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The Australian Journal of Emergency Management, Vol. 18 No. 2, May 2003

By Mark Sullivan

This paper considers the factors that relate to the

recovery of a community affected by emergency. In

particular, principles of recovery, the process of

recovery, the reactions of people affected by

emergencies, and the means by which recovery

needs might be addressed are considered. An

approach to recovery that is not strictly sequential,

but is flexible, community-centric and which is

integrated with other elements of the emergency

management process is advanced.

On 20 May 2002 the Republic of East Timor was

acknowledged by the United Nations as a country in

its own right. When interviewed, citizens of the new

country expressed relief at no longer having to live in

fear of violent militia attacks. They did however

express new concerns; concerns more characteristic

of the aftermath of a less insidious, yet equally

destructive calamity. These concerns included the

need for employment, long-term accommodation,

and economic viability. The above, in addition to the

psychological sequelae, represent some of the more

typical needs of a recovering community. Indeed, the

recovery of a community, whether from war or

cyclone, rates as one of the more complex and

lengthy challenges to confront both those affected

by the event and those called to assist the affected.

This paper considers the process of recovery. In

particular, several key principals of recovery are

considered along with the process by which the

recovery of a community occurs. In addition to the

aforementioned fundamentals of recovery

management, several other recovery issues will be

considered, including the diverse reactions to

emergencies. The question of meeting the needs of a

recovering community in terms of what is required

and who accepts responsibility for its provision will

also be addressed. Importantly, a number of

conclusions will be drawn with respect to factors that

affect recovery.

Part 1: Definition of recoveryIt is important, when discussing recovery management,that a working definition of what actually constitutesrecovery be explored. Recovery has been defined anumber of ways, including:

“the coordinated process of supporting disaster-affectedcommunities in reconstruction of the physicalinfrastructure and restoration of emotional, social,economic and physical well-being.” (EMA, 1996)

The State of Victoria State Emergency Response Unit(VSERU) (2000) offers an alternative definition:

“an enabling and supportive process which allowsindividuals, families and communities to attain a properlevel of functioning through the provision of information,specialist services and resources.”

These two definitions highlight a number of importantaspects of what constitutes recovery. However, principalamongst these is the notion of recovery as a supportiveprocess; that is, a process in which the affectedcommunity plays a central role. This notion isfundamental to the recovery process and will bereinforced ad nauseam throughout this paper.

Part 2: Principles of recoveryRecovery has been described by a number of sources,including Carter (1991), VSERU (2000), and Kates &Pijawka (1977) as a protracted, dynamic and complexprocess. The myriad interrelationships and fundamentalconsiderations required of the recovery managernecessitate a carefully crafted approach to the recoveryprocess. Such concerns, as described by VSERU (2000),include physical rehabilitation, personal rehabilitation,community development, economic concerns andenvironmental considerations. Consequently, theadherence to a set of recovery management guiding

Integrated recovery management:

A new way of looking at a delicate process

“If Winter comes, can Spring be far behind?”Percy Bysshe Shelley (1792–1822) English lyric poet

principles can greatly increase the chance of asmooth recovery.

Since 1979, recovery management in Australia has beenset against a background of eight guiding principles,endorsed by the Standing Committee of CommunityServices and Income Security Administrators. Theseguiding principles are outlined and discussed below. Theprinciples themselves are taken from EmergencyManagement Australia’s Disaster Recovery Manual (1996,para. 1.03) (Hence the continued reference to ‘disaster’rather than ‘emergency’).

Principle 1: Recovery defined“Recovery from disaster is an enabling and supportiveprocess which allows individuals, families and communitiesto attain a proper level of functioning through the provisionof information, specialist services and resources.”

This principle is, for all intents and purposes, one of themore widely endorsed definitions of recovery.Nevertheless, it does stand to highlight some importantaspects of recovery management.

First, and arguably foremost, is that recovery is asupportive process. Implicit in this element is the ever-present emergency management fundamental of acommunity-centric or even community-driven process.The rationale being that the community itself is bestplaced to identify the community’s needs. Hence, ratherthan playing the role of juggernaut, the recoverymanager must instead support the community inits recovery.

The second key element of Principle 1 is the proposedend-state; that is, that those affected are allowed toattain a proper level of functioning, the operative wordin this case being ‘proper’. Lunn (2001) rephrases thisa little more accurately through the use of the word‘appropriate’. In practice, this suggests that thecommunity be assisted to a level of functioning wherethey are able to sustain themselves in the absence offurther external intervention. It does not imply a betterlevel of functioning, nor does it imply a level offunctioning similar to that formerly enjoyed. Thereasons for this are simple in that a better level offunctioning may not be feasible, whereas the formerlevel of functioning may not be desirable. Moreover,there comes a time where external support needs toleave the community to its own devices, and this may beat a time well before the community can claim to bebetter off than it was previously.

Notwithstanding, current initiatives in the wake of thepresent Council of Australian Governments (COAG)review of disaster mitigation are redefining the landscapein terms of ‘recovery’ funding such as the NaturalDisaster Relief Arrangements (NDRA). Consequently,there is a growing need to consider assisting thecommunity to a better level of functioning through the

implementation of mitigation measures during therecovery process.

Principle 2: Planning and management“Effective recovery from disaster requires the establishment ofplanning and management arrangements which are acceptedand understood by recovery agencies, combat agencies andthe community.”

Again, Lunn (2001) couches this principle in moreappropriate terms with respect to those that areexpected to accept and understand the aforementionedarrangements. Specifically, he writes in terms of ‘allinterested and affected parties’. Granted, all interestedand affected parties will encompass recovery agencies,combat agencies and the community, but it is stillprudent, as Lunn (2001) has done, to consider thisprinciple in the context of all potential stakeholders.

Nevertheless, the crux of Principle 2 is the establishmentof agreed and understood planning and managementarrangements for which there is widespreadcommitment. This essentially requires the development,in consultation, of arrangements that not only outlinehow recovery will be prepared for, but how the recoveryprocess will actually be conducted. As alluded to, andsimilar to planning for response operations, recoveryplanning and management arrangements need to bedeveloped in partnership with all parties who are eitherlikely to be affected by an emergency or who have a roleto play in the recovery of those affected. Each of thesestakeholders need to play an active part in the planningprocess in order that their understanding of andcommitment to the agreed arrangements is encouraged.Clearly, the broadest consultation would be impracticaland unwieldy. Therefore, the means by whichstakeholders are involved must be carefully considered.This, however is outside the scope of this paper, sufficeto say that a recovery committee similar to that whichwould operate during an actual event should form thecore of this planning committee.

The development of recovery planning and managementarrangements, in addition to being a fundamental aspectof effective recovery management, is also in many casesa legal requirement. For example, under the EmergencyManagement Act (Vic) 1986, Victorian municipalities arerequired to prepare an Emergency Recovery Plan as partof their Municipal Emergency Management Plan.Similar, though less specific requirements also applyat Regional levels. This requirement is testament to thehigh importance placed on recovery and recoveryplanning by many jurisdictions.

Principle 3: Recognition of changing needs andcomplex nature“Recovery management arrangements are most effectivewhen they recognise the complex, dynamic and protractednature of recovery processes and the changing needs of

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The Australian Journal of Emergency Management, Vol. 18 No 2. May 2003

affected individuals, families and groups within thecommunity over time.”

Perhaps more so than at any other stage of anemergency, recovery deals with people in need.Moreover, owing to the infinite complexity ofcommunities and the unprecedented change that ischaracteristic of a recovering community, these needsand the context within which they develop is dynamic.For these reasons, recovery management arrangementsneed to be flexible. Indeed, flexibility lies at the heart ofPrinciple 3.

Notwithstanding, flexibility is for nought if not for themeans by which the need for flexibility can beidentified. In other words, mechanisms must be in placeto identify the extent to which recovery processes, aswell as the needs of individuals, families andcommunities, are changing. Therefore, communicationis fundamental to the extent to which Principle 3 can befollowed. Carter (1991) supports this proposition, albeitprincipally within the context of response operations.Nevertheless, his ideas are equally applicable to theidentification of recovery needs. In fact, the manner bywhich some needs may be addressed are alreadyoutlined for the reader and include such things as meansby which information can be obtained, and appropriateactions that the community can take. These equate toaddressing one Kates’ (1977) principal communityneeds during recovery – that of ‘reducing theuncertainty’. However, other more tangible needs willrequire voicing and addressing, and it is these that willbe continually changing. Accordingly, means by whichthe community can communicate their changing needswill need to feature prominently in any recoverystrategy. Such means should be both active and passive.Specifically, communication with those affected shouldbe active in terms of seeking out the needs of thoseaffected, but also passive in terms of being receptive tochanging needs as expressed by individuals, familiesand communities.

In considering changing needs during recovery, it isprudent not to overlook the likelihood of greed andavarice creeping into the minds of those who areexpressing their needs. Many, including Carter (1991)have drawn attention to the possibility of individualsand groups seeking to advance their own interestsduring recovery to the extent that their wants areexpressed as needs. Whilst it is important to do thegreatest good with the available recovery resources, andtherefore not address these wants, the way in which thisdistinction can be drawn is problematic. Such adistinction is likely to be highly subjective and will varyon a case by case basis. Distinctions between needs andwants therefore should be made with utmost care, therationale formally recorded for future reference andaccountability.

Principle 4: Community development approach“The management of disaster recovery is best approachedfrom a community development perspective and is mosteffective when conducted at the local level with activeparticipation of the affected community and a maximumreliance on local capacities and expertise.”

There are three key aspects to this principle. Firstly, thatdisaster recovery is best approached from a communitydevelopment perspective; secondly, that disasterrecovery is most effective when conducted at thelocal level with active participation of the community,and finally, that maximum reliance should be placed onlocal capacities and expertise. Yet, despite thisdistinction, a common theme prevails – that of acommunity-centric approach, previously discussedunder principle 1.

Again, the importance of this theme cannot beoveremphasised. In the context of Principle 4, such anapproach acts to empower a disenfranchised communityand is therefore central to their future healthfulfunctioning. Clearly, the community developmentapproach is logical. The opportunities manifested ina community that has been fundamentally altered bycalamity present significant room for change. Thisopportunity ought to be capitalised upon in order thatthe potential for community betterment in areas such ashazard mitigation and enhanced preparedness canbe realised.

The importance of involving and empowering thecommunity during this process also cannot beoverstated. As has been stated many times thus far,involvement of the community in managing the recoveryprocess is central to the success of key recoveryinitiatives. Moreover, involvement of the communityalters their status from passive pawns in the process, toonce again active and contributing directors of their owndestiny. This is a very important element in terms ofa positive psychological outlook (Raphael, 1986).

Finally, it is important to place as much reliance as issensibly possible upon local capacities and resources.The value in this approach is essentially twofold. Firstly,the more that recovery relies on local resources, thequicker that the community will be able to movetowards self-sustainability, thus move away fromrecovery and towards relative normalcy. Secondly, butmore subtly, a reliance on external resources has thetendency to take business away from those resourceproviders who are still capable of providing goods andservices. Hence, the recovery process is unnecessarilyprolonged. The reason for this is clearly articulated byHaas, et. al. (1977) who state that a central element inthe speed of a community’s recovery is the speed withwhich the economic sector can re-establish itself.Sinclair (1990) provides a good example of where thisapproach was adopted in his report on the recovery

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subsequent to the Nyngan floods. In this instance, theutilisation of donated goods was carefully managed insuch a way as to minimise the detrimental effect on localretail clothing and homeware outlets. In addition,much reliance was placed on locally sourcedvolunteer assistance.

Principle 5: Involvement of human serviceagencies“Recovery management is most effective when human serviceagencies play a major role in all levels of key decisionmaking which may influence the well being and recovery ofthe affected community.”

On first impressions, this principle may appear to be atodds with the important role of the community in thedecision-making process. This conflict is without merit.Rather, the important role of the human service agenciesworks in concert with the community in determiningneeds and informing decisions, one not takingprecedence over the other. Indeed the very early stagesof recovery, during which times many keystonedecisions are made, represent a period of significantpsychological distress (Raphael, 1986). It is duringthis time of diminished psychological capacity thathealth service agencies can play a crucial role inidentifying the needs of the community, perhaps inextreme circumstances effectively acting as thecommunity’s proxy.

Nevertheless, it is clearly impractical for the communityor even a community representative to play a role indecision making at all levels. This is where humanservice agencies play a particularly useful role, havingthe capacity and the knowledge to represent thecommunity’s interests at all levels. The value in thisadvocacy function being performed by the humanservice agencies lies in their intimate knowledge ofcommunity needs during times of crisis, this being theircore day to day function. This rationale is reminiscent ofemergency planning principles, where agencies areallocated roles and responsibilities that reflect as closelyas possible those which they engage in on an everydaybasis. However, the role and importance of thecommunity must never be ignored.

Principle 6: Recovery begins at impact“Recovery from disaster is best achieved where the recoveryprocess begins from the moment of disaster impact.”

There is a tendency in the part of some to think ofcomprehensive emergency management in terms of fourseparate and distinct phases of emergency management,which include prevention/mitigation, preparedness,response and recovery. This approach is fundamentallyflawed and is something that Principle 6 seeksto redress.

Recovery actions must and do begin from the momentof impact. Not only are there some critical actions thatcan take place, which will facilitate a more rapidrecovery, but individuals, agencies and organisations thathave a major role during response operations also mayhave a key role in recovery. A very small, but fittingexample can be seen in the fire service’s responseto a house fire. A critical element in any firefightingstrategy is ‘salvage’. Salvage refers to actions takento minimise further damage to property during and afterfirefighting operations, in effect facilitating a morerapid recovery.

However, this principle could be taken further,particularly when considered in parallel withPrinciple 2. Specifically, recovery should bea consideration during prevention/mitigation,preparedness and response activities. For example,during the recovery of a community, initiatives shouldbe taking place to prevent or mitigate futureoccurrences. Similarly, while activities are taking place toprevent or mitigate future impact, consideration shouldbe given to how this will bear on recovery needsand processes.

Preparedness activities, on the other hand, place muchemphasis on formulating plans, training and exercising.It would be remiss not to devote a significant amount ofpreparedness effort toward recovery considerations sothat in addition to being prepared for the impact ofa hazard, all parties are prepared for what must be doneonce the proverbial dust has settled. The events ofSeptember 11 2001 serve to further highlight the linkbetween preparedness and recovery. It was demonstratedthat organisations that had prepared by maintainingappropriate business recovery arrangements, such asback-up data storage and information processingrepositories, were able to conduct business as usual onSeptember 12 2001 (Meredith, 2002).

Accordingly, while Principle 6 ostensibly relates toresponse considerations of recovery, much benefit canbe cultivated from a more comprehensive considerationof recovery management well before an eventactually occurs.

Principle 7: Training and exercising of recoveryarrangements“Recovery planning and management arrangements are mosteffective when they are supported by training programs andexercises which ensure that recovery agencies and personnelare properly prepared for their role.”

Training and exercising forms a central link betweenthese principles, particularly Principle 2, and theefficient and effective management of the recoveryprocess. Carter (1991) reinforces this point on a numberof occasions, stating that training and exercising arecrucial to maintaining the viability of plans, as well as

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being a key element in preparedness. However, Carter(1991) is not unique in his emphasis on the importanceof training and exercising. Rather, such sentiment can befound reflected in many contemporary training andemergency management texts, including those publishedby Emergency Management Australia.

While training and exercising have been mentionedabove in the same vein, it is important that they aredistinguished in terms of their benefit to recoverymanagement.

Training is crucial to ensuring that all those with aresponsibility under the extant recovery managementarrangements are familiar with and capable of carryingout their designated roles and responsibilities. Moreover,training provides and opportunity for the participants tobuild a concept of how the process fits together andwhat command, control, coordination andcommunication arrangements are in place and whatauthority is in place to support these arrangements.

In comparison, exercising brings all the elementstogether to test the recovery management plans andarrangements. This is the generally agreed role ofexercising. However, there exist a number of collateralbenefits. These include the determination of thecontinued appropriateness of extant roles andresponsibilities; the highlighting of impracticalitiesinherent in existing arrangements; deficiencies intraining; and an awareness of the real potentialresource demands.

Of course, a full-scale exercise of recovery managementarrangements would not be feasible, hence underliningthe importance of effective training and extremelycarefully crafted desktop (or similar) exercises.

Principle 8: Comprehensive, integrated, timely,equitable, fair and flexible arrangements“Recovery from disaster is most effective where recoverymanagement arrangements provide a comprehensive andintegrated framework for managing all potential emergenciesand disasters and where assistance measures are provided ina timely, fair, equitable manner and are sufficiently flexible torespond to a diversity of community needs.”

This principle describes two quite separateconsiderations, one pertaining to recovery managementarrangements, the second pertaining to assistancemeasures. Accordingly, each will be described in turn.

Principle 8 recommends in the first instance thatarrangements provide a comprehensive and integratedframework for managing all potential emergencies anddisasters. This holds a number of implications. Firstly,the use of the word framework suggests thatarrangements are a starting point for recoverymanagement; a ‘straw man’. Clearly, this wouldencourage flexibility and enhance the practicality of any

such arrangements. Secondly, this framework should becomprehensive and integrated. This impliesthoroughness, broad consultation and, most importantly,a well prepared, multi-level, all-agency recovery planwhere all stakeholders are appropriately involved andinteract in a seamless, coordinated, effective and efficientmanner. Finally, the first part of Principle 8 makesreference to ‘managing all potential emergencies anddisasters’. This is consistent with the widely accepted ‘allhazards’ approach to emergency management, thusensuring arrangements aren’t concerned with theminutiae of specific emergencies thereby losing any traceof practicality, applicability and flexibility. In otherwords, truly pragmatic recovery managementarrangements would not reflect the specifics of therecovery process. Rather, they would be more generalin nature, consistent with the framework conceptdiscussed above.

As mentioned, the second part of Principle 8 relates toassistance measures; that is, those contingenciesestablished or maintained to meet the needs of theaffected community. Specifically, Principle 8recommends that these measures are provided ina timely, fair, equitable manner and are sufficientlyflexible to meet a diversity of community needs. In otherwords, assistance measures need to meet fourrequirements. Firstly, assistance measures should bemade available to the affected community in time forsuch measures to achieve their desired outcomes.

Secondly, assistance measures should be made availableon an equal basis to elements of the affected community,with the following caveat: while availability should beon an equal basis, this should also be fair to all involved.For example, equal may mean two bags of rice for eachfamily. It would not be fair to provide two bags of rice tofamilies that have an existing large storage of rice. Aninteresting challenge to this concept often arises in thewake of bushfire, where debate centres on the provisionof appeal funding and other monetary assistance touninsured homeowners to the exclusion of insuredhome owners, leaving the insured questioning the senseof paying years of premiums.

Finally, assistance measures should be flexible enough tomeet a wide variety of community needs. This requirescareful forethought, thus again bearing heavily onPrinciple 2. Measures not only need to exhibit diversity,but within themselves need to be flexible. This flexibilityalso reflects the sentiments of Principle 3.

OverviewEach of these eight principles represents an importantrecovery management consideration in its own right.However, as highlighted a number of times during theirdiscussion, these principles are also closely interrelated,each one complementing and supporting the other.

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While not considered in the above discussion, there arealso 11 ‘Recovery Concepts’, which reinforce andprovide additional substance to these eight overarchingprinciples. Unfortunately, a discussion of these conceptsis outside the scope of this paper. However, the reader isreferred to Emergency Management Australia’s DisasterRecovery manual (1996, paras 1.04–1.15) for a detaileddiscussion of these concepts.

Part 3: The recovery processEmergency managers, hence recovery managers, workparticularly well when there is a clearly describedprocess from which ideas can be generated. It isimportant to note that the mere outline of a recoveryprocess, no matter how inspired, cannot take the placeof proper planning. Rather, as alluded to above, thedescription of a recovery process acts as a tool ofevaluation and comparison of planned and actualrecovery efforts, as well as a springboard forfurther work.

The recovery process in the broader context ofemergency managementRecovery is an integral part of the comprehensiveemergency management process. Thus, to truly considerthe recovery management process properly, it must beconsidered in light of this broader context.

In consideration of any process, it can be tempting tofall into the trap of ‘sequencing’ the myriad steps andsub-processes. This is particularly unwise in the field ofemergency management, where the emergency managermust take care to be mindful of the entire process at allstages. For example, recovery must be consideredduring preparedness activities, whereas it is also prudentto consider prevention or mitigation measures duringrecovery. An attempt has been made in Figure 1, torepresent this concept graphically.

As shown, comprehensive emergency managementrequires interaction between each of Prevention,Preparedness, Response and Recovery at any point inthe process. The large circular arrow represents thegeneral tendency, however, of the process toapproximate a sequence. Notwithstanding, the mostimportant point is represented by the blurred transitionbetween each element in the process – that theseelements are not ‘stages’, where one begins and the otherends, but rather elements in a continuum.

Spotlight on the recovery processAn underlying conceptJust as the process described above should not beassumed to represent a number of discreet stages, so toodoes this principle apply to the recovery process. Thisapproach is strongly supported by the Victorian SERU(2000). In their recovery Planning Guidelines, a keyconcept is the consideration of the recovery process as

a set of activities as opposed to a chronological sequenceof events. This is the first principle upon which therecovery process should be based.

A recovery process frameworkIt is one thing to view the process as a set of activitiesand still another to define exactly what these activitiesare. Yet, despite the veritable dearth of literaturedescribing the myriad tasks comprising the recoveryprocess, there is little in the way of broadly endorsedrecovery process frameworks. Notwithstanding, thereare a number of theories in existence upon which tobase an accurate description of the recovery process.Prominent among these the four-level process outlinedby Kates & Pijawka (1977).

Described as a sequential model, Kates & Pijawka’s(1977) recovery process outlines four principle periodsencompassed by the recovery process. These include:

1. The Emergency Period;

2. The Restoration Period;

3. The Replacement Reconstruction Period; and

4. The Commemorative, Betterment and DevelopmentalReconstruction Period.

These periods are defined by Kates & Pijawka (1977) inreasonably unambiguous terms. The Emergency, orperhaps more appropriately Post-Impact Period ischaracterised by activities required by those affected tohandle the drastic changes that have been wrought uponthem. In comparison, the Restoration Period is a‘patching’ period characterised by a progressive return torelatively normal socio-economic functioning. TheReplacement Reconstruction Period is represented bya full return to pre-emergency functioning, whereas theCommemorative, Betterment and DevelopmentalReconstruction Period is characterised by projects tomemorialise, improve on or further develop the affectedcommunity. Kates & Pijawka (1977) also observe thateach of these periods have historically taken about tentime as long as that which occurred prior. An outline of 9


Prevention Preparedness Response Recovery

Figure 1. The Integrated Emergency Management Process

the how these periods represent a process, adapted fromKates (1977) is outlined in Figure 2.

The rate of recovery, according to Kates & Pijawka(1977), do note that could be greatly enhanced byencouraging as much simultaneous activity aspossible, thus reducing the peak and troughs, asdemonstrated by figure 3.

Integration with the emergencymanagement processWhile Kates & Pijawka’s (1977) and Kates’ (1977)theories and observations hold a great deal of merit, themeans by which they can be integrated with the broaderemergency management process are more suited to a

sequential model, which is not supported by this paper.Accordingly, this paper proposes an augmentation to theprocess advocated by Kates & Pijawka (1977) that ismore suited to the emergency management processdescribed earlier. While it is noted that the emergencymanagement process generally conforms to anapproximate sequence of events, the interaction betweenall elements of the process cannot be ignored. Examplesof this interaction are not hard to bring to mind with alittle applied thought. Figure 4, ‘Charlotte’s Doughnut’(Charlotte being a cryptic reference to web between eachelement of the process) represents the conceptsdescribed above; that is the tendency for the process toapproximate a ‘sequential continuum’, whilstmaintaining constant interaction between all elements.

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Post-ImpactMaximal

Minimal

Co

pin

g A

ctiv

ity

Restoration ReplacementReconstruction

Commemorative,Betterment andDevelopmentalReconstruction

Time in weeks following disaster

0 0.5 1 2 5 10 20 40 100 200 500

Figure 2. The Recovery Process. Source: Kates (1977)

Post-ImpactMaximal

Minimal

Co

pin

g A

ctiv

ity

Restoration

ReplacementReconstruction

Commemorative,Betterment andDevelopmentalReconstruction

Time in weeks following disaster

0 0.5 1 2 5 10 20 40 100 200 500

Figure 3. An enhanced Recovery Process Adapted from Kates & Pijawka (1977)

Charlotte’s Doughnut reinforces the fact that, whilerecovery may not in fact be taking place, all elementsof the emergency management process continue tocontribute to the pace and effectiveness of recoveryfor when it does finally begin.

The questions now remain as to, firstly, what it is that iscontributed to the recovery process from each elementof the broader emergency management process, andsecondly, what it is that is comprised by each of theelement in the recovery process.

Recovery process specificsThere are essentially seven elements of relevance, eitherdirectly or indirectly, to the recovery process. Three ofthese, the ‘extra-recovery’ elements are the partnerelements of recovery within the emergency managementprocess. These elements are either dependent on therecovery process or vice versa.

The remaining elements, the intra-recovery elements, arethose that directly comprise the recovery process and arebased on the recovery process advanced by Kates andPijawka (1977).

Not surprisingly, a narrative description of theinteractions and actions that relate to each of theseelements would be quite tortuous and potentiallyconfusing. Therefore, in the interest of clarity andpragmatism, a description of these elements is presentedin the tables in the following pages.

As may be observed in Table 1, extra-recovery elementsare principally concerned with building on previousrecovery, planning for future recovery and bringingrecovery arrangements on-line. Table 2, now bringsrecovery management into the limelight, focusing onthe activities and considerations that compriserecovery proper.

Recovery process key pointsTables 1 and 2 show that recovery is a complex,protracted and dynamic process, which occurs at manylevels of the community. It is important to remaincontinuously mindful that recovery is a community-centric process, and one that is not strictly sequential,but with each of its elements often operating in concert.Moreover, it is important to remain cognisant thatrecovery is an integral element of the Comprehensiveapproach to emergency management and therefore mustconsider and be considered by its partner elements.Thus, the process of recovery cannot be consideredwithout reference to these elements, for what affectsone also affects others.

Part 4: Diverse reactions toemergenciesWhen the infinite combination of hazards andindividuals are taken into account, the potentialreactions to emergencies are expectably diverse. Furthercompounding these diverse reactions are the equallydiverse reactions prevalent at other levels of society,including family, peer-group and community.

Clearly, a complete exposition of all reactions by allindividuals and groups would be a monumental taskand is thus outside the scope of this paper. However, themore prevalent reactions to emergencies will beoutlined, from which it may be possible for the readerto gain an appreciation of the likely reactions that maybe observed in a community following an emergency.

Nevertheless, an understanding of reactions toemergencies is arguably the most central of mentalhealth considerations to the recovery process. Thereason being that it is these diverse reactions ofindividuals and groups to emergencies highlights theneeds of those impacted, thereby facilitating a moreinformed and realistic approach to both themanagement of the recovery process as well asrecovery planning.

Reactions to emergencies: Community, familyand individual

CommunityRaphael (1986) paints an extremely accurate, yetpoignant picture of a community’s response toemergencies. She outlines the community response inparallel with the individual response, that is, confusionand change followed by adaptation, management of thesituation, reorganisation, and recovery. What effectivelyhappens is that the emergency serves to fundamentallyalter the myriad interactions within the community, oras Gordon (1990) suggests, destroy all bonds that comeinto its contact. However, what is discussed here ismerely an aspect of the psychosocial ramifications of theemergency. There is also a physical aspect in the sensethat the community can be physically broken up, such

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Preparedness

Response

Post-Impact

Restoration

Prevention

ReplacementReconstruction

CommemorativeBetterment andDevelopmentalReconstruction

Figure 4. Charlotte’s Doughnut

as was the case in the Hobart Bridge Disaster, which initself can have psychosocial implications(Raphael, 1986).

Nevertheless, according to Raphael (1986), leadersquickly emerge from the confusion and coordinate whatis essentially a process driven by post-impact altruism.This stage is sustained to a point at which former powerstructures reassert themselves and altruism gives wayto former patterns of conflict and bureaucracy,sometimes even manifesting in turf wars between aidand recovery agencies. Further, SERU (2000) state that

an unquestionable consequence of emergencies isa degree of community division. The degree to whichthis division affects the community will depend on anumber of factors, including the level of social capital,isolation and resilience.

As one looks closer at what happens to communities inemergencies the real impact of emergencies oncommunities emerges. For example, uncertainty andcomplexity are cited by SERU (2000) as significantaspects of the earliest phases of recovery. This accordswith Raphael’s (1986) description of the ‘2nd Disaster’,

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Table 1: Extra-recovery elements.

ELEMENT PRINCIPLE FOCUS RELATIONSHIP TO RECOVERY-RELATED ACTIONSOF ELEMENT RECOVERY INDIVIDUAL COMMUNITY

Prevention and Prevent or Recovery actions Incorporate Incorporate Mitigation mitigate against incorporate prevention or prevention or

the impact of a prevention or mitigation strategies mitigation strategies hazard mitigation measures; during recovery; during recovery;

Implications for Take out insurance Take out insurancerecovery are (home, belongingsconsidered during and income)prevention and mitigation activities

Preparedness Ensure the Recovery plans Take actions to Develop plans;community are developed; ensure post-impactis prepared for sustainability; Conduct of the impact of a vulnerability studies;hazard Recovery Identify

considerations are contingencies for Incorporate recoveryincorporated into accommodation, considerations into emergency plans schooling, work, etc.; emergency plans;

Ensure awareness of Training in recoverypotential effects, needs management andand available resources arrangements;post-impact

Exercising of recoveryarrangements;

Take actions to ensure post-impact community sustainability;

Identify contingenciesfor accommodation, schooling, work, etc.

Response Respond to the Implications for Secure valuables, Activate recoveryimpact of a hazard recovery are especially documents; plan and keep upon a community considered during stakeholders

response activities; informed,including the community;

Actions are taken Tie into community Identify potential to initiate or enhance information networks; recovery resource recovery processes needs from the

earliest;

Maintain contact withfamily and friends Identify resources

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Table 2: Intra-recovery elements.

ELEMENT PRINCIPLE FOCUS RELATIONSHIP TO RECOVERY-RELATED ACTIONSOF ELEMENT THE BROADER EM INDIVIDUAL COMMUNITY

PROCESS

Post-impact Implementation of strategies to cope with damage, dislocation, death and injury

Restoration Progressive return to relatively normal economic and social functioning – patching up

Establishment ofrecovery committee;

Establishment ofrecovery centre;

Conduct of damageand needsassessment;

Suspend normalactivities wherenecessary;

Activate recoverysystems inaccordance withrecovery plan;

Search and Rescue;

Establishment ofemergency reliefmeasures, includingfeeding, shelter andclothing;

Establishment ofpublic informationdisseminationsystems;

Begin clearing debris;

Provision of mentalhealth services;

Satisfaction of basicneeds: physiological,safety & security,limited belongingand love needs;

Account for familyand friends;

Seek and gatherinformation;

Attend topsychological needsas best and as earlyas possible

Strongly linked withresponse, but also toother elements;

Should commencefrom the moment ofimpact;

Effectiveness isassociated witheffectiveness ofpreparednessactivities

Cessation of searchand rescue;

Restoration ofeconomic base;

Restoration ofphysicalinfrastructure andutilities, includingtransportationsystems, water,sewerage, etc.;

Closure of reliefoperations, includingfeeding, shelter andclothing;

Provision ofpsychological supportservices;

Financial assistancesought and provided;

Appeals establishedand managed

Most debris removed

Restoration of socialstructure;

Manifestations ofgrief and loss;

Possible relocationon a permanent orsemi-permanentbasis for some;

Progressive return ofevacuees;

Clean-up of homeand personalproperty;

Schooling resumed;

Financial assistancesought;

Insurance claimed;

Counselling

Still linked with allelements;

Effectiveness isassociated witheffectiveness ofpreparednessactivities;

Some restorationactivities will have astrong bearing onfuture preventionand mitigation

Table 2 continues on the next page

14


Table 2: Intra-recovery elements – continued.

ELEMENT PRINCIPLE FOCUS RELATIONSHIP TO RECOVERY-RELATED ACTIONSOF ELEMENT THE BROADER EM INDIVIDUAL COMMUNITY

PROCESS

Replacement Progressive return Reconstruction to relatively

normal economic and social functioning – patching up

Commemorative, Memorialise the Betterment and event, encourage Developmental community growth Reconstruction and building of

social capital, and encouragecontinued community development

Employmentrecovers to relativelynormal levels;

Physicalinfrastructure fullyreconstructed;

Service industry fullyoperational;

Return to normaleconomicfunctioning;

Large developmentalprojects commenced;

Litigationcommences

Homes rebuilt andpersonal propertyreplaced;

Employmentresumed;

Social networkrestored;

Reduced demand forpsychologicalassistance;

Possible continuedheightened demandfor health services;

Long-termpsychologicalsequelae becomesmanifest

Strongly linked withprevention andmitigation, but alsoto other elements;

Much activity relatesto implementation ofprevention andmitigation measuresas well as review ofrecoveryarrangements;


Building ofmemorials andmonuments;

Commemorationdays;

Public holidays;

Efforts to expandand further developthe community;

Large-scalecommunitydevelopments;

Furtherimplementation ofprevention andmitigation measures;

Increased efforts toimprove communitysustainability;

Settlement oflitigation;

Normaliseddemography;

Return topreparatory ratherthan recoverymindset and politicalagenda

Anniversaries of theevent and/or loss offamily and friends;

Planning for thefuture and focus onthe future;

Increased birthrate;

Some instances ofpermanent relocation

Again, stronglylinked withprevention andmitigation, but alsoto other elements;

Much activity alsorelates toimplementation ofprevention andmitigation measuresas well as review ofrecoveryarrangements;


where confusion reigns supreme as a consequence

of damaged communications and information

dissemination mechanisms and infrastructure. This

uncertainty, complexity and resulting confusion

no doubt compounds the already burdensome stressors

upon a community.

Another significant stressor bearing down on the

recovering community is the loss of autonomy, which

according to SERU (2000) can only be mitigated by

encouraging a community-driven recovery process.

However, as stated by Raphael (1986), the loss of

dignity that goes with asking for help is also a significant

15


stressor. It seems therefore inevitable that no matterwhich way the recovery of a community is managed,there is going to be some inherent conflict andresulting stress.

FamilyJust as family is important in daily life, so too are theyimportant during emergencies, but to a degreeunimaginable during times of peace and calm. Thisimportance of family has been highlighted by Raphael(1986), who suggests that the family, operating as asystem, goes through some important changes in orderto support and protect its members. This accords withthe kin input mode as advanced by Haas, et. al. (1977).The kin input mode is a mechanism of coping used byfamilies as a single autonomous unit. This contrasts withthe institutionalised and autonomous modes putforward by the same authors, where the institutionalisedmode refers to heavy reliance on public supportsystems, and the autonomous mode placing little or noreliance on public support systems.

Principal reactions of families to emergencies center onprotection of its members and provision of support.

In describing the reactions of families to emergencies,Raphael (1986) outlines 5 key observations:

1. Bereavements of family or close friends were likely tobe associated with a lower level of recovery;

2. A majority of family ties were strengthened followingemergencies;

3. Larger families were more vulnerable to the stressaspects of the experience;

4. Higher income was associated with better familycoping;

5. Economic recovery had the highest causal effect onemotional recovery.

In addition, Haas, et. al. (1977) observe that familiesseem to recover faster than cities reconstruct.

From the above, it may be observed that the familyplays a pivotal role in the emotional, hence overall,recovery of a community and therefore should be aprime concern in recovery planning and management.

IndividualIt is perhaps the individual reactions to emergencies thatare the most diverse. Not only are differences apparentbetween individuals, but there is also variations betweenparticular demographics; principally the very young andvery old. Therefore, against the background of group-based differences outlined above, it is important toconsider the diverse reactions of individuals and some ofthe implications this holds for recovery management.

Generally observable reactionsRaphael (1986) outlines three discreet categories ofreaction to the stressors inherent during and after

emergencies. These include post-traumatic stresssyndrome (also referred to as post-traumatic stressdisorder, or PTSD), survivor syndrome, and disasterbereavement syndrome. In addition, other reactions maybe observed, including anxiety disorders, depressivedisorders and psychic numbing.

An alternate, though not conflicting perspective ispresented by Malt (1994), who highlights four broadcategories of psychological reaction to traumatic events.These include mood disorders, anxiety disorders(including posttraumatic stress disorder), somatoformautonomic dysfunction and organic mental disorders asa consequence of injury. This range of disorders isreflected in a wide range of traumatic events, includingdisasters such as earthquake (Sharan, et al., 1996) andvolcanic eruptions (Shore, 1986); urban terrorism(Trappler, 1996) and interpersonal violence (Pynoos,et al., 1993). The root of these disorders and theirsymptoms is beyond the scope of this paper, althoughMalt (1994) offers a sound and comprehensive analysis,particularly in the case of non-organic psychologicalsequelae. Nevertheless, it is conceivable, albeitsomewhat simplistic to posit that at the root of many ofthese problems is a set of destroyed constructs, or in thewords of Janoff-Bulman (1992) a collection of ‘ShatteredAssumptions’.

