethnicity/nationality in the 1931 census.

Montenegrin rebirth in the Yugoslav federation

Subsequent to the end of the Second World War, in which it once again ended

on the winning side, Montenegro was reestablished as a political entity.

Denouncing the greater Serbian hegemony, which they regarded as the key

factor in the failure of the first Yugoslavia, Yugoslav Communists – the leading

force in the popular armed resistance against the Axis powers – endorsed the

post-war creation of a federation of six republics “based on the principle of nationality under centralized party control.”22 On equal terms with Bosnia and

Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Serbia, and Slovenia, Montenegro thus

entered the new Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia. In addition, the 1946 federal constitution listed Montenegrins as one of its constituent nations.

Furthermore, reflecting its political status, the first census organized in the

socialist Yugoslavia in 1948 demonstrated a radical change in the national

structure of Montenegro’s population. Montenegrins – unrecognized in the

Yugoslav kingdom – comprised the vast majority of people living in the

smallest FNRJ republic with no less than 90.7%.23 At the same time, the

percentage of people self-identifying as Serbs in the population of Montenegro

went down to 1.7%.24 The next Yugoslav census conducted five years later had

a similar outcome in this regard. There were officially 86.6% of Montenegrins

and 3.3% of Serbs in Montenegro.25 Just like in 1921, the results of the 1948

and 1953 censuses mirrored the political reality, rather than any demographic

change taking place in this country.

Namely, the Communist-led resistance movement in Montenegro during the

Second World War, which was adjacent to class, aimed at the national

liberation of its people. On 13 July 1941, Montenegrins organized hitherto the

largest popular uprising in Axis-occupied Europe.26 Moreover, both during and

after WWII, a higher percentage of population belonged to the Yugoslav

communist party in Montenegro than in any other republic.27 At the end of the

21 Ramet, The Three Yugoslavias, 81. 22 Morrison, Montenegro, 66. 23 In contrast, the number of Albanians – standing in 1948 at 5.4% of the population – remained

stable to date. See footnote 6. 24 Interestingly, this was less than the percentage of Croats (1.8) living in Montenegro at that time. 25 In addition, Yugoslavs (1.5%) appeared for the first time as a separate national group in

Montenegro. For the complete results of the 1953 census, see here. 26 During the next four years, Montenegro suffered massive human losses. The official death toll at

the end of the war stood at 40.446 (more than 10 per cent of the country’s pre-war population –

I.V.). See Marović, Branislav. 1987. Društveno-ekonomski razvoj Crne Gore, 1945-1953. Titograd:

Istorijski institut SR Crne Gore, 28-30. It is important to mention that a considerable number of

these casualties resulted from an internal conflict between the Montenegrin Partisans and the

Serbian loyalists (Četnici) whose extremely nationalist program, contrary to the Communists’ idea of “a society of equal peoples and a state that would be restructured on a federal basis” (See Rastoder, A Short Review, 135), envisaged the creation of ethnically homogenous nation-state

under the Serbian crown. 27 Thompson, Mark. 1992. A Paper House: The Ending of Yugoslavia. New York: Pantheon Books,

162.

Ivan Vuković

131

war, 17% of the officers and as many as 36% of the Communist-led Partisan

army generals were Montenegrin.28 Containing merely 2% of its population,

Montenegro therefore joined the federal Yugoslavia with huge moral capital.29

Given their prestige in the newly established Yugoslav state, one should not be

surprised by the extremely high percentage of Montenegrins (in Montenegro) in

the censuses conducted in the aftermath of its creation.

On account of the role they played in the National Liberation War

(Narodnooslobodilački rat), Montenegrins subsequently managed to “colonize the federal bureaucracy”and – due to strong clientelistic networks – remained

heavily overrepresented for decades in the institutions of socialist Yugoslavia.30

The power of the Montenegrin political elite was most clearly reflected in the

generous allocations to the Republic from the federal budget as a result of

which, during the times of socialist Yugoslavia, “Montenegro experienced the greatest economic regeneration in its entire history.”31 At the same time, its

dynamic development was followed by the strengthening of the feeling of

Montenegrin national separateness in the federation. In line with the idea of

Yugoslavia as – in the words of Veljko Milatović (then president of the Montenegrin Presidency) – “an alliance of free states which Montenegro joined voluntarily,”32 the Republic’s highest officials had throughout this period been

very critical of any initiative that could bring into question the national rights

of Montenegrins.

On the other hand, Montenegro’s communist leadership constantly avoided tackling the problem of defining the meaning of Montenegrin nationhood.

Instead, its representatives purposefully chose to cover it with “the blanket of ideological uniformity.”33 Through strict adherence to the Yugoslav communist

dogmas, the local party leaders effectively sought to neutralize the national

identity issue. In practice, as Andrijašević and Rastoder argue, they represented “an ideal surrogate of the Yugoslav nationality“:

“Throughout the post-war period, [they were] less nationally-oriented than

any other (‘Our nationality is communist – internationalist’), being the last to found a national party (1948); they were the most ardent protagonists of

the class struggle (“class above nation”); they lagged behind the others in the setting up of national institutions [;] they cherished the policy of

inferiority and the extended hand [;] they operated by clichés and used a

political vocabulary replete with phrases and slogans“.34

Such a “neutral” stance on the national identity issue was primarily aimed at bridging the deeply rooted Green-White political division in Montenegro.35

28 Hobsbawm, Eric. 1995. Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century 1914-1991. London:

Abacus, 170. 29 Andrijašević and Rastoder, The History of Montenegro, 227. 30 Lampe, R. John. 2006. Yugoslavia as History: Twice there was a Country. Cambridge, UK:

Cambridge University Press, 303. 31 Rastoder, A Short Review, 137. 32 Milatović, Veljko. 1975. Tokovi revolucije. Zagreb: Centar za aktualni politički studij, 262. 33 Pavlović, Who are Montenegrins?, 92. 34 Andrijašević and Rastoder, The History of Montenegro, 259. 35 The Green-White divide refers to the aforementioned Podgorica Assembly that voted in 1918 to

abolish Montenegro as an independent state. Namely, a vast majority of delegates supporting its

decisions printed their agendas on white paper while a few of those who opposed them printed


132

With strong memories of its bloody revival in the Second World War, the

Republic’s leadership was determined to maintain an internal political balance between the diametrically opposed positions. The socialist federation seemed to

“engulf this demarcation by absorbing Montenegro’s two tones into a larger palette”.36 In essence, however, it implied an “undefined dual politics without a national program“.37

Its impact on the process of Montenegrin national identity building was evident

from the results of the population censuses conducted in Yugoslavia during this

period. As demonstrated in Table 1 (see below), the share of people self-

identifying as Montenegrins in the Republic’s population dropped from 81.3% in 1961 to 68.5 two decades later.38 Moreover, when judged against the first

one, the last census organized in the federation in 1991 showed a decrease in

the number of Montenegrins by almost one third (61.8 vs. 90.6%).39 For the

reasons mentioned above, the socialist Yugoslav years were, for many in

Montenegro, the best in its entire history.40 Yet, because of the ambivalent

attitude of its political elites, the issues of Montenegrin national identity and –

in the context of the late 1980s Yugoslav political crisis – the related

Montenegrin national interest remained essentially unresolved.41 Determined

principally by Montenegro’s political status within the SFRJ, they were bound

to be re-problematized as the foundations of the socialist federation started to

shake.

Post-Yugoslav ethnic/national realignment in Montenegro

Compared to the period between the two world wars, the ethnic/national

structure of Montenegro changed substantially during the period of socialist

Yugoslavia (see below). Montenegrins – officially unrecognized as a separate

nation in the Yugoslav kingdom – became far and away the most populous

declared national group in the smallest FNRJ/SFRJ republic. In contrast, the

share in its population of the once-predominant Serbs plummeted to the single

digits. In addition, Muslims and Yugoslavs emerged in 1961 as newly

theirs on green paper. Seemingly irrelevant, this detail would symbolically mark the onset of the

great political schism between pro-unionist and pro-independence oriented Montenegrins (Vuković, 2014: 68). 36 Thompson, A Paper House, 160. 37 Quoted in Morrison, Montenegro, 82. 38 In 1971, Montenegrins made up 67.1% of the population of Montenegro. At the same time, the

percentage of Serbs increased from less than three in 1961 to 7.4 ten years later. Similarly, the

number of Muslims in Montenegro (see: footnote 7) doubled during this period (from 6.5 to 13.2%).

The share of Yugoslavs in the Montenegrin population also rose progressively (0.3% in 1961; 2% in

1971; 5.6% in 1981). 39 The percentage of Serbs in Montenegro’s population almost tripled between 1981 and 1991 (3.3 to 9.3). The results of the 1981 Yugoslav census are available here. For the 1991 census, see

Grupković, Dragutin. 1994. Popis stanovništva, domaćinstava, stanova i poljoprivrednih

gazdinstava u 1991. godini. Beograd: Savezni zavod za statistiku. 40 Roberts, Realm of the Black Mountain, 393. 41 For an interesting analysis of the failure of the nation-building project in communist

Montenegro, see: Jenne K. Erin and Florian Bieber. 2014. Situational Nationalism: Nation-building

in the Balkans, Subversive Institutions and the Montenegrin Paradox. Ethnopolitics 13(5), 431-60.

Ivan Vuković

133

recognized nationalities in Montenegro. As noted by Džankić, national identity during the socialist period in this country was indeed “far from consolidated.”42

Table 1. National self-identification (%) in Montenegro during socialist Yugoslavia

Source: Statistical Office of Montenegro (data available at: http://www.monstat.org/eng/)

Furthermore, the radical changes in Montenegro’s ethnic/national set-up

during the period of socialist Yugoslavia continued even more radically in the

years that followed its 1992 dissolution (see Table 2). Namely, along with the

disappearance of Yugoslavs as a distinct national identity, the population

censuses conducted in 2003 and 2011 indicated a substantial reconfiguration of

the ethnic/national structure within the country’s two biggest religious groups – Orthodox Christians and Muslims.43 For the first time since WWII, it was

possible to clearly identify differentiation within those declaring as Orthodox

Christian, to understand who identified as Montenegrin or Serb. Moreover,

even though the share of Montenegrins in the general population dropped

sharply between 1991 and 2003, they remained the most populous national

group in Montenegro. On the other hand, due to the political reasons explained

in the second part of this paper, the number of Serbs tripled during the

observed period. At the same time, within the Muslim religious corpus, the

emergence of national polarization between Bosniaks and Muslims became

evident. The former group first appeared in the 2003 census (7.7%) and

increased in number to the current 8.6% of the total population of Montenegro.

In contrast, the number of people declaring themselves as Muslims went down

to slightly less than 4% in 2003 and further to 3.3% in the last Montenegrin

census. Interestingly, the ratio between the sizes of the two main religous

denominations in the country remained largely stable between 1991 and 2011.

42 Džankić, Jelena. 2013. Cutting the Mists of the Black Mountain: Cleavages in Montenegro’s Divide over Statehood and Identity.” Nationalities Papers: The Journal of Nationalism and

Ethnicity 41(3), 415. 43 See footnote 6.

0

20

40

60

80

100

1948 1953 1961 1971 1981 1991

Montenegrins

Serbs

Muslims

Albanians

Croats

Yugoslavs


134

Table 2. Montenegro’s national “restructuring” – the largest national groups (%) in the last

three population censuses

Source: Statistical Office of Montenegro (data available at: http://www.monstat.org/eng/)

Taking into account its crucial importance for the overall political development

of Montenegro, the remainder of this paper focuses on the recent

ethnic/national restructuring within the Christian Orthodox segment of the

country’s population. It argues that the aforementioned diverging census results reflect the character of the political evolution which Montenegro as well

as the rest of former Yugoslavia underwent in the course of the last quarter of

a century. At the same time, in view of the establishment of a significant

number of national parties during this period (see footnote 8) and the ensuing

issues of the politicization of identity in Montenegro – especially after the 2006

renewal of its independence – the article also hypothesizes a growing impact of

the population censuses on the country’s political dynamics.

In the SFR Yugoslavia, as previously elaborated, the question of Montenegrin

national identity had seemed to have been given an appropriate, that is

historically justified, political answer. Nevertheless, the outbreak of political

crisis in the federation and, in particular, the growing political pressure from

the Serbian intellectual elite and the new leadership under Slobodan Milošević

soon demonstrated the weaknesses of this approach.44 The new political

developments in Serbia caught the Montenegrin authorities completely

unprepared. Still firmly clinging to the idea of brotherhood and the unity of the

Yugoslav peoples, they used the 1986 SKCG Congress to call for a “continuous strenghtening of socialist self-management and [...] the development of the

Yugoslav federation based on the constitutional principles of the national

equality and workers-class interest“.45 In this spirit, at the moment when “the political rhetoric of national interest and nationalism increasingly framed

publice debate and participation“,46 the Montenegrin leadership also pledged,

“an uncompromising battle against the causes and manifestations of Montenegrin, Greater Serbian, Muslim, Albanian, and Croatian nationalism”.47

44 On the wave of Serbian nationalism built up subsequent to the 1980 death of Josip Broz Tito –

the founder and the life-long President of socialist Yugoslavia – Milošević took control over the Serbian League of Communists (Savez komunista Srbije, SKS) in September 1987. 45 Quoted in Radonjić, Politička misao, 531. 46 Woodward, L. Susan. 1995. Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold War.

Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 89. 47 Quoted in Radonjić, Politička misao, 531.

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

1991 2003 2011

Montenegrins

Serbs

Muslims

Bosniaks

Ivan Vuković

135

With political circumstances in Yugoslavia changing in exactly the opposite

direction, the communist leaders of Montenegro soon found themselves on a

dead-end political course. To make their position even more difficult, the socio-

economic situation in the Republic was nearing catastrophe during this

period.48 As a consequence, more and more Montenegrins were openly

demonstrating anger toward their political representatives.49 Many in

Montenegro came to believe that their insistence on the political status quo of

Yugoslavia was actually motivated by their personal political interests, i.e. the

desire to preserve privileged positions within the country’s political system. At that point, the smallest Yugoslav republic was politically and economically

“ripe for a major outburst of popular discontent”.50 Milošević’s populist, anti-bureaucratic movement which by mid-1988 began to “flow out” of Serbia served merely as the trigger.

In January 1989, following a series of massive popular protests, the communist

leadership of Montenegro was forced to resign. Embraced by the Montenegrin

people and politically and logistically endorsed from Belgrade, a new

generation of the SKCG officials organized the overthrow of their allegedly self-

interested and detached-from-the-popular-base comrades. Interestingly, and

contrary to common knowledge of these events, which focus entirely on the role

of Milošević’s political and security apparatus – the turnover in Montenegro’s political summit did not mark a simple victory of Serbian nationalism in the

republic. The future Serbian president did, as a result of the shake-up, secure

political support in Montenegro for his plans to reorganize the Yugoslav

federation so as to “protect Serbian national interests”. Moreover, and arguably

due to Belgrade’s considerable political influence, a significantly higher percentage of people in Montenegro declared themselves Serbs in the following

population census. Identity-wise, however, the new SKCG leadership continued

along the path paved by the old party elite, adamantly protecting Montenegro’s status within the socialist federation.

This was unreservedly stated in the official opening address at the Tenth

Congress of the Communist Alliance of Montenegro, summoned in April 1989

to formalize the political change that had taken place a few months earlier:

“Montenegro is a state within the Yugoslav federation [.] Should there be no federation, Montenegro, as a sovereign state, will independently decide on the

form of relations with other states“.51 Veselin Vukotić, the coordinator of the party interim presidency similarly pointed out: “Neither from abroad nor

48 Montenegrin heavy industry-based economy, largely dependent on the federal subsidies, was hit

hard by the 1982 introduction of severe austerity measures by the Yugoslav government aimed at

tackling the country’s fast growing international debt, inflation rate and the living costs. As a

consequence, massive numbers of workers in Montenegro’s largely unproductive enterprises were laid off. Already in 1984, one in four Montenegrins was unemployed. Three years later, the

Republic officially declared bankruptcy. For more on the topic, see Andrijašević and Rastoder, The

History of Montenegro. 49 The number of strikes in the Republic that, according to the official figures, saw none in 1980

thus amounted to 50 in 1987. See Fočo, Salih. 1989. Strajk izmedju iluzije i zbilje, Beograd:

Radnička štampa, 127. 50 Vladisavljević, Nebojša. 2008. Serbia’s Antibureaucratic Revolution: Milosevic, the Fall of Communism, and Nationalist Mobilization. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 161. 51 Krug, 22. September 1990.


136

domestically were people manipulated. These events do not signify any

Serbization of Montenegro but [an expression of] the will to restore the dignity

of the Montenegrin nation“.52 In a similar vein, at a meeting held in October

1989, the SKCG Central Committee concluded that the “Montenegrin nation and Montenegrin state are definitely a reality“.53

Two weeks earlier, in Montenegro’s old royal capital of Cetinje, the government had organized a massively-attended re-burial of the remains of King Nikola

and the members of his family. Given the above-mentioned political

circumstances under which they died in exile, the symbolic connotation of this

event was particularly strong. Furthermore, in an opinion poll published in

November 1990, a month before the first multi-party parliamentary elections

in Montenegro convincingly won by the SKCG, as many as 81.3% of the

respondents expressed a very positive or positive attitude toward the

Montenegrin nation.54 That a relatively high percentage (61.8) of people in

Montenegro declared themselves Montenegrins – particularly when judged

against the percentage of Serbs (9.3) – in the 1991 census should therefore not

be considered surprising.

However, within the next decade, the political situation in Montenegro and – as

it became evident in 2003 – its ethnic/national composition, changed

drastically. Following the collapse of Yugoslavia, at the referendum organized

in March 1992, Montenegrins decided by a large majority to continue living

with Serbia in a state federation.55 After coming first in the 1990 elections, the

SKCG – renamed in 1991 the Democratic Party of Socialists (Demokratska

partija socijalista, DPS) – won again in 1992 and 1996.56 Yet, at the beginning

of 1997, merely a few months after the landslide electoral victory, the ruling

party split up as a result of conflict between its two most important figures –

president Bulatović and vice-president Đukanović – over the issue of political

partnership with Milošević. While the DPS head remained loyal to its old political friend – despite terrible economic and political consequences of his

belligerent politics – Đukanović gradually moved away from him and toward new, Western political partners. The resultant division of the predominant

52 RTCG, 1 February 2015. 53 Burzan, Danilo. 2009. 1989. Cetinje: Crnogorski kulturni krug, 114. 54 Pavićević, Veselin. 1997. Izborni sistem i izbori u Crnoj Gori, 1990-1996. Podgorica: CID, 84.

Running under the original name, the party won an impressive 52.6% of the vote. In addition, the

SKCG head, Momir Bulatović, won the second round of the concomitantly organized presidential election. For more on the post-communist political development of Montenegro, see: Vuković, Ivan. 2010. The Post-Communist Political Transition of Montenegro: Democratization prior to

Europeanization. Contemporary European Studies 2(1), 59-77; Vuković, Ivan. 2011. Diverging Party Outcomes in Hybrid Regimes: The Cases of Croatia, Serbia, and Montenegro. Romanian

Journal of Political Science 11(2), 81-104; Vuković, Ivan. 2015. Political Dynamics of the Post-

Communist Montenegro: One-Party Show. Democratization 22(1), 73-91. 55 Out of 2/3 of Montenegrins who took part in the referendum, almost 96% voted to stay with

Serbia. On 27 April 1992, the two-member Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Savezna republika

Jugoslavija, SRJ) was officially proclaimed. 56 In the general elections held on 20 December 1992, the Democratic Party of Socialists triumphed

with 42.6% of the vote (46/85 parliamentary seats), and Bulatović was re-elected President,

garnering 63.4% of the vote in the second round. Four years later, the ruling Montenegrin party

even managed to win an absolute majority of the vote - 51.2%. It is important to mention that the

DPS’s electoral successes, in large part, stem from the semi-authoritarian character of its rule

during this period. For a detailed analysis of the reasons behind the early 1990s political

domination in Montenegro by the Democratic Party of Socialists, see Vuković, Political Dynamics.

Ivan Vuković

137

ruling party and, in particular, Đukanović’s narrow triumph in the October 1997 presidential election marked the beginning of Montenegro’s genuine democratic transition and – as it soon turned out – the decisive step towards

the renewal of its independence.57

In addition, the 1997 conflict in the DPS resulted in the creation of (or,

perhaps, just made obvious) a clear line of separation within the country’s Orthodox Christian population between Montenegrin and Serb national

identities.58 In the years that followed, the DPS became the leading advocate of

Montenegrin independence and a separate Montenegrin ethnic identity, while

Bulatović’s newly-established SNP promoted the common state with Serbia and

a Montenegrin ethnic identity indistinguishable from the Serb one.59 After a

long period during which it was common for people in Montenegro – regardless

of how they would officially declare themselves – to feel both “Montenegrin“ and “Serb“ at the same time, the growing division over its potential independence led to the “reconstruction of these identities and their association to pro-independence and unionist camps, respectively”.60 The political debate in

Montenegro during this period “greatly resembled that of 1918, when the issue of the unification of Montenegro with Serbia was a hot political topic.”61 This

time, however, the constellation of political forces was very different. As noted

by Gallagher, “those who insist that Serbs were coethnics of Montenegrins or

else closely related to them in terms of kinship and that Montenegrin

government policy ought to reflect such ethnic consistency, found themselves

on the defensive before forces asserting a primary Montenegrin identity“.62

The primacy of the Montenegrin national identity among the Christian

Orthodox population of Montenegro was confirmed by the results of the 2003

census.63 Its political verification came three years later, with the success of the

referendum on independence.64 Furthermore, judged by the results of the latest

population census conducted in Montenegro, the renewal of its statehood seems

to have strengthened the sense of Montenegrin national distinctiveness as the

percentage of people who declared themselves Montenegrins increased for the

first time since 1981. As expected, this was followed by a drop in the number of

Serbs in Montenegro.65 Above all, the two groups now seem permanently

divided not only along the lines of national, but also linguistic (Serbian vs.

57 After Bulatović won by a small margin in the first round (47.44 against 46.71% of the vote), Đukanović prevailed in the second by less than 5.500 votes (out of 344.000 cast). Subsequently, the

Bulatović-led faction left the DPS and in February 1998 organized a new party organization – the

Socialist People’s Party (Socijalistička narodna partija, SNP). 58 For a detailed account of this process, see: Džankić, Jelena. 2014. Reconstructing the Meaning of

Being “Montenegrin”. Slavic Review 73(2), 347-71. 59 Džankić, Cutting the Mists, 413. 60 Džankić, Cutting the Mists. 61 Pavlović, Who are Montenegrins?, 94. 62 Gallagher, Tom. 2003. Identity in Flux, Destination Uncertain: Montenegro During and After the

Yugoslav Wars. International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society 17(1), 54-5. 63 See footnote 6. 64 On 21 May 2006, with the turnout of over 86%, 55.5% of Montenegrins voted in favor of

independence (see the OSCE offical report on the referendum here (accessed: 1. November 2015). 65 See footnote 6.


138

Montenegrin language) and to a smaller extent religious identity (Serbian vs.

Montenegrin Orthodox Church).66

Finally, its turbulent post-communist transition, dominated by various forms of

ethno-politics resulted in the establishment of a considerable number of

national parties in Montenegro.67 Prior to the beginning of its democratization

in 1997, the opposition parties in this country – including those with a national

prefix – were all politically subjugated under the semi-authoritarian rule of the

hegemonic Democratic Party of Socialists. What is more, throughout the years

that followed, everything in Montenegrin politics happened in anticipation of

the referendum on independence. Hence, only after the statehood issue was

taken off the table in 2006 could the national parties actually embark on the

realization of their political programs, most of which prioritizing the

preservation of cultural autonomy and proportional representation in political

institutions.

At the same time, their political demands within the latter principle are, for

obvious reasons, principally founded on the results of population censuses.

Given its heterogeneity, the ethnic/national structure of Montenegro has thus

become an important factor in the country’s overall political life. Moreover, on account of the active role they played in the pro-independence referendum

campaign, Albanian, Croat, and Muslim/Bosniak political organizations

“earned“ a considerable amount of political credit for the future period. Their position is further strengthened by the existence of the previously elaborated

deep political cleavage between the two biggest national groups in Montenegro.

The fact that a certain number of minority national parties participated in all

Montenegrin governments in the post-referendum period allows them to put

forward their political agendas. Thus, for instance, the political platform based

on which the Bosniak Party, Croatian Democratic Inititiative, and the

(Albanian) Forca agreed to enter the incumbent government lists “higher level of the minority peoples’ integration into the democratic processes in the society” as one of the founding principles.68

On the other hand, the Constitution adopted on 19. October 2007 – with the

support of the above-mentioned parties’ MPs – established Montenegro as a

civic state. As stated in Article 2, the “bearer of sovereignty is the citizen with

Montenegrin citizenship“.69 It is therefore hard not to notice the collision

between the basic legal norm and the increasingly applied practice, defining

the character of the political system. It is even harder to presume how the two

will be reconciled in the future, particularly in view of the complicated process

of constitutional revision in Montenegro, on the one hand, and the growing

demands for minority rights protection in the process of its European

integration, on the other.

66 As a part of the “unification” of Serbia and Montenegro in 1918, the autocephalous Orthodox Church in Montenegro was abolished and integrated into the Serbian Orthodox Church. In 1993,

the Montenegrin Orthodox Church was officially restored. However, the Serbian Orthodox Church

is still in the possession of nearly all monasteries and churches in Montenegro. See more in

Džankić, Cutting the Mists. 67 See footnote 9. 68 The original document is available here. (accessed: 1. November 2015). 69 The full text of the Constitution is available here (accessed: 1. November 2015).

Ivan Vuković

139

Concluding remarks

Within the last one hundred years, Montenegro has experienced an unusually

turbulent political development. In between the loss of state independence in

1918 and its renewal in 2006, the country had, under very distinct

circumstances, entered the three politically very different Yugoslav states. As a

consequence, even without significant demographic changes, Montenegro’s declared ethnic/national composition has been altered substantially throughout

this time. Montenegrins, politically unrecognized after WWI, became the

largest national group in Montenegro after WWII. This, again, was causally

linked with the variation in number of Serbs in this country. In addition,

Yugoslavs, Muslims, and somewhat later Bosniaks emerged as its distinct

nationalities.

This paper sought to explain the interplay between the aforementioned

dynamic political processes and Montenegro’s constant ethnic/national reconfiguration. It found the diverging results of the population censuses to

reflect the character of political changes which the country had undergone

throughout the observed period. Certainly the most interesting finding in this

regard concerns the negative causal relationship between the percentages of

Montenegrins and Serbs in the population of Montenegro. Contingent upon a

political context in which the censuses took place, Montenegrins would increase

in number while Serbs would proportionally drop, and vice-versa. Similar

tendencies could lately be observed within the Bosniak-Muslim group in

Montenegro.

The paper also demonstrated that in recent years, as a result of the political

activity of nationally-oriented party organizations, census results became

highly politically salient and, even began to affect the very nature of the

political game in Montenegro. A number of Albanian, Bosniak, and Croatian

parties took part in every Montenegrin government formed subsequent to the

2006 referendum in which they played an active role in the pro-independence

movement. This fact gives them considerable political leverage and,

notwithstanding the constitutional definition of Montenegro as a civic state,

allows them to demand proportional political representation of their peoples.

Census-determined percentages of their participation in the country’s total population are at the core of such political aspirations; how such

ethnic/national and civic aspirations will be reconciled remains to be seen.

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A Tale of Two Serbias?

Census-taking in 2002 and 2011 Research Article

Mina Djurić Nikolić Independent Research

[email protected]

Laura Trimajova Accredited Parliamentary Assistant, European Parliament

[email protected]

http://www.suedosteuropa.uni-graz.at/cse/en/djuric_trimajova





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A Tale of Two Serbias?

Census-taking in 2002 and 2011

Mina Djurić Nikolić and Laura Trimajova

The challenges implicit in census-taking are especially pronounced in the

Western Balkans and, very specifically, in Serbia, considering this

country’s multi-ethnic and multi-religious makeup, as reflected in

territorial delineations, as well as its political past. Minorities, in

particular, have suffered from ongoing discrimination, which is brought to

the fore by the politicization of census taking exercises by political elites,

as seen in 2002 and 2011. These political elites have leveraged census

taking in order to promote their own agendas, often to the detriment of

citizens belonging to minority groups. The administrative and monetary

influence of the EU in census taking exercises marked a slight shift

toward better integrating minorities into these exercises in 2011. The

prospect of EU accession will continue to influence Belgrade’s decisions in making further strides towards minority integration.

Keywords: census-taking, Serbia, European Union, minority rights,

demographics

Introduction

Due to the sensitive nature of the collection of data on the private life of

citizens, a census-taking exercise is a complex undertaking. Even in those

jurisdictions with a high level of ethnic or religious homogeneity, census-taking

can easily become a politicized exercise with nationalistic undertones. The

matter becomes further complicated in the Balkans, where one must take into

account the ethnic, religious, and political diversity within a post-war context.

