DVACET LET POTÉ

TWENTY YEARS AFTERINTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE

MEZINÁRODNÍ KONFERENCE

This study consists of two closely related papers. The first is an essay by Ivo K. Feierabend – THE LAPSE OF HISTORICAL MEMORY AS A TRAIT OF POST-TOTALITARIAN SYNDROME, which analyses the surprising lack of rejoicing over the transitional changes to democracy. The second by Martina Klicperová-Baker and Jaroslav Košťál – POST-COMMUNIST SYNDROME: A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND EMPIRICAL FINDINGS – focuses on the concept of post-totalitarian syndrome and its incidence in contemporary Czech society. It also provides additional results of further surveys examining the dissatisfaction of Czech citizens with past and present regimes.

I. The lapse of historical memory as a trait of post-totalitarian syndromeIvo K. Feierabend

Summary

A recent survey, in which Czech respondents evaluated changes that had occurred under the current regime since 1989, yielded some rather disappointing results. The relative lack of rejoicing about current conditions can be interpreted as a memory lapse and a symptom of post-totalitarian syndrome. The Czech totalitarian condition (1948-1989) is compared to the extreme situations of famous experiments by Philip Zimbardo1 and Stanley Milgram2. Indifference and nostalgia for the past are explained by the repression of memories. Since “conscience is formed by memory…” (Archbishop Olivier de Berranger), a true reflection on history is essential.

KEY WORDS: post-totalitarian syndrome, “democratic hardware”, “democratic software”, psychological pre-requisites for democracy, lapse of memory

The national epiphany of the Velvet Revolution during the annus mirabilis of 1989 was a rare and sacred moment in the life of the Czech nation with its passionate rejection of communist totalitarianism and exhilarating embrace of freedom and democracy. The civilized world watched in fascination, and marvelled at the spontaneity, discipline and civility of thousands of protesters in the squares and streets of Prague. There were no store windows broken and no streets littered. Czech citizens even reprimanded foreign TV crews for stepping into flowerbeds. The Velvet Revolution seemed unreal in its profound human message.

A Czech colleague in New York confessed that the world seemed such a good place to her at the time, and the human condition so beautiful, that she would have gladly died at that moment.

The promise of the Velvet Revolution was delivered only in the form of “democratic hardware” in the words of Jiří Pehe3. That is to say, democratic institutions have been in place for past 20 years and have been functioning with free elections, a parliamentary assembly, political parties, etc. Today, nobody seriously doubts that democracy, as the saying goes, is the only show in town. Nevertheless, the “democratic software”, according to Pehe and other critics, leaves much to be desired. The psychological prerequisites for democracy in terms of the people and their elites still

Post-communist syndrome: a mental heritageA theoretical framework and empirical findings

Martina Klicperová-Baker, Ivo K. Feierabend, Jaroslav Košťál

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suffer from the legacy of the ancien régime – the toxic waste of fallen totalitarianism.

The findings of a survey study conducted by Martina Klicperová-Baker and Jaroslav Košťál are a small, but disturbing, part of the testimony gathered on this subject. In the survey, the status quo of the polity and society of the present republic is not condemned for falling short of the ideals of freedom and democracy, but is instead unfavourably com-pared by far too many respondents to the status quo ante of communist totalitarianism. As illustrated in Graph No.1 of the survey by Klicperová-Baker and Košťál (see below), 36% of respondents were nei-ther pleased nor regretful about the changes that followed communism. What a strange indifference! Additionally, 8% had great regrets and 19% were somewhat regretful. And so, 20 years after the fall of communism, only 33% of respondents in this representative national sample identified with the glorious promise of the Velvet Revolution, whereas a total of 66% of respondents were indifferent to it or rejected it outright. How disconcerting!

The findings in Graph No 3 of the same survey draw an even bleaker picture. If we look at how people view the 32 social and political issues listed, we see that only 9 are perceived more favourably from the current perspective while totalitarianism is alleged to have been the more capable agent in terms of dealing with the remainder.

Even if a lot of dissatisfaction with democratic government exists, is there reason to be indifferent or even perversely nostalgic for a regime that started with a wave of democidal terror that lasted for a decade and with labour camps full of MUKLs (the Czech acronym for “person destined for liquidation” an equivalent of the German RU – Rückkehr uner-wünscht, i.e. “return undesirable”). It was a regime where the class struggle destroyed the peasantry, decimated the middle class and paralyzed the elites. The Stalinist years were a brutal and painful national trauma, which was worse than the Nazi occupation in some respects.

The less harsh decades that followed allowed a handful of dissidents to survive, but only barely. It was a system in which (according to Václav Havel) people were forced to live a lie. The monopolies of force and power as well as the economy and social structures remained in the hands of the Communist Party, while the rewards and punishments available in society sustained the absurd ideological state and the acquiescence of the captive population. Together, the four decades of communism reduced modern, developed Czechoslovakia, which was a First World country at the beginning of the 20th century, to a Second World moribund socialist state by the time the communist regime came to an end. The epiphany of the Velvet Revolution was good enough to scorch the toxic waste of collapsed totalitarianism but not enough to cremate it.

Let us give a tentative answer to the puzzling findings of the survey. It has to do with the extreme situation created by the totalitarian regime, the repression of its horrendous and painful memories, as well as the reprehensible behaviour and desperate coping mechanisms that existed under the old system. The lapse of historical memory uncovered in the study is one the many traits of post-totalitarian syndrome.

In social and political psychology, there are two relevant, famous studies of extreme situations and reprehensible behaviour on the part of experimental subjects. The first is a set of experiments conducted by Stanley Milgram at Yale University. His results showed that most people will deliver a lethal dose of electricity to another subject if instructed to do so by a scientist in a white lab coat. Only a small minority of the experimental subjects in this bizarre situation, the heroes, if you will, said no to the authority figure in the white coat.

The other study was Philip Zimbardo’s experiment in the basement of a building at Stanford University. The subjects were students in a simulated prison situation. Zimbardo had to interrupt the experiment when the situation started to resemble Abu Ghraib. Here at Stanford, as in Iraq, there were a few courageous individuals like Lt. David O. Sutten, William J. Kimbro, a Navy dog handler, and Specialist Joseph M. Darby, who blew the whistle and sounded the alarm to stop (O’Connor, 2004).4

The American Psychological Association and university rules have since banned similar drastic experiments on ethical grounds, and to protect subjects’ psychological well being. In the debriefing period after the experiments, some Yale and Stanford subjects were found to be traumatized by the experience to the point that they needed psychological counselling.