Psychological response to traumatic events has beendescribed as a normal reaction to an abnormal event(Tunnecliffe, 1999). Moreover, this notion ofabnormality is further expanded by Janoff-Bulman(1992) when he describes traumatic events as those thatare out of the ordinary and threatening to one’sexistence. In stating that such events are a threat to one’sexistence, it follows that such events would present asignificant risk of personal injury. U.F. Malt (1994) offersa reasonably comprehensive list of traumatic events thatcould foreseeably lead to such a risk, including theinjuries that would likely arise. It is questionable,however, whether or not it is appropriate to pigeonholeinjuries in this way. Nevertheless, he impresses upon thereader that a significant consequence of such injury ispsychological trauma. No doubt, any such reference toinjury would conceivably apply equally to emotionalinjury as well as physical injury. Moreover, as posited byRaphael (1986), there appears to be a direct associationbetween the severity of the stressor and the resultingreaction or pathology.

In addition, Raphael (1986) has suggested that there area number of individual factors that bear on individuals’vulnerability to psychological stressors in emergencies.Figure 5 provides and overview. Put simply, the presenceor level of certain compounding or mitigating factorsbears heavily on an individual’s psychological prognosis.One of these, age, will be discussed in greater detaillater. Notwithstanding, an appreciation of some of thesevulnerability factors is potentially of great benefit when

16


attempts are being made to identify elements of the

community at heightened risk of psychological trauma.

Figure 5 goes some way toward demonstrating the

complexity of the human condition with respect to

reactions to emergencies. Clearly, the many

combinations of vulnerability factors equate to a great

diversity in the potential reactions and severity of

reactions to emergencies.

Other elements of Figure 5 that are of interest are those

of age, religion and cultural factors. While cultural

issues and religion are fairly straightforward in that they

may correlate with either high or low vulnerability,

depending on the individual and the religion, age isslightly more complex and requires further discussion.

ChildrenMany emergency management texts draw attention tosome of the myths associated with the reaction ofchildren to emergencies. However, while their reactionsare different to that of adults, children are not immunefrom the psychological impact of emergencies. Indeed,Raphael (1986) states that children respond directly andappropriately to emergencies. In other words, they arenot afforded the protection of the proverbial rose-tintedglasses of youth. Rather, they are affected in a very realand tangible way.

High

AG

E

REL

IGIO

N

Low HighHuman Resillience

LowLevel of Vulnerability

CU

LTU

RA

L FA

CTO

RS

Low HighEducation Level

Jobless EmployedEmployment

Low HighSocioeconomic Status

Single MarriedMarital Status

No YesPast Disaster Experience

Yes NoPast Psychotrauma

Yes NoFamily History

Yes NoPersonal Injury

Yes NoLoss of Loved Ones

Yes NoLoss of Property

Long ShortEvent Duration

High LowEvent Intensity

External InternalLocus of Control

No YesFinancial Aid

No YesCounselling

Figure 5. Vulnerability Indicators Based on Raphael (1986)

17


Some of the more typical reactions include fear, a needto re-establish family links, separation anxiety, sleepdisturbances, emergency-related play, and behaviouralproblems (EMA, 1996). In addition, Raphael (1996)points out some additional reactions typical of children.

Children tend to be less inclined to use denial as adefence mechanism. Further, while children can and doexperience symptoms indicative of PTSD, Terr (1983)did not observe evidence of numbing, amnesia orflashbacks in children, but noted a distinctly limitedfuture perspective in child survivors of emergencies.This is supported by Raphael (1986) who observeda sense of ‘loss of childhood’ in such individuals.

Finally, as shown in Figure 6, while childrenacknowledge death and grieve as a consequence, thefinality of death is difficult for the very young to grasp.

In most texts dealing with the childhood experience ofemergencies, a recurrent theme is the need forreassurance and maintenance where possible of familybonds. Children should also be given as manyopportunities as practicable to master the experience.This is a critical function of play, school and home life.

ElderlyThere has been and will continue to be concerted debateas to the reactions of elderly to emergencies. Regardless,some general themes have emerged upon which theneeds of the elderly can be based. Principal among theseis that, while the elderly do tend to experience greatermortality rates than those of younger demographics,elderly survivors tend to be more resilient. This issupported by Haas, et. al. (1977) in their discussion ofthe autonomous recovery mode; a mode representativeof the means by which elderly potentially cope withemergencies. There is also the proposition of Raphael(1986) which implies that the elderly are reluctant to seethemselves as burdens upon younger generations.Notwithstanding, owing to their oftentimes lessfavourable financial situation, the elderly tend torecover slower economically, thus emotionally andtherefore warrant serious consideration in terms ofrecovery arrangements.

Key points of diverse reactions to emergenciesIn light of the wide range of variables relevant to themanifested reactions of individuals and groups toemergencies, the reactions to emergencies are, notsurprisingly, diverse. While reactions withindemographics and within categories of groups can beroughly surmised, the reactions of individuals are a littlemore difficult to predict. Nevertheless, it is withoutdoubt that planning for the psychological aspects ofrecovery is in all cases warranted. Moreover, the carefuland considered deployment of mental health servicesshould feature as an element of any recovery operation.With respect to each of these propositions, it is

important that appropriate mental health professionalsbe consulted from the outset and form part of therecovery management process.

Part 5: Recovery resourcesAs with any aspect of emergency management, resourcesfeature as an ever-present challenge to planners andmanagers. These needs will be outlined firstly in termsof what is required and how the required resources areprovided. A final consideration, that of who acceptsresponsibility for provision of resources, is an equallyimportant challenge and will be addressed in thesubsequent section.

Some important considerations, highlighted by Carter(1991), should be taken into account when consideringthe resource requirements of recovery. Firstly, the timepressures of response tend not to apply to recovery,although time is still a factor. Secondly, recovery tendsto take place in more stable conditions, except inparticularly politically unstable or hazard-prone areas.

Recovery resource requirementsA thorough identification of resource requirements forrecovery is particularly problematic, given that recoveryneeds vary from event to event and no two events arethe same. Nevertheless there are indeed some generalrequirements that need to be provided in order tofacilitate recovery. In order to identify some of theseneeds it has been necessary to examine extant recoveryplans, recovery texts and a number of recovery casestudies, including that of the Nyngan and EastGippsland floods of 1989 and 1998, respectively, andthose described by Haas, et. al. (1977). Of these, extantplans provided the least assistance hence are not referredto in the bibliography, with case studies providing theclearest insight.

The results of these investigations have been distilledinto a list of recovery needs, presented in Table 3. Eachof these needs are expanded upon to enhance clarity.It should be noted that the categorisation of these needsis not based on any documented methodology andis thus open to debate. Further, some needs applyequally to a number of categories, such as expert advice.

There exists the question of what it is that triggers theneed to be fulfilled. In a truly community-focusedrecovery process, the trigger will be the voicing of theneed by the person or group of people in need.However, in an ideal situation, the human serviceagencies will be a key element in recovery managementand may therefore also be in a position to identifyneeds for which the community is yet unaware.Furthermore, those burdened with particular recoverytasks, such as infrastructure restoration, will alsobe aware of particular needs for which the broadercommunity is again unaware. This highlights the

18


Table 3: Recovery needs.

GENERAL DESCRIPTION DETAILS OF NEED MEANS OF PROVISION

Recovery management structure Task force or committee Pre-planned and activated on impact.structure to coordinate the recovery process. This structure must engage the community.

Government Government services and Efforts to reinstate government political operations are required functioning should begin as to provide top-cover and soon as possible after impactrecovery support.

Staff A variety of staff are required Potential sources should befor numerous functions, earmarked during planning. including clerical support, However, efforts should field staff and management concentrate on utilisation of staff. These will be required local workforce.across organisations and functions.

Expert advice Expert advice will be required Organisations and agencies shouldacross a number of have identified potential sources organisations and functions, of expertise. This information including medical, engineering, should also have been catalogued public health, disease, planning, in planning.communications, public information and policy.

Volunteer labour forces There will likely be a large Most volunteers will offer theirdemand for volunteer services without prompting. Effortslabour during recovery need to be directed at managingoperations, especially this resource effectively as well clean-up. as targeting local labour.

Communications Effective communications are Carriers and carriage service essential to the smooth control providers have arrangements inand coordination of recovery place to bring communications efforts. Where communications on line. There is also an industryinfrastructure has been guideline on the coordination ofdamaged, efforts need to be additional ad hoc communications.directed at immediate restoration.

Finances The entire recovery process There are a number of sources of rests on access to sufficient funding. However, existing ‘local’ recovery funds. sources of funding should be

investigated in the first instance.

Public information systems The need to reduce public Mechanisms of public informationuncertainty has already been should have been pre-planned highlighted. Public information and be capable of activation at is central to achieving this the earliest.objective thus facilitating a smoother recovery.

Insurance needs Almost immediately, the need The Insurance Emergency Serviceto process insurance claims will and the Insurance Council of arise. The effective management Australia exist to, amongst of this need is central to other things, facilitate the facilitating the economic proper management of insurancerecovery of the community. concerns subsequent to emergencies.

Legal aid Just as insurance issues will Legal Aid would be able to provide arise in the very early stages a limited service, but every effortof recovery, so too will legal should be made to encourage theissues. Legal advice will need identification in planning of to be tendered to both sources of legal advice.individuals, groups and organisations.

Administration consumables A large number of Existing stock should be such administration will be generated that operations are supported during the recovery process, in the early stages. Suppliers which will need to be supported should also be identified in by forms, records and good planning.information management – all requiring large quantities of consumables.

OV

ERA

LL R

ECO

VER

Y M

AN

AG

EMEN

T N

EED

S

19


UTI

LITY

NEE

DS

PHY

SIC

AL

INFR

AST

RU

CTU

RE

NEE

DS


HEA

LTH

NEE

DS

Table 3: Recovery needs – continued.


Sanitation Subsequent to an emergency, Primary and redundant sanitationit is likely that sanitation maintenance and provision shouldservices will have been have been outlined in planning.compromised and will therefore require restoration urgently.

Medical Facilities Medical services and facilities Primary and redundant medicalare likely to be subjected to facilities should have beenhigh demand, though they may identified in planning. Availablehave themselves been impacted. medical expertise should also have

been identified.

Hazardous waste management The need to identify, contain and Conventional hazard managementdispose of hazardous waste is of agencies are likely to begreat importance to ward off risk overwhelmed, so secondary of a secondary emergency. sources should have been identified.

Waste management There is likely to be a great deal The waste management system of waste subsequent to an and a back-up should have plans inemergency. In addition, further place to ensure a rapid return towaste will continue to be generated. service.

Mortuary There is potential for large numbers Identification of appropriate of dead. Long-term mortuary mortuary facilities should befacilities may be required to receive outlined in planning.the potential large number of bodies.

Infectious disease control In the wake of an emergency, Arrangements for relevant expertisethere is a large potential for health in this area should be in place as problems due to ineffective disease well as identification of alternatives.control. This aspect must be managed as early as possible.

Vermin and vector control See Infectious disease control See Infectious disease control

Animal disposal facilities In some emergencies there are There are national industry large numbers of dead animals guidelines in place for disposal which need to be disposed of of animals. This activity may beappropriately in order to protect undertaken by the animal owners humans and the agriculture or contract/volunteer labour.industry from disease.

Dry food storage While conventional food storage is The provision of such storage being restored, there is a need to should be planned, but may be maintain adequate dry food the responsibility of food owners or storage. providers.

Refrigeration See Dry Food Storage See Dry Food Storage

Electricity Utilities are critical infrastructure The utilities themselves maintainWater elements and require a very high recovery plans and will restore Telephone priority of restoration in order to their services as a matter of Gas give the community means by priority.

which they can recover other elements.

Plant and Equipment Central to the requirement to Plans should identify potentialrestore the built infrastructure is sources of such equipment. Also, availability of the tools to do given that the current trend is tothe job. outsource these services, the

contractor may maintain some sort of business recovery plan or may not even be affected.

Maintenance facilities Maintenance facilities will be While sources of plant andrequired to maintain the plant and equipment are being confirmed, equipment used in recovery. the same providers should be

queried on maintenance facilities.

Generators The demand for electricity in the See Plant and Equipmentearly stages of recovery will be high, despite the potential that none is available. Generators should therefore be obtained to support critical infrastructure such as medical facilities.

PUB

LIC

SA

FETY

NEE

DS

20


BA

SIC

CO

MM

UN

ITY

NEE

DS

Table 3: Recovery needs – continued.


Food People need to eat. These resources represent some of the most basic human needs during the recovery process and therefore should form and important element of planning and earmarking.

Cooking facilities People need to prepare cooked food.

Accommodation People need shelter.

Clothing People need to be clothed.

Bedding People need to be able to sleep.

Counselling People need psychological support.

Transport The large number of resources, With damaged transportationincluding the human resource will infrastructure, it is important that require transportation, especially alternate means are identified inwhere existing methods are planning.destroyed or inoperable.

Fuel Fuel will be required for generators, If fuel suppliers cannot re-supply heaters, plant, equipment and depleted fuel reserves before transport. transportation infrastructure is

restored, innovative and pre-planned arrangements will need to be implemented.

Childcare Adults may need to go to work or Children will ideally be care for byto assist in the recovery process. parents. Where this is not the case,Children will require care. This may pre-planned and ad hoc childcarealso have some positive arrangements should be psychological effects in terms of established.socialisation.

School facilities It is important for the mental health Alternate schooling arrangementsof children for them to return to should have been identified in thenormal routine and socialisation as planning stages or be capable of early as possible. Parents may also being readily identified andbe required to be absent from home implemented quickly.and unable to care for the children.

Animal welfare The large numbers of domestic A number of sources of advice are animals affected by the emergency available on care of domesticwill need to be cared for. animals during recovery. This

information should be readily available and have been prepared/identified in advance where possible

Heating/Cooling In locations where extremes of Resource lists outlined in recoveryclimate prevail, heating or cooling plans should identify how thesewill be required. needs can be satisfied, including

sources of heating/cooling supplies.

Storage Large storage facilities will be During the damage assessment,required for the substantial potential storage facilities shouldquantities of donated and be noted. In addition, unaffectedrecovered goods. nearby resources should be

identified.

Recreation and cultural activities It is important for the mental health Efforts should be made as soon of the community for them to return as practicable to engage theto normal routine and socialisation community in recreational and as early as possible. cultural activities.

Law and Order Despite the heavy demands likely These agencies would more thanFirefighting upon public safety agencies, there likely be quite well positioned toAmbulance will be a need to maintain at least recover a reasonable level of

a skeleton force to attend to the functioning from very early on indaily, ‘routine’ demands of the the emergency.recovering community, as people will still have heart attacks, break the law and light fires.

21


requirement for higher-level coordination by arepresentative recovery committee or task force.

From Table 3 it becomes apparent that comprehensiveand effective planning is an integral element in theunfettered addressing of recovery needs. Planning acts toidentify potential needs, potential resource shortfalls andsurpluses and means of dealing with these shortfalls andsurpluses. Comprehensive preparedness is thus anintegral element in the ultimate effectiveness ofrecovery efforts.

Responsibility for resource provisionClearly, there are a great number of needs that must bemet in order to facilitate recovery. However, thereremains the important issue of who is responsible forthe provision of these resources. Table 4 provides somesuggestions as to who might take such responsibility.However, while not emphasised in Table 4, the use oflocal resources in the first instance should be a recurringtheme whenever considering the provision of resources.The importance of this notion lies in the propositionthat the speed of recovery will be greatly enhancedwhere community self-help is encouraged from theoutset. In this respect the community will be guidedand supported by all levels of government, withrelevant input from key organisations and agencies.Table 4 elaborates.

From Table 4 it becomes clear that the number ofstakeholders in recovery is potentially very large, furtherhighlighting the importance of training and exercising inaddition to planning. This will encourage eachstakeholder to be aware of their role and that of othersin the recovery process, and more importantly, that theseroles and responsibilities all work together in acontrolled and coordinated fashion and are agreed by allinvolved. Again, the importance of communityinvolvement in these processes cannot beoveremphasised.

Part 6: Conclusions on factors thataffect recoveryThis paper has presented a substantial amount of theoryand information on the factors that affect recovery.However, it is important that some practical conclusionsare distilled from this material. Such conclusions maythen serve as a guide to subsequent evaluations ofrecovery capabilities of communities, as well as aframework around which actual recoveries may beassessed. Therefore, the true pragmatism of this paperlies not so much in the preceding pages, but in thesections that follow – the conclusions on the factorspresented in these preceding pages that affect recovery.

Principles of recoveryIn all, eight principles of recovery were outlined.Throughout this paper, many of these principles havebeen continually alluded to, and while not explicitlyexpressed, these principles have formed the basis ofmuch of this paper’s discussion. Adherence to theseguiding principles will undoubtedly facilitate theeffective and efficient conduct of a smooth recoveryprocess.

Principle 1: Recovery definedBased on this principle, recovery has at its core thecommunity. The community must be involved at allpoints in the recovery process, supported rather thandirected by external stakeholders.

Secondly, the desired end-state, in terms of recoverymanagement, is to allow the community to attain a levelof functioning that is sustainable and where lessons areincorporated into the broader emergency managementprocess.

Principle 2: Planning and managementRecovery should be planned and prepared for in wideconsultation with all stakeholders, including thecommunity. This planning is fundamental to theeffectiveness of recovery and was a recurrent theme inthe previous outline of recovery needs in Part 5.

A recovery committee is an appropriate means by whichconsultative planning can take place. Such recoverycommittees are a legislative requirement within manyAustralian States and Territories.

Principle 3: Recognition of changing needs andcomplex natureRecovery arrangements must be flexible. Moreover, theremust be mechanisms in place whereby the need forflexibility can be established, hence means throughwhich the community can communicate their needs arean important element of recovery. Importantly,communication and information media should be bothactive and passive.

Many wants will be expressed as needs. The mannerby which this problem is addressed must be carefullythought out, with auditable and transparentdecision criteria.

Principle 4: Community development approachAgain, the community-centric approach to recovery isemphasised, with emphasis on the utilisation of localresources and expertise. This is again a recurrent themethroughout this paper and an underlying theme inPart 5.

The involvement of the affected community and itsresources where possible has a positive effect on thepsychological functioning of the community through

OV

ERA

LL R

ECO

VER

Y M

AN

AG

EMEN

T N

EED

SH

EALT

H N

EED

S

22


Recovery manager;Most senior public official

Departmental responsibility

Government;Council;Temp agencies;Volunteers (community)

Government;Academia;Industry;Community

Community;Neighbouring communities

Telecommunications providers;Government

Appeals;Donations;Government

Media;Emergency Service Organisations;Community;Government

Insurance Council of Australia;Insurance Emergency Service;Individual Insurers

Legal Aid;Private firms

Donations;Commercial sources;Government;Existing stocks

Waste management authority;Engineers;Commercial sources

Local and nearby hospitals;Private practice;Government (Defence)

Fire brigade;Work cover;Dangerous goods unit;Hospitals;Universities

Urban services;Community;Contractors

Local and nearby facilities;Contractors (eg. Kenyons)

Health;Hospitals;Community;Government (Defence)

Department of agriculture;Contractors;Community

Department of Prime Minister andCabinet;

Attorney General’s Department;

Department of EmergencyServices;

Mayor’s office.

Department of Health and Aging;State Health;Urban Services;Council Engineers;Hospital

Table 4: Responsibility for resources.

GENERAL DESCRIPTION PRIMARY AGENCY (ALL LEVELS POTENTIAL RESPONSIBLE PARTIESOF GOVERNMENT)

Recovery management structure

Government

Staff

Expert advic

Volunteer labour forces

Communications

Finances

Public information systems

Insurance needs

Legal aid

Administration consumables

Sanitation

Medical Facilities

Hazardous waste management

Waste management

Mortuary

Infectious disease control

Vermin and vector control

23


BA

SIC

CO

MM

UN

ITY

NEE

DS

UTI

LITY

NEE

DS

PHY

SIC

AL

INFR

AST

RU

CTU

RE

NEE

DS

BA

SIC

CO

MM

UN

ITY

NEE

DS

Table 4: Responsibility for resources – continued.

GENERAL DESCRIPTION PRIMARY AGENCY (ALL LEVELS POTENTIAL RESPONSIBLE PARTIESOF GOVERNMENT)

Animal disposal facilities

Dry food storage

Refrigeration

Electricity

Water

Telephone

Gas

Plant and Equipment

Maintenance facilities

Generators

Food

Cooking facilities

Accommodation

Clothing

Bedding

Counselling

Utility companies

Department of urban services;Engineering department

Department of Health and Aging;Centrelink;Department of CommunityServices

Department of agriculture;Animal Health Australia;Industry;Contractors;Community

Supermarkets;Airports;Transport hubs;Community

Electricity Authority;Contractors (generators)

Water Authority;Contractors;Government (Defence)

Carriers and Carriage ServiceProviders;

Gas Authority;Contractors

Engineering department;Contractors;Community



Donations;Non government organisations,eg. Red Cross;Contractors;Neighbouring communities

Contractors;Commercial supplies;Non government organisations,eg. Red Cross;Government (Defence)

Neighbouring communities;Non government organisations,eg. Adracare;Government;Existing facilities;Commercial sources

Donations;Non government organisations,eg. St Vincent de Paul;Commercial sources;

Donations;Non government organisations,eg. St Vincent de Paul;Commercial sources;

Hospitals;Mental health service;Private practice;Emergency service organisations;Volunteers


24


BA

SIC

CO

MM

UN

ITY

NEE

DS

PUB

LIC

SA

FETY

NEE

DS

Table 4: Responsibility for resources – continued.GENERAL DESCRIPTION PRIMARY AGENCY (ALL LEVELS POTENTIAL RESPONSIBLE PARTIES

OF GOVERNMENT)

Transport

Fuel

Child care

School facilities

Animal welfare

Heating/Cooling

Storage

Recreation and cultural activities

Law and Order

Firefighting

Ambulance

Contractors;Local industry;Government (Defence);Community

Fuel Companies;see also transport

Existing facilities:Schools;Volunteers;Community;Contractors

Existing local andneighbouring facilities

RSPCA;Veterinary practices;Community;WIRES;Volunteers

Commercial sources;ContractorsExisting facilities

Supermarkets;Airports;Transport hubs;Warehouses;Community

Donated services;Commercial ventures;Community

Police;Security contractors

Fire brigade;Volunteers

Health/Ambulance;Volunteers, eg. St John’s Ambulance

Attorney General’sDepartment;Department of EmergencyServices;Health;Police service

mastery. It also has a positive effect on the economicrecovery, providing local business and industry with areason to recover as quickly as possible.

Recovery also presents an opportunity for bettermentthrough community development activity, which shouldbe a feature of all recovery processes.

Principle 5: Involvement of human serviceagenciesHuman service agencies posses an in-depth knowledgeof community needs and therefore are key stakeholdersin the recovery process, able to accurately represent theneeds of the affected community, especially in the earlystages of recovery. The human service agencies can alsoplay the role of community advocate in forums whereit is neither possible nor appropriate for the community

to be involved, but where community interests shouldbe represented.

Principle 6: Recovery begins at impactThis is yet another principle that features prominentlythroughout this paper. There is a wealth of evidence tosupport the fact that recovery is more effective and oftenless protracted when conducted from the momentof impact.

However, this principle was expanded upon to alsoadvance the notion of recovery arrangements that arecompletely integrated with other elements of thecomprehensive emergency management process.This concept was expanded upon in Part 3.

25


Principle 7: Training and exercising of recoveryarrangementsAs also discussed in Part 6, training and exercising iscentral to the effectiveness and endorsement ofrecovery arrangements, where training inculcates therequired knowledge and exercising tests and refinesthe arrangements. Training and exercising are the gluethat binds preparedness activities to actualrecovery operations.

Principle 8: Comprehensive, integrated, timely,equitable, fair and flexible arrangementsRecovery arrangements should represent guidelines tobe adapted depending on the situation, thusencouraging flexibility and practicality. Recoveryarrangements should also be thorough, developed inbroad consultation and, most importantly, wellprepared, multi-level, and all-agency. Truly pragmaticrecovery management arrangements would not reflectthe specifics of the recovery process. Rather, they wouldbe more general in nature.

Recovery assistance measures need to meet severalrequirements:

1. Assistance measures should be made available to theaffected community in time for such measures toachieve their desired outcomes;

2. Assistance measures should be made available on anequal and fair basis to elements of the affectedcommunity;

3. Assistance measures should be flexible enough tomeet a wide variety of community needs. Measuresnot only need to exhibit diversity, but withinthemselves need to be flexible.

The recovery processThe recovery process is an integral element of thebroader emergency management process and cannotoperate in isolation from other elements of theemergency management process. Much has been saidabout the link between recovery and response, however,equally vital links apply to prevention and preparedness.

Recovery is not strictly a sequential process, although itdoes tend to approximate one at times. Rather, recoverycomprises a number of activities that can be categorisedand can also occur in concert. Indeed the simultaneousconduct of appropriate recovery activities can greatlyenhance the pace at which recovery occurs.

A four-stage process was considered comprising thefollowing elements:

1. Emergency or Post-impact;

2. Restoration;

3. Replacement Reconstruction; and

4. Commemorative, Betterment and DevelopmentalReconstruction.

These four elements are accurate but have a tendencyto be strictly sequential and marginally difficult tointegrate with the comprehensive emergencymanagement process. Accordingly, a model recoveryprocess was advanced, affectionately titled ‘CharlottesDoughnut’. Charlotte’s Doughnut is an attempt toreconcile the four-stage process with both the principleof a continuum approach and the elements ofcomprehensive emergency management.

Therefore it is suggested that an ideal recovery processwould approximate Charlotte’s Doughnut, displaying theelements of a continuum that approximates a sequenceand which is integrated with the broader elements ofemergency management.

The specifics of the proposed recovery process includeextra-recovery elements, which operate outside thecontext of the actual recovery and intra-recoveryelements that are integral to the actual recovery.However all are interlinked and have at their core thecommunity.

Diverse reactions to emergenciesThe reactions to emergencies are diverse and rangeacross individuals, families and communities. Anunderstanding of these reactions is central to planningthe likely psychological and support needs of theaffected people during recovery. The diversity of thesereactions is yet another justification of the need forflexibility described in the recovery principles.

Community reactionsThe principal impacts on communities include thedestruction of bonds and forming of new ones,uncertainty, stress and conflict. Thus, recoveryarrangements must be structured in such a way as to re-build social capital, remove uncertainty, and reducestress and conflict. This is one of the justifications forthe community-centric approach, where the communityis empowered and bonds are re-formed. Uncertainty,hence stress and conflict, are also reduced.

Family reactionsThe family is a key element to the recovery of acommunity, playing a pivotal role in the emotional,hence overall, recovery of a community. Family thereforeshould be a prime concern in recovery planning andmanagement. While many family bonds arestrengthened in the wake of emergencies, specificattention should be given to families who haveexperienced bereavement, low income families andlarger families, as these are less likely to recover quickly.

Individual reactions

General

Individual reactions to emergencies are quite varied andinclude anxiety disorders (including posttraumatic stress

26


disorder), mood disorders such as survivor syndromeand disaster bereavement syndrome, somatoformautonomic dysfunction, and organic mental disorders asa consequence of injury. There are at least 19 factors thatcontribute to an individual’s psychological outlookfollowing an emergency (See Figure 5) and these shouldbe kept in mind when considering the reactions ofindividuals to emergencies.

ChildrenChildren are not immune from the psychological impactof emergencies and are affected in a very real andtangible way. Some of the more typical reactions includefear, a need to re-establish family links, separationanxiety, sleep disturbances, emergency-related play, andbehavioural problems. Children tend to be less inclinedto use denial as a defence mechanism and doexperience, albeit slightly different, symptoms indicativeof PTSD. Further, while children acknowledge death andgrieve as a consequence, the finality of death is difficultfor the very young to grasp.

Accordingly, contrary to the myth that children are noteffected by the psychological sequelae of emergencies,recovery arrangements should give seriousconsideration to the mental health needs of childrenaffected by emergencies.

ElderlyElderly survivors tend to be more psychologicallyresilient to the psychological effects of emergencies.Moreover, the elderly are reluctant to see themselves asburdens upon younger generations and therefore tend toavoid seeking help. Notwithstanding, owing to theiroftentimes less favourable financial situation, the elderlytend to recover slower economically, thus emotionallyand therefore warrant serious consideration in terms ofrecovery arrangements. Also, with respect to the theirreluctance to seek out assistance, the elderly may needto be proactively provided support.

Recovery resourcesThe conclusions that may be drawn from the discussionin Part 5 on recovery resources are fairlystraightforward. The recovery demands arising duringrecovery are significant. Furthermore, the range ofindividuals, companies, agencies, organisations anddepartments is equally extensive.

All this points to nine key elements in facilitating asuccessful recovery from the perspective of addressingrecovery needs:

1. Planning, planning and planning;

2. Training, training and training; and

3. Exercising, exercising and exercising.

This may sound a little trite, but in effect goes right tothe heart of adequately meeting the recovery needs of

the community. Moreover, as has been constantlyreinforced, these ‘nine’ elements need to take place inwide consultation with stakeholders, the most importantof which is the community.

Overall conclusionsThe eight principles that have served as the foundationof this paper have repeatedly appeared as key elementsin the effective recovery of a community effected bycommunity. However, if emphasis were to be placed onthree general recovery philosophies, based on theprevious pages these would be:

1. The importance of placing the community at thecentre of recovery management;

2. The importance of consultative and comprehensiveplanning, including the training in and exercising ofsuch plans;

3. The importance of flexibility.

With this in mind, one can be confident that, whenoperating in line with agreed recovery principlesaccording to a pragmatic recovery process, mindful ofthe diverse reactions to emergencies, and with adequateand agreed means of satisfying recovery needs, that therecovery of a community impacted by a hazard has thebest opportunity to serve as an exemplar of successfulrecovery.

ReferencesCarter, W. N. (1991). Disaster Management, A DisasterManager’s Handbook. Manila: Asian Development Bank.

Department of Natural Resources and Environment,Department of Human Services, East Gippsland CatchmentManagement Authority & East Gippsland Shire Council(1999). 1998 Flood : The Road to Recovery in East Gippsland.Bairnsdale: E-G Printers.

Emergency Management Australia (1996), Disaster Recovery,Australian Emergency Manual, Emergency ManagementAustralia, Canberra.

Gordon, R. (1990). Community responses to disaster. TheLocal Government Engineer in Disaster Recovery. MountMacedon: Australian Counter Disaster College.

Haas, J. E., Kates, R. W. & Bowden, M. J. (1977).Reconstruction Following Disaster. Massachusetts: The MITPress.

Haas, J. E., Trainer, P. B., Bowden, M. J. & Bolin, R. (1977)Reconstruction issues in perspective. In ReconstructionFollowing Disaster. Eds. Haas, J. E., Kates, R. W. & Bowden, M.J. Massachusetts: The MIT Press.

Janoff-Bulman, R. (1992). Shattered assumptions: Towards a newpsychology of trauma. New York: The Free Press.

Kates, R. W. & Pijawka, D. (1977) From rubble to monument:the pace of reconstruction. In Reconstruction Following Disaster.Eds. Haas, J. E., Kates, R. W. & Bowden, M. J. Massachusetts:The MIT Press.

Kates, R. W. (1977) Major insights: A summary andrecommendations. In Reconstruction Following Disaster. Eds.Haas, J. E., Kates, R. W. & Bowden, M. J. Massachusetts: TheMIT Press.

27


Lunn, J. (2001). Emergency Recovery Management 1: StudyGuide. Bathurst: Charles Sturt University Learning MaterialsCentre.

Malt, V. F. (1994). Traumatic effects of accidents, Individualand community responses to disaster: The structure of humanchaos. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 103–155.

Meredith, H. (2002). Learning all about disaster recovery.Australian Financial Review, 1 May, 2002.

Pynoos, R. S., Sorenson, S. B. & Steinberg, A. M. (1993).Interpersonal violence and traumatic stress reactions,Handbook of stress (2nd Edition) eds. Goldberger, L & Breznitz,S. New York: The Free Press.

Raphael, B. (1986). When Disaster Strikes: How Individuals andCommunities Cope with Catastrophe. New York: Basic Books.

Sharan, P., Chaudhary, G., Kavathekar, S. A. & Saxena, S.(1996). Preliminary report of psychiatric disorders insurvivors of a severe earthquake. American Journal ofPsychiatry, 153(4), 556–558.

Shore, J. H., Tatum, E. L. & Vollmer, W. M. (1986).Psychiatric reactions to disaster: The Mount St. Helensexperience. American Journal of Psychiatry, 143(5), 590–595.

Sinclair, P. (1990). Nyngan Flood Disaster: Recovery Report to theNew South Wales Premier by the Premier’s Special Coordinator.(Unpublished).

State of Victoria State Emergency Response Unit (2000).Recovery From Emergencies: Checklists. Melbourne: DHS.

State of Victoria State Emergency Response Unit (2000).Recovery From Emergencies: Management Guidelines. Melbourne:DHS.

State of Victoria State Emergency Response Unit (2000).Recovery From Emergencies: Planning Guidelines. Melbourne:DHS.

Terr, L. C. (1983). Chowchilla revisited: The effects of psychictrauma four years after a school-bus kidnapping. AmericanJournal of Psychiatry, 140: 1543–1550.

Trappler, B. & Friedman, S. (1996). Posttraumatic StressDisorder in survivors of the Brooklyn Bridge shooting.American Journal of Psychiatry, 153(5), 705–707.

Tunnecliffe, M. (1999). The peer supporter’s handbook(2nd Edition). Palmyra: Bayside Books.

AuthorMark Sullivan is the Assistant Director, Chemical, Biological andRadiological Enhancement Program at Emergency ManagementAustralia, joining the EMA team from a decade-long career withthe ACT Fire Brigade. Mark has completed a Degree in EmergencyManagement at Charles Sturt University and maintains a stronginterest in emergency planning, across all areas of emergencymanagement. His email address is [email protected]

R

By Rajib Shaw, Manu Gupta and Anshu Sarma

The 2001 Gujarat Earthquake in India highlighted the

need for involvement, leadership and ownership of

communities in the recovery process. A multi-

stakeholder, and multi-organization rehabilitation

program was implemented in Patanka, one of the

hardest hit villages in Gujarat.

The lessons learned during the program are

summarized in this paper. Firstly, interacting and

building trust with the community, proper planning

processes and budget and time flexibility were

important initial considerations. Secondly,

implementation was undertaken jointly with the

community, along with capacity and confidence-

building processes. Sustainability was a major focus

during implementation, so that the rehabilitation

project became part of the development initiative.

Finally, the most important aspect was the exit policy

of the project team, leaving an institutional

mechanism in the community that enabled it to serve

its own needs.

IntroductionAn unparalleled earthquake (magnitude 7.7, USGS)devastated the Gujarat State in Western India on26 January 2001 bringing with it unprecedented andwidespread loss of lives and property. More than13,000 people lost their lives and thousands wereinjured (GSDMA, 2002) in the quake affecting an areastretching more than 400 km, including urban, semi-urban and rural areas. Several villages close to theepicentre were completely destroyed. Over 300,000buildings collapsed and more than twice that numberwere severely damaged. The earthquake was a tragicblow to the region already suffering from droughtconditions and the aftermath of a cyclone three years

earlier. The devastation affected the area socially,economically and physically (Shaw et al., 2001).

The State received an overwhelming response from amyriad of organisations offering support for relief andreconstruction of the quake-hit areas. Several disastermanagement institutions and organisations launched acombined effort in the post-earthquake response,providing material and in-kind support. One suchconsortium included government, non-government,academic and international organizations from India,Japan and Nepal (see figure 1). Sustainable Environmentand Ecological Development Society (SEEDS), NGOsKobe, United Nations Centre for Regional Development(UNCRD), and Earthquake Disaster Mitigation ResearchCentre (EDM) were the major agencies involved in thereconstruction project along with the Gujarat StateDisaster Management Authority (GSDMA). Theseagencies were supported by other organisations withtechnical and financial inputs.

The purpose of the consortium was to use collectivegroup strengths and past experiences to assist the peopleof Gujarat. The Patan district, located to the east ofKuchchh district in Gujarat State and one of the hardest

28


Community recovery and its sustainability: Lessons from Gujaratearthquake of India

Shaw et. al. case study the rehabilitation of the village of Patank in Gujarat State in Western India after the Gujaret Earthquake

Community Common

People

InternationalOrganisation

UNCRD

Foreign Government

Japanese Government Local

GovernmentGujarat State

District, Village

Central Government

Indian Government

Research Institute

EDM

NGOSEEDSNCPDP

NGOs Kobe

Figure 1: Involvement of different stakeholders

hit districts, was chosen as an area for intervention(Figure 2). The village of Patanka, located approximately270 km north-west of Ahmedabad and 70 km west ofthe epicentre of the earthquake, was chosen by theconsortium to test a ‘model’ mitigation approach.Previously, Shaw et al. (2003) detailed the village, itsethnic group makeup and the role of the localgovernment. Figure 3 shows the types of damage torural houses in Patanka.

The consortium formed a Project Team on an initiativecalled the ‘Patan Navjivan Yojana’ (Patanka New LifeProject)(PNY). The project had two major goals:

1. to rehabilitate the lives of the residents of Patankaproviding safer houses, better infrastructure andgreater livelihood security; and

2. to provide a shake table demonstration for buildinglocal capacities in building earthquake-saferconstruction.

