Nations and Nationalism 4 (3), 1998, 321-46. 0 ASEN 1998

Dynamics of disintegration: diaspora, secession and the paradox of

nation-states*

YOSSI SHAIN and MARTIN SHERMAN Department of Political Science, Tel Aviv University

ABSTRACT. The underlying logic of an international system based on nation-states should lead to the gradual elimination of trans-national loyalties, intra-national divisions and stateless communities. Paradoxically, current realities indicate that the reverse is true, with these phenomena becoming more and more prevalent. The article proposes a comprehensive analytical framework for the study of the complex relationships between diaspora formation, secessionist (and irredentist) drives and the existing nation-state system. It traces the genesis, and the subsequent effects, of differing variants of diaspora formations and secession (irredentist) movements to the interplay between two distinct independent variables: (1) the formation and disintegration of different nation-types (ethno-focal or ideo-focal); and (2) the modus operandi of different regirne-types (libertarian or authoritarian). The processes produced by these interactions generate a perennial source for the rejuvenation of old identities and the awakening of new ones, which in turn constitute an incessant challenge to the prevailing state system. Thus rather than becoming an anomalous anachronism of the past, diasporas and separatist sentiments appear to be not only an endemic feature of the international system, but a pivotal element in comprehending the direction of present and future trends in it.

Diasporas and secession: an ‘anomaly’ in the world of nation-states?

At the centre of the national ideal is the belief that people with a distinct character should possess their own territory. Thus, over time, a world consisting of independent nation-states should, by definition, obviate such phenomena as separatist movements and diasporas. In this sense both diasporic existence and secessionist claims are what might be termed ‘counter-theoretical’ concepts, inconsistent with the structural rationale of the global system.

An earlier version of this article was presented at the Harvard-MIT MacArthur Seminar in March 1996. The authors wish to thank Juan J. Linz, Myron Weiner, Zvi Gitelman, Aharon Klieman, Michael Kochin, Barry Bristman and the two anonymous referees for their helpful comments.

322 Yossi Shain and Martin Sherman

In this article, we propose a broad analytical framework for the study of the complex relationships between the diaspora formation, secessionist (and irredentist) drives and the existing nation-state system, tracing the genesis, and the subsequent effects, of these processes to the interplay between two distinct independent variables:

(1) The nature of intra-national bonds that forge the unifying sentiment of national identity, defining its limits and the span of the heterogeneity of its membership, i.e. the nation-type.

(2) The manner in which the nation is governed, particularly in terms of the pluralism and accountability that prevail in its polity, i.e. regime-type.

However, as will become evident, the mutual interaction between respective nation-types and regime-types determines to a large degree not only which variant of secession motivation and diaspora formation will be dominant. It also generates a perennial source for the rejuvenation of old identities and the awakening of new ones, which in turn constitutes an incessant challenge to the prevailing state system.

Indeed, the ethno-political dynamic described above seems to lead to a paradox whereby the ceaseless quest for self-determination begins to threaten the feasibility of the idea of self-determination itself. For the accelerated proliferation of new nation-states will almost certainly promote continual disintegration, or at least erosion, of existing states. Clearly, if not arrested, this process may imperil no less than the very concept of the nation-state as a viable political entity. Thus, rather than fading away as anomalous anachronisms of the past, diasporas and separatist sentiments appear to be not only an endemic feature of the international system, but a pivotal element in comprehending the direction of present and future trends in it. *

The ensuing attempt to impose theoretical order on the elaborate interplay between the dispersion, fragmentation and amalgamation of political communities may ultimately help in illuminating broader issues of identities and membership in our time.

A genealogy of nationalism, diaspora formation and secession incentives

In general, one may identify a twin mechanism in the formation of diasporas and secessionist movements. On the one hand, incomplete implementation of the principle of self-determination - in which ‘the political borders of states have been superimposed upon the ethnic map with cavalier disregard for ethnic homelands’ (Connor 1986: 20) - may leave ethno-cultural groups with unfulfilled aspirations for political independence. These groups may remain either ‘stateless’ diasporas,* and/or secessionist claimants, sometimes with ties of allegiance to an already independent political unit.3 On the other hand, the successful implementation of the national idea may not preclude, and may indeed foster, the resurgence or

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reawakening of national aspirations within ethnic groups, thereby engen- dering secessionist or irredentist drives. Thus neither the birth nor the maturation of the nation-state seems able to stem the apparent self- generating potential of secessionist sentiments and diaspora formation.

In the development of the ensuing genealogy, we adopt a distinction between two principal types of ‘nation’, that of an ethno-focal variant in which the nation is seen an organic division of humanity, decreed by some divine or natural edict (Kedourie 1966: 58), and that of an ideo-focal variant in which the perception of a nation is ‘a community formed by the [exercise of the subjective] will [of its individual members] to be a nation’ (Hertz 1966: 12) not dependent upon ‘race or descent, but upon a common thought and a common goal’ (Kohn 1946: 92). Although it is true that in many respects this division parallels that of the more familiar distinction between ‘ethnic’ and ‘civic’ nations, it does however deviate from it in two substantively important aspects: first, while this latter distinction focuses more on the end results of political process (the kind of states and/or nations which reflect the culmination of a process of nation-building), our terminology places greater emphasis on the causal origins of political process (the nature of the ‘nuclei’ around which national collectivities coalesce and which ‘seed’ the nation-building process). Moreover, the ‘ideo- focal’ term is more inclusive than the ‘civic’ one. For while the latter is almost universally associated with multiethnic-libertarian connotations, the former is intended to incorporate multiethnic-authoritarian contexts as well, in which the use of the term ‘civic’ would be at best misleading if not entirely misplaced. By contrast, the term ‘ideo-focal’ focuses on the allegedly unifying ideal (such as Soviet communism), rather than the rights exercised by those allegedy unified by it.

Our analysis of diasporas and their formation is intimately linked to these alternative concepts of the ‘nation’. We define ‘diaspora’ as a people with a common origin who reside outside their perceived ‘homeland’, whether independent or not. They regard themselves, or are regarded by others, as members or potential members of the national community of their ‘home- land’, a standing retained regardless of the actual status of their citizenship inside or outside their homeland, whether real or symbolic (Shain 1989).

The dichotomous distinction between the two archetypal paradigms of ‘nation’ - ethno-focal and ideo-focal - constitutes the conceptual foundation for the ensuing analytical framework. This framework illustrates how different processes of diaspora formation and secessionist desires are linked to various paths of nation-building and maintenance. As noted before, there is a duality in the processes of diaspora formation and secession motivation which corresponds to differing ‘flaws’ in either the generation of a new principle of nation-identity or the maintenance of an existing one. These deficiencies (or ‘aberrations’ from theoretical ideals) may be rooted in socio- cultural divisions, ideo-political rifts, and/or geo-economic inequities (Hor- owitz 1985).