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The spectre of totalitarianism is placed at the extreme negative end of the spectrum of political systems. Its extreme situation far exceeds the two experiments in scope and it embraces an entire social system. And, of course, it is not a lab experiment, but a real and long-lasting life experience.5

Once the extreme situation passes, as occurred after the Velvet Revolution, it is easier for participants to forget or deny the trauma instead of holding on to it with the clarity of recollection, as a courageous few were able to do. For-getting is convenient for the perpetrators of the criminal regime, their fellow travellers, and collaborators. For them, ignorance provides impunity for their complicity.

Generally, the horror, the suffering, the sense of shame and guilt is likely to result in varied reactions of forgetting, repression, alibis, or arguments about the unavoidable temper of the times. There are self-celebrating dissidents who were former communists, and there are even some who still are communists, with little humility for their dubious pasts.

The 63% of respondents expressing indifference or nostalgia towards the ancien régime are symptomatic of post-totalitarian syndrome. And then, there is the denial of wrongdoing. Eichmann, in Jerusalem, claimed that he was only following orders, (this is blaming the man in the white lab coat, which Arendt characterized as the “banality of evil”).6 There are also those who hide their guilt in the collective solidarity of the wrongdoers, still proud of their crimes in the name of higher goals, ideology or passions. The perpetrators of ethnic cleansing also come under this category.7 All these expressions represent an acute threat to the socialization of democratic citizenship, a prerequisite for the “software of democracy.”

It is no wonder that only 33% of the survey’s respondents seemed to have inherited the inspiration of the Velvet Revo-lution, while the rest, in ignorance, complicity or repression dismissed the totalitarian horrors and, with it, the meaning of freedom and democracy.

It is no wonder that it took almost 20 years of strenuous effort and incremental piecemeal progress before two impor-tant steps were finally achieved to redress the loss of Memory and History.6 These two steps comprised the opening of the Security Services’ archives, which became fully accessible to the public, and the establishment of the Institute for the Study of Totalitarian Regimes. It took a lot of frustration on the part of the courageous and principled few as well as their struggle with dithering authorities, reluctant “old structures,” the communists, and the indifference of public opinion before these goals could eventually be attained. These developments are critical tools for the democratic so-cialization process, which may now start anew. Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk’s legacy has come to life again. Truth was at the top of his hierarchy of values.

Reiterating the wisdom of George Santayana, the Harvard Professor, the law providing for the opening of the archives and the Institute, states in its preamble that, “He who does not know his past is condemned to repeat it”.9

When he was apologizing for the French Church’s lapse of memory with regard to the survivors of the Holocaust, Arch-bishop Olivier de Berranger eloquently said that, “Conscience is formed by memory and no society can live in peace with itself on the basis of a false or repressed past any more than an individual can.”* * *When will we know that the struggle for the past (Boje o minulost the title of Pavel Žáček’s monograph10) has come to an end?

When the public consciousness is able to equate the horrors of communism with the horrors of Nazism.

When the Communist Party disappears as a political actor and finally becomes nothing but a painful national memory.

When the 33% of survey respondents indicating a preference for democracy turn into a vast majority.

When the euphoria of the Velvet Revolution is transformed into a true internalized democratic creed.

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Bibliography:

Arendt, Hannah. Eichmann and the Holocaust. London – New York: Penguin Group, 2005.

Feierabend, Ivo K. “Systemic Requisites of Total Power in Macro and Micro Social Systems.” Modelling and Simulation: Socio-Economic Systems, v. 10/4. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh, 1979.

Joffe, Josef. “The Worst of Times” (review of Reflections on a Ravaged Century from Robert Conquest). The New York Times Book Review, November 21, 1999.

Klicperová-Baker, M., and J. Košťál. Totalitní a demokratická zkušenost. Občané České republiky k životu před rokem 1989 a nyní. Výzkumná zpráva. Prague: Psychologický ústav AV ČR a TNS-AISA, 2008.

Milgram, Stanley. Obedience to Authority; An Experimental View. New York: Harper & Row, 1974.

O’Connor, Anahad. “Why Some Prison Guards Have Refused to Join in the Abuse: Psychology Offers Clues.” New York Times, 2004.

Pehe, Jiří. “Jak je na tom naše demokracie po 20 letech.” Americké listy, June 18, 2009.

Power, Samantha. “A problem from hell”: America and the age of genocide. New York: Basic Books, 2002.

Zimbardo, Philip G. Moc a zlo. Sociálně psychologický pohled na svět. [Power and Evil: A social psychologi-cal view of the world]. Edited by J. Fiala and M. Klicperová-Baker. Prague: Library of the Dagmar and Václav

Havel Foundation Vision 97 –Moraviapress, 2005.

Žáček, Pavel. Boje o minulost. Brno: Barrister and Principal, 2000.

II. Post-communist syndrome: A theoretical framework and empirical findingsMartina Klicperová-Baker and Jaroslav Košťál

Summary

This article discusses post-totalitarian symptoms and the concept of post-totalitarian syndrome, which can explain the mentality of some dissatisfied East European citizens. The current Czech post-totalitarian condi-tions are analyzed in terms of specific grievances and human needs; it is suggested that the disappointed include numerous frustrated but otherwise pro-democratic citizens. Complaints focus on economic insecu-rity (fear of unemployment, lack of security in old age), crime (both white-collar economic and street crime), a lack of overall security and disappointment with the general decline of interpersonal relations. Although respondents found it much easier to be upset with the current circumstances than with the totalitarian past,

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direct questions referring to the pre-1989 police state revealed an overwhelming awareness of and frustra-tion with it. The most intense current anger is provoked by the misconduct of politicians, yet democracy as a regime is not doubted. Czech citizens manifest a good level of psychological predispositions for democracy and reserved optimism.

KEY WORDS: post-communist syndrome/post-totalitarian syndrome, coming to terms with the past, eco-nomic insecurity, deterioration in interpersonal relations, predispositions for democracy, civic political cul-ture, civility, civic patriotism

Socialization and life under a totalitarian regime caused the development of a variety of psychological symp-toms. Some almost resemble clinical pictures: learned helplessness, suppression of individuality, chronic anxiety, lack of trust, lack of civility, cognitive defects (e.g. motivated cognition, rigid cognitive schemata, suppressed or selective memory) along with a lack of guilty feelings etc. These symptoms constitute a char-acteristic syndrome, which we have labelled as post-communist or post-totalitarian syndrome. (See Table 1 for an abridged depiction, for more details see Klicperová et al. 199711).