In this paper, the lessons learned from the rehabilitationof the ‘model’ village are described.

Need for the model approach incommunity rehabilitationThe need for a ‘model’ approach to communityrehabilitation is felt now more than ever before. Thefollowing factors contribute to this need:

1. Disasters in recent decades are causing more deathsthan in the past century. Indeed, some areas arerepeatedly affected by disasters, yet the relief andrehabilitation carried out following one disaster doeslittle to protect against subsequent disasters.

2. Some areas vulnerable to recurrent disasters do notlearn from past incidents and consequentlyexperience a disaster-poverty cycle (Bhatt, 1998).Limited education and awareness among thestakeholders and a lack of confidence in disaster-

29


ARABIAN SEA

Worst affected area

State boundaryDistrict boundaryState headquarterDistrict headquarterCreek

MAHARASHTRA

MADHYAPRADESH

DADRA &NAGAR HAVELI

Valsad

NavsariNavsari

SuratSurat

BharuchBharuch Narmada

VadodaraAnandAnand

Kheda PanchmahalDahod

Gandhi NagarGandhi NagarSabar KanthaMehsanaMehsana

PatanPatan

Banas KanthaRann of Kachchh

RAJASTHAN

PATANKAVILLAGE

PAKISTANDAMAGE AREA MAP

Gujarat

N

PorbanderPorbander

Gulf of KuchchhGulf of Kuchchh

Gulf of Gulf of KhambhatKhambhat

DiuDiu(Diu and Daman)(Diu and Daman)

DamanDaman(Daman and Diu)(Daman and Diu)

JunagadhJunagadhAmreliAmreli BhavnagarBhavnagar

RajkotRajkot

SurendranagarSurendranagar

JamnagarJamnagar

KachchhKachchh

Little RannOf

Kachchh

The Dangs

Figure 2: Location of study area in Gujarat, Western India

Figure 3: Damage to rural housing in Patanka

resistant practices (i.e. construction) are regarded astwo major reasons for the repetition of mistakes andtragedy (Shaw et al, 2003).

3. The reconstruction efforts being largely ad-hoc, meanthere is no strategic framework and coordination.Inadequate planning, coupled with lack ofpreparedness and mitigation infrastructure, poorinformation dissemination and inappropriatemeasures for accountability have aggravatedthe problem.

4. Population increases are felt in most parts of theworld directly contributing to a rising trend oflife loss.

Appropriate rehabilitation and mitigation practices canpotentially reduce the loss of life in disaster situations(Maskrey, 1989). Over many years, attempts have beenmade to develop sustainable disaster management‘models’ that can effectively reduce risk. Experienceshows most ‘models’ exist as long as there is externalsupport to the local community (Twigg, 2000). Mostinitiatives fail soon after external assistance iswithdrawn. Ultimately, this withdrawal results in thevulnerability of the community increasing to its previouslevel. Furthermore, it is widely accepted that anincreased coordination and capacity building among aidagencies, long-term planning and a greaterunderstanding of the recovery and rehabilitation issuescan potentially improve post-disaster actions at thecommunity level. Accordingly, the Project Team stronglyadvocated the need to urgently develop a ‘model’approach following the Gujarat earthquake.

PNY was conceived as a model program right from itsinception. It sought to empower the affected communityto become sufficiently resilient against any futuredisasters. It attempted to link immediate response in theform of relief to mainstream development. An importantaspect of the initiative was to establish a framework ofmutual cooperation among different stakeholders in thepost-disaster scenario. Most importantly, it aimed atsuccessively reducing the role of external agencies inlocal rehabilitation action until the local communitycould assume all functions. Figure 4 shows thechronology of events of the PNY project.

The work was completed by a Project Team, consistingof representatives of each of the agencies previouslymentioned and four in-the-field engineers and fivetrained masons located on site during the projectimplementation.

The process of rehabilitationThe process of rehabilitation was based on concernsrelating to the community’s needs in the aftermath of thedisaster, the need to increase capacity and the need forthe community to be autonomous and resilient to anyfuture disasters. Experience showed that in disastersituations, especially earthquakes, affected individualsand their neighbours are the best disaster managers.Rehabilitation should therefore also be a mitigationexercise (Kobe Action Plan, 2003).

An ideal process in the post-disaster scenario needed tolink immediate recovery to development. Broadly theprocess followed the three stages (see figure 5). In thefirst stage, an overall plan defined the principles and theaim of the rehabilitation exercise. The second stage wascarried out jointly with the community with a two-wayflow between the Project Team and the individualhousehold. The third stage was the exit stage for theProject Team after it ensured sustainability of itsinterventions while the community prepared itself tointegrate itself to mainstream development.

Rehabilitation stage I: Principles andplanningThe first task was setting up the basic principles forplanning the rehabilitation intervention. Theintervention had to be participatory increasingcommunity involvement gradually. The program hadto be flexible with enough buffers for time and resourcescreated in the overall project schedule. The interventionhad to follow the minimum standards on the quality ofbenefits for the community. Rehabilitation was not justa short term, gap-filling exercise. In most cases, thecommunity faced the threat of recurrent disasters andtherefore the rehabilitation was aimed at reducing theirvulnerability. This implied building the community’sassets, achieving sustainability of residents’ livelihoods,building houses that could protect residents against30


Jan–Feb 2001

SEEDS Relief

April–May 2001

STA

GE

IST

AG

E II

STA

GE

III

Planning Process

June–Sept 2001

Training, ConfidenceBuilding

October 2001

Mason Exchange

January 2002

Livelihood Program

January 2002 onwardCBO, Mason Guild

Dec 01– Aug 02Shake TableDemonstration Testing

July 01–Aug 02

Participatory Construction

June–July 2001

March–April 2001

GO-NGO-Community

Community workshop

26 January 2001The Earthquake

Figure 4: Chronology of events in PNY project

future earthquakes and building an infrastructure thatcould potentially improve the quality of life in thecommunity to a level better than it was beforethe disaster.

The rehabilitation process also needed to beempowering. The Project Team agreed that they wouldnot, and should not, remain with the communityforever. Owing to this commitment, the community, thefirst responder, was sufficiently equipped to cater for itsimmediate needs. A well-planned rehabilitation exercisehad to significantly increase the capacity of thecommunity for a more effective response. Social,economic and psychological aspects therefore were anintegral part of the rehabilitation program.The rehabilitation philosophy was that properrehabilitation was not only about building earthquakeresistant houses, but also the restoration of livelihoods,and the restoration of normal life with sustainableeconomic activities. ‘Livelihood’ could not be ensuredonly by safer housing and suitable income, but wouldneed to include issues such as welfare, health care,medical service, educational facilities, labor condition,disaster prevention and others maintained ingood balance.

Rehabilitation needed to also incorporate local culturalaspects and foster a ‘safer construction’ culture in thecommunity. The rehabilitation program tried to establisha strong bond within the community and with differentrelated stakeholders. The success of the rehabilitationexercise was judged by the degree to which thecommunity replicated actions without intervention fromthe aid agency. Inputs on capacity-building weretherefore important. Additionally, the Project Teamneeded to ensure that conditions would continue toexist for easy replication.

Incorporating the principles stated above, an overallplan evolved. The plan eventuating from the process hadthree parts: The Strategy Plan, The Community Action Planand The Implementation Plan. In the first part, the ProjectTeam drew on its past experiences and research to draw

a broad framework of rehabilitation – The Mission,Goals and Objectives. This formed the basis of thestrategic plan. In the second part, the Project Teamactively consulted the community as well as the localgovernment to ensure that implementing strategies wereculturally and environmentally acceptable to the peopleto whom they were addressed and were within theframework and guidelines laid down by the localgovernment. The Project Team consulted with thecommunity by organizing local workshops with thecommunity, and involving different stakeholders(Figure 6). In the third part, the Project Team devisedspecific action plans for the implementation of variouscomponents of the project, these were primarily basedon local needs and existing capacities. Development andenhancement of the Community Action Plan and theImplementation Plan were completed in RehabilitationStage II.

The role of the Project Team was to facilitate thereconstruction process. The composition of the teamwas therefore very important. Getting appropriate staffmembers with suitable motivation and skills wasdifficult, however suitable training and encouragementhelped. Establishing good relationships with thecommunity was the foremost responsibility of theProject Team, skills and knowledge followed. The

31


STAGE II STAGE IIISTAGE I

EstablishingPrinciples of

Rehabilitation

Integration withDevelopment

Ensuring Sustainability

Planning Process– Strategy– Community– Implementation

Need Assessment

CapacityBuilding

JointImplementation

Figure 5: Different stages of recovery process

Figure 6: Community Workshop

Project Team had to commit to helping the communityso that they could help themselves. Maintainingprofessional and ethical standards while performingamidst the community earned the respect and trust ofthe community. The ability of the Project Team totranslate their knowledge into community acceptablepractice was crucial to success. Furthermore the teamhad to ensure transparency in their accounting systemsand working methods. This helped in establishingcredibility for the team within the community.

Rehabilitation stage II:ImplementationThis Implementation Stage of the project consisted ofthree steps: 1) Need Assessment, 2) Capacity Building,and 3) Implementation. In Step 1, attention was focusedon the following features: 1) Recognising thecommunity’s needs, 2) Prioritising needs as per availableresources, and 3) Translating needs into appropriateaction jointly with the community. Role of Governmentin this stage of the exercise provided a recognised legalbasis for working in the community. The involvement ofthe government also reinforced its relationship with thecommunity. The basic needs of the community werealways the same – food, clothing & shelter. Ethnic andregional differences created further complexities inneeds. However, field experiences revealed that culturalacceptance of external aid was as important as the aiditself. Local needs were determined by interacting withthe community – the best way of doing so was throughdialogue, demonstration and training. Carrying out reliefoperations immediately after the earthquake provided awindow to peep into the community’s lifestyle, habitsand customs. This insight was supported by interactionswith the community, especially women. Use of graphicmaterial and practical demonstrations dissolved possiblelanguage barriers and increased the scope forcommunity feedback.

Local requirements needed to be matched with availableoptions. Failing to find the best requirement/option fitmay have caused several problems, as evidenced in therehabilitation process after the Kobe earthquake of 1995

(Leckie, 1996). Climatic conditions, cost effectivenessand cultural adaptability were other considerations.Options were identified through extensive research andanalysis. Community interaction provided many ideas.The options developed by the Project Team had to be re-examined against community preferences.

The framework of action in the field supported bycommunity preferences defined a Community ActionPlan that had two components: Framework and Processof implementation. The Plan outlined the mechanism bywhich the actions would be implemented at communitylevel. The plan also defined the action modes and theroles played by different stakeholders. Governmentguidelines and policies needed to be recognized andinterpreted in the local plan.

Ideally, in a democratic system the government and thecommunity are directly accountable to each other. Therole of the Project Team on the PKY project was tostrengthen the link between the government andcommunity. Winning the trust of the community wascritical for a joint ownership of the process. Unlikeprograms-driven development initiatives, a rehabilitationexercise had to be executed in the shortest possible time.Getting full community support in such a short timewas difficult. The Project Team needed to make positivemoves to win community trust. A ‘resolution’ by thecommunity leaders was sought. Strong leaders wereidentified to assist in organising a common voice for theproject. Leadership problems were previously observedin the Kobe earthquake (Kobe Action Plan 2003), whereweak leadership caused factions within the communityand hampered the rehabilitation process.

Step 2 aimed to translate the plan into action. At thefirst stage, the team needed to provide training to buildcapacity in the community. This training programmewas a confidence-building exercise through which thelocal communities gained assurance in the technologyand process. Individual householders and families drovethe project, and the construction activity was adjusted toindividuals’ budget and priorities (Figure 7). Inadequateattention to capacity-building may have jeopardised anyrehabilitation exercise. The Project Team included awide range of capacity building activities that rangedover counseling people who had just experienced thetrauma of a disaster, to empowering individuals tohandle their needs in case of any future disasters.

To introduce earthquake-safer building technology, localmasons were trained to replicate various buildingpractices. Householders were so positively influencedthey demanded safer houses without compromising onquality of construction.

For activities to be sustainable, strengthening existingdemocratic structures, compared to creating newstructures, reaped positive benefits. Training inleadership was also important. A social calendar

32


Figure 7: Family builds its own house

of activities ensured good relationships withthe community.

Step 3 focused on joint implementation. Rebuildinghomes and lives after a disaster extended beyond merephysical activity on part of the households. As residentsrebuilt their lives, they would look for an opportunity toget closer to the long-cherished dream, while buryingthe past. The Project Team strived to strengthen thosedreams, and not to replace it with their own. Therehabilitation exercise showed best results when thecommunity and the Project Team carried out jointactions. At the joint implementation stage, along withcapacity-building, action plans for each area ofintervention needed to be drawn out. There were thehousing reconstruction action plan, the houseretrofitting action plan, the livelihood action plan, andthe social action plan. To prepare and actualize theaction plans, one-to-one dialogue with individualhouseholds helped. To achieve some action plans theProject Team needed to make itself available andamenable to all individual needs and priorities.

A previously-set ceiling on the expenditure perhousehold with flexibility in design and constructionworked the best both for the community and the ProjectTeam. When work-sharing was involved, roleclarification and transparency were necessary. Roles andtransparency mechanisms were clarified in theAction Plans.

Rehabilitation stage III: EnsuringsustainabilityThe effort initiated by the Project Team needed to besustainable long after the interventions finished. Ineffect, intervention was designed to ensure that thecommunity was able to take care of its developmentneeds and was resilient against future disasters. For theintervention to be sustainable, capacity-building andstrengthening/building local institutional mechanismswere absolutely necessary. Additionally, local institutionsneeded adequate capacity and a fixed source of incometo exist and complete its programs. Thus, rehabilitation

33


Table 1: Check-list for sustainable community recovery.

STAGE I STAGE II STAGE III

ESTABLISH PRINCIPLES NEED ASSESSMENT CAPACITY BUILDING LOCAL INSTITUTIONALSTRENGTHENING

Rehabilitation linked to Dialogue Training of Masons, Labor Integration with government Development development schemes.

Rehabilitation to be Training & Demonstration Building Community Creating assets for securityparticipatory confidence on disaster

resistant practices

To Follow minimum Community Feedback Strengthening Institutional Ensuring means for established standards Structures at Community continuous capacity building

Level process.

Rehabilitation aimed at Damage Assessments Social Mobilization Providing new opportunitiesreducing vulnerability for growth

Promote empowerment Identifying Suitable Options Social Calendar

To be Flexible Preparation of Local Plans Joint Action

Cooperation between Community Preferences Prepare Sector specific stakeholders Action Plans

Improve Quality of Life Mechanism for joint One to one dialogueaction with the community

Strategic Planning Identifying areas of Flexible ApproachCapacity Building

Mission Meeting with Community Guidance & Supervision of involving government Ongoing construction

Aims & Objectives Adapting Government Role Clarification & Guidelines Transparency

Establish Team Identifying Confidence Establishing InfrastructureBuilding Measures for local storage of

raw materials

Making the first move to Establishing systems forforge trust with the monitoring and Community evaluation of construction work.

actions were sustainable if the individual in thecommunity was empowered and owned the project.

‘Model’ of rehabilitationAs stated earlier, one of the main objectives of thisexercise was to evolve a ‘model’ for rehabilitation andmitigation that could be universally applicable. Extratime and resources were allocated to enable the ProjectTeam to experiment with new strategies and activities.The program that was the focus of this case study waslimited to just one community comprising of256 households. The Project Team is convinced thatwhat could be carried out in the community of Patanka,could also be replicated in many more communities.Scale was not an important consideration as the issuewas the quality of the intervention. What could becompleted in one community had the power toinfluence grassroots endeavours and policy frameworksuniversally. The lessons learned from the currentinitiative can therefore be summarized as in Table 1.

AcknowledgementsThe authors gratefully acknowledge the help,collaboration, commitments and inputs from manyindividual and organizations involved in the project.Notably, special thanks are given to M. M. Murai, R.Suzuki, M. Kobayashi, and H. Kameda for their inputsto the project and to the dedicated work of Kamya andChandra who provided the base to the project. Thanksalso goes to the people of the village of Patanka, thelocal government representatives and GSDMA for theirkind help in different stages of the project.

ReferencesBhatt M. R., 1998, ‘Can Vulnerability be Understood?’, inTwigg J., Bhatt M.R. (eds.), Understanding Vulnerability: SouthAsian Perspectives, London, IT Publications.

GSDMA (2002) Post-earthquake rehabilitation: current status,GSDMA Report, Gandhinagar, GSDMA Publication.

Kobe Action Plan 2003, From disaster to sustainable communitydevelopment: The Kobe Experience, Tsunehiro Y., Goda K. andShaw R., Kobe, UNCRD Publication.

Leckie S., 1996, Still Waiting: Housing rights violations in a landof plenty; The Kobe Earthquake and beyond, Tokyo, HICPublication.

Maskrey A., 1989, Disaster Mitigation. A Community BasedApproach, Oxford, Oxfam, pp. 69–99.

Shaw, R., Sinha, R., Goyal, A., Saita, J., Arai, H., Choudhury,M., Jaiswal, K., and Pribadi, K., 2001, The Bhuj Earthquake ofJanuary 2001, Miki, EDM-IIT Joint Publication.

Shaw R., Kobayashi M., Kameda H., Gupta M., Sharma A.,Nakagawa Y., and Banba M. (2003) ‘International Cooperationin a Post-disaster Scenario: A Case Study from Gujarat, India’.Journal of Natural Disaster Science.

Twigg J., 2000, ‘The age of accountability?: future communityinvolvement in disaster reduction’, Australian Journal ofEmergency Management, Vol. Summer 1999/2000, pp. 51–58.

AuthorsRajib Shaw, United Nations Centre for Regional Development(UNCRD), Kobe, JapanManu Gupta, Sustainable Environment and Ecological DevelopmentSociety (SEEDS), Delhi, India Anshu Sharma, Sustainable Environment and EcologicalDevelopment Society (SEEDS), Delhi, India

34


R

35


By James Lewis

It can no longer be assumed for all earthquake

areas, as it was thirty years ago, that all architects

and engineers are both accessible and competent for

earthquake-resistant housing. There is a long-

overdue requirement for urban multi-storey and

self-build small buildings to improve the standard of

their construction. After almost every urban

earthquake, the call goes out for building

construction to be improved. But what are the

requirements for improving building construction,

and how can they be achieved; and are there other

housing strategies to be considered for the

achievement of earthquake disaster reduction as an

integral part of sustainable development ?

Continued attention to rural small buildings is not

disputed, but there is now also a need for redress

of an imbalance in the strategy, to reflect the

need that clearly exists for more attention to all

kinds of urban housing – but it is not only

shortcomings in the application of building

construction technology that is responsible for

these circumstances; so are planning,

management, administration and integrity.

All forms of building construction involve a

process of legitimate physical covering over of

each stage of construction. As each stage is

completed, it becomes concealed by a subsequent

stage – from foundations under the ground

through to the last coat of paint. For there to be

as much certainty as possible, from stage to

stage, in the achievement of construction quality,

periodic, even constant, independent inspection

of buildings under construction is necessary.

Legislation does exist in the form of building

regulations, codes, standards and guidelines in

most countries, but legislation is insufficient

without regular, strategic, informed and

reliable inspection to ensure its enforcement.

Earthquake-responsible development can achieve

more by adopting earthquake awareness through all

sectors; micro-zoning of earthquake risk can be used

to modify population occupancy and to modify

construction standards. Peru is an example of the

practice and Turkey is an example of the need.

IntroductionIt is exactly thirty years since the publication of A F Daldy's groundbreaking ‘Small building's inearthquake areas’ by the UK Building ResearchEstablishment (Daldy: 1972). In the preface, Daldywrote: “This handbook is not written for theprofessionally qualified architect or engineer, but forbuilders and others who actually construct smallbuildings in earthquake areas. In this context a 'smallbuilding' means a building of not more than two storeys,with a total floor area not more than about 120 sqm.This is the type of building in which the large majorityof people live, and which is generally built withoutstructural calculations by professional engineers”.

Since then, for the past thirty years, to counter emphasisthere had been on urban, professionally designedhousing, there has been appropriate attention given tolow-cost, self-build, rural, domestic buildingconstruction, in efforts to facilitate resistance to theforces of natural hazards. During the same period oftime, however, processes of urbanisation have continuedto create the demand from many, and opportunities forsome, for rapid construction of multi-storey buildingsfor domestic housing. These buildings for domesticaccommodation, on the one hand, and urban self-buildon the other, were excluded by Daldy's definition of‘small building’ and by his assumption that singledwellings with an area of 120 sqm are where ‘the largemajority of people live’.

Housing construction inearthquake-prone places:Perspectives, priorities and

projections for developmentJames Lewis argues the requirement for improved

building development in earthquake-prone countries

Furthermore, it can no longer be assumed, even if itcould be in 1972, that architects and engineers areavailable and that if they are, they have the necessaryskills, and that these services can be afforded, and thatthere is a perception of need of them by developers,for the design of speculative multi-storey housing.Urban self-build is, by its nature, largely outside ofnormal professional interest. There is a long-overduerequirement for the inclusion of multi-storey housingand urban self-build to be made a part ofrenewed attention to housing construction inearthquake-prone places.

“The type of construction used in most poor people'surban housing makes them particularly vulnerable.The reinforced, concrete-framed, multi-storey blockwith masonry or precast panels or cladding is potentiallyhazardous in disaster-prone areas. Although this typeof construction can be made relatively safe in all butthe most severe disasters, few architects designing suchblocks in the South are familiar with the engineeringprinciples of building safer multi-storey buildings,the construction skills of the building contractors maynot be adequate, and the introduction of safety featuressuch as shear walls and cross-bracing can addsignificantly to the cost” (Ruskulis, 2002) – and even ifknown of, are likely to be omitted by unscrupulousdevelopers.

Multi-storey and low-rise urban self-build housing forthe poor is a constant and increasing activity, and

overcrowding is a normal characteristic; it follows thatgreater attention to the structural security of these kindsof housing would be a major component of housingsecurity and disaster reduction, and one which wouldsignificantly contribute towards contexts of long-termsustainable development.

Structural inadequacy is exposed by failure of so manyof these kinds of building in almost every earthquake,and there is ample evidence that urban, high-risehousing construction cannot, as has been assumed, beleft to itself as not in need of scrutiny and improvement.If media attention to building construction failure inearthquakes were a reliable guide, it could be inferredthat urban construction in earthquake-prone areas isnow more in need of improvement than that of its ruralcounterparts, due to high incidence of occurrence,inevitably overcrowded occupancies, and consequentlyhigh numbers of casualties that urban buildingcollapses cause.

Urbanisation no longer means only the growth ofestablished cities, but also the growth of previouslysmall villages to towns, small towns to large ones, andlarge ones to conurbations, as a consequence ofmigration from impoverished rural livelihoods. Nor canthe process of enlargement and construction beenvisaged as regular, ordered and planned, but as takingplace in contexts of ‘a combination of human error,indifference, corruption and greed’ (Wisner: 2001).

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Structural inadequacy is exposed by failure of so many buildings. Compare for instance the building in the rear to the building in the foreground

37


Consequently, after almost every urban earthquake, thecall goes out for building construction to be improved.But what are the requirements for improving buildingconstruction, and how can they be achieved; and arethere other strategies for housing in built environmentsto be considered towards the achievement of earthquakedisaster reduction in the even longer-term?

Thirty years is a period of time sufficient for largenumbers of buildings to have been designed,constructed, occupied, and tested by the natural hazardsof their locations. That some buildings have survivedsuch rigourous testing can be assumed, and theirnumber would be difficult to ascertain. That there havebeen, in that time, so many catastrophic failures ofbuildings built within the same period, especiallybuildings for housing, is made repeatedly apparent bythe many earthquakes to which they and theiroccupants have been collectively subjected.

Urban low-riseUrban construction for housing is not all multi-storey,and not all developer-built. Urban low-rise housing,inclusive of self-built ‘shanty-towns’, ‘bidonvilles’, and‘squatter settlements’, is a significant feature of urbandevelopment in most cities of developing countries,from Rio de Janeiro to Bombay. Special programmes arein place, and need to be replicated, so that this crucialand heavily populated aspect of urban housing does notcontinue to be ignored as part of the urban housingfabric – whilst it is excluded from programmes for itsrural counterpart. Housing of this kind, usually theproduct of impressive local initiatives, needs to becomerecognised as a part of municipal responsibility so that itmay benefit from appropriate applications of secure

building construction siting, guidance, legislationand control.

“… formal building codes in disaster-prone areas rarelyconsider housing and building in informal and low-income settlements. In some Southern cities 60 to70 percent of the population live in such settlements.Building codes will have little impact in these settlements.This situation is unlikely to change unless community-based organisations representing informal and low incomesettlements are fully integrated into city-wide planningprocesses on disaster management” (Ruskulis, 2002).

Rural constructionSince 1972 there has been emphasis on rural domesticconstruction. This emphasis is evidenced not only by itsquantity, but also its variety of applications to veryspecific and often remote locations: for example: Norton(1985) for Guinea; Afshar et al (1978) for Iran; andBoyle (1988) for the Australian bush. Similarly,emphasis on some specific building types; eg: Vickery(1982) for school buildings, reflects a recognition of theimportance of school buildings in disaster-prone places(Bothara: 2002), and the degree of specialisationachieved within wide ranging rural construction, aformerly significant but neglected area.

Other examples of rural emphasis relate to specificapplications such as Department of Economic and SocialAffairs (1977) for repair of buildings damaged byearthquakes, and Nimpuno (1993) for NGO training instructural upgrading; others are of mixed applications,such as; Aysan et al (1995); Clayton & Davis (1994), anannotated bibliography, and Dudley & Haaland (1993)on communicating technical information to localbuilders and householders.

Urban low-rise housing is a significant feature of urban development in most cities of developing countries

An equally large number relate to issues of concern inthe USA, and for applications as part of the US overseasaid programme; for example the Office of US ForeignDisaster Assistance (1981). The former stem from the(not so rural) technical aftermath of the 1902 SanFransisco earthquake; eg: Clay Products Institute(1929); followed by earthquake resistant design inOsman (1976) and Green (1978).

However, the majority of these many examples frombuilding construction literature, of efforts for theachievement of earthquake-resistant buildingconstruction, are related to the construction of low-cost,self-build small and rural domestic buildings; forexample, and in addition to Daldy (1972): Departmentof Economic and Social Affairs (1975); BRE (1988);Landewijk & Shordt (1989); and Hodgson et al (1999),and for the most part, Coburn et al (1995), inclusivealso of guidance in reinforced concrete construction forlow-rise multi-storey buildings; and the exemplary BasinNews (2002).

Probably only one or two references have anything ofstructural engineering content applicable to high-rise

urban construction; for example Coburn & Spence(1992) and Key (1995). That professional literature, asdistinct from that for informed general readership,includes of this specialist area of structural engineeringcan be assumed, but that its application is not assured isevidenced by repetitions of structural failure. It can nolonger be assumed that urban high-rise construction canbe regarded as an area of activity exempt from concern,as being subject to professional inputs or that it isautomatically subject to regulated design guidance.

Although much of the damage caused by earthquakes isto buildings older than thirty years, there are many builtwithin that time that should not have failed to the extentthey did. This applies to both less-developed anddeveloped countries; shortcomings of construction wereexposed in the earthquakes at Kobe (1995) and atSeattle (2001). Repeated examples of serious earthquakedamage to comparatively recent construction, can onlybe an illustration of a pervasive failure to applyinformation that has been available for many years.

The continued need for attention to rural smallbuildings is not disputed, but there is now also a needfor redress of an imbalance in the strategy, to reflectthe need that clearly exists for more attention to urban,multi-storey and self-build housing – but it is not onlyshortcomings in the application of buildingconstruction technology that is responsible for thesecircumstances; so are planning, management,administration and integrity.

The nature of building constructionBuilding construction proceeds in stages; starting in theground, for foundations and drainage; proceeding to theerection of superstructure of wall, columns, floors andstaircases, etc; to roofing; to the fitting of secondarycomponents, such as window and door frames; to watersupply, plumbing, and electric wiring; and to surfacefinishes for walls, ceilings and floors; and to painting.Some stages may overlap, or are arranged into sub-stages, as different parts of buildings are completed toseparate programmes. Each stage is achieved by differenttrades; the arrival or departure of each one usuallysignifying start or completion of each stage, or sub-stage.

All forms of building construction involve a process oflegitimate physical covering over of each stage ofconstruction, especially the early stages of foundationsand superstructure. As each stage is completed, itbecomes concealed by a subsequent stage – fromfoundations under the ground through to the last coat ofpaint. Mistakes, omissions, deviations, andmisunderstandings of requirements, have therefore to beidentified and rectified within and as part of each stage.To go back to a previous stage requires costly and timeconsuming investigation and rectification.

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There are many buildings older than thirty years that should notfail to the extent they do

39


Building construction of any kind takes place underpressures of time; caused by weather or by need tocomplete by a given date, or both, often with a highpenalty or loss of financial incentive for the builder fornot doing so. Opportunities to save time, and to save onthe cost of materials by reductions in quality or amount,mean that temptations of expediency, shortcuts andomissions, are boundless.

For there to be as much certainty as possible, from stageto stage, in the achievement of construction quality,periodic, even constant, independent inspection ofbuildings under construction would be necessary.Model regulations for application in legislation haveexisted for many years (eg: Building Research Station,1966) and building regulations, codes, standards andguidelines have been published in many countries: (e.g. Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States: 1991)but legislation is insufficient without regular,strategic, informed and reliable inspection to ensureits enforcement.

Project design and management, andconstruction inspectionDesign of structural resistance to earthquake forces,depends upon an assessed or predetermined ‘designlevel’ conditioned, in part, by cost and factors ofpracticality. Design levels may indeed be overcome by anearthquake (or wind or flood) of greater magnitude thanthat designed for. Decisions concerning the level ofresistance are inherent in design standards, even thoughthe design level need not publicly be known. Absolute‘proof’ against earthquake, or any other hazard, is notusually feasible.

Other aspects of building design, such as form,juxtaposition and relationship, can influence structuralresistance, and means of escape in case of earthquakecan all be applied so as to additionally influenceoccupants' chances of survival.

Inspection of building construction in progress isachieved from either of two different sources, or fromboth. Arrangements for project management, beforeconstruction starts, can be made inclusive, with therequest or agreement of the building owner, of measuresfor the achievement of a required quality ofconstruction. It can arrange for:

• separation of design, specification andtendering/bidding from the undertaking ofconstruction itself, so that structural design isindependent of the construction process (over recentyears, this traditional arrangement has beenrepeatedly contested for reasons of cost and allegedinefficiency, but in the context of this paper, it hasobvious advantages).

• arrange the inclusion of calculations andspecifications of materials, in drawings and otherdocumentation, before tendering, so that

requirements for construction quality are known andcosted at the outset.

Management at this pre-construction stage, can also bemade to include arrangements for inspection ofconstruction-in-progress as part of the execution ofindependent design management. The projectmanagement process can continue into its owninspection by the appointment of:

• site inspectorate (engineers, architects, clerks-of-works), and arrangements for:

• testing and recording of materials in use

• regular inspection and recording of construction inprogress

• periodic and final payments for work only whendeemed to have been completed as specified

Inspection may also be undertaken by local governmentbuilding inspectors, or similar, in addition toconstruction inspection provided by the building owner.

Legislation is insufficient without regular, strategic, informed andreliable inspection to ensure its enforcement

The purpose of building inspectors is to ensurecompliance with the requirements and standards ofbuilding legislation that is in place. Design standards canof course exceed the standards required by legislation,or may be the same, but may not be less. In otherwords, building legislation is likely to be a minimalrequirement that it may be possible or desirableto exceed.

Shortcomings, and temptations forcorrupt practice There are many cases where construction legislation is inplace, but where there is an inadequate inspectorate, orno inspectorate at all, to ensure its appropriateapplication: ‘For example, the Marmara earthquake inTurkey in 1999 saw widespread destruction of buildingsdespite measures being in place to ensure that buildingswere earthquake resistant. Inadequacies in the controlmechanisms of local municipalities for checking thework of local building contractors meant that manybuildings were not built to standard’ (Ozerdem: 1999).

The need for building inspectors is the greater incircumstances of a rapidly increasing demand forhousing, and a consequent financial imperative todispense with detailed arrangements for constructionproject management as an obvious saving in time and

cost. In these very common circumstances and on siteswhere minimal construction is the norm, or there issimply a practice of doing what a builder may havedone before (or says he has done before), the need forinspection is crucial.

Legislated inspection aims to ensure basic constructionquality, and therefore security, on behalf of current andfuture occupiers, users and passers-by, in accordancewith defined national and local parameters andrequirements. The advantages to an unscrupulousdeveloper to offer inducements to inspectors to turn theother way, not appear for certain operations on site, ornot to inspect too closely – or at all – are as obvious asare the temptations to inspectors to accept them. Therisks to occupants and community, where this is theonly source of inspection, are enormous; and by thetime building failure occurs, due to earthquake ornot, the developer, the builder, and inspectors will allhave disappeared.

The construction industries in Britain and in the USA,rich and developed countries of the global North, havelong histories of construction legislation, ofteninfluenced by past catastrophe, and this process iscontinuous (eg: Natural Hazards Observer: 2002).In spite of this, failures and corruption continue tooccur. If this is the case in developed countries, then

40


Many homes were destroyed by the earthquake that devastated Northern Algeria in May 2003

41


there are questions for many other countries about howeffective legislation can be, how it can be achieved, howit will be implemented, and how long it will take.Construction, and construction management, in somedeveloping countries, is evolving so as to eventuallyeradicate such shortcomings. Even where this is thecase, it will be a long time before indigenousconstruction practice can consistently and pervasivelyachieve a quality of building construction so that allbuildings are able to resist even moderate earthquakes.

Large construction companies, medium and smallconstruction groups and self-builders will all need to bemonitored, modified and inspected on all of theirconstruction sites for appropriate compliance andquality achievement. This supported by, but in additionto, legislation in place. For this to happen requires avolume, strength and persistence of political andpersonal commitment by very many trained people forlengths of time much longer than working lives. And itrequires people, a system, and levels of payment, todeter and to resist the temptations of corrupt practice.Even when and where all this is achievable, there will bebacklogs of buildings built to earlier less exactingstandards and requirements.

The savings to some governments of earthquake-pronecountries, or their sheer inability, or reluctance, toachieve a trained building construction inspectorate, isself evident; but the social and economic costs to theirnations, societies and communities, of not doing so isnevertheless colossal. In the meantime, there will bemore earthquakes. Yes, improved building constructionis needed, but in addition, so are a broad spectrum ofother measures to do with buildings, to be incorporatedinto the overall processes of national housingdevelopment.

Projections for built development inearthquake-prone placesIt is not difficult in contexts prone to the effects ofnatural hazards, to identify and to project the need formeasures for disaster-responsible development (Lewis:1999; Lewis: 2001), but in this, or any other context,earthquake disaster reduction is not a monodisciplinary,nor indeed a monosectoral undertaking. The Safer Citiesseries of Case Studies, for example, prepared by theAsian Disaster Preparedness Center presents usefulstrategies for urban disaster mitigation derived fromanalyses of real-life experiences, successful practices, andlessons learned. Focusing less on post-disaster responseand relief, and more upon comprehensive approachestaken prior to disasters so as to reduce human suffering,economic losses and institutional collapse, this approachintegrates disaster risk reduction with sustainableeconomic, social, and environmental development(Apikul: 2002).

Improved building construction for housing of all kindsshould and could well be a component of suchprogrammes; but for improved building construction tobe achieved in all housing activities and sectors will alsorequire long-term programmes for legislation, training,integrated demonstration projects, the preparation ofinformation for non-professional use, and itsdissemination. The need is so widespread and pervasivethat implementation will require such recurrent series ofwidely repeated projects to render the programme acontinuous one.

Earthquake-responsible developmentBuilding construction legislation, however, is concernedwith how buildings are constructed, not where they areplaced. Geological, topographical and geographicalexamination to identify zones of earthquake risk, withthe purpose of micro-zoning, enables land-use planningto have the opportunity to deter or preventinappropriate construction in high risk areas, andprepares the way for modification of constructionstandards appropriate to zones of risk. Micro-zoningneed not be a prohibitively complex and timeconsuming exercise; methods of earthquake zoningbased upon surface observations of natural features,have been developed and successfully applied in Perufor many years (Kuroiwa: 1982, 1986 & 2002).

Algerians recover what is left of their properties inside theirhomes destroyed in Isser 65 kilometres east of the capital Algiers

In Turkey in 1999, even if building construction hadbeen adequate, there would still have been earthquakedisasters – though with fewer casualties (Lewis: 2001).Some buildings inevitably would have failed and roads,bridges, power lines, telecommunications, water andfuel supplies would have been disrupted. Villages andrural communities would have been isolated, andtsunamis would have inundated coastal fishing andtourist venues. The poor would still have been living inovercrowded sub-standard dwellings, and the poorwould still have been highest amongst the casualties, inurban new and older buildings, shanty settlements, andin rural areas.

Development needs to adjust to a broad spectrum fordisaster reduction, inclusive of all its sectors – not onlythose labeled ‘disaster management’ – to ensureequitable inclusion of small domestic buildings as wellas large and commercial ones, and with inducements forequitable dispersion of communities with commensurateaccessibility to services, communications and resourcesfor self-reliance and survival.