326 Yossi Shain and Martin Sherman

Table 1 elaborates on the principles presented above. It traces the major failures that produce processes of diaspora formation and secession motivation. It shows how in an ethno-focal setting, diaspora formation and/or secessionist drives may be the result either of the failure to create (or impose) a mono-ethnic national identity (Class A); or the failure to maintain one (Class B). By contrast, in an ideo-focal setting, diaspora formation andor secessionist drives may be the result of either the failure to impose a supra-ethnic national identity (Class C) or the failure to maintain one (Class D).

Clearly, in light of the definition of ‘nation’, the failure to create (impose) or to maintain a national identity will occur whenever there arises an effective challenge, disputing the legitimacy of the prevailing source of sovereign authority. If this challenge arises with the inception of a sovereign political unit, the failure will be one of creation (or imposition). If it arises after such a unit has effectively stabilised, the failure will be one of maintenance. Challenges which dispute the unitary nature of a single source of sovereignty and call for its division into two or more sources will express themselves as secessionist claims. Challenges which call for the adoption of an alternative existing source will express themselves as irredentist claims. Coercive rejection of such challenges are liable to generate migratory flows and exilic and/or diasporic communities.

The development of a theoretical model to account for, and/or predict, the occurrence of such failures, with sufficient generality, elegance and parsimony to elevate it above a mere description of the actual historical events that brought them about, is an ambitious task. It goes beyond this study’s more modest scope. We confine ourselves to laying down the foundations for a conceptual frame of reference for the causal analysis of the formation of secessionist claims and diasporic communities. From the underlying rationale of such a framework, we then propose a functional typology for a classification of these phenomena and processes - which is a fundamental prerequisite for almost any scientific endeavour. Thus, while such a classificatory endeavour is a somewhat less ambitious target, it nevertheless may well be an indispensable preliminary for a more sophisti- cated venture in model-b~ilding.~

Class A

The major causal stimulus in this category is the attempt by certain nation- states to implement an ethno-focal principle by imposing the identity of a dominant ethnic group as the national identity of the state, even though the boundaries of geopolitical sovereignty do not coincide with boundaries of ethno-political allegiance. As previously pointed out, resistance to attempted imposition and subjugation may in principle result in one of two diametrically opposed processes, or a combination of both.

(1) Migration (forced or voluntary) of the ethnic minority, and the

Failure to impose a mono-ethnic national identity

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creation of diasporas outside its indigenous homeland. Some of these diasporas may be granted citizenship in host states, potentially facilitating their access to a new national identity, while others may remain stateless refugees, deprived of such opportunity.

(2) Rebellion and endeavours by an ethnic minority to extricate itself from foreign domination by secession or irredentism - i.e. either to establish a separate ethno-focal sovereignty or to unite with a contiguous neigh- bouring state of compatible ethnic makeup. Here again, these secessionist and irredentist tendencies need not be mutually exclusive and both may occur simultaneously as the Moldovan case exhibit^.^

Claims for self-determination of indigenous populations may involve diasporas abroad or kindred states with strong ethno-national ties to the minority claimants. The support of Armenia and diasporic Armenians around the globe in the secessionist struggle of Armenians in Nagorno- Karabagh has been critical in the efforts of the latter to resist Azerbaijani hegemony. One observer has written that ‘if the Armenians do ultimately carve out an independent region in Azerbaijan for themselves . . . it will be largely a result of the efforts of zealous diaspora Armenians’ (Finuncial Times, 16 Sept. 1994).

Attempted impositions of ethno-focal identity have at times taken extreme forms of genocide and population transfer. The struggle between Turks and Armenians over the possession of a single homeland led to the Armenian genocide of 1915 when 1.5 million Armenians perished. Popula- tion transfer - which was once considered an acceptable norm in the creation of new nation-states - was another method in the implementation of the mono-ethnic Turkish ideal. The Greco-Turkish exchange of popula- tions after the treaty of Lausanne set a precedent for compulsory transfer of populations in our time.6 In it more than a million Greeks were sent from Turkey to Greece, and a smaller number of Turks from Greece to Turkey, thereby drastically reducing diasporic presence on both sides of the border (Kedourie 1992: 284-91).7

In addition, the failure to impose a mono-ethnic Turkish nationality and erase the quest for a separate Kurdish entity has generated a formidable ‘stateless’ community, thereby setting the stage for chronic secession drives. Kurdish pursuit of self-determination came close to realisation after the First World War when the principle of self-determination was sanctioned at the Versailles Peace Conference. Thereafter, in the Treaty of Sevres in 1920, the Kurds were promised an independent state to be carved out in ‘areas lying east of the Euphrates’ (cited in Robins 1993: 659). Yet Kurdish hopes were quickly shattered when Mustafa Kemal Ataturk founded the modem Turkish state, which ignored international convention by refusing to recognise ethnically based minorities. Since then Kurds have remained scattered in many states, suffering from their host-governments’ efforts to deny and crush their identity. Undoubtedly, ‘if there is one thing that united all [Kurdish contiguous host-] countries - Iraq, Iran, Turkey and Syria - it

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is their hostility to the Kurds and their unwillingness to see the emergence of a Kurdish state in their midst’ (Bengo 1995: 82).*

Class B Failure to maintain an ethno-focal identity

Even states in which the implementation of the ethno-focal principle has largely been successful (with or without the use of force), are not immune to divisions which may lead to exiled diasporas and political separatism. However, unlike the former case of impaired implementation of the ethno- focal idea, in this case the division and dispersion are not the result of ethnological, but rather of ideological rifts, which override the sense of unity engendered by common ethnic affiliation. Such disputes, particularly in the latter part of this century, have resulted in the splitting of several nation- states into two or more sovereign entities. The divisions of East and West Germany, North and South Vietnam and North and South Korea, are all instances of largely uniform ethnic states breaking up into independent political units, not because of rivalry over ethno-cultural dominance, but over paradigms of politico-socio-economic organisation. Whether endogen- ously generated or exogenously imposed, such rifts have produced large flows of exiles and refugees-turned-diasporas.

Political exiles who have contested the government in their monoethnic home nation, without challenging the boundaries of the state or its ethno- based identity, are a common feature of modem world politics. Such exilic groups, however, should be distinguished from ‘stateless’ diasporic commu- nities which aspire to create a new (additional) state, rather than displace an incumbent regime in an existing state (Shain, 1989).9 While, in the former case, centrifugal stimuli for secessionists’ division and dispersion are rooted in ethnic disparities, in the latter instance they are rooted in polemics of political predilections. Empirical evidence in recent years suggests that once these ideological disputes are settled, and one socio-economic doctrine triumphs over another, the centripetal stimuli rooted in ethnic uniformity and the widely accepted concept that one nation should have no more than one nation-state, will militate towards eventual reunification. Reunification, in turn, may also promote the repatriation of diasporas and exiles from other countries.