Table 1: Selected symptoms of post-communist syndrome – an abridged version

In general, two varieties of the syndrome can be recognized:1. A passive, dependent type in which learned helplessness plays the main role.2. An active, predatory type abusing the system and others for individualistic profit.

Still, it needs to be stressed that a lack of freedom itself is not a determinant for a post-totalitarian mentality. Some people are able to face adverse conditions without losing their freedom and dignity. An extreme case was provided by Viktor Frankl (1946/1985):12

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“We who lived in concentration camps can remember the men who walked through the huts com- forting oth-ers, giving away their last piece of bread. They may have been few in number, but they offer sufficient proof that everything can be taken from a man but one thing: the last of human freedoms – to choose one’s attitude in any given set of circumstances, to choose one’s own way.” (p. 86).

II. Post-communist syndrome: A theoretical framework and empirical findings

Martina Klicperová-Baker and Jaroslav Košťál

Summary

INDIVIDUALLEVEL

INTERPERSONALLEVEL

INSTITUTIONALLEVEL

SOCIETAL LEVEL

INDIVIDUALITY Suppressedindividuality

Conformity,feelings ofinferiority

Provincial loss inthe system orclever abuse of it

“Us” and“them”perspective

EMOTIONS Anxiety,depression,nostalgia

Envy, hatred Apathy Hate,xenophobia

COGNITIONS Rigidity Distrust,defensivemechanisms

Ignorance orshrewdness

Black/whitethinking

ACTIONS Learnedhelplessness

Conformity,intolerance ofdifferences

Low self-efficacy,exploitation

Avoidance ofresponsibility,authoritarianism

MORALITY Lack of moralintegrity, lack of guilt

Rudeness,dishonesty

Legitimization ofimmorality andcrime

Parasitism,alienation

In general, two varieties of the syndrome can be recognized:1. A passive, dependent type in which learned helplessness plays the main role.2. An active, predatory type abusing the system and others for individualistic profit.

Still, it needs to be stressed that a lack of freedom itself is not a determinant for a post-totalitarian mentality. Some people are able to face adverse conditions without losingtheir freedom and dignity. An extreme case was provided by Viktor Frankl (1946/1985)11:

“We who lived in concentration camps can remember the men who walkedthrough the huts comforting others, giving away their last piece of bread. Theymay have been few in number, but they offer sufficient proof that everythingcan be taken from a man but one thing: the last of human freedoms – tochoose one’s attitude in any given set of circumstances, to choose one’s ownway.” (p. 86).

“Fundamentally, therefore, any man can, even under such circumstances,decide what shall become of him – mentally and spiritually. He may retain hishuman dignity even in a concentration camp” (p. 87).

11 V. E. Frankl, Man's Search for Meaning (New York: Washington Square Press - Simon & Schuster, Inc.,1946/1985).

President Václav Havel (1990)13 imparted another strong example — a case of oppression which not only failed to smother him but provided an opportunity. In his address to the joint session of the American Con-gress, he testified that the communist type of totalitarian system caused immense horrors – “countless dead, an infinite spectrum of human suffering, profound economic decline, and above all enormous human humiliation.” In spite of this he noted:

Post-totalitarian syndrome was observed in a variety of countries and described under different names, e.g., old communist mentality, captive mind, civilizational incompetence and others – see Table 2. It is still a widespread mentality in the East European region. Our comparative study in 2002 revealed dependent and safety seeking negativistic post-communism to be a major type of mentality characterizing many re-spondents from a representative sample of citizens of Belarus, Bulgaria, Slovakia and the Czech Republic (Klicperová-Baker, Feierabend et al. 200714). Yet, it was not the major, most typical mentality for the Czechs.

Table 2 – Equivalents of post-communist syndrome in post-totalitarian countries

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“Fundamentally, therefore, any man can, even under such circumstances, decide what shall become of him – mentally and spiritually. He may retain his human dignity even in a concentration camp” (p. 87).

“At the same time, however unintentionally, of course, it has given us something positive: a special capacity to look, from time to time, somewhat further than someone who has not undergone this bitter experience. A person who cannot move and live a normal life because he is pinned under a boulder has more time to think about his hopes than someone who is not trapped in this way.”

Our comparative study in 2002 revealed dependent and safety seeking negativistic post-communism to be a major type of mentality characterizing many respondents from arepresentative sample of citizens of Belarus, Bulgaria, Slovakia and the Czech Republic(Klicperová-Baker, Feierabend et al. 200714). Yet, it was not the major, most typicalmentality for the Czechs.

Table 2 – Equivalents of post-communist syndrome in post-totalitarian countries

POST-TOTALITARIAN MENTALITYArato (1991) authoritarian socialist formationČulík (2008) normalization mentality (Czech Republic)Boym (1995) post-communist nostalgia (Russia)Connolly (2006) totally collective mentality (Russia)Dainov (1995) closed mentality (Bulgaria) Fibich (1996) mentality of “real socialism” (Czech Republic)Fuxman (1997) old communist mentality (Ukraine)Goldfarb (1989) post-totalitarian mind (Russia)Halík (1993) narrow-minded Czech (Czech Republic)Kakabadze et al (2004) Totalitarian social mentality (Georgia)Kitaev (1994) post-Soviet mentality (Russia)Koralewicz, Ziolkowski (1990) socialist mentality (Poland)Lukasiewicz, Sicinski (1994) populist thinking (Poland)Lutynski (1991) psychological and socio-moral infrastructure of collective lifeMarlin (1990, 1992) totalitarian mentality (Czechoslovakia)Marody (1987) social sub-consciousness (Poland)Mikheyev (1987) Soviet mentality (Soviet Union)Mihailescu (1993) psychological damage and mental stereotypes (Romania)Milosz (1953) captive mind (Poland)Scheye (1991) Central-European mental structureSztompka (1993) civilizational incompetence (Poland) Vainshtein (1994) totalitarian public consciousness (Russia)Watts (1994) socialist personality (Germany)Zeman (1992) totalitarian psychology, populist syndrome (Czechoslovakia)Zinovyev (1986) “Homo sovieticus”

14 M. Klicperová-Baker, I. K. Feierabend, S. Kovacheva, L. Titarenko, J. Košťál, C.R.

Hofstetter, Demokratická kultura v České republice: Občanská kultura, éthos avlastenectví

ze srovnávacího pohledu. [Democratic culture in the Czech Republic: Civic culture,ethos and

patriotism from a comparative perspective.] (Prague: Academia, 2007).