Serbia, despite a strong central government in Belgrade, has a substantial

number of minority groups of various sizes, located throughout the country.

Census-taking in Serbia is particularly important as the results dictate

budgetary fund allocations for each respective ministry; as such, the need for

accuracy cannot be overstated. The seriousness of certain minority issues in

parts of Serbia were brought to the fore as a result of the 2011 census, the

importance of which is politically and socially critical. Within this framework,

this article will analyze how the Serbian censuses of 2002 and 2011 proved to

Mina Djurić Nikolić received a Bachelors degree cum laude in Romance Languages and minored

in International Politics at New York University (NYU). She received a Masters degree from

Columbia University in Russian, Eastern European, and Eurasian Studies. She was Senior Editor

of the Journal of International Affairs for the School of International and Public Affairs (SIPA) at

Columbia University. Mina Djurić Nikolić also spent semesters at Sciences-Po in Paris and NYU’s campus in Florence, Italy.

Laura Trimajova pursued a Master's degree in International Security at Sciences-Po in Paris as a

fellow of the French government, during which she spent a semester at SIPA. Returning to New

York City as a Fulbright Fellow, Laura Trimajova graduated from Columbia University’s Harriman Institute with a Master's in Russian, Eastern European, and Eurasian Studies in 2013.

She currently works in the European Parliament in Brussels, Belgium


143

be sources of contention and were, indeed, “marginally contested” due to a boycott by the Albanian and Bosniak minorities.1

The aim of this paper is to analyze the complexity of the two censuses in post-

Milosevic Serbia through a comparison of the different political reactions of

leading figures in different ethnic communities. As the case study of Serbia will

demonstrate, a rather simple technical exercise can entail various political

challenges where minority issues overshadow the technicality of the process.

The article begins with a brief overview of these technical exercises as they

took place in Serbia in 2002 and 2011. This article will then consider the extent

to which Serbia’s political elites strategically utilized the census. Specifically,

we will analyze whether the census was approached as a depoliticized exercise,

or leveraged to promote respective strategic nationalist agendas. We will look

at the role of the European Union (EU) in this process, discussing whether it

was sufficiently constructive considering its perceived role as a crucial player in

both censuses. Lastly, we will sum up by offering a recommendation on how

census results can be used instrumentally in the future.

Two different tales?

Census-taking is an important and complex statistical exercise. It becomes a

more demanding exercise when a country is decentralized and heterogeneous.

In heterogeneous societies, the census also becomes a barometer for the

country’s policy towards minorities and vulnerable groups, who might fear the impact of the outcomes of this technical exercise. The political structure of

Serbia and its numerous nationalities and ethnic groups ensures that the

census continues to be debated, especially in respect to sensitive questions on

ethnicity, religion, and language. The disintegration of Yugoslavia and the

ethnic politics of the Milosevic regime have given Serbia an international

reputation which revolves around nationalism with right-wing extremism and

the oft-quoted underlying discourse of Greater Serbia.2 Serbia is a diverse

country, home to many ethnic and linguistic minorities, both bigger (like the

Hungarians) and smaller (like the Czechs or Egyptians). Additionally, and

perhaps most importantly for the purpose of this study, external influence in a

country’s highly internal undertaking (which the census undisputedly is) can

play an instrumental role in both the preparation and the conducting of the

census.

European countries were preparing for the 2001 round of census-taking since

the end of the 1990s. Serbia at the time was undergoing a radical political

transformation; with the crumbling of the Yugoslav state, the aftermath of the

Kosovo conflict, and the October 2000 ousting of Slobodan Milosevic. At this

period the census-taking exercise was a major challenge that had to be

undertaken by legislators, state agencies, and people in the field. At each of

these stages, even the simplest ones, problems were expected. But the census-

taking was critically necessary, as the Yugoslav wars led to significant

1 Gëzim, Visoka and Elvin Gjevori. 2013. Census politics and ethnicity in the Western Balkans.

East European Politics 29(4), 479-98. 2 See, e.g., Judah, Tim. 2000. The Serbs: History, Myth, and the Destruction of Yugoslavia. Yale:

University Press: New Haven.

A Tale of Two Serbias? Census-taking in 2002 and 2011

144

demographic and border changes. It was also a test for Belgrade, which had to

take into account the discontent expected from minorities throughout Serbia.

A decade later, in line with the 2011 censuses that took place throughout the

EU and reflecting its EU aspirations, Serbia held a census as well.3 The EU

legislation on population and housing foresees census-taking in ten-year cycles.

The preparations for the 2011 census had been underway since 2008, when, for

the first time, the census was covered by EU regulation and guidance.4 As all

countries in the Western Balkans are viewed as future EU member states, the

EU’s involvement in their domestic politics is much more pronounced than in other parts of the world. This translates into the EU’s support in technical exercises, such as census-taking, while expecting convergence in the acquis

communautaire related to the census. Flexing its soft power in its immediate

neighborhood, it is in the EU’s interest to help countries prepare for membership and assist in technical matters, to ensure consistency of

methodology and collected data. Serbia, after years of political turmoil

following the ousting of Milosevic, is an EU candidate country. Preconditions

for successful accession negotiations necessitate reliable information reflecting

the actual demographic composition of each country.

National minorities and ethnic groups in Serbia

In order to study the approach to the census in both 2002 and 2011, one must

understand the heterogeneous ethnic mosaic of the country5. While Central

Serbia remains predominantly Serbian, Vojvodina is home to a diverse

population, and some other geographical parts of Serbia, such as Sandzak, are

affiliated with particular national minorities, mostly linked to similar

populations in neighboring countries. After the demise of the Milosevic regime,

Serbia fast-tracked its obligations toward minorities and adopted

comprehensive laws on their freedoms and rights, regional and minority

languages, and launched bilateral agreements with neighboring countries on

minority protection. The Serbian Constitution affirms the protection of national

minorities in its Constitutional principles under Article 14, pledging to “[…]

3 “Initially all the countries in the Western Balkans planned to carry out their population censuses in April 2011. However, for different reasons censuses were only carried out in Croatia,

Montenegro and Kosovo at that time. The censuses in Serbia, Albania and the former Yugoslav

Republic of Macedonia were postponed till October 2011. The censuses in Serbia and Albania

commenced as planned whereas the census in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia was

cancelled after a few days of field operations. For Bosnia and Herzegovina the population

enumeration phase took place in October 2013 and the following census phases are yet to follow.” Everaers, Pieter. Annex to: The 2011 round of Population and Housing censuses in the Western

Balkan countries in the context of the political situation and technical preparedness: a comparative

analysis with a main focus on ethnicity and citizenship. Paper presented at ASN World Convention

2014, 2. 4 Commission Regulation. 20October Regulation (EC) No 763/2008 of the European Parliament and

of the Council of 9 July 2008 on population and housing censuses. Official Journal of the European

Union, 9 December 2010 (accessed: 24 October 2015). 5 Identity formation is an ongoing process in Serbia, due to the aftermath of the dissolution of

Yugoslavia. Despite the fact that it is an inevitable part of the ethnic picture of present-day Serbia

and closely linked to the study of censuses, this paper will not be concentrating on the trends of

identity-formation for reasons of length and scope.


145

guarantee special protection to national minorities for the purpose of exercising

full equality and preserving their identity.”6

Apart from national minorities in Serbia, one also needs to distinguish among

Croats, Bosniaks/Muslims, Macedonians, and Slovenes, and after the 2006

independence vote, Montenegrins, “[…] who were considered “constituent nations” and did not enjoy minority rights which were secured for so called

“nationalities.”7 There are other distinctions as well. While the Hungarian

minority living in Vojvodina is considered to be economically and socially well-

off, with their minority rights exercised consistently, the situation for other

minorities remains difficult. Those residing in Eastern Serbia, as well as

Bulgarians, Romanians/Vlachs, and Albanians concentrated around the poor

regions of South Serbia, have experienced high unemployment rates and the

overall economic decline of the regions they inhabit.8 The situation remains

complex and indeed, multifaceted: the economic disadvantages of the

population in poor regions feed political, social and cultural discrimination in a

vicious cycle.

Increasing regional autonomy is still a contentious issue in Serbia. Serbia’s mainstream elite “still believes that unification of all Serbs would be possible

sometime in the future […] for them, autonomists, particularly those in

Vojvodina, are ‘tearing apart the unique Serb national being’.”9 The large

Hungarian minority has been successful in presenting a united front when

dealing with issues of concern to them, though not without controversy. The

adoption of the Law on Rehabilitation drew a sharp reaction from Hungarians

due to its link to the restitution of property dating to the Second World War. In

respect to the EU, the opening of the Vojvodina European Office in Brussels in

early 2011 triggered controversy in Serbia, with many insisting that this action

was yet another step on Vojvodina’s path toward secession. While then-Foreign

Minister Vuk Jeremic had pledged his support for this initiative, it took over

three months for the government to formally give its consent; likewise, the

opening of the Office was continuously postponed. The divisiveness in public

opinion as far as Vojvodina is concerned highlights the importance of the

autonomy debate in Serbia, and its resolution is essential for progress on the

EU accession agenda. Lingering issues such as these show that sub-groups of

the Balkans often have a long memory, and that injustices against minorities

cannot just be swept under the carpet.

Census-taking as an exercise is instrumental in re-exposing these various

injustices and grudges; however, it is left to each state’s respective government to deal with these issues in a proactive manner. Failing to do so has very

definite implications for Serbia’s EU accession; Hungary, for example, has warned Serbia that denying Hungarians the right to property restitution seized

after World War II, might compromise Serbia’s accession effort. Other issues encountered by the Hungarian population include the inability to receive

6 Government of the Republic of Serbia. 2004. Constitution of the Republic of Serbia (accessed: 24

October 2015). 7 OSCE. 2008. Ethnic Minorities in Serbia: An Overview (accessed: 24.October 2015). 8 European Centre for Minority Issues. 2006. Minority Issues Mainstreaming: A Practical Guide for

European Agency for Reconstruction Programmes. Thessaloniki/Flensburg, 68. 9 European Center for Minority Issues, Minority Issues, 18.


146

instruction in their mother tongue, along with difficulties in media

representation.

Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 2002

The three most recent pre-war censuses were carried out in 1971, 1981, and

1991. Serbia’s first post-war census was anticipated in 2001, the year that all

other European countries held censuses. However, the Serbian census was

launched a year later than originally planned due to “[t]he political situation in the country and the lack of financial resources”10 . The legal basis for the census

was the 1999 Law on Census11. The political situation in Serbia in 2002 could

be described as a time of maximal euphoria following the ousting of Slobodan

Milosevic in October 2000, and the agony of not reforming quickly enough in

the wake of this change. The Milosevic administration was out of office, but its

structures remained. Though the EU was open to communication with Serbia,

the Stabilisation and Association Agreement was not yet signed, nor had the

country been invited to join the Council of Europe. The opposition figures that

had rallied around the one common point in their agenda – ousting President

Milosevic – were now increasingly populist and radical.12 The complex

disillusionment in Serbia was reflected in the 2002 Presidential elections;13

with all three rounds void, the Speaker of the Parliament assumed the role of

the Serbian President on 29 December 2002.

Assessing the census in Serbia in April 2002, one must understand the

particularity not only of the political climate at that time, but the actual state

structures and relationships between various levels of government that

resulted from the demise of Tito’s Yugoslavia. The situation in Serbia was complex at the FRY, state, and regional levels, and could best be described as a

“provisorium” coupled with “a crisis of identity.”14 Despite the 5 October events,

Serbia was still officially part of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY),

which it formed with Montenegro in April 1992.15 Additionally, the status of

the two autonomous provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo remained contentious,

with tensions rising between Novi Sad and Pristina versus Belgrade. Indeed,

Kosovo was under international administration since 1999 until unilaterally

declaring independence in 2008 —the legality of which is still contested in

Belgrade.

Additionally, the census in FRY was not performed in all parts of the country

at the same time; while in Serbia it was carried out at the beginning of April

2002, in Montenegro16 it only took place a year and a half later, in October

10 UN Economic Commissioner for Europe. 2003. Experiences in preparation for the population,

households and dwelling census in year 2002. Eurostat, Conference of European Statisticians,

Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia, Working Paper no. 9 (accessed: 25 October 2015). 11 Full text of the law [in Serbian] available here. 12 Biserko, Sonja. 2003. Human Rights in the Shadow of Nationalism Serbia 2002. Helsinki

Committee for Human Rights in Serbia. Belgrade: Zagorac, 8. 13 OSCE, Ethnic Minorities in Serbia. 14 Biserko, Human Rights,14. 15 The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) was reconstituted as the State Union of Serbia and

Montenegro in 2003, following an orchestrated effort of the European Union. This Union ceased to

exist in 2006 when Montenegro formally declared independence, following a referendum. 16 Please also see the paper on Montenegro in this special issue on this topic.


147

2003. Additionally, the census in Kosovo17 was not carried out at all, continuing

the difficult census tradition there since 1981: “[A] census of population, households and dwellings has been carried out in the area of Central Serbia

and Vojvodina, while the Census in Kosovo and Metohija is predicted when

conditions are more favourable or, in another words, after the end of the United

Nations Mission for temporary administration (UNMIK).”18 The census in

Serbia was finally carried out from 1-15 April 2002. The results of the census

showed a total of 7, 498, 001 inhabitants in Serbia (including Vojvodina), out of

which almost 83 percent accounted for Serbs, with the rest being national or

ethnic minorities.19 The questions on national affiliation, mother tongue and

religion were open questions in the 2001 form, while the "citizenship" question

was a closed one.20 Unfortunately, data comparison to the 1991 census proved

to be difficult due to substantial demographic changes caused by both the

Yugoslav wars and the disastrous post-war economic situation and subsequent

economic migration.21

The first census after the Yugoslav wars was expected to be difficult, and many

challenges appeared: defining respondents’ usual place of residence; colossal migration movements of population with groups of people of different

statuses;22 ambiguity in economic activity due to the collapse of the state-run

economy and the grey economy that thrived during the international isolation

of Yugoslavia; blurred lines between household members and households; and

the general mistrust of the population toward the census takers due to the

possibility of data misuse.23 Indeed, it was noted that “[m]assive forced migrations of population, […] as well as the departure of a large number of young and educated persons from the country, due to the unstable economic

situation, have contributed to a very unclear picture of demographic reality in

Serbia and emphasize the need for data from the Census.”24

17 Please also see the paper on Kosovo in this special issue on this topic. 18 UN Economic Commissioner for Europe, Experiences in Preparation. 19 Statistical Office of Republic of Serbia. 2002. Final Results of the Census 2002. 24 December

2002, issue LII (accessed: 24.October 2015). 20 The possible answers were: FRY and Republic of Serbia; FRY and Republic of Montenegro; FRY,

Republic of Serbia and foreign country; FRY, Republic of Montenegro and foreign country; Foreign;

Without citizenship. Questions on national affiliation and religion were not obligatory in the 2001

census forms, as per the Constitution of the FRY. In the 2001 "Accessory questionnaire for

Yugoslav citizens working abroad with foreign employer or working independently and for the

members of the family living with them", the citizenship question was a closed question (citizen of

FRY, citizen of FRY and other, without citizenship), while the national affiliation (not obligatory)

and the native language were open questions. It appears there was no question on religious

affiliation. This questionnaire also involved a question on whether the person was displaced from

Kosovo, or a refugee from another part of former Yugoslavia. 21 As the Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia has explained: “Permanent population by the definition from 1991 census includes the population in the country and the population temporarily

employed abroad, as well as members of their families who accompanied them there. In line with

international recommendations, the 2002 census includes the population in the country, Yugoslav

citizens who had been employed abroad for less than a year, as well as foreign citizens who had

worked in Yugoslavia for more than a year and their family members.” Ibid. 22 Either IDPs or refugees. 23 UN Economic Commission for Europe. 2004. Some Difficulties in Application of

Recommendations 2000 in Serbian Census 2002. Eurostat, Conference of European Statisticians,

Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia, 11 November 2004, Working Paper 17 (accessed: 25

October 2015). 24 UN Economic Commissioner for Europe, Experiences in Preparation.


148

Difficulties in obtaining clear answers with respect to determining the “place of usual residence” were linked to the specific case of refugees: “The refugees were enumerated as permanent residents of Yugoslavia, and also as a population

who migrated, under threat and pressure, from the (presently) foreign

countries that were formed on the territory of former Yugoslavia.”25 Matters

were further complicated when it came to the status of refugees from within

the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY), as the census

would seek to count all refugees from former SFRY republics and internally

displaced persons from Kosovo and Metohija, “regardless of whether they have acquired the FRY citizenship or not.”26 An extraordinary challenge presented

itself in the Kosovo/Metohija case, despite the fact that the 2002 Census was

not carried out on that territory, which resulted in the FRY authorities

reasoning that, “this region is a constituent part of Serbia and Yugoslavia, and the population that fled to other parts of Serbia and Montenegro under

pressure and threat, could not be considered as refugees in their own country.

However, in order to secure all relevant data on these persons, they were

conditionally treated as migrants, and they were obliged to furnish data on

place of permanent residence in Kosovo and Metohija, and the time of arrival to

present residence place.”27

Challenges were also present in the monitoring of economic activity, mostly due

to the abrupt change in the economic system of the country (with the entire

Yugoslav-run economy still tied to the FRY). The status of (formally) employed,

(formally) unemployed and all those in between “[…] necessitated monitoring of the economic situation and employment in a shorter sequence of time. The

period of one year, which is typical for the approach of usual activity, cannot

express the wide variety of work curricula of many employees in Yugoslavia.”28

In addition, people were mostly “[…] reserved about data of agricultural holdings,” while pointing out the distrust of the population to authorities and the possibility of the misuse of data.29 Despite the fact that the wars in

Yugoslavia did not specifically take place on the territory of Serbia proper, “[…] Muslims, Croats, Hungarians and Albanians were subject to intimidation,

harassment, discrimination and forced displacement, mainly by paramilitary

groups.”30 Thus, it is imperative to understand the differentiations among the

main minorities in Serbia, whose economic and social status “vary greatly”.31

Roma, as stated above, are considered to be the most numerous ethnic minority

group in Serbia (excluding Kosovo), despite the fact that according to the 2002

census data, they numbered only 108,193 (1.4% of the population), which would

make them the third largest minority after Hungarians and Bosniaks/Muslims.

Unofficial estimates vary anywhere from 300,000 to 800,000. Counting this

population is consistently difficult. The Roma are arguably the most

discriminated and impoverished ethnic group in Serbia, with the highest

25 UN Economic Commission for Europe, Difficulties in Application of Recommendations 2000. 26 UNECE, Census of Population, Households and Dwellings in 2002. 27 UN Economic Commission for Europe, Difficulties in Application of Recommendations 2000. 28 UN Economic Commission for Europe, Difficulties in Application of Recommendations 2000. 29 UN Economic Commission for Europe, Difficulties in Application of Recommendations 2000. 30 UN-HABITAT. 2005. Housing and Property Rights – Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and

Serbia and Montenegro, (accessed: 25 October 2015), 101. 31 European Centre for Minority Issues, European Centre for Minority Issues.


149

unemployment and illiteracy rates in the country, at approximately 80 percent

of the overall population.32 Due to these factors, the challenges that the Roma

community faced regarding participation in the census, and response to

identity questions, were of a different nature than those of other minorities,

who were much more effectively politically organized in particular regions of

Serbia. Additionally, the political organization of the Roma is somewhat

fragmented as the Roma population is spread across the country, unlike other

minorities who are geographically more concentrated.33

According to demographers, Vojvodina is becoming a less multicultural region,

with 90 percent of the population identifying as ethnically Serbian by the end

of the century and the remainder being split between Hungarians and Roma.34

Counted at 293,299 in the 2002 census, or 3.91% of the population, the

numbers of Hungarians living in Serbia who are concentrated in Vojvodina,

have slowly yet consistently been dropping over the decades. Individual

Hungarians’ participation in the census exercise varied largely by municipality, with more than half of these municipalities showing a less than 10 percent

participation of their respective citizens in the census. Traditionally the biggest

and most organized ethnic minority in Vojvodina, and by official numbers the

most populous minority in all of Serbia, the Hungarians participated in the

census-taking exercise on both occasions. The reasons for the decrease are not

necessarily political in nature, but are rather more straightforward: the

population is aging, and many have left (or are leaving) for either Belgrade or

other EU member states.

Vojvodina saw a change in its status in 2002 after shifting levels of autonomy

in the preceding decades. Though it had been endowed with more extensive

rights of self-rule in the 1974 Yugoslav constitution, its parliamentary

influence decreased during Milosevic’s time, when many of its autonomous powers were transferred to Belgrade. The fall of Milosevic in 2000 created a

more open atmosphere of reform, resulting in the passing of the omnibus law

which gave Vojvodina increased freedom to establish and administer its own

institutions, allowing local policymakers to better address the needs of the

citizens of this province within the oversight of central governmental bodies.35

The Albanians in Serbia’s south have boycotted the census since 1981, and the

refusal to participate in political life in Belgrade spiraled out of control in 2000

when an armed conflict erupted after Serbian troops retreating from Kosovo

clashed with local paramilitaries. The initial objective of the Liberation Army

of Presevo, Bujanovac and Medvedja (UCPBM), was to join the three

municipalities with Kosovo.36 With tensions high in the economically poor

Presevo valley, the participation of the Albanians in the 2002 census exercise

32 OSCE, Ethnic Minorities in Serbia, 20. 33 Orlovic, Slavisa. 2011. Politicko predstavljanje nacionalih manjina – Srbija u komparativnoj

perspektivi [Political presentation of national minorities – Serbia from a comparitive perspective].

Migracijske i etnicke teme 27(3), 393-417. 34 Orlovic, Politicko predstavljanje nacionalnih manjina. 35 See, e.g., Petsinis, Vassilis. 2003. Vojvodina’s National Minorities: Current Realities and Future

Prospects. Spacesofidentity 3(3), 7-32. 36 Adams, Jim. 2002. Serbia: Census Deal Resolves Presevo Crisis. Institute for War and Peace

Reporting, 17 April 2002 (accessed: 25 October 2015).


150

became an important issue to political leaders in Belgrade as well as in the

Serbian South. Ultimately, the OSCE Mission to the FRY brokered a deal with

local leaders and agreed to complement the municipal census commission with

OSCE representatives through a “confidence-building” measure, in which a

decision was made to send in “small teams of international staff members complemented by experienced local staff” as per the appeal of both Serbian authorities and representatives of the Albanian community in Southern Serbia

“for the OSCE to facilitate and assist the census process.”37 At the signing of

the deal with central authorities in Belgrade, Riza Halimi, mayor of Presevo

and leader of the Party of Democratic Action (PDA), declared that “[a]fter 21 years we have made moves towards having a proper census in this area and we

hope displaced people can take part in the forthcoming extraordinary local

elections as well.”38 This also provoked a reaction from the Serbian community

living in the Presevo valley, as fears escalated that the census would show

their decline in numbers and lead to “[…] an Albanian take-over in local

government.”39 Thus, the census was a strongly politicized exercise, with people

taking part in the discussions based solely on their ethnic affiliation.

The Albanian community numbered 61,647, with an absolute majority

population in Presevo (89 percent) and Bujanovac (55 percent), and 26 percent

in Medvedja.40 Census forms were in both the Serbian and Albanian

languages.41 The organization of the 2002 census should be seen as a sign of

significant progress in Southern Serbia, as it was the first formal cooperation

between the central authorities and the local authorities in that region since

the Kosovo war. It formed a base for future political dialogue, despite that fact

that the Albanian community did not formally establish the National Council

of the Albanian National Minority (as other minorities have)42.

One of the most interesting communities in Serbia are the Bosniaks, who

distinguish themselves on an ethnic, religious and linguistic platform. The

Bosniak community, predominantly located in Sandzak in Serbia, found itself

in a complicated situation during the census rounds with multiple factors to

take into account. These include the stigma and flight of refugees from the war

in Bosnia and Herzegovina and their self-identification; a heated debate on the

name of the language (Bosniak versus Serbo-Croatian, and later Serbian); and

confusion on the distinction between Muslims and Bosniaks, and whether this

37 OSCE (b). 2002. OSCE starts to take up its role in census in southern Serbia. OSCE, 5 April

2002 (accessed: 25 October 2015). 38 Adams, Serbia: Census Deal Resolves Presevo Crisis. 39 Adams, Serbia: Census Deal Resolves Presevo Crisis. 40 OSCE, Ethnic Minorities in Serbia, 7. 41 Janjic, Dusan. n.d. Challenges of the Peace Process in the South of Serbia, 73. 42 The OSCE and the international community were then subsequently involved in organizing the

extra-ordinary local elections in Presevo Valley, which “[…] resulted in Albanians leading local government in Bujanovac and Presevo and the participation of the Albanian ethnic party in the

Medvedja municipality since 2002, in OSCE, Ethnic Minorities in Serbia,7.

With regards to continued cooperation with Belgrade, the presidential elections held later that year

were met with very low enthusiasm from the Albanian population. The Party of the Democratic

Union of Albanians and the Movement for Democratic Progress called for a boycott. On the other

hand, the PDA called on its supporters to participate. OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission

Final Report. 2003. Presidential elections and repeat presidential elections 2002, 18 February 2003

(accessed: 25 October 2015), 12.


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was even a distinction to be made.43 Most Bosniak leaders advocated for self-

identification as “Bosniak” and urged the population to declare Bosniak as their native language, thus replacing the traditional pattern of Bosniaks

identifying themselves as “Muslims” since the 1971 census.44 This was

propagated as a key theme by Rasim Ljajic, leader of Sandzak’s Democratic Party, and Esad Dzudzevic of the Bosniak Democratic Party of Sandzak.45

Contrary to the reaction of Bosniaks in the Sandzak region, the Muslims in

Belgrade and Novi Sad were not so keen on following these calls, and chose

instead to continue to self-identify as Muslims.

The 2002 census saw the identification of 136,087 citizens as Bosniaks, and

19,053 as Muslims, with a majority Bosniak population in Novi Pazar, Sjenica,

and Tutin, while Serbs were the majority in Priboj, Prijepolje and Nova

Varos.46 The Sandzak region as a whole experienced the departure of many

Serbians, but this was largely explained by economic reasons (structural

unemployment), an argument put forward by Bosniak parties who have argued

that Sandzak’s demographic changes were neither a result of political nor national pressure.47

The 2002 census was conducted in a highly volatile political, social and

economic time in Serbia, then still a constituent entity of the FRY. Due to

significant population shifts following the end of the conflicts in the Balkans,

coupled with the October ousting of Milosevic, tensions among minorities were

exacerbated. Contestation was practically inevitable, particularly with respect

to the south of the country and the Albanian minority. Initially unwilling to

take part, the participation of the Albanian minority was largely brokered by

the OSCE in what should be seen as a successful initiative. Thus, overall, the

conducting of the 2002 census can be considered to be a successful technical

exercise despite the initial contestation by the Albanians.

Serbia 2011

The organization of the census in 2011 was particularly significant for the

state, both politically and otherwise, as it was the first census undertaken after

Kosovo’s declaration of independence in 2008. The question of its exclusion from the 2011 census was contentious, as Belgrade’s refusal to recognize Kosovo as a separate country did not automatically exclude its citizens from

being counted. Indeed, census-taking in Kosovo had been problematic for years;

ethnic Albanians boycotted the census of 1991, and the conditions in place for

the 2002 census precluded it from being counted. Belgrade cited this same

reason for excluding Kosovo from the 2011 census, stating that there were “no conditions on the territory of [Kosovo] for the implementation of the census.”48

43 The evolution of the identity of Serbia's Muslims and/or Bosniaks remains an important issue to

be studied in more detail, and future publications will certainly contribute to the literature. 44 Biserko, Human Rights, 339. 45 Biserko, Human Rights, 340. 46 Biserko, Human Rights, 338. 47 Biserko, Human Rights, 338. 48 Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia. 2013. 2011 Census of Population, Households and

Dwellings in the Republic of Serbia: Population: Religion, Mother Tongue and Ethnicity. Belgrade:

2013, 12, On census-taking in Kosovo, see the paper by Mehmet Musaj in this Special Issue.


152

The Serbian census was launched on 30 September 2011, and lasted from 1-15

October, with enumeration extended from 16-18 October and until 20 October

in the bigger cities. (Initially, the census was to take place in the first two

weeks of April, but was postponed due to funding.49) The census was a

traditional face-to-face census with interviewers, based on the Census Law

adopted in December 2009 and amended in March 2011.50 International

funding was secured mostly through the support of the EU.51 The census forms

were available in English and in eight languages, reflecting the largest

national minorities (Hungarian, Albanian, Roma, Slovakian, Ruthenian,

Romanian, Bulgarian, and Macedonian). The results confirmed a population of

7,186,862 (a decline of 4.2% from 2002), with 83 percent of the population

declaring itself as Serbian.52 There was a slight decline in the overall

population of Vojvodina, from 2,031,992 in 2002 to 1,931,809 in 2011.