Another variant of failure to maintain ethno-focal national unity may arise from incoming migratory pressures, resulting in expatriate ethnic communities which may develop into ‘incipient’ diasporas. Such phenomena are often the consequence of economic exigencies that compel ethno-focal states to open their gates to foreign workers, whose remittances may frequently be crucial to the well being of their compatriots in their country of origin (Weiner 1986) (as in the case of the Turks in Germany, or the huge recent influx of Asians, Africans, and East Europeans into Israel - International Herald Tribune 20 Aug. 1996).’O This variant of ‘identity- maintenance’ failure is differentiated from that previously discussed in at

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least two important aspects. First, it will rarely give rise to secessionist pressures. Second, diasporas are usually (although not exclusively) the result of voluntary inflows into an ethno-focal state, rather than the coercively induced outflows from it, as in the previous ideological induced variant (Weiner 1986).

Perhaps one of the most distinct instances of such a process of immigrant generated erosion of an ethno-focal identity is the case of the American nation. This is described most succinctly by Lind in the following excerpt:

The First American Republic, then, was a nation-state, based upon an Anglo- American Protestant nationalism that was as much racial and religious as it was political. Most Americans before the Civil War did not think of theirs as a melting pot nation. The plot of the national story was the expansion across North America of a nation of virtuous, republican, Protestant Anglo-Saxons, a master race possessed of the true principles of government and religion. The Anglo-American nation had a great future ahead of it; but that future did not include cultural hybridization or genetic transformation through amalgamation with other, lesser stocks. This conception of the American identity and destiny would be changed, by massive European immigration. (Lind 1995b: 46-7)

In this regard, Myron Weiner has pointed out that ‘countries in which societal membership is based on notions of “indigenousness” or consangui- nity are likely to have a greater sense of threat from migration than societies that have a political definition of membership’ (1995: 141). Although secessionist claims are rarely associated with this process, the deliberate ‘dumping’ of diasporas in a neighbouring country may be used as a pretext for ensuing irredentist claims by the dispatching state. For example, the influx of Filipinos into the Sabah state of Malaysia encourages the Philippines’ claim to the region (ibid.).

Class C Failure to create (impose) a supra-ethnic national identity

When historic events as such the breakdown of empires, termination of colonial rule or war produce states whose boundaries include diverse indigenous ethnic groups, efforts may be made by ruling elites to override these disparities by attempting to impose a supra-ethnic state identity. Such an identity may be based on some universal ideal that transcends ethno- national solidarity altogether (e.g. USSR),” or on the insistence that loyalty to an ‘imagined’ nationality should override all ethno-cultural or religious affiliation (e.g. India’s ‘secular nationalism’ or Iraqi ‘Ba’athism’).

Note that Class C must be differentiated from Class A where a dominant existing mono-ethnic identity (as opposed to a new supra-ethnic one) is imposed as the national identity on other ethnic communities - for example, Ethiopia’s imposition on Eritrea during the dictatorship of Mengistu Haile Mariam (Ethiopiawi 1977: 136-7). The failure to force a hybrid multiethnic national identity onto an ethnically diverse, yet distinct society, either by administrativeAegalistic means in libertarian regimes (i.e. civic nationalism)

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or by authoritarian coercion, is liable to incite secessionist demands and produce diasporas - unless ethnic groups are well dispersed throughout the confines of the state without significant geographic concentration in defined regions.I3 Not surprisingly, therefore, one of the tactics of ideo-focal imposition has been to encourage or to coerce population blending via resettlement in order to achieve ethno-national heterogeneity (as opposed to Class A where population transfer is intended to achieve ethno-national homogeneity).

Class D Failure to maintain a supra-ethnic identity

In this category the principle causal impetus is likely to be the obsolescence or loss of relevance of a former unifying ideal. For it is possible that a supra-ethnic ideal may be accepted and even internalised, not only under libertarian settings, but also under authoritarianism. Thus, for analytical purposes, one must distinguish between the failure to achieve a widespread internalised acceptance of the supra-ethnic national identity, and the failure to maintain such internalisation (after it has been achieved). Susanne Hoeber Rudolph and Lloyd Rudolph have made a similar distinction in their analysis of conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, and in India where Hindu nationalism has been on the rise. Rather than focus on the question ‘why old conflicts are flaring up anew’ (Class C) they asked, ‘why traditionally harmonious mosaics have been shattered’ (Class D) (Rudolph and Rudolph 1993).

In Class D processes, the disintegration of a unifying ideo-focal principle may be closely linked to a process of regime transformation and state dissolution. Declining authoritarian regimes which initiated and sustained an ideo-focal imposition over ethnically distinct minorities (residing in defined areas), are particularly susceptible to secessionist drives.14

The influence of regime types

In the following section we elaborate on the basic nation-type (ethnohdeo- focal) categorisation by demonstrating how the influence of differing regime-types (libertariadauthoritarian) is liable to affect the various classes of diaspora and secession related processes, generating several sub-variants of these classes.

The more limited degree of plurality and accountability in autocratic regimes affords them greater freedom of action in dealing coercively with challenges to their sovereign authority relative to libertarian regimes.15 Clearly this difference in ‘coercive latitude’ in the different regimes is likely to express itself in the treatment meted out to ethnic dissidents or separatist claimants, tending to make certain diaspora formation and secession related processes more prevalent in one type of regime rather than in another. We

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may thus expect that the interaction between the various categories in the foregoing nation-type based genealogy, on the one hand, and differing regime-types, on the other, will produce an additional source of variation in the basic categories developed above. (It should of course be emphasised that these postulated regime induced variations should be interpreted in terms of differences in probable propensities rather than deterministic dichotomies.)

It should not be overlooked that in addition to the influences of nation- type and regime-type, further influences, rooted in the composition of the population (i.e. immigrant communities versus indigenous peoples) have important effects on the diasporas and secession related processes, which cut across, and are superimposed on, the divisions discussed hitherto. l6

Consequently, it is a factor which impinges significantly upon the nature of the nation-state and the concept of national allegiance. As such it is incorporated in the ensuing analysis, receiving extensive attention in the discussion of the various categories in the elaborated genealogy.

Libertarian and authoritarian influences on ethno-focal processes

Very few libertarian states with ethno-focal aspirations have been able to maintain a monoethnically homogeneous community. More frequently, ethno-focal libertarian states were established by a dominant group that incorporated indigenous minorities who were reluctant to forgo the perception of congruence between their ethnic affiliation and their own national identity. Some of these indigenous groups may have been previously self-governing societies while others were diasporas of existing nation-states. The birth of Israel as a Jewish state is to a large degree an exceptional case, in which the genesis of a ethno-focal libertarian state involved the simultaneous repatriation of a stateless diaspora (Jews) and the dispersion (partially coercive) of an indigenous (at least in part) ethnic minority (Palestinians). Palestinians have consequently perceived themselves as a stateless diaspora with ethno-national aspirations, similar to those previously harboured by the Jews (Morris 1989).17

In ethno-focal libertarian states (especially those uncomplicated by ethnically disparate minorities) a high value is placed on preserving the uniformity of the community. State authorities often strive to avoid ‘tainting’ the ethnic composition of the population by restricting immigra- tion of non-nationals andor preventing ethnically ‘incompatible’ residents from acquiring citizenship rights. (Japan and Germany are good examples.) Some ethno-focal countries may also encourage the repatriation of their kindred diasporic communities. Germany and Israel are often mentioned in this context (Weiner 1993: 14-15).