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How well did the Czech Republic come to terms with its past and how does it cope with its “new pres-ent”?Some people claim that this is the best time this country ever experienced and they use mostly economic arguments (President Václav Klaus in his New Year’s address in 200815). Others are horrified by the politi-cal and moral decay (Meda Mládková, 200916). And the vox populi often utters yet another stance: “Noth-ing has changed!” The relationship of “those above” to the common people stayed the same; it is yet again the arrogance of power versus the helplessness of decent people.

So are things better, worse or the same? How satisfied are the citizens with the change of regime? Our representative study of Czech residents, which was focused on the totalitarian and democratic experience (Klicperová-Baker and Košťál 200817), confirmed that the nation is divided. Graph 1 illustrates that most people accepted the changes from 1989 till now with mixed feelings – over a third of respondents. For another third (33% of respondents) change from the past is a joyful experience. And as many as 27% are regretful (19% “somewhat regretful” with 8 % admitting “great regrets”).

Graph 1 – Attitudes to transition from 1989 till now(Klicperová-Baker & Košťál 2008).

This three-way split of attitudes revealed by our study is consistent with the long term observations of the Centre for Research of Public Opinion (CVVM 200718). CVVM has been asking a representative sample of Czech citizens “to recall the times before November 1989 and, whilst taking everything into account, to choose one of the offered options” – see Graph 2. Here too, life in democracy is definitely appealing to ap-proximately one third of respondents and another third are hesitant. The last third either remembers the past with nostalgia or does not know or care. The trends suggest that the numbers of defenders of com-munism are steadily declining while the “ignorant” are on the rise. (The data also reflects the crisis of 1997 and the rebound from it.)

How well did the Czech Republic come to terms with its past and how does it cope with its “newpresent”?

Some people claim that this is the best time this country ever experienced and they usemostly economic arguments (President Václav Klaus in his New Year’s address in200815). Others are horrified by the political and moral decay (Meda Mládková, 200916).And the vox populi often utters yet another stance: “Nothing has changed!” Therelationship of “those above” to the common people stayed the same; it is yet again thearrogance of power versus the helplessness of decent people.

So are things better, worse or the same? How satisfied are the citizens with the change ofregime? Our representative study of Czech residents, which was focused on thetotalitarian and democratic experience (Klicperová-Baker and Košťál 200817), confirmedthat the nation is divided. Graph 1 illustrates that most people accepted the changesfrom 1989 till now with mixed feelings – over a third of respondents. For another third(33% of respondents) change from the past is a joyful experience. And as many as 27%are regretful (19% “somewhat regretful” with 8 % admitting “great regrets”).

ATTITUDES TOWARD TRANSITION FROM 1989 TILL NOW

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%

Graph 1 – Attitudes to transition from 1989 till now (Klicperová-Baker & Košťál 2008).

This three-way split of attitudes revealed by our study is consistent with the long termobservations of the Centre for Research of Public Opinion (CVVM 200718). CVVM has been

15 V. Klaus, New Year’s Address, January 1, 2008, http://www.klaus.cz/klaus2/asp/clanek.asp?id=lmt6ZXkOf7aw.

16 M. Mládková, “Česká republika nebyla nikdy v tak špatné situaci,.” Ona dnes, June 15, 2009, http://ona.idnes.cz/meda-mladkova-ceska-republika-nebyla-nikdy-v-tak-spatne-situaci-

pve-/ona_ony.asp?c=A090605_144602_ona_ony_jup.

17 M. Klicperová-Baker, and J. Košťál. Totalitní a demokratická zkušenost. Občané České

republiky k životu před rokem 1989 a nyní. Výzkumná zpráva. [Totalitarian and democratic

experience. Citizens of the Czech Republic about life before 1989 and now. Research report]

(Prague: Psychologický ústav AV ČR a TNS-AISA, 2008).

18 J . Červenka, Srovnání současné situace s poměry před listopadem 1989 z pohleduveřejnosti

[Comparison of the current conditions with conditions before November 1989 from the

Graph 2 – Comparison of pre- and post-November 1989 situations

As much as these statistics seem disappointing, we realize that they reflect more than a judgment on the totalitarian regime and evaluation of freedom. They reveal an amalgam of experience, including frustration at transformational problems and betrayal by the???. We were particularly interested in problems which were most upsetting in the past (before 1989) or at the present time (the survey was conducted in 2008). From 32 topics which were assessed, just a few received a more favourable rating now than in political elites. Some of the mixed feelings may be explained by habitual Czech grumbling, but more importantly a substantial portion of negativity may be assigned to the unexpected loss of life security. Many people sud-denly appear in an insecure or desperate situation – unemployed, humiliated, evicted from apartments. It may be harsh to reprimand them for a loss of revolutionary ideals.

We wanted to clarify that. We asked respondents, who already expressed their opinions about transition (Graph 1), about specific issues which for people like them may have been a source of dissatisfaction in the past or now – see Graph 3. In the light of the theories of the psychologist Abraham Maslow, the old regime was more successful in satisfying the basic, “deficit” needs, and the current one is better at satisfying the higher, “growth” needs – to a considerable degree at the expense of a feeling of security. What used to be taken for granted is suddenly at risk.

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asking a representative sample of Czech citizens “to recall the times before November1989 and, whilst taking everything into account, to choose one of the offered options” –see Graph 2. Here too, life in democracy is definitely appealing to approximately one thirdof respondents and another third are hesitant. The last third either remembers the pastwith nostalgia or does not know or care. The trends suggest that the numbers ofdefenders of communism are steadily declining while the “ignorant” are on the rise. (Thedata also reflects the crisis of 1997 and the rebound from it.)

PREFERENCES FOR PRE- or POST-1989 CONDITIONS

Graph based on CVVM (2007) data

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Better before Nov. 1989 Better NOW

Half and half Do not know or care

Graph 2 – Comparison of pre- and post-November 1989 situations

As much as these statistics seem disappointing, we realize that they reflect more than ajudgment on the totalitarian regime and evaluation of freedom. They reveal an amalgamof experience, including frustration at transformational problems and betrayal by the???.We were particularly interested in problems which were most upsetting in the past (before1989) or at the present time (the survey was conducted in 2008). From 32 topics whichwere assessed, just a few received a more favourable rating now than in political elites.Some of the mixed feelings may be explained by habitual Czech grumbling, but moreimportantly a substantial portion of negativity may be assigned to the unexpected loss oflife security. Many people suddenly appear in an insecure or desperate situation –unemployed, humiliated, evicted from apartments. It may be harsh to reprimand them fora loss of revolutionary ideals.