The population of North-western Turkey increasedexponentially since 1945; the population of Istanbulhaving increased fifteen times in thirty years. The north-western region in which the1999 earthquakes occurred,has the highest population density of all and containsmore than twenty percent of Turkey's nationalpopulation. The province of Kocaeli, offshore of whichwas the earthquake's epicentre, had a population densityof 260 people per square kilometre – amongst thehighest in Turkey. A centralised government has

attracted migration to the capital, and to other citiesnow so devastatingly destroyed. In a country severelyprone to earthquakes, concentration of populationanywhere is to be countered – until such time as zonesof earthquake risk and vulnerability can be geologicallyand geographically identified.

Significantly, the 2002 earthquake in Gujarat (see articlein this journal) similarly occurred in one of India’s mostindustrially developed and most densely populatedstates. Rather than waiting for catastrophe to recur inTurkey or India, and in many other countries, as theyhave recurred in the past and will in the future, andrather than depend only on search and rescue, it wouldindeed be ‘better to invest in normality than incatastrophe’ by wider adjustments in developmentstrategy:

• First; all development sectors need to take on boardthe earthquake potential, not just those for civildefence and rescue, nor even only for housing andbuilding construction. Issues seemingly not relevantto earthquakes often bear the greatest consequences

• Second; high density populations need dispersal overtime for more appropriate risk-related geographicalbalance. With reconstruction programmes nownecessary in India and Turkey, there is theopportunity

• Third; not only is rehousing required, but alsoredistribution of clinics and hospitals, education inall grades, and social services of all kinds. These to beequitably commensurate with present and future,urban and rural, populations. Sustainable economic

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A man searches for his belongings in the rubble of his house after a new second quake aftershock measuring 5.8 points on the Richterscale hit Zemmouri, 60 km east of Algiers, 28 May 2003

43


development requires all these and communication,transportation and marketing facilities as well.As much attention needs to be given to existing ruraland agricultural areas, both currently damaged andthose undamaged

• Fourth; multiple series of small and diverse projectsfor reconstruction and development are required, notmassive ones. In the face of the image of massivecatastrophe, it is myriad seemingly inconspicuousmeasures that are the most effective for normal selfreliance and quality of life, before, between, during,and in the aftermath of disasters. Though we read ofnational catastrophes, they are made up of myriadcommunity and domestic small ones.

Sustainability

Much has been written about sustainability, as a matterof energy saving, adaptability, ecological compatibility,and of environmental integration. Damage anddestruction caused by natural hazards is the arch-indicator of non-sustainable development. Earthquake-resistant building construction is therefore prerequisitefor sustainable housing. The original ethos of theconcept of sustainability had social, as well as economicand environmental dimensions, expressed throughidentification of social needs (WCED, 1987), and thisemphasis has been furthered by the 2002 JohannesburgConference. For there to be sustainable development,‘needs’ have to be appropriately identified and expressedin the first place. There can surely be no greater needthan for secure building construction for housing,resistant against earthquakes so as to reduce recurrentdeaths, injuries, damage and suffering, as well as paralleleconomic losses. Sustainable development initiatives,such as the Sustainable Cities Programme (UN Habitat,2002) have the imperative to focus on this need onbehalf of humanity. It is not before time:

“(Kluge) …suspects that we are unable to learn from themisfortunes we bring on ourselves, that we areincorrigible and will continue along the beaten tracks….He looks at the destruction of his home town with thehorrified fixity of Walter Benjamin’s ‘angel of history’,whose ‘face is turned towards the past. Where we perceivea chain of events, he sees one single catastrophe whichkeeps piling wreckage and hurls it in front of his feet.

The angel would like to stay, awaken the dead, makewhole what has been smashed. But a storm is blowingfrom Paradise; it has got caught in his wings with suchviolence that the angel can no longer close them. Thisstorm irresistibly propels him into the future to which hisback is turned, while the pile of debris before him growsskyward. The storm is what we call progress' “(Sebald 2003).

Sustainability is the name of the angel that faces thefuture, for the piles of debris to be reduced.

ReferencesAfshar, Farroukh; Cain, Allan; Daraie, Mohammad-Reza;Norton, John (1978) Mobilising indigenous resources forearthquake construction Housing Science 2/4 pp335–350.Pergamon

Apikul, Christine (2002) Making Cities Safer … Before DisastersStrike Natural Hazards Observer XVI/6 July Natural HazardsResearch and Applications Center. Boulder

Aysan, Yasemin; Clayton, Andrew; Cory, Alistair; Davis, Ian;Sanderson, David (1995) Developing Building for SafetyProgrammes: Guidelines for organising safe building improvementprogrammes in disaster–prone areas Intermediate TechnologyPublications. London

Basin News (2002) Disaster Prevention and Mitigation (BuildingAdvisory Service and Information Network) Special Issue No23 June. SKAT St Gallen

Becker, J; Johnston, D (2002) Planning for earthquake hazardsin New Zealand: a study of four regions Australian Journal ofEmergency Management 17/1 pp 2–8 Autumn

Bothara, Jitendra K (2002) ISDR Earth Summit Debatehttp://www.earthsummit2002.org/debate

Boyle, Charles (1988) Disaster-resistant Construction forTraditional Bush Houses: A handbook of guidelines AustralianOverseas Disaster Response Organisation. Sydney

BRE (1988) Cyclone Resistant Housing for Developing CountriesBuilding Research Establishment. Watford

Building Research Station (1966) Model Regulations for SmallBuildings in Earthquake and Hurricane Areas Tropical BuildingLegislation: Note 7. Watford

Coburn, A W; Spence, R J S (1992) Earthquake Protection JohnWiley. Chichester

Coburn, Andrew; Hughes, Richard; Pomonis, Antonios;Spence, Robin (1995) Technical Principles of Building for SafetyIntermediate Technology Publications. London

Clay Products Institute of California (1929) Earthquakes andBuilding Construction: A review of authoritative Engineering Dataand Records of Experience Clay Products Institute of California.San Fransisco

Clayton, Andrew; Davis, Ian (1994) Building for SafetyCompendium: An annotated bibliography and informationdirectory for safe building Intermediate Technology Publications.London

Daldy, A F (1972) Small Buildings in Earthquake Areas BuildingResearch Establishment. Watford

Department of Economic and Social Affairs (1975) Low-costConstruction Resistant to Earthquakes and Hurricanes UnitedNations. New York

Department of Economic and Social Affairs (1977) Repair ofBuildings Damaged by Earthquakes United Nations. New York

Dudley, Eric; Haaland, Ane (1993) Communicating Building forSafety: Guidelines for methods of communicating technicalinformation to local builders and householders IntermediateTechnology Publications. London

Green, Kevin W Ed (1978) Seismic Design Research & DesignQuarterly AIA Research Corporation

Hodgson, Robert L P; Seraj, Salek M; Choudhury, Jamilur R(1999) Implementing Hazard-resistant Housing Proceedings ofthe First International Housing and Hazards Workshop,Dhaka. Bangladesh University of Engineering and Technology/ Housing and Hazards Group, University of Exeter

Key, David (Ed: 1995) Structures to Withstand Disaster TheInstitution of Civil Engineers/Thomas Telford. London

Kuroiwa, Julio (1982) Studies on the prevention of earthquakedisasters and their application in urban planning in Peru Mimeo:

Workshop on Planning for Human Settlements in Disaster-prone Areas, UNCHS 1983 Nairobi

Kuroiwa, Julio (1986) Planning and Management of RegionalDevelopment for Earthquake Disaster Mitigation Mimeo UNCRD

Kuroiwa, Julio (2002) Communication ISDR Earth SummitDebate http://www.earthsummit2002.org/debate

Landewijk, Jan van; Shordt, Kathleen; Eds (1989) Settlementsand Disasters. Proceedings of the Workshop, Amsterdam 1988Disaster and Emergency Reference Center, Delft University ofTechnology

Lewis, James (1999) Development in Disaster-prone Places ITPublications. London

Lewis, James (2001) Improved building construction? Radixwebsite (Knowing versus doing)www.anglia.ac/geography/radix/

Meichenbaum, D. 91994) A Clinical handbook/practicaltherapist manual for assessing and treating adults with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Waterloo, Ontario: Institute Press

Natural Hazards Observer (2002) Florida Passes StatewideBuilding Code to Make Structures More Hurricane ResistantNatural Hazards Observer XXVI/5 May p5

Nimpuno, Krisno (1993) Participation in structural upgrading:A training course for NGOs

Norton, John (1985) Introduction of Earthquake ResistantBuilding Techniques in the Koumbia Area, NW Guinea, AfricaFinal Report to USAID. Development Workshop Europe

Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance (1981) TransitionHousing for Victims of Disasters Disaster Assistance ManualVol I. Agency for International Development. Wasington DC

Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States (1991) Draft BuildingGuidelines for the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean StatesUNCHS/UNDP

Osman, Mary (1976) Earthquake Design: It Cannot All Be Left tothe Engineers AIA Journal December

Ozerdem, A (1999) Tiles, taps and earthquake-proofing: lessonsfor disaster management in Turkey Environment andUrbanisation 11/2 pp177–179 (quoted in Becker &Johnston, 2002)

Ruskulis, Otto (2002) Developing processes for improvingdisaster mitigation of the urban poor Basin News (BuildingAdvisory Service and Information Network) No 23 June.SKAT St Gallen

Sebald W G (2003) Air War and Literature: Zurich Lectures(p68) in On the Natural History of Destruction (trans. AntheaBell) Hamish Hamilton Penguin. London (Kluge is writing of thedestruction by bombing of the town of Halberstadt during WorldWar II. The quotation from Walter Benjamin is from Illuminations(trans. Harry Zorn: London 1970).

UN-Habitat (2002 onwards) Monthly Electronic Newsletter of theUnited Nations Human Settlements Programme 1/1 January:http://www.unhabitat.org/hb/index.asp

Vickery, D J (1982) School buildings and natural disastersUNESCO. Paris

WCED (1987) Our Common Future The World Commission onEnvironment and Development. Oxford University Press

Wisner, Ben (2001) Same old story The Guardian: ScienceFebruary 1: also on the Radix website:www.anglia.ac/geography/radix/

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AuthorJames Lewis is a UK Chartered and Registered architect, andconsultant in environmental hazards and human settlements to theCommonwealth, United Nations and European Commission. He hasworked on construction inspection as resident/site-architect in theUnited States, Hong Kong and the United Kingdom; and onearthquake reconstruction planning in Algeria, on hurricane-resistantconstruction methodology in the Caribbean, on the design of newbuildings and the inspection and evaluation of buildings underconstruction in Bangladesh, and on the impact of flooding onbuildings. He is Visiting Fellow in Development Studies at theUniversity of Bath. James LewisDatum [email protected]

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Evaluating the effectiveness ofpsychological preparedness

advice in community cyclonepreparedness materials

Morrissey & Reser explore whether psychological preparedness information helps individuals to prepare for the onset of cyclones.

By Dr. Shirley A. Morrissey & Dr Joseph P. Reser

This paper addresses the case of tropical cyclone

warnings in Northern Australia and briefly outlines

the nature, logic, and findings of a psychological

preparedness intervention trialed in Cairns,

Queensland, during the 1996/1997cyclone season.

The aim of the research was to trial, evaluate and

refine an innovative natural disaster public education

and warning communication intervention focusing

on tropical cyclone preparedness and response. This

risk communication intervention involved the

dissemination of selected psychological information

designed to enable individuals to better cope with

themselves and others in an increasingly threatening

situation. The psycho-educational content material

incorporated was derived from ‘Stress Inoculation

Theory’ (Meichenbaum, 1985; 1994; Meichenbaum

& Deffenbacher, 1988). The research found that the

pre-cyclone season period is a critically important

time and venue for prevention and mitigation, and

that psychological factors and processes during this

threat period are of singular importance to effective

coping and adaptive responding. The research also

clearly indicated that there are a substantial number

of residents in cyclone-prone communities for whom

chronic anxiety, avoidant coping styles, and prior

traumatic experience constitute both a substantial

vulnerability factor and a genuine impediment to

psychological and physical preparedness.

The nature and effectiveness of natural disaster warningmessages and community education and preparednessinitiatives and materials constitute areas of surprisingresearch neglect in an era in which considerableinvestment is being made in disaster reduction andmitigation. Likewise, pre-impact psychological

intervention has been an area of surprising omission inmultidisciplinary writings about human response tonatural disaster, with Australian bushfire preparednesswork being a noteworthy exception (e.g., Rohrmann,1998, 2000). This is not to say that there does not existan extensive literature on human response to naturaland man-made hazards, but much of this discourserelates to either post impact stress and coping issues ororganizational preparedness and response. Theliteratures which seemingly focus more directly onindividual risk perception and human response tothreatening events are typically not psychological(e.g., Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982; Freudenburg &Pastor, 1992; Mileti & Sorensen, 1990; Saarinen, 1982;Turner, Nigg & Paz, 1986) and do not tend to addressthe individual experience of a threatening andpotentially cataclysmic event. While this says moreabout interdisciplinary fragmentation than any reality,it is surprisingly the case that there has been very littleresearch done at the individual response level as distinctfrom collective community and organizational impact(e.g. Baum, 1987, 1991; Bell, Greene, Fisher, & Baum,2000; Earle & Cvetkovich, 1990).

While the clear priorities and research agenda of therecent United Nations declared International Decade ofNatural Disaster Reduction were ‘to reduce naturaldisasters through prevention, mitigation andpreparedness measures’ (United Nations resolution,1994), these objectives are far from being realised, oneyear from the close of the decade, in terms of anyfocused research on the human and psychological sideof risk communication or preparedness. Of particularneglect are psychological preparedness and the nature ofhuman response to natural disaster warnings as distinctfrom actual impact (e.g., Reser, 1996). The vastproportion of natural disaster research is focused oneither the physical event itself, or post impact recovery.Yet from a preventive and mitigation perspective,preparedness and human response to riskcommunication and threat appraisal are a criticalconcern. It is noteworthy, indeed remarkable, that solittle research has focused on the psychological processes

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underlying threat appraisal and coping with naturaldisaster warning messages, and that no research to datehas explored the utility of a stress inoculation, emotionmanagement procedure such as that described inthis paper.

This paper addresses the case of tropical cyclonewarnings in Northern Australia and briefly outlines thenature, logic, and findings of a psychologicalpreparedness intervention trialed in Cairns, Queensland,during the 1996/1997 cyclone season. The interventionconstituted a modified stress inoculation procedurebased on the work of Meichenbaum (1977, 1985).The occurrence of Cyclone Justin in the 1996/1997season allowed for a pre and post event evaluation ofa spectrum of psychological variables andpreparedness measures.

Aim of the researchThe aim of the research was to trial, evaluate and refinean innovative natural disaster public education andwarning communication intervention focusing ontropical cyclone preparedness and response. This riskcommunication intervention involved the disseminationof selected psychological information designed to enableindividuals to better cope with themselves and others inan increasingly threatening situation. This informationwas designed to complement conventional publiceducation materials independently distributed andmade available through the Cairns City Council, theBureau of Meteorology, and other regional authorities.The psycho-educational content material incorporatedwas derived from ‘Stress Inoculation Theory’(Meichenbaum, 1985; 1994; Meichenbaum &Deffenbacher, 1988). Stress Inoculation Theory (SIT)is a well-researched emotion management strategy andcognitive behavioural procedure, which enhancesindividuals’ ability to anticipate, identify, and copewith stressful situations and stress-induced emotionalresponses. The intervention was intended to addressthe well-documented non-preparedness of NorthernAustralian coastal communities vulnerable to tropicalcyclones. The logic for employing such a procedure waspremised on the arguments that anxiety in the face of animpending natural disaster threat ‘gets in the way’ ofadequate preparedness, and that being able to anticipate,recognise and manage such anxiety and other emotionalresponses to natural disaster threat will enhancesuccessful coping, promote more adequatepreparedness, and ensure that preparedness measuresare reinforced by experienced stress reduction andcompetence in an emergency situation (e.g., Reser,1980, 1996; Reser & Morrissey, 1995; Morrissey &Reser, 2001). The intervention is also viewed ashaving substantial preventive value in reducingpost-traumatic stress.

MethodologyThe study was an evaluation or outcome study,involving a naturally occurring variable/event (a severecyclone warning) as well as the presence or absence ofan earlier psychological intervention. The methodologyof the study conformed to what is known as a ‘pre-test –post-test control group design’ (e.g., Campbell &Stanley, 1963; Singleton & Straits, 1999). See Table 1.Essentially this is a study in which measures are takenboth before and after an experimental procedure or atrialed intervention. In this research the methodologyalso included a second or ‘hanging’ control group, whichwas only surveyed following the cyclone warning toindependently assess the effect of the pre-season surveyitself. The research can also be considered an evaluationstudy in that a primary objective was to evaluate theeffectiveness of a planned intervention (e.g., Lipsey &Cordray, 2000; Posavac & Carey, 1997; Rossi, Freeman& Lipsey, 1999). The study employed an experimentaldesign and survey methodology which involved440 residents completing two sequential questionnaires,each of which was approximately nine pages in length,depending on research condition and pre or post-eventversion, with a further 200 residents completing a post-event only version (Reser & Morrissey, 2000).

Participant households were selected using a stratifiedstreet and house sampling procedure, and wererandomly assigned to each of the three researchconditions. The Cairns suburbs included in the studywere essentially from Trinity Park north, including thesuburbs of Trinity Park, Smithfield, Trinity Beach,Kewarra Beach, Clifton Beach, and Palm Cove. These

Coming to terms with the aftermath

suburbs were selected for logistical reasons, as well asthe fact that they were particularly ‘vulnerable’ tocyclonic winds and storm surge threat. The sampledarea included some areas of relative safety and elevatedground, extending to the hills on the western side ofCaptain Cook Highway, and representative strata ofsocio-economic circumstances. A return rate of72 per cent and attrition rate of only 28 per cent weresurprisingly good for a survey-based study, reflectinga drop-off/pick-up procedure and careful nonreturnfollow-up, as well as impressive co-operation andinterest on the part of residents of these Northern Beachcommunities.

The 1996/1997 cyclone seasonin CairnsThe initiating of the preseason community survey wasdelayed by a late funding decision in December of 1996.The survey was nonetheless undertaken between the14th and the 21st of December, 1996, in Cairns, NorthQueensland. While the original research intention wasto collect pre-event data in both Cairns and Townsville,thereby maximising the opportunity of encountering athreat situation, ultimate funding and timing did notallow for this more comprehensive undertaking. Onehalf of the 440 households surveyed at this point intime, the treatment and pre-test control groups, receiveda copy of the psychological preparedness guide. Theobjective was to re-administer a post-event version ofthe survey following a severe cyclone warning situation.While a number of cyclone warning situations didinclude the Cairns region over January of 1997, nonewere of a magnitude or proximity to justifyimplementing the post-event survey until the CycloneJustin warning situation occurred on 7 March, as anextensive system being experienced over most of theCoral Sea. This system intensified to a severe category 3cyclone off the coast of southeast Papua New Guinea on17 March. The difficult decision was when to administerthe post-event survey in this situation, given theextended duration of the warning period and the erraticnature of Cyclone Justin. (See Figure 1). An importantconcern was that a too immediate distribution of the

survey following a physical impact would be intrusive,insensitive, and counterproductive. A decision wasfinally made to administer the post-event survey on the13th of March, following Met Bureau advice that thecyclone was moving out to sea and towards Papua NewGuinea. It was also felt that the severity of an imminentand threatening category 3 cyclone impacting on theCairns region was more than adequate to evaluate theeffectiveness of the psychological preparedness guide,and the judgement was made that the integrity of thestudy would have been compromised if much more timehad elapsed while waiting for a final resolution ofCyclone Justin's course. What must, of course, befactored into the results is the fact that Cairns residentswere theoretically still in a cyclone threat situation whencompleting the post-event questionnaires, and, in fact,Cyclone Justin did return to pass right over Cairns,albeit at diminished strength, on the 22nd of March.Respondents therefore completed their post-eventquestionnaire approximately three months after thepre-season survey, and following six days of a very largecyclone system sitting off the coast of Cairns, withattendant watches and warnings.

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Table 1: Research design.

Pre-Season Psychological Severe Cyclone Post-EventSurvey Only Preparedness Warning Survey

Intervention Situation

Group 1Intervention O1 X1 X2 O2

Group 2Control O1 X2 O2

Group 3Hanging Control X2 O2

O1 = pre-season survey, X1 = psychological guide,X2 = Justin warnings and threat situation, O2 = post-event survey

Wave action and seaspray along the foreshore near Cairns

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FindingsThe meaningfulness of the results of a study such as thisdepends in part on the comparability of the treatmentand control groups prior to an investigated event orintervention. The research groups did differ significantlywith respect to gender and education. This wasparticularly the case for the hanging control group,which was characterised by a higher proportion offemale respondents (61 per cent vs 51 per cent and53 per cent) and residents with secondary education(61 per cent vs 55 per cent and 45 per cent) ascontrasted with the intervention and control groups.As subsequent ANOVA tests evidenced no significantdifferences between the education groups in cyclonepreparedness or response, it was considered that thevariance in education profile did not materially influenceother comparisons in the reported analyses. Genderdifferences are a concern, however, as gender features asan important variable in subsequent analyses, forexample, with respect to reported prior traumaticexperience. No significant differences were foundbetween intervention, control and hanging controlgroups with respect to age, cyclone experience, yearslived in Cairns or North Queensland, pre-cyclone seasonphysical preparedness, or with respect to the personalitytrait of anxiety. Notwithstanding this absence ofstatistically significant differences, a further noteworthydifference between the intervention and control groupswas that whereas 52 per cent of the intervention grouphad prior direct experience with cyclones, 62 per cent ofthe control group reported such prior experience.As well the pre-cyclone physical preparedness score of

the intervention group was slightly better than that forthe control group (14.7 vs 13.2), a matter addressedlater by a consideration of relative changes in physicalpreparedness for each group. The chance butconsequential differences in the hanging control groupwith respect to the relative proportion of male andfemale respondents were substantial enough to warrantits non-inclusion in group comparisons relating to theeffectiveness of the psychological preparednessintervention in the following analyses and discussion.

Intervention and controlgroup comparisonsSeveral initial and important questions in the pre-seasonquestionnaire related to how concerned residents wereat the beginning of the cyclone season. More specifically,residents were asked to indicate how concerned,confident, frightened, anxious, and helpless they felt viastandard six-point semantic differential rating scales.They were also asked these questions immediately afterthe Cyclone Justin warning situation. Answers to theseinitial survey questions allowed the researchers todocument what has been an area of guesswork ratherthan fact, i.e., how people are feeling and thinkingcoming into the cyclone season (in this instance towardthe end of December), and to compare that with theirfeelings and thoughts immediately after the cyclonewarning situation. There does exist some comparativedata from Cyclone Joy for the Cairns region, wheresurvey results following Joy indicated that 36 per cent of

Figure 1: The story of Cyclone Justin

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respondents had been ‘very worried’ and 31 per cent‘somewhat worried’ about Joy (Smithson, 1991).

The results of the pre-season and post-Justin surveyresponses to the above items are presented in Table 2.These findings tell us that the majority of residents inboth the intervention and control groups weremoderately concerned and anxious at the beginning ofthe cyclone season, but reported feeling somewhat lessfrightened and helpless at this point in time, and theirrated confidence was at least modest.

It is clear that these feelings were appreciablyheightened during the Cyclone Justin warning situation.The data also tells us that there were considerableindividual differences here, with some individualsevidencing high levels of anxiety and helplessness bothat the beginning of the cyclone season and duringCyclone Justin. Significant differences in changedemotional state were found for concern and confidenceduring the cyclone warning period, with thoseindividuals using the guide expressing less concernoverall and greater confidence.

All of the changes shown in Table 2 were significant,with the exception of intervention group concern level,which remained stable. These changes were largely asexpected and in a logical direction, with anxiety and feardropping with the actual occurrence of an anticipatedevent that was relatively benign and supposedly over.As well, there is some evidence that the pre-seasonsurvey constituted a modest intervention in itself for thecontrol group. What is of particular importance,however, is that the relative magnitude of change

between intervention and control groups wassignificantly and substantially different for reportedlevels of concern and confidence, with controlrespondents reporting a significant increase in concern,and intervention respondents showing steady but notincreasing levels of concern as well as an increase inconfidence which was more than twice that for thecontrol group. See Figures 2 and 3. This provides strongsupport for the effectiveness of the psychologicalpreparedness guide.

What was of particular relevance to the research waswhether those individuals who received and used thepsychological guide were able to manage their feelingsbetter during the Cyclone Justin situation. The stressinoculation training intervention is essentially anemotion management training technique. If we comparethe intervention group with the control group on thesemeasures, taken immediately after the more acutewarning period of Cyclone Justin, it is clear that the useof the guide was effective in managing levels of concernand in increasing levels of confidence. While thechanges in levels of reported anxiety, fear, andhelplessness do not differ appreciably between thecontrol and the intervention group, it is important toremember that the objective of the psychologicalpreparedness intervention was to enhance theanticipation, identification, and management of emotionalresponses. It was not intended to reduce the anxiety andapprehension which are normal and adaptive humanresponses to a threatening emergency situation. As well,the air of emergency at the time of post-event surveywas substantially reduced, as there was a palpable sense

Table 2: Mean rated emotional states at the beginning of the cycloneseason and after Cyclone Justin.

Intervention Group (n=137)

Mean Mean Mean Standard Cohen’sPre-season Post-event Change Error ’d‘ t p

Rating Rating

Anxiety 3.05 2.69 -.36 .14 .44 2.52 .013

Fear 2.54 2.13 -40 .12 .58 3.31 .001

Concern 3.25 3.25 0 .16 .01 .05 ns

Confidence 3.84 4.60 +.75 .13 -.86 -5.8 .000

Helpless 2.43 1.81 -.62 .13 .83 4.8 .000

Control Group (n = 138-140)

Anxiety 3.05 2.63 -.42 .14 .25 2.88 .005

Fear 2.58 2.16 -.41 .13 .26 3.05 .003

Concern 3.16 3.63 +.47 .16 -.24 -3.01 .003

Confidence 3.79 4.15 +.36 .15 -.23 -2.45 .016

Helpless 2.40 1.81 -.57 .13 .38 4.37 .000

Note: Cohen’s ‘d’ provides an index of effect size independent of sample size or differing units of measure (e.g.,Cohen, 1988; Shaughnessy et al., 2000).


of relief in the community with the issuing of MetBureau bulletins to the effect that the cyclone washeading out to sea.

Another straightforward and pragmatic set of questionshad to do with whether respondents were reasonablyprepared with respect to physical preparations at thebeginning of the cyclone season, and whether thoserespondents who received and used the psychologicalguide were better prepared than the control group at thetime of the post-Justin survey. One of the argumentsbeing explored was that anxiety and fear could begetting in the way of physical preparedness, and thatpoor physical preparedness also reflected the use of avariety of maladaptive defence mechanisms anddistorting beliefs for dealing with anxieties and concerns

(e.g., Reser, 1980; Reser & Morrissey, 1995). Physicalpreparedness items are shown in Table 3.

These physical preparedness measures were similar tomeasures used by many other researchers in this area,but included more specificity with respect to whetherthe item needed attention, whether some actualpreparedness activity had taken place, or whether thepreparedness measure was completed. The itemsallowed for a reasonably sensitive composite index ofphysical preparedness which could be calculated for thebeginning of the cyclone season and at the time of thepost-event survey (score range was 0–24). The meanphysical preparedness score for the intervention and thecontrol group were 14.70 and 13.23 at the beginning ofthe cyclone season, and 18.85 and 15.00, respectively, atthe time of the post-Justin survey.

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Table 3: Preparedness activity checklist.

Cyclone preparedness activity Need attention Begun attending to this Completed this activity

Cleaned the yard

Purchased new batteries

Purchased emergency food supplies

Checked or purchased first aid kit

Checked battery function of radio

Checked for containers of water

Filled a spare petrol can

Checked for candles

Checked gas cylinder

Carefully read through cyclonepreparedness pamphlet

Checked emergency numbers

Checked radio frequencies

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It is clear that respondents were reasonably prepared atthe beginning of the cyclone season, and that residentsin the intervention group reported a modestly higherlevel of physical preparedness than those in the controlgroup at the beginning of the cyclone season. Thisrelatively high level of physical preparedness contrastswith media statements during this 1996/1997 seasonthat the Cairns community was, once again, poorlyprepared for the cyclone season. It is also clear thatlevels of preparedness were significantly improved at thetime of the post-event survey for both groups.See Figure 4.

These improvements are not surprising in that CycloneJustin would have motivated many, if not most,residents to get serious about preparedness. Changesbetween the pre and post-event scores for theintervention group as compared with the control groupare, however, of particular interest. The appreciable andsignificant difference found between intervention groupimprovement and control group improvement, a scorechange of 4.15 versus 1.77 (p <.000), provides strongsupport for the effectiveness of the psychological guide.This is a particularly strong finding given the relativelyhigh level of reported physical preparedness at thebeginning of the cyclone season, which created,arguably, something of a ceiling effect. Across bothgroups, the improvement in physical preparedness was

significantly less for those respondents reporting priortraumatic cyclone experience.

An interesting comparison was the difference betweenthe physical preparedness scores of the interventiongroup and the hanging control group at the time of thepost-event survey, as this control group had no exposureto our pre-season survey, which arguably could haveconstituted an influential intervention in itself. Thepreparedness score for the hanging control groupwas 16.43, which was significantly lower than theintervention group but actually higher than the pre-testcontrol group, i.e., the hanging control group reportedbeing somewhat better prepared than the pre-testcontrol group (at the time of the post-Justin survey).This could suggest that the heightening of threatsalience and provision of preparedness information,in this case through the completion of the pre-seasonsurvey, but without psychological advice, might haveactually diminished ultimate preparedness.

Of related interest was whether respondents feltpsychologically prepared for the cyclone season and thespecific warning situation of Justin. The discussionearlier examined levels of reported concern, anxiety andconfidence, and how these changed for the interventionand control groups between the time of the pre-seasonsurvey and the post-Justin survey. In addition,respondents were asked, at the time of the post-Justinsurvey, how confident they felt about being able to copewith another serious cyclone situation and whether theythought it was possible to exercise any personal controlover the impact of a cyclone on themselves or theirfamilies. The findings in Table 5 again suggest strongsupport for the effectiveness of the psychological guide.Intervention respondents reported feeling significantlymore confident about being able to cope with anotherserious cyclone situation, they reported that they felt itwas more possible to exercise personal control over theimpact of a cyclone (although this difference did notachieve significance), and they reported experiencingless concern about the threat of another cyclone.

An additional set of survey questions exploredpsychological preparedness with respect to a number ofspecific predictions relating to the psychological guide.The rationale for the stress inoculation trainingintervention that was provided was that it should enable

Table 4: Physical preparedness at the beginning of the cyclone seasonand following Cyclone Justin.

Pre-season Post Justin Change Std Error Cohen’s t pScore Score d

Intervention group(n = 131) 14.70 18.85 4.15 .43 1.95 -8.64 .000

Control group(n = 141) 13.23 15.00 1.77 .53 .70 -3.05 .003

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Table 5: Rated confidence, personal control, and concern with respectto another serious cyclone event this season.

Intervention Control Std Cohen’s t pGroup Group error ’d‘

n = 140 n = 137

How confident at beingable to cope 5.07 4.54 .146 .39 3.63 .000

How possible to exercisepersonal control 4.83 4.61 .161 .15 1.42 .156

How concerned aboutanother threat 3.05 3.47 .195 -.26 -2.18 .003

Table 6: Reported effectiveness ratings of stress inoculation onspecific components of stress inoculation.

Intervention Control Std Cohen’s t pGroup Group error ’d‘

n = 138-141 n = 135-137

Anticipate feelings 4.08 3.23 .21 .65 4.06 .000

Identify feelings 4.08 3.24 .22 .62 3.76 .000

Manage feelings 5.05 4.81 .16 .21 1.50 .135

Table 7: Reported utility of psychological preparedness guide.

n % (%) Missing

Not at all useful 10 7% 18%Somewhat useful 60 40%Very useful 48 34%

Didn’t provide any new strategies 29 20% 19.4%Provided some new strategies 62 44%Provided many new strategies 25 17.5%

participants to better anticipate their feelings in a cyclonewarning situation, to better identify particular feelings,and to better manage these feelings. All respondentswere asked these questions at the time of the post-eventsurvey, directly following their experience with CycloneJustin. The results for both the intervention and thecontrol groups are presented in Table 6.

The results are very clear. Respondents who used theguide reported being better able to anticipate how theywould feel and that they were better able to identifyparticular feelings. While the intervention group alsoreported being able to manage their feelings better, thiseffect was not as marked. There are several points thatshould be kept in mind in interpreting this latterfinding. Such evaluative and reflective self-report itemsare reasonably different in nature than simplerdescriptive self-report items. This makes it somewhatmore difficult to interpret and evaluate these statements.Are individuals, for example, able to judge accurately amodest and diffuse improvement in ‘emotionmanagement’ abilities?

A further set of questions directly asked interventionrespondents about their use of the psychological guideand its relative effectiveness and utility. The results arepresented in Table 7.

It is clear that 74 per cent of intervention grouprespondents felt that the guide was useful, with over onethird of respondents finding it ‘very useful’.

Intervention participants were also asked whether theguide made them feel more or less anxious during therecent cyclone. This item was measured using a 6-pointLikert-type scale where ‘1’ indicated less anxiety and ‘6’indicates greater anxiety. More than 60% of respondentsreported feeling less anxious (scoring 1, 2 or 3 on thescale), 14 per cent scored a ‘4’ on the scale, and only4 per cent indicated a ‘5’ on the scale, with none of theparticipants reporting greater anxiety (‘6’ on the scale).

Clearly the above findings relate to self-report items thatmust be interpreted with caution, but they do reflect theconsidered judgement of all of those respondents whotrialed the psychological guide during an eventfulcyclone season. These questions also provide additional


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and convergent support for the findings examinedearlier. They indicate that intervention respondents usedthe guide during the cyclone season, that such use madethem feel less anxious, and that the guide provided themwith new and helpful strategies for managing theirfeelings during the Cyclone Justin warning situation.

The post-Justin survey for the intervention groupincluded two items asking whether the psychologicalpreparedness guide provided them with any newstrategies for managing their feelings during the cyclonewarning situation, and to describe these new strategies.The mean rating for this first item, going from ‘not at all’to ‘a great deal’ suggests that respondents did learn anumber of new coping strategies. The kinds of writtenresponses received included repeated reference to self-talk and calming exercises, as well as normalising one’sfeelings. These responses are very congruent with thenature of the psychological advice and strategiesincluded in the preparedness guide.

“We talked a lot more about our feelings”

“I talked to myself and others about what wecould do to stay safe”

“Felt good knowing that being anxious is ok”

“The guide made my feelings feel normal. I don’tfeel so isolated”

“Talked about the feelings that occurred instead ofpretending they were not there”

“Think things through – don’t panic”

While it is questionable that these were entirely “newstrategies’, e.g., many respondents may have simplylearned how to better anticipate and identify particularfeelings, it seems clear that the guide facilitatedrespondents actually using these procedures and feelingbetter about doing so.

Did the psychological guide helpsome people more than others?An important aspect of this research concerned whetherthe psychological preparedness guide was differentiallyeffective for different types of individuals. There aremultiple theoretical reasons for expecting that the stressinoculation and management components of thepsychological preparedness material might be lesseffective for individuals characterised by moderate tohigh chronic anxiety and/or prior and traumatic cycloneor other natural disaster experience (e.g., Gibbs, 1989;Gist & Lubin, 1989; Lazarus, 1991; Myers, 1994,NAMHC, 1996; Russell, Goltz & Bourrque, 1995;Watson & Clark, 1984). Briefly, these theoreticalarguments relate to the fact that chronically anxious orpreviously traumatised individuals might well needmore assistance than that which a brief self-instructionguide on managing emotions might be able to provide.As well it was possible that the stress inductioncomponent of an SIT intervention might have

heightened anxiety for those ‘normally high anxious’respondents to an extent that self-directed cognitivebehavioural management techniques might not havebeen sufficient. It was also the case that the overall levelof preparedness for more highly anxious individuals orthose with prior traumatic cyclone experience might beexpected to be relatively low, possibly reflecting selectiveavoidance strategies and an escalating experience ofanticipatory stress and panic.

Variables of particular note that were examined in thisstudy included the demographic variables of age,education and gender; the ‘personality’ variables of traitanxiety, coping style, optimism-pessimism, and self-efficacy; and the situational variables of knowledge, priorcyclone experience, threat appraisal, and perceivedcontrol. The two variables of particular relevance to thedifferential efficacy of the intervention, and to thehypothesised vulnerability of particular residents werethe personality variable of trait anxiety and the person-situation variable of prior experience. Previous researchhas shown that trait anxiety is positively associated withexperienced stress in an emergency situation andinversely related to physical preparedness (e.g., De Man& Simpson-Housley, 1987, 1988; Dooley et al., 1992).Research which has examined the role of priorexperience in disaster preparedness and response(e.g., Baker, 1989; Faupel & Stiles, 1993; Nielson &Lidstone, 1998; Riad & Norris, 1998; Sattler, Adams& Watts, 1995; Smithson, 1991) has reported verymixed findings, suggesting that experience contributesto better preparedness under some circumstances andconditions, but not in others. The previous findings forCairns and Townsville residents were that priorexperience did not appear to be related to preparedness(Smithson, 1991). This aspect of the current studyparticularly addressed whether the psychologicalpreparedness guide was less helpful for those residentswho normally experienced moderate to high anxiety andfor those individuals who had prior but very stressfulexperience with cyclone situations (Walsh, 1999).