Broadly speaking, therefore, libertarian states without disparate indi- genous ethnic populations are less susceptible to diasporic or exile politics, let alone to secessionist challenges by disgruntled ethnic minorities. They

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may, however, in principle, face secessionist threats on ideo-political grounds. An example of this may be the Southern states’ secession during the American Civil War - although the South’s support of the institution of slavery may cast some doubt on its ‘libertarian’ status (Brandon 1992). The move towards political secession - as opposed to ethno-national secession - may take place under different types of political regimes. However, it is more likely to occur during civil strife or regime transition when forces in the periphery are in a position to defy the centre.18

Despite their basic reluctance to admit non-national immigrants and refugees, many homogenous libertarian states have opened their gates to aliens for economic or humane reasons - as they are liberal democracies after all (Joly and Cohen 1989). Though such immigrant communities are not likely to become secessionist (as they have no generic ties to a defined region in their new country), they tend to cultivate minority consciousness in their host societies and often develop diasporic id en ti tie^.'^ In reality, many immigrant groups have asserted their identification with their native lands, in large measure as a result of their communal experience abroad; whether due to their exposure to exclusion and hardships in their new countries of domicile, even though libertarian, or because of their distinctively peculiar religious obligations.

In the United States, especially at the turn of the twentieth century, many diasporas whose group identity had been dormant became ardent national- ists, much more than they ever were in their native lands. With the outbreak of the First World War, ethnic Americans became increasingly preoccupied with the independence of their countries of origin. Inspired by Woodrow Wilson’s proclamation of the principle of self-determination, Poles, Ukrai- nians, Lithuanians, Armenians, Albanians and Croats, mobilised their diasporic energies into a powerful force in promoting the cause of national independence of their homelands, carefully blending into their home country’s agenda Wilson’s post-war vision. To a large extent, the east European immigrants were permitted (and even encouraged) to display their attachment to their homelands because they were ruled by Germanophone nations. President Wilson’s sympathy for the independence of eastern Europeans was however also linked to his personal political ambition to build supportive constituencies among ethnic Americans for electoral purposes (DeConde 1992: 88-91; Portes and Rumbaut 1990: 101-5; Shain 1994: 90-1; 1994-5: 817).20

By juxtaposing the liberal ethos of their host state against the ethno-focal definition of the community, immigrant groups may pose a challenge to the ethno-focal identity of their host countries. Recent examples of this phenomenon are the identity and citizenship debates in France and Germany. Both countries were founded on the equivalence of nationality and citizenship and have refused to think of themselves as countries of immigrants. Though different in their approach to citizenship - France, being universalist and assimilationist, has adopted the principle of jus soli

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(place of birth constituting the determining factor) and naturalised non- national newcomers, while German citizenship is ethnically based and blood-transmitted (jus sunguinis) - both countries have witnessed an anti- immigrant xenophobic backlash and a growing resentment at the ‘spectre’ of a pluralistic society (Brubaker 1989, 1992; Klusmeyer 1993; Schnapper 199 1; Zimmermann 1 997).21 Indeed, libertarian ethno-focal countries which open their gates to non-nationals - even without granting them citizenship - may in time evolve into ‘poly-ethnic democracies’, to use Will Kymlicka’s term, or even reconsider their own ethno-focal distinctiveness (Kymlicka 1995a).

Though many ethno-focal Western democracies have moved to halt migration, they are still loath to deport ‘rejected asylum seekers or individuals given temporary asylum’. Western democracies have also granted foreign workers many social rights and benefits usually provided to citizens. Non-libertarian ethno-focal states, by contrast, have imposed many civil restrictions on migrant workers. Since they ‘are unencumbered by protests from human rights organizations in their own country and unrest- rained by liberal ideology’ they may quickly deport their foreign populations once they consider them politically dangerous or economically ineffective (Weiner 1995: 207; 1986: 55). The massive expulsions of foreign labourers by Saudi Arabia and Arab principalities during the Persian Gulf crisis are examples of this phenomenon.

Moreover, when ethno-focal libertarian states are founded or coalesce in the process of incorporating indigenous populations (as opposed to ethno- focal states which opened their doors to ethnically disparate immigrants), the potential for cleavages and political tensions between the dominant group and the incorporated minorities is imminent. Even if ‘common citizenship’ is offered to the minorities, the claim that ‘there is more than one people, each with the right to rule themselves’, is likely to endure (Kymlicka 1995a: 182). Indeed, the increasing autonomy and struggles for self-determination of aboriginal nations in ‘First World’ countries in recent decades have challenged ‘the way political rights are to be understood within liberal democracies’ (Werther 1992: xvii).22

Controversy over kindred populations may arise between neighbouring states which take a strong interest in the fate of their respective diasporas across the border. The condition of the Hungarian minority in post- independence Slovakia (1 1 per cent of the country’s population), who have been targeted by Slovak nationalists, raised tensions between the two countries (The Economist 1993-4: 18). When democracies confront each other on this score they are more likely to collaborate to defuse tensions; they may mutually agree to grant cultural autonomy to their respective diasporas or may even promote peaceful population exchanges. Yet when such confrontation develops between more autocratic countries, conflagra- tion of violence and even ethnic cleansing may ensue.23

Concern, real or otherwise, for indigenous minorities in neighbouring

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states (perceived to be kindred diasporas) may be exploited by extremists to whip up nationalist fervour and/or to fuel irredentism. The Nazis’ support of the Sudeten German demand for self-determination from Czechoslovakia was a pretext to undermine the existence of the Czechoslovak state itself. Recently, the fate of Russian minorities in postsoviet states has been exploited by Russian nationalists, in an attempt to challenge Russia’s fragile democracy. 24

Coercive attempts to assimilate indigenous populations into the majority have taken place under all types of regimes, although authoritarian governments are far less scrupulous than democracies in imposing cultural hegemony or in ignoring minority cultural demands (Kymlicka 1995b: 11). The example of the Kurds in Turkey illustrates clearly the impact of regime type on the fate of diasporas and the accompanying complex of political processes such as separatism, perceptions of national identity, territorial boundaries and definitions of homeland. Turkey’s harsh treatment of its large Kurdish minority has repeatedly undermined its attempts to present itself as a Western-style democracy. Its refusal to recognise a separate Kurdish identity and its uncompromising efforts to impose a monoethnic Turkish nationality are widely perceived to be inconsistent with the norms of modern liberal regimes and have strained Turkey’s relations with the United States and its European partners in NATO (Cowell 1994; Hedges 1995).