The Hungarian population in the north, representing the largest official

minority in Serbia by census figures, has taken issue with the Serbian

government, slamming heads on topics such as post-Second World War

reparations, among others.53 The Hungarian minority has consistently been

fighting for more minority rights, but on a politically more advanced platform

than other minority parties. For instance, Prime Minister Vucic has invited the

Alliance of Vojvodina Hungarians (SVM) to join the coalition government in

201454, which resulted in a functioning partnership between the coalition and

the Alliance. The Alliance holds seats in both the National Assembly and the

Assembly of Vojvodina (where it is part of the coalition government), thus

capitalizing on their political weight to push for their national interests. Active

participation in the census is part of this. Such initiatives have helped the

Hungarian minority become more integrated into political life, reflected in

greater participation in the 2011 census. As seen in the 2002 census, some minorities in Serbia are prone to greater

difficulties and even to discrimination as a result of their preferred self-

49 “Pursuant to the Law on the Census of Population, Households and Dwellings (“The Official Gazette of the RS,” no. 104/09), the 2011 Census was envisaged for the period from 1–15 April

2011. However, the sufficient funds for its preparation and field implementation were not provided

in time in the budget of the Republic of Serbia. After an agreement had been reached between the

Government of the Republic of Serbia and the European Commission (the Delegation of the

European Union in the Republic of Serbia) on the joint financing of the census activities, the Law

on the Amendments to the Law on the Census of Population, Households and Dwellings 2011 was

passed (“The Official Gazette of the RS,” no. 24/11) and thereby the enumeration was postponed by

six months.” “Annex to: The 2011 round of Population and Housing censuses in the Western Balkan countries in the context of the political situation and technical preparedness: a comparative

analysis with a main focus on ethnicity and citizenship”, 25. 50 Approximately 41, 000 people were hired to conduct the census. 51 “The budget for the 2011 Census in Serbia was EUR 24.8 million. The Census was financially supported by the European Union with an IPA 2011 grant of about 14 million €, which covered approximately 60% of the total cost. 52 Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia. 2012. 2011 Census of Population, Households and

Dwellings in the Republic of Serbia: Ethnicity (accessed: 25 October 2015). 53 Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia, Population: Religion, Mother Tongue and Ethnicity,

21. 54 Caloianu, Ioana / Druker, Jeremy / Frye, Barbara and Ky Krauthamer. 2014. Vucic Invites

Hungarians Into Serbian Government, Chechen Warlord 'Neutralized. Transitions Online, 9 April



153

identification. These problems are persistent and equally true for the 2011

round, and have been documented extensively by the media, NGOs, and

international organizations.55 Roma, perhaps the most numerous of these

minority groups (when taking into account other numbers estimated to be

much larger than reflected in the census), continue to be discriminated against

and subjected to human rights abuses and negligence. The census numbers for

Serbia’s Roma population are estimated to be two to three times larger than

reflected, even when considering the relative success of the 2011 census in

increasing the number of registered Roma participants by 40%.56 Recorded

numbers for Roma in the 2011 census total 147,604; the Council of Europe

estimates actual numbers to be around 400,000, making the Roma the second

largest minority group within Serbia (after the Hungarians).57 The 40%

increase in numbers since the 2002 census is of particular significance

administratively, as these figures translate directly into assigned quotas for

state administration and police employment. Thus, the higher number

necessitates increased hiring of Roma in positions in public enterprises,

institutions, and the media. However, the Roma as a group continue to have

considerably weaker political lobbying power and are often shunted to the side

as more “pressing” issues are discussed by elites. Indeed, they represent the majority of “legally invisible” persons in Serbia, encountering immense difficulty in obtaining personal documents. While some programs and

initiatives have been instituted to aid the Roma population, mere gesturing on

the part of political elites has more often been the norm, as will be discussed.

The plight of the Roma continues be overlooked, as the problems that this

“silent” minority faces are politically over-shadowed by the issues presented by

another minority: the ethnic Albanians, largely concentrated in Southern

Serbia. As noted above, they constitute the majority in Bujanovac and Presevo,

and tensions again came to a head in late 2012 and early 2013. The illegal

erection of a monument to fallen KLA fighters, spearheaded by ethnic

Albanians in Presevo and located in the town center, led to an uproar in

Belgrade. After weeks of vacillation on the part of the Serbian government and

numerous requests to have ethnic Albanian authorities move the monument,

which fell on deaf ears, authorities in Belgrade eventually removed it.

Compounded with issues such as language instruction in schools, as well as

tensions left over from the conflict in Kosovo, ethnic Albanians are often viewed

with distrust, and Serbia’s political elites have capitalized on this distrust in anti-minority rhetoric that they enshroud with pro-Serb, nationalist terms.

The 2011 census only underscored the growing tensions in these areas.

Notably, it was not the official census results that worried politicians; it was

the lack thereof, as ethnic Albanians largely boycotted the census. Additionally,

it was reported that no one collected census materials from purely Albanian

villages.58 While the number of Albanians in Serbia is estimated to number

55 See, e.g., Matic, Marko. 2012. Manjine u Srbiji – meta drzavne represije [Minorities in Serbia –

target of state repression]. Al Jazeera, 7 June 2012 (accessed: 25 October 2015). 56 Jovanovic, Zeljko and Mensur Haliti. 2012. Roma Feel Less Fear and More Hope After Census.

Open Society Foundation, 12 December 2012 (accessed: 25 October 2015). 57 Jovanovic and Haliti, Roma Feel Less Fear. 58 Danas, 5 October 2011, cited in Biserko, Human Rights.


154

around 50,000, only 5,809 were counted in census results.59 The monument

incident in Presevo highlighted the potential for conflict that arises as a result

of demographic and ethnic tensions. More significantly, the 2011 census

showed how a task that is purely administrative in theory can quickly take on

ethnic, religious, and political overtones in practice, leading to division and

dissent within a state and within a society. The 2011 census was useful not

only in providing data, but also in bringing to light tensions that had been

simmering quietly – including, but not limited to- questions of language

instruction, alphabet, religious freedom, and others. Belgrade’s resolution of

the incident has only temporarily quelled a growingly problematic situation.

The EU applauded Serbia’s attempt to be more inclusive of minorities during the census-taking exercise, noting that it “included provisions facilitating the participation of minorities.”60 However, it likewise notes that implementation

of relevant legislation needs to be undertaken before any true progress can be

made in the long-term.

Further evidence of posturing by political elites in respect to the minority

question heated up in the time before parliamentary elections were held in

March 2014. Rasim Ljajic, Minister of Foreign and Domestic Trade and

Telecommunications, visited the area around Pirot in Southern Serbia in

February 2014. In a speech given there, he told attendees that his party, in

coalition with the leading Serbian Progressive Party (SNS), would give more

attention to the plight of minorities in Serbia, focusing in particular on Roma

citizens and the elderly.61 Ljajic’s rhetoric is commendable and his position as not only a member of the political elite, but also as a Sandzak Muslim, gives

him credibility and leverage in respect to minority rights. However, it remains

to be seen what policies will be put in place to effectively address minority

issues, particularly in light of the resounding success of SPS in the

parliamentary elections held a month later.

Ljajic’s position in respect to the Albanian minority in South Serbia has been more clearly delineated, in keeping with the greater complexity of the situation

and the events that had gone on in Presevo. The lack of participation by this

minority in the 2011 census only underscored ongoing problems in the area,

and the subsequent Presevo incident just brought these tensions to light. On

the January 2013 morning of the removal of the controversial monument in

Presevo, Minister Ljajic stated that it would be impossible for South Serbia to

ever move its borders so that these Albanian-majority towns could become part

of Kosovo. More importantly, he cautioned that it would be in ethnic Albanians’ best interests to align themselves with Belgrade instead of with Pristina or

Tirana. He also stated that the removal of the illegally erected monument was

the only option left to state authorities, as requests to have it moved from the

center of town to a more appropriate location went unheeded.62 Ljajic’s words

59 Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia, Population: Religion, Mother Tongue and Ethnicity,

21. 60 European Commission. 2012. Commission Staff Working Document: Serbia 2012 Progress

Report. European Commission. Brussels: 10 October 2012. 61 N.N. 2014. Ljajic: Paznja manjinama, starima i penzionerima [Ljajic: Attention to minorities,

elderly, and pensioners]. Mondo, 13 February 2014 (accessed: 25 October 2015). 62 N.D. 2013. Albanci sa juga da se okrenu BG [Albanians in the South should turn to Belgrade].

B92, 20 January 2013 (accessed: 25 October 2015).


155

were heavy, yet used strategically as Belgrade sought to avoid repeating any

potential conflict that could ensue.

The importance of such rhetoric in respect to EU aspirations is high, as

Belgrade must tread a thin line between sounding authoritarian and condoning

discrimination, versus potentially sacrificing its sovereign rights in deference

to incendiary and/or illegal actions. The wariness of the government, especially

in regards to its Albanian minority, cannot be overstated, especially given the

events of the past ten years, and Belgrade seeks to minimize the potential for

any future problems. Belgrade risks angering the EU by dealing with these

issues with too firm a hand, and as such, increased prudence and more

proactive attempts to deal with minority problems have been encouraged.

Carried out nine years after the prior census, the 2011 census was undertaken

in a different context, with the EU heavily investing both in this census and in

those undertaken throughout the rest of Europe. Indeed, it funded 60 percent

of the exercise in Serbia. The change in contestation among ethnic Albanians

between the censuses of 2002 and 2011 underscored that the issues present in

the 2002 census remain extant and continue to be of concern, especially insofar

as they continue to be politicized and leveraged by political elites. Indeed, as it

stands now, the contestation of the census in 2011 foreshadowed the continuing

issues of contention, as seen not only in 2013, but even today, such as with the

Albanian push to set up an association of municipalities in southern Serbia,

similar to the association of Serbian municipalities in Kosovo.63

Conclusion

Census-taking is considered to be a statistical and technical exercise of

considerable importance to every country, as the data it provides is crucial to

policy planning in key sectors. Census-taking also requires repetition, because

it establishes a continuum of vital socio-economic data. In the context of

multiethnic and multi-religious states, however, the census exercise becomes a

more delicate and politically challenging question, bringing questions of

identity to the forefront of debate in a society. This can be exacerbated in

polarizing settings and in countries where conflicts have resulted in a large

displacement of persons and where the consequences of the war are still visible,

as with the unfinished returns of refugees. It has equally proven to be a

contested exercise in countries with sizeable minorities where the “central” power has proven to be close to the country’s majority.

It is in the Western Balkans that many of these challenges are omnipresent.

Additionally, the region is under the close auspices of the European Union,

which, through the prospect of membership, offers clear incentives and funding

to complete tasks deemed problematic. Though uninvolved in the 2002 round of

census-taking, the EU heavily invested in the 2011 European-wide census,

ensuring that they both comply with European standards. Not only has the

European Union provided technical and substantial financial assistance, it also

funded 60% percent of the census exercise in Serbia.

63 Jovanovic, Igor. 2015. Serbia’s Albanians Plot Their Own Municipal Union. Balkan Insight, 11

September 2015 (accessed: 25 October 2015).


156

Both rounds of censuses have seen important contestation from minorities in

Serbia. Resulting from border changes, dramatic movements of population, and

fear of centralization of power in Belgrade, Serbia’s minorities have been in doubt about their future in the country. This had not entirely changed in the

nine years between the 2002 and 2011 censuses, and the results reflected the

internal dynamic in ethnically mixed areas in Serbia. While on one hand, some

national minorities remain well-integrated in Serbia, such as Hungarians or

Slovaks in Vojvodina, others feel threatened and abandoned by the central

government, such as Albanians and Bosniaks, while a third group, the Roma,

are not genuinely reflected in their actual numbers, nor effectively organized

on a national level.

The implications of these findings are thus two-fold: they both define the state-

of-play of “majority versus minority” dynamics in Serbia and demonstrate that unresolved issues can begin to be addressed through approximation with the

EU acquis communautaire and further advances in the EU integration process,

increasing the likelihood that the objective of EU integration can help facilitate

advances in minority rights. Firstly, both census rounds in Serbia illuminated

the outstanding issues that persist in the country, particularly related to

minority questions. The lessons from these censuses should oblige the Serbian

authorities to create a more favorable and inclusive environment for its

minorities. In fact there was a clear difference in the general tone and the

atmosphere in which the 2002 and the 2011 censuses were conducted: the

former took place in a soul-searching phase between the East and the West,

while the 2011 census exercise took place during Serbia's increased orientation

towards the European Union and Western values. However, there is still much

room for improvement in both enumeration and the use of the results in policy-

making.

EU regulation, guidance, and monetary support for the 2011 census helped

ensure that the administrative component of census-taking was more in line

with the interests of Serbia’s minority citizens, making it easier for them to participate (though whether they chose to actually do so was a different

matter). Providing census forms in multiple languages, for example, as per the

stipulations of the acquis communautaire, helped facilitate a more inclusive

census-taking exercise the second time around. This effort was recognized by

the EU, as noted, and future efforts to ensure minority integration will likely

continue by proxy through Serbia’s continued interest in staying on the path to

accession. Thus, the direct aid of the EU, as well as its indirect influence with

the “carrot” of accession, have allowed for small steps in minority integration into censuses and will potentially facilitate greater inclusion in the future.

In conclusion, Serbia has proven to be an interesting case study for the analysis

of a complex census-taking exercise: heterogeneous populations with varying

degrees of polarization; contestation of census conduct; politicization of the

exercise itself; and the ubiquitous presence of the European Union in the 2011

round. What will be the biggest challenge for the next round of census in

Serbia, most probably taking place in 2021? To create an environment in which

all ethnic minorities will participate in the exercise and feel included in the

state.


157

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Slovenia and the Census: From the 20.

Century Yugoslav Counts to the

Register-based Census of 2011 Research Article

Damir Josipovič Senior Scientific Associate, Institute for Ethnic Studies in Ljubljana

[email protected]

http://www.suedosteuropa.uni-graz.at/cse/en/josipovic





159

Slovenia and the Census:

From the 20. Century Yugoslav Counts

to the Register-based Census of 2011

Damir Josipovič

The article critically examines censuses in the Republic of Slovenia. Owing to its Yugoslav past, the censuses after 1945 have been closely scrutinized, and the common Yugoslav census methodology had a strong influence on the 1991 and 2002 censuses. The 1991 enumeration was carried out within the Yugoslav state; however the data processing and result publishing was done under the newly independent Slovenian state. The 2002 census was the last census to be carried out using classic door-to-door enumeration, since the 2011 census was completely register-based. The paper explores censuses in Slovenia since 1991, noting numerous changes and controversies. In 2002, in contrast to 1991, the applied definition of the resident population left out some 35,000 people working temporarily abroad. In addition, the 2002 census witnessed the highest ever number of ethnically non-affiliated respondents. An even bigger controversy was related to the erasure of some 30,000 people from the register of permanent residents for failing to apply for Slovenian citizenship after the break-up of Yugoslavia. The article also briefly reviews the difficulty in addressing the status of the constitutional national minorities and other unrecognized former Yugoslav nations in a situation in which specific data on their number, social and economic structure are no longer collected.

Keywords: census in Slovenia, minorities, ethnicity, discrimination Introduction

This article analyses the development of statistical practices in Slovenia since 1991. In order to understand the post-independence period, the article examines the origins of the census structure and content, including Slovenia’s development of census methodologies over time. The article also deals with the issue of the so-called “ethnic” questions, with special scrutiny of developments in the Yugoslav era in light of the impact of the Yugoslav legacy on contemporary census methodology and results. The history of modern censuses in the present day Slovenian territory dates back to the 19th century, when the first general Habsburg census was carried out in 1857. The historical developments of different parts of the region (Austrian, Hungarian, Venetian Italian) led to varied practices in census

Damir Josipovič is a social geographer and demographer. He graduated from the University of Ljubljana Faculty of Letters, in the Department of Geography, in 1998, and received an M.A. in 2002, and a Ph.D. in 2005. His research interests are cross-disciplinary and cover a variety of topics within social and human geography. He works as a senior scientific associate at the Institute for Ethnic Studies in Ljubljana.

Slovenia and the Census: From the 20. Century Yugoslav Counts to the Register-based Census of 2011

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methodology and execution. With the census of 1869, the former inner Austrian lands (Styria, Carniola, Carinthia, the Littoral, Gorizia, Triest and Istria) developed different methodologies in comparison with the Hungarian parts east of the Mura River. For example, one of the most important differences was the language question. In the Austrian part, the population was asked about its Umgangsprache (colloquial language), while in Hungary the methodology included a question about anyanyelv (mother tongue).1 Since the creation of the Yugoslav state after World War I, the census methodologies and the questions posed were intrinsically related to the political characteristics of a multi-ethnic state. Nevertheless, the core methodology was transferred over from the Austrian and Hungarian practices. Censuses in the independent Republic of Slovenia cannot be examined without knowing its Yugoslav context. Constitutionally, the former Yugoslavia was a socialist federation consisting of six republics with one of them (Serbia) including further sub-units (the two socialist autonomous provinces, Vojvodina and Kosovo-Metohija).2 Slovenia was the westernmost of the six republics, bordering the rest of the former federation only through Croatia. Though relatively small in size (20,273 km2 or less than a twelfth of Yugoslavia’s 256,000 km2), Slovenia occupied a geopolitically and strategically important area (Table 1). It was the only Yugoslav republic to border a capitalist country (232 km with Italy and 318 km with Austria). Geographically situated between the Adriatic Sea and the Pannonian basin it also shared a north-eastern boundary with Hungary (102 km). The territorial boundaries of Slovenia changed a few times during the period after World War II, and these changes affected the census results, making comparisons more difficult. In 1945, many westward lying areas inhabited by a Slovene-speaking population were ceded from Italy to Yugoslavia and Slovenia respectively. After an initial post-war crisis - the short-term formation of the Free Territory of Trieste (1947–1954) - the Slovenian territory was increased from the pre-war 15,809 km2 by almost a third, until 1956 when it more or less gained its present-day size.3 The immediate consequences of the new delimitation raised many questions, including population settlement throughout the country, but especially in the northeast (Prekmurje i.e. Trans-Mura region) and southwest (Istria, the Littoral).

1 Josipovič, Damir. 2012. “Instrumentalization of ethnicity within multi-national countries: the colonization of Slovenes in the Austro-Hungarian part of the former Yugoslavia.” Two Homelands 35, 135-148. 2 While Vojvodina held the status of an autonomous province (autonomna pokrajina) from the beginning, Kosovo first had the status of a special district (kosovsko-metohijska oblast) within Serbia. 3 The contemporary boundary dispute between Slovenia and Croatia is to be solved by an ad hoc Arbitration Tribunal in the Hague. It is expected that the verdict will be reached in 2015. It must be noted that except for a Macedonian-Serbian agreement on their mutual boundary, all other former internal Yugoslav boundaries remain subject to dispute.

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Table 1: Territorial coverage, division, and changes of the former Yugoslavia from 1981 to 2002

Census

1981 Census

1991 Censuses 2001/2002

Change (km2)

Yugoslavia 255.804 255.813 255.882 +78

Serbia 88.361 88.361 88.361 No change

Serbia Proper 55.968 55.968 55.968 No change

Vojvodina 21.506 21.506 21.506 No change Kosovo 10.887 10.887 no census No change

Croatia 56.538 56.542 56.594 +56

Bosnia-Herzegovina 51.129 51.129 no census No change

Macedonia 25.713 25.713 25.713 No change

Slovenia 20.251 20.2564 20.2735 +22

Montenegro 13.812 13.812 13.812 (2003) No change Sources for 1981 and 1991 censuses: Federal Statistical Office of SFRY; Source for 2001 census: Statistical Office of Croatia; Source for 2002 census: Statistical Office of Slovenia

Historical review - censuses in the former Yugoslavia

Yugoslav censuses have been held since the formation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, with the first carried out on 31 January 1921. Unfortunately, the population was not enumerated completely due to the partial occupation of Dalmatia by Italian armed forces after the break-up of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The new Kingdom changed its name to Yugoslavia through the constitution of King Alexander I in 1929. The first census under the new name was carried out on 31 March 1931. The main characteristic of both censuses was the absence of a specific question on ethnicity; however, it included a question on religion. The statistical methodology of the 1921 census used the respondents’ mother tongue as a basis or proxy for ethnic affiliation. Based on the assumption of the common Serbo-Croatian language, the Serbo-Croatian ethnicity was therefore generalized. Since the Slovene language was recognized as a distinct category, it was possible to assume the linguistic difference amongst the Catholic population (e.g., Slovenian or Serbo-Croatian speaking Catholics). However, while it was possible to determine religious differences among the Serbo-Croatian speakers (Orthodox, Catholic, Muslim, Evangelical, etc.), it was not possible to distinguish ethnic differences among the Yugoslav Orthodox population since the Macedonian language was not officially recognized. Another important shortcoming of the census methodology was the incomparability of the administrative division of the territories included in the new state due to their different historical backgrounds (Habsburg versus Ottoman legacies). Many of these shortcomings were present in the next census as well. The census of 31 March 1931 included both a question on religion and a question on mother tongue, but the census results (published after the war in 1945) reflected only the Yugoslav language by aggregating the Slovenian, Croatian and Serbian responses. In fact, cross-tabulations on mother-tongue and religion were prepared in 1940 but remained unreleased for political reasons and due to

4 The cadastral measurement accounts for only 20.253.12 km2 5 The new planimetric cadastral measurement used in 2002 census accounts for 20.273.00 km2


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the outbreak of World War II. This major change was implemented by the September constitution of 1931 (oktroirani ustav). It fostered the use of “Yugoslavhood” (jugoslovenstvo) as a unifying concept for all the South Slavic peoples of Yugoslavia except for Bulgarians. Other linguistic census categories remained intact (German, Hungarian, Rumanian, Arnaut (Albanian), Greek etc.). The published census data in 1938 included only the religious affiliation of individuals, and no data on ethnicity. It is again difficult to compare data, as many political and administrative changes occurred in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in the 1930s resulting in the reorganization of the banovina system. Due to the outbreak of war on 6 April, the 1941 census was not carried out completely. The war further prevented the publication of combined religious-linguistic tables based on data from the 1931 census. The few surviving originals were taken to Vienna by the occupying Nazi-German army.6 The successor of the Kingdom, the Democratic Federal Yugoslavia was proclaimed a socialist republic on 29 November 1945, based on the AVNOJ (Anti-fascist Council of the National Liberation of Yugoslavia) congress held in Jajce (in Bosnia) on 29 November 1943 shortly after the Italian capitulation on 8 September 1943. During its post-war existence, Yugoslavia adopted four constitutions and held six censuses. Following the Declaration of Independence, the first constitution was proclaimed on 31 January 1946. The first thorough population census was carried out only in 1948, three years after the war, partly due to the difficult installation of the new state, the massive physical destruction, and the unfulfilled elements of peace treaties, but also in order to conceal huge demographic losses (about one million people, or 8% of the population).7 The Decree on the Short Population Census in the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia (published in The Official Gazette Nr. 22 on 10 March 1947) provided the legal basis for its implementation. Due to the severe political crisis in the country it was not until March 1948 that the census was finally conducted. For the first time the question of ethnicity (called narodnost or nationality) was posed to the population.8 The methodological peculiarity of this census was the institutionalized admittance that one’s “national affiliation” was of a “subjective nature” in contrast to the pre-war “objective” indicator based on the mother tongue.9 The modernization of the census methodology was in line with Soviet views on the matter at the time. However, the “Cominform” crisis started that same year, and led the Yugoslav leadership away from its Moscovian tutorship. As a result, Yugoslavia introduced a socialist system with the focus on self-governance, so-called communal ownership (collective instead of state ownership), and abolished the presidium (predsedništvo) as a consulting body

6 Josipovič, Damir. 2014a. Slovenci na Balkanu skozi moderne popise prebivalstva 1880-2012, in Slovenian immigration and society activities across the former Yugoslavia, edited by Žitnik Serafin, Janja. Ljubljana: Založba ZRC, 67-89. 7 On the war losses see Kočović for the Serbian perspective and Žerjavić for the Croatian perspective. In the aftermath of WWII the official number was considerably higher at about 1.7 million casualties. This number was seriously questioned in the 1980s. 8 For the Muslim population, three options were available: Serb – Muslim; Croat – Muslim; or unaffiliated – Muslim. 9 Josipovič, Slovenci na Balkanu.

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of the president. The new constitutional law was adopted on 13 January 1953. The same year a new thorough census was carried out to record the outcome of the first petletka – the five-year economic plan 1946–1951 (interrupted by the conflict between the Warsaw Pact states and Yugoslavia). The legal base was represented in the Act on the Population Census on the Territory of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, 31 March 1953 (published in the Official Gazette, Nr. 60 in 1952). The census methodology generally remained the same, though many census questions and additional data elaborations were added. It is important to stress the somewhat special position of Slovenia within Yugoslavia. At that time the question on the Trieste territory had not yet been resolved, and the Koper district in Zone B, administered by the Yugoslav military, was not under Slovenian administration. Despite the second Trieste crisis, the on-going dispute with the Soviet Union and the embargo imposed from the COMECON countries to Yugoslavia, the country continued with the census exercise. Furthermore, it introduced a question on religious affiliation,10 not just to assess the degree of “atheization” in the secular country, but also to persuade its western allies of its neutral political status. According to Edvard Kardelj,11 seeking neutral status was the only way to ensure the socialist state’s existence since the break from the USSR. However, this did little to persuade western partners (especially the USA and UK), since Yugoslavia was constitutionally an atheist country, and it was not until 1991 when a question on religious affiliation was posed again – this time on the eve of the dissolution of the federation. The census of 1953 was very important for Slovenia from the perspective of territorial coverage. Among sixteen volumes of published results , book XV (issued in 1960) covered for the first time the whole area of Slovenia, Croatia, and consequently the whole of Yugoslavia (cf. Table 1). In 1954 the former Zone B of the Free Territory of Trieste was divided between Slovenia and Croatia, following another change in Istria in 1956, where parts of three cadastral municipalities formerly under the short-term Croatian administration were annexed to Slovenia.12 The 1961 census was the first to ensure the same methodology was used throughout the country. It was carried out according to the Act on the Population Census in 1961 (published in the Official Gazette Nr. 53 in 1960), around the time of the adoption of the third Yugoslav Constitution (7 April 1963). In addition to the change of the name to the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY), the constitution gave a further degree of self-governance to its republics, as well as to the autonomous provinces in Serbia. The publication of the results had a certain orientation towards migration trends, and in support of such analysis, special demographic macro-regions (demografski rajoni) were formed within the republics and provinces. The

10 The census question asked about one’s “personal relation towards religion.” The question was removed from the questionnaire for the next three censuses (1961, 1971, and 1981). 11 Kardelj, Edvard. 1980. Boj za priznanje in neodvisnost nove Jugoslavije 1944-1957. Ljubljana: DZS, 130, 142-143. 12 Josipovič, Damir and Vera Kržišnik-Bukić. 2010. Slovensko-hrvaški obmejni prostor. Etnične vzporednice med popisi prebivalstva po letu 1991. Ljubljana: Institute for Ethnic Studies, 130.


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census results confirmed the tangible effects of industrialization and urbanization, but they also revealed the first signs of depopulation in the countryside and pronounced differences in fertility rates. Slovenia was seen to be transforming into an immigration destination, as the urban centres received many people from other republics, predominantly Croatia. The 1960s also marked a period of extensive guest-worker emigration, predominantly to Germany and Austria. This emigration mostly affected the eastern and north-eastern parts of Slovenia, though workers streamed north from throughout the SFRY. This massive “temporary work” emigration led the federal statistical office to introduce changes in the census methodology. To avoid enumerating a considerable population outflow (estimated at some 5% at the time), the census of 1971 included a category for the absent “guest workers” (zdomci) and their family members on the basis of one’s permanent residence, which remained in Slovenia or elsewhere in Yugoslavia. The 1971 census was carried out in accordance with the Act on the Census of Population and Dwellings in 1971 (published in the Official Gazette Nr. 32 in 1970), and it recorded a number of evolving changes. The membership of Slovenia in the Yugoslav federation had a massive impact on its overall development. Especially after the second period of industrialization in the 1960s, Slovenia became the most developed part of Yugoslavia, with strong immigration from other republics. The planned immigration was directed to strategically important infrastructure sites including the military, hospitals, railways, customs, police, etc.; or towards the developed urban centres, through a policy of so-called pseudo-voluntary migration.13 Due to its geographical position, proximity and open border to the west, and small population, Slovenia was a convenient subject for a series of more or less successful experiments related to counting the population. For example, it was the first republic to establish an electronic population register in the 1970s based on the Introduction of the Central Register of Permanent Population Act (published in the Official Gazette Nr. 46 in 1970). The register’s database was partially used in the 1971 census, while the census data were in turn used to correct the initial inputs into the Register’s database. The electronic processing of the collected data was another important achievement of the 1971 census, which became a standard for future censuses. As far as the results themselves are concerned, the census revealed high temporary emigration from Slovenia to the west (60,000 people or about 7% of the economically active population in Slovenia). The censuses of 1981 and 1991 were in line with the foundations laid out in the 1971 methodology (in terms of the principle of permanent population), and considered together with the changes in the 1974 constitution, occurred against a backdrop of continued decentralization which, with the benefit of hindsight, paved the way to the independence of various Yugoslav republics and the

13 About the immigration to Slovenia from other republics of Yugoslavia after WWII see Josipovič, Damir. 2006. The effect of Immigration to Slovenia After WWII. Ljubljana: Založba ZRC. About the concept of pseudo-voluntary migration see Josipovič, Damir. 2013. Pseudo-voluntary migration: the case of internal migration system in former Yugoslavia. Ars & Humanitas 7(2), 71-85.