The focus of the data analyses relating to whether thepsychological preparedness guide worked better forsome residents than others was the intervention group.Some information on this group is helpful. It isnoteworthy that 65 individuals in the intervention group(44.5 per cent) reported no prior cyclone experience.Respondents were asked, “Have you personallyexperienced a severe cyclone warning situation?”, andthen asked, “Have you personally experienced a cycloneevent?”, with a description of the event requested. Thismade it possible to establish which respondents hadactually been in more than a warning situation. Seventy-two percent of the intervention group (105 individuals)reported having experienced a severe cyclone warningsituation previously. Fifty-five percent reported that theyhad more direct experience with a ‘cyclone event’. Ofthose 81 intervention group respondents reporting prior


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cyclone experience, one half (40) indicated that thisexperience was highly stressful, i.e., they gave a rating ofeither ‘5’ or ‘6’ on a six point impact of event scale goingfrom ‘1’ (not at all stressful) to ‘6’ (very stressful). Thesefigures provide an interesting profile of an unbiasedsample of northern beach community Cairns residentswith respect to anxiety and experience. What is clear isthat many residents had no prior experience of an actual‘cyclone event’, and of those who did, at least halfreported the experience to have been very stressful andpossibly traumatic.

None of the demographic variables explored weresignificantly related to physical or psychologicalpreparedness, the principal measures of interventioneffectiveness, with the exception of gender, with womenreporting that they experienced more stress during theCyclone Justin warning, while men reported feelingmore psychologically prepared. In these individualdifference analyses psychological preparedness wasmeasured by a composite ‘psychological preparedness’score utilising the summed individual self-ratings ofconcern, confidence, anxiety, helplessness, and fear(see Walsh, 1999).

An examination of the personality variables measuredidentified 20.6 per cent residents in the interventiongroup as ‘highly anxious’. The personality measure

employed was the PANAS scale (Watson & Clark, 1984,Watson, Clark & Tellegen, 1988) and respondents wereclassified as falling into three anxiety groups dependingupon whether their scores fell into the upper quartile,mid quartiles, or lower quartile of the trait negativeaffect scores (with score range of 10–28). The numberof individuals falling into the lower quartile, ‘low-anxiety’ group was 41(28.1 per cent), the numbercategorised as ‘moderately anxious’ was 75(51.3 per cent), and the number labelled as highlyanxious was 30 (20.6 per cent). These respondentsclassified as being highly anxious with respect to traitanxiety had scores greater than 18.

All personality variables explored, trait anxiety, copingstyle and prior cyclone experience, were found tosignificantly influence physical preparedness andpsychological preparedness. The results confirm thatlower physical preparedness scores were found forhighly anxious individuals, for those who often useavoidant coping strategies, and for those with prior andtraumatic cyclone experience. The results also confirmthat anxiety level and prior experience interact, withhigh anxious individuals with prior traumaticexperience evidencing the lowest physical preparednesslevels. These results were very similar for psychologicalpreparedness, with the highest psychologicalpreparedness scores being those for the low anxious,active coping, and no prior experience groups, whereasthe lowest psychological preparedness scores werefound for the high anxious group, high users ofavoidance, and prior traumatic experience groups. Againanxiousness, avoidant coping, and prior traumaticexperience were found to significantly interact with eachother, with the lowest psychological preparedness scoresbeing evidenced by those highly anxious individualswith prior traumatic experience and an avoidant copingstyle (see Walsh, 1999 for more details).

Psychological preparednessand vulnerability There has been a strong consensus among clinical andcounselling psychologists and other mental healthprofessionals for many years to the effect that adequateinformation and preparation for recurrent naturaldisasters can empower individuals and assist in theprevention of physical and psychological devastationand distress (e.g., Dudley-Grant et al., 2000; Gist &Lubin, 1989; Gist & Stolz, 1982; Lindell & Perry, 1992;Myers, 1994). This consensus is mirrored in thesociological risk communication literature (e.g., Covello,McCallum & Pavlova, 1989; Drabek, 1986; Mileti& Sorensen, 1990; Tierney, 1993). An extensivetheoretical and research literature addresses the valueof such ‘critical incident stress training’ for emergencyworkers, both before and after disaster relief andrecovery involvement (e.g., Dyregrov, 1989; Mitchell,1983; Mitchell & Bray, 1990). Nonetheless there have

Psychological Preparedness Kit for Natural Disaster Warnings andNatural Disasters following from Cyclone Justin research project


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been very few published discussions of what thisactually means in practice for those who are notemergency workers, or how psychological preparednessmight be operationalised and enhanced in a communitypreparedness and preventive context. There have alsobeen very few published research findings relating topsychological intervention outcome studies particularlyfocused on natural disaster public education or warningsituations. This may reflect, in part, the overwhelmingweight of evidence and professional experience andjudgement in other areas with respect to the preventivevalue of stress inoculation and general emotionmanagement knowledge in emergency situations.It also reflects the difficulty of undertaking intervention-focused outcome studies in the context of unpredictablenatural hazards.

A core construct and parameter in natural disasterprevention and mitigation considerations is vulnerability(e.g., Blaikie et al., 1994; Briere, 1995, Buckle, Mars,& Smale, 2000; Cutter, 1993; King & MacGregor, 2000,Salter, 1997). Indeed, this notion has taken on newmeaning and life as a key indicator in both riskassessment and the mapping of risk via GIS and otherrisk representation strategies. Unfortunately these riskmanagement and emergency management discoursesmake little if any reference to psychological vulnerabilityor the extensive psychological and health literatures onvulnerability and resilience (e.g., Dohrenwend& Dohrenwend, 1974, 1981; Freedy et al., 1993;Hodgkinson & Stewart, 1991; Katschnigi, 1986; Lazarus& Folkman, 1984; Yager, et al., 1984; McFarlane, 1988,1989; Monat & Lazarus, 1991; NAMHC, 1996;Spacapan & Thompson, 1991; Zeidner & Endler,1996). The current research findings and those of many

others document the critical importance of psychologicalmediators of vulnerability and ultimate preparednessand successful coping. These include personality factorssuch as trait anxiety and coping style, and situationalvariables such as the nature and extent of prior naturaldisaster experience and perceived risk. Our currentresearch would indicate that anxiousness and priortraumatic experience are particularly importantpsychological variables which should be factored intoany assessment of ‘community vulnerability’. Thesevariables in particular appear to reduce the efficacy ofa psychological preparedness intervention such as thattrialed, notwithstanding its overall positive role inenhancing community physical and psychologicalpreparedness. Such psychological indicators aremeasurable, and allow for identification beforehand ofthose individuals and households likely to be poorlyprepared in the event of a cyclone warning situation. Itis also the case that it is just such psychological factorsrelating to chronic anxiety and critical incident distressthat are specifically addressed by more focused andintensive anxiety and stress management interventions.

The understandable societal and agency preoccupationwith community intervention and recovery in theaftermath of natural disaster events has tended to eclipsethe far more extensive human impact of severe warningsand near misses, as in the case of cyclone warnings in acyclone prone region such as northern coastal Australia.The social science research literature on human responseto natural and technological environmental threat clearlydocuments the powerful psychological impacts ofperceived threats (e.g., Baum & Fleming. 1993, Lehman& Taylor, 1986; Cvetkovich & Earle, 1992; Turner,Nigg & Heller Paz, 1986; Wandersman & Hallman,1993). Indeed the burgeoning literature on riskperception, assessment and communication largelyreflects this new understanding that perception is realityand that the warning situation itself can in fact be moredistressing than impact, and can have dramatic and longlasting psychological and social impacts (e.g., O’Riordan,1995; Slovic, 1987, 2000). The research focus of thepresent study was on the effectiveness of a particularpsychological intervention in helping residents managetheir emotional response which were hindering adaptivephysical preparedness. The research findings, however,with respect to the nature, severity and extent ofemotional distress, both before and during a severecyclone warning situation, and the lasting impact ofprevious traumatic experience, suggest that a pervasivenatural disaster impact, currently neither recognisednor addressed, is the impact of severe cyclone warningsituations on individuals and communities. Theseimpacts are both serious and consequential, not only interms of psychological well being and mental health, butbecause these impacts very directly influence futurepreparedness and vulnerability (e.g., Reser, 1996).

Cyclones can be particularly distressing for children


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From a public health perspective it is useful to knowthat the guide was helpful and improved physical andpsychological preparedness for most residents. From avulnerability perspective it is helpful to know that thereare many residents whose chronic anxiety level, copingstyle, and/or prior traumatic experience with cyclonesappears to reduce the overall effectiveness of the guide.It is important to reiterate that fully one half of thoseresidents reporting prior direct cyclone experiencefound this experience to be highly stressful, and thatthe proportion of residents who would appear to beprone to high anxiety is reasonably high, one out of five.It was also quite evident in this study that most peoplewere actually quite worried about Cyclone Justin, withsituation-precipitated anxiety being widespread.These individual difference findings, along with theintervention and control group comparisons, clearlysuggest that there are a large number of individualswho, for reasons of temperament and past experience,find a cyclone warning situation to be particularlystressful and one for which they are typically less well-prepared, physically or psychologically, than otherresidents. These individuals may benefit from beingtargeted in future preparedness studies, utilisinga more complex intervention (e.g., participation ina group anxiety management and cyclonepreparedness program, facilitated by a communitymental health professional).

Final window on findingsA final window on what this extensive data setsuggests is provided by how people felt when itlooked like Cyclone Justin was not going to actuallyimpact on the Cairns region and was heading outto sea. We were particularly interested in whether mostpeople would experience such a situation with amixture of relief and disappointment, and whether itwould be experienced as a near miss or a false alarm.Our own view is that media coverage can stronglyinfluence how people feel following a cyclone warningsituation, and that it is vital that preparednessbehaviours are reinforced and validated by the mediafollowing a serious warning situation. It was pleasing tofind that 84 per cent of respondents felt that CycloneJustin was a ‘close call’ or ‘near miss’ situation asdistinct from a ‘false alarm’. This would indicate thatthey felt good about their preparedness activities, andthat this behaviour was validated by their overallexperience during and following the cyclone threat. That16 per cent of respondents would have viewed theCyclone Justin warning situation as an over-reaction anda false alarm is still quite worrying, but it doesn’tcoincide with some problematic media coveragesuggesting that the cyclone was a ‘fizzer’.

Implications and recommendations fornatural disaster public education,warning messages and proceduresThe research undertaken was in the context of a tropicalcyclone warning situation in Far North Queensland.Any generalisations to other disaster warning situationsand circumstances must be done with this qualificationin mind. Natural disasters are quite different in manyrespects, and elicit rather different human responses torisk communications concerning an impending orpotential threat (e.g., Bell et al., 2000; Cvetkovich &Earle, 1992; Quarantelli, 1998). Indeed, Quarantelliargues that physical parameters are not sufficient todefine and differentiate natural disasters and that a moreinformative and useful taxonomy and yardstick is withrespect to the nature and extent of disruptive impact onthe community itself. All of this suggests some cautionin generalising findings from a community and regionalcontext such as coastal North Queensland wherecyclones are an integral part of ‘living in the north’. Inparticular, communities in cyclone prone regions tendto establish a culture of anticipation and concern, if notpreparedness, which influences how disasterpreparedness communications are perceived andresponded to (e.g., Sims & Bauman, 1972; Renn &Rohrman, 2000; Riad & Norris, 1998, 1999). Similarlyindividuals living in such regions develop their ownpersonal and prior experience-influenced responsepattern to impending cyclone threat, with this particularevent having very event-specific meanings andimplications. We note this, in part, because the findingsof this research are being applied to other naturaldisaster situations in the context of an underlying andwidespread ‘all-hazard’ approach to natural disasterwarning messages and materials in Australia.

One of the most important implications of theseresearch findings is a non-obvious one. We haveevaluated the utility of psychological content incommunity education and preparedness materials, butwhat happens when such information is not there? Thecurrent findings strongly suggest that the provision ofpreparedness information which heightens the salience,nature, likelihood and magnitude of a natural disaster,without providing adequate and concrete informationabout what to do and how to deal with such a situation,is likely to result in either a diminished adaptiveresponse to the risk communication or an erosion ofexisting preparedness motivation and resolve. The datafor the second or hanging control group with respect tophysical and psychological preparedness indicated thatthose residents who did not complete a pre-seasonquestionnaire were in fact marginally better preparedphysically and psychologically than the control groupwhich completed the pre-season questionnaire. Thissuggests that heightening the salience and need fornatural disaster preparedness, without providingpsychological advice and strategies, can in fact beneutralising or even counterproductive with respect toindividual and community preparedness. While almost


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all natural disaster education and warning materials doinclude advice and strategies with respect to physicalpreparedness, almost none include information andadvice with respect to psychological preparedness.It is arguable that managing one’s own psychologicalresponse to a disaster preparedness message or warning,or the emotional response of others, is at least of equalimportance to actual physical preparedness advice, andthat the absence of such advice substantially reduces theeffectiveness of the physical preparedness advice andrecommendations. This appears to be particularly truefor those moderate to high anxious individuals forwhom the cyclone season is a source of considerableconcern and anxiety, and who, in effect, aremost vulnerable.

The argument and the psychological processes involvedin risk communication appraisal and response andpreparedness activities are somewhat more involvedthan may be immediately apparent. Our researchfindings over the past 20 years with cyclone warningpreparations suggest that many people are unpreparedfor the elevated anxiety and concern which accompaniesthe thinking through and carrying out of standardphysical preparedness advice. This anxiety is oftenunrecognised as such, but is nonetheless distressing,and a common response for many residents is to simplythink about other things or stop doing whateverpreparedness activity they may have commenced (forexample, battening down, checking emergency supplies,or writing down radio station frequencies andemergency service numbers (e.g., Reser, 1980). Anxietyand fear do not just accompany the reading throughand thinking about preparedness advice or warningbulletins; it is often an integral and powerfulaccompaniment to preparedness activities themselves,with these feelings and the activity itself conferring aparticular reality and salience to the threat. The clearimplication of this argument and both past and currentresearch evidence is that the inclusion of psychologicaladvice about how to anticipate, recognise, and cope with

one’s own emotional response to a cyclone threat willenhance the effectiveness of conventional and existingpublic education and warning materials. The absence ofsuch advice may well diminish and compromise theeffectiveness and utility of such materials.

Further effective research on cyclone preparedness andhuman response to risk communications requires alonger-term research investment and strategic planning.In many ways the most valuable research beingundertaken in North America in natural disasterpreparedness is that which has targeted particular citiesand catchment areas for longitudinal panel studies(e.g., Riad & Norris, 1998; Riad, Norris & Rubak, 1999;Mileti & Fitzpatrick, 1993). Such research initiativescan build up a database and profile of communities,can establish the reliability and appropriateness ofmeasurement, can have in place a methodology and setof procedures for data collection in the event of awarning period or an actual disaster, and can moreclearly monitor and assess the experiences over time ofparticular individuals, households and communities.The far north coast of North Queensland provides anideal location for such programmatic research andevaluation studies, given the foundation provided by theCentre of Disaster Studies, the composite risk profile ofCairns produced by the Australian Geological SurveyOrganisation (e.g., Granger et al., 1999), the lead rolewhich has been taken by the Queensland Bureau ofMeteorology, and the strong support and commitment oflocal authorities, such as the Cairns City Council.

ConclusionThe research provides convincing support for theeffectiveness of the modified stress inoculationintervention in an actual cyclone threat circumstance.The research design and methodology provided for avery credible and comprehensive evaluation of thepsychological preparedness guide, within the constraintsof a single study and an ongoing natural disastersituation, and the research data shed considerable lighton the nature of residents’ cognitive, emotional andbehavioural responses and experience at the beginningof the cyclone season and following a severe cyclonewarning period. The investment of time, energy andresources in studying the pre-disaster situation andpsychological preparedness as well as physicalpreparedness has proven to be of substantial valueand benefit.

The research findings and substantial media andconference coverage have disseminated the messagethat the pre-disaster situation, and in particular thepre-cyclone season period, is a critically important timeand venue for prevention and mitigation, and thatpsychological factors and processes during this threatperiod are of singular importance to effective coping andadaptive responding. The research has also clearlyindicated that there are a substantial number ofresidents in cyclone-prone communities for whom

Anxiety accompanies preparedness and can interfere


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chronic anxiety, avoidant coping styles, and priortraumatic experience constitute both a substantialvulnerability factor and a genuine impediment topsychological and physical preparedness. The clearlypsychological character of this research, theintervention, and the expertise and training of theresearchers has served to highlight the importance ofprofessional psychological input as well as the need fortransdisciplinary and intersectorial collaboration in thedevelopment of effective natural disaster mitigationpolices and programs. The findings of this research,undertaken before, during, and following the onset ofCyclone Justin, have allowed for the development of aninnovative series of warning statements and educationalmessages which are being adopted by EmergencyManagement Australia, and the preparation andpublication of a trainer’s manual for the facilitationof training workshops focusing on communitypsychological preparedness (Morrissey & Reser, 2000).

We have attempted to stress that this research study is inmany ways exceptional, due to its design, its focus, itsdisciplinary base, and to the exceptional good fortune ofit having been undertaken in the right place at the righttime. The data reported here, and the convergentevidence and argument of many other studies eloquentlymake the case for including psychological advice innatural disaster public education and warning messagesand materials. This is happening, here in Australia, to amodest extent, with respect to all hazard brochuresproduced by Emergency Management Australia. Thereis nonetheless a pressing public need for more andbetter advice on how to cope with and better manageone’s own emotional and psychological response todramatic environmental threat or hazard, and that ofothers. Such human responses constitute very genuineimpacts in themselves, whether the event is a seriousthreat or a physical event, with these psychologicalimpacts often being very stressful, costly andconsequential in terms of individual and communityvulnerability and resilience.

AcknowledgementsThis research project received critical funding and supportfrom the United Nation’s International Decade of NaturalDisaster Research (IDNDR) and Emergency ManagementAustralia (EMA). The authors of this report would like toacknowledge the valuable advice and assistance provided byDr. David King and Linda Berry of the James Cook UniversityCentre for Disaster Studies, the support and assistance of theDisaster Research Centre of the University of Delaware, andthe excellent logistical, technical and meteorological supportand assistance of the Queensland Bureau of Meteorology, andin particular the assistance of Jim Davidson and Rex Falls.

Particular acknowledgement and thanks must go to JoanneWalsh, who participated in this research project, both asBachelor of Psychology Honours student undertaking her finalyear thesis study, and as a Research Assistant to the project.Gratitude and thanks is also due to the fourth year psychologystudents at James Cook University Cairns Campus whoprovided considerable time, energy, and commitment to thisimportant project. These were Janette Bailey, Jason Ferris,

Glenda Gray-James, Ushi Lang, Kirsty McDougall, FionaPerrett, Anita Plesko, and Jeff Weatherby. Finally, this researchcould not have been carried out without the truly marvellousparticipation and assistance of the residents of the CairnsNorthern Beach communities who gave so freely of their timebefore and after very threatening natural disaster situations.

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AuthorsDr Shirley Morrissey is Adjunct Senior Lecturer in Psychology,James Cook University. Ph: (08) 8945 1244; Fax: (08) 8945 1244;Email: [email protected]

Dr. Joseph P. Reser is an Emeritus at the University of Durham(England). He is currently attached to the Centre for NorthAustralian and Asian Research, NTU. Ph: (08) 8946 6845; Fax: (08) 8946 6977; Email: [email protected]

R

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By Irene Hocke & Arthur O’Brien

The Queensland Department of Emergency Services

is focused on improvements to the health, disaster

resilience and well-being of rural and remote

communities, particularly Aboriginal and Torres Strait

Islander communities. A number of initiatives are

being implemented across each of the operational

areas of the Department to address the Queensland

Government’s priorities for Aboriginal and Torres

Strait Islander people and communities across the

State and to strengthen the capacity of these

communities to respond to disasters and

emergencies.

IntroductionThe Queensland Department of Emergency Servicescomprises the Queensland Fire and Rescue Service, theQueensland Ambulance Service and the CounterDisaster and Rescue Services.

The Department is an essential community safety agencythat either directly delivers or funds a range of criticalemergency and disaster management services. Theseservices focus on preventing, in the first instance, orminimising the risk or impact of emergencies anddisasters, as well as response to and recovery fromemergencies and disasters.

The Department is addressing the challenge ofimproving services to rural and remote communitieswithin an environment of funding restrictions.A number of innovative and potentially revolutionaryinitiatives are being, or will be, implemented as part of acollaborative effort between the respective operationalarms of the Department, in conjunction with otherGovernment Departments or in partnership with localCommunity Councils.

Future work of the Department will also includeaddressing the emergency and disaster response andrecovery needs of the outstation or homelandmovements, and involving other communityrepresentatives and organisations in the delivery ofemergency and counter disaster services.

The contextHistorically, fire and ambulance services wereestablished by local communities forming, in the firstinstance, volunteer services.

Over time these volunteer services iterated into parttime or full time services with a paid workforce in thosecommunities that could justify such a service.Communities with a high socio-economic profile couldafford a better service, while those relativelydisadvantaged communities went without or continuedwith a volunteer service. The ongoing viability of thesevolunteer services relied heavily on the ongoinggoodwill of the local people.

In 1975, the State Counter Disaster Organisation Act wasproclaimed and established the State Emergency Service(SES) as a State-wide volunteer based emergency service.SES Units have been established in each QueenslandLocal Government and Community Council area. SESUnits comprise volunteers from the local communitywho are willing to make a commitment to preparing fordisasters and thus protecting and supporting theircommunities.

In 1989, both the fire and ambulance services inQueensland went through a revolutionary change andbecame State-wide services. Over the last decade bothservices have been refining resource allocation models toaddress some of the inequities of the past and put inplace models of service delivery based on population,demand and risk profiles.

In 1994, the SES Cadet Scheme was established as partof the Government’s youth strategy. The scheme aims to

Strengthening the capacity of remote

Indigenous communitiesthrough emergency

managementHocke & O’Brien show how the Queensland Department of

Emergency Services is strengthening community capacity in RICs

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train and resource groups of young people capable ofassisting their communities in times of emergency andto foster career development in permanent andvolunteer emergency services.

More recently, the Department has focused onimproving equity of access to emergency servicesfor people living in rural, remote and Indigenouscommunities.

Why focus on Indigenouscommunities?Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders generally live inremote coastal regions in greater numbers than otherAustralians. Their communities are extremely isolated,generally lack effective cyclone shelters, housing andinfrastructure is a lower standard than elsewhere andthey have limited communications and transportfacilities.

Communities also have low levels of education andawareness, a lack of access to knowledge andinformation on health and safety, and suffer the effectsof complex social issues such as alcohol abuse, familyviolence and dispossession. Adding to this there is thegrowing movement by traditional owners back tohomelands or outstations, who now have access to landsunder native title legislation, and through the AboriginalLand Act 1991. This means that the number of verysmall communities scattered across very rugged andremote areas is on the increase. These factors combineto make these communities particularly at risk fromclimate change and natural disasters and thereforereliant on access to emergency services.

The Department of Emergency Services’ purpose is tosave lives, protect property and help preserve thenatural environment. To achieve this purpose theDepartment needs to ensure that the best value servicesare provided to communities and individualsthroughout Queensland commensurate with theinherent risks and hazards within those communitiesand within the overall resource constraints imposedby Government.

A recent Aboriginal and Torres Strait IslanderCommission (ATSIC) Submission to the Council ofAustralian Governments’ Review of Natural DisasterRelief and Mitigation Arrangements summarised theissues of significance to the delivery of emergencyservices to remote Indigenous communities. The issuesraised by ATSIC are summarised in Box 1.

The extent of the issues raised by ATSIC makes itapparent that the effect of emergencies and disasters gobeyond the realm of emergency management and canstrike at the foundations of a community in terms ofoverall health and well-being.

Previous community awareness programs undertakenwithin Indigenous communities have had limitedsuccess due to the lack of sustainable funding requiredto properly support an ongoing awareness program anda lack of suitable materials due to language and culturalbarriers. An important lesson learnt through programs

Previous community awareness programs undertakenwithin Indigenous communities have had limitedsuccess due to the lack of sustainable funding requiredto properly support an ongoing awareness program anda lack of suitable materials due to language and culturalbarriers. An important lesson learnt through programsattempted to date is that one size does not fit allcommunities, yet the many sizes to fit manycommunities is an expensive exercise. Given that thereare 32 identifiable Community Councils withinQueensland, plus a significant number of outstations,many with differing languages and cultural norms,raising community awareness of emergency and counterdisaster issues becomes a challenging exercise.

Box 1: Issues raised by ATSIC intheir submission to the Councilof Australian GovernmentsReview of Natural DisasterRelief and MitigationArrangements.• The lack of resources, equipment and expertise

means that Indigenous communities are generallyunder prepared for emergency situations.

• There is confusion regarding the respective roles ofCommonwealth, State and local governmentbodies in planning for and responding toemergencies.

• Indigenous communities can be overlookedbecause of their small size and remote location.Local governments, which are usually theresponsible bodies through which recoveryactivities from disasters are coordinated, eithermay not recognise Indigenous communities asbeing within their sphere of responsibility or maynot have sufficient resources to fulfil theirobligations to such communities.

• There is a reliance on ATSIC and State Indigenouswelfare/development agencies to take leadingroles in responding to emergencies in Indigenouscommunities. However, these agencies haveneither the resources nor the expertise to carry outsuch functions.

• Environmental health issues already exist in small,isolated communities and these existing problemsare exacerbated during and after natural disasterevents. Some Indigenous communities rely on theirown generators that are prone to sustained failureduring disasters. The consequent malfunction ofsewerage and water pumps can lead to serioushealth problems which are less likely to occur inmainstream towns.

• Recovery can be severely affected by damage toaccess roads that can be a critical factor in theongoing viability of some communities.

• There is a lack of appropriate cyclone shelters orcommunity buildings for use as effective refugesduring emergency events.

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One possible process for progressing this issue is aprioritisation of community risk based on a variety offactors including:

• accessibility to existing emergency and healthservices (and information);

• exploring existing community informationmechanisms; and

• identification of the existing capacity of individualcommunities.

This information would then allow an assessment to bemade of the vulnerability of that particular communityto emergencies and natural hazards enabling aprioritisation of information needs across communitieswithout resorting to a one size fits all policy.

While the Department has implemented a number ofprograms to address shortfalls in terms of the emergencyand disaster management systems in place withinIndigenous communities, there is a need to go furtherand to explore our role in terms of the overall healthand well-being of communities.

One question with which the Department is currentlygrappling is – ‘Is the lack of comprehensive emergencyservices within communities adding to the extent of thesocial and economic problems inherent in communities,or is the lack of emergency services within communitiesdue to the social and economic problems?’

In addressing this question the Department is alsoasking – ‘What effect will improved emergency serviceshave on other issues of relevance to that community?If the effect results in a net benefit to that community –how best do we assist communities to developappropriate emergency management measures within anenvironment of limited resources?’ Finally – ‘What roledoes the Department have in terms of building theoverall capacity of communities beyond simplyemergency and disaster management?’

Realistically communities cannot develop and becomesustainable where community capacity is low. Indicatorsof the dysfunction that exists within a majority ofIndigenous Australian communities have beenhighlighted in numerous reports and studies includingthe Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody in1991 and the Aboriginal And Torres Strait IslanderWomen’s Task Force on Violence in 1999.

More recently Fitzgerald’s Cape York Justice Study, 2001,points out the social and economic problems facingAboriginal people in Cape York communities asreproduced in Box 2.

Fitzgerald, gravely points out that, ‘Unless the epidemicof alcohol abuse is dealt with, no other development,including economic and educational reform, can occur.’(Fitzgerald, 2001).

Further to this, the Aboriginal and Torres Strait IslanderWomen’s Task Force on Violence argues for an holistic,just, and co-ordinated whole of government approach,that focuses on helping individuals, families and theFurther to this, the Aboriginal and Torres Strait IslanderWomen’s Task Force on Violence argues for a holistic,just, and co-ordinated whole of government approach,

Yarrabah Emergency Services Unit – joint RFS and SES

‘Levels of health, education, life expectancy andemployment for Indigenous people are significantlylower than for other Queensland communities.

For example, Indigenous people on Cape York havesome of the poorest health profiles in Australia:

• Mortality rates 2–3 times higher than that ofQueensland’s population over all

• Median age at death at least 20 years below thatof non-Indigenous people

• Suicide rates among aboriginal males in remotecommunities over six times higher than that ofQueensland’s population overall

• The highest prevalence of sexually transmitteddiseases in QAlcohol-related death rates are over21 times the general Queensland rate, and forhomicide and violence (much of it alcohol-related)18 times higher’.

Box 2: Extract from ‘MeetingChallenges, Making Choices’ –April 2002.

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which focuses on helping individuals, families and thecommunity to heal, become stronger and capable ofsustainable development. The implications are an urgentneed for reform, and new approaches to address issuesand problems linked to individuals and communitycapacity and social and family networks withincommunities.

In Australia, emphasis is now being placed on thebuilding of community capacity, through thedevelopment of social and human capital withincommunities. Collaboration between governments andnon-government agencies and communities to buildon the current assets that exist within communitiesis required.

The Department’s role in communitycapacity buildingCavaye (2000) sees capacity building as ‘a flexible seriesof actions conducted by community people that createseconomic benefits and helps communities become moreable to manage change.’

The Aspen Institute (2000) described capacity buildingas the combined influence of a community’scommitment, resources and skills that can be deployedto build on the communities strengths and addresscommunity problems.

In exploring the Department’s role in communitycapacity building, a decision needs to be formally takenas to whether we are simply strengthening the existingcapacity of communities in a purely emergencymanagement context, or does the Department havea role in building the community’s capacity in otherareas. Other areas would of necessity include providingservices that respond to drugs/alcohol abuse, domesticviolence and environmental health concernswithin communities.

A whole of government approach would suggest that theDepartment would need to play a broader role incapacity building and sustainable communitydevelopment, particularly given the complexities ofsocial and economic issues impacting on a large numberof Indigenous Australian communities.

Obviously, in assisting communities to build capacity inareas outside traditional business, the Department isheavily reliant on working with State andCommonwealth agencies such as Queensland Health,Queensland Police, the Department of Aboriginal andTorres Strait Islander Policy, the EnvironmentalProtection Agency and the Aboriginal and Torres StraitIslander Commission. The Department is no less relianton community organisations and the continuinggoodwill of individuals within the communities due tothese partnerships.

The exploration of the role of the Department willcontinue, particularly given the QueenslandGovernment’s commitment to the Meeting Challenges,Making Choices – the Queensland Government’s responseto the Cape York Justice Study. The Department’sproposed innovative solutions, outside of themainstream, may well prove beneficial to both theGovernment as a whole, and to target communities,for very little up front investment.

Why build capacity?The Department is heavily reliant on a volunteeremergency services workforce in those communities,which are unable to justify, in terms of population levelsand risks, a part time or full time paid workforce.

Developing a self-sustaining volunteer emergency servicewithin communities across Queensland is challengingand relies heavily on the goodwill and support withincommunities, particularly from local government andcommunity councils. The Department has historicallyenjoyed, and indeed encourages, a cultural ethos ofcommunity self-help. In addition, there is also a heavyreliance on those individuals within communitieswho donate both time and money to support theongoing operations of the various emergency servicesvolunteer organisations.

This reliance on the goodwill of local communities liesat the heart of community capacity. Communitiesmust be prepared to engage with the Department inorder for our volunteer service delivery model tofunction effectively.

Victor Joseph of St Paul Community, Moa Island in theTorres Strait, explained it best when he talked about atriangular relationship between Government, thecommunity (represented by the Community Counciland other key community representatives) and theindividuals that make up the volunteer services.Importantly, without the support of any side of thistriangle the service delivery model falls apart.

The challenge for the Department is therefore to sustainand strengthen partnerships in areas where the model isoperating well and to build partnerships in those areaswhere the model is not yet in place.

The Department, over the past few years has begun tolook beyond simply providing training, support andinfrastructure to volunteers and is now looking at ourrole in terms of building the capacity of communities to

Comm

unity

Individuals

Government

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respond to some of the other issues impacting on theirlives and our role in terms of building social capital.

Our approach to enhancing servicedeliveryIn responding to the issues and challenges in deliveringessential emergency services to remote Indigenouscommunities, the Department is implementing a two-pronged approach by focusing on both service deliveryand on employment opportunities for IndigenousAustralians.

Regarding service delivery, the Department is developinga five-year service delivery plan to improve the deliveryof emergency services to rural and remote Aboriginaland Torres Strait Islander communities throughenhancing partnerships and collaboration withcommunity representatives, local, State andCommonwealth agencies.

The Plan will also improve the culturalappropriateness of our services, and promote positiveoutcomes and improved quality of life forIndigenous people, particularly those living in rural andremote communities.

The Plan is being developed through engaging withcommunities to discuss current issues and forcommunities to suggest possible solutions. Issues raisedthrough community consultations are being prioritisedin consultation with the community and will beaddressed through the Plan.

Some 21 out of 32 rural and remote Indigenous

Communities have contributed to the development of

the Plan.

The results of the consultation process with local

communities are encouraging. A number of

communities have identified the potential role of the

Department in assisting community capacity building

for sustained service delivery through partnership

arrangements. While communities have acknowledged

the Department’s focus on emergency management, they

believe that this focus may well have spin off outcomes

in terms of social and economic benefits.

Communities are also seeking outcomes in the delivery

of training, equipment, infrastructure, community

education and awareness and are seeking ownership and

responsibility for emergency services delivery. Locally

based individuals are seeking responsibility for local

service delivery to maintain the expertise of local

people, build sustainable emergency response and

recovery systems and to develop culturally appropriate

programs delivered by local people.

One of the key directions of this project is to develop

innovative and flexible models of service delivery that

meet the emergency and disaster service needs of local

communities. In this regard it is intended to support the

continuing development of a number of joint rescue

units in Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander

communities in the Cape, Gulf and Torres Strait areas.

First Aid training at Oriners Outstation a homeland of the Kwanyama Aboriginal Community

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This will entail the enhancement of joint Rural FireService (RFS), State Emergency Services (SES) and insome cases Volunteer Marine Rescue (VMR) emergencyservices units in remote Aboriginal and Torres StraitIslander communities. A rationalisation of volunteercommitment, and resource efficiencies, will lead toimproved safety outcomes for these communities fromthis type of initiative.

The Department has also initiated a consultation processwith key Government stakeholders both in Cairns andin Brisbane. Part of this process is related to exploringthe Department’s role in areas outside of our traditionalbusiness. More importantly, the Department is buildingrelationships with other providers of services toIndigenous communities (both Government and non-Government) to leverage the very best services at themost effective cost.

The Queensland Ambulance Service (QAS) undertook amajor consultation process in 1999 with Indigenouscommunities in the Cape and Torres Strait,Commonwealth and State agencies, the Royal FlyingDoctor Service and other relevant organisations tofurther determine the QAS response in terms of pre-hospital care and injury prevention for isolated remotecommunities. The results of these consultations formpart of the five-year service delivery plan and led to theformation of the QAS Aboriginal and Torres StraitIslander Co-ordination Unit.

This Unit was initiated to develop and implement acomprehensive policy framework to provide a betterambulance service to Aboriginal and Torres StraitIslander people.

This framework includes:

• Guidelines for culturally and clinically appropriateservice delivery;

• Educational support packages to officers deliveringservices to Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islandercommunities.

• Bridging programs to provide assistance witheducation and competency requirements to ensureAboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people have theopportunity to qualify as student ambulance officers.

• Establishment of a mandatory 10 per cent intake ofAboriginal and Torres Strait Islander specific studentpositions within the Student Paramedic Intake for2000–01 onwards.

• A commitment to provide support to healthpromotion/equity-based collaborative projects forAboriginal and Torres Strait Islander individuals andcommunities to encourage better health outcomes.

As a result of the consultation and subsequentrecommendations of the Service Development Plan forCape York Peninsula, the QAS has established a FieldOfficer in Coen. This Field Officer will provide training

and assistance to the remote communities of Coen,Lockhart River, Aurukun, Pormpuraaw, Kowanyama andmajor outstations throughout the area.

The QAS is working with Cape York communities andthe Cape York Partnerships Office to establishappropriate service delivery models including theestablishment of Field Officer positions in otherlocations throughout the Cape and within theTorres Straits.

The establishment of QAS Field Officers in remotecommunities builds on the existing collaborativearrangements in place with Queensland Health and willenable joint planning and service delivery in these areas.

The role of QAS Field Officers is:1. To assist Indigenous communities in Cape York to

establish or further develop effective arrangementsfor pre-hospital emergency care;

2. To work with Indigenous communities to increase thecapacity of community members to respondeffectively and appropriately to health careemergencies and to injuries or their prevention;

3. To work with Indigenous communities to identifyand assist prepare community members foremployment within QAS;

4. To assist/respond to pre-hospital care emergencies;and

5. To assist with health promotion and health educationprograms.

The QAS has conducted consultations throughout theTorres Strait Islands and has recently launchedEnhancing the Capacity of Islander Communities to Preventand Respond to Health Care Emergencies and Injuries.