Since the imposition of a dominant national identity tends to spur claims for autonomy or self-government and breeds tensions of dual loyalties, ethno-focal liberal states may choose to abandon the option of assimilation in favour of ‘consociational solutions which accept the plural divisions as the basic building blocks for a stable democratic regime’ (Lijphart 1977: 45). Yet, as Arend Lijphart has pointed out, if such arrangements are implausible or were tried and failed, ‘the remaining logical alternative is to reduce pluralism by dividing the state into two or more separate and more homogeneous states’ ( ib i~f . ) .*~ While libertarian regimes have been generally amenable to peaceful consociational arrange- ments, the nature of authoritarian regimes militates against their imple- menting similar measures (Sherman 1998). Such non-libertarian regimes in ethno-focal states will have a higher propensity to resort to extreme coercive measures to eradicate the ethnic identity of dissenting minorities and suppress any expression of aspirations for self-determination. These may include forcible expulsion of ethnic elites, mass transfer of indigenous minorities and even genocide.

Libertarian and authoritarian influence on the ideo-focal process

Unlike the ethno-focal libertarian states where in principle indigenous populations reject ethnically discriminatory domination, in ideo-focal libertarian states the rejection focuses on inclusion into a larger ethnically

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heterogeneous entity under the banner of alleged civil ‘homogenisation’ (Taylor 1992: 52). In other words, while in an ethno-focal setting the rejection is of perceived ethnic subjugation, in an ideo-focal setting the rejection is of perceived ethnic egalitarianism, according to which, socio- cultural diversity must be subordinated to civic-legal equality in the dispensation of governmental authority. In this regard, it is perhaps appropriate to recall Lord Acton’s distinction between the demands of allegiance that ethno-focal and ideo-focal nationalism can legitimately place on the individual. While, in the former case, these demands are unlimited, embracing all walks of life, in the latter case they are limited only to the political sphere, with a ‘firm barrier’ emplaced against the ‘intrusion . . . into the social department’ (Acton 1949: 185).

In principle, two major variants of this latter class, which we have designated as a ‘harmony of diversity’, may be identified - either a harmony of discrete ethnicities or a harmony of dvfwe ethnicities (see Figure 1). In practice it is likely that the former variant will pertain to a population composed of geographically distinct indigenous ethnicities (as in India) while the latter is more likely to pertain to a largely immigrant society comprising a diffuse cosmopolitan melange (as in the United States). The Canadian example reflects a combination of both.

The nature of a harmoniously diffuse ideo-focal variant has been well articulated by Michael Walzer who wrote that, in the US-type model:

the singular [political] union claims to distinguish itself from all the [ethnic] plural unions, refusing to endorse or support their ways of life or to take an active interest in their social reproduction or to allow any one of them to seize state power, even locally . . . there is no privileged majority and there are no exceptional minorities. (Walzer 1992 101)

By contrast, Nehru characterised the harmonious discrete variant in his description of India’s secular nationalism as follows: ‘unity was not conceived as something imposed from outside, a standardization of beliefs. It was something deeper, and within its fold, the widest tolerance of belief and custom was practiced and every variety acknowledged and even encouraged‘ (cited in Varshney 1993: 236). These structural differences tend to generate divergent influences on the nature of diasporas, their political objectives and their modes of operation (see Figure 1). With respect to the ethnically discrete model, the diasporic condition involves indigenous ethnicities residing outside the borders of the ideo-focal nation-state (such as Punjabi Sikhs and Kashmiris outside India). In the ethnically diffuse variant, the diasporic condition involves foreign ethnicities residing inside the borders of the ideo-focal nation state (like many hyphenated Amer- icans). In the former case, diasporic energies are directed inward from outside the ideo-focal state in which the homeland lies. In the latter case energies are directed outward from within the ideo-focal state towards the homeland abroad.

336 Yossi Shain and Martin Sherman

Endogenic diasporic energies Exogenic diasporic energies Composite interactions between directed towards exogenous directed towards endogenous diasporas and homeland homeland homeland

k -. A \

Hybrid national identity Composite national identity USA-type model Indian-type model

Compound ideal-type

I Canadian-type model

Figure 1. Diasporic condition in ideo-focal libertarian states - ideal-type variants

Thus in the latter case secessionist claims of ethnicities are highly unlikely prospects. Concerns over diasporic identities and actions are mostly associated with the ‘threat’ of multi-culturalism andor dual loyalty. In the United States, for example, critics of the growing ‘cult of ethnicity’ in American civic culture are rearticulating an old American anxiety that the devotion to ancestral homelands undermines national cohesiveness by encouraging sub-national loyalties.26 (Recent analysis, however, has shown that diasporic involvement of ethnic Americans in homeland issues tends to enhance the integration of immigrants, reinforce the value of democracy and pluralism abroad, and temper, rather than exacerbate, domestic ethnic conflicts - Shain 1995.)

By contrast, territorial based minorities, like the Sikhs and Kashmiris in India or the Quebecois in Canada, will be a fertile breeding ground for secessionist ambitions, frequently encouraged by outside diasporas. In this respect, kindred ethnic groups (sovereign states or diasporas) may play multiple roles. On the one hand, they may be actively sought after as potential sources of support for secessionist claims. On the other hand, they may themselves be a powerful stimulus in encouraging separatism. Sikhs in North America have played this role for Punjabi aspirations inside India, while France has fulfilled both these functions for Quebec separatists.

In his controversial visit to the province, President de Gaulle energised the nascent secessionist movement in Quebec when he publicly pronounced the call: ‘vive le Qukbec libre!’ Since then, leaders of the Quebec separatist movement have travelled repeatedly to Paris seeking (and often receiving) the endorsement and encouragement of their French cousins. Indeed, in spite of France’s official policy of non-interference, such leaders have been

Dynamics of disintegration 337

granted the treatment and ceremony usually reserved for heads of sovereign states (Reilly 1995).27

In an ideo-focal non-libertarian state, a pan-ethnic socio-political vision is invoked in an attempt to erase previous ethno-nationavtribal loyalties of indigenous peoples included in the geopolitical boundaries of the state. Soviet socialism, Titoisim and to some extent Arab Ba’athism fit this model. Attempts to blur the ethno-distinctiveness of regions may lead to a large- scale relocation of population. As regions secede, often because of radical ethno-nationalists gaining the upper hand against the sentiment of the general public, attempts to rebuild lost national identities may result in transformation of settler communities into ethnic diasporas. This has been the case in Transnistria where ethnic Russians united with Russian- speaking Ukrainians against Moldovian radical ethno-nationalists (Yamskov 1995).28

The forcible annexation of sovereign nation-states, accompanied by an attempted imposition of new identity, naturally operates to generate resistance and/or mass departure of indigenous populations that create organised diasporas abroad. Such diasporas are motivated to preserve the original national identity, while their leaders often play a major role in keeping the flame of ‘nationhood’ alive for their kinfolk in the annexed homeland. Led by the Dalai Lama, the Tibetan diaspora has nurtured an alternative democratic polity in India, and, in the words of Franz Michael, ‘provided a beam of light and hope . . . for the six million Tibetans remaining in the Chinese-dominated Tibet’ (cited in Shah 1989: 33). Indeed, diasporic leadership may remain, even after generations of displacement, the driving force in the international struggle for reinstating independence and may ultimately assume a central role once sovereignty is regained. The crucial role played by the diasporic Dashnak Party in Armenian modem history is a case in point (Tololyan 1991).