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dissolution of the Yugoslav federation. Decentralization stretched to census administration as well. These developments allowed for the autonomous execution of the 1981 census by the Slovenian Statistical Office based on a separate republic Act on the Census of Population, Households and Dwellings in the Socialist Republic of Slovenia in 1981 (Published both in the federal (Nr. 41) and in the Official Gazette of the Socialist Republic of Slovenia (Nr. 25) in 1980). However, this was not the case in other republics, which, with the partial exception of Croatia remained dependent on the central statistical office in Belgrade. The development of a complete electronic database for the 1981 census allowed for broader access to data (including by the research community), especially after 1991. The 1981 census marked the end of a peak period in immigration to Slovenia. However, the results somewhat blurred the picture since some temporary emigrants (zdomci) eventually turned into permanent emigrants (the 1981 census showed more than 70,000 working legally abroad, while only around 26,000 persons who had been temporarily abroad had returned). Taking into account the number of temporary emigrants, the share of self-identified Slovenes dropped under 90% for the first time after World War II. Moreover, perhaps owing to Tito’s death in 1980, the number of “Yugoslavs” soared from less than 7,000 in 1971 to over 26,000, mirroring ideological trends in other republics (“Tito after Tito”; po Titu Tito/iza Tita Tito).14 Another important census result was an unexpectedly high number of people temporarily present in Slovenia (82,000 or 4% of the population), i.e. present but without permanent residence. The 1991 census was carried out at the end of the Yugoslav era. Except for the basic publication of the first results published by the federal statistical authority, all other results were published only later by the Slovenian Statistical Office as the region descended into war. The legal basis was very complex since the Act on the Census of Population, Households, Dwellings and Agricultural Holdings in 1991 (published in the Official Gazette Nr. 3 in 1990) was amended and published the same year (Official Gazette Nr. 72). The federal Act was supplemented by the republic Act published in the Official Gazette of the Socialist Republic of Slovenia Nr. 8 just before the adoption of amendments to the Slovenian Constitution which ultimately allowed for independence. It is fair to say that the last Yugoslav census of 1991 was simultaneously the first independent Slovenian census, at least as far as the data analyses and the scope of publication are concerned. Post-1991 censuses: The census of 2002

After the simultaneous declaration of independence of Slovenia and Croatia and the outbreak of the Yugoslav wars, Slovenian statistical policy slowly started to divert from the Yugoslav statistical practices and doctrines. However, it was not until the 2011 census when Slovenia officially made a final break with the previous methodology. The census of 2002 was still very much like the census of 1991; only increased automation made it much quicker to collect, analyse, and publish the data.

14 Pirjevec, Jože. 1995. Jugoslavija 1918-1992. Koper: Lipa, 218.


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The legal provisions and protocol in 2002 were much more complicated compared to previous censuses. First of all, in comparison with the preceding census of 1991, agricultural households were enumerated separately, a process that began already in 2000. Second, the definition of the Slovenian population changed in 1995, and so did the counting procedure. Namely, all persons temporarily residing in Slovenia were to be included in the population, while persons away for more than one year, regardless of possession of permanent residence in Slovenia, were not counted. Third, based on the Personal Data Protection Act from 1999 (published in The Official Gazette Nr. 59), the Census Act from 2000 was heavily disputed as was the financing for its execution. Fourth and foremost, due to political and public constraints, the census was carried out a year later than anticipated. The main problem in 2002 was the debate on whether to ask people highly personal, subjective questions on their religious belief and ethnic/national affiliation. Tensions arose between the left and the right wing parties in the national parliament. On the one hand, the right wing politicians maintained it was of essential importance to know the situation of the ethnic Slovenes and the status of the dominant religious group (Catholics) in order to adopt some protective legal measures if it happened to be that the share of either Slovenes or Catholics might decrease. On the other hand, the left wing parties focused their argument on human rights standards and opposed any intrusion through the inquiries related to a respondent’s beliefs, or of one’s ethnic persuasion. Among the proponents for posing questions on religious belief and ethnic affiliation were representatives of different churches and mosques (Catholic, Protestant, Orthodox, and Muslim) as well as the members of ethnic minorities, either very small minorities protected by the constitution (Italians, Hungarians, and Roma, each with less than 10,000 declared), or the larger minorities (Croats, Serbs, and Bosniaks, each about 50,000 strong). The politicisation of the “personal questions” was so harsh that the parliament even failed to reserve finances in the national budget for the execution of the census in 2001, as there was no agreement. After additional public debate, a compromise was achieved and the Act on the Census of Population, Households and Dwellings in the Republic of Slovenia in 2001 (published in the Official Gazette Nr. 66 in 2000) was amended in 2001 (published in the Official Gazette Nr. 26). The changes provided for non-

obligatory questions on religious belief and ethnic/national affiliation. A special category was included for persons not wanting to answer. The question would be posed to all respondents aged 15 and above. In case of an absence at the time of the census-taking, people could send their statements on both questions separately on a special form. This procedure reflected the sensitive nature of these questions, as for other census questions, a family or a household member could supply answers for those absent. Due to these changes, the National Statistics Act from 1995 (OG 45) was amended in 2001 (OG 9) in order to reflect the new requirements. In the preparation of the 2002 census the Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia (SURS) acknowledged taking into account pertinent international recommendations. A UN Resolution on censuses and statistics (adopted on 19

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July 1995 at the 44th plenary) aimed at fulfilling the expectations for censuses in the period 1995–2004, and to ensure advanced planning and timely dissemination of census results to all users. Another important programme affecting the data release, availability of results and publication was the 2000 World Population and Housing Census Programme adopted by the UN Economic and Social Council. According to its provisions, the state should take care of data dissemination, reporting to the UN and involving appropriate intergovernmental and other organizations to assist in studies on population development, the environment and socio-economic development. Slovenia also followed the European rules on statistics since it was progressing through the accession process. The enumeration period began on 31 March 2002 at midnight. The data collection procedure was divided into three separate sub-censuses, for population, households, and for dwellings. To reduce costs, the Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia pre-prepared forms within the questionnaires with data already gathered from various administrative and statistical sources. The pre-census database was prepared using data from the Central Population Register, the Permanent Population Register, the Register of Spatial Units, the Statistical Register of Employment, the Business Register of Slovenia, the Unemployment Register of the Employment Service of Slovenia, the Pension and Disability Insurance Database, the statistical survey data on students and graduates, and the 1991 Census data. Thus the census form was pre-filled and consequently much shorter. The pre-filled content included: place of birth, last migration, citizenship, marital status, field of education, employment status, occupation, job, usual working hours, and place of work. Along with these data sets, some data was partially used depending on prior availability: gender, the address of residence one year before the census, first residence after birth, educational attainment and place of education. The pre-filling process did not raise questions of data privacy since the data related mostly to date and place of birth, year of migration to present locality etc.; furthermore, the enumerators were bound to secrecy. Every enumerator had a maximum of 100 people to count. The field work consisted of two possible approaches. The possibility of self-enumeration foresaw that answers to most questions on the P-2 census questionnaire for dwellings and the P-3 census questionnaire for persons were answered by the respondents themselves (for the reference persons of the household and for other household members). The person enumerating a given household would have to establish the number of its members and upon their request deliver a pre-filled census form. In practice this was not very common. Instead, a classical enumeration technique was predominantly used. In the latter case, census questionnaires would be filled in by specially trained enumerators on the basis of interviews with respondents or by an adult member of the household responding for absent household members and children under 15.15 The Population Census of 2002 was unique in many ways. Apart from the changed population definition, it also contained the last data collected on

15 Source: Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia.


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ethnic and religious structure (though as noted above, these questions were not obligatory). It was also the first census to reveal a decrease in the total population – 1,965,886 in 1991 as opposed to 1,964,036 in 2002, which rendered public opinion very critical to the census results as a whole. According to its methodology, the census enumerated only the resident population (the Slovenian citizens and the foreign citizens with a permanent residence in Slovenia at the time of the census), while this was not the case in the former census. The Slovenian Statistical Office (SURS) restructured the results of the 1991 census to make it comparable to those of 2002. In doing so it subtracted all temporary migrants abroad (52,000) from the number of the total population. Thus it rendered a new total of 1,913,355 inhabitants, thus the total number of the population reportedly increased by 50,681 persons or +2.6% between 1991 and 2002. Despite the negative natural increase (–3, 500 persons during this period) this increase may be attributed to immigration (28,000 persons since 1991) and the legalisation of residence of former Yugoslav citizens who already lived in Slovenia at the time of the 1991 census.16 Thorough analyses, on the contrary, showed that the inter-census period produced an increase of +14,000 citizens permanently living in Slovenia. In the meantime, the natural increase was reduced by only 2,000 persons, and net immigration amounted to only 15,000 persons.17 Apart from 1,924,000 citizens, the census enumerated about 40,000 permanent residents (without citizenship), but did not enumerate those persons with a temporary residence permit regardless of the length or nature of their stay (e.g. continuing extensions). Thus the time-series was broken and the census data cannot be simply compared with previous censuses. Another huge obstacle in data analyses was the question of the “erased” population. Slovenia erased some 30,000 persons from its population register as a reaction to (some would say punishment for) not applying for Slovenian citizenship when Yugoslavia began to fall apart.18 The majority of the “erased” was born in one of the former Yugoslav republics and were ethnically mostly Serbs and Muslims, but included Slovenes, Croats, and others as well. Due to its clear anti-Yugoslav perspective (the orchestrated but hidden procedure was applied to no other foreign citizens at that time living in Slovenia) this eradication has been referred to by some as an “e-genocide”.19 While drawing criticism for being overly dramatic and therefore devaluing the actual violent impact of the wars in the region, some said that the practical consequence of such a demographic “genocidal process” was the subordination of certain groups, through extermination, removal or suppression.20 However, while the

16 Source: Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia. 2004. 17 Josipovič, The effect of Immigration, 258–263. 18 Dedić, Jasminka, et al. 2003. Izbrisani (The Erased): organizirana nedolžnost in politike izključevanja. Ljubljana: Peace institute. 19 Just as “genocide” is a highly disputed and controversial term in this context, Sémelin (2009) proposed the use of the term “mass murder,” arguing that the electronically “murdered” did not exist anymore. “We moved into the twilight zone, we ceased to exist, we were clinically dead,” as recalled by an “erased” 45-year old M.P. from Ljubljana. Josipovič, Damir. 2014b. Avtohtonost,

etničnost, narodnost in definicija narodne manjšine, in Zgodovinski, politološki, pravni in kulturološki okvir za definicijo narodne manjšine v Republiki Sloveniji, edited by Josipovič, Damir and Vera Kržišnik-Bukić. Ljubljana: Institute for Ethnic Studies, 9-34. 20 Sémelin, Jacques. 2009 [2005]. Purifier et détruire: Usages politiques des massacres et génocides. Éditions de Seuil, 349.

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appropriate terminology is debatable, the process had undeniable demographic consequences. A careful reading of the above-noted information on the inter-census population increase shows that the National Statistical Office admitted the existence of more than 26,000 of the previously erased people, whose existence has finally been recognised and legalised (though the process is not yet finished). Another change was related to data retrieval and subsequent analyses. The introduction of confidentiality (as part of the outcome of the aforementioned public debate) was regulated by the amended Act on the 2002 census (OG 26 in 2001). Data confidentiality was operationalized through the substitution of the small aggregate numbers or the individual data (based on the aggregate data for the settlement, category, or other statistical grouping) with the letter “z” (zaupno or confidential). The total numbers under 4, say, per village was not shown due to a possibility of cross calculation. When dealing with the ethnic and religious data, the minimum aggregate number was 10, for example, per municipality. In previous censuses, all data were published to the level of a settlement (e.g. village).21 The 2011 census

The population census of 2011 was the first entirely register-based census in Slovenia. There was no door-to-door enumeration. It was also Slovenia’s first census as a member of the EU. Its legal basis was covered with the Programme of the statistical research and the Act of the National Statistics from 2001. The decision on a register-based census was adopted in 2004 with the final report of the 2002 census. The problems in carrying out a classical census and the questionnaire content, as well as substantial financial savings, were among the main reasons for this decision. Methodologically the Statistical Office followed the EU regulations on censuses from 2008, as well as relevant regulations from 2009 and 2010. By 2011 Slovenia was one of nine countries in Europe to introduce this form of census-taking.22 The register-based census is basically not a census but rather a critical moment based break-down of the population situation in Slovenia according to the collected data of various registers. The critical date was 1 January 2011, and the data sources for this aggregative process were broad. It included official statistical databases produced or administered by the Statistical Office (Statistics of births, migration, employment, student enrolment in tertiary education, recipients of scholarships, and the 2002 census database); Administrative registers managed by the Ministry of the Interior, including the Central Population Register and the Household Register; data from the Surveying and Mapping Authority of the Republic of Slovenia including the Real Estate Register, the Register of Spatial Units; and the Business Register of Slovenia maintained by the Agency for Public Legal Records and Related Services. There are several

21 The marginal aggregate number of any statistical appearance was 4. Numbers 1, 2, and 3 were deemed “unsafe” and replaced by “z” values. However, the marginal number with ethnic statistics was 10 and all aggregate numbers below 10 were replaced by “z”. This procedure was applied for the first time in the history of modern censuses in Slovenia. 22 Beside Slovenia, Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, Iceland, Belgium, Sweden, Norway, and Austria use this approach.


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other databases and registers supervised or covered by other public offices: recipients of social transfers by the Ministry of Labour, Family and Social Affairs, income tax by the Tax Administration of the Republic of Slovenia, unemployed persons by the Employment Service of Slovenia, national examination and graduates by the National Examination Center, recipients of pensions by the Pension and Disability Insurance Institute, and insured persons by the Health Insurance Institute of Slovenia. This practice helps to cut costs, enhances data analyses and publication, and reduces the potential for harassment or a person’s exposure to the intrusion of face-to-face inquiry. However, it also assumes a trustworthy system of gathering and entering data and transferring it to higher level data bundles, as well as effective quality control mechanisms. This method of collecting census data can lead to problems of presupposed data, untrue entries, as well as questions regarding the validity of the data (such as actual occupation of dwellings, fictitious population, etc.) some of which can only be supplied through direct interviews with the target population. The census data covered a wide variety of features from the field of population, household and families, and dwellings.23 It did not cover questions on ethnicity, religions, and language, since the various registers do not systematically collect this type of data. The census results were relatively quickly available and obtainable online in 2011. It was the first census to have published all the results exclusively electronically with no paper publication.

Conclusion – controversies and challenges

Slovenia’s census history reflects its changed position and status throughout the past century, while its most recent census reflects its status as a member of the EU. However, as Slovenia moves forward with statistical data collection and analyses, a number of issues must be considered and improved if public policy is to be grounded in solid data. Three main groups of challenges and issues are noted below. The views of ethnic and religious communities about ethnicity and religion statistics The last register-based census of 2011 was carried out rather quietly, and due to its register nature was rather detached from the public. Considering the

23 Split into three major parts (Population, Household and Families, and Dwellings), the census covered exclusively the data already gathered by various registers and databases: Demographic characteristics (gender, age, legal marital status, de facto marital status, live born children, citizenship, usual residence); Migration (place of birth, ever resided abroad, year of arrival to Slovenia, previous usual residence, year of last migration, migration status of parents, immigrant background); Activity (activity status, status in employment, occupation, industry, size-class, type of sector, place of work); Educational attainment; Households (relation to the reference person, type of household, size of household, household status, tenure status of household, generational composition); Families (type of family, size of family, family status, position in family); Dwellings and equipment (type of living quarters, location of living quarters, housing arrangements, type of ownership, useful floor space, number of rooms, kitchen, electricity supply, piped gas, water supply system, toilet facilities, bathing facilities, sewage disposal, type of heating, type of building, number of floors, lift, construction materials, period of construction, occupancy status, number of occupants, number of households, density standard, seasonal and secondary use).

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financial position of the central government, the economic crisis and austerity measures (regular door-to-door enumeration would have cost around 14 million Euros), the decision to implement a register-based census was politically well accepted.24 Owing to European regulations and the non-obligatory status of questions on ethnicity and religion, the census was performed without much publicity. However, this was not so well accepted among the general public or within religious and ethnic communities, as many wanted to have a classical personal enumeration in order to gain some insight into recent changes and trends in the ethnic and religious structure.25 One possibility to overcome this issue was to include the ethnicity data where possible. While many registers do not systematically include data on ethnicity, some are available; the system does collect data on ethnicity including statistics on births, conjugal status, deaths, migration etc. These data became highly volatile in recent years, since the ethnic affiliation of mothers giving birth was not noted in 70% of cases.26 According to official sources, about one fifth of the population has a registered ethnicity in some register.27 Use of such data would be problematic since ethnic affiliations can be subject to change. Such an approach would also not be consistent. The constitutionally protected privileged Italian and Hungarian minorities have very little insight into the quantitative and demographic development of their communities. Traditionally inhabiting the Littoral (Italians) and, Prekmurje (Hungarians) in the east, over time, they lost a substantial portion of their former population. According to the last available data from 2002, there are about 2,300 Italians (3,800 with Italian mother tongue), and 6,200 Hungarians (7,700 with Hungarian mother tongue). In spite of these low numbers, Hungarians and Italians enjoy guaranteed representation in the National Parliament (one member per each minority). In addition, the Roma population is also constitutionally protected, though to a limited degree. The first appearance of Roma as a category recognized in the Slovenian legal system was in the constitution of 1991, when they were noted as a protected minority at the same time as the new constitution introduced the term “autochthonous” for Hungarians and Italians. The constitution anticipated a special act on Roma, which was adopted in 2007.28 The 2002 census was thus a kind of a stimulant for relevant legislation since the census enumerated as twice as many Roma as in 1991, even though the question was non-obligatory, and even though the census data were not used to determine the areas of Romani settlements. In 2002 there were 3,200 Roma (3,800 with

24 One additional possible reason why the census of 2011 was not executed in the classical way is the unsolved question on the boundary course between Slovenia and Croatia. Hamlets along Dragonja River are subject to dispute – enumeration exhibits the effectivité principle. Effectivité, a principle in international law, describes which of the involved sides exhibit the control over a given territory. If for instance one side cannot “exhibit” an enumeration over such a territory than it would be considered “ineffective.” 25 cf. The internal report of Government's position towards the conclusions of the Commission for ethnic minorities of the Republic of Slovenia (6.6.2013) 26 Josipovič, The effect of Immigration, 159–160. 27 Government's opinion of the Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia on the question of the Parliamentary Commission on the national minorities. Ministry of Interior, 6 June 2013. 28 The Roma Community Act. The Official Gazette 33/07.


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Romani mother tongue). In contrast with the legal position of Hungarians and Italians (where bilingual settlements were recognized for legal protection), Roma were allowed a municipal counsellor in every municipality (and not settlement or locality), where Roma traditionally live, again regardless of census data. Roma do not have the right to a Parliament member. In contrast to ethnicity, religious belief is not included in any register-based data collection. It can thus only be indirectly inferred from the data on religious communities. For this reason, many interest groups, i.e. ethnic minorities (especially the Hungarians and Italians, but also the minorities from the former Yugoslavia) and religious communities (Catholic, Protestant, Orthodox, and Islamic) questioned the usefulness of a register census. They expected other ways of assessing the ethnic and religious structure, but the state failed to provide such alternative solutions. The question of the Erased population of 1992 and the status of ex-Yugoslav minorities Many ethnicity-based cultural societies, representing mostly the members of former Yugoslav constitutive nations (Bosniaks, Croats, Serbs, Macedonians, Montenegrins) and Albanians (from Kosovo, Macedonia and Montenegro), openly laid claims for constitutional or legal recognition.29 According to EXYUMAK (The coordination of minorities from the former Yugoslavia in Slovenia), there are more than 200,000 members of the former Yugoslav nations deprived of collective legal protection in Slovenia.30 As noted, the so-called Erased population, was and remains controversial. The act of erasure was deemed illegal by the Constitutional Court through several verdicts.31 Some suggest that the state ought to repair the injustices and return to the Erased the status of permanent residents, notwithstanding the potential application for Slovenian citizenship. Others maintain that the Erased did not want Slovenian citizenship in the first place, and are thus entitled to neither residency nor citizenship. The problem is still not completely resolved. Representatives of civil society organizations working on behalf of the Erased pleaded for a classical census to determine the real extent of the affected population by the erasure. This problem is in a way connected to the broader issue of xenophobia and public discourse on the idea that the population of ethnic Slovenes is decreasing and at risk of being extinguished. Even though thorough data analysis showed that the share of Slovenes did not decrease in the period 1991–2002, this did not stop public opinion from being somewhat influenced and informed by experts or by parties’ spokespersons claiming the opposite.32 The

29 Kržišnik-Bukić, Vera. 2014. Kdo so narodne manjšine v Sloveniji? Ljubljana: Zveza zvez kulturnih društev narodov in narodnosti nekdanje SFRJ v Sloveniji. 30 Kržišnik-Bukić, Vera. Kdo so narodne manjšine v Sloveniji?. 31 Constitutional Court Verdicts nr. U-I-284/94, 8 February 1999, and nr. U-I-246/02, 3 April 2003. 32 See for example, Šumi, Irena 2005: Natives, newcomers and others: metalepsis of belonging in the

borderland of Val Canale, Italy, in Culture and power at the edges of the state, edited by Thomas M. Wilson, Hastings Donnan. Münster : LIT, 2005. (European studies in culture and policy ; vol. 3), 103–126.

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main reason for varied interpretations of the 2002 census results, however, is methodological in nature. The number of the ethnically undeclared in the population rose immensely (from 42,000 in 1991 to 175,000 in 2002). Due to complicated census methodology, it is hard to penetrate the public sphere with more argumentative discussion. Domestic politicians are often inclined to misuse results related to ethnic affiliation, and a lower share of the ethnic Slovene majority could possibly increase ethnic tensions and xenophobia in the country. Hiring quotas and public policy Another issue was raised by questioning the suitability of the census data to arrange quotas for the state financing of religious personnel (priests, military curates etc.). The only way to roughly assess the share of Catholics was to employ the 2002 census data. A very high proportion of non-responses (persons who did not wish to answer the question on religious belief) led to diminished numbers of the religiously declared population. According to the 57% share in the 2002 census, the Catholic Church was allocated co-financing for 800 priests (health insurance and pension funds). The Catholic Church, however, claims the share of worshippers is around 80%. In the Slovenian education system there is no general provision on the use of census data to determine quotas on teachers or students. Nevertheless, in the Italian and Hungarian minority areas, there are other legal provisions that ensure the principles of rotation, shares of the minority speakers etc. Among these the question of language use in official procedures is of paramount importance for both minorities. Their rights are based on a territorial principle (areas with legally recognized settlements or parts of settlements). But the lack of administration workers’ linguistic proficiency in minority languages has led to a deteriorated position for minority members at the local level since they sometimes cannot efficiently communicate with the officials. Again, the lack of up to date information on these populations make relevant public policy difficult to implement. The results of the 2011 census are mixed. On the one hand, as an EU member state Slovenia’s use of the register-based method was useful in keeping costs down, ensuring rapid publication of results, and gathering the information which was felt to be most needed in the making of public policy. They were able to do this without introducing “sensitive” questions into the discussion that could have distracted from the other data collection goals. On the other hand, the absence of sensitive identity-related information has been criticized by those who believe such information is needed, either for the simple sake of knowledge or to determine certain allocations of public funding or representation. Moving forward, it will be interesting to see how Slovenia strives to strike a balance on this complicated and often controversial issue. Since independence, the censuses in Slovenia have reflected heavy politicization. Soon after the 1991 census, the issue of the Erased population appeared. Though enumerated within the permanent population of Slovenia in 1991, the treatment of the Erased represented the first massive casualty of anti-Yugoslav and xenophobic sentiment. Only months after the erasure, the census results revealed a surprisingly low number of non-Slovenian, former


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Yugoslav-descent respondents, thus demonstrating the practical impact of the policy regarding the Erased. The 2002 census results confirmed this. The Roma were one of the few minority groups who quantitatively benefitted from the constitutional recognition of 1991 and the Roma Community Act in 2007. In addition, it is interesting that these censuses revealed a generally lower share of all ethnic self-determination alternatives, as the non-response option was increasingly used. In the two decades since independence, Slovenia has gradually moved from the Yugoslav-oriented census policy to a more Scandinavian approach. Previously the questions on ethnicity, language, and religion were censuses’ conditio sine

qua non – the central issue and by far the most eagerly awaited result. Such expectations endured well after 2002. Only the last census of 2011 breaks with the past and ends this era, though the Yugoslav legacy critically affected the formation of the census methodology and consequently its results in Slovenia. This historic break was informed more by financial shortcomings and considerations than by realistic political and policy preferences. However, the issue – and challenge - of effectively ensuring rights and representation continues. Bibliography

Dedić, Jasminka, et al. 2003. Izbrisani (The Erased): organizirana nedolžnost in politike izključevanja. Ljubljana: Peace institute.

Federal Statistical Office. 1981. Population census. Belgrade: Federal Statistical Office of SFRY.

Federal Statistical Office. 1991. Population census. Belgrade: Federal Statistical Office of SFRY.

Government of the Republic of Slovenia, 2013. The internal report of Government's position towards the conclusions of the Commission for ethnic minorities of the Republic of Slovenia (6.6.2013)

Josipovič, Damir. 2006. The effects of Immigration to Slovenia After WWII. Ljubljana: Založba ZRC.

. 2012. Instrumentalization of ethnicity within multi-national countries: the colonization of Slovenes in the Austro-Hungarian part of the former Yugoslavia. Two Homelands 35, 135-148.

. 2013. Pseudo-voluntary migration: the case of internal migration system in former Yugoslavia. Ars & Humanitas 7(2), 71-85.

. 2014a. Slovenci na Balkanu skozi moderne popise prebivalstva 1880-2012, in Slovenian immigration and society activities across the former

Yugoslavia, edited by Žitnik Serafin, Janja. Ljubljana: Založba ZRC, 67-89. . 2014b. Avtohtonost, etničnost, narodnost in definicija narodne manjšine, in

Zgodovinski, politološki, pravni in kulturološki okvir za definicijo narodne manjšine v Republiki Sloveniji, edited by Josipovič, Damir and Vera Kržišnik-Bukić. Ljubljana: Institute for Ethnic Studies, 9-34.

. and Vera Kržišnik-Bukić. 2010. Slovensko-hrvaški obmejni prostor. Etnične vzporednice med popisi prebivalstva po letu 1991. Ljubljana: Institute for Ethnic Studies.

Kardelj, Edvard. 1980. Boj za priznanje in neodvisnost nove Jugoslavije 1944-

1957. Ljubljana: DZS.

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Kržišnik-Bukić, Vera. 2014. Kdo so narodne manjšine v Sloveniji? Ljubljana: Zveza zvez kulturnih društev narodov in narodnosti nekdanje SFRJ v Sloveniji.

Pirjevec, Jože. 1995. Jugoslavija 1918-1992: Nastanek razvoj in razpad

Karadjordjevičeve in Titove Jugoslavije. Koper: Lipa, 218. Sémelin, Jacques. 2009 [2005]. Purifier et détruire: Usages politiques des

massacres et génocides. Éditions de Seuil. Statistical Office of Croatia, 2001. Population census. Zagreb: Statistical Office

of Croatia. Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia, 2002. Population census.

Ljubljana: Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia. . 2004. The assessment of 2002 census. Ljubjana: Statistical Office of the

Republic of Slovenia. Šumi, Irena 2005: Natives, newcomers and others: metalepsis of belonging in

the borderland of Val Canale, Italy, in Culture and power at the edges of

the state, edited by Thomas M. Wilson, Hastings Donnan. Münster : LIT, 2005. (European studies in culture and policy ; vol. 3), 103–126.

. and Josipovič, Damir. 2008. Autochthonism and Romany: Towards Rethinking the Principles of Minority Policies in Slovenia. Two Homelands

28, 93–111.

Conclusion: The Politics of Numbers – Censuses in the Post-Yugoslav States

Soeren Keil Reader, Canterbury Christ Church University

[email protected]

http://www.suedosteuropa.uni-graz.at/cse/en/keil





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Soeren Keil

This conclusion poses a number of questions related to policy issues and

the censuses in the post-Yugoslav states. It is argued that censuses are

always more than just a technical counting exercise. Census discussions in

Western Europe tend to focus on regional funding, infrastructure support

and long-term policy planning, and can be as contested and heated as

questions over identity, religion and mother tongue in the post-Yugoslav

states. However, identity-related questions in an area in which identity is

still in flux and in which fundamental demographic changes have taken

place recently, prevent any focus on more policy-oriented discussions. In

their EU integration process, all of the post-Yugoslav countries will have

to concentrate on issues such as economic development, sustainable

infrastructure planning, budgeting within the strict rules of the most

recent EU agreements and hence policy discussions should be at the

forefront of the debates about the results of the censuses. Instead,

discussions over who is counted and how remain of key importance in all

countries (even those that have joined the EU), and demonstrate

unconsolidated nation-building projects.