During the 2001–02 financial year an importantmilestone in the 25-year history of the SES inQueensland was achieved through the completion of theSES Strategic Plan.

Initiatives developed as part of the implementationprocess of this plan will address a number of the equityand diversity issues facing Aboriginal and Torres StraitIslander SES volunteers and their communities. Prioritywill be given to developing closer working relationshipswith communities and reviewing SES guidelines andprocedures to not only ensure equity in the workplacebut to also address the sensitivities applicable to theneeds of Indigenous communities.

The Department is also currently collaborating withAboriginal and Torres Strait Islander communitycouncils to develop Natural Disaster Risk ManagementStudies Program (NDRMSP), funded by theCommonwealth, State and Local Governments. The aimof this program is to aid the identification of mitigationstrategies that may lead to a reduction in communityloss and suffering caused by natural disasters.

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Recent Budget outcomes have enabled the Departmentto continue its support of Torres Strait Rescue, anorganisation that provides a contracted aeromedical andair rescue helicopter service to the Northern Cape Yorkarea and Torres Strait.

The Department pays an annual standing chargetowards this service and provides training for thevolunteer air rescue crew through QueenslandGovernment Helicopter Rescue Service personnel. Thereare currently five, trained volunteer crew membersdrawn from Queensland Ambulance Service (2),Queensland Police Service (1) and Torres Strait Islandersfrom the local community (2).

The futureThe Department intends to build upon the strategiescommenced in 2001–02 and to increase the focus onenhancing service delivery to rural and remoteIndigenous communities.

The QAS has employed a Field Officer at Horn Island,and is in the process of building a field office andemploying additional Field Officer at Kowanyama.These Field Officers will assist these communities toestablish or further develop arrangements for pre-hospital emergency care, increase the capacity ofcommunity members to respond effectively andappropriately to health care emergencies and to injuriesor their prevention and to work with Indigenouscommunities to identify and prepare communitymembers for employment within the ambulance service.

The establishment of QAS Field Officers in remotecommunities builds on the existing collaborativearrangements in place with Queensland Health and willenable joint planning and service delivery in these areas.

An additional Rural Fire Service and Counter Disasterand Rescue Training Officers will be employed toprovide training and support specifically to Cape Yorkand Torres Strait communities and will help build thecapacity of existing joint RFS & SES volunteer units aswell as working towards establishing new units inpartnership with Community Councils.

The Department has also established an IndigenousProject Officer based in Townsville to enhancecommunity safety and prevention capability on PalmIsland as part of a pilot project. This pilot will beevaluated for possible expansion into other areas ofQueensland.

A number of innovative programs which will assist inbuilding the capacity of Indigenous communitiesbeyond simply an emergency management response hascommenced, including a drug awareness program forIndigenous Year 7 children from communitiesthroughout Queensland to be developed and deliveredin conjunction with Queensland Health.

The Department also intends to pilot a joint EmergencyServices/Environmental Protection Agency rescue unit inCape York including trialling an emergency services

Horn Island SES Unit at the State Rescue Competition in Toowoomba

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coordinator at the Land and Sea Management Centre atLockhart River.

The recent Queensland Government Response to theCape York Justice Study Meeting Challenges, MakingChoices recommends, amongst other things, that youthprograms such as the State Emergency Services Cadetsbe expanded. Currently the SES Cadets Programinvolves 1,000 Cadets in 38 Units across Queensland.

The Program provides leadership skills to young peopleaged 12 to 16 with Cadets called upon to support thesocial fabric of their communities.

Potentially the program can be further developed as ayouth development program and extended into remoteIndigenous communities as a potential crimeprevention, suicide prevention, and substance abuseprevention strategy.

In addition, the Department will explore models ofcommunity engagement as part of its five-year servicedelivery plan.

The Department intends to contribute to a new youthdevelopment program in Cape York and the Torres Straitin the 2002–03 financial year including the currentpiloting of a primary school-based program on MoaIsland (St Pauls) with the aim of extending it to othercentres in Cape York.

The Indigenous Coordination Unit is the Department’smost recent initiative was established in Cairns onDecember 2002 and launched on 23 May, 2003. TheICU will establish a collaborative approach todeveloping the capacity of staff to work withcommunities to ensure effective and efficient outcomes.The Unit will effectively co-ordinate resources from amulti-service perspective, and will ensure collaborativeconsultation and negotiations with relevantGovernment, Non-Government, and Aboriginal andTorres Strait Islander Communities to meet specific andsustainable community-based outcomes.

Through the Unit, the department will also be able torespond efficiently and contribute to the Government’sCape York Justice Study and Ten Year PartnershipStrategies, coordinate the implementation of theDepartment’s Five Year Plan for Safer and Healthier Murriand Ilan Communities in North Queensland, 2003–2007,and effectively support a multi-Agency approach for theimplementation of and reporting on appropriateplanning framework and service delivery outcomes.

Community engagementCommunity engagement has come into prominence overthe past few years as a means of planning and deliveringresponsive Government services, that meet the needsand expectations of local communities.

Engaging with communities, not just consultation hasbecome an important facet in the planning, policydevelopment and service delivery componentsof Government.

The Department of Emergency Services has had in placea number of excellent examples of communityengagement practices – the Local AmbulanceCommittees (LAC) that have been an importantcomponent of ambulance service delivery, and theEmergency Services Advisory Council (ESAC) and theRural Fire Council (RFC).

The LACs, first established in 1991, advise localambulance services on the needs of their community, thequality of services provided and manage funds on behalfof the community. The QAS has made a genuinecommitment to community engagement both instructural and performance terms through the LACs.

The ESAC is a non-policy-making community basedbody, which reports to the Minister for EmergencyServices on the extent to which the delivery of fire,ambulance and other disaster management andemergency services meet community needs.

The RFC provides advice to the Minister for EmergencyServices and the QFRS in respect of fires in rural areasand the operation of rural fire brigades and promotesfire safety, fire prevention and the reduction of firedanger within rural areas.

More recently a Community Engagement Unit hasbeen established. The role of this Unit is to work inpartnership with communities to develop policiesand service delivery models that meet the needs ofthose communities.

Another aspect of community engagement has beengenerated through the establishment of the Department’sStrategic Plan for Indigenous Australians. This Planreflects the Government’s commitment to thereconciliation process and the principles containedwithin the Ten Year Planning Framework forIndigenous Affairs and the Cape York Partnerships: SomePractical Ideas.

This Plan was developed through input from seniormanagers of the Department and Indigenous staffrepresentatives from across the Portfolio. The Plan isunderpinned by a Departmental Reference Group,personally Chaired by the Director-General, whichcomprises Indigenous and management representativesof both the Department and its volunteer groups.

The Plan is being advanced through the establishment ofLocal Support Network groups in a number of cities andprovincial towns across Queensland including Yarrabah,Cherbourg/Murgon, Townsville/Burdekin,Mackay/Bowen and Brisbane. Local Support Network

forums allow a support mechanism for staff and providea link between the Department and local communities.The development of the 5 Year for Safer and HealthierMurri and Ilan Communities North Queensland2003–2007, supports the need to investigate theestablishment of similar support mechanisms forvolunteers and employees in remote locations.

ConclusionThe Department of Emergency Services has embracedthe principles of community capacity building indelivering on its vision to improve service delivery torural and remote Indigenous communities acrossQueensland. While only just commencing this journey,the Department recognises that it has a long way to go,and needs the support of staff, Community Councilsand community individuals if it is to succeed.

A number of innovative pilot projects will commence inthe 2002–03 financial year and will be evaluated, notjust in terms of the emergency management outcomes,but also in terms of broader social and economicoutcomes for target communities.

A key rationale for these initiatives is the need to investtime and resources into strengthening the capacity ofremote Indigenous communities to protect themselvesfrom natural hazards and other emergencies. However,enhancing the communities’ emergency managementcapacity can also have further benefits in terms of thesocial and economic development of communities andtherefore generate real value for money from theresources invested.

ReferencesAboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Women’s Task Force onViolence, 1991.

Aspen Institute Measuring Community Capacity Building:A Workbook-in-Progress for Rural Communities. The AspenInstitute, Washington D.C. 1996.

Cavaye, J. Government and Community Capacity –Learning Kit for the Public Sector.Department of Emergency Services Annual Report 2000–01.Fitzgerald, T. Cape York Justice Study, November 2001.

Lodder, S. & Preist, K. Supporting Indigenous CommunityCapacity Building, Paper prepared for the CollaborativeAboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Policy Conference, CairnsAustralia May 2002.

Meeting Challenges, Making Choices – QueenslandGovernment response to the Cape York Justice Study,April 2002.

Queensland Ambulance Service Ten Year Review 1991–2001.Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody, 1991.

AcknowledgmentsIrene and Arthur would like to acknowledge the many staffand volunteers of the Department who provided input intothis paper.

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AuthorsArthur O’Brien is the Director, Strategic Management and Policy,Department of Emergency Services, Queensland. Email:[email protected]

Irene Hocke, Senior Project Officer, Department of EmergencyServices, Queensland

R

By Paul Gabriel

In Australia, local government plays an essential role

in emergency management, although not a provider

of emergency services. The role of supporting

emergency services and the community both during

and after emergencies has been a traditional role.

Added to this is an increasing responsibility as the

focal point for the conduct of local mitigation using

risk analysis, prioritisation, and treatment under the

methodology of emergency risk management. This

role is part of a shift in the emphasis of emergency

management in Australia away from the strong

focus on emergencies and the emergency services,

towards an emphasis on the sustainability of the

community and its life in the context of the risk of

loss posed by natural and other hazards. Models of

municipal emergency risk management planning are

presented to assist municipalities to connect or even

integrate their emergency management planning

processes with other similar community safety

activities such as crime and injury prevention.

Australia’s Federal system ofGovernmentThe Australian states were formerly separate Britishcolonies which came together in 1901 to form the statesof the Commonwealth of Australia, together with twoterritories (Northern Territory and Australian CapitalTerritory) both of which are now self-governing. Underthe Australian constitution, the commonwealth hasjurisdiction over national issues such as defence, trade,immigration, and major aspects of taxation. Many of themore community-interface government services such aseducation, health (including public hospital andambulance services), and public transport remain withthe states. Importantly, state responsibilities also includepolice and fire services; the latter are generally set up asmore or less autonomous statutory authorities so as togive them a degree of operational and financialindependence from the government of the day.

Local Government responsibilitiesIn Australia there are some 770 municipalities, withpopulations ranging from a few thousand to over three-quarters of a million. Large areas of Australia with lowpopulation density do not have municipal government,so municipal services are provided there by state orterritory agencies.

Local governments are created by state governments,whose legislation governs their formation, roles, andpowers. Their traditional responsibilities of roads, rates,and rubbish have expanded considerably in recent yearsto encompass promotion of healthy, prosperouscommunities, and they carry significant roles inemergency management through responsibilities forland use zoning (within state statutory frameworksand policies) and application and enforcement ofbuilding control standards. More specific roles arediscussed below.

Unlike many other countries, Australian municipalitiesare not responsible for provision of police services, butin rural areas many have a close involvement with fireservices through support to volunteer brigades. There is,however, a trend towards greater state responsibility forrural fire service resourcing and management, as theneeds of state fire services for a homogeneous forcedeployable over a wide area exceed the capacity ofmunicipalities.

Emergency managementresponsibilities of states and theCommonwealthUnder Australia’s constitutional arrangements,emergency management is a state responsibility, as areall nonmilitary aspects of safety for the community.States provide emergency response services (fire, police,ambulance, and state emergency services) using acombination of paid and volunteer staff. In addition, thestates control or provide the major legislative andfinancial tools for prevention/mitigation andprofessional and financial services for recovery. All ofthese state-based organisations use some type ofregional structure for provision of services andoperational management.

The development of municipal emergency

management planning inVictoria, Australia

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Most states and territories also have emergencymanagement legislation which creates the framework forrelationships between the key organisations andprovides for declaration of specific legal states, such asstates of emergency/disaster, for times when there isneed to use extraordinary or coercive powers in dealingwith a disaster or major emergency.

The commonwealth provides explicit support to thestates and territories through the provision of

• physical resource support, mainly from the defenceforces, when state resources are inadequate orunavailable;

• financial support for regional planning supportpersonnel, general enhancement of emergencymanagement capabilities through, for example,research or specialised equipment acquisition,mitigation through grants programs, and alsoresponse and recovery expenditure when states’ costsexceed thresholds linked to the size of their generalrevenues; and

• a range of supports to the improvement of emergencymanagement nationally, through EmergencyManagement Australia (EMA), part of the AttorneyGeneral’s Department; these include facilitation ofnational policy and practice, research, and, throughits training arm the Emergency Management AustraliaInstitute (EMAI), specialised development andtraining services.

Principles underpinning the currentemergency nanagement systemDuring the 1970s and 1980s, Australian statesdeveloped formalised emergency management structureslargely in response to both a series of major emergenciessuch as the substantial devastation of Darwin byCyclone Tracey in 1974, major floods in Brisbane in1974, and the ‘Ash Wednesday’ bushfires in Victoria andSouth Australia in 1983. Further impetus was providedby the emergence of a new commonwealth focus in theformation of EMA (then Natural Disasters Organisation)by the reformist Whitlam Labor government in the early1970s.

Significantly, the Comprehensive and Integrated modelof emergency management articulated by the NationalGovernors’ Association (1979) from the U.S. wasincorporated into states’ legislation and managementstructures and, by virtue of national training programs,became deeply embedded in the thinking of emergencymanagement practitioners and the many others whoundertook basic familiarisation courses, where it residesto this day.

The most prominent element is the Prevention,Preparedness, Response, and Recovery (PPRR) model(Emergency Management Australia 1993). The Australia-wide uptake of this model has been very beneficial onthe whole because of its emphasis on a broad range of

emergency management activities carried out by avariety of organisations, not only emergency services.

There are various limitations or, to be fairer, misuses ofthe PPRR model, as noted by Crondstedt (2002)including the tendency to see its components asseparate, as always equal in importance, as sequentialphases of a cycle, or as focused on activity and physicalaction. Another limitation is, again, not an inherentfault, but rather the assumption that the various PPRRcomponents are managed and discharged in similarways, and by roughly the same groups of peopleand organisations.

Until recently, the emergency management networks andstructures at state and local levels have been centredaround emergency services and their personnel, whohave not necessarily been in the best position tosignificantly influence and promoteprevention/mitigation on a comprehensive basis.Prevention may be facilitated through organisationswith appropriate powers, responsibilities, and resources,in conjunction with the exposed communities generally.As noted by Hays (1999), the creation of a ‘naturaldisaster reduction culture’ is a considerable challenge forany jurisdiction.

Reconceptualising emergencymanagementThe PPRR model may now be close to its ‘use-by date’because it is emergency-centric, in that emergencyevents are the focal point and purpose for the activityembraced by it. (Prevention of emergencies, preparednessfor emergencies, response to emergencies, and recoveryfrom emergencies.) Emergency management objectivescan no longer be limited in scope to coping better withemergencies and disasters, but must instead be seen inthe broader context of the ongoing everyday life of thecommunity. Emergency management is a keycontributor to community ‘triple bottom line’ outcomesby its specific contributions to safety and sustainability.

The range of perceptual and conceptual shifts inAustralian emergency management over recent yearsincludes such directions as:

• away from an emergency-centric view of emergencymanagement and towards a community-centric view;

• away from an emergency-service centric view ofemergency management and towards one whichembraces the whole of government;

• towards an increased emphasis on sustainability as akey purpose of emergency management;

• seeing emergencies as manifestations of vulnerabilitynot simply as a function of the presence of hazards(Salter 1995);

• recognising the need to create many focal points forinterdisciplinary and intersectoral partnerships

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(International Strategy for Disaster Reduction 1999);and

• emphasising the benefits of effort and resourcesinvested in prevention/mitigation/risk reductioncompared with response and recovery.

Victoria’s Emergency Services Commissioner, BruceEsplin, has observed that ‘Communities own their ownrisks, and a community-centred rather than agency-centred approach is essential in the management of[emergency-related] risks and the development of local,integrated plans and programs. What works in onecommunity may not work in another’ (Esplin 2000).A major paradigm shift is underway in which we arewitnessing a shift in the role and image of theemergency services away from the role of quasi-military‘authorities’ (Dynes 1994) taking charge of thecommunity during times of crisis, into supporters andfacilitators working with community in dealing with itsrisks as well as its emergencies (Esplin 2000).

Risk management and PPRRIt is in the context of this broader imperative that riskmanagement offers a new way to think about and buildplanning frameworks for emergency management.Following the publication in 1995 and revision in 1999of the Australian Standard on Risk Management(Standards Australia 1999), Australia’s emergencymanagement community has been quick to adopt andadapt the standards generic risk management approachto its own field, recognising its potential to provide abetter way to manage prevention in particular. In theemergency management environment, risk managementhas been adapted to become emergency riskmanagement (Emergency Management Australia 2000).

The risk management based framework facilitates

• a focus on risks (the interactions between hazardsand communities in particular contexts) and not juston hazards;

• the development of a variety of innovativeapproaches to safety programs through the reductionof risk by modification either of likelihood ofemergencies and/or of their potential consequences, by,for example, enhancing the resilience of exposedpopulations; and

• the engagement of a wider group of people andprofessions than just emergency services to promotesafety and sustainability.

Despite the ready uptake of risk management, there hasbeen some lack of clarity in thinking among someAustralian emergency management practitioners as tohow emergency risk management relates to the PPRRformulation. For example, in the Emergency RiskManagement Applications Guide (Emergency ManagementAustralia 2000) in which a risk management process foremergency-related community risks is set out in detail,one of the final stages in a detailed analytical process

model is ‘[g]enerate risk treatment options’ (EmergencyManagement Australia 2000, p. 20). Under this section,PPRR is included as a potential way of ‘thinking about’risk treatment. This reveals a misunderstanding of risk,of risk management, and of the differences betweentreatment of risk (a constructed idea) and dealing withan emergency (a real phenomenon). Worse, it suggeststhat the risk management process is an additional set ofactivities on top of what was already being undertakenusing the PPRR process.

A more satisfactory marriage of the two approaches isbased on the recognition that treatment or reduction ofrisk (through reduction of likelihood and/or potentialconsequences) is the same thing as what has been calledprevention/mitigation – it aims to achieve the samegoals. In the emergency context, risk reduction willrarely result in the elimination of a particular risk, ofcourse, unless drastic steps are taken, such as moving acommunity and its assets completely out of a floodplain.

The risk that remains subsequent to risk reductionactivities is known as residual risk (Standards Australia1999, p. 3). The exposed community lives with residualrisk on an ongoing basis. Generally, there remains a riskof potential future loss or damage from emergencieswhich it is too expensive, difficult, or disruptive to lifeto eliminate or avoid. Therefore, there is need for theexposed community, in conjunction with its emergencyagencies, to prepare for both response and recovery.

Recent publications by EMA such as Reducing theCommunity Impact of Landslides (EmergencyManagement Australia 2001) have adopted this way ofarticulating the relationship between risk reduction andoperational preparedness, using the linking concept ofresidual risk.

In a public administration activity such as emergencymanagement, there are those who would argue that ashortcoming to an approach is not a problem, as long asthere is a some actual and hopefully beneficial activitytaking place. However, the major benefit of theemergency risk management approach is to pursue allthe means other than response and recovery of reducingthe likelihood and/or potential consequences of

Treat risks(mitigation)

Plan and Prepare forResponse and Recovery

(Preparedness)

Acknowledgeresidual risk

Identify,Assess and Prioritise

Risks

Figure 1. Emergency Risk Management Linked to OperationalPlanning.

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emergencies. This is well expressed by Crondstedt, whostates that ‘Un constrained [sic] thinking about possibletreatments is a critical feature of deriving innovative,new and possibly better ways of treating risks.Participants in the risk management process, inparticular while sourcing and selecting treatments, musttherefore be able to look beyond a framework thatemerged from an era well prior to the current riskmanagement framework’ (Crondstedt 2002, p. 13). Theintroduction of emergency risk management would yieldlittle true benefit if the ‘old treatments’ of response andrecovery were considered to be available options, as theycould tend to be relied upon excessively.

Municipal roles in emergencymanagementThe role of local government as a key focal point for thevarious networks of people, organisations, needs,resources, and issues that impact on communitysustainability and safety has become increasinglyimportant. However, this role is not always taken upwillingly or competently, and, in doing so, localgovernments may encounter structural obstacles createdby others, such as the state, for which some solutionsneed to be facilitated.

The emergency management roles of local governmentin Australia include the following:

• Identification and treatment of emergency-relatedrisks using such resources as they have available tothem, in conjunction with other government agenciesand nongovernmental organisations and the privatesector. This includes establishing and maintainingnonstructural risk treatment options such ascommunity education and awareness, and warningsystems.

• Support for the emergency services in responseoperations. Control of emergency operations isusually vested by legislation or agreement in amember of a statutory body (fire service, StateEmergency Service, police) according to the type ofemergency. Municipal support can take the form ofresources such as the provision of heavy machinerywhich the response agency needs but does not own,responsibility for feeding response agency personnel,managing road closures, provision of localinformation to response agencies, provision ofevacuation or relief centres, and general immediatesupport to its community.

• In recovery from emergencies, the provision not onlyof resources to assist residents with clean up, but alsopersonnel to manage the recovery process and assistaffected householders and communities, usingcommunity development processes, with theirrecovery journey into a viable future. In this they areoften supported by personnel from relevant statehuman service departments – who may also sourcefinancial assistance from state and commonwealthassistance programs.

• Generally mediating between their communities andstate agencies in emergency management matters.

To underpin these roles, Victoria’s emergencymanagement legislation requires each localgovernment to:

• develop and maintain a municipal emergencymanagement plan,

• make specific appointments of municipal emergencyofficers whose role is to ensure provision ofmunicipal resources in emergencies, and

• appoint a planning committee which must followplanning guidelines issues by the Minister for Policeand Emergency Services (Emergency Management Act1986).

An additional impetus to municipal planning is acommonwealth requirement that postdisaster financialassistance to a municipality may be reduced if it has notbeen engaging in risk reduction activities arising out ofits risk analyses. In Victoria at least, emergencymanagement planning support and facilitation isprovided free of cost to municipalities. This is carriedout by paid personnel of the State Emergency Service(SES), a predominantly volunteer organisation whoseother main roles include volunteer response to floods,storms, and road crashes. The benefit of this paidsupport is that there is a quality level below whichmunicipalities’ plans rarely fall.

Repositioning municipal emergencymanagementMany municipalities identify emergency management assubstantially the responsibility of the ‘outdoor’ orphysical services side of their activities, often managedpart-time by engineers who also may be responsible forcontract and/or works management. This is consistentwith the traditional view of municipal emergencymanagement as support to response agencies. As abroader view of emergency and risk management gainsstrength, the municipal locus of responsibilities needs toshift towards the community services or people-focusedside of municipal activities. This would supportmunicipal emergency management planning, to bothmaintain the emphasis of coping better with actualemergencies and incorporating the further dimension ofmanaging the risks to community safety andsustainability by engaging the community in relevantsocial processes.

The question now becomes how to efficiently andeffectively organise and plan for all the various activitieswhich contribute to the safety and sustainability ofcommunities. As pointed out by Britton (2001, p. 45),emergency management is now placed ‘in the overallcontext of a community’s economic and social [and, onemight add, environmental] activities.’

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Other influencesIn addition to emergency risk management, other factorsare influential in the rethinking of how municipalitiesengage with emergency management and how theymight evolve their approach into the future.

Community safetyA range of social programs in Victoria associate underthe umbrella term community safety. The Governmentof Victoria supports a range of community safetyprograms and objectives such as crime prevention,prevention of injury in the home, workplace, and inpublic and recreational spaces, as well as the preventionof emergencies and the minimisation of their effects. Thegovernment has sought, over the past few years, toencourage local governments to be actively involved inprograms to promote and improve community safety.

The government’s sponsorship of Community SafetyMonth (formerly Community Safety Week) is designedto encourage communities and households to be moreconscious of the need for safe behaviours in a variety oflife activities and situations. It is a focal period for manylocal safety displays and events, incorporatingemergency services among others.

Mandated planning committeesAs pointed out above, emergency management at themunicipal level carries a legislative mandate, requiringeach municipality to have a planning committee, a plan,and appointments of emergency-relevant officers. Incontrast, municipal participation in crime preventionhas been promoted through government grant fundingprograms as well as the encouragement of municipalitiesto appoint specific personnel to promote this activity.

These personnel tend to be drawn from the communitydevelopment side of the municipal organisation. Inaddition, outer metropolitan and rural municipalities inVictoria are required under fire legislation to maintainmunicipal fire prevention committees. The role of thesecommittees is to devise treatment strategies related tothe fire risk in their municipal district and torecommend implementation to the municipality andother bodies.

All these safety-related activities promote a riskmanagement approach which commences with anassessment and evaluation of the risks which are facingthe communities of that municipality. There is a clearpossibility that a conscientious municipality mightundertake all the processes in isolation from each otherand duplicate not only the findings regarding risk, butalso the effort involved in undertaking the assessmentsand in devising and planning treatments.

The challengeThe challenge for municipalities in Victoria is that eachof these state-initiated programs, whether statutory orfunded, calls for a specific committee in every localgovernment to promote and administer it. Each one alsopromotes a holistic approach to problem identificationand solving without full acknowledgment thatmunicipalities may already be engaged in very similarprograms and projects under slightly different banners.And each has to report independently.

This is made more complex by the fact that many of theprograms which promote safety can overlap, can besimilar, and could draw upon the others’ programs andtheir proponents to contribute to their own objectives.For example, it would be feasible for those people who

CrimeMunicipalEmergency

ManagementPlanning

Committee

Managingresidual risk

Specialist risktreatment teams

IDENTIFYING RISKS

TREATMENT RISKS

PLANNING FOREMERGENCIES

Communitysafety risk

identificationand assessment

group(s)Road Safety

Fire

Flood

IsolatedElderly

PublicHealth

Emergency Aspects

Emergency Aspects

Emergency Aspects

Figure 2. Integrated Community Safety and Emergency Operations Planning Model.

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routinely visit elderly people in their homes to add asmall component to their visit to explore and promotefire safety issues.

Model for integrating communitysafety planningWhat is needed is an integrated, holistic process forlocal government community safety planning andpractice which is not only efficient and effective, but also

• responsive to the legislation and/or fundingconditions required by state government;

• manageable and managed by local governmentpersonnel, so it is ‘owned’ and not simply run out ofa sense of duty; and

• capable of contributing to key objectives as anelement of municipal core business.

This represents a strong argument for integrating at themunicipal level the planning and execution of programswhich promote community resilience and well-being.

The model represented in Figure 2 is being promoted toVictorian local governments (Office of EmergencyServices Commissioner 2001) as a way in which theycan operate a community safety process which assists inmeeting the criteria set out above. Implementing thismodel requires municipalities to interpret, for their ownresources, structures, and communities, the stategovernment’s expectations for managing the variousaspects of community safety. It therefore promotes theprinciple of diversity—local structures devising localsolutions for local problems (Wheatley 1997).

The model draws on the simplified representation ofrisk management identified in Figure 1, above, in whichthe key elements (in respect of organising the planningprocess) are:

• Identify, analyse, and prioritise risks

• Treat risks

• Acknowledge existence of residual risks

• Plan and prepare for emergency operational activities

The first activity, that of identifying, analysing, andprioritising risks, should be a holistic activity, coveringas broad a range of community safety risks as themunicipality wishes. This is a major activity, and shouldnot take place too frequently – once per three- to five-year period may be appropriate. It needs a reasonableamount of knowledge and expertise to obtain andinterpret data from a number of sources, includinggovernment or research institutions that gather statisticson health, emergencies or crime, and to segment it on amunicipal basis. In addition, information from alldepartments of the municipal organisation can providevaluable insights into the community including possiblypeople at higher than normal risk, the local area and its

hazards, and existing hazard-relevant planning andbuilding controls.

A common presentation basis using a GeographicInformation System (GIS) would facilitate interpretationand understanding, and assist in identifying areas ofheightened risk. It must be acknowledged in thiscontext that identifying, for mapping purposes, thecharacteristics of communities which indicate resilienceand/or vulnerability is currently at an early stageof development.

This first stage is not isolated in terms of people orinformation from the other stages. Risk is evaluated withreference to treatment strategies already in place. On thediagram in Figure 2, the first stage is represented ashaving an interactive relationship with the second stage,that of treating risks. The first stage results in adetermination by the municipality in association with itspartners of the high priority risks affecting the relevantarea and its communities which are to be addressed byrisk reduction activities.

The next stage is the allocation of risk reduction tasks tothose in the best position to address them. In thediagram, this is managed through specialist risk teamsdifferentiated by hazard type (e.g., fire, flood, or roadaccident). However, the separation of risk treatmentteams implied by the diagram is not desirable. Rather,there should be a degree of common membershipand/or an overarching structure within which each teaminteracts, to ensure that there is exploration of thepossibilities for common action. The common actionwould be specifically directed to enhancement ofcommunity capacity as a means of reducing risk.

The activity on the right side of the model is planningand preparedness for emergencies, given the existence ofresidual risk and the expectation that emergencies willoccur. This is the traditional role of municipalemergency management planning committees inVictoria; their membership made up of municipalitiesand emergency service representatives makes them well-suited for this purpose.

This model clearly places new demands on theadministration of the municipality to manage the variouselements, stages, and bodies involved. However, it isimportant to note that not all possible risks need to betreated in all places and all times—the process of riskprioritisation is important. In addition, there areefficiency gains to be made throughout the wholeprocess which could provide a payoff for the extraadministrative effort involved.

The emphasis is on local process. The skills are those ofnetworking, consultation, and problem-solving, wherepeople are provoked and empowered to identify andaddress their local safety issues with the support of

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emergency services and other organisations withnecessary knowledge and expertise.

It is acknowledged that this model is yet to be exploredin-depth by municipalities on a practical basis. It hasbeen put forward on the basis that municipal emergencymanagement planning ought not be an isolatedautonomous activity and would benefit greatly by beingincorporated into a larger stream of activities.

ConclusionAs with any evolutionary process, the directionsoutlined in this paper may not all lead to an improvedfuture safety for communities and more efficient andeffective multiagency planning processes. Change alwaysrequires a letting go of the familiar previous practice.For busy people whose commitment to municipalemergency management is generally part-time, the effortto grapple with something they have to partially inventthemselves can be difficult to justify. Nonetheless, thereare those who are prepared to take up the challenge ofdiscovery, and whose experience will be instrumental inthe development and refinement of the way forward.

ReferencesBritton, Neil R. 2001 ‘A New Emergency Management for aNew Millennium?’ Australian Journal of Emergency Management16: 44–54.

Crondstedt, Mal. 2002. ‘Prevention, Preparedness, Response,Recovery: An Outdated Concept?’ Australian Journal ofEmergency Management 17: 10–13.

Dynes, Russell R. 1994 ‘Community Emergency Planning:False Assumptions and Inappropriate Analogies.’ InternationalJournal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters 12: 141–158.

Emergency Management Act. 1986. (Victoria). Part 4.

Emergency Management Australia. 1993. CommonwealthCounter Disaster Concepts and Principles Australian CounterDisaster Handbook No. 1. Second Edition.

———. 2000. Emergency Risk Management Applications Guide.Australian Emergency Manual Part II, Vol. 1.

———. 2001. Reducing the Community Impact of Landslides.Australian Emergency Manual Part III, Vol. 3, Guide 8.

Esplin, Bruce N. 2000. Repositioning Emergency Management ina Larger Context. Presentation to Essential Services DisruptionSeminar, Melbourne 8–9 May 2000. [Online]. Available:http://www.ema.gov.au/4edutrainresearch/repositioning.html[2 September 2002].

Hays, Walter. 1999. ‘The IDNDR in Perspective.’ Pp 276–279in Natural Disaster Management: A Presentation to Commemoratethe International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction, editedby Jon Ingleton. Leicester, UK: Tudor Rose Holdings, Ltd.

International Strategy for Disaster Reduction. 1999. A SaferWorld in the 21st Century: Disaster and Risk Reduction. IDNDRProgramme Forum, Geneva. [Online]. Available:http://www.unisdr.org/unisdr/safer.htm [5 September 2002].

National Governors’ Association. 1979. State ComprehensiveEmergency Management: Final Report of the EmergencyPreparedness Project 1978. Washington, DC: Defence CivilPreparedness Agency.

Office of the Emergency Services Commissioner. 2001.‘Municipal Emergency Management Planning Guidelines.’ Part3 of Emergency Management Manual Victoria, Melbourne.

Salter, John. 1995. ‘Disasters as Manifestations ofVulnerability.’ Australian Journal of Emergency Management 10:8–16.

Standards Australia. 1999. Risk Management: AS/NZS4360:1999. Joint Australian/New Zealand Standard preparedby the Joint Technical Committee OB/. Strathfield, NSW:Standards Association of Australia.

Wheatley, Margaret. 1997 Goodbye, Command and Control.[Online]. Available:http://www.pfdf.org/leaderbooks/l2l/summer97/wheatley97.html [20 March 2002].

AuthorPaul GabrielEmergency Management PolicyOffice of the Emergency Services Commissioner55 St. Andrews PlaceGPO Box 4356QQMelbourne, Victoria [email protected]

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Reframing risk, hazards,disasters, and daily life:

A report of research into local1 appreciation of

risks and threats

* The authors have collaborated on a number of research activities, teaching programs, consultancies, and operational matters over the pastfive years. These activities have been, and continue to be, across Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

By Philip Buckle2, Graham Marsh and Sydney Smale*

This paper introduces a series of research projects inwhich we have been engaged examining a numberof issues related to contemporary disastermanagement since 1999 (Marsh, Smale, and Buckle1999; Buckle, Marsh, and Smale 2001a, 2001b,2002). These research projects, supported by ourown agencies and Emergency ManagementAustralia, have at their core an examination of theconcepts of community, localness, risk, hazard,vulnerability, and resilience and everyday life.3 Theresults of completed research projects are availableeither from the authors, from the Department ofHuman Services (DHS) or from EmergencyManagement Australia (EMA). All documents areavailable on request by email [email protected], acknowledging the centrality of theseconcepts, there are two caveats. First, while there isagreement on how these terms are defined, there isoften not a good understanding of the internalstructure, mechanisms, and dynamics of theseconcepts. For example, there is agreement thatcommunity is a core disaster management (DM)concept, but whether in practice this refers to issuessuch as community as locality, community as interestgroup, or community as demographic group (genderor age, for example) is often not clear. Second, thelinkages and interactions between these core

concepts are not well understood, either. How docommunities (however defined) define and deal withrisk?; how does risk translate to vulnerability (or viceversa)?; and, how are resilience and vulnerabilitylinked or dependent (if they are)?In the first research project (Marsh et al. 1999), forthe Department of Human Services, we worked toidentify which groups in the community wereespecially vulnerable.4 In our second research project,conducted for EMA, we talked with local peopleacross Victoria about the perception andunderstanding of disaster, hazard, risk, andvulnerability among agencies and communities.In our third project, also for EMA, we asked thequestion of local agencies and municipalities, whythey frequently did not use the documents,guidelines, and resources used to encourage,support, and direct risk, vulnerability and resilienceassessments. In our current project, also for EMA, weare trying to identify and describe any linkages thatmay exist at municipal and local levels betweencommunity capacity building and DM capability. Thislast project is being managed using a comparativemethod using case studies in Australia and theUnited Kingdom.

BackgroundDisaster management in Australia and in other locationswithin the developed and developing worlds is in theprocess of moving from a hazard management paradigm(where the focus of policy and program attention is on

1. In this context, local refers to individuals or small groups that are not professional disaster managers and that are active at the municipallevel or lower levels of social organization.

2. At the start of this research program Philip Buckle was the Manager, State Emergency Recovery Unit in the Department of HumanServices, Victoria, Australia; he is now Academic Leader, Cranfield Disaster Management Centre in the United Kingdom.

3. Each of these core concepts has its definition, or in some cases many definitions, and we do not propose to review them here. Wegenerally accept the definitions given in the glossary prepared by Emergency Management Australia as working definitions. All we needto observe at this point is that these concepts are central to current thinking in disaster management (DM).

4. Prior to clear and resolved definition of terms, the everyday use of language (which often has agreed-upon definitions which have veryfuzzy boundaries) seems to force us into this perceived and sometimes actual circularity of expression.

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management of the perceived hazard agent), though arisk management paradigm (where efforts are directedmore comprehensively to both hazards and impacts andto the development of strategies that may be directed ata range of mitigation, response, and recovery options)through to (so we would argue) a consequencemanagement paradigm where effort and attention isdirected at putting greater emphasis on understanding,prioritising, and dealing with the full range ofconsequences. These are not fully logically consistentor exclusive categories, but public administration isas much about achieving results as it is aboutintellectual coherence.

As part of this movement through a series ofmanagement paradigms there has been an increasingunderstanding and acceptance of the concepts of risk,vulnerability, and resilience, but especially there hasbeen an increasing acknowledgement of communityright to be engaged in the DM process and of thecontribution that the community can make toDM policy and practice. This critical development hasbeen driven in part by the political process ofcommunity activation, in part by an increasingemphasis on rights and participation as key elements inDM thinking and practice, and partly by the directexperience that community engagement is anindispensable tool in effective management and policydevelopment. Nonetheless, there is still not a goodunderstanding on the part of disaster managers of thesignificance and meaning that these concepts and of therealities they have for local people.