Diasporas as cause and effect in ideo-focal disintegration

As noted above, the overriding goal of ideo-focal imposition is to erase and deny the existence of indigenous group identities. History has shown this to be a task of immense difficulty. For example, in the case of the former Soviet Union, while some observers consider the policy of pluralist integration to have been quite successful before being frustrated by the collapse of the state, others have argued that the inadequacy of Soviet nationalism was inherent in its very nature, ‘made manifest by the collapse [of the old state] but not caused by it’ (Toloyan 1995: 98).

However, it does seem that, at times, the ideo-focal goal is attainable, fusing diverse identities into genuinely internalised supra-ethnic national sentiment - both in a libertarian and an authoritarian context.

Thus, as a libertarian example, the American people, according to some

338 Yossi Shain and Martin Sherman

observers who have rejected the multicultural vision, ‘constitute a genuine nation, with its own nation-state, the USA, with its own genuine, if largely inarticulate, nationalism’. According to this view, ‘most Americans of all races are born and acculturated into the American nation; most immigrants and their descendants will be assimilated into it. The American nation is different in detail from [other] . . . nations. It is not, however, different in kind’ (Lind 1995b: 355, 357). Among non-libertarian states, Yugoslavia under Tito was perceived by some as a country which successfully attained the supra-national goal: ‘Where others had failed Tito had apparently constructed a multinational state in the Balkans’ (Glenny 1990: 118).

Clearly, there may be justifiable debates over the empirical accuracy of the above assessments (see, for example, Lytle’s reservations regarding the success of Tito’s unification - 1995: 239). However, for analytical purposes one can, indeed should, distinguish between the rejection of the imposition of a supra-ethnic identity prior to its genuine internalisation, and the disintegra- tion of a genuinely internalised supra-ethnic identity, allowing the resurgence of previously ‘suspended’ ethno-national sentiments. Thus the fact that the unequivocal classification of any particular empirical case into one or other of these categories may be open to controversy, should not diminish the fundamental conceptual validity (or utility) of this analytical distinction. Nor should it obscure the fact that they point to two substantially different political conditions under which diasporas may form and secessionist sentiments arise. For, while in the former condition, the failure to attain the goal of a stable nation may be cited as the cause for diaspora formations and secessionist claims, the latter indicates that the successful achievement of this goal guarantees no termination of these processes.

This is illustrated graphically by the Balkan reality. Thus, Tito’s relatively successful imposition of the supra-ethnic Yugoslav identity diminished the political profile and intensity of diasporic aspirants for ethnic-based self- determination. However, Slobodan Milosevic’s subsequent seizure of power in 1987, playing the Serbian nationalist card, turned out to be a watershed in the course of Balkan nationalism. It ignited interethnic conflict by thrusting the issue of diaspora and secession to the forefront of the national agenda. Likewise, his suppression of ethnic Albanians in Kosovo mobilised Albanians around the world to a common cause (Shain 1994-5).

For diasporic Croats in particular, the cause of independence was a difficult one to espouse during Tito’s period because of Croatia’s fascist legacy and collaboration with the Nazis during the Second World War.29 Moreover, Croat diasporic proponents of self-determination were widely regarded in Europe and North America as extremists advocating terrorism to obtain their goal. These qxiles did not enjoy wide support among overseas Croats and were hunted by Tito’s secret police (UDBA). To a large degree, it was with the disintegration of Yugoslavia’s nationalism and the pursuant intercommunal war, that the diaspora at large was galvanised into action in the service of the seceding state. The emergence of Croatian independence in

Dynamics of disintegration 339

1990 was a turning point in the awakening of the Croatian diaspora. Croats in North America have begun to assert their ethnic pride primarily by identifying with the political cause of their kin in the former Yugoslavia. Regardless of their specific relationship to the mother country, they now speak of their transformation as a people from . . . a historically repressed minority group in former Yugoslavia to a proud, new nation that has successfully shrugged off the yoke of communist rule and asserted a new sense of purpose and pride. (Winland 1995: 3-4)

Tentative conclusions

Our analysis shows that the idea of the nation-state, even when successfully realised, has patently been unable to generate durable stability either internationally or intranationally. A world order of nation-states, despite the apparent underlying rationale to the contrary, is seemingly incapable of preventing either the dispersion of stateless minorities, or the continuing rebellion of ever-emerging ethnicities, demanding vehicles to express their own distinct national aspirations as independent political entities, separate from the existing array of nation-states.

According to the nationalist ideal, an international system of nation- states should, by the very definition of ‘state’ and of ‘nation’, eliminate ethnically motivated transnational loyalties and do away with intranational strife. For, in theory, any disgruntled diasporic ethnic group, whether resident in an alien monoethnic state, or an unsatisfying ideo-focal one, could then immigrate to its own nation-state, while content diasporas which have forsaken aspirations of self-determination could be absorbed into the socio-political fabric of host nations either on an ideo-focal basis, or as willingly incorporated minorities in an ethno-focal one. This view, however, is based on an underlying assumption of a slutic equilibrium of political loyalties. If this were indeed true, then one could well expect that an appropriate division of humanity into nation-states would generate a tendency by which transnational bonds, and intranational insurrection, would eventually die out.

Yet, this static perspective fails to capture the dynamics of a reality in which political loyalties and national identities are constantly undergoing change, even after stable nation-states have coalesced. These dynamics, which may include processes such as ideo-focal disintegration, and ethno- focal rupture (to name but two of the full range of possibilities), suggest that diaspora formations and secessionist claims are in fact endemic to a world order of nation-states, rather than anomalous anachronisms doomed to extinction. Indeed, the scope for the revival and /or reconstruction of political allegiances and ethno-national identities can be gauged from the fact that the number of ‘homelands’ and potential nations ‘is many times larger than the present number of nations with or without a state and

340 Yossi Shain and Martin Sherman

infinitely larger than the number of states’ (Linz 1993: 2). This perpetual challenge to the validity of existing political entities may eventually under- mine the very conceptual ‘well’ from which they draw their own legitimacy. For the unrestrained invocation of the principle of ‘self-determination’ challenges the feasibility of its continued implementation in practice, by creating a constant menace of instability and fragmentation of already established states, thus imperilling the viability of a global system based on the dominance of nation-states as the overriding principle of world order.

It is in this context that diasporas and separatist sentiments, rather than becoming an anomalous anachronism of the past, appear to be not only an endemic feature of the international system, but a pivotal element in comprehending the direction of present and future trends in it.