We wanted to clarify that. We asked respondents, who already expressed their opinionsabout transition (Graph 1), about specific issues which for people like them may havebeen a source of dissatisfaction in the past or now – see Graph 3. In the light of thetheories of the psychologist Abraham Maslow, the old regime was more successful insatisfying the basic, “deficit” needs, and the current one is better at satisfying the higher,“growth” needs – to a considerable degree at the expense of a feeling of security. Whatused to be taken for granted is suddenly at risk.

perspective of the public. Press release]. Naše společnost 2007, v07-10. Prague: CVVM, 2007. http://www.cvvm.cas.cz/upl/zpravy/100729s_pd71116.pdf.

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Graph 3: What bothered people most before 1989 and now?(“extremely bothers” should be “extremely bothered”)

Graph 3: What bothered people most before 1989 and now?(“extremely bothers” should be “extremely bothered”)

In general, respondents found it much easier to be critical and upset about the current circumstances. Hardly anyone failed to point out something very negative about them. Spontaneously, people were outraged by the behaviour of politicians – but not by politics itself (they did not seem to be alienated from the system, just annoyed with how democracy is exercised). When judging a list of issues, two groups of problems made it to the top: economic insecurity and deterioration in interpersonal relations (particularly political lies, cor-ruption in politics, but also fear of criminals, the arrogance of business, discrimination, and a general level of rudeness and envy).

Again, our survey is consistent with results of CVVM (200719) which also detected a loss of security in the forefront of complaints (loss of social security, fear of unemployment, lack of security for old age) and along with it, a decline in interpersonal relations: corruption, general as well as economic crime, political arro-gance, widespread envy, intolerance and greed.

Did we not expect an improvement in interpersonal relations in a liberated society, particularly after the Vel-vet treatment? Instead, we witness the ideals of the Velvet Revolution often ridiculed along with the “truth-love-worshippers” (pravdoláskaři) who are standing up for them.

We also asked directly whether our respondents considered pre-November 1989 Czechoslovakia a police state (“a police state limiting personal freedom, state-provoked informing activity”). An overwhelming num-ber of Czech respondents recognized it as such and over three quarters of respondents claimed that “people like them” were bothered by it (one third were extremely bothered) – see Graph 4. At the same time, almost a quarter of respondents were in denial or were hardly troubled by it.

9

Graph 4 – Attitudes toward the police state prior to 1989

Who are these people, who are nostalgic or indifferent to the wrongdoing of the totalitarian regime? Closer analyses show that age, political orientation, and party sympathies play a significant role (probability of er-ror <.01). The respondent’s education and the region where they live may also contribute (probability <.05).

Age: The typical stereotype of a senior Communist Party sympathizer was confirmed. Respondents above the age of 60 often trivialized past horrors. But even more importantly, indifference and ignorance is a trait of the young generation, not just teenagers but also respondents in their 20s (!), while respondents between 30 and 60 years of age reject totalitarian wrongdoings most intensely.

Political orientation: More than being left of centre, it is the inability to declare a political inclination or a refusal to do so which correlates with acceptance of the old regime. And the same seems to be true with political parties, as hypothesized. Communist Party sympathizers were overrepresented among the deniers of past totalitarian horrors, but even more often, those who denied totalitarian wrongdoings were those who failed to declare their preferred political party (admittedly, some “crypto-communists” could have been among them, too). Education appeared to be another obvious protective factor against loss of memory. Those who had only a basic education had a higher tendency to deny past wrongdoings (here there is a partial correlation with age). To a certain degree residence in Moravia/Silesia and Central Bohemia (except Prague) also indicated a less critical view of the past. Residents of Prague appeared to have a more critical view of totalitarianism.

As mentioned above, respondents were more upset about the current circumstances than about the past. About one third of respondents spontaneously pointed out that they used to be very upset by the lack of freedom and, along with it, also by the hypocrisy, informing for the regime, etc. Almost a quarter of respon-dents could not recall anything about the old regime that was particularly upsetting. Of course, the number of people without a direct memory of oppression is declining and emotions about the past have calmed down. Still, we certainly encounter remarkable memory lapses along with the fact that the old regime was quite acceptable to many people.

Predispositions for democracyEmpirical findings: Czech respondents in an international perspective.Almost since the beginning of the democratic transformation of 1989, we have been attempting to assess the psychological predispositions for democracy which we sometimes refer to as the Feierabend triad20. This triad consists of civic political culture, civility, and civic patriotism.

In general, respondents found it much easier to be critical and upset about the currentcircumstances. Hardly anyone failed to point out something very negative about them.Spontaneously, people were outraged by the behaviour of politicians – but not by politicsitself (they did not seem to be alienated from the system, just annoyed with howdemocracy is exercised). When judging a list of issues, two groups of problems made it tothe top: economic insecurity and deterioration in interpersonal relations (particularlypolitical lies, corruption in politics, but also fear of criminals, the arrogance of business,discrimination, and a general level of rudeness and envy).

Again, our survey is consistent with results of CVVM (200719) which also detected a lossof security in the forefront of complaints (loss of social security, fear of unemployment,lack of security for old age) and along with it, a decline in interpersonal relations:corruption, general as well as economic crime, political arrogance, widespread envy,intolerance and greed. Did we not expect an improvement in interpersonal relations in a liberated society,particularly after the Velvet treatment? Instead, we witness the ideals of the VelvetRevolution often ridiculed along with the “truth-love-worshippers” (pravdoláskaři) who arestanding up for them.

We also asked directly whether our respondents considered pre-November 1989Czechoslovakia a police state (“a police state limiting personal freedom, state-provokedinforming activity”). An overwhelming number of Czech respondents recognized it as suchand over three quarters of respondents claimed that “people like them” were bothered byit (one third were extremely bothered) – see Graph 4. At the same time, almost a quarterof respondents were in denial or were hardly troubled by it.

EXPERIENCE OF POLICE STATE PRIOR TO 1989

33.1

22.5

19.9

7.2

5

3.1

9.1

0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35

Extremely bothered

Very bothered

Quite bothered

Slightly bothered

I did not mind

Did not happen

Do not know / no answer

%

Graph 4 – Attitudes toward the police state prior to 1989

Who are these people, who are nostalgic or indifferent to the wrongdoing of thetotalitarian regime? Closer analyses show that age, political orientation, and partysympathies play a significant role (probability of error <.01). The respondent’s educationand the region where they live may also contribute (probability <.05). Age: The typical stereotype of a senior Communist Party sympathizer was confirmed.Respondents above the age of 60 often trivialized past horrors. But even moreimportantly, indifference and ignorance is a trait of the young generation, not justteenagers but also respondents in their 20s (!), while respondents between 30 and 60years of age reject totalitarian wrongdoings most intensely.