Origin of the studiesIn June 1998 there were major floods in East Gippsland,a remote and sparsely populated rural area in easternVictoria. These floods confronted the local communityand the recovery management team with particularproblems. An economic, environmental, and socialcontext which include severe drought in the years up toand including 1998, recent Ovine Johnnes disease, adownturn in agricultural commodity markets as well asa diverse population – aging farmers in the hinterland,retirees along the coast, urban populations in the east ofthe municipality – combined to make this a uniquesituation. Understanding the context, vulnerabilities,and capacities of the affected population took some timeeven after it was recognised that we were not dealingwith a homogeneous population.

Three months later an industrial accident at Victoria’sonly domestic and industrial gas processing plant, runby Esso in Gippsland, left 1.8 million households out ofa total number of about 2.1 million without gas. Againthe significance of this loss was not immediatelyperceived. The focus of attention was on managing thefire at the damaged processing plant, but over a fewdays it became obvious that maintaining critical facilities

such as hospitals reliant on gas for heating, laundry,sterilising, and other critical functions was of equalneed. Further, it rapidly became apparent that, apartfrom industrial needs for plants and commercialactivities dependent on gas for industrial processes,cooking, and the like, there was a very vulnerablepopulation that itself was diverse. Two hundred peopleon gas-powered life support systems, people receivingpalliative care, the incontinent and new born babiesrequiring washing facilities, the frail elderly needingheating, and people with skin disorders requiringregular and frequent bathing were among the groups ofpeople dependent on gas.

These events prompted an increasing awareness of thediversity of groups at risk and of the range ofvulnerabilities. With this improving knowledge, workbegan early in 1999 to prepare for any possibleY2K disruption. Although no significant events occurredin the transition to the new millennium, the work inpreparedness, risk assessment, community consultation,and vulnerability analysis was profitable in that itincisively informed the planning process for otherdisaster potentialities.

This work paid dividends in better informingpreparedness and risk reduction activities, not just for‘traditional’ natural disasters such as windstorms andwildfires, but also for widespread, socially disruptive,and potentially disastrous events such as electricitysupply disruption. In Victoria, electricity generation innow privatised, and it appears that private companiesmay have little economic incentive to provide the safetynet margin of productive capacity that existed whenownership of utilities was in public hands. As a result, attimes of peak demand (during hot days in summerwhen air conditioners exact a heavy toll on the availableelectricity supply), ‘brown-outs’ and in some conditionsactual power outages may occur. This has necessitatedthe development of sophisticated schedules for thereduction in use of electricity and, in parallel, thedevelopment of exemption criteria for groups most atrisk in circumstances where power is not available.

MethodThe studies we are discussing form a deliberatesuccession: first an analysis of vulnerability and riskappreciation, second an analysis of why risk andvulnerability assessment tools are or are not used, andthird how community capability to manage disasters canbe improved. However, given the absence of a robustand rigorous body of knowledge and theory about theseconcepts and issues, our work has been in partexploratory, in part speculative, to identify key issuesand to stimulate debate on these critical subjects.The methods we have used have reflected the prioritywe have given to exploration and (initial) description asprecursors to analysis and theory building, and we

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recognise their limitations while also acknowledging thatthey have been appropriate for the current stateof knowledge.

Each study has been started with an exhaustive reviewof the literature. Many people have contributed to animproved understanding of the issues, but no one, inour view, has developed models that link risk,vulnerability, resilience and day-to-day life in a coherentand puissant framework, nor have any analyticalframeworks or models emerged that have managed todeal with the complex interactions of daily life, riskmanagement, and disaster management in ways whichallow for the linkage and integration of these issuesbetween individual, group, community and systemlevels. Of course, at local levels where the focus will beon discrete groups such as family units, clans, and tribesor geographically defined communities, this may notmatter. But for policy development at regional, state, andnational levels, a coherent framework is an imperative.

Following the literature review we employed a variety ofmethods, each with their strengths and weaknesses buteach able to help in the triangulation process.Employing a grounded theory approach of recursiveexamination, development, and refinement ofknowledge and query and framed within aninterpretivist method, we began first with a modifiedDelphi technique calling upon experts in the field ofdisaster management to provide their views. Someexperts were interviewed individually, others as part ofa group. We employed a structured approach tointerviews and then, as the interview progressed, movedinto a semistructured approach. Interviews and groupmeetings were repeated with some key informants.These experts were drawn from public administration,encompassing areas of policy formulation, programdevelopment, disaster management, and planning, aswell as from comparable areas in municipal governmentand also from the academic world in Australia, theUnited Kingdom, the United States, and Canada.

Participant observation was another technique that weemployed, although infrequently given that our researchinterest focused on local people and municipal officersrather than agency officers with whom we interacted ona daily basis but to whom we were known. Weconducted a series of focus groups in ten municipalitiesacross Victoria. These municipalities included rural,urban/rural fringe, and metropolitan municipalities withthese subdivided into those that had recent experienceof disasters and those that had no recent experience.We also used a case study method and looked at anumber of municipalities that had recent experience ofsignificant disasters.

Research findings from project 1:Assessment of community impactsThis project set out to identify and describe the groupsof people most at risk from major utility disruption, buttook into account also vulnerability to natural disasters.We acknowledged that certain groups of people, such asthe elderly, disabled, and very young, might beparticularly at risk. These groups, as we acknowledged,are traditionally thought of as being vulnerable.We identified a range of other groups who might also beat particular risk. These included the homeless, thosewithout existing resources, travellers and tourists, aswell as people who have been affected by the events(emergent vulnerabilities).

It is not entirely trite to say that we are all vulnerable inparticular ways in specific circumstances, although itmay be a blunt instrument for policy development.However, it is the case that we are all vulnerable to arange of events, and we are all vulnerable in a range ofways, including loss of life, injury, loss of home, and lossof livelihood, and trauma.

We indicated in this report, which by its brief wasexploratory and descriptive, that vulnerability iscontingent not only upon the inherent characteristics ofthe subject but also on the local circumstances. In thissense vulnerability (and with it the related concepts ofrisk and resilience) is relative, not simply in the sensethat each person or social entity is vulnerable indifferent ways but that vulnerability varies across time,space, and activity.

Research findings from project 2:Assessment of personal andcommunityResilience and vulnerabilityThe results from our first study, local appreciation ofrisks and disasters, surprised us but were notinconsistent with much sociological research into choice,risk perception, and the ‘overheads’ of everyday life.It was clear from our discussions and interviews withlocal people that their appreciation of risks and hazardswas clearly disparate with the assessment of DMprofessionals. The risks associated with hazards such asfire and flood were demonstrably of less significancethan threats associated with the practicalities ofnavigating a course through daily life. No oneunderestimated the potential of hazards such as wildfireto disrupt life and health. But given their lowprobability, particularly relative to the likelihood of therisks of maintaining a mortgage, managing children’seducation, and sustaining a healthy, vibrant communityand environment, they scored low compared with moremundane (as assessed by DM professionals) risks.

It was particularly important that local people tooka much more strategic approach to risk assessment than

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did DM professionals. Local people looked to thehorizon to see demographic changes, changes to theenvironment, changes to farming and business practices,and the loss of young people to large urban centres asthe critical issues in risk and safety management. Localpeople saw the underlying structure to their riskenvironment, whereas DM professionals saw topicalissues and risks and failed to see the social andeconomic determinants of safety and sustainable living.Of course, agencies and their staff are invariablyconstrained by their mandate to focus on particularissues and risks, and this leaves them unable to focuson others.

Sense of place, history and contextOn reflection it may be no surprise that local people hada sense of place as a geographic area, but also as a socialspace defined by a set of values and shared aspirations.This is linked to a sense of history, most strongly in ruralareas where population changes are least, and if not ofa sense of communal destiny, of a feeling for a directionin community development. This is paralleled by a senseof contemporary activity such as recent and continuingeconomic trends, demographic trends (particularlyimmigration and emigration from the area), andactivities that harm or sustain the natural environment.

Sense of daily lifeWithin the broader context of purposeful and oftendriven direction, people had a pragmatic appreciationof the exigencies, labours, and rewards of daily life.The necessity of meeting mortgage payments, managingchildren’s education, sustaining a social life, and otherequally necessary but often mundane activities set thecontemporary context in which attention to risks fromnatural and nonnatural hazards was merely anotheractivity to be managed in sustaining family andcommunity life.

Local hopes and fearsDaily life and its maintenance provide a foreground tolife, but they are intertwined and coloured by hopes,aspirations, and fears about the future and about therealisation of personal, family, and community goals.These hopes and fears are the counterbalance to thepracticalities of day-to-day existence, and as such theyprovide the goals for which people aim. Missing thetarget was not seen to be significantly affected byhazards and disasters. Broader social and economicprocesses were felt to have more influence on desiredfutures. These issues therefore formed and set theboundary to the context in which local peopleunderstand hazards and disasters.

Local understanding of hazards and risksLocal people had an understanding of hazards to whichthey and their communities are exposed that wassophisticated and comprehensive. They understood

better than agencies the range of hazards to which theyare exposed and also the potential outcomes (risks) towhich they were exposed when confronted by thehazard agents. In particular, they had a morecomprehensive understating of environmental hazardsand risks to farming and economic processes than didagencies. Local people understood that environmental,social, and economic processes work over decades andgenerations and that, while particular outcomes may notbe predicted, it is possible to foresee that profoundstructural changes may occur to the community whenexposed to the tides of long-term processes.

Local changes: thresholds and rates of changeIt became clear in our meetings and discussions withlocal people that change was often discontinuous andunpredictable. For example, local sporting clubs cansurvive (more or less) down to a critical point which isusually the minimum number of players to field a team.Once membership falls below this critical number, theclub disappears. In a sense, therefore, the club existsand functions, or it odes not exist. There is no middleground, no gray area, and no ambiguity. Local capacityis affected by this step-like approach to change.

Local changes: predictability of outcomesLinked to the notion of thresholds is the issue ofpredictability. Numerous changes have consequencesthat are not easily foreseeable. For instance, a scheme tobuy back land from flood-affected farmers assistedfarmers with cash and finances for their future, but itremoved people from the local community as theymoved off to the coast or large cities for retirement. Thisweakened the local community and further reduced itscoping capacity. This is particularly the case withpopulation reduction, which reduces the pool of peopleavailable to provide volunteer services. The rural fireservices, rural emergency services, and support servicesdepend almost entirely on local volunteers. Any measurewhich encourages people to move away (and often thisencouragement is given with altruistic intent) weakensthe local community.

Significance of lossesThe losses to which people and communities areexposed range from the loss of physical infrastructure,through material assets such as houses, throughintangible losses such as mementoes and memorabilia aswell as health and safety, through to intangible or evenindefinable losses such as loss of community, loss oftrust, loss of hope, and loss of peace of mind. Theseintangible, irreversible, and uninsurable losses are heldby most local people to be more important than the lossof physical, material items that may be replaced.Replacement, of course, comes at a financial cost, but itis achievable.

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Significance of disastersDisasters as periodic but unpredictable events wereacknowledged by local people to be potentially serious,but the implicit risk assessment they carried outsuggested that the risk (as a function of probability andseverity of consequence) was generally less than that ofmore probable but, for any particular occurrence, lessimportant event.

Divergence of agency and local prioritiesThe conclusions suggested from the results indicatedabove showed that agencies, mandated by legislation,government policy, political expediency, and agencytradition, had a different view of hazards and risks tolocal people and to local communities. This is notintended to either denigrate or devalue the agencyassessment, but rather to point out that this divergenceexists and must be accounted for in policy developmentand planning if disaster management is to be effective.

Issues for disaster managementThe issues that were identified by this project that aremost relevant for more effective disaster management,and in particular for disaster management that isresponsive to community needs and priorities, are:

Remoteness and Communications. The absence of easyaccess to services and to elected representatives and theabsence or access only to intermittent services that aredependable was a recurrent theme.

Youth and Community Futures. The future of localcommunities, faced with the fact of the emigration ofyoung people to large metropolitan centres, wasfrequently expressed concern for rural areas. Thisemigration in the long term threatened communityviability and in the short-term reduced the capacity todeal with hazards and risks by reducing the numberof available volunteers for fire and otheremergency services.

Change to Society and Environment. Other socialchanges, such as the perceived (but often incorrect)assumption of immigration of new types of people, anaging population, net emigration, and other changes,as well as changes to the environment through changedagricultural practice, tree plantations using new species,and other developments reduced the capacity to rely onexisting and traditional methods of risk reduction.

Change to the Local Economic Base. Rural economicdecline in both absolute terms (though perhapsoccasioned by social developments such as an agingpopulation) and in relative terms when compared tothe increasing dominance of large urban centres reducedthe capacity of rural communities to manage hazardsand risks in ways that they thought appropriate and inways that allowed them to deal with new andemerging threats.

Thresholds. Our research also suggested that socialcapacity may not decline linearly but may decline in astep-like manner, and that this loss of capacity may notbe easy to foresee. For example, sports clubs and churchcongregations are likely to have levels (well above zeromembers) below which they are not viable, but thedemarcation line between viability and irreversible andrapid or immediate collapse is very thin and may not beapparent before the event.

Local Capacity. Ability to manage hazards and risks iscritically dependent on local capacity in areas ofresources (including personnel), skills, and knowledge.Local people were inventive in tailoring existingcapacities and in developing new strategies andmethods, but the eventual success of long-termeffectiveness was ultimately dependent on local capacity;this was often reported to be in accelerating decline.

Long-Term Development. Social, economic, andenvironmental development was recognised by localcommunities (and is increasingly being acknowledgedby disaster management agencies) as central to thebuilding of capacity but also to the reduction of riskthrough incorporating mitigation into development,betterment into infrastructure projects to reduce theirvulnerability to identified impact thresholds, and toincorporating sustainability into the fabric ofcommunity life.

Research findings from project 3:Assessing the implementation ofcommunity resilience andvulnerability analysisThis project focused on an assessment of whethervarious materials (such as videos, pamphlets, andguidelines) and training programs on disastermanagement planning (and weighted towards recoveryplanning) and vulnerability and resilience assessmenthad had any effect, whether this effect was positive ornegative, and in any case (positive, no effect, ornegative) why this was. The focus of this study was onmunicipal officers but also included regional officersfrom government agencies and nongovernmentalorganisations.

Our study concluded that the various productsindividually had had little influence on planningactivities. Cumulatively, they had contributed over timeto a general awareness of the need for risk andvulnerability assessment. The manifest issues are setout below.

Confusing definitions: vulnerability and disasterIt was clear that municipal and regional officers were notclear about the defined meanings of key terms as thesewere used by central agency staff or by the researchcommunity. This confusion over meanings and

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significance attenuated the message that such conceptsare central to understanding disaster causation andremedy.

Time and resource constraintsAlthough it appears mundane (and perhaps even trivial),this factor in the low uptake of risk and vulnerabilityassessment (and the low responsiveness to supportingmaterial) was pivotal. Most officers are too busy andmany commented that over recent years they havebecome significantly busier. This has lead them to focuson management by crisis (dealing with issues as theyapproach a deadline or point of failure) or to focus onmeeting legislative requirements first. Both thesepositions are dictated by necessity, often by legalrequirements, and both seem quite rational, purposive,and efficacious in the face of insufficient resources andtime to do all tasks. Given that disasters are infrequentand improbable events, it is comprehensible that priorityresources are directed at frequent and foreseeable threatseven if they are individually of less import. Of course,the cumulative impact of many day-to-day events ifpoorly managed may exceed the impact of rare butlarge-scale disasters. This issue in particular tied in withthe finding from our previous research that day-to-daylife usually takes precedence over spectacular butinfrequent events.

Existing data sourcesCounterbalancing the general inability or reluctance toundertake risk and vulnerability assessment (thoughthere was a common agreement that in themselves thesewere worthy activities) was the capacity of municipaland agency managers to draw upon existing knowledgebases, data sources, and practices and to rapidly meldthese into vulnerability assessments in real time. Whenan event occurred or seemed imminent, staff had accessto information that could with some precision identifygroups at risk and local capacities. This capacity drewheavily on the competence and professionalismmanagers and their staff, but seemed a capacity that wasshared by all the municipalities and agencies with whichwe met. This real time assessment is not ideal, especiallyas the ability to make the assessment may be affected bythe impact itself, but it went some way in practicalterms to ameliorating the absence of forward planning.

Dealing with uncertainty and improbabilityManagers and their agencies are often not comfortabledealing with uncertainty. This applies in many differentways to disasters, which may be characterised as eventswith a high inherent uncertainty. The lack of definiteboundaries (what is or is not an emergency or disaster),the lack of predictability of occurrence, the uncertaintyabout location, size, and extent, and the contingentuncertainty about appropriate meliorative activity actedas inhibitors to agency staff. Planning for the definiteeven if the planning process is complex is more

desirable and more easily accepted cognitively andemotionally than planning for the improbable.Issues forDisaster Management

Managing Uncertainty. Officers with responsibility fordisaster planning and management need to be giventraining and special support in dealing with uncertaintyas a central element of social life. At the same time theyneed to be supported by senior management in makingdecisions to allocate resources to planning for highconsequence, low probability events. Senior managerscan give critical support in indicating whether disastermanagement planning and associated activities such asrisk and vulnerability assessment is to be given apriority. Senior officer mandates would resolve a sourceof doubt and uncertainty for many middle managers.

Workloads, Direction, and Resources. At the same timeas providing strategic direction, additional resources, orreduced workloads, are needed if risk and vulnerabilityare to be properly assessed. Competing demands forresources inadequate to meet all those demands oftenresults in all tasks being completed suboptimally.

Existing Knowledge. Existing knowledge and datasources can be tapped rapidly to provide indicativerisk and vulnerability assessments. These sources needto be identified and catalogued as metadata; this wouldsave considerable time and effort in preparing moredetailed assessments.

Integrating Expertise. Parallel with using existingknowledge is the benefit from integrating existingexpertise, which typically is held in different parts oforganisations. Our research indicated that socialservices, planning, environmental services, engineeringand physical infrastructure, and public health servicescould all contribute to a comprehensive risk andvulnerability assessment of an agencies clients. But thiswas rarely achieved in practice; at best it occurred as anafterthought. However, all our respondents indicatedthat there were synergies to this type of interaction aswell as better coverage of the risk landscape. This isa planning strategy that is dependent on seniorofficer mandate.

Research project 4: Development ofcommunity capacityAssessment methodology as applying todisaster management capabilityThis project is underway at the moment, and we havenot reached any definitive conclusions; indeed, notentative conclusions. Our hypothesis is that communitycapability building projects that embrace social, health,environmental, economic, and infrastructure issues cancontribute to enhanced disaster management capacity.This is presaged in part on the notion intrinsic tocapability that it is sustainable, and this concept is nowentering the language of disaster management. But we

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suspect that particular activities can do more thanpromote sustainability in so far as they can directly andin specific and discernible ways contribute to particulardisaster management skills, knowledge, and resources.

It our supposition also that this increased disastermanagement capacity will not come in the form of, orbe derived from, additional resources. These are notlikely to be forthcoming in the short-term exceptperhaps as targeted, time-limited government subsidies.However, improved knowledge of local skills, sharedknowledge, and improved linkages and networks maycontribute significantly to local capacity. This capacitymay not be improved significantly in the area ofoperations, which is crucially dependent on physicalresources, but may be much strengthened in areas oflocal contribution to policy advice and development,risk perception and risk analysis, and vulnerability andresilience assessment.

We expect to conclude this project in mid-2003.A further comparative study between Australia, theUnited Kingdom, and the United States or Canada isthen proposed to provide triangulation and theevaluation of our conclusions from societies that sharemany similarities in their value systems, socialorganisation and behaviour, and disaster managementarrangements.

ConclusionMany of the conclusions we drew from our research arealready known in the developing world, especially inrelation to values, beliefs, and behaviour at local leveland how these are relevant to disaster management. Inthis sense our conclusions simply confirm much otherresearch. It appears to us that disaster managementagencies need to address some critical matters if they areto progress with a better understanding of local andcommunity responses to risks and disasters and if theyare to improve disaster management effectiveness.

These issues include, but are not confined to:

1. The current demand for local and communityengagement in the disaster management process hasits basis in civic rights, the duties and responsibilitiesof citizens, as well as the practical issue that disastermanagement is only fully effective when thecommunity is an active participant. However, giventhe responsibilities and commitments of day-to-daylife and such competing priorities as managingfamilies and employment, it may well be the case thatengagement in disaster management will rarely begiven a high priority by local people. They may argue(in our view, with at least partial justification) that itis the role of government to protect its citizens. Inany case, local capacity to commit a large amount oftime and effort to unlikely events is not high.Governments need to be clear about what they canexpect from citizens in dealing with unlikely eventsthat, in competition with day-to-day matters, have a

low priority. This is apart from the argument that thedrive to engage the community may be a covertmeans of shifting responsibility and costs fromgovernment onto local people.

2. Incorporating local assessments of risks into theplanning process, not only so that local issues can beaddressed but also so that a proper priority can beestablished for the planning and management ofevents which are traditionally considered to be‘disasters’ such as fires and floods.

3. Understanding local values so that sustainablecommunities can be built that encompass thesevalues in ways, which allow for the realisticmanagement of the spectrum of risks faced by, andperceived to be faced by, local communities.

4. Moving from a response-based approach (which stillinclines to a focus on the hazard agent as the objectto be controlled) and a command and control modelof management to an approach which recognises thatmanaging consequences, and developing responseoptions and mechanisms on the basis of acomprehensive risk assessment, will lead toimprovements in the engagement of local people inthe management of the risks that they face.

Finally, we would like to acknowledge all those peoplewho worked with us in this research, as collaborators,partners, advisors, and contributors and as interviewees.Often an individual filled many of the roles. We learnedearly on that people in disaster-affected communities areoften inundated with well-intentioned researchers. Well-intentioned they may be, but this does not make the nthor nth + 10 research team any easier to deal with. But allthe people we interviewed were gracious and providedus with many new insights.

ReferencesBuckle, Philip, Graham Marsh, and Sydney Smale. 2001a.Assessment of Personal and Community Resilience andVulnerability. Emergency Management Australia Project15/2000.

———. 2001b. Assessing Resilience and Vulnerability:Principles, Strategies and Actions. Emergency ManagementAustralia Project 15/2000.

———. 2002. Assessing the Implementation of CommunityResilience and Vulnerability Analysis. Emergency ManagementAustralia Project 04/2001.

Marsh, Graham, Sydney Smale, and Philip Buckle. 1999.Community Issues Impact Group 1999: Report to the Departmentof Human Services, Victoria, Australia. Department of HumanServices.

Authors

Philip BuckleDisaster Management Centre, Cranfield UniversityShrivenham Campus, Swindon SN6 8LA, UNITED [email protected]

Graham L. MarshSchool of Social Science and Planning, RMIT UniversityGPO Box 2476V, Melbourne, Victoria 3001, [email protected]

Sydney SmaleState Coordinator for Disaster RecoveryVictorian Council of Churches, Victoria, AUSTRALIA

R

By John Handmer*

Loss assessments are undertaken to support decisions

about disaster mitigation. There is considerable

pressure to use economic principles and to make

such assessments a condition of funding for all

mitigation. A fundamental underlying assumption is

that loss assessments are accurate and comparable –

and that this accuracy makes comparisons more

valid. Unfortunately, it appears that this is not the

case. A key question concerns whether loss

assessments can be made accurate and comparable

through improved knowledge and training – as

implied by many critics of the approach – or whether

the problems are inherent in the idea of loss

assessment. Drawing primarily on Australian flood

loss assessment work, these issues are examined.

Results suggest that the uncertainties may be larger

than generally acknowledged, that at least some are

irreducible, and that comparisons may not be

assisted by improved accuracy. The implication is that

loss assessment methods should aim to make

comparisons valid and reliable rather than chase

unachievable precision.

The development and implementation of disastermitigation strategies have long relied on politicalsupport with occasionally some financial analysis.However, treasury and finance departments everywherehave always sought economic justification for anysignificant expenditure. Now, in many jurisdictions,these government entities have increased influence andare demanding that expenditure be based on case-by-case sound economic justification. Sound economic

analysis is desired so that there is confidence thatexpenditure is worthwhile, and importantly that theexpenditure is worthwhile compared with othermitigation proposals.

There are strong assumptions here about the accuracyand comparability of loss assessments. Cochrane (1991)among others has argued that economic loss assessmentin disaster management has been of highly variable andoften very low quality. The development and applicationof cost-benefit analysis has been matched byoutpourings of criticism – generally directed at theeconomic and other methodological assumptionsunderpinning the approach including its sensitivity toassumptions about the future, in particular the way thefuture is discounted, and the inherent bias of manyassessments against what is difficult to measure – withthe result that the approach supports measurement ofproperty rather than human capital losses, and favoursstructural mitigation in flood risk management.

A key question concerns whether loss assessments basedon economic principles can be made accurate andcomparable through improved knowledge and training –as implied by many critics of the approach – or whetherthe problems are inherent in the idea of loss assessment.This is not the only issue. Loss assessment does not takeplace on the basis of sound datasets and modelling asdocumented by, among others, Blong (2002), Cutter(2001), and Granger (2002).

A major project undertaken recently for the Australianstate of Queensland (Handmer, Read, and Percovich2002) highlighted a range of issues – somemethodological and some of a more public-policy nature– which help answer the above question. This paperbuilds on this and other work, and takes it further bysuggesting a way of managing the problem of inherentuncertainties.

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The chimera of precision: Inherent uncertainties

in disaster loss assessment

* Much of the work reported here was undertaken with support from the Queensland Department of Emergency Services, EmergencyManagement Australia, and RMIT University as part of the ‘Assessing the Economic Losses from Disasters’ project. Their support isgratefully acknowledged. Thanks are due to Lesley Galloway and Alice Zamecka of the Department of Emergency Services and to OliverPercovich, Cassia Read, Heidi Ellemor, and Sam Downing of the Centre for Risk and Community Safety at RMIT University. The ideaswere initially presented at the Social Perspectives on Disaster workshop held at the Emergency Management Australia Institute, Mt.Macedon, July 2002. My thanks to Andrew Coghlan who organized that meeting and to Joe Scanlon and others for useful suggestions.

Reasons for lack of accuracyLoss estimates typically vary greatly between similarevents, and estimates for the same event may varygreatly. This is the case whether the event beingexamined is hypothetical or has actually occurred.When assessing losses resulting from actual events,minor differences in hazard characteristics may result inmajor differences in loss. For example, flood depth maybe just below or just above a critical level – such as floorlevel or levee top.

Reasons for variations in estimates appear to fall intofour general categories:

1. the inherent complexity of loss assessments;

2. the level of knowledge. This includes lack of data fora specific event as well as vested interests (e.g., majorenterprises, land developers, environmental interests)emphasising certain types of data over others. Inaddition, it is often uncertain what data are beingused, and appropriate metadata are often unavailable(Cutter [2001] makes these comments for earthquakeloss assessment);

3. differences in the philosophy and approach broughtto the loss assessment – for example, is the need for arapid assessment for political purposes, a thorougheconomic analysis to persuade treasury officials,something to guide recovery planning, or deciding onmitigation between competing areas or betweencompeting proposals in the same area? Eachapproach and accompanying mindset will have itsown gaps and limitations; and

4. variations in the funds, expertise, and time availablefor assessments.

Appreciation of all four basic reasons is needed tounderstand why loss estimates vary and why theiraccuracy and comparability is an issue. It is reasonablyclear that lack of knowledge and variations in theavailable resources and expertise will affect the scopeand quality of assessments. It should also be clear thatassessments conducted for different purposes will oftenquite appropriately reach different results. Differentresults are reached in this context because, among otherthings, different levels of accuracy are required fordifferent purposes and because different assumptions aremade about losses by groups with different objectives.

This paper, however, deals with the first point: theinherent, or apparently inherent complexities andinaccuracies in loss assessments. It does this becausemany of the sources of and reasons for lack of precisionare not widely acknowledged. The paper first examinessome implications of using an economic approach,including issues surrounding assessment of mitigationalternatives. The identification and measurement oflosses is then discussed with the emphasis on thedifficulties involved with indirect and intangible losses –the assumption that stage-damage curves are reliable isquestioned; dealing with the underlying problems of

uncertainty in flood frequency determinations andpredictions about the future – both essential for cost-benefit analysis – is covered next; approaches toassessment follow, with comments on their dependenceon accurate information and their robustness in the faceof uncertainty; finally, the peculiarly Australian questionof converting ‘potential’ into ‘actual’ loss estimates isexamined. Flood loss assessment is used throughout toillustrate the issues.

What is an economic approach?Poor quality assessments do not occur because the basicprinciples and procedures are unknown. In fact, thefield of economic cost-benefit analysis was originallycodified for assessing whether flood mitigation proposalswere worthwhile in the U.S. Flood Control Act of 1936.The basic approach has been extended since and appliedto most areas of government activity. As far as hazardmitigation is concerned, economic assessment has beenextended the furthest in the U.K. and U.S. For decades,central government funds have been made available forflood works in the U.K. only if the proposals satisfycost-benefit criteria following government guidelines.Assessments there have generally followed the detailedapproach set out in handbooks prepared by MiddlesexUniversity’s Flood Hazard Research Centre (Penning-Rowsell and Chatterton 1977; Parker, Green, andThompson 1987; Penning-Rowsell et al. 1992). TheNational Academy of Sciences has published guidelinesin the U.S., and FEMA is developing a comprehensiveapproach to Natural Hazard Loss Estimation Methodologyor HAZUS (see www.fema.gov/hazus/fl_main.htm). TheU.S. General Accounting Office sets out its criteria for aneconomic loss assessment in its review of losses from theattacks on the World Trade Centre (U.S. GAO 2002).In Australia, the approach has been widely, if erratically,used and was codified by Thompson and Handmer(1996). Recently, the Australian Bureau of TransportEconomics has restated the principles of economic lossassessment and applied them in a national assessment,the Economic Costs of Natural Disasters in Australia(Bureau of Transport Economics 2001). Thesedocuments pay only limited attention to the gaps andlimitations in loss assessments.

Economic versus financial lossesThe principles of economics are different from thosegoverning financial accounting in private-sectorenterprises. However, few loss assessments satisfy thedemands of either economics (Cochrane 1991) orfinancial accounting.

The objective of an economic analysis is to assess theimpact of an event on the economy of the area selectedfor analysis (see Table 1). Such areas are usually largepolitical jurisdictions, such as countries or states, withresponsibility for economic management. Selection ofother areas, such as a region or town, involves a large

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degree of judgment and acceptance that much of theeconomic activity flowing into and out of the area willnot be captured. We are interested in the net economiccost of a disaster to the area. To calculate this net cost,all costs and benefits resulting from that event needto be identified and where possible quantified. Anysocial or environmental costs (known as intangibles,see below) must be identified and included in theeconomic analysis.

A financial analysis, on the other hand, is usuallyundertaken to assess the return or loss on an investmentfrom the perspective of a commercial enterprise(Table 1). Commercial enterprises are interested in theimpact of a disaster on their own profits rather than theimpact on the economy. Some impacts not counted as afinancial loss by a business affected by a disaster can becounted as losses to society. Such losses would generallyinclude all intangible losses, much of the disruptioncaused by disaster, and losses to the residential andgovernmental sectors. Similarly, there are financial lossesthat are not economic losses. For example, one companymay be forced to close following a disaster and therebylose its sales market, but others may then reap the lostbusiness, resulting in no net loss to the economy inquestion, apart from any extra costs incurred intransferring production. Similarly, tourists may canceltheir trips to an area impacted by disaster, but holidayelsewhere in the same country or region – with nonet loss to the economy. Such impacts dependon the structure and boundary of the economyunder consideration.

Insurance assessments can produce estimates higherthan those prepared using economic principles. This isbecause household insurance policies commonlyprovide ‘new for old’ replacement coverage for insuredlosses, whereas an economic analysis only counts themarket or depreciated value of goods lost or damaged.This comment applies to household insurance policies;it does not apply to insurance for vehicles, commerce,etc. Depreciated value can be thought of as the actualmarket value. For example, most new cars or computerslose value dramatically with time, so that a five-year-oldcar might be worth half its new value.

Use of economic approaches forassessing mitigation proposalsMitigation measures are implemented to reduce disasterlosses, and so the benefits of any disaster mitigationmeasure are assessed in terms of the losses expected tobe avoided by introducing that measure. Economicassessment is one of a number of decision support toolsfor mitigation proposals. But in practice it is often used

as the sole criterion for flood mitigation, especially inEngland and Wales, and for some projects funded by theU.S. federal government. Decision makers often ignorethe limitations of an economic approach and proceed asif the results of an analysis were near perfect. Table 2sets out some of the more common experiences withusing an economic approach for assessing mitigation.

The type of loss and the type of mitigation measuredetermine how complex it is going to be to include it inan economic assessment. Mitigation measures that try toprevent the disaster, such as levees or dams thatpositively exclude floods from an otherwise flood-pronearea or strict land use controls that exclude people fromhazardous areas, are relatively easy to assess as they willprevent almost all of the losses which would otherwisehave been expected. There are some caveats to thisgeneral picture. Of course, they will not prevent lossesabove their design level, but these can usually becalculated. If the measure is a structure such as a floodlevee, normally some allowance should be made for thechance that it might fail. We could add that even thiscalculation would normally assume perfect maintenance,whereas this is far from the case, and maintenance costsand difficulties are almost always underestimated.Political neglect, other priorities, new knowledge andrising standards making the original design obsolete arejust some of the reasons why maintenance difficultiesare underestimated. Where measures are likely toincrease exposure to the hazard, although at a reduced

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* A key element here is the ‘stocks and flows’ issue whereby damage to a physical asset (stock) should not be counted as well as loss ofprofits generated by that asset (flows), on the basis that one is a reflection of the other. Rose and Lim (2002) review the issue. This is notdealt with here except to note that, in a world dominated by human capital, the issue may not be so clear cut.

Table 1: Key elements of aneconomic approach to lossassessment, contrasted with theusual or financial approach.

Economic assessment is about:

• All members of a defined society or economy, notindividual firms;

• Economic efficiency for this defined economy, notcomponents within it;

• Depreciated rather than replacement values;

• Counting all impacts on the economy, both positiveand negative;

• Changes to economic activity as a result of thedisaster in the defined economy.

• Avoiding double counting, by counting losses once*and by not counting losses made up later or by otherbusinesses in the same economy.

Economic assessment is NOT about:

• Distributional affects;

• Commercial profit and loss.

risk – such as levees encouraging new development inthe newly protected areas – this should also be takeninto account as possibly leading to higher loss thanbefore if the levee is ever breached or over-topped.Mitigation measures may also create new hazards ortransfer the problem elsewhere rather thaneliminating it.

However, most disaster mitigation measures can onlyalter the outcome of the event by changing the patternor amount of loss, rather than preventing (or nearlypreventing) losses altogether. Assessment of measuresthat modify the disaster outcome, such as smaller scalebuilding modifications including floodproofing orretrofitting for earthquake and cyclone protection,may appear simple to assess, but compliance with theserequirements has to be estimated, and it may bevery low.

A similar problem of estimating compliance arises withmitigation measures which rely on public or commercialresponse such as warning systems, flood managementschemes, and other strategies open to interpretation andnegotiation, including most land use regulations. Thesemitigation measures are easily specified on paper, butthere is great uncertainty over how they work out inpractice – and the economic outcome will depend onthe reality of how well they work in the event ofa disaster. The issue here is the gap between writtenregulations and the realities of implementation(e.g., between the assumptions about near-perfectwarning message dissemination and the reality of patchydissemination and slow response).

Estimating the economic benefits of disaster mitigationis wholly dependent on predictions of the future. Yet, aswith predicting the level of compliance with regulations,predicting the future through forecasting land uses,

commodity prices, and environmental conditions is itselfhazardous and prone to uncertainty. Assuming that itwill be the same as the present is a typical and perhapsnecessary approach, but one which is usually incorrect.

Implications of using an economicapproachEconomic loss assessment counts the losses to the localeconomy as well as the benefits. Even if we could assesslosses perfectly – and we cannot – we would still befaced with the problem of identifying and thenestimating the benefits (or offsetting payments) resultingfrom the disaster for the area of assessment. This isparticularly important within a regional context, becausepostdisaster insurance and aid funds that flow into thearea may partly offset the tangible losses suffered –something that is unusual at the national level. JoeScanlon (1988) is one of the few hazard researchers todocument the benefits offsetting some disaster losses.Note that dollar benefits are normally offset againstdollar losses only. Intangible losses are not included inthis part of the analysis. Normally, attention could begiven only to the major flows of funds into the regionthat are clearly a result of the event under assessment.This can generally be assessed fairly easily after an actualevent, but poses difficulties when hypothetical eventsare being assessed. Table 3 shows the impact ofincluding benefits for a region of North Queensland,Australia. In this case study the losses were estimated at$245.1 million (Australian dollars [ED.: $138 millionU.S]), but benefits to the region in the form ofinsurance payments and government aid (both fromoutside the region) amounted to $141.9 million($80 million U.S.), for a resultant net loss of$123.2 million ($69 million U.S.) – half the originalestimate. This net loss is borne by the region defined forthe analysis. However, the loss to the nation would bethe full amount of $245.1 million as benefits to theregion are simply transfers within the national economy.(Even this statement needs qualification, as businessgains outside the region would need to be deductedfrom the loss estimate for a national perspective.) TheU.S. General Accounting Office highlights theimportance of offsetting payments in its report on theWorld Trade Center attacks. The New York CityPartnership estimates the losses to the city at 83 billionU.S. dollars, offset by insurance, federal government aid,and increased economic activity worth about67 billion dollars, to give a net loss to the city of some16 billion (quoted in U.S. GAO 2002).