Notes

1 In this context, the history of Czechoslovakia affords a graphic illustration of the centrality of role played by diasporas in the formation and disintegration of states. Both the creation of Czechoslovakia in 1918 and the partition of the state in 1993 were influenced by diasporic elements. Slovak and Czech imigris in the United States were behind the crafting of the Pittsburgh Agreement, signed on 30 May 1918, that set the stage for the foundation of Czechoslovakian national identity. At this stage Slovaks yielded to the Czechoslovakian orientation by avoiding any reference to the ‘Slovak nation’. However, in early 1990, shortly after the downfall of the communist regime, diasporic Slovaks were those who instigated the so- called ‘hyphen war’, raised the emotional issue of ‘devalued‘ Slovak identity, and advanced the cause of Slovak independence (Shain 1994-5: 818). On 16 February 1990, Igor Uhrik, one of the leading members of the Slovak League of America, appeared on Czechoslovak TV and presented to the viewers a collection of American TV news reports which hailed the Velvet Revolution without ever mentioning the words Slovaks or Slovakia. Uhrik then made a patriotic appeal to his Slovak compatriots on behalf of their Slovak diasporic kinfolk: ‘Isn’t it about time we let the world know who we are? . . . Lets stop being ashamed of being Slovaks’ (documentation available upon request).

It should also be recalled that Czechoslovakia’s previous dismemberment at the hands of Nazi Germany was closely linked to disaporic irredentism among Sudeten Germans who comprised almost a quarter of the population at the time of Czechoslovakia’s inception. 2 Such as the Kurds. 3 Such as present-day relations between Armenians in Nagorno-Karabagh and independent

Armenia. 4 Whatever the details of such a model may turn out to be, it seems likely that the causal

roots of a failure to create (impose) a national identity may be traced, albeit not exclusively, to inappropriate delineation of political boundaries in relation to political allegiances, while those of failures to maintain national identity may be attributed, at least partially, to the obsolescence or loss of relevance of some formerly unifying ideology.

5 Since Moldova declared its independence from the Soviet Union, the new country has faced secessionist claims by republics in southern and eastern Moldova, Gagauzia and Transnistria (which has a large Russian-speaking community). At the same time, some ethnic Moldovan elites pressed their case for a pan-Romanian nation and called for the reintegration of Moldova with Romania. The Gagauzi and Transnistrians feared that ‘the pan-Romanian euphoria which swept the republic during the second half of 1989 would lead to their forced “romanianisation” and a quick union of Moldova and Romania’ (King 1994: 358). The fighting between the

Dynamics of disintegration 341

Dniester Republic and the Moldovans claimed the lives of hundreds and led to the dispatch of Russian troops into action on the side of the Dniester Republic. Eventually, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) sent a representative mission that formulated a comprehensive proposal for cantonising the region. On 1 February 1994, after political and military pressure from the Russian state, the Moldovan government officially approved autonomy for Transnistria, granting it a high degree of self-government which fell short of federal status (The Econombt, 10 July 1993; Keesing’s Report of World Events, Feb. 1994; 39876). 6 British Foreign Secretary Lord Curzon criticised the action as ‘a thoroughly bad and vicious

solution for which the world will pay a heavy penalty for a hundred years to come’. Winston Churchill, however, argued that ‘the disentanglement of populations which took place between Greece and Turkey . . . was in many ways a success, and has produced friendly relations between Greece and Turkey ever since’. At the Nuremberg trials, population transfers were defined as war crimes (cited in Dowty 1987: 88,97). 7 Bernard Lewis has written that ‘at first sight this exchange seems a clear indication of the

prevalence on both sides of nationalistic and patriotic ideas, and of the desire to give greater unity and cohesion to the nation and the fatherland’. Yet it soon became apparent that the exchange was not leading to homogeneity as both diasporas had already created new identities (1961: 348). 8 Since 1984 Turkey has been fighting against the Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK) separatists

in southeast Anatolia. The war has divided the country and claimed many thousands of lives - including many civilians. Espousing a pan-Kurdish vision, the PKK’s threat has become a major issue on the Turkish national agenda. When the government in Ankara came to believe that the PKK had gained the support of Kurds in northern Iraq, it took steps to bolster Iraqi authority over its Kurdish population (Rouleau 1993: 122). Moreover, the continuing Kurdish failure to acquire sovereignty has undermined internal cohesion, serving to aggravate intra- Kurdish conflicts. Thus, there are signs that a unified Kurdish national identity is being eroded by the fact that Kurds have been forced to develop their communities within diverse state systems and cultures (Fuller 1993: 110). 9 In their common struggle to depose an existing tyrannical regime, nationalist exiles may

collaborate with ethnic secessionists. 10 According to Israel Television Evening News (23 Aug. 1996), one out of every six residents in Tel Aviv is a migrant foreign worker. 11 The Soviet model was intended in theory, though it failed in practice, to unite all ethno- national groups in the Soviet empire under the banner of socialist comradeship. In many respects Soviet policy seems to have been confused and self-contradictory. Thus, on the one hand, it prohibited any other vision of its constituent republics, and systematically attempted to obliterate traditional cultures and to erase the recorded histories and memories of its titular nations (Tololyan 1995: 92). At the same time, and in apparent contradiction to its own political ideology, the Soviet state fostered and cultivated the titular nationalities. Indeed, the Constitution of the Soviet Union also provided in the famous article 17 that ‘the right freely to secede from the USSR is reserved to every Union Republic’ (cited in Buchheit 1978: 100). 12 When Iraqi President Saddam Hussein explained his insistence on imposing an Iraqi national idea throughout the temtory - despite the reality of a heterogeneous population with ethno-geographic distinction - he said: ‘We in Iraq are one united people: Muslims and Christians, Shi’ites and Sunnis, Arabs and Kurds. The Muslims in the past came out with sects. Some said we are Sunnis and others said we are Shi’ites. So what? If the Iraqi people are made up of Sunnis and Shi’ites, does this make them two different peoples and not a united people?’ (cited in Helms, 1984 24). 13 The following account by Kedourie of the Turkish experience illustrates the complexity involved in the creation of an ideo-focal identity:

Legal and political equality - however formal and empty of substance - made it difficult, if not impossible, to justify the millet system, with its communal institutions which acted as a shield to

342 Yossi Shain and Martin Sherman

protect its members from the demands, and the usually unwelcome attentions of the government. If equality was now the rule there was no need for special privileges and for institutions to secure these. Under the new dispensation millets became minorities since equality necessarily meant that one citizen, whatever his religion, was to count no more than another citizen. This is indeed the logic of democracy, but the logic becomes some what oppressive when majorities and minorities are immutable. The majority is thus perpetually dominant, and imposes its norms and views on the minority, while the minority has little or no interest in maintaining the body politic of which it is ostensibly a member. A minority in such circumstances remains as much outside the pays politique in a modem Rechzszaaz as the millet had been when the state followed the laws of Islam. The minority may have a few representatives in parliamentary assemblies. But such representatives cannot possibly sway, or prevail against, the overwhelming numbers who belong to the majority religion. Again, should they attempt to act as the representatives of a minority, their position becomes false and awkward, precisely because the polity is deemed to be nationally homogeneous, and to proscribe divisions based on religion. The recognized status of the millet is replaced by the insecurity and tension which the discrepancy between democratic rhetoric and political reality must generate. (Kedourie 1992: 44-5)