19 Ibid.

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Civic political culture encompasses such aspects of political life as insight into politics and laws, democrat-ic creed and active participation in interest groups, respect for the rule of law and an ability to overcome a feeling of alienation if things are not going well. (It should be noted that our interest is in the political culture of the people, not of politicians.)

Generalizing from our representative surveys and comparisons within the East/Central European region, the Czechs fare relatively well: Czech citizens mostly came across as sophisticated democrats. Their democratic creed was realistically reserved, it did not express uncritical democratic excitement (as could be found in Belarusians who still court democracy with great illusions); neither did we detect in the Czechs any exces-sive alienation (often manifested among Bulgarians as well as among our Slovak neighbours). Overall, the Czechs displayed a good level of civic political culture which is assumed to be a major precondition for successful democratic societies. This reserved dispassionateness sometimes creates an impression that Czechs do not care about democracy. But while the Czechs are very critical of democratic shortcomings, a similarly large majority of them also endorses the Churchillian wisdom that democracy, compared to other political regimes, is the least bad (CVVM, 200221). This conflict is motivating and hopeful.

Our studies also confirmed another Czech feature – nonconforming disobedience. This nonconformity has its moral as well as immoral aspects. In our surveys, it manifested itself as a rebellious tendency towards their own government and also in a lack of respect for the law (even for laws that were democratically ap-proved). Czechs behaved as if they could judge the quality of laws themselves and respect them selectively. This disrespect for the law is obviously detrimental to democracy.

Civility is the second important prerequisite for democracy. It is the morality of civil society. It encompasses decency in its deepest meaning, honesty and trust, tolerance of differences in ethnicity, race, gender, status etc; freedom balanced with responsibility.

Although the post-totalitarian syndrome of passive negativism was still obvious in our comparative surveys, the major Czech mentality that we detected can be characterized rather as tolerant bon-vivant liberalism. We confirmed this type of mentality again in a recent study from the data of the European Social Survey (Klicperová-Baker & Košťál, 200922). Tolerant bon-vivant liberalism can be characterized in terms of the no-tions “live and let live” as well as “live and enjoy life” – without unmeasured risk and without overwhelming consumerism. It involves relative benevolence and tolerance (in particular toward women’s liberation and al-ternative gay lifestyles), social compassion and, at the same time, personal responsibility without too strong an influence of state paternalism. This mentality also has its shortcomings in terms of a lack of honesty and the selective tolerance of ethnic minorities.

Civic patriotism is the last one of the trio of democratic predispositions. We studied how ethnic identity, “Czechness” (or “Moravianness”), related to various values: freedom, history, food and drink, science and technology, etc. As expected, cultural items appeared as most firmly related to national identity among re-spondents in the Czech Republic (in contrast, for example, with students from the USA., who reliably equate “Americanness” with civic values, particularly with freedom and democracy). The reader will probably guess what appeared at the very top of the list – it was the Czech language, both in Bohemia and Moravia. Among Bohemian respondents, the Czech language was closely followed by freedom and culture. In Moravia “tradi-tional food and drinks” ranked in second place. And what value appeared as being least related to respon-dents’ ethnicity? It was religion. Both in Bohemian and Moravian respondents (although in statistical terms, this was less significantly rejected by Moravians).

Some are disturbed by Czech agnosticism or perhaps atheism; they tend to see it as a handicap for democ-racy. And indeed, our results suggest that the mentality of (Christian) traditional virtues generally correlates more strongly with democratic civic culture than the mentality of tolerant bon-vivant liberalism. Neverthe-

11

less, a closer analysis indicates that tolerant bon-vivant liberalism may protect better against nondemocra-tic tendencies than the mentality of traditional virtues (Klicperová-Baker, Feierabend et al, 2007, p. 11623). Humanism can be atheistic although great Czech humanists of the past were mostly religious. Moreover, Říčan and Janošová pointed out special aspects of Czech spirituality as eco-spirituality and moral engage-ment (2005)24. The relationship between religiosity-spirituality and democracy is complex, but there is good evidence that democracy can flourish without religion if secular civic virtues are respected, as in secular Scandinavia or The Netherlands. Zuckerman25 proves that the “majority of the most irreligious democracies are among the most prosperous and successful nations on earth,” who additionally enjoy a good quality of life, the highest life expectancies of their citizens, a high level of education, the lowest murder rates, etc. We can assume that democracy can prosper quite well without religion, but it cannot exist well without a moral compass and some basic trust (in an Eriksonian sense). Still, basic trust can be found in a positive worldview toward the cosmos and humanity; and the moral compass can stem from what Kohlberg called a post-conventional level of morality, which does not require the threat of authority.

In place of conclusions

The survey results show that almost two decades after the Velvet Revolution, the citizens of the Czech Republic manifest very mixed feelings about the present democracy as well as about the totalitarian past. Such an outcome can easily lead to disappointment in democratic patriots. Closer analysis, though, sug-gests that this diversity of opinions cannot be simply explained by mere remnants of post-communist syn-drome (although we can attribute to it many current ailments, such as rudeness, disrespect for the law and corruption). Some of these mixed feelings are related to legitimate complaints and are still in line with the Czech “pro-democratic” spirit.

There is a good basis for reserved optimism because, for the most part, Czech citizens recognize totalitarian wrongdoings. They also trust in democracy and have a significant level of pro-democratic psychological pre-dispositions. In general, Czech respondents also express optimism about the future of their country – see Graph 5.

Graph 5 – The life line of the Czech nation according to a representative survey in 2007

citizens, a high level of education, the lowest murder rates, etc. We can assume thatdemocracy can prosper quite well without religion, but it cannot exist well without a moralcompass and some basic trust (in an Eriksonian sense). Still, basic trust can be found ina positive worldview toward the cosmos and humanity; and the moral compass can stemfrom what Kohlberg called a post-conventional level of morality, which does not requirethe threat of authority.

In place of conclusions

The survey results show that almost two decades after the Velvet Revolution, the citizensof the Czech Republic manifest very mixed feelings about the present democracy as wellas about the totalitarian past. Such an outcome can easily lead to disappointment indemocratic patriots. Closer analysis, though, suggests that this diversity of opinionscannot be simply explained by mere remnants of post-communist syndrome (although wecan attribute to it many current ailments, such as rudeness, disrespect for the law andcorruption). Some of these mixed feelings are related to legitimate complaints and are still in linewith the Czech “pro-democratic” spirit.