Keywords: Census taking, post-Yugoslav states, EU enlargement,

Ethnicity, nation-building

Introduction

As the papers in this special issue have demonstrated, censuses have been

highly contested in the post-Yugoslav states. From the question of the “erased” persons in Slovenia to problems related to the inclusion of minorities such as the

Roma, and especially issues related to inter-ethnic relations in very diverse

societies – censuses remain divisive, create conflict and contribute to new

tensions.1

Yet, there is little disagreement that censuses also matter in practical terms.

Nobody, as Pieter Everaers points out, questions the usefulness of a census as a

tool to inform policy-makers about future policy planning in relation to

schooling, hospitals, regional development, budget allocation, etc. Indeed, the

usefulness of information about how many people live in a state and which

Soeren Keil is Reader in Politics and International Relations at Canterbury Christ Church

University in the United Kingdom. His research interests include the political systems of the post-

Yugoslav states, EU enlargement policy and conflict resolution in divided societies. He is the

author of “Multinational Federalism in Bosnia and Herzegovina” (2013) and the Co-editor (with

Valery Perry) of “State-Building and Democratization in Bosnia and Herzegovina” (forthcoming 2015). 1 Visoka, Gëzim and Elvin Gjevori. 2013. Census Politics and Ethnicity in the Western Balkans.

East European Politics 29(4), 479-98.

Soeren Keil

177

regions they live in (and also how the population has changed over time – for

example through migration), are indeed vital for policy-making. Reliable data

are of key importance in decisions on complex questions, including budget

allocation and regional development issues. Having said this, what is often

forgotten is that these policy decisions can have far-reaching consequences.

Decisions over who gets what kind of resources, where hospitals and schools are

being built and which regions deserve special financial support are deeply

political – and contested, even in the established liberal democracies in Western

Europe. Censuses, in other words, are never just a technical exercise; they have

far-reaching implications for future policy- and decision-making.

In the post-Yugoslav states, there has been a stronger focus on identity-related

questions, in particular in relation to ethnicity/nationality, religion, mother

tongue and in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) also over the question of

citizenship. These questions add an additional layer of complexity to census

exercises, because their use is often unclear and in fact is mostly linked to

ethnic engineering, confirming the dominance of one group in a territory over

another, or ensuring certain rights associated to the numbers represented in the

census. What the strong focus on these questions demonstrates is that identity

is still a flexible category in the post-Yugoslav states, though there are strong

incentives to pressure a more rigid personal affiliation that in turn would

enlarge and strengthen certain groups. In the most extreme case, Montenegro,

there have been fundamental changes in who declares as Montenegrin or as

Serbian in the last 20 years.2 At the same time population changes resulting

from refugees and internally displaced people in the recent wars, as well as

internal and external migration, also play a much more important role in the

post-Yugoslav states than in many other Western European states.

This Conclusion is focussed on the policy implications of the most recent

censuses in the post-Yugoslav states. It will proceed in three steps. In the first

part, the contested nature of a census will be described in more detail, before the

focus shifts again to the post-Yugoslav states and the sources of contestation in

this region. The final part will look at policy implications and lessons learned.

The Contested Nature of Censuses

In their study of censuses and their political impact, Kertzner and Arel have

highlighted some of the issues related to population counts.3 They demonstrate

that censuses are particularly contested in diverse societies, in post-colonial

countries and in post-war states. Yet, their work clearly highlights that in the

game of numbers as to who is included and what categories are being used,

there are always contested issues, even in relatively homogenous societies. In

Germany, the announcement of a new census in 2011 resulted in numerous

interesting and contested results. For once, big cities such as Berlin and

Hamburg had a lower overall population than previously assumed. This does

not only affect their own budget planning and tax income in the near future, but

2 See for example: Džankić, Jelena. 2014. Reconstructing the Meaning of Being “Montenegrin. Slavic Review 73(2). 347-71. 3 Kertzner, David I. and Dominique Arel (eds.). 2002. Census and Identity: The Politics of Race,

Ethnicity, and Language in National Censuses. Cambridge University Press.


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will also have consequences for their financial subsidiaries, which result from

fiscal equalisation payments. Furthermore, the German census demonstrated

that Germany is relying on immigration for its population growth, and that a

greater proportion of the population have immigrated into Germany or have an

immigration background.4 While some right-wing groups have used these

results to demonstrate the threat immigration poses and warn of the loss of

German identity, cities such as Bremerhaven have filed legal complaints

challenging the results of the census complaining about under-counting,

consequently fearing less financial support.5 Discussions about intra-German

migration, particularly from the East to the richer Western parts of the country,

have also surrounded the census, as have further discussions about the financial

consequences and its impact on the distribution of seats in the Bundesrat,

Germany’s second chamber of Parliament.6 Hence, even in a more homogenous

and well-established liberal democracy such as Germany, the census has had a

big impact and has been contested by different actors.

The situation in countries like Belgium and Spain is even more complicated, as

they have a higher degree of ethnic and linguistic diversity. While it is forbidden

by law to ask certain questions related to identity in Brussels for example, in

Spain groups such as the Catalans and the Basques use the census as a tool to

confirm their absolute majority in their “homelands” and confirm demands for autonomy and even secession. Pieter Everaers is right in his article, when he

claims that similar discussions about the contested nature of censuses that were

observed in the post-Yugoslav states can also be found in other European and

non-European countries. Censuses, in short, are always more than a simple

population count. While often labelled as a simple technical exercise, they

contribute to putting the population of a country in certain pre-prepared

patterns (this is most visible in terms of ethnicity and identity, but also includes

social categories and patterns related to employment).7 This is why it is

important to not only look at the use of census data, but at the way in which

census questions are designed. The design of a question, – whether it is an open

question or uses prepared (some would say limited) categories – the choice of

categories offered, the languages in which people can fill in the census, and the

methods used for holding the census (administrative data collection, interviews,

sending out questionnaires, etc.) all have an impact on the usefulness and the

role of a census in nation-building. Ultimately, this is what it is all about:

censuses are forms of nation-building8 used to confirm who is in a majority in a

given territory, who is a minority and which rights and resources should be

allocated to different groups. Of course data are important for policy planning,

but this policy planning in itself is a form of nation-building. A key criteria for a

4 Bielicki, Jan. 2013. Einwanderungsrepublik Deutschland. Süddeutsche Zeitung, 1. June 2013

(accessed : 03 November 2015). 5 Available here. 6 N.N. 2013. Bevölkerungsrückgng löst Streit ums Geld aus. Die Zeit, 31. May 2013 (accessed: 03

November 2015). 7 The author remembers the 2011 census round in the United Kingdom. When asked about his

employment status he was puzzled by the lack of flexibility in the existing categories, as he was

working part-time as a teaching assistant, while also being a self-employed researcher at the same

time. There were a lot of discussions which boxes to tick and how to describe this employment

status. 8 Anderson, Benedict. 1991. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of

Nationalism. London: Verso.

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nation is not only a shared history, but also a common vision for the future. In

addition to demonstrating a certain degree of homogeneity, census data provide

a great framework for planning and implementing a common vision for the

future.9 This form of nation-building, in connection with state-

building/consolidation and Europeanisation is particularly visible in the post-

Yugoslav states, to which this conclusion now turns.

Censuses in the Post-Yugoslav states: Nation-building, state-

consolidation and Europeanisation

In the Introduction to this special issue, three common themes amongst the

papers are identified: the link of census results and public policy planning,

changing and shifting identities and contested issues within censuses. These

themes demonstrate that despite the diversity of approaches and topics

discussed in each of the post-Yugoslav states’ census, there are still a number of similarities they share. This can be explained by the complex transition that all

of these countries have been going through in recent years – the shift to

becoming independent, building efficient and democratic structures and of

course the process of European integration.10 This rather complicated mix of

different transitions has been labelled as EU Member State Building – an

involvement of the EU in the consolidation and EU integration of the post-

Yugoslav states.11 Censuses are of key importance in this EU Member State

Building process. As all authors in this special issue have pointed out, the EU

played a vital role in the preparation and initiation of the censuses, in some

cases it provided financial assistance for the census exercise, expertise on data

collection and data processing, and, in some cases (Bosnia and Kosovo) more

direct engagement through an International Monitoring Mission.

The EU’s involvement can therefore be classified in three main areas: (a) active state-building by supporting the establishment and training of the government

statistical offices; (b) Europeanisation by focusing on norm adoption and

providing a European framework and European standards for the census

exercise; and (c) democratization by highlighting the importance of the

legitimacy of the census and the proper use of census data in the decision-

making process. From the perspective of the post-Yugoslav states, a number of

observations can be made. As Anna-Lena Hoh and Damir Josipovič highlight in the cases of Croatia and Slovenia respectively, the census exercise was not only

about providing good data for policy planning, but also for proving that both

countries are “good” EU Member States that can fulfil their obligations as members. In particular, Hoh points out that Croatia’s census in this respect was

also seen as an example for the other Western Balkan countries. In the cases of

Montenegro and Serbia, Vuković and Nikolić/Trimajova explain how census taking formed part of the EU integration and accession process of these

countries. The ability to hold a census, despite regional and identity conflicts in

9 For a further discussion on nation-building and nationalism see: Hobsbawm, Eric. 1992. Nations

and Nationalism since 1780. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 10 On the link between these, see: Keil, Soeren. 2013. Europeanization, state-building and

democratization in the Western Balkans. Nationalities Papers 41(3), 343-53. 11 For more on EU Member State Building, see Keil, Soeren and Zeynep Arkan. (eds.). 2015. The

EU and Member State Building – European Foreign Policy in the Western Balkans. Basingstoke:

Routledge.


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both countries, was seen as an important milestone in their ability to adopt EU

law and implement complex European regulations. For Kosovo, Bosnia and

Macedonia, the census exercise demonstrated their long road towards state-

consolidation, and persistent questions related to ethnicity, citizenship and

belonging. It is not surprising that in these three countries the census was most

contested, especially in relation to issues of nationality/ethnicity, religion and

mother tongue. All three countries remain inherently weak, characterised by

political systems which have been influenced by external intervention, and by

identity groups that remain contested and fluid.12 In short, they are

unconsolidated states that are still internally and externally contested.

This is clearly reflected in the census exercise, most drastically in Macedonia

where questions over methodology and data use resulted in the failure of the

latest attempt to hold a census. In Bosnia and Kosovo, too, there are continued

pressures on state institutions and territorial integrity. Kosovo’s census remains contested, as a large portion of the Serb population (especially, but not only, in

the North) has boycotted the census, because they do not, as Musaj argues,

recognise the legitimacy of the institutions of Kosovo to organise such a

population count. In Bosnia, it took nearly 20 years after the end of the conflict

to hold a census, and even when it was organised in 2013, it was neither a

smooth, nor a technical issue. Not only have different political and religious

groups contested the results before they are even published; but as Valery Perry

demonstrates, it remains to be seen how the results of the census will be used

for public policy-making.

The nexus of state-and nation-building, Europeanisation and democratization in

the post-Yugoslav states has had a particular impact on the censuses in these

countries. While all countries tried to prove their ability to hold a technical

counting exercise according to European standards, in many cases this was

overshadowed by questions over who is counted, how is the population count

done and most importantly, how will the data be used for policy-making. All

papers highlight that there have been issues of contestation, and severe effects

on inter-ethnic relations, which in some cases have worsened as a result of the

census exercise. While the EU, as Pieter Everaers demonstrates, can generally

be satisfied with the ability of the states to hold a census, there is nevertheless a

growing recognition that these population counts have contributed to contested

decisions, and will certainly contribute to contested and problematic policies. It

is therefore worth looking at some of the lessons learnt from these censuses.

Policy implications and lessons learnt

The discussion above has demonstrated that the censuses in the post-Yugoslav

states raise a number of interesting issues, both from an academic point of view

and for future policy planning.

As for the academic issues, the link between state-building, Europeanisation

and unconsolidated nation-building projects has been highlighted in numerous

12 Keil, Soeren. 2015. Power-sharing Success and Failures in the Western Balkans, in State-

Building and Democratization in Bosnia and Herzegovina, edited by Keil, Soeren and Valery Perry.

Farnham: Ashgate, 193-212.

Soeren Keil

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papers, and especially the relationship of censuses to nation-building and

consolidation deserves further examination in academic literature.13

Furthermore, the use of censuses as tools of state-building has been

demonstrated. Highlighting ethnic homogeneity, changing population patterns

and deciding who is part of a polity and who is not, who has what status and

what rights are connected to this – these are just some of the questions which

remain of key importance in the post-Yugoslav states. The results of the most

recent violent conflicts in the 1990s are still being felt in many countries, most

visibly in Bosnia and Kosovo. Unresolved issues over ethnic relations have

influenced population counts in Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro. Further

research on this topic promises to tell us more about censuses and state-

building, but also about ongoing nation-building projects and the consolidation

of multi-ethnic states, especially after violent conflict.14 Finally, the European

dimension cannot be underestimated. While EU policies do not require

questions on identity, the EU did not effectively dissuade or prevent countries

from asking these questions, or even ask political elites to justify the inclusion of

these questions. Further, as the EU provided much financial support for the

censuses, the fact that EU money supported censuses in which non-essential

questions came to dominate the public discourse could be a cause for concern.

The EU enlargement process is in many aspects also a large technical exercise,

strengthening state capacity and administrative capabilities. Censuses are the

key, not only because they themselves are seen as a technical exercise, but also

because of their influence on future decision-making. In the post-Yugoslav

states, there has been a strong focus on identity-related issues. It remains to be

seen if there will be more focused policy debates once the results of the most

recent census round will be fully implemented in policy formulation and

decision-making.

In terms of policy implications, one major lesson learnt (or perhaps, confirmed)

is that censuses are never just technical exercises. Their design, the methods

used and their consequences are political. This is not only the case in the

countries discussed in this special issue; but it is of special importance for these

countries. It certainly was a mistake to ever regard these censuses as simple

counting exercises to provide data for policy planning. The implications and

consequences of these censuses are far-reaching, from worsened inter-ethnic

relations in Croatia, to new political and religious mobilisation in Bosnia; from

questions over minority community funding in Kosovo to the failure of census

taking in Macedonia, political issues will continue to dominate the agenda in

the post-Yugoslav states, and these are strongly linked to the census round in

2011.

Could anything have been done differently? Certainly Slovenia’s move towards an electronic census based on aggregating different existing registers is an

alternative to the standard census interview and can prevent the dominance of

13 For a more recent discussion on this topic, see Bieber, Florian. 2015. The Construction of

National Identity and its Challenges in Post-Yugoslav Censuses. Social Science Quarterly 96(3),

873-902. 14 For a discussion on some of these issues, see Džankić, Jelena. 2015. Citizenship in Bosnia and

Herzegovina, Macedonia and Montenegro – Effects of Statehood and Identity Challenges. Farnham

and Burlington: Ashgate.


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identity-related issues in a traditional census exercise. However, it remains

questionable if countries like Bosnia and Kosovo (and even Macedonia) have the

administrative capacity and trustworthy data systems needed to be able to

implement a population count based on different registers. One way to prevent

the focus on identity-related questions and new tensions amongst different

groups would be an insistence from the EU and other financial supporters to

avoid these questions altogether. This, however, would be problematic, because

as the papers on Croatia and Macedonia have demonstrated, minority rights are

often connected to a certain share in the population, which is assessed based on

census data. Having said this, it is a completely flawed assumption that

censuses ever truly reflect the ethnic composition of a country. Not only are

some groups continuously undercounted (such as the Roma), but boycotts

(Kosovo), questions over diaspora involvement (Croatia and Macedonia) and

shifting self-identification (Montenegro) have all resulted in census results

which provide a picture, but not the real picture, of ethnic composition in these

countries. Identity remains a fluctuating category in these new states that were

born out of violent conflict and remain involved in complex state-building and

nation-building projects. This is something that the census cannot take into

account. But this is also the reason why the results should be analysed with

care, and a critical eye for the circumstances surrounding census-taking,

counting criteria and ongoing political discussions, should be adopted. A census

is a snapshot – and as the discussion in this special issue has demonstrated, a

very contested one.

Bibliography

Anderson, Benedict. 1991. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and

Spread of Nationalism. London: Verso.

Bieber, Florian. 2015. The Construction of National Identity and its Challenges

in Post-Yugoslav Censuses. Social Science Quarterly 96(3), 873-902.

Bielicki, Jan. 2013. Einwanderungsrepublik Deutschland. Süddeutsche

Zeitung, 1. June 2013 (accessed : 03 November 2015).

Džankić, Jelena. 2014. Reconstructing the Meaning of Being “Montenegrin. Slavic Review 73(2), 347-71.

. 2015. Citizenship in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and Montenegro

– Effects of Statehood and Identity Challenges. Farnham and Burlington:

Ashgate.

Hobsbawm, Eric. 1992. Nations and Nationalism since 1780. Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press

Keil, Soeren. 2013. Europeanization, state-building and democratization in the

Western Balkans. Nationalities Papers 41(3), 343-53. . 2015. Power-sharing Success and Failures in the Western Balkans, in

State-Building and Democratization in Bosnia and Herzegovina, edited by

Keil, Soeren and Valery Perry. Farnham: Ashgate, 193-212. and Zeynep Arkan. (eds.). 2015. The EU and Member State Building –

European Foreign Policy in the Western Balkans. Basingstoke: Routledge.

Kertzner, David I. and Dominique Arel (eds.). 2002. Census and Identity: The

Politics of Race, Ethnicity, and Language in National Censuses. Cambridge:

University Press.

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2013 (accessed: 03 November 2015).

Soeren Keil

183

Visoka, Gëzim and Elvin Gjevori. 2013. Census Politics and Ethnicity in the


Turkey – June 7: The Elections with

the Wrong Results Election Analysis

Cengiz Günay

Senior Fellow, Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP), Vienna

[email protected]

http://www.suedosteuropa.uni-graz.at/cse/en/gunay Contemporary Southeastern Europe, 2015, 2(2), 16-22




16

Turkey – June 7

The Elections with the Wrong Results

Cengiz Günay*

Keywords: Turkey, Elections June 2015, AKP, HDP, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan

The elections of June 7, 2015 had the effect of a political earthquake. Turkey’s

ruling AKP conceded a sharp drop of 9 percent (from 49.9 to 40.9 percent),

losing, after 13 years in power the overall majority of seats. It was the first

time the ruling party saw a dramatic fall in support. The AKP’s losses seem even more dramatic considering the opposition parties’ underrepresentation in

media and the ruling party’s abuse of public resources.

The major victor of June 7 was the leftist pro-Kurdish HDP (Peoples’ Democratic Party). So far, in order to circumvent the 10 percent threshold, the

Kurdish movement had fielded independent candidates who then once elected

formed a group in parliament. Despite of the fact that Selahattin Demirtaş, the party’s co-leader had achieved 9.7 percent in the presidential elections in

August 2014, the decision still harboured many risks (Todays Zaman 17-01-

2015).1 Polls showed that the party would narrowly pass the 10 percent,

necessary to enter parliament, but only a few observers expected a

breakthrough of 13.1 percent. The HDP’s rise can be attributed to the party’s departure from ethnic based Kurdish political rhetoric, and re-branding and

opening up to an electorate much beyond its Kurdish core constituency in the

country’s east, but this time also the 10 percent threshold played positive role

for the HDP. Many people voted for the HDP because they feared that in case

the party could not exceed the 10 percent, this would leave the Kurds out of

parliament and open the door to a constitutional majority for the AKP. While

the 10 percent threshold had been an instrument that bolstered the ruling

parties’ majority in parliament, this time it turned against the AKP.

Also the nationalist MHP (Nationalist Movement Party) could increase its

votes by 4 percent, gaining 16.3 percent. As opposed to this, the major

opposition party CHP (Republican People’s Party) had not been able to increase

its votes and even lost one percent falling to 25.0 percent.

Seats in parliament are distributed as 258 for the AKP, 132 for the CHP and 80

for the MHP and 80 for the HDP. The result re-introduced Turkey with the

* Cengiz Günay is a senior fellow at the Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP) in

Vienna. He is also lecturer at the Institute for Political Science, University of Vienna as well as at

the Danube University Krems. His fields of expertise encompass the Middle East and Turkey and

their related political systems, islamist movements, socio-economic and political transformation

processes, foreign policy analysis and EU – Turkey relations. 1 Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was elected president in the first round with 51.79 percent.

Cengiz Günay

17

concept of coalition governments.2 The unexpected fact that the AKP did not

only by far miss its set goal of gaining a two-third majority in order to

transform the constitutional system into a tailor-made presidential one, but –

with only 258 seats – it also missed the number of 276 seats, necessary to form

a government on its own, turned the political game in Ankara on its head. As

Aslı Aydıntaşbaş, a journalist with Milliyet daily held in a TV program, on

June 8 Ankara woke up to a new political reality in which Erdoğan and the AKP are not the only game makers in town anymore. Although the political

community had difficulties in adapting to it, a breeze of freedom started to flow

through media. Even pro-government channels began to cautiously air

criticism. President Erdoğan who had openly campaigned for the AKP did not appear in public and did not comment on the results. Erdoğan stayed off-air for

more than three days and twenty two hours, considering his omnipresence in

media an unprecedented length counted by an online ticking counter (Hürriyet

Daily 11-06-2015). His silence opened a discursive space for oppositional voices.

However, it soon became clear the domination of the AKP was not easy to

break. A coalition between the three oppositional parties, leaving the AKP out

was immediately ruled out by the nationalists. The MHP went further and

refused any cooperation with the HDP accusing them of being the long arm of

the Kurdish guerrilla. The AKP’s regaining of control became evident in the

election of the speaker of parliament. While the CHP did not support the

MHP’s candidate (the two parties’ joint candidate in the presidential elections), the MHP in turn refused to support anyone who would also get the votes of the

HDP. The frictions within the oppositional camp re-widened President

Erdoğan’s scope of action. Erdoğan returned on the scene and began to

circulate the idea of early elections. Ahmet Davutoğlu was only given the task of forming a government a month after the elections on July 9th. The

constitution provides that if no government can be formed within 45 days early

elections have to be called. AKP and CHP delegations met several times, but

the leaders were only involved in the last stage. Once also preliminary talks

with the MHP also failed all viable options were exhausted, as the AKP

categorically ruled out any potential coalition with the HDP. Erdoğan did not hand over the task to Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu from the CHP, but called for early elections on November 1st.3

The electoral campaign

The elections of June 7 were the first general elections since Recep Tayyip

Erdoğan’s election into the post of President of the Republic in August 2014.4

2 In its almost 70 years long history of multi-party politics, Turkey has experienced numerous

coalition governments. Particularly, the 1970s and 1990s were characterized by alternating

coalition governments. 3 Erdoğan declared that he would not give the task to anyone “who does not know the way to Beştepe”, Erdoğan’s new presidential palace, referring to the opposition’s refusal to participate in any receptions held in the new presidential palace. 4 A constitutional amendment made in 2007, approved by a plebiscite, provides for the election of

president by popular vote for a five-year term with a chance to be re-elected. The amendment

reduces the tenure of parliament to four years. In the first popular election of a Turkish president

Tayyip Erdoğan was elected into the new office with 51.79 percent in the first round, while the

joint candidate of the two major opposition parties Republican People’s Party (CHP) and the

Turkey – June 7


18

The Turkish constitution assigns the president the role of a non-partisan

arbiter with relatively broad powers particularly in regard to the filling of

higher public sector posts and the formation of government. Erdoğan, however, referring to the fact that he is the first and only president in Republican

history, who was elected by popular vote (51 percent), claims a re-

interpretation of the office as the supreme head of state and politics. Since

assuming office he has pushed to the limits of the constitutional system. He did

not stay aloof from day-to-day politics. Erdoğan convened several times the

cabinet, publicly stated his opinion and ignored the principle of impartiality.

Erdoğan repeatedly highlighted the ills of a “double headed” system. He toyed

with the idea of a change of the current parliamentary system into a

presidential one, strengthening the role of the president and reducing that of

the PM, the government and the parliament. Erdoğan held that this change had become necessary as the presidency which was earlier defined as a

guardian of the tutelary regime would now be the elected representative of the

people. Erdoğan and the AKP have come to see a presidential system as the last cornerstone in the reconfiguration of the Kemalist state.

In the run-up to the elections, Erdoğan toured the country under the pretext of

openings of infrastructure projects or “presidential visits”. In his speeches he

mobilized for his political project. As the opposition fiercely defied his

ambitions, Erdoğan called for 400 seats (a bit more than a two-third majority,

required for constitutional amendments) for the ruling party. Erdoğan did not

take on the role of a distanced statesman or of a neutral arbiter, but by acting

as if he was still a party politician, he breached the constitution. His discourse

mainly polarized against the HDP whose electoral success would prevent him

from a “presidential majority”.

Erdoğan’s re-interpretation of the presidency politicized the office, made it

more vulnerable. It challenged the constitutional order and further polarized

society. As neither the constitutional court nor the supreme election board or

any other independent institution put Erdoğan in his place, the elections became the only arena to defy him. In light of the president’s unbridled hunger for unlimited authority, Selahattin Demirtaş’s proclamation; “we won’t let you become president!” fell on a fertile ground. Demirtaş and the HDP’s campaign revived the Gezi spirit of summer 2013. The HDP’s anti-authoritarian liberal

messages and Demirtaş’s cheeky and humorous responses to Erdoğan’s aggressive rhetoric appealed to a broad spectrum of Erdoğan critics much beyond the party’s Kurdish constituencies. The party’s campaign aimed at presenting the HDP not as a Kurdish party, but one that has also a Turkish

focus. Consequently, the HDP addressed the Kurdish issue in the broader

context of principles as human rights, minority rights and gender rights. It

highlighted the Kurdish issue in the context of the ills of the authoritarian

Turkish state, represented by the AKP. The HDP’s representation of the Kurds as the victims of the authoritarian state built a bridge to other minorities and

groups discriminated against by the male authoritarian state such as women,

LGBTs, leftists, trade unionists, workers, Alevis and others. The HDP’s

Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) won 38.44 percent and Selahattin Demirtaş of the Democracy

Party of Peoples (HDP) garnered 9.78 percent.

Cengiz Günay

19

inclusive message, its reference to diversity and equality and its sensitivity

towards other “victims” in return increased the sense of solidarity and

compassion with the Kurds. Besides liberal constituencies in the country’s western cities such as Istanbul, - where the HDP could win 12.43 percent - the

party was also able to appeal to conservative Kurdish voters, who had earlier

voted for the AKP but have become increasingly disappointed with the

government’s handling of the Kobane crisis and the Roboski (Uludere) massacre when in December 2011 34 civilians were killed in a Turkish

airstrike. The government blocked any investigation on the case and has ever

since tried to sweep it under the carpet. In that regard, the HDP was able to

capitalize on the peace process. The AKP’s decision to start negotiations with the Kurdish guerrilla had been a paradigmatic change that was accompanied

the breach of many nationalist taboos. The HDP could build on this

atmosphere.

While the AKP could hardly capitalize on the peace process – due to the above

mentioned reasons- another party did; the nationalist MHP. While the HDP

could address those who supported the peace process, the MHP’s messages

addressed the fears and uncertainties connected with the process. To many

voters, Turkish nationalism was the answer to the fear of the partition of the

country. These fears were also rising as news about the absence of Turkish

state authority over the eastern provinces began to circulate. Allegedly, the

government in order not to disturb the peace process had turned a blind eye on

the PKK’s establishment of parallel administrative structures in the region,

including check points and courts.

One can conclude that the supporters of the peace process as well its critics

were lured away from the two major political parties; the AKP and the

Republican People’s Party (CHP). Despite a face lifting and a reframing of its electoral program – the CHP tried to present itself as a viable and serious

social democrat alternative, emphasizing mainly social issues – the HDP

proved to be the better and fresher liberal leftist alternative. Demirtaş’s humorous responses to President Erdoğan’s attacks made him into the most

popular oppositional leader. Although, Demirtaş’s charisma radiated away into

the CHP and sympathies for him flew high, to many CHP voters with a

nationalist leaning, the HDP still remained unelectable due to its relations

with the PKK.

The AKP’s campaign in turn, tried to picture the party as the only

representative of the real people. The AKP campaign referred to the party’s “Yeni Türkiye” – New Turkey project, transporting imaginaries of economic

development and social advancement, but it was mainly devoted to Erdoğan’s presidential system. The presidential system was presented as a remedy to the

ills of the country. The AKP’s campaign did not claim the peace process it had

initiated. Instead, the party seemed to turn away from the peace process.

Erdoğan’s attacks on the HDP targeted the rising Turkish nationalist votes.