14 Recent experiences of democratic transition indicate how volatile the question of political reform in decentralised states may become in the absence of a strong political centre (Shain and Linz 1995). In this context, scholars have identified several reasons why administrative blunders, rather than resurgent ethnicity, have played a central role in the disintegration of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union. They particularly emphasised the harmful impact of ‘punctuated and plural electoral sequences’, and warned against holding regional elections prior to union-wide elections during the transitional phase (Linz and Stepan 1992: 134-5; Lytle 1995). I5 Sherman, for example, has developed a theoretical model, showing how the differences in the internal structures of regimes affect the harshness of their policy choices (Sherman 1998). 16 Indigenous peoples include Aboriginal, i.e. ‘the residents of a place from earliest known times’, or colonialist settlers (Werther 1992: 7). 17 Israel provides an interesting duality of both ethno-focal and ideo-focal traits. If ‘Jewishness’ is considered an ethnically homogenous feature, then in this regard, Israel is indeed an ethno- focal state. If, however, the more commonly perceived ethnic traits, such as ancestral origin, social and cultural norms or mother tongue, or even physiological features are considered, then the Jewish population of Israel may be perceived as a highly diverse ethnic community, united by the ideo-focal principle of Zionism. In fact, some have argued that the ethno-focal component of the Jews in modem times is more the result of global animosity and of persecution by external groups, than any inherent sense of a common national identity. 18 For example, in 1993 after Cambodia’s first democratic elections, Prince Chakrapong, one of Prince Norodom Sihanouk’s sons, refused to accept his party’s defeat and challenged the authorities by declaring a secessionist movement in the country’s eastern provinces (New York Times 16 June 1993). 19 Refugees, forced out of their homeland, frequently resist adaptation while awaiting their return. By contrast, new immigrants tend to try and adopt a new identity associated with the host country. However, with the passage of time, even the most dedicated exile communities begin to adopt immigrant-like characteristics, such as in the case of the anti-Castro Cubans in the United States (Rieff 1995). Immigrant communities are at times drawn into ethno-national existence abroad when they face difficulties in assimilating into their host societies. The reluctance to integrate may also be encouraged by religious obligations as in the case of certain orthodox followers of the Muslim faith. They cannot, in principle, integrate into a system that requires loyalty to a liberal democratic state (Shain 1996 32-3). 20 Yet, when Irish-Americans lobbied the president to apply the doctrine of self-determination to Ireland, Wilson rebuffed their plea and remained loyal to the Anglo-Saxon transatlantic alliance. Thus the endorsement of eastern European diasporic mobilisation stood in sharp contrast to the Anglo-Saxon cultural imposition of the time that condemned diasporic affinity

Dynamics of disintegration 343

and ‘hyphenism’ as anti-patriotic. During the First World War Theodore Roosevelt cautioned German-Americans that ‘adherence to the politico-racial hyphen [is] . . . the badge and sign of moral treaSon to the republic’ (cited in DeConde 1992 86). 21 For many years France suppressed the cultures of ethnic minorities like the Basques, Bretons and Corsicans, and labelled their aspirations as ‘feudal backwardness’. Yet, France has also admitted immigrants because of economic need and humanitarian concerns, including Portuguese, Maghrebi (North Africans), black Africans and South-East Asians. The massive influx of post-war immigration, and the impact of transnational regionalism and open borders of the European community, have forced French society to respond to the increasingly multicultural and multiethnic character of their country (Saffran 1991: 33-4). Although France still refuses to recognise the status of ethnic groups as such - it does however recognise religious communities - there is a growing debate between those who advocate ‘integration’ and those who promote community ‘furtherance’. In the words of Nadia Rachedi of the University of Paris: ‘The conflict has to do both with social reality - are there foreign “communities” in France? - and with politics - should we now endeavour to integrate people of foreign extraction through the medium of distinctive communities, as being better adapted to modem societies, or should we continue to assimilate people as individuals in the way the nation-state has traditionally done? (cited in Rachedi 1994: 68). 22 According to Will Kymlicka, the granting of common citizenship is often considered a pretext by indigenous minorities to impose the majority’s culture - language, holidays, etc. - as the official state culture (1995a: 183). 23 Here we must distinguish between (1) an ‘irredentist’ diaspora and (2) a ‘far-removed‘ diaspora. Though members of the first category reside outside the national state they still remain within the geographical confines of the ‘homeland’ as defined by nationalists. In this sense they are not really a diaspora. Moreover, not all transborder communities consist of indigenous people, and, in fact, many are simply immigrants. Yet, even in the latter case, the sense of indigenousness may be developed and irredentist claims may ultimately form. For example, the Mexican-American population in the southwest of the United States has been cited as a potential source of irredentist aspirations (Janowitz 1983: 137), although other scholars dispute this claim (Skerry 1993). 24 Latvia and Estonia disenfranchised many ethnic Russians by making fluency in their national languages and knowledge of Baltic history a requirement for citizenship. They also introduced residency requirements and made provisions barring former military and KGB officials from citizenship (Chicago Tribune, 26 Nov. 1994). 25 Indeed, ‘secession into sovereign statehood goes a significant step beyond the segmental autonomy, of course but it is not incompatible with the basic assumption underlying the consociational model’ (Lijphart 1977: 45). 26 The fear of American disunity has received new theoretical backing in Samuel Huntington’s recent thesis about the expanding dominance of ‘civilisations’ in world affairs. Huntington has argued that the persistence of ‘kin-country’ loyalties in the United States run much deeper than assimilationists are willing to admit, and has questioned whether the trend towards ‘the de- Westernization of the United States . . . means its de-Americanization in the democratic sense’ (Huntington 1993: 189-90). 27 One factor that may attenuate secessionist forces in the discrete model is the presence of kindred ethnicities residing outside the homeland elsewhere in the ideo-focal state. For example, Quebec’s secessionist fervour has been somewhat dampened by the apprehension of French Canadians residing in other provinces of Canada, while Sikhs in other parts of India have been alarmed by Punjabi separatism (Hannum 1990 170- 1). 28 However, if settler populations evolve demographically into a large minority (or even a majority) and become well blended in cultural-linguistic terms with the indigenous group - so that many of its members no longer even speak the language of their respective nationalities - regional identity, and not ethnicity, may emerge as the new basis for the seceding areas. Such newly established sovereign entities now constitute a community with a distinct version of culture whose members do not perceive themselves as part of a diaspora, even though the

344 Yossi Shain and Martin Sherman

new state maintains strong connections with the state from which they secede (see Yamskov 1995). 29 The communist partisans, on the other hand, ‘had mobilised across national lines’ (Lytle 1991: 130).

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