There is a good basis for reserved optimism because, for the most part, Czech citizensrecognize totalitarian wrongdoings. They also trust in democracy and have a significantlevel of pro-democratic psychological predispositions. In general, Czech respondents alsoexpress optimism about the future of their country – see Graph 5.

-7

-6

-5

-4

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1900

1910

1920

1930

1940

1950

1960

1970

1980

1990

2000

2010

Graph 5 – The life line of the Czech nation according to a representative survey in 2007

Importantly, despite all the struggles, two thirds of Czech citizens accept the challenge offreedom and democracy when asked whether the change of social system in 1989 wasworth it? – see Graph 6.

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Importantly, despite all the struggles, two thirds of Czech citizens accept the challenge of freedom and democracy when asked whether the change of social system in 1989 was worth it? – see Graph 6.

Graph 6 – Views of the 1989 change of regime (CVVM 2007)

Nevertheless, indifference and ignorance among the young appear to be a growing threat. The best invest-ment in democracy is in civic education, fostering democratic predispositions, an honest investigation into our past and education about it.

Bibliography

Červenka, J. Demokracie, lidská práva a korupce mezi politiky. CVVM Tisková zpráva. [Democracy, human rights and corruption among politicians. Press Release.] Naše společnost 2002. Prague: CVVM, 2002. http://www.cvvm.cas.cz/upl/zpravy/100110s_pd21004.pdf.

Červenka, J. Srovnání současné situace s poměry před listopadem 1989 z pohledu veřejnosti [Compari-son of the current conditions with conditions before November 1989 from the perspective of the pub-lic. Press release]. Naše společnost 2007, v07-10. Prague: CVVM, 2007. http://www.cvvm.cas.cz/upl/zpravy/100729s_pd71116.pdf.

Frankl, V. E. Man’s Search for Meaning. New York: Washington Square Press - Simon & Schuster, Inc., 1946/1985.

Havel, V. Address to the Joint Session of the U. S. Congress, Washington, D.C., February 21, 1990, http://old.hrad.cz/president/Havel/speeches/1990/2102_uk.html.

Klaus, V. New Year’s Address, January 1, 2008, http://www.klaus.cz/klaus2/asp/clanek.asp?id=lmt6ZXkOf7aw.

Klicperová, M., I. K. Feierabend, and C. R. Hofstetter. “In the search for a post-communist syndrome. A theoretical framework and empirical assessment.” Journal of Community and Applied Social Psychology 7 (1997): 39-52.

WAS THE 1989 REGIME CHANGE WORTH IT?

27

37

14 15

7

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

YESdefinitely

YES rather Do not know NO rather NO defintiely

%

Graph 6 – Views of the 1989 change of regime (CVVM 2007)

Nevertheless, indifference and ignorance among the young appear to be a growing threat.The best investment in democracy is in civic education, fostering democraticpredispositions, an honest investigation into our past and education about it.

Bibliography

Červenka, J. Demokracie, lidská práva a korupce mezi politiky. CVVM Tisková zpráva.[Democracy, human rights and corruption among politicians. Press Release.]N a š e s p o l e č n o s t 2 0 0 2 . P r a g u e : C V V M , 2 0 0 2 .http://www.cvvm.cas.cz/upl/zpravy/100110s_pd21004.pdf.

Červenka, J. Srovnání současné situace s poměry před listopadem 1989 z pohleduveřejnosti [Comparison of the current conditions with conditions beforeNovember 1989 from the perspective of the public. Press release]. Našes p o l e č n o s t 2 0 0 7 , v 0 7 - 1 0 . P r a g u e : C V V M , 2 0 0 7 .http://www.cvvm.cas.cz/upl/zpravy/100729s_pd71116.pdf.

Frankl, V. E. Man's Search for Meaning. New York: Washington Square Press - Simon &Schuster, Inc., 1946/1985.

Havel, V. Address to the Joint Session of the U. S. Congress, Washington, D.C., February21, 1990, http://old.hrad.cz/president/Havel/speeches/1990/2102_uk.html.

Klaus, V. New Year’s Address, January 1, 2008, http://www.klaus.cz/klaus2/asp/clanek.asp?id=lmt6ZXkOf7aw.

Klicperová, M., I. K. Feierabend, and C. R. Hofstetter. “In the search for a post-communistsyndrome. A theoretical framework and empirical assessment.” Journal ofCommunity and Applied Social Psychology 7 (1997): 39-52.

Klicperová-Baker, M. “Introduction.” In M. Klicperová-Baker, Ivo. K. Feierabend, C. RichardHofstetter, Robert V. Levine, Jan Srnec et al. Ready for Democracy? Civic Cultureand Civility with a Focus on Czech Society. Praha: Institute of Psychology,Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic, 1999.

Klicperová-Baker, M., I. K. Feierabend, S. Kovacheva, L. Titarenko, J. Košťál, and C. R.Hofstetter. Demokratická kultura v České republice: Občanská kultura, éthos avlastenectví ze srovnávacího pohledu. [Democratic culture in the CzechRepublic: Civic culture, ethos and patriotism from a comparative perspective].Prague: Academia, 2007.

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Klicperová-Baker, M. “Introduction.” In M. Klicperová-Baker, Ivo. K. Feierabend, C. Richard Hofstetter, Rob-ert V. Levine, Jan Srnec et al. Ready for Democracy? Civic Culture and Civility with a Focus on Czech Society. Praha: Institute of Psychology, Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic, 1999.

Klicperová-Baker, M., I. K. Feierabend, S. Kovacheva, L. Titarenko, J. Košťál, and C. R. Hofstetter. Demokrat-ická kultura v České republice: Občanská kultura, éthos a vlastenectví ze srovnávacího pohledu. [Demo-cratic culture in the Czech Republic: Civic culture, ethos and patriotism from a comparative perspective]. Prague: Academia, 2007.

Klicperová-Baker, M., and J. Košťál. Totalitní a demokratická zkušenost. Občané České republiky k životu před rokem 1989 a nyní. Výzkumná zpráva. [Totalitarian and democratic experience. Citizens of the Czech Republic about life before 1989 and now. Research report]. Prague: Psychologický ústav AV ČR a TNS-AISA, 2008.

Klicperová-Baker, M., and J. Košťál. Czech Mentalities. Cluster Analysis of European Social Survey data (manuscript). Prague: Institute of Psychology, Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic, 2009. Mládková, M. “Česká republika nebyla nikdy v tak špatné situaci.” Ona dnes, June 15, 2009, http://ona.idnes.cz/meda-mladkova-ceska-republika-nebyla-nikdy-v-tak-spatne-situaci-pve-/ona_ony.asp?c=A090605_144602_ona_ony_jup.