Erdoğan’s partisan attitude and active campaigning for the AKP overshadowed

the run-up to the elections. Erdoğan was not only partisan, but he acted as if

he was still the head of government and leader of the AKP. While the PM and

the cabinet became reduced to the executive of decisions taken in Beştepe,

Turkey – June 7


20

Erdoğan’s new presidential palace. His public appearances dwarfed PM Ahmet

Davutoglu and other leading party figures. He was overrepresented in media

and the abuse of state resources was massive. Erdoğan’s authoritarian attitude

fuelled fears of manipulations of the electoral results. This in turn stimulated

an unprecedented number of people to register with newly constituted NGOs

such as oy ve ötesi (vote and beyond) for voluntary election monitoring.

The AKP’s new ideology: Erdoganism The June 7 elections provided Erdoğan and the people around him the

opportunity to get rid of inconvenient persons within the party. Particularly,

people accounted as being close to former President Abdullah Gül posed

potential obstacles to the AKP’s transformation into a de-ideologicized party

machine and majority provider for Erdoğan’s ambitions. Levent Gültekin an

independent journalist wrote in the online news platform Diken that Erdoğan played a major role in choosing the candidates for the elections. Gültekin

highlights that many ideologues and old companions became replaced with yes-

men, who owe their status and position to Erdoğan and who are absolutely

loyal to him (Diken 31-05-2015). Erdoğan’s interventions made Davutoğlu look like his trustee. This had a negative effect on their relationship. Tensions

between the palace (saray) on the one hand and Davutoğlu, the government and leading party figures on the other hand grew. Three major events revealed

the growing frictions between the palace (saray) and the Davutoğlu government:

The first one was President Erdoğan’s public fall out with the governor of the central bank. Erdoğan attacked the governor of pursuing a wrong interest rate policy. The crisis was seen as a reflection of the growing tensions between Yiğit Bulut, a former TV comentator and the president’s major advisor on economy and Ali Babacan, the minister of economy a mentor of the governor and a

defender of the institution’s independence.

The second event was the so called “Fidan case”. Hakan Fidan, the chief of the Turkish national intelligence organization (MIT) often described as Erdoğan’s black box is considered to be a major cornerstone of his personal power system.

In the run-up to the elections Fidan resigned after consulting the PM from his

post and put his candidature for parliament on the AKP list. Fidan was fancied

as the country’s future foreign minister. Erdoğan openly stated his disappointment about Fidan’s resignation without asking for permission:

We brought [Fidan] to such a position. I am the one who brought

him there. If so, when departing, he should have stayed and not left

there if he was not being allowed to do so,” “[…] There is of course a

disappointment if a candidacy is in question even though we have

expressed our opinions (Hürriyet Daily News 04-03-2015).

Shortly after, Fidan withdrew his candidacy and returned to his post as chief of

MIT.

The third major event that made the growing tensions within the AKP visible

was the president’s fall out with the government over the “peace process” and

Cengiz Günay

21

the turbulences this caused among leading party figures. Erdoğan publicly

disagreed with the government on the so called “Dolmabahçe declaration” in

which the government and a Kurdish delegation jointly declared to have agreed

on the formation of an observational committee. Deputy Prime Minister and

the government’s spokesperson Bülent Arınç, a founding member of the party and a long standing political companion of Tayyip Erdogan, responded the next

day by stating that it is still the government that rules the country and

politically responsible and that the president’s statements were inappropriate. Arınç’s statement in return was commented by Melih Gökçek the mayor of

Ankara with a tweet. Gökçek accused of having ties with the Gülen

Movement5. Arınç’s response came prompt accusing the mayor of Ankara of

extensive corruption and of having himself “sat in Gülen’s lap” (Hürriyet Daily News 23-03-2015). Arınç also announced to “reveal the mayor’s wrongdoings” after the June 7 elections (Hürriyet Daily News 23-03-2015). Meanwhile Arınç did not reveal any of his allegations, the prosecutor did not become active and

no file was opened. The dispute brought the conflict within the party to the

fore.

The June 7 elections clearly bolstered Erdoğan’s grip on the party, also because many of the “heavy weights” among the ideologues, such as Arınç himself, were

not able to stand in the elections due to the party’s self-imposed three term

limitation for any party functions.

One can conclude that Erdoğan’s omnipresence has undermined the party’s political mission and identity. Ideology has become replaced by Erdoğanism, where allegiance to the leader is a major requirement. This has further

fostered the personalization and informalization of relations and opened the

door to palace intrigues. The election results of June 7 thwarted Erdoğan’s plans. The solution of the “system error” was seen in a reset; early elections.

Inciting the Kurdish question

On July 20, 34 people, mainly young Kurdish activists, were killed in a major

bomb attack in the town of Suruç, close to the Syrian border. The attack was

allegedly committed by the IS (Islamic State). The next day, as retaliation for

the attack, two policemen were shot dead by the PKK. These events signalled

the beginning of a spiral of violence. While in the first days the government

declared to fight terrorism of all sorts, it soon became clear that this was the

beginning of a new war against the PKK. The oppositional newspaper Sözcü

commented the government’s U-turn from the peace process with the following

headline; “votes gone - peace process gone” (Sözcü 25-07-2015). Indeed, to many

observers it has not been clear why the government’s policy towards the peace process has changed that radically. The government’s escalation strategy

seems to have nationalist votes in mind. Critics suspect President Erdoğan of

having consciously incited conflict in order to be able to present himself as a

5 The Gülen Movement, a former ally, has turned into Erdoğan’s major internal enemy. The movement accused of having infiltrated the judiciary and the security apparatus, has been

associated with the bugging of the PM and ministers and the allegations brought forward against

Erdoğan and his son. Ever since, the Gülen movement has been a red rag to Erdoğan. Ties with

Gülen have now become a liability and a subject of political pressure and blackmailing within the

ruling party.

Turkey – June 7


22

guarantor of stability and national unity. His repeated claims for a two-third

majority in parliament as a guarantor for stability; “if we would have gained 400 seats, the situation would have been different” (Diken 06-09-2015) seem to

confirm these suspicions. Debates on whether the resurgence of the conflict was

staged have been also fuelled by the tweets of whistle-blower Fuat Avni, who

claims to be a part of Erdoğan’s inner circle. Avni has tweeted several events in

advance. In any case, the government’s willingness to return to a military

conflict resonated with the position of elements within the PKK who seemed

also disturbed by Selahattin Demirtaş’s and the HDP’s rise and its universalist

messages.

The news on fallen soldiers have incited feelings of revenge and invoked

nationalist responses. The killing of 16 soldiers in Hakkari Dağlıca on

September 4, fuelled public anger. In the following days, in a concerted action,

nationalist groups, including young AKP supporters, went into the streets.

HDP bureaus, shops that were allegedly owned by Kurds as well as

oppositional media institutions such as the offices of the Hürriyet newspaper

were attacked and some of them set on fire. At the same time PKK attacks on

the Turkish state have continued. The town of Cizre, a PKK stronghold, was

under curfew for a couple of days. The security situation in the eastern

provinces has deteriorated. Debates whether elections can be held on

November 1st became aired.

The political discourse has been defined by nationalist themes. Under these

circumstances conciliatory voices have been silenced or not heard. But, at the

same time it seems that the mood has also turned against the AKP and

President Erdoğan. The resurgence of the conflict with the PKK has not

alleviated the polarization within society. On the contrary, critical voices

against the government have increasingly turned into angry voices. On several

occasions, the funerals of fallen soldiers have turned into protests against the

government. The outcry of a lieutenant colonel at his brother’s funeral, a soldier who had fallen in the fight against the PKK was synonymous. His

words; “why do those who called for peace now call for war?”(Zaman 24-08-

2015).

Despite of the dramatic changes that occurred since June 7, polls point at no

radical changes for the outcome of the November 1st elections. It seems that the

AKP will not be able to capitalize on its politics of escalation and re-gain an

overall majority, if it will not be able to lure away some of the nationalist votes

it lost to the MHP, Turkey will again stand where it stood on June 7, however

in the meantime even more polarized, divided into ethnic camps, desperate,

disillusioned and economically weakened.

Parliamentary Elections in Croatia 2015:

Victory without Actual Winners Election Analysis

Tihomir Cipek Professor, Faculty of Political Science Zagreb

[email protected]

Miroslav Macan Research Associate, Academy for Political Development Zagreb [email protected]

Tea Trubić Independent Researcher

[email protected]

http://www.suedosteuropa.uni-graz.at/cse/en/cipek Contemporary Southeastern Europe, 2015, 2(2), 99-106




99

Parliamentary Elections in Croatia

2015: Victory without Actual Winners

Tihomir Cipek, Miroslav Macan, Tea Trubić

Keywords: Croatia, Parliamentary Elections, HDZ, SDP, Karamarko, Milanović,

MOST

Introduction

The Croatian Democratic Union (Hrvatska demokratska zajednica, HDZ) has

won yet another election in Croatia. After the success it had on the European

and presidential elections, the so-called „Patriotic Coalition“, led by the aforementioned party has won 59 out of 151 seats in the Parliament. Their

opponents, a slightly-altered version of the current leading coalition led by the

leftist Social Democratic Party (Socijaldemokratska partija Hrvatske, SDP),

won 56 seats. However, the results are far from final. According to the Croatian

Constitution, the party that would be given the mandate to form a government

has to assure the support of 76 seats in the Parliament. So far, none of the new

major parties has succeeded in that task.

The current situation is additionally complicated by the fact that the winner of

the most recent elections is the newly formed initiative called MOST (literally

translated; „the bridge“) which won 19 seats in the Parliament, and without

which it is mathematically impossible to form a government. Given the fact

that MOST is not a party, but a platform made out of 19 individuals, it does not

have a clear party structure, ideology or discipline, and it is therefore almost

impossible to predict the side it will eventually choose to form the government

with. There are several conclusions that could be made when observing the

most recent elections in Croatia; regardless of the continuing growth of

criticism among the voters directed towards the two major parties, both have

succeeded in preserving their dominance in the Croatian political scene. In

spite of the large number of seats won by the initiative MOST, the two major

coalitions won ¾ of the overall seats in the Parliament, therefore proving the

stability of the Croatian political party system. Furthermore, democracy needs

parties to function properly; the emergence of a non-party initiative in the

Tihomir Cipek, is a professor at the Faculty of Political Science in Zagreb. He served as president of the Croatian

Political Science Association. In 2006, he won the Croatian National Award for Science. He was a visiting

professor and researcher at the University of Göttingen, Marburg an der Lahn, Vienna, Bonn, Bratislava, London,

and at the Institute for the Science of Man in Vienna. The subject of his research interests are political ideologies,

Croatian and comparative politics and European studies.

Miroslav Macan recieved a Master degree in Political Science in the fields of Comparative Politics and

International Relations at the Faculty of Political Science, University of Zagreb. He is working as a professional

associate at the Academy for Political Development in Zagreb, Croatia.

Tea Trubić recieved a Master degree in European Studies at KU Leuven and a Bachelor degree from the Faculty of

Political Science at the University of Zagreb.

Parliamentary Elections in Croatia 2015: Victory without Actual Winners

100

political arena is more likely to damage the Croatian democratic practice than

to improve it because of their lack of experience and disorientation on national

level. Finally, the only true loser of these elections is the leader of the right

party in Croatia, Tomislav Karamarko.

The economic situation of the country

In 2011, the left coalition celebrated a landslide victory over the previous HDZ-

led government, which lost the elections due to corruption scandals and the

poor economic situation that it was not able to cope with. The voters in Croatia

were thus motivated to change the government due to the economic downfall.

However, the left coalition did not live up to the expectations of improving the

economy. If anything, it additionally damaged it. At the very beginning of their

term, Croatia had become the 28th member of the European Union. It had the

misfortune of entering the Union at the time of the biggest Eurozone debt

crisis, so the initial effects were negative. Even though there were a lot of

expectations following the acquirement of membership, the government failed

to take advantage of the resources offered by the Union, so the country soon

became one of the very few that had given more than it had received from the

EU. It has been estimated that by 1 December 2014, Croatia had extracted only

45% of the available resources from the EU funds, unlike Slovenia that had

extracted 76%, Poland 82% and the Baltic countries more than 90%. Alongside

the lack of success in European policy-making, the left-government had failed

in the domestic political arena as well.

Graph 1: Annual GDP growth comparison; source: World Bank (20.11.2015.)

Just when the country’s GDP growth had started to gradually recover from the

global economic crisis from 2010 to 2011 (as seen on the graph 1), it dropped

down from -0.3% in 2011 to -2.2% in 2012. However, the Croatian GDP started

to grow in low intensity in every quarter since the end of 2014. Due to all of its

wrong judgments and the overall lack of success, the left government gained a

label of being the least popular government in Croatian history. It has been


101

estimated that even in the better part of its term, more than 70% of voters

believed that the government was leading the country in the wrong direction.

Considering all of the negative economic trends the left government caused

during its previous term, one would have assumed that the opposition would

get the majority in the following elections without any trouble. However, by

assuring only relative instead of an absolute majority, the opposition had failed

to take advantage of the momentum. The question remains: how was that

possible?

Cleavages between the voters and the two parties

According to a research conducted by Josip Glaurdić of the University of Cambridge, the voters of the Western democracies in Europe have a tendency

of voting predominantly by evaluating the economic performance of the current

government. The same research was conducted in Croatia and it was expected

that the economic performance of a given government would gradually

overshadow voting inspired by identity politics. The results of the research

were completely the opposite; they demonstrated that among the Croatian

voters, economic performance was submitted to the identity towards a certain

party, usually produced during the World War II.1 Those powerful identities

have almost unexceptionally been passed through generations in families,

creating a very firm electorate for the two parties. Even though the voters

might be disappointed by the poor economic performance or numerous

corruption scandals, the voters will still vote for a given party primarily

because of the animosity they feel towards the other party. That is one of the

reasons which explains why HDZ and SDP have successfully maintained their

stability and power in Croatian domestic politics since the foundation of

democracy. These results place Croatia in a somewhat different position in

regards to democratic development comparing to any other post-socialist

country in Central Europe. Other Central and Eastern European countries

have experienced a downfall of the parties that were dominant in the first

stage of their democratic transition.

In Croatia, the animosity between the two parties and two electorates

interdependently determines their stability. Ever since Croatia entered the

European Union, the parties lost their common interest. Consequently, the

rhetoric among the two sharpened as a result of the overall lack of mutual

goals. On top of that, after the historically bad result on the elections in 2011,

HDZ was forced to change its President in order to do some damage-control.

Tomislav Karamarko, former intelligence service official and Minister of the

Interior, filled the position. His initial idea was to detach the party from the

center-right towards the radical right, with strong patriotic, anticommunist

and Christian sentiment. As HDZ celebrated victory on two consecutive

elections; European ones in 2014, and more importantly, the presidential ones

in 2014/2015, Karamarko believed that intensification of such rhetoric could

lead to another good electoral result. He failed to take into account, just like

the former president Josipović, that current president Kolinda Grabar-

Kitarović won the elections by accumulating votes from the center and the

1 N.N. 2015. Matematicka analiza parlamentarnih izbora. Što je Hrvatima važnije: ekonomsko blagostanje ili ratna

prošlost. Jutarnji list, 24 October 2015 (accessed: 04 December 2015).


102

center-right. According to the victory on the presidential elections, but also due

to the high unpopularity of the left government, most of the polls conducted

prior to the recent parliamentary elections were announcing great advantage of

the coalition led by HDZ.

Graph 2: Support towards the two parties during the election year, Source: IPSOS Pulse,

Crobarometar (20.11.2015.)

Graph 2 represents support towards the two big parties conducted in

consecutive months before the elections. As evidently shown in the graph, the

support toward the ruling party was relatively low one year before the

elections, but it had recovered greatly in one year.

On the other hand, the opposition party had lost its initial advantage, with a

decrease in popularity for a couple of months, resulting with an insignificant

advantage before the elections. Furthermore, the immigrant crisis sharpened

the discord between the two parties as they had different strategies to manage

the problem. SDP leaders made good use of the crisis to accumulate support

from the voters; they were certain that the refugees had no intention of staying

in Croatia, so they used it to promote the humanitarian approach. One can

argue that voters believed that the management of the crisis should be guided

by the principle of humanitarian help rather than radically, as suggested by

HDZ. As seen on the graph above, the approach of the government was

perceived as the more positive one, given the fact that their support began to

grow in September when the crisis escalated. On the other hand, the

opposition’s support began to decline.

Campaign

HDZ failed to accumulate the disapproval of the government into its own

success. Karamarko used radical patriotic rhetoric during the campaign and

the main point of the campaign was to stress the negative effects the previous

government had made in its term. Also, they used the slogan “Together for

better Croatia”, accompanied with a lot of suggested reforms and changes,


103

alluding that with their leadership the country would overcome the economic

and social crisis. On the other hand, SDP decided to fully personalize their

campaign; the main actor was the president of the party who turned out to be

better spoken than his opponent. HDZ recognized that and chose to evade any

direct confrontation between the two party presidents. This could be

characterized as one of the fatal mistakes of the right-wing party, as their

avoidance of confrontations was presented by the media and their opponents as

an expression of their unprofessionalism. One of the fairly used slogans at the

time directed towards Karamarko was “Come out and fight”, emphasizing that that his abolishment of the debate was damaging the established democratic

practice during the campaign. It has to be said that debates are common

practice in other European democracies, such as Denmark, the UK, Poland and

Spain. Likewise, SDP presented the aforementioned opposition’s slogan and suggested reforms as a relapse to corruption and recession.

Table 1: Seats in the Parliament and percentage of votes in the previous elections, Source: Croatian

State Electorate Commission (20.11.2015.)

Table 1 shows the results of parliamentary elections in 10 national

constituencies which are represented through 140 parliamentary mandates.

Seats reserved for the national minorities are therefore excluded from this

analysis, and so are the diaspora votes. Failed votes represent the amount of

votes given to the options that did not pass the threshold of 5% within the

constituency in which they ran for mandates. As seen in the Table 1, the

parties have turned back to their harshly polarized electorate. The table also

shows the high percentage of failed votes in the 2011 elections (19.76%)

significantly decreased on the 2015 elections (7.64%) which proves that MOST

managed to homogenize and accumulate those votes into their benefit.

MOST – the initiative and its voters

Due to the sudden and unexpected success of the initiative MOST, it is natural

to wonder who are the people behind this initiative, what does it represent,

whose votes did it get and which party did it damage the most. As previously

stated, the 19 elected representatives of the platform do not function as a

common party; all of them are independent and have different ideological

backgrounds. The foundation of their platform was the urge for reforms that

have not been initiated by any of the two major parties. One of the main

questions asked after the elections was: who did the initiative damage the

most? A survey conducted by Dragan Bagić on 34 353 respondents indicated that the majority of MOST’s voters (38%) were voters who had voted for some of the third parties in the previous elections. Thus, the majority of voters did


104

not greatly damage the steady electoral body of the two major parties, HDZ and

SDP.

However, if the former voters of the two parties are analyzed specifically, Bagić states that former voters of the left-coalition make 30% of the MOST electoral

body, while the former voters of the right-wing coalition make only 12%.

Considering this data, it is hard to argue that HDZ failed to get an absolute

majority because of the emergence of initiative MOST.

Final remarks

The elections held on the 8th of November 2015 ended with the following result.

Seats %

Patriotic Coalition 56 33,36%

Left coalition; „Croatia is Growing“ 56 33,2%

MOST NL 19 13,51%

IDS-PGS-RI; „Our Own Right“ 3 1,83%

Bandic Milan 365; Labor and

Solidarity Coalition 2 3,32%

HDSSB 2 1,36%

Zivi zid 1 4,24%

Reformists; „Successful Croatia“ 1 1,54%

Representatives of Croatian

citizens living abroad

3 (mandates won by

Patriotic Coalition)

Representatives of national

minorities 8

Failed votes 7,64%

TOTAL 151

Table 2: Results of the most recent elections in Croatia, Source: Croatian State Electoral

Commission (20.11.2015)

As seen in Table 2, both of the Patriotic Coalition and the Left Coalition

garnered the same result. Given the fact that it is mathematically impossible to

form a government without assuring the support of the representatives from

MOST, the process of forming the government entered a stalemate phase.

An already complex situation was additionally complicated by the fact that the

representatives of MOST had notarized a statement against forming a coalition

with either of the parties, accusing them of destroying the economy of Croatia.

The representatives have found themselves in an undesirable situation in

which they either have to violate the promise given to their voters by colliding

with either of the parties in question, or to trigger new elections in Croatia. It

has to be noted that the new elections would surely damage the good result

MOST achieved as the voters would blame them for irresponsible behavior. On

the election night, while the votes were still being counted, both of the party

leaders proclaimed their victory. Zoran Milanović, the president of SDP, expressed his gratitude towards the voters and has invited all the parties


105

interested in reforms to support him as a leader. He also invited the

representatives from the platform MOST to shape the future executive branch,

as equals. On the other hand, Tomislav Karamarko gave a speech when HDZ

had greater advantage in seats according to unofficial results; he believed that

their advantage is going to additionally grow through the night. He thanked all

of the voters and coalition partners, declaring a glorious victory and better

times ahead for Croatia, forgetting to invite other parties (primarily MOST) to

cooperate until he was reminded of it by one of the coalition partners. In this

case, much like during the campaign, Milanović had shown a certain political wisdom and put himself in a better negotiating position.

Today, both of the coalitions are negotiating with the representatives from

MOST, trying to find common ground for pushing the reforms. By now, most of

the minority and regional representatives have declared their support for the

left coalition as a response to the the radical right-wing rhetoric of Karamarko.

Moreover, other parties that have passed the electoral threshold are also more

likely to support the left government than the right one but none of them has

officially declared their support, leaving the possibility of giving support to the

right-wing government. In the quest of reforms initiated by MOST, it seems

like Karamarko could be more generous in his willingness for reforms and

offering some key positions in the executive branch because his position in the

party is jeopardized by unexpected low result. On the other hand, Milanović’s position in the party is not as questioned. Even if he fails to form a government

he is less likely to be replaced within his own party. To sum up, two major

parties continue to reign over the political system of Croatia. Even though they

both won almost the same amount of mandates, the left coalition can be more

satisfied considering that it saved the possibility of forming another

government regardless of their bad governmental performance and the lack of

support in the pre-election polls.

The right-wing coalition won the elections by a relative majority, but it cannot

be satisfied with the result as it expected to win an absolute majority, given the

fact that the previous left-wing government performed poorly during the last

term. MOST seems shocked with the amount of the mandates won which

became evident during the government-forming process by their confusing

behavior and inexperienced communication within the highest level of national

politics. Despite the big disturbance MOST caused on the Croatian political

scene, by winning the ¾ of the seats in the Parliament, the two major parties

have proven to be the only stable and solid options – that trend is unlikely to be

changed in the future.

Bibliography

Božica Babić. 2014. Hrvatska iskoristila tek 45 posto novca iz fondova

Europske unije. Poslovni dnevnik, 07 December 2014 (accessed: 04

December 2015).

Ciglenečki, Dražen. 2015. Debata neće biti: Hrvatska jedina u EU bez sučeljavanja glavnih aktera parlamentarnih izbora. Novi list, 09 October

2015 (accessed: 04 December 2015).

Cipek, Tihomir. 2014 European Elections in Croatia. Political Preferences

9/2014, Institute of Political Science and Journalism at the University of


106

Silesia and the Center for Innovation, Technology Transfer and

Development Foundation of the University of Silesia, Katowice, 21-37.

Croatian Constitution. Zakonhr (accessed: 04 December 2015).

Dragan Bagić. 2015. Glasačka povijest birača MOST-a: Podaci izlaznih anketa.

Official site of Dragan Bagić (accessed: 04 December 2015.).

Godeč, Željka. 2015. Jedinstveni potez Bože Petrova; Kod bilježnika ovjerio izjavu u kojoj piše da MOST nakon izbora neće u koaliciju ni s HDZ-om ni sa

SDP-om!. Jutarnji list, 06 November 2015 (accessed: 04 December 2015).

Izborihr. Official site of The National Electoral Commission of the Republic of

Croatia (accessed: 04 December 2015).

N.N. 2015. Matematicka analiza parlamentarnih izbora. Što je Hrvatima važnije: ekonomsko blagostanje ili ratna prošlost. Jutarnji list, 24 October

2015 (accessed: 04 December 2015).

___. 2015. HDZ-ova koalicija vodi 10 posto, Milanović najnepopularniji

premijer. Večernji list, 25 June 2014 (accessed: 04 December 2015).

The World Bank. GDP growth (annual %) comparison (accessed: 04 December

2015.).

A Critical Analysis of the Greek

Referendum of July 2015 Event Analysis

Yannis Sygkelos Lecturer, DEI College, University of London

[email protected]

www.suedosteuropa.uni-graz.at/cse/en/sygkelos

Contemporary Southeastern Europe 2015, 2(2), 1-6




A Critical Analysis of the Greek

Referendum of July 2015

Yannis Sygkelos*

Keywords: Greece, Referendum, Syriza

Introduction

On 27 June 2015, after five months of politics of brinkmanship in negotiations

with the European Union / European Central Bank / International Monetary

Fund (EU/ECB/IMF) troika, Alexis Tsipras, the Prime Minister of the unusual

coalition government of the left-wing Coalition of the Radical Left

(Synaspismos Rizospastikis Aristeras, SYRIZA) and the far-right Independent

Greeks (Aneksartitoi Ellines, ANEL), all of a sudden, proclaimed a referendum,

to be held on 5 July 2015. Referendums first ushered in under the rule of

Napoleon Bonaparte; in the 19th and the first half of the 20th century, they

were, at its best, a highly controversial form of direct democracy. Referendums

were being advocated by so uncommon political forces as British Conservatives,

German Social Democrats and Nazis, but were also being disapproved by

severely opposing political ideologues such as liberals and communists.1 By the

end of the 20th century, though, they have proliferated in many European

countries, inasmuch as issue politics have been outweighing representative

democracy along with social, economic, ethnic and/or religious cleavages.2

Hence, citizens are now getting more and more eager to influence key decision-

making concerning single issues and this is feasible through referendums or

citizens’ initiatives. Nonetheless, Greece has got an extremely poor political

experience in types of direct democracy. Apart from the post-junta referendum

of 1974 on Republic, all other six referendums held during the 20th century

were conducted in conditions of political turmoil, chaos and, in most of the

cases, extensive electoral fraud.

Referendums have assorted shapes and dilemmas, such as constitutional

issues, strategic options for a state (e.g. accession to the EU, adoption of the

euro), devolution or secession, and local mundane issues. In constitutional

* Yannis Sygkelos is a Lecturer at DEI College [Thessaloniki, Greece], a registered teaching

institution of the University of London (International Programmes). His research interests involve

nationalism, human rights, political ideologies, and discourse theory and analysis, while his main

field is the Balkans. He is the author of the manuscript “Nationalism from the Left” and several academic articles. 1 Qvortrup, Matt. 2014. Referendums around the World: The Continued Growth of Direct

Democracy. London: Palgrave MacMillan, 4-10. 2 Inglehart, Ronald. 1990. Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society. Princeton: Princeton

University Press; Inglehart, Ronald and Christian Welzel. 2010. Changing Mass Priorities: The

Link between Modernization and Democracy. Perspectives on Politics 8(2), 551-67; and Tierney,

Stephen. 2012. Constitutional Referendums: The Theory and Practice of Republican Deliberation.

Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Yannis Sygkelos

2

theory, referendums are classified into binding and advisory or into

constitutional and facultative.3 In practice, however, one could distinguish

referendums between those that governments use to consult the electorate or

are constitutionally required to approve constitutional amendments, and those

that governments abuse as a façade of legitimacy and popular mobilization.

This classification does not intend to imply that the latter are always rigged

and satisfactory for the leaders who devise them, the Chilean plebiscite of

1988, which removed Pinochet from power, being the most compulsive.

Constitutional oddities in respect of the Greek referendum of July

2015

The legality of the recent Greek referendum is wholly indubitable. Greek

Constitution art.44 stipulates that

a referendum over pivotal national questions is proclaimed by a Presidential

decree, after the approval of Cabinet’s request by the absolute majority of the

total number of MPs.

Art.44 is supplemented by the implementing law 4023/2011 “on enhancing direct and participatory democracy through referendums.” Fiscal questions are

excluded, albeit upon already passed bills. In his address to the Greek people,

Alexis Tsipras announced that the Cabinet decided to put the ultimatum (sic)

of the EU/ECB/IMF institutions, that is, their proposal on Greece’s bailout programme, at referendum. Articulating a discourse fraught with national

instances, he invoked national sovereignty, national unity, the dignity of the

Greek people, national history, and the metaphor of Greece as the birthplace of

democracy and the foundation of the European civilisation.4 As a consequence,

the national question art.44 refers to was translated into a national cause: the

resistance of the Greek people to EU/ECB/IMF proposals and plans of people’s humiliation and subversion of government’s democratic mandate. Playing the patriotic card and setting the goal of popular mobilization, Tsipras and his

close associates resorted to a facultative referendum in order that the

incumbent coalition government retain office.

Within this framework, a wide range of constitutional oddities took place. To

begin with, the one-week-time frame between the call and the date of the

referendum was too pressing. A week time, as the General Secretary of the

Council of Europe, Thorbjorn Jagland, mentioned, is not sufficient for the

voters to make their minds up.5 4023/2011 art.12 provides that the referendum

should be held within 30 days “after the publication of the Presidential decree

on its proclamation.” Evidently, this is not to be interpreted that a referendum

ought to be called and conducted within 30 days. Such a very brief period is

rather unprecedented: we could only compare it with referendums held by

3 A constitutional referendum is stipulated in the Constitution, e.g. Irish referendums over any

constitutional amendment; a facultative referendum operates as a mediating device to cope with an

exigency, e.g. the UK referendum over the EEC membership (1975). 4 N.N. Dimopsifisma stis 5 Iouliou yper i kata tis Protasis ton Thesmon (Referendum on the 5 July

for or against the Proposal of the Institutions). To Vima. 26 June 2015. (accessed: 13 October 2015). 5 Council of Europe. Greek Referendum Falls Short of Standards. Reuters. 1 July 2015. (accessed:

13 October 2015).

A critical analysis of the Greek referendum of July 2015

3

authoritarian or illegitimate regimes, such as the one concerned the status of

Crimea (2014), which was proclaimed by pro-Russian secessionists to be held

within ten days. On the contrary, referendums held in established European

democracies allow a long period for public deliberation. For instance, the recent

referendum on Scottish independence was settled on under the Edinburgh

Agreement (15 October 2012), proclaimed under the Scotland Act 1998 Order

2013 (issued on 12 February 2013), and held on 18 September 2014. Also, the

Danish euro referendum (2000) allowed over six months of campaigning

despite that two referendums on the Maastricht Treaty on European Union

(1992 and 1993) had already been held and the recent, more trivial, Irish

referendum over same-sex marriage allowed four months of public debate.

Within the very limited time of one week, no essential campaigning was

unfolded. Instead of distinct YES and NO camps being deployed and public

debate being held, YES and NO proponents orchestrated rallies and argue

their cases mainly through broadcasting and the social media. As political

science comparative studies have shown, however, campaigning might prove to

be decisive in determining the outcome of a referendum.6 Eventually, the

referendum ended up to a proxy-election aiming to determine the popularity of

the incumbent government. And the shorter a government has been in office,

the more likely it is to convince the electorate to take its side: in our case, the

NO side. Apparently, there was not enough time for the voters to make

informed decisions, campaigning was at its best truncated, and the voters cast

their ballot expressing, in general terms, their preference to the government of

the day or the opposition.

Another important constitutional oddity concerns the clarity of the question.

According to 4023/2011 art.3, “the question is phrased in a comprehensible and

succinct manner.” On the contrary, the question was puzzling and vaguely framed. The ballot read:

should the plan agreement submitted by the European Commission, the

European Central Bank, and the International Monetary Fund in the

Euro-group of 25.06.2015, be approved? It consists of two parts, which

constitute an aggregate proposal: the first document is entitled “Reforms for the Completion of the Current Program and beyond” and the second “Preliminary Debt Sustainability Analysis”

(both document titles appeared in English with a translation in Greek placed in

brackets). It offered two options: Not approved/NO and approved/YES. Apart

from being too lengthy to be placed on a referendum ballot, the question cited

two documents of a very recent non-paper amounted to 34 pages that the voters

themselves had to find out and read carefully. Besides, the Greek translation of

the above documents contained abbreviations in English as well as economic

and legal jargon non-comprehensible to most of the voters. Citation of

documents is not unusual in referendum ballots: most of the referendums on

the EU required prior reading of Treaties; yet, the texts were not that

sophisticated and the time allowed the voters to be informed was substantially

6 LeDuc, Lawrence. 2002. Referendums and Elections: How do Campaigns differ?, in Do Political

Campaigns Matter? Campaign Effects in Elections and Referendums, edited by Farrell, David and

Rüdiger, Schmitt-Back. London: Routledge, 145-62.

Yannis Sygkelos

4

longer. Nevertheless, the questions were rather comprehensible and succinct,

e.g. "are you in favour of or against approval by the Netherlands of the treaty

establishing a constitution for Europe?” (Dutch referendum on the Constitutional Treaty held in 2005). That is to say, that even if a voter had not

read the document of the Treaty could very well reply to the question of

whether s/he is in favour of a European Constitution or, by implication, of

ceding part of sovereignty to a supranational authority. On the contrary, the

Greek referendum ballot did not address the issue at stake outright, that is,

the bailout program, but a peripheral agreement emanating from it.

As regards to the consequences, they were wholly unforeseen and ambiguous.

Even the seemingly clear-cut YES option would have had ambiguous

ramifications. The draft agreement that the Greek electorate would have

potentially approved concerned a bailout program due to expire on the 30 June,

that is, before the referendum having been held. The NO option was completely

ambiguous: had the electorate disapproved the draft agreement put in

referendum, would the government have proceeded with another bailout

agreement? To what extent, a new bailout agreement would have been

different from the disapproved one? Would there have been no bailout

programme at all? Would this have meant default and Grexit? A request for an

extension of the bailout program with amendments on the proposal that the

coalition government called the voters to disapprove, was submitted by Tsipras

on 30 June and caused further confusion as regards the expediency and the

necessity of the referendum. Such ambivalence as of the impact of the result of

the referendum is rather unprecedented in established democracies. From a

constitutional point of view, referendums should not allow any interpretation of

the popular vote and the impact of YES and NO should be absolutely clear

either.

The last but not least oddity concerned the architecture of the ballot.

Paradoxically, the NO option, backed by the government, was above the YES

one: a manoeuvre rather reminiscent of referendums called by authoritarian

regimes. For example, the format of the 1978 Chilean referendum ballot on the

approval of Pinochet’s regime was biased in favour of YES, which was

represented by the national flag, whereas the NO block was a black rectangle.7

Conclusions

Too a pressing time frame, absence of an essential campaigning, puzzling

wording, unforeseen implications, and a bizarre format, all made the Greek

referendum of July 2015 problematic. Regardless of whether aiming to forestall

the split of SYRIZA and government’s downfall, or being a step towards a decisive split with the euro-zone facilitating a drachma plot,8 or intending to

7 N.N. The Greek referendum question makes (almost) no sense. BBC. 29 June 2015. (accessed: 13

October 2015). 8 Many reports published in the press describe this scenario: Hope, Kerin and Tony Barber. 2015.

Syriza’s Covert plot during Crisis Talks to Return to Drachma. Financial Times. 24 July 2015.

(accessed: 13 October 2015); Evans-Pritchard, Ambrose. 2015. Syriza Left Demands 'Icelandic'

Default as Greek Defiance Stiffens. Telegraph. 14 June 2015. (accessed: 13 October 2015);

Kounalaki, Ksenia. 2015. Plan B me Ypoklopes kai Hacking (Plan B with Interception and

Hacking). Kathimerini. 26 July 2015. (accessed: 13 October 2015); Kanellis, Vasilis. 2015. To

A critical analysis of the Greek referendum of July 2015

5

increase the popularity and legitimacy of Tsipras, because of all the

aforementioned oddities, this referendum should have never been made. It

rather constituted an abuse of direct democracy, an unexpected political

manoeuvre made by a political leader to circumvent a hard political exigency.

Despite the so many appeals of the coalition government to European values

and standards during the tiny period of campaigning, such a referendum falls

short of European standards and is unfamiliar with European democratic

norms.

The financial repercussions of the proclamation of this referendum were harsh

for the Greek society, as it immediately led to a bank run and the inevitable

imposition of capital controls. What is more, the compromise reached in the EU

Summit of 12 July 2015 made it absolutely meaningless in political terms.

Most interestingly, nonetheless, the referendum of July 2015 highlighted the

oxymoron of what might be called a “leftist democratic myth”, systematically articulated by SYRIZA, that is that globalised neo-liberal institutions, namely

the EU/IMF/ECB troika, and hegemonic figures at a global level, i.e. Schaeuble

foremost, Merkel, Lagarde, Dragi, and Juncker, all allegedly aborted the

democratic mandate of the coalition government and defied the vote and will of

the Greek electorate. On the contrary, the conduct of a referendum

manipulative of the popular vote and serving certain partisan considerations

and ends is apparently at odds with the democratic discourse of SYRIZA’s leadership.

Bibliography

Council of Europe. Greek Referendum Falls Short of Standards. Reuters. 1 July


Evans-Pritchard, Ambrose. 2015. Syriza Left Demands 'Icelandic' Default as

Greek Defiance Stiffens. Telegraph. 14 June 2015 (accessed: 13 October

2015).

Hope, Kerin and Tony Barber. 2015. Syriza’s Covert plot during Crisis Talks to Return to Drachma. Financial Times. 24 July 2015. (accessed: 13 September

2015).

Inglehart, Ronald and Christian Welzel. 2010. Changing Mass Priorities: The

Link between Modernization and Democracy. Perspectives on Politics 8(2),

551-67.

Inglehart, Ronald. 1990. Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society.

Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Kanellis, Vasilis. 2015. To Mystiko Sxedio gia ti Drachmi (The Secret Drachma

Plan). Imerisia. 19 July 2015. (accessed: 13 October 2015).

Kounalaki, Ksenia. 2015. Plan B me Ypoklopes kai Hacking (Plan B with

Interception and Hacking). Kathimerini. 26 July 2015. (accessed: 13

October, 2015).

LeDuc, Lawrence. 2002. Referendums and Elections: How do Campaigns

differ?, in Do Political Campaigns Matter? Campaign Effects in Elections

and Referendums, edited by Farrell, David and Rüdiger, Schmitt-Back.

London: Routledge, 145-62.

Mystiko Sxedio gia ti Drachmi (The Secret Drachma Plan). Imerisia. 19 July 2015. (accessed: 13

October 2015).

Yannis Sygkelos

6

N.N. Dimopsifisma stis 5 Iouliou yper i kata tis Protasis ton Thesmon

(Referendum on the 5 July for or against the Proposal of the Institutions).

To Vima. 26 June 2015. (accessed: 13 October 2015).

N.N. The Greek referendum question makes (almost) no sense. BBC. 29 June

2015. (accessed: 13 October 2015).

Qvortrup, Matt. 2014. Referendums around the World: The Continued Growth

of Direct Democracy. London: Palgrave MacMillan.

Tierney, Stephen. 2012. Constitutional Referendums: The Theory and Practice

of Republican Deliberation. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

The 2011 Round of Population and

Housing Censuses in the Western

Balkans: A Comparative Analysis with

a Focus on Ethnicity and Citizenship Event Analysis

Pieter Everaers Director “Cooperation in the European Statistical System; International Cooperation; Resources”, DG Eurostat [email protected]

http://www.suedosteuropa.uni-graz.at/cse/en/everaers





184

The 2011 Round of Population and

Housing Censuses in the Western

Balkans: A Comparative Analysis with

a Focus on Ethnicity and Citizenship

Pieter Everaers

Keywords: population census, Western Balkans, facts, quality, costs and

benefits

Introduction

The censuses in the Western Balkan countries deserve special attention as they

are grouped in a region with a conflictual and difficult past. The Socialist

Federal Republic of Yugoslavia fell apart in the early 1990s, resulting in the

current configuration of independent countries (Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and

Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro, Kosovo1 and the Former Yugoslav Republic

of Macedonia). This dissolution process has troubled the region for years with

wars that have cost many lives, and which still remain an important event in

the minds of many people in the region as well as in the minds of the hundreds

of thousands that have fled the region and built a life in other European

countries. Many of these people in the diaspora still feel affiliated with the

area; they might still have family or own property, or they simply decided not

to settle for life outside the region of their childhood. Even 20 years after the

wars there are many traumas and the relations between population groups are

difficult.

All the former Yugoslav countries as well as Albania are considered potential

members of an enlarged European Union (EU), and for that reason the EU has

a special relationship (via Stabilization and Association Agreements) with

these so-called “enlargement’’ countries. The status as an enlargement country brings very strong support to all elements of society, from funding of road

infrastructure and agricultural development projects, to poverty eradication

and implementation of the rule of law. This relationship also brings obligations

in the context of the “European acquis’’. For statistics, this acquis is reflected in

the set of regulations for European statistics.2 The countries are supported over

a period of approximately 10 to 15 years to develop a set of statistics that

Pieter Everaers is Director of Directorate A- Cooperation in the European Statistical System;

International Cooperation; Resources at DG Eurostat, the statistical office of the European

Commission. From 2008, he has been leading the International Monitoring Operations for the

Population and Housing Censuses in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, and Montenegro. 1 This designation is without prejudice on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244 and the

International Court of Justice (ICJ) Opinion on the Kosovo Declaration of Independence. This

footnote is relevant for all references in this document to “Kosovo’’. 2 Eurostat. 2014. Statistical Requirements Compendium. European Commission.

Pieter Everaers

185

reflects the content and quality of the statistics in the European Statistical

System (ESS). In the work plan for the European Union Member States - as is

the case for the potential members - the censuses are an important reference

point for population data; data essential as basic building blocks for many

other statistics (e.g. Gross National Income). In the European Union, statistics

are an important part of the societal infrastructure. The contribution to the

common budget of the EU is based on high quality statistics, and subsidies and

funds for redistributing the budget are based on sound figures. “Evidence Based Decision Making” is an important cornerstone of European society; new countries joining the Union are expected to have achieved the same statistical

standards.

Compared to difficult census operations in countries all over the world, the

recent political history of the Western Balkans adds an extra level of

complexity. The European Commission, via the Directorate General Eurostat

(DG ESTAT) and the Directorate General Enlargement (DG NEAR), is involved

in this process, and as a consequence it supported the development of

appropriate statistical infrastructures; for the census more specifically this has

been done via a series of ‘’Technical Cooperation Meetings.’’3 In these meetings,

the Directors General of the National Statistical Institutes (NSIs) of the

countries and the various state census experts met with experts from the

European Commission to exchange best practices on the population and

housing census, create a good understanding of one another’s specific situation, and cultivate cooperation with the aim of achieving a certain level of

comparability among the results of the individual countries. This support,

which was given as part of multiple beneficiary projects to the countries via

horizontal projects, forms a part of the efforts to enhance cooperation among

the countries themselves, as well as the cooperation with the European

Statistical System. An important result of these intensive discussions is a

detailed overview of all the choices and decisions, as well as a rich data base of

factual information. The European Commission, via the national support

programmes installed via the EU delegations in the concerned countries, has

also funded many preparatory projects, and in some countries parts of the

enumeration itself as well as parts of the processing were funded by the EC.

Finally, but of critical importance, several countries (Montenegro, Kosovo, the

former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), Bosnia and Herzegovina

and to a minor extent Albania, have requested the establishment of an

International Monitoring Operation (IMO) to guarantee a fair and transparent

census-taking.

3 In October 2009, Eurostat established a Technical Coordination Group (TGC) consisting of all

census managers in the region aiming at exchanging experience on the census, sharing best

practices and harmonising methodologies and definitions on a regional level. The group has had

five meetings. For the TCG, a ‘matrix of key census issues’ was created where the countries reported their level of preparedness on a number of areas, ranging from planning and management

to census methodology and logistics.

The 2011 Round of Population and Housing Censuses in the Western Balkans: A Comparative

Analysis with a Focus on Ethnicity and Citizenship

186

Background on the Western Balkan countries4

To better understand the impact and role of the census, the recent history and

the current ethnic situation of the region needs to be described in more detail.

After the death of President Tito in 1980, ideological and ethnic tensions led to

violent confrontations. Starting from 1986, the different republics, reflecting

rising Serbian and Croatian nationalism, became increasingly divided. The

historical tensions between Serbs, Albanians, Croats and Bosnians over the

question of who would hold the power led to the disintegration of Yugoslavia.

Over a period of approximately 10 years, the Yugoslav wars played out to the

current situation, with different levels of violence and different outcomes. In

1991, Slovenia succeeded in splitting very quickly and without much bloodshed

from the rest, and Croatia also became independent in 1992, though there was

significant violence in parts of the country. From 1992 the Bosnian War was

fought, until a peace agreement confirmed the creation of the country of Bosnia

and Herzegovina in 1995. In 1999, Kosovo violently split from Serbia, while in

FYROM there was a brief armed conflict which ended in 2001. A couple of

years later, in 2006, Montenegro became independent following a peaceful

referendum.

The wars of the 1990s resulted in significant population flux. Several

agreements ended the conflicts in the region and contributed to improved inter-

ethnic relations, for example the Ohrid Framework Agreement in FYROM (2

million inhabitants), the Dayton Agreement for Bosnia and Herzegovina (3.8

million), and rather recently (2013) the specific agreement between Kosovo (1.7

million) and Serbia (7.2 million, excluding the area of Kosovo), which led Serbia

towards a breakthrough in its potential membership of the EU. Croatia (4.2

million) followed Slovenia as the second country of the Western Balkans to

become a Member of the European Union, acceding in 2013. While FYROM has

been a candidate country already since 2005, negotiations have not yet started,

while with Montenegro (0.6 m) and Serbia, accession negotiations started

recently.

Albania (2.9 million inhabitants) needs a special mention. Established in 1944

as a Socialist Republic based on the Chinese communist model, it transformed

into the Republic of Albania with a parliamentary democracy in 1991. An

economic and societal crisis in the nineties drove many people to flee from the

country, though many have returned in recent years. Albania achieved EU

candidate status in 2014; however negotiations have not yet started.

Another specificity of this region is the distribution of ethnic and religious

groups. The complicated history of the Balkans, with population shifts which

occurred over centuries mixing people from east and west, north and south,

resulted in a striking diversity that at time reveals some deeply rooted ethnic

and religious cleavages . Croats, Albanians, Serbians, Roma, Turks, Muslims,

Christians, Greek Orthodox, Jews, Russian Orthodox, etc, are spread

throughout and integrated into various parts of the region. These groups were

living over a period of some 50 years in relative peace as neighbours within the

former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

4 Detailed statistical information on the Western Balkan enlargement countries is available in

Eurostat. 2014. Pocketbook on the enlargement countries. European Commission.

Pieter Everaers

187

War and extreme social disruption caused a large outflow of the population,

degradation of the transport system and dilution of the societal infrastructure.

It resulted in a very low interest in foreign investment in these countries;

consequently resulting in a relatively high level of unemployment, and the

continued high scope of a rural economy. The large population groups that left

for countries like Austria, Germany and Switzerland live in a wealthier

situation with relatively high incomes. As a consequence, the economy of many

of the Western Balkan countries is dependent on remittances, and influenced

by groups from the diaspora. Countries that were dependent on Belgrade for

certain aspects of infrastructure, political direction and economic development,

had to re-start their development from a relatively backward situation as a

result of years of violence and warfare, as well as semi-authoritarian

governance.

These countries have shown impressive developments resulting in their

recognition as potential member states of the European Union. However many

visible and invisible remainders of the difficult period of the wars persist.

Demolished and empty homes, clearly divided areas and often a feeling of

distrust, overall daily lives still are very much dominated by polarisation.

The reasons for a Population and Housing census

Population and Housing censuses are a common tool for collecting basic

information on the size and structure of the population once every five or ten

years for a wide range of planning and often also serve political purposes.

Under the leadership of the UN, every 10 years, the vast majority of countries

hold a census. In many countries, the enumeration is still done via a traditional

paper and pencil interview. Since 2000, world Population and Housing census

round many countries all over the world began to use modern interview tools

for data collection such as handheld computers or the Internet. New

technological and societal developments have made it possible - especially in

the more developed countries - to integrate results of vital statistics and

administrative registers to completely eliminate the role of the census

interview. A third group of countries used a combination of data collected via

interviews with data aggregated from registers and administrative sources. A

handful of countries all over the world do not use a full population count at all,

but base their ‘census results’ on sampling techniques and consequently collect

thorough information for only a part of the total population. The fact that

census results are considered very important by many stakeholders also

ensures that the census is an important cause for discussions and even

tensions concerning the results. Even in highly developed countries the results

and even the basic format of a census lead to difficult discussions, as well as

political interventions in the management of national statistical offices. Such

challenges can even lead to heavy political crisis, as was the case for FYROM in

the Western Balkans, but there are several similar and even more serious

examples from the 2001 and 2010 population census rounds in other parts of

the world.

However, even when the procedures and outcomes might be contested, the

usefulness of a census is in general not contested. The population census is



188

considered as a crucial basis for many other statistics. In the modern evidence-

based society, good quality statistics are a part of the basic infrastructure. In

the Western Balkan countries which are also candidate countries for the EU,

the need for and use of census data can be seen from several perspectives.

Firstly, in order to join the EU and especially to comply with the governance

procedures in the EU statistics are essential. They are important for the

calculation of the contribution to the EU and the subsidies from the EU budget,

related to a large variety of policies.

Second, from the perspective of internal planning purposes and local funding

and support mechanisms, good information on population groups is needed to

internally plan health, education systems, and others, in a democratic manner.

Support from international organisations also depends on trusted statistical

information.

A fourth perspective includes the obligations set in some agreements that

rights and obligations of populations and governments on a local or sub-

regional level depend on the number of citizens or distribution of

characteristics of the population in certain districts or regions. To implement

these obligations, regular data collection in the form of a census is considered

essential. This is particularly important when the rights of certain groups (i.e.

minorities) are connected to a certain percentage share of the population.

Finally, for some countries in this region - even when not spelled out clearly

but nevertheless still important - the Population and Housing censuses serves

as a tool for the creation of a national feeling. Part of building or consolidating

a nation is to know how many “we’’ are and what “our’’ characteristics are. In

addition, censuses are sometimes used politically to consolidate the results of

wars. The popular saying ‘when you are not counted, you do not exist’ is relevant for some population groups.

It is evident from both a global and EU perspective, as well as for internal and

“nationality‘’ reasons, that the Western Balkan countries were under a certain pressure to conduct censuses in the 2011 census round. In fact, almost all

countries in the world held a population census in one way or another, so why

would the Western Balkans be an exception? Eurostat, on the request of DG

Enlargement and also from some of the countries themselves, supported almost

all the countries in this census exercise. This support ranged from purely

financial to technical assistance, capacity building, political, as well as moral

and professional support to the statistical authorities. For this wide network of

political and technical contacts in the countries concerned were set up and

maintained.5

5 For the author of this paper this meant that regular (sometimes weekly) contacts with the

responsible ministers and other high level stakeholders were needed to discuss main decisions and

progress in the preparations.

Pieter Everaers

189

Factual information on the censuses in the Western Balkans

The systematic technical support from Eurostat via the Technical Coordination

Group as well as the involvement in census projects in the individual countries

resulted in a rich overview of characteristics of the censuses in the Western

Balkan countries. This information is available through a series of ‘Factsheets on population censuses in the Enlargement countries’.6 The information varies

from basic factual information on the number of enumerators, to overall costs

and specific costs of parts of the project (for example, communication and

outreach policies).7 The sheets describe “factual’’ information, so they do not

include details on what happened during the preparation, enumeration and the

processing stage of the census, nor do they relate to discussions between the

main stakeholders, the political parties, government, the census institute (the

National Statistical Institute), with the main sponsors of the census and a

great variety of other parties interested or involved (e.g., NGOs, the media,

universities, religious and ethnic groups and even neighbouring countries).

From the first phase of census preparation - the discussions on the census law -

until the very last moments on how to disseminate and interpret the results,

opinions can differ greatly between stakeholders on how to go ahead. It is

common that during all phases there are stakeholders that try (and often

succeed) in stepping over the outer line of their responsibility, and in doing so

try to impose their influence in areas that should be the sole responsibility of

the Head of the National Statistical Institute. Professional independence

(particularly on methodological decisions) as requested from the UN

Fundamental Principles of Official Statistics is often not that easy to defend in

countries with such complex governance systems, weak democratic traditions

and complicated ethnic and religious structures as the Western Balkan

countries.

The following sections will review various key thematic issues of importance,

both to explain certain policies and then to consider how the various countries

in the region can be assessed. As the census results in Bosnia and Herzegovina

have not been released, this case cannot be considered yet in the regional

assessments with the same detail as the other countries.

Population in the diaspora and the treatment of the sensitive

questions on ethnicity, religion and nationality

The noted factsheets describe all the stages of preparing the census, from the

enumeration itself until the moment of dissemination. Interesting conclusions

can be drawn, like the relatively high costs of the communication and outreach

in Kosovo, the high number of enumerators in FYROM or the lengthy process

of establishing the census law in Bosnia and Herzegovina. They also describe

the complexity for hiring census staff, and information on how to measure the

population in the Diaspora (this is typically not seen as part of a census

exercise) as well as reaching agreement on the inclusion and formulation of the

6 Eurostat. 2013. 2011 Population Census Framework. Factsheets on Population Census in the

Enlargement Countries. European Commission. 7 These factsheets are made available in agreement with National Statistical Institutes of the

countries concerned.



190

sensitive questions on ethnicity, religion and nationality (and state/entity

citizenship in Bosnia and Herzegovina) in the questionnaire. These two issues:

how to measure/include information on the population living abroad and the

inclusion and formulation of these sensitive questions, have created huge

discussions and disputes. In all countries concerned these issues had to be

tackled, which had an impact on the formulation of the census law, the

required communication and outreach and the training of the enumerators,

among others. Of course, in each of the countries (and as discussed in the other

articles in this volume) there were specific problems and issues which

complicated the process.

The measurement of the population in the diaspora was mainly done via a

special form at the end of the questionnaire, allowing the households to inform

the enumerator on family members living abroad, permanently or at the time

of the enumeration. This was done for Kosovo, Montenegro and Bosnia and

Herzegovina. In a context where the percentage of a population group in the

total population is important for existing agreements, for house and land

ownership or simply having sufficiently high numbers to justify certain policies

(e.g., the Ohrid Agreement for the Albanian population in FYROM, or the

Dayton Agreement for Bosnia and Herzegovina), the issue of the diaspora

population caused long disputes. More specifically, there were discussions on

how this population group could be approached, how the questions were

formulated and how the answers could be checked against other information.

However, the final results of these efforts are considered to be relatively

minimal. Based on results of a variety of polls a large part of the former

residents now living abroad has either no intention to return to the original

country (many of them children of the former residents), has no link to the

newly established countries (as they left the country before 1991) or they are

simply not interested and could/did not want to be reached.

The controversies over the formulation of the sensitive questions raised many

more concerns, and might also have affected the final results. These questions

are noted in the UNECE/Eurostat recommendations for the Population and

Housing Census for round 2011, and are described as non-core questions.8 This

implies that countries are free to decide to include them in the questionnaire,

or not. But if they decide to do so, they are strongly encouraged to follow the

recommendations on how they are formulated. An essential element of these

recommendations is that these questions are asked based on a self-declaration,

either via a fully open question (no answer categories) or a combination of a set

of predefined answers with also the possibility to give an answer different from

the predefined. Furthermore, there should be the possibility, as the response to

these questions is considered voluntary, to use the option to actively declare no

ethnicity, religion or national affiliation. Considering the context of the ethnic

complexity of the Western Balkan countries, the tense discussions between the

population groups (via political organisations or NGOs), and the apparent need

to have specific information over these population groups for specific agreed

policies (as the Ohrid Agreement), the collection of information on these

8 Eurostat. 2009. UNECE/Eurostat Recommendations for the 2011 round of Population and

Housing Census. European Commission.

Pieter Everaers

191

variables was considered a crucial element of the census-taking by the decision-

making authorities in many of these countries. A remarkable example in this

context is the use of the 1991 population census in BiH to ensure positive

discrimination for returning minority populations based on pre-war data. The

countries have found varying solutions for these questions, ranging from

sticking very closely to the UNECE/Eurostat recommendations (Albania,

Croatia, Montenegro and Kosovo), to strongly criticized versions (only partly

open) like in BiH and FYROM. In most of the countries the ethnic, religious or

political institutions and movements have tried to influence the citizens’ behaviour on how to answer these questions.

Success factors for the Population and Housing census

Indicators of success of the censuses is also summarized in the fact sheets,

though for this purpose additional quality information has to be used to ensure

a good level of understanding on the usefulness and effectiveness of the

projects. Useful indicators include the acceptance of the numbers of the total

population and the numbers for subgroups (as was the case in Albania and

Montenegro), as well as the speed in delivering preliminary, first and final

results (again Montenegro). Factual information also comes from the Post

Enumeration Survey in the form of estimates on the absolute and relative

under or over count (representation in the census) of populations groups. This

quality information results often from Post Enumeration surveys. The training

of the enumerators, as well as the infrastructure and logistics created for the

enumeration and the processing of the collected information, also supports the

chances of a successful census (likewise the motivation of the census staff can

be reflected in, for example, the feeling of being respected and well paid.). In

addition, the International Monitoring Operations can provide competent

advice and support; a factor that like technical assistance, can contribute to the

overall success of a census.