Procházková, K. Srovnání poměrů dnes a před rokem 1989. Tisková zpráva. [Comparison of conditions before and after 1989. Press release] Naše společnost 2006, v06-10. Prague: CVVM, 2006. http://www.cvvm.cas.cz/upl/zpravy/100614s_pd61109.pdf.

Říčan, P., and P. Janošová. “Spirituality: Its Psychological Operationalization via Measurement of Individual Differences: A Czech Perspective.” Studia Psychologica, 47/2 (2005): 157-165.Zuckerman, P. Society without God: What the least religious nations can tell us about contentment. New York: New York University Press, 2008.

1 Philip G. Zimbardo, Moc a zlo. Sociálně psychologický pohled na svět [Power and Evil: A social psychological view of the world], ed. J. Fiala and M. Klicperová-Baker (Prague: Library of the Dagmar and Václav Havel Foundation Vision 97 – Moraviapress, 2005).

2 Stanley Milgram, Obedience to Authority; An Experimental View (New York: Harper & Row, 1974).

3 Jiří Pehe, “Jak je na tom naše demokracie po 20 letech,” Americké listy, June 18, 2009.

4 Anahad O’Connor, “Why Some Prison Guards Have Refused to Join in the Abuse: Psychology Offers Clues,” New York Times, 2004.

5 Two short citations can demonstrate the insane extremism of totalitarianism. The first one is a comment on the deadly sta-tistics of the 20th (totalitarian) century. The second demonstrates the deadly obedience that exists under undiluted total power in a microcosmic totalitarian system.

Josef Joffe (1999) asked: “Consider these gruesome numbers. Regular was has killed 30 million, but this figure pales when compared to the 170 million civilians massacred by states and regimes like the Soviet, German or Chinese.”The cult leader, Jim Jones, ordered his entire assembled congregation (some 1,000 people) to commit suicide in Jonestown, Guyana, and they did. “A lonely woman’s voice, preserved on tape, argued with Jones, telling him that children have the right to live. He told her that children have the right to peace, too; and she was shouted down by the other cultists…The power that makes parents kill their children and the power that kills millions with impunity deserves the name of total power.” Ivo K. Fei-erabend, “Systemic Requisites of Total Power in Macro and Micro Social Systems,” Modelling and Simulation: Socio-Economic Systems, v. 10/4 (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh, 1979): 1473.

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6 Hannah Arendt, Eichmann and the Holocaust (London – New York: Penguin Group, 2005).

7 Samantha Power, “A problem from hell”: America and the age of genocide (New York: Basic Books, 2002).

8 This is the very appropriate name of the journal of the Institute for the Study of Totalitarian Regimes (Paměť a dějiny).

9 Notable Quotations from George Santayana (“Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.”) Life of Reason, Reason in Common Sense (New York, Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1905), 284.

10 Pavel Žáček, Boje o minulost (Brno: Barrister and Principal, 2000).

11 M. Klicperová, I. K. Feierabend, and C. R. Hofstetter, “In the search for a post-communist syndrome. A theoretical frame-work and empirical assessment,” Journal of Community and Applied Social Psychology 7 (1997): 39-52.. 12 V. E. Frankl, Man’s Search for Meaning (New York: Washington Square Press - Simon & Schuster, Inc., 1946/1985).

13 V. Havel, Address to the Joint Session of the U. S. Congress, Washington, D.C., February 21, 1990, http://old.hrad.cz/presi-dent/Havel/speeches/1990/2102_uk.html.

14 M. Klicperová-Baker, I. K. Feierabend, S. Kovacheva, L. Titarenko, J. Košťál, C. R. Hofstetter, Demokratická kultura v České republice: Občanská kultura, éthos a vlastenectví ze srovnávacího pohledu. [Democratic culture in the Czech Republic: Civic culture, ethos and patriotism from a comparative perspective.] (Prague: Academia, 2007).

15 V. Klaus, New Year’s Address, January 1, 2008, http://www.klaus.cz/klaus2/asp/clanek.asp?id=lmt6ZXkOf7aw.

16 M. Mládková, “Česká republika nebyla nikdy v tak špatné situaci,.” Ona dnes, June 15, 2009, http://ona.idnes.cz/meda-mladkova-ceska-republika-nebyla-nikdy-v-tak-spatne-situaci-pve-/ona_ony.asp?c=A090605_144602_ona_ony_jup.

17 M. Klicperová-Baker, and J. Košťál. Totalitní a demokratická zkušenost. Občané České republiky k životu před rokem 1989 a nyní. Výzkumná zpráva. [Totalitarian and democratic experience. Citizens of the Czech Republic about life before 1989 and now. Research report] (Prague: Psychologický ústav AV ČR a TNS-AISA, 2008).

13 J. Červenka, Srovnání současné situace s poměry před listopadem 1989 z pohledu veřejnosti [Comparison of the current conditions with conditions before November 1989 from the perspective of the public. Press release]. Naše společnost 2007, v07-10. Prague: CVVM, 2007. http://www.cvvm.cas.cz/upl/zpravy/100729s_pd71116.pdf.

19 Ibid.

20 M. Klicperová, I. K. Feierabend, and C. R. Hofstetter, “In the search for a post-communist syndrome. A theoretical frame-work and empirical assessment,” Journal of Community and Applied Social Psychology 7 (1997): 39-52.

21. Červenka, Demokracie, lidská práva a korupce mezi politiky. CVVM Tisková zpráva. [Democracy, human rights and corrup-tion among politicians. Press Release.] Naše společnost 2002 (Prague: CVVM, 2002). http://www.cvvm.cas.cz/upl/zpravy/100110s_pd21004.pdf.

22 M. Klicperová-Baker, and J. Košťál, Czech Mentalities. Cluster Analysis of European Social Survey data, manuscript (Prague: Institute of Psychology, Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic, 2009).

23 M. Klicperová-Baker, I. K. Feierabend, S. Kovacheva, L. Titarenko, J. Košťál, and C. R. Hofstetter. Demokratická kultura v České republice: Občanská kultura, éthos a vlastenectví ze srovnávacího pohledu [Democratic culture in the Czech Republic: Civic culture, ethos and patriotism from a comparative perspective] (Prague: Academia, 2007).

24 P. Říčan, and P. Janošová, “Spirituality: Its Psychological Operationalization via Measurement of Individual Differences: A Czech Perspective,” Studia Psychologica, 47/2 (2005): 157-165.

25 P. Zuckerman, Society without God: What the least religious nations can tell us about contentment (New York: New York University Press, 2008), 18.

15