One could assume that the success of a census also depends on factors such as

the existence of a well organised state government, the oversight of this

government over regions, the trust in state organisations and the experience

and skills in the administration, particularly in the National Statistical

Institutes. On these issues the countries are all very different (knowing their

history). Of equal importance is the societal infrastructure in the country, and

how well the society is organised. The internal coherence of the population

groups or the awareness of the heterogeneity of the population can be a factor

of influence. Likewise, group feeling and the political engagement of the

population will play a role; this, of course in combination with more basic

issues such as literacy, education and overall interest in a country’s issues, and

more generally the trust in society, common goals, norms and values and

understanding of the common values of a developed democratic society. Media

plays a very important role in this context, not only for the official awareness

campaigns but also for any opposition groups and movements. A clear example

of this impact was seen in the first week of the enumeration in 2012 in

FYROM. Based on statements in television interviews, enumerators as well as

citizens engaged in declarations on how to interpret certain questions and how

to count people, with the result that the government had to stop the census



192

enumeration midway through the enumeration stage.9 Another factor is the

overall political situation. Not only is the trust of the citizens in their

government and in society in general important, but trust and belief in

statistics is important as well, as is the understanding that the government can

use the data in the process of development. Specific awareness among a

population of how a census can play a role in a country’s EU candidacy can also be critical in explaining the success. In Montenegro and Albania as well as in

Kosovo this awareness was very high.

In addition to all this, specific and time bound developments can play an

important role in the success of a census project. The role of key leaders,

incidents not related but having a big impact (e.g., election campaigns) or even

the very personal behavioural issues of stakeholders have to be taken into

account in trying to explain the success and outcomes.

The usefulness and effectiveness of the censuses

Discussing the usefulness of the census for each of the countries concerned is

difficult from the perspective of the long-term benefits. In most, if not all the

countries, the project significantly increased the functioning of the National

Statistical Institutes and resulted in an increase in experience and skills. The

infrastructure needed to ensure good statistics clearly improved the amount

and quality of actual information available on populations, groups, as well as

on all kinds of developments in the society (from literacy, urbanisation to

health and housing). The basic information collected will support international

and state policies. Without a doubt the financial investment will be paid back

via international programs that support economic development, as well as

through more focussed development and investment projects. The availability

of useful and “fit for purpose” statistical information will lead to better spent domestic budgets. The fact that International Monitoring Operations were

present in Kosovo, Montenegro, BiH as well as in Albania could send a strong

message about the credibility of the census results; this is particularly

important for Kosovo.

However, it remains important to consider the effect of a census on the issues

of ethnicity, religion and nationality. For most of the countries under

consideration, these issues are related to populations residing in the countries

being enumerated and - differing from what is practice in most other countries

- to the population in the diaspora. Two concrete and relevant factors arise:

firstly, regarding the information collected via specific forms on family

members residing outside the country; and second whether the information

from the non-core sensitive questions where citizens (according to

recommendations) were allowed to declare that they do not belong to an ethnic,

religious group or nationality. Both questions lead to concerns on whether the

census has indeed resulted in credible data. Have the censuses contributed to a

process of settling disputes between population groups, and contributed to a

more stable society? The extent to which censuses play a role in these dynamics

is influenced both by the fact that answering these questions has been

influenced by many NGOs, political leaders, religious figures and public

9 See on this issue also Roska Vrgova’s contribution in this volume.

Pieter Everaers

193

discussions, as well as the fact that a significant number of the population

might not have provided answers for these questions, meaning that their

usefulness is questionable. Using these variables as explanatory (independent)

variables is not very problematic; however to use them by themselves as

absolute outcomes must be done only with great caution.

As mentioned in the introduction a census in any one of the Western Balkan

countries does not only affect dynamics within its own borders, as the ethnic

and religious groups do not follow the country borders. The Albanian

population may have its main concentration in Albania, but Albanians also live

in the neighbouring countries of Kosovo and FYROM; similarly, Croats live in

Croatia but also in parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Roma population is

spread in different concentrations all over the area of the Western Balkans, as

well as old Turkish rooted groups in FYROM and Kosovo. The Serbian

population lives in Serbia but also in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro,

Croatia, and Kosovo.

Comparable results among countries, especially on ethnicity and religion, are

very interesting from the perspective of regional policies and cultures as well as

ambitions. In addition, they very much affect the behaviour of local and

regional politicians. Compared to difficult census operations in individual

countries this situation of countries with strong cross-border ties creates an

extra level of complexity. The Directorate General Eurostat and the wider

European Commission has tried to steer this process via the regular Technical

Cooperation Meetings on the census at the level of the statisticians of these

countries, developing a good understanding and cooperation as well as sharing

of best practices. These meetings were also aimed at promoting the use of the

same approaches to achieve maximum comparability of the results. This

maximum comparability, by guaranteeing rather rigidly the principle of place

of usual residence for counting the population (therefore not including diaspora)

should lead to more credible and exhaustive results overall for the whole

region.

However, these policies have not prevented the development of sometimes

different approaches and conflicting results. Slightly varying data collection

methods, resulting in different under-and over-counting, but also differences in

attitudes among individuals enumerated and the impact of the population in

the diaspora will not - when summing up the results on the sensitive variables

of the individual countries - lead to reliable results for the region.

It is relevant to note that in supporting the census work (with technical

support, funding and monitoring) the starting point for the European

Commission and other international organisations involved as well as other

individual donor countries, was the correct implementation of the international

recommendations on Population and Housing censuses and at the same time

respecting the details as agreed by the national governments in their

respective Population and Housing Census Laws on the details of the topics to

be collected (as for example the questions on citizenship, nationality, among

other things).



194

Cost benefit analysis and potential impact

The censuses already have and will continue to provide useful statistical

information, but as said above for some variables this information has to be

handled with great care. Can we conclude that the censuses in the Western

Balkans were an example of value for money? Have the censuses resulted in

information that can and will be used? Were they worthwhile or would it have

been more useful to resist the international pressure for holding the census?

These questions are difficult to answer: the costs can be calculated easily,

however, the benefits cannot. Census results might lead to financial support as

well as increased credibility and recognition of the country. But the census can

also lead to heated debates between ethnic and religious population groups.

Are the societies mature enough to accept the results and how can they

transform this information into useful policy information? This is a question

that is useful to ask in looking at the efforts, the discussions and the results.

The other contributions in this volume attempt to do so. To what extent does it

also help the regional cooperation between the countries? Only over a period of

years will the impact and real benefit be visible.

Bibliography

Eurostat. 2009. UNECE/Eurostat Recommendations for the 2011 round of

Population and Housing Census. European Commission.

. 2013. 2011 Population Census Framework. Factsheets on Population

Census in the Enlargement Countries. European Commission.

. 2014. Statistical Requirements Compendium. European Commission.

. Pocketbook on the enlargement countries. European Commission.

Building State Failure in Kosovo? Book Review

Joseph Coelho

Assistant Professor, Framingham State University, Massachusetts

[email protected]

http://www.suedosteuropa.uni-graz.at/cse/en/coelho





7

Building State Failure in Kosovo?

Joseph Coelho*

Keywords: Kosovo, state-building, local ownership, corruption, state capture

Introduction

Since the end of the Cold War, the international community has engaged in a

number of ambitious interventions in postwar countries with the aim of

fundamentally reshaping state-society relations through building new state

institutions, restructuring economies and supporting the development of civil

society. The notion that international actors are able to build effective and

legitimate state institutions in societies recovering from war has led to a

proliferation of studies that have explored, both theoretically and empirically,

the impact of international state-building. The general consensus in the

literature is that the record is not a good one: the few success stories of

international state-building have been overshadowed by a laundry list of

failures. Explanations of these failures typically range from a mismatch of

resources and mission objectives1 and the lack of strategic coherence among

international state-builders2 to the deleterious effects of liberal interventions3

and so-called ‘liberal imperialism’.4

The international intervention in postwar Kosovo is perhaps the epitome of

international state-building missions. Since the 1999 NATO military

intervention, Kosovo has been subjected to a series of highly invasive

international missions that have built and supported the institutional

architecture of its political and economic systems. From 1999-2008, it was a

protectorate of the international community and administered by the United

Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), a mission that

wielded executive, legislative, and judicial powers. On 17 February 2008,

Kosovo declared its independence from Serbia and was subsequently placed

under the supervision of the International Civilian Office (ICO). Its police,

border control, and judiciary are currently under the authority of the European

Union Rule of Law Mission (EULEX). Yet after fifteen years of state-building,

international administration and supervision, and billions in aid, resources and

investments, Kosovo is still considered a ‘black hole’ in Europe. Today, the

* Joseph Coelho is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at Framingham State University in

Framingham, Massachusetts. He received his PhD in International Relations at Northeastern

University in Boston Massachusetts. His research interests are in state-building and

democratization in the Western Balkans. He is currently a member of the International Advisory

Board for the Balkans Free Press. 1 See Chesterman, Simon. 2004. You, the People: The United Nations, Transitional Administration,

and Statebuilding. New York: Oxford University Press, Fearon, James D. and Laitin, David D.

2004. Neotrusteeship and the Problem of Weak States. International Security 28(4), 5-43. 2 See Paris, Roland. 2009. Understanding the “coordination problem in postwar statebuilding, in

The Dilemmas of Statebuilding: Confronting the Contradictions of Postwar Peace Operations, edited

by Paris, Roland and Timothy Sisk. New York: Routledge, 53-78. 3 See Richmond, Oliver. 2011. A Post-Liberal Peace. Abington: Routledge. 4 See Chandler, David. 2010. International Statebuilding: The Rise of Post-Liberal Governance.

London: Routledge.


8

country’s political system is designated as a ‘semi-consolidated authoritarian

regime.’5 Political corruption and organized crime are rampant. Unemployment

rates are among the highest in the region and about one third of the country

lives in poverty. The economy is largely dependent on international aid and

remittances from abroad. And recently, tens of thousands of desperate

Kosovars left the country seeking refuge and economic opportunity elsewhere

in Europe.

Two recent books on Kosovo offer some compelling insights and answers as to

why international state-builders stumbled in Kosovo: Elton Skendaj’s, Creating

Kosovo: International Oversight and the Making of Ethical Institutions

(hardback $49.95) and Andrea Lorenzo Capussela’s State-Building in Kosovo:

Democracy, Corruption and the EU in the Balkans (hardback $55.00). Both

books are welcome additions to the growing discourse on state-building and

touch on some of the more important themes that have recently dominated the

literature, including the principle of local ownership, the limitations of

technocratic approaches to state-building, and the dilemmas of political

corruption and state capture in postwar societies.

Local ownership is overrated

In Creating Kosovo, Skendaj attempts to answer a straightforward question:

Can ambitious international interventions build states and democracies? His

initial hypothesis going into the research was that international organizations

would be unable to accomplish such goals. This is not surprising given that for

sometime in the scholarship on state-building (and liberal peace-building alike)

the pendulum swung from emphasis on institutional strengthening led by

international technocrats with strong executive mandates to expressions of

locally-driven transitions that genuinely promoted greater ‘local ownership’ of state-building processes. This shift towards local ownership represented a

growing criticism among scholars and practitioners alike that international

interventions usually lack the local sensitivities and knowledge needed for

effective state-building. As a result, international missions create state

institutions that are detached from the realities of the everyday local.

The findings presented in Creating Kosovo, however, push against the grain

and in some ways swing the pendulum back towards the other direction:

instead of handing over the keys to local officials during the incipient stages of

post-conflict state-building, the international community should insulate state

institutions from political and societal influences for an extended period of

time. By insulating these institutions from local political pressures,

internationals will be able to build and leave behind autonomous state

bureaucracies that will recruit and promote based on meritocracy. From this,

the new employees of these established bureaucracies would learn that

professional success depends upon following rule-bound behavior through

various mechanisms, such as strategic calculation, role-playing, and normative

suasion. Such a sequence will lead to effective and ethical bureaucracies that

will be able to implement public policies in an impartial manner. By contrast,

the author hypothesizes that the local ownership approach, or the early

5Freedom House. Nations in Transit 2014: Eurasia’s Rupture with Democracy (accessed: 30 October

2015).

Joseph Coelho

9

devolution of authority from international to local actors, leaves bureaucracies

vulnerable to corrupt practices that result in ineffective institutional outcomes.

In the end, the key to Skendaj’s argument is that “international strategy matters more than international resources in state-building.”6

Skendaj’s analysis is essentially a Weberian approach to understanding state development. He arrives at his conclusion by unpacking Kosovo’s state into

four of its core bureaucracies: the central administration, court system, police

force, and customs service. According to the author, this is an important first

step because most of the literature on state-building treats the state as a

unitary concept that is “overly abstract” and fails to take into account how state bureaucracies vary in terms of their effectiveness. In chapter 3, Skendaj

provides evidence that supports his hypothesis and demonstrates the hazards

of transferring authority early to elected leaders in the central administration

and outright ownership of the judiciary by local judges and prosecutors. With

regard to the central administration, UNMIK’s strategy led to the politicization

of this particular bureaucratic organization as “party elites brought their

village or town networks and employed family and friends in the new

administration.”7 In terms of the judiciary, the institution was corrupted from

the beginning as local judges and prosecutors were exposed to intimidation,

corruption and intense political interference. In chapter 4, the author’s findings demonstrate the opposite institutional outcome when UNMIK insulated both

the customs service and police forces from political and societal interference.

He finds:

“[t]he sequence for proper construction of the bureaucratic organization is

therefore ensuring autonomy through insulation before embedding

organizations in society. The socialization of officials into the professional

norms of bureaucracy started with strategic calculation and it continued with

roleplaying and normative suasion as employees learned appropriate behavior

in the organization. With time, employees thus internalized such rules and

acted on them habitually. Therefore public administration employees need to

be socialized into the rules and norms of the bureaucracy in order to behave in

a rational Weberian fashion.”8

Skendaj then shifts his attention from Kosovo’s state-building process to

democratization in chapter 5. The author argues that citizen mobilization in

the 1990s during Serbian repression supported the theoretical argument that

mass mobilization and public participation contributed to a democratic opening

in Kosovo. However, in the postwar stage, the country’s democratic

development had been undermined by the unwillingness of Kosovo’s voters and

civil society to hold their elites accountable. This demobilization of citizenry is

a direct legacy of the parallel structures of the 1990s when nationalism was

used to silence opponents and critics of Kosovo’s emerging political elites. This trend continued in the postwar phase as Kosovo’s elites used the status

question throughout UNMIK’s rule to evade responsibility for poor governance

6 Skendaj, Elton. 2014. Creating Kosovo: International Oversight and the Making of Ethical

Institutions. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 132. 7 Skendaj, Creating Kosovo, 80 8 Skendaj, Creating Kosovo, 131


10

and denounced critics and opposition forces as “anti-Albanian” or “traitors.”9

Moreover, the international community is equally responsible for demobilizing

Kosovo society as “influential international actors tried to influence public opinion against engaging in protests or visible criticism of government

policies.”10 The key finding here is that international actors have to take

different approaches to state-building and democratization: whereas state-

building requires insulation from the public, democratization depends on active

societal participation to drive the process and hold political elites accountable

for their behavior and policies.

Creating Kosovo is a well-written and researched book that challenges the

premise of local ownership, which at times has dominated the contemporary

scholarship and practice of state-building. For this reason, it is an important

and refreshing contribution to this growing field. The study relies on data

drawn from fieldwork that generated over 100 semi-structured interviews with

international representatives, government officials, and members of local civil

society. In addition, he utilizes various survey data – including Gallup’s Balkan

Monitor Insights and Perceptions: Voices from the Balkans (2008-2010) and the

Early Warning Reports published by the United Nations Development

Programme – to measure public perceptions of bureaucratic effectiveness.

However, the implications of his findings will undoubtedly lead critics of

international state-building to shake their heads in disagreement. The notion

that internationals need to assume control over bureaucratic organizations in

order to insulate them from local influences is hardly the solution that

countries from the developing world are likely to accept. Moreover, the

international appetite for costly and invasive international interventions is

unlikely to materialize in the foreseeable future. With no international

administrators or supervisors willing to insulate the bureaucracies of war-torn

countries, Skendaj suggests that media and civil society will have to take the

lead in monitoring these organizations and putting pressuring on local officials

to behave professionally. But as Skendaj shows in the case of Kosovo, such

societal organizations remain weak and ineffective at changing the behaviors of

illiberal political elites. This left the reviewer scratching his head at the

conclusion of Creating Kosovo.

Fearing Kosovo’s criminal elites State-building in Kosovo by Andrea Lorenzo Capussela is an insider’s account of the EU’s flagship mission – EULEX – to strengthen Kosovo’s rule of law institutions. Between 2008-2011, he served as the head of the economics unit of

the ICO, which was in charge of supervising the functioning of Kosovo’s new

state institutions laid out in the 2007 Comprehensive Proposal for Kosovo

Status Settlement, generally known as the ‘Ahtisaari plan.’ In some ways,

Capussela’s study is a sequel to Iain King and Whit Mason’s Peace at Any

Price, which was also an insider’s account of the obstacles faced by UNMIK

during its state-building mandate.11 While both books offer astute observations

9 Skendaj, Creating Kosovo, 155-62. 10 Skendaj, Creating Kosovo, 164. 11 King, Iain and Whit Mason 2006. Peace at Any Price: How the World Failed Kosovo. Ithaca:

Cornell University Press.

Joseph Coelho

11

about the geopolitical issues of international interventionism in Kosovo and

how they impacted the mandates of international state-builders, Capussela’s analysis is much more in tune with the contemporary scholarly literature on

institutional development and state-building.

Capussela’s main argument is that the international community allowed

Kosovo’s main elites to capture and corrupt the new state it had created. Due to

the controversial nature of NATO’s military intervention in 1999, the Western

governments had to demonstrate to both world opinion and their domestic

constituents that the intervention was a moral decision, justified by their aims

of laying the institutional foundations of a democratic Kosovo state that

respected the principles of human rights and the rule of law. Preoccupied with

the image of Kosovo being a source of regional instability, the international

community made itself vulnerable to the threats of Kosovo’s politico-criminal

elites, who at times have instigated instability if their perceived interests were

threatened by international policies, as evidenced by the unrest in northern

Kosovo and in neighboring Macedonia. According to Capussela, the critical

event that led the international community down this path was the failure of

NATO to enforce its disarmament program of the Kosovo Liberation Army

(KLA) after its bombing campaign: “Tolerating that its disarmament orders be openly flouted was a grave mistake, which weakened the credibility of Kosovo’s new administrators and magnified the political influence of the worst elements

of Kosovo’s emerging elites.”12

This vulnerability led the international community to neglect its state-building

mandate by overly concerning itself with the short-term priority of maintaining

stability at the expense of its long-term goals of developing a prosperous

market democracy. It also opened the way for Kosovo’s elites to gradually consolidate their grip over political and economic power. Entrenched in

organized crime and a violent insurgent past, the emerging elites entered

politics after the war and subverted Kosovo’s fragile institutions as a way of expanding their criminal fortunes through patronage networks and rent

extraction. According to the author, this led to the development of a particular

‘social order’ that emerged during the early days of Kosovo’s status as an

international protectorate. Here Capussela dips into the theoretical literature

on institutional development and draws heavily from the economic historian,

Douglass North, whose work in 2009, Violence and Social Orders, provides

Capussela with his conceptual framework for understanding the high levels of

corruption and state fragility in Kosovo. Classifying Kosovo as having a ‘limited access social order,’ Capuessla explains how this type of social order is

predicated on a ‘pact’ among a dominant coalition of elites, who organizes

society through various patronage networks. What keeps the pact together and

self-enforcing is a balance of power in terms of the distribution of rents that are

generated by limiting public access to valuable assets, resources, and activities.

Rents are therefore the key to maintaining stability in limited access societies.

International efforts aimed at strengthening state institutions contradict the

logic of this social order as they threaten the dominant elite’s privileges and

access to rents. Accordingly, any disruptions to the distribution of rents will

12 Capussela, Andrea Lorenzo. 2015. State-Building in Kosovo: Democracy, Corruption, and the EU

in the Balkans. New York: I.B. Tauris, 6.


12

likely lead to violence and instability, which in part explains why the

international community behaved so cravenly and passively in Kosovo.

Capussela posits that Kosovo’s social order is the main causal mechanism for generating corruption and state failure in the country. For this reason, the

biggest obstacle to international state-building in Kosovo is the elite class,

which is opposed to any meaningful reforms that may mitigate the logic of this

social order. His main findings are located in chapters 4 and 5 where he

examines the ICO and EULEX respectively. The author goes to great lengths to

demonstrate that, while both missions were given extensive resources and

powers to accomplish their objectives, the misalignment of interests among

certain international actors and the international community’s obsession with the policy of local ownership undermined them. In terms of the former,

Capussela traces the powerful influence that American diplomats have wielded

throughout Kosovo’s postwar development. From selecting presidents and

prime ministers to organizing political coalitions, the actions of the American

embassy have had a detrimental impact on Kosovo’s state-building process. In

particular, the American embassy defanged the ICO and prevented the mission

from criticizing governmental corruption and upholding the governance

principles outlined in the Ahtisaari plan: “it was clear that, should improving

governance in Kosovo come into conflict with other national interests […]

Washington was more likely than the EU to pursue the latter to the detriment

of the former, because Kosovo’s long-term development is not a US priority.”13

Capussela attributes EULEX’s inability and unwillingness to prosecute serious

crimes to a combination of factors, including the misallocation of funds at the

expense of its judicial mandate, the mission’s unpopularity among the local population, and EULEX’s propensity to avoid conflict with the dominant coalition out of fear of elite retaliation. As for local ownership, Capussela

makes a persuasive case that ELUEX’s obsession with local ownership

mitigated the effectiveness of the mission. Local ownership was in

contradiction to the EU’s Joint Action plan that established the mission in the

first place: “it confirms the importance of the executive functions and, in particular, the need to tackle high-level corruption and organized crime.”14 Yet,

instead of wielding this executive authority in the judiciary, the most corrupted

institution in Kosovo, EULEX simply opted to perform its monitoring and

advisory functions that allowed political corruption and organized crime to

flourish in the country since its deployment. Here, Capussela presents his most

interesting findings that are both revealing and provocative. He analyzes 23

criminal cases of critical political and economic importance that were

adjudicated between 2008-2014 and opened by the EULEX mission. Of the 23

cases, EULEX issued 15 indictments, of which only 4 of them ended in

convictions. A closer analysis is provided in the Annex, which is accessible

online,15 and suggests that the “mission tended not to prosecute high-level

crime, and, when it had to, it sought not to indict or convict prominent

figures.”16

13 Capussela, State-building in Kosovo, 104. 14 Capussela, State-building in Kosovo, 115. 15 To access the Annex, visit: https://eulexannex.wix.com/draft. 16 Capussela, State-building in Kosovo, 121.

Joseph Coelho

13

State-building in Kosovo is a compelling book that provides a comprehensive

analysis of the limitations of state-building interventions that underestimate or

misunderstand the social orders of post-conflict societies. The significance of

the study lies in how it approaches the subject matter from a perspective of

political economy, which is sorely lacking in the scholarship of state-building.17

To assess the impact of international efforts on Kosovo’s institutions,

Capussela employs data from the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance

Indicators, which allows him to draw developmental comparisons in the region.

In addition, the book heavily relies on internal reports by the European

Commission and leaked intelligence documents by NATO and Germany’s

intelligence agency, all of which paint a controversial image of Kosovo’s government dominated by political elites steeped in organize crime and

political corruption. While his analysis is theoretically informed and supported

by a plethora of international and local sources, one must also reserve caution

about certain findings due to his involvement in the ICO; especially those

claims that involve rivalries among his former organization and other

international actors. Nevertheless, what it may lack in ‘scientific objectivity’ is

more than made up for with his inside accounts and anecdotes that reveal the

contentious relationships among international actors and the dilemmas they

faced in interacting with Kosovo’s criminal elites.

Conclusion

Although the international state-building efforts can play an important role in

helping societies move out of conflict, the overall impact in terms of promoting

development and creating the institutional foundations of a capable and

legitimate state remains decidedly mixed. The books reviewed here highlight a

number of themes in the literature that help explain why international state-

building in Kosovo fell short of the expectations of international and local

actors alike. Perhaps the most dominant theme that transcends both books is

the principle of local ownership. Both authors seem to question the strategy of

devolving authority over to local actors early on in the state-building process.

In Kosovo, this led to the capture of state institutions as these “bureaucracies

became embedded sites of patronage politics, in which employees were only

loyal to top politicians without substantial concern for public services.”18 The

international strategy of insulating state bureaucracies from local influences

and wielding executive authority for an extended period of time is similar to

that of Steven Krasner’s ‘shared sovereignty’ approach, which recommends external actors taking responsibility for some of the domestic authority

structures of target states for long stretches of time.19 Yet, today, such

solutions seem very unrealistic given the recent failures in Afghanistan and

Iraq and the current financial crisis, which have dampened the international

community’s inclination for engaging in such ambitious interventions.

A second theme that emerges from both books is the issue of relying on

technocratic approaches and solutions to rebuilding postwar societies. The

17 See Berdal, Mats and Dominik Zaum. 2013. Political Economy of Statebuilding: Power After

Peace. New York: Routledge. 18 Skendaj, Creating Kosovo, 174. 19 Krasner, Stephen. 2004. Sharing Sovereignty: New Institutions for Collapsed and Failing States.

International Security 29(2), 85-120.


14

strategy of treating failed states much “like broken machines, [which] can be

repaired by good mechanics”20 has been increasingly challenged in the

contemporary literature of state-building. Such approaches and solutions have

been criticized for their Western dogma on state development; their tendency to

treat local actors as merely passive recipients of international measures; and

for their failure to consider how local interests and values interact with

international ones, and what the implications of this are for state-building

outcomes. In some ways Creating Kosovo falls victim to some of this criticism:

Skendaj’s approach to understanding successful institutional outcomes is

contingent on whether or not international technocrats have insulated local

bureaucracies and employed Western practices of meritocratic hiring and

promotion. Such an approach fails to consider the political nature of

international state-building and how such efforts interact with local values and

conceptions of legitimacy. Conversely, the political economy approach taken in

State-building in Kosovo is more in tune with the contemporary scholarship

and its growing aversion to technocratic approaches. In his analysis, Capussela

demonstrated how important it is not to gloss over the interests and

motivations of Kosovo’s local elites, who in many ways actively worked to

weaken the state and its institutions in order to entrench their own power and

personal economic interests. His examination of Kosovo’s prevailing social order showed the critical role of informal authorities and power structures, and

the continued existence of wartime economies and political networks that

subverted Kosovo’s newly established institutions.

A final theme worth noting is the problematic impact of political corruption on

Kosovo’s democracy and institutional development. Both authors go to great

lengths to show the extent to which political corruption and organized crime

have penetrated many aspects of the country’s economy and public institutions.

Perceptions of Kosovo as one of the most corrupt countries in the region (and in

the world) has dissuaded foreign investments, and has prevented the European

Commission from lifting visa requirements, which has further isolated the

country’s image as a regional pariah. However, the authors of the two books

reviewed here provide different explanations on the ubiquity of corruption in

today’s Kosovo. According to Skendaj, the corrupt practices of today’s dominant

elites in Kosovo are a direct legacy of communist Yugoslavia: “One of the enduring legacies of the Yugoslav socialist party organizations in Kosovo has

been the continuing presence of clientelist networks in the local courts and the

central administration.”21 He contends that patron-client networks were an

indispensible source of stability in Yugoslavia’s communist system and that the persistence of such networks in the 1990s and onwards is a common feature

throughout the rest of post-communist Europe. Skendaj therefore paints a

historical and cultural understanding of Kosovo’s current problems with

political corruption. By contrast, Capussela dismisses partially the premise

that links Kosovo’s predilection for poor governance and corruption to historical

and cultural explanations. For him, such explanations are “self-serving” and over-simplistic and ignore the power and interests of the country’s emerging

elite and the passive role that international state-builders played in facilitating

the nexus of politics, corruption, and organized crime in Kosovo.

20 Ellis, Stephen. 2005. How to Rebuild Africa. Foreign Affairs 84(5), 136. 21 Skendaj, Creating Kosovo, 42.

Joseph Coelho

15

Bibliography

Berdal, Mats and Dominik Zaum. 2013. Political Economy of Statebuilding:

Power After Peace. New York: Routledge.

Capussela, Andrea Lorenzo. 2015. State-building in Kosovo:

Democracy,Corruption and the EU in the Balkans. New York: I.B. Tauris.

Chandler, David. 2010. International Statebuilding: The Rise of Post-Liberal

Governance. London: Routledge.

Chesterman, Simon. 2004. You, the People: The United Nations, Transitional

Administration, and Statebuilding. New York: Oxford University Press.

Ellis, Stephen. 2005. How to Rebuild Africa. Foreign Affairs 84(5), 135-48.

Fearon, James D. and David D. Laitin. 2004. Neotrusteeship and the Problem

of Weak States. International Security 28(4), 5-43.

King, Iain and Whit Mason 2006. Peace at Any Price: How the World Failed

Kosovo. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Krasner, Stephen. 2004. Sharing Sovereignty: New Institutions for Collapsed

and Failing States. International Security 29(2), 85-120.

Paris, Roland. 2009. Understanding the “Coordination Problem” in Postwar Statebuilding, in The Dilemmas of Statebuilding: Confronting the

Contradictions of Postwar Peace Operations, edited by Paris, Roland and

Timothy Sisk. New York: Routledge, 53-78.

Richmond, Oliver. 2011. A Post-Liberal Peace. Abington: Routledge.

Skendaj, Elton. 2014. Creating Kosovo: International Oversight and the Making

of Ethical Institutions. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

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