Defining and measuring lossThe economic framework for disaster loss assessmentpossess a number of measurement challenges includingdetermination of the spatial and temporal boundaries ofthe analysis. Within this framework, the assessment offlood losses is based on a number of conventional oragreed approaches, each of which carries assumptions

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Table 2: Some experience witheconomic assessment fordisaster losses.

• Decision makers ignore the limitations of economicassessment.

• Items for which market values are hard to establish,or which are contentious, are ignored.

• Poorer areas do badly – they are worth less, andprotecting them gives less return for the investment– as economics generally ignores distributionaleffects.

• Assumptions about the future of land use, climate,and individual behavior are always rough estimates.

• Through the application of discount rates, the futureis generally discounted at the same rate foreverything: Is this appropriate?

• The time dimension and event sequencing are usuallyignored.

and its own set of uncertainties and measurementproblems. This section examines: how losses arenormally classified; stage-damage curves which havebeen a key tool for flood loss assessment; thegeophysical information underlying cost-benefit analysis;and issues of exposure and vulnerability.

Types of lossLosses are conventionally classified as either direct orindirect. These are the major categories of loss, whichcan be further subdivided into tangibles and nonmarketimpacts – or intangibles – according to whether or notthe loss can be easily valued in dollars. Table 4 containsexamples. In practice, the two types of tangible lossesare distinguished from intangible losses, giving threeoverall loss categories: direct, indirect, and intangible.These three categories represent increasing levels ofuncertainty and measurement difficulty. Uncertainty willalso increase with the scale of the event. This is becauseindirect and intangible losses are likely to be larger, asa percentage of the total loss, as the size of the impactincreases – with the result that losses from large-scaleevents will likely be underestimated (research cited inU.S. NAS 1999, p. 15). The U.S. GAO follows thisclassification of direct/indirect losses but does not havea separate category for intangibles. For an examinationof other approaches to defining direct and indirectlosses, see Rose and Lim (2002).

• Direct losses result from contact with floodwater,wind, etc. They are generally the most visible, oftenrepresent the largest loss component, and are theeasiest to assess. Nevertheless, a wide range of lossestimates is still possible because of differentassumptions about the condition of the assets beforethe disaster and, as with all types of loss, because ofdifferent approaches to measurement and variationsin the resources and skill used in the assessment.

• Indirect losses arise as a consequence of the impactof the hazard. They reflect disruption to economicand other activity within the area of analysis, whichflow from the effects of flooding, wind, or fire, etc. –hence the term ‘indirect.’ Indirect losses are morecomplex to evaluate, particularly because of theneed to avoid double counting losses which havealready been assessed as direct losses or which arealready counted elsewhere in the analysis. Indirectlosses to commerce may be made up by otherenterprises within the area of analysis or by the same

enterprise over a reasonable time period. Notsurprisingly, the application of economic principlessuch as the need to determine the spatial andtemporal dimensions of the analysis has the mostimpact in dealing with indirect loss assessment –generally reducing the estimates.

• Intangible losses is a catchall term that identifiesdirect and indirect impacts for which there is nocommonly agreed method of evaluation and notnormally a market. They include lives, health,memorabilia, ecological damages, destruction ofcommunity life, cultural artefacts, and loss of leisure.Research shows that people often value the intangiblelosses from a flooded home – principally loss ofmemorabilia, stress, and resultant ill health – as atleast as great as their tangible dollar losses (Heinz2000). Yet, most studies relegate intangibles to littlebetter than footnote status. The National Academy ofSciences Framework for loss estimation (U.S. NAS1999, p. 15) states that intangible losses “maysometimes be greater than the losses of directphysical destruction.” But on the same page it advisesthat loss assessors should “Focus on direct losses, asthey are easier to objectively measure” (ibid.). Liveslost are an exception to this general picture. TheAustralian Bureau of Transport Economics uses avalue of $1.3 million Australian ($732,000 U.S.)per life (BTE 2001). Assessments of losses from theWorld Trade Center attacks used a foregone earningsapproach to value lives at about $5 million U.S. each(U.S. GAO 2002). One problem with the U.S.approach is that the lives of high income earnershave greater value than those on lower incomes.In summary, there is usually great uncertainty overthe identification of intangibles and theirvaluation, with the result that losses are typicallyseriously undervalued.

Identifying losses is challenging, especially for those ofan indirect and intangible nature. Although thereappears to be reasonable consensus over the appropriateapproach to measurement for most direct losses, thisapparent agreement disguises much variation in practice,in particular over how the damaged item is valued.Stage-damage curves, the basic method of assessingdirect flood losses to dwellings, are reviewed below.There is now doubt about their real value.

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Table 3: Total economic cost of the January 1998 floods to northQueensland: Implications of including benefits.(Figures are in Australian dollars [AUD].NDRA refers to the Australian Natural Disaster Relief Arrangements.)

Loss type Losses to region Benefits to region Total economic loss($m) NDRA ($m) Insurance ($m) Total ($m) ($m)

Totals AUD 245.1 52.56 69.35 121.91 123.19($U.S.) (138.1) (29.6) (39.1) (68.7) (69.4)

Are stage-damage curves worth theeffort?Stage- (or depth-) damage curves represent therelationship between expected loss and varying depthsof flood water. These are typically used for assessing lossto housing and other structures where the stage ordepth refers to depth of water inside a building and thedamage refers to the damage expected from that depthof water. They have been the fundamental element offlood loss assessment.

The basic expectation from flooding is that deeper waterwill result in greater loss. At floor level, floor coveringswill be damaged, and there may be losses to furnitureand other items normally kept at floor level. At two orthree metres of water inside a single storey building, allcontents will be lost, and the structure itself may beendangered. Modern building techniques andfurnishings, as well as contemporary furnishings andcontents, may be making the stage-damage concept lessrelevant. Curves may disguise enormous variation inindividual cases and uncertainty about their true value(Blong 2002).

There are two methods for developing stage-damagecurves:

• Firstly, they can be compiled from loss measuredfollowing flooding; Stage-damage curves can be basedon actual loss data collected after a flood using asingle event or an amalgam of events. The U.S.curves employed by the Corps of Engineers aredrawn up this way (USACE 1996), as are mostAustralian stage-damage curves.

• Secondly, the curves can be constructed synthetically.Synthetic stage-damage curves are produced fromdetailed inventories of typical property contents fordifferent types of property; the height above floorlevel each item is normally kept, classified by thepotential loss if flooded. This is the method used bythe U.K.’s Flood Hazard Research Centre, where theitems are also depreciated so that the loss reflects the

economic loss rather than the replacement cost of theflooded items (Penning-Rowsell and Chatterton1977). In practice, each item is assumed to behalfway through its economic life. Structural damageis derived from estimates of the cost of repairing thedamage caused by flooding to building fabric for eachbuilding type.

Both methods are based on an averaging approach(explained below in ‘Implications for Approaches to LossAssessment’) and assumptions regarding the validity ofthe transfer of loss estimates from one situation toanother. Stage-damage curve values are very sensitive toflood water depth, yet this is frequently known onlyapproximately. The curves only assess direct losses tosmall structures and their contents. No matter howmuch effort is put into them, large elements of directloss must be assessed in other ways. In most cases,overall assessment results will depend on how indirectand intangible losses are handled.

Exposure and vulnerabilityIn the definitions employed in this paper and drawnfrom Emergency Management Australia (EMA 2000),exposure refers to people, assets, and activitiesthreatened or potentially threatened by flooding, andvulnerability refers to the susceptibility to harm byflooding of what is exposed and its ability to recover.Assessment of exposure is reasonably straightforwardwithin the rather severe limits of flood hydrology andhydraulics, as set out below, and the quality andreliability of the needed datasets (see, for example,Granger, 2002). As well, the number of people andactivities actually exposed may be dependent on manycircumstantial factors. However, assessment ofvulnerability is much more complex. There is no generalagreement on what constitutes vulnerability or on how itshould be measured. Although there are manypublications suggesting various approaches, most ofthese either use surrogates or employ indicators forwhich the evidence is often contested. Physical scientists

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Table 4: Types of loss and measurement.(Uncertainty in both identification and valuationincreases from the top left to the lower right of the table.)

Can the lost item be Direct Loss Indirect Lossbought and sold Loss from direct contact with No contact – loss as a consequence for dollars? flood water. of flood water.

Yes – For example, buildings and For example, disruption to transport,Tangible contents, cars, livestock, crops, etc. Loss of value added in commerce

infrastructure. and business interruption where not made up elsewhere.

Legal costs associated with lawsuits

No – For example, lives and For example, stress and anxiety. Intangible injuries. Loss of memorabilia. Disruption to living. Loss of

Damage to cultural or heritage community. Loss of nonuse sites. Ecological damage. values for cultural and environmental

sites and collections.

may assess vulnerability in terms of building safety, forexample; other disciplines will employ livelihoodsecurity, wealth, gender, and so on. For our purposeshere, it is sufficient to highlight that the concept andmeasurement are contested and that vulnerability isoften specific to the situation and circumstance. At thepresent state of knowledge, measurement is expensiveand of limited use for economic assessment due to itslack of stability through time. In addition, there is animportant policy issue. Those of high vulnerability arelikely to be less wealthy with fewer assets. A standardeconomic assessment would judge such people worthyof little flood mitigation investment relative to richergroups. This may not be a satisfactory social orpolitical outcome.

The geophysical dimensionKnowledge about flood water extent and othercharacteristics is usually important for loss assessment ofa single flood event. The survey and synthetic methodsin particular depend on having accurate floodinformation. Where cost-benefit analysis is to beundertaken, additional information is needed.Knowledge of the flood frequency and magnituderelationship for the area being assessed is essential forestimating average annual damages (AAD) and forprojecting losses into the future as required for cost-benefit analysis. Underlying the frequency-magnitudeconcept are many assumptions, including a stationary orstable climate. In addition, there is often uncertaintyabout the precise extent and attributes of the hazard,such as a storm or flood: where did it go, how strongwas the water flow, how long did it last, whatcontaminants were in the water, and so on? Where floodwater remains high for weeks, or where the contaminantmay remain indefinitely, indirect and intangible lossesmay be much larger than direct losses even in theabsence of deaths. However, existing standard methodsdo not assess this properly or even properlyacknowledge the potential impacts.

To assess the magnitude of relatively rare events like theone percent flood takes a long, stable record. This is animportant underlying assumption of both flood recordanalysis and flood damage assessment. But there is goodevidence that the flood-producing aspects of climate arevariable over periods of decades (for eastern Australia,see Smith and Greenaway 1983; for New Zealand, seeMcKerchar and Pearson 2001). In addition, in someareas short-term variability – also referred to asreliability – may be enormous. Arid areas exhibit thischaracteristic dramatically, where long periods of noflow may be followed by extensive flooding. McMahon,Finlayson, and Haines (1992) show that streamflow andtherefore flooding in Australia and southern Africa variesgreatly over the short-term – in addition to the longer-term variability mentioned above. On top of this, it isnow generally recognised that climate change may have

significant impacts on flood frequency and magnitude(Handmer, Penning-Rowsell, and Tapsell 1999).

The effects of land-use change on runoff adds furtheruncertainty to frequency/magnitude calculations. For alltheir apparent precision and the attention paid to theflood record, calculations of rare floods are abstract andsit within very wide confidence bands. It is also quitepossible that climate change will affect the shape of thefrequency/magnitude distribution. There appear to betwo possibilities here. One possibility is that the rarer ormore extreme events, such as the 1:100 flood or evenrarer events, will be affected disproportionately. At otherlocations, the whole magnitude/frequency relationshipmay shift, so that floods of all severities will change.Such shifts will have a profound effect on thecalculated annual average damage as smaller andmedium-sized events are more important since theyoccur much more often and thereby normally contributea greater proportion of the average damage. This shifthas been documented from historical flood data; forexample, Smith and Greenaway (1983) have shownthat in southeastern Australia the floodfrequency/magnitude regime has shifted, with a dramaticincrease in flood damages.

Implications for approaches toassessmentHow does all this uncertainty – in the economicapproach, the underlying geophysical and demographicdata, and the identification and measurement of damage– affect the various approaches to loss assessment? Thevariety of assessment methods used worldwide todaycan be categorised into three general types which rangefrom very detailed postdisaster surveys attempting tocalculate precise losses through to rapid estimates. Theyare known here as the averaging, synthetic, and surveyapproaches (Table 5). In practice, some combination ofapproaches would normally be used; for example,surveys are the most appropriate method for assessinglosses to large businesses most infrastructure, andintangibles. The implications for each approach areconsidered below.

1. The averaging approach sets out an average loss perimpacted dwelling, with average values for businesspremises based on the area of the structure. It doesthis by drawing on preexisting data. This average lossis applied to every flooded structure in the area beingassessed. In the Australian state of Victoria,percentage figures for indirects and indexes forintangible losses are also used (Read, Sturgess, andAssociates 2000). The averaging approach has theadvantage of great simplicity and relatively lowresource requirements compared with otherapproaches. It makes no pretence at precision inindividual cases and does not rely on accurate flooddepth information – although for cost-benefit analysisfrequency/magnitude information is needed. Theaveraging approach also suggests considerable

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evenhandedness, with one outcome being that theloss potential of poorer areas will be valued much thesame as wealthy areas. However, the approach mayunder- or overvalue indirect and intangible losses.It also treats very serious and dangerous floodhazards the same as shallow flooding that results inlittle damage and poses little threat to safety. Withrefinement, the approach may be able to overcomethese problems.

2. The synthetic approach involves a detailed assessmentbased on preexisting databases covering a range ofbuilding types and contents. Losses are based onassumptions regarding the age and condition of theitems and the effect of the hazard, and are oftendeveloped theoretically or synthetically – as opposedto being based on experience. The synthetic approachis probably the most flexible and currently mostwidely used of the three approaches. It can make useof a variety of existing computer packages with theirown stage-damage curves for calculating direct lossesfor the residences and small shops. However, theextensive use and availability of calculation packagesdisguises considerable debate over the accuracy of thestage-damage curves and resulting figures. Theaccuracy of the synthetic method depends, therefore,on the reliability of the available datasets includingthe detailed characteristics of the flood or floods inquestion. One argument is that the inaccuracies inthis approach make no difference when it is appliedto large areas – this argument can be made for theaveraging approach, too, but that approach involvesmuch less effort.

3. A survey or historical approach involves using surveysafter the event being assessed to establish actuallosses. The approach depends on surveys to ascertainthe extent of the loss. Often this will involve taking asample of households or enterprises and generalising

the results to the affected population. Where asubstantial number of properties are involved, a moresophisticated analysis is usually attempted, and stage-damage curves may be constructed for differentactivities and structure types. The curves produced inthis way are based on a sample of affected propertiesand are used to estimate losses for all affectedproperties. The accuracy of the results depends,among other things, on rigorous sampling and carefulsurvey design.

No matter how much effort goes into the rigor of thisapproach, historical loss assessment provides results thatdefine the losses experienced at one point in time, giventhe community’s preparedness, length of warning, andother unique attributes of the flood. This fact – and thewide variations in survey and sampling quality and inthe elapsed time between the flood event and survey –greatly reduce the utility of the approach forcomparative purposes.

‘Actual’ versus ‘potential’ losses?Loss data collected after an event will be – or at leastwill appear to be – the losses actually experienced.In Australia such loss estimates are known as ‘actual’losses. They (purport to) take account of the uniquefeatures of the event, the warning system, people’sexperience with the hazard, and their preparedness.Questionnaire surveys typically provide this type ofestimate. The synthetic approaches for flood lossestimation developed in the U.K., the U.S., andAustralia, as well as the averaging approach, cannotreflect the unique attributes of each event and of thepeople involved. Instead, they provide what are knownin Australia as ‘potential’ losses. Generally, these are the

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Table 5: Summary review of basic eements of the three approaches toloss assessment.

Loss Direct Loss Indirect Loss Intangible LossAssessment Houses/Small Commerce, InfrastructureApproach Business Farming

(>1000m3)

I Average loss Average loss Average $ Examine $ Identify types Averaging per flooded per m2 for Per km of flow and use and magnitude.

structure types of road and surveysenterprise & surveys* % of directsurveys Surveys

II Standard Stage-damage Stage-damage Examine Identify typesSynthetic stage-damage curves applied and average loss cash flow and magnitude.

curves for types to m3 for per km and use of property. different types depending surveys.

of business on type of infrastructure Surveys

III Surveys – new Surveys. Surveys. Surveys. Surveys.Survey stage-damage (based on curves.sampling)

* Much public infrastructure does not generate income directly, so future revenue cannot be used to assess loss nor is its social benefitnecessarily related directly to the infrastructure cost.

maximum losses likely to occur in a given event.Potential losses are averages in the sense that they donot take account of the unique features of the event orof the affected population. It is worth observing thatmost U.S. and Australian stage-damage curves have beenconstructed from an amalgam of postflood event lossassessments and therefore reflect a mix of actual losses,including insurance losses – although they do not reflectthe unique features of any one event. The U.K. curveshave been synthesised as described earlier and representpure potential loss.

Many of those assessing flood losses in Australiahave adjusted potential losses so that they are closer to‘actual’ losses, typically taking into account localexperience, preparedness, and warning time.In Australia more or less standard ratios are often usedfor conversion of potential to actual losses(e.g., see Read, Sturgess, and Associates 2000; Handmeret al. 2002). Application of these ratios makes a majordifference to the resulting damage estimate, reducing itby 60 percent for a flood experienced community withat least twelve hours of warning time. However, theratios are based on a few data points frompredominantly rural locations and were developed manyyears ago as indicative or preliminary (Smith 1981).

In addition to serious questions about the validity of theratios, there are a number of practical and policyproblems with this approach:

• the use of ‘actual’ losses may be discriminatoryagainst those who take action to reduce their losses,as it will reduce the amount deemed worth spendingon mitigation in their communities;

• ‘actual’ losses may discriminate systematically againstpoorer sections of the community, because theiractual tangible losses may be very low – althoughintangibles may be very high – with the result that itwill not be worth investing in mitigation;

• the ‘actual’ loss estimates are unstable as people moveor as circumstances change – yet in cost-benefitanalyses estimates are projected decades into thefuture; and

• it is not easy to estimate the ratio between actual andpotential losses for different flood pronecommunities.

In any case, we may be fooling ourselves that we canmeasure ‘actual’ losses with precision. The implicationis that, at the present state of knowledge, estimatesof ‘actual’ losses may not be valid. Instead, it maybe more appropriate to think of potential losses underdifferent circumstances.

Conclusion – accept averagesThere are significant uncertainties at every step in theloss assessment process, whether the intent is toproduce economically sound estimates or not. Some ofthese uncertainties may be essentially irreducible, and,

even if this eventually proves not to be the case as ourknowledge expands, key steps require judgments –some of an overtly political nature. These uncertaintiesare not merely features of loss assessment, they are alsoinherent in the limits to our knowledge of climate andextreme events, and of people and economies.The apparent accuracy of assessments conductedimmediately after a disaster may make them unsuitablefor comparative purposes, as the precise impact of eachdisaster is contingent on an almost infinite range ofsituational factors which will vary over time and space.

The implications for loss assessment procedureseverywhere are, in summary:

• exact loss estimates do not exist, and it is importantto appreciate that disaster losses can only beestimated;

• the assessment process involves judgment, and effortsshould go into refining this judgment process ratherthan simply attempting to achieve ‘exact’ loss values;

• training will increase expertise, which is essential forthe application of an approach based on theprinciples of economics, but will not eliminateuncertainty;

• as intangible and indirect losses are difficult toidentify and assess, are often the major part of thetotal loss, and are frequently ignored because ofmeasurement difficulties, special effort should bedevoted to these loss categories; and

• the approaches used should be examined forsystematic or inherent biases.

These limitations support the development and adoptionof an averaging approach. The emphasis here is onachieving a transparent and consistent approach thatenables comparisons between areas and alternativestrategies for risk management, rather than to pursueincreasing accuracy which may be an illusion anyway.The approach should not be overly sensitive to minorchanges in the dimensions of the hazard underconsideration – as this will usually be an area ofconsiderable uncertainty. The approach shouldnevertheless aim for a reasonable and achievable degreeof accuracy and replicability. Consistency andreplicability enables confidence with comparisonsbetween areas, as well as between mitigation options –the normal reason for the assessment.

ReferencesBlong, R. 2002. ‘Estimating Residential Flood Damage.’ Pp.175–200 in Residential Flood Damage: The Implications forFloodplain Management Policy, edited by D. I. Smith and J.Handmer. Canberra: Water Research Foundation of Australia.

BTE (Bureau of Transport Economics-Australia). 2001.Economic Costs of Natural Disasters in Australia. Canberra:Report 103, Bureau of Transport Economics.

Cochrane, H. 1991. The Principles of Damage AssessmentApplied to the Loma Prieta Earthquake and Hurricane Hugo. LosAngeles, CA: paper presented at the International Conference

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on the Impact of Disasters, University of California at LosAngeles.

Cutter, S. L. (ed.). 2001. American Hazardscapes: TheRegionalization of Hazards and Disasters. Washington, DC:Joseph Henry Press.

EMA (Emergency Management Australia). 2000. TheAustralian Emergency Risk Management Applications Guide, PartII. Approaches to Emergency Management, Volume I, RiskManagement. Canberra: Emergency Management Australia.

Granger, K. 1998. ASDI (Australian Spatial Data Infrastructure)from the Ground Up: A Public Safety Perspective. Canberra:Australian New Zealand Land Information Council and AGSO.

_______ . 2002. ‘Floods, Information and GIS: ImprovingOur Understanding of Flood Risk.’ Pp. 201–218 in ResidentialFlood Damage: The Implications for Floodplain ManagementPolicy, edited by D. I. Smith and J. Handmer. Canberra: WaterResearch Foundation of Australia.

Handmer, J., E. C. Penning-Rowsell, and S. Tapsell. 1999.‘Flooding in a Warmer World: The View from Europe.’ Pp.125–161 in Climate, Change and Risk, edited by T. E.Downing, A. J. Olsthoorn, and S. J. Tol. London: Routledge.

Handmer, J., C. Read, and O. Percovich. 2002. Disaster LossAssessment Guidelines. Queensland, Australia: Counter Disasterand Rescue Services, Department of Emergency Services.

Heinz, H. J. 2000. The Hidden Costs of Coastal Hazards:Iimplications for Risk Assessment and mitigation. H. John HeinzIII Centre for Science, Economics, and the Environment.Washington, DC: Island Press.

McKerchar, A. L. and C. P. Pearson. 2001. ‘Factors CausingFlooding to be New Zealand’s Number One Hazard.’ TEPHRAFebruary: 9–15

McMahon, T. A., B. R. Finlayson, and A. T. Haines. 1992.Global Runoff: Continental Comparisons of Annual Flows andDischarges. Cremlingen-Destedt: Catena Verlag.

Parker, D. J., C. H. Green, and P. M. Thompson. 1987. UrbanFlood Protection Benefits: A Project Appraisal Guide. Aldershot:Gower Technical Press.

Penning-Rowsell, E. C., et al. 1992. The Economics of CoastalManagement: A Manual of Assessment Techniques. Farnborough:Gower Technical Press.

Penning-Rowsell, E. C and J. B. Chatterton. 1977. The Benefitsof Flood Alleviation: A Manual of Assessment Techniques (BlueManual). Flood Hazard research Centre, Middlesex University,Pub. No. 18.

Read, Sturgess, and Associates. 2000. Rapid Appraisal Method(RAM) for Floodplain Management. Melbourne, Victoria:Department of Natural Resources and Environment.

Rose, A. and D. Lim. 2002. ‘Business Interruption Losses fromNatural Hazards: Conceptual and Methodological Issues in theCase of the Northridge Earthquake.’ Environmental Hazards 4:1–14.

Scanlon, J. 1988. ‘Winners and Losers: Some Thoughts aboutthe Political Economy of Disaster.’ International Journal of MassEmergencies and Disasters 6: 47–63.

Smith, D. I. 1981. ‘Actual and Potential Flood Damage: ACase Study for Urban Lismore, NSW, Australia.’ AppliedGeography 1: 31–39.

Smith, D. I. and M. Greenaway. 1983. ‘Flood Probabilities andUrban Flood Damage in Coastal Northern NSW.’ Search 13:312–314.

Thompson, P. and J. Handmer. 1996. Economic Assessment ofDisaster Mitigation: An Australian Guide. Centre for ResourceEnvironmental Studies, Australian National University, andFlood Hazard Research Centre, Middlesex University, for theAustralian International Decade for Natural Disaster ReductionCommittee.

USACE. 1996. Risk-Based Analysis for Flood Damage ReductionStudies. Engineer Manual 1110–2–1619. U.S. Army Corps ofEngineers.

U.S. GAO (General Accounting Office). 2002. Review of Studiesof the Economic Impact of the September 11, 2001, TerroristAttacks on the World Trade Center. Washington, DC:GAO–02–700R.

U.S. NAS (National Academy of Sciences). 1999. The Impactsof Natural Disasters: A Framework for Loss Estimation.Washington, DC: National Academy of Sciences.

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AuthorJohn HandmerCentre for Risk and Community SafetyDepartment of Geospatial Science RMIT UniversityGPO Box 2476V Melbourne, VIC 3001 [email protected]

R

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Order out of chaos? A critical review

of the role of central, regional, and local Government

in emergency planning inLondon

“Ministers have admitted that the chaos over the fuel crisis, flooding, foot-and-mouthand then the panic over September 11 have shown the United Kingdom’s ability to

respond to national emergencies is haphazard.”(Hall and Palmer, Sunday Express, 17 March 2002)

By Sarah Norman and Eve Coles

The events in New York and Washington on

September 11, 2001, (9/11) apparently represented a

fundamental shift in opinion towards emergency

management, presenting a unique opportunity to

promote change in England and Wales through

heightened awareness of the need for emergency

planning. The awareness afforded by 9/11 and the

proposed changes in legislation recommended by the

most recent review of emergency planning in the

United Kingdom (U.K.) presented a unique

opportunity for government to put its ‘emergency

planning house’ in order. The review, initiated after

the flooding and fuel crises of 2000 and given

further impetus by the foot-and-mouth crisis, stated

that: “The need for effective partnership working

across organisational boundaries is a major

requirement for emergency planning in the future”

(Cabinet Office 2001, p. 8). As the last of a number

of reviews over the past eleven years, this review

seemed to offer the opportunity of a bright future

for emergency planning by providing comprehensive

legislation, the restructuring of emergency planning,

and the hope of increasing public awareness of the

role of emergency managers. Unfortunately, it is our

contention that much of the impetus generated by

events of the past two years has slowly disappeared

as the recommendations of the review have been

buried in the bureaucracy of the civil service

administration known in the U.K. as ‘Whitehall.’

A distinct lack of research from a British perspective

is evident, and yet the organisation of emergency

planning in the U.K. is a crucial issue. As yet another

review is relegated to the ‘slow waltz’ of Whitehall,

the question must be asked whether the role and

importance of issues such as legislation, structure,

communication, and coordination will continue to be

shrouded in secrecy, hampered by the continued

mismatch of policies that successive governments

have introduced and low public interest, all of which

is demonstrated by the last fifty years of the British

civil defence system.

This paper will focus on the recent development of

emergency planning in the U.K., the current situation

following the latest review, and how the structures

that exist between the Greater London Boroughs and

Central Government have reacted in responding to

an event of equal magnitude to 9/11.

It must also be noted at this stage that disasters are

complex events, and the definitional debate that

surrounds them is equally complex (see, for example,

Quarantelli 1998). In the U.K., such events are more

commonly referred to by emergency services and

response organisations as a ‘major incident’ (Home

Office 1997, p. 1). Similarly, the term ‘emergency

management’ (Lindell and Perry 1992, p. 2) is not

one in regular use in the U.K. More commonly the

term ‘Emergency Planning’ is used for this varied and

responsibility-laden job, which in our opinion does

not always reflect the responsibilities and scope of

this ‘profession.’

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Another point of clarification needed here is the

perceived difference (in the U.K.) between civil

defence and peacetime emergency planning. Civil

defence is the protection of the civil population in

the event of a hostile attack by a foreign power.

Peacetime emergency planning is seen as planning

for the response to a major accident or emergency

that may occur as a result of explosion, train crash,

building collapse, or the like. In the U.K., planning

for civil defence at the local level is compulsory and

has been governed by an act of Parliament since

1948. Yet despite the plethora of disasters since the

1980s, peacetime emergency planning is not yet

compulsory, although a new act of Parliament is

currently being drawn up.

Emergency planning in the U.K. is carried out at the

local government level; there is no government

agency that undertakes such activities. Thus, in order

to understand how it works it is necessary to

understand firstly the structure of local government

in England and Wales and secondly the development

of the legislation controlling emergency planning.

The structure of local Government inEngland and WalesThe U.K. is comprised of England, Wales, Scotland, andNorthern Ireland. For the purposes of this paper andbecause Scotland and Northern Ireland have their owndevolved assemblies with legislative powers, onlyarrangements related to England and Wales will bediscussed. To further narrow the focus and to helpdemonstrate the complexity of emergency planningarrangements in England and Wales, London will behighlighted. Also, it is vital to understand here that,unlike the United States, Canada, and Australia thathave a federal system of government the U.K. has aunitary system. This means that central governmentdetermines all policies and decisions. These are thenimplemented in acts of Parliament or regulations in turndetermining (in emergency planning, for instance) whata local government can and cannot do. Furthermore, thesetup of U.K. local government is extremely confusing.This is the result of a complete reorganisation in 1973and further partial reorganisations in 1986 and the1990s which have left a very complex situation. In themajor urban areas—London, West Midlands, GreaterManchester, Merseyside, South Yorkshire, WestYorkshire, and Tyne and Wear—there is a single tier ofcouncils responsible for all the services. These are calledLondon Borough Councils in London and MetropolitanDistrict Councils in the other areas. Moreover, in orderto avoid total chaos in these areas and to fall in line withalready existing regional services, functions such as fire,police, and public transport are exercised through joint

boards to which all the local authorities in an areaappointed members.

In the 1990s the Conservative government’s view wasthat the two-tier model of service provision provided bythe more rural county councils and district councils wasinefficient and confusing and that county councils weretoo remote from those they served. Therefore, it wassuggested that county councils should be abolished andtheir functions transferred to district councils, withsome of the smaller districts being merged.

In Scotland and Wales this is exactly what was done.In England there was a process of local consultationwhich led to the single-tier model being supported, andimplemented, in some places and rejected in rathermore. Where single-tier councils have beenimplemented, they are called Unitary Authorities.

At the conclusion of this reorganisation the total countof Principal Authorities in England and Wales is: CountyCouncils 34, District Councils 238, London Boroughs32, Corporation of London 1, Isles of Scilly Council 1,Metropolitan Districts 36, English Unitary Authorities46, and Welsh Unitary Authorities 22.

Legislative frameworkSecondly, understanding the legislation is importantbecause it will help clarify the situation that exists notonly in London but also throughout the U.K. At presentthere are a number of different acts of Parliament andregulations that govern the way local authorities plan forcivil defence and emergencies/disaster. Again it is worthemphasising here that the only compulsion on localauthorities to plan is for civil defence; hence the basisfor the legislation is a civil defence Act.

The legislative framework that underpins emergencyplanning in England and Wales is a patchwork of actsthat began with the Civil Defence Act (1948) and hasdeveloped through a series of ad hoc measuresintroduced over the last fifty years. However, the 1920Emergency Powers Act (a piece of legislation designed togive governments the power to declare a ‘state ofemergency’ in the event of industrial unrest) has takenon a new significance since 9/11 (Turney 2002),particularly when considered in conjunction with theincreased threat from terrorism and chemical, biological,nuclear, and radiation attack (CBRN).

Although now seen by government as an outdated act(Civil Contingencies Secretariat [CCS] Progress Paper2002), the 1948 Civil Defence Act was an enablingdevice that allowed the Home Secretary to introduceregulations affecting the functions of local authoritiesand their ability to deal with defence of the civilpopulation “against any form of hostile attack bya foreign power” (Tucker 1999). The act also providedfor a grant from central government to fund the civil

defence activities only of local authorities. The act stillprovides the statutory basis for emergency planning inthe U.K. and the grant, which will be approximately£18 million [ED.: $29 million U.S.] for 2003/2004, isstill the only funding that local authorities receive fromcentral government for carrying out these activities.

Various statues and regulations have followed the 1948act including, the Local Government Act (1972) thatallowed local authorities to spend money to “. . . avert,alleviate or eradicate” the effects caused by disasters(Turney 1990), the Civil Protection in Peacetime Act(1986) (a direct result of the disasters of the 1980s) thatfurther allowed local authorities to ‘use civil defenceresources’ (i.e., the civil defence grant) to respond to a‘peacetime emergency,’ a recognition of the risks facedby the U.K. that are unconnected with any form ofhostile threat (Tucker 1999, p. 10), the Civil Defence(Grant) Regulations (1987) that raised “the level of thegrant for salaries and associated expenses of employinglocal authority emergency planning teams for civildefence purposes from 75 per cent to 100 per cent”(ibid), the Civil Defence (General Local AuthorityFunctions) Regulations (1993), and finally theEuropean-led legislation, the Control of Industrial MajorAccident Hazards (CIMAH) regulations (1984) thatrequired a company undertaking hazardous industrialactivities to produce an on-site plan for dealing with amajor accident and for local authorities to produce anoff-site plan for protection the civil population in thevent of a major accident. The CIMAH regulations werereplaced by the Control of Major Accident Hazards(COMAH) regulations in 1999 (ibid., p. 11).

Most of the above legislation (except for the COMAHregulations) is expected to be superseded by the newCivil Contingencies Bill that is currently being preparedby central government. This bill, a result of the latestreview, will for the first time place a statutory duty onlocal authorities to plan for peacetime emergencies.Ironically, the Labour Party itself stated in its policyreview in 1989 that it would like “to ensure adequatedevelopment of a new statutory emergency planningsystem,” a proposal strongly supported by the FennellInquiry into the Kings Cross Underground Fire (Colesand Smith 1997), the Civil Emergencies Adviser in hisfirst report, and Parker and Handmer (1992a) in theirassessment of the U.K. situation in 1992. It is, however,disappointing to note here that, even under a Labourgovernment (that has been in power since 1997), thispiece of new legislation will have virtually no newmoney attached to it and will not be given parliamentarytime until at least 2003/2004 (Weatherill 2002).

Development of emergency planningSince the 1980s/1990sThat there is a need for good civil protection andpeacetime emergency planning at a local level has beenrecognised by researchers for a number of years (seeDynes and Quarantelli 1975; Dynes 1994; Drabek 1986;Newkirk 1998; Parker and Handmer 1992a; Quarantelli1976, 1985, 1988, 1991, 1995). However, it was notuntil the proliferation of major incidents and crises inthe 1980s and early 1990s that disaster recovery andemergency planning in the U.K. was firmly catapultedonto the political and public agenda. Indeed, Parker andHandmer (1992a) suggest that the decade of the 1980swill be remembered as the decade of disaster for theUnited Kingdom. Disaster events like the ones noted1

are triggering mechanisms; they have the effect ofpushing issues such as local authority emergencyplanning onto the political and public agenda almostinstantaneously. These situations occurred in the U.K. atthe end of the 1980s when, as Rocket (1994) noted, thegovernment finally appeared to accept “the need forpeacetime disaster preparedness” and resulted in the roleof emergency planning being subjected to twogovernment reviews in close succession.

The first review in 1989 concluded that the primeresponsibility for handling disasters should remain ata local level and that more needed to be done toencourage and develop coordination of the variousservices at that level. It also resulted in the appointmentof a civil emergencies adviser and in the Civil DefenceCollege changing its name to Emergency PlanningCollege to reflect a new, wider peacetime planning remit(Civil Protection 1989). The review, however, did littleto allay the concerns of those involved with emergencyplanning (Sibson 1991; Parker and Handmer 1992a).Parker and Handmer (1992a) also noted that “the Britishapproach is characterised by a lack of policies, especiallyexplicit national policies providing unambiguoussignals.”

The second review in 1991 was carried out after theCivil Emergencies Adviser issued his first report and at atime when there was much debate within the emergencyplanning community regarding, among other things, theissue of a statutory duty. The Home Secretary (KennethBaker) did not, however, implement therecommendations of his adviser to impose a statutoryduty on local authorities. Instead, he adopted what hecalled ‘a broad based approach’ in an effort “to achieveimprovements in local authority planning foremergencies in peace and war through a package ofmeasures” (Baker 1991). These measures included theintroduction of an integrated emergency planning policy,a more flexible use of the civil defence grant, guidelines

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1. For example, the Bradford City Fire, Hungerford, the great storm of 1987, the Kings Cross Underground Fire, Piper Alpha, the Herald ofFree Enterprise, Lockerbie, Hillsborough, Kegworth, The Marchioness, Dunblane, and others.

for dealing with disasters, a review of emergencyplanning in metropolitan areas, and a more efficient useof emergency centres and communications.

Following the second review a circular issued to localauthorities by the Home Office in September 1993stated that “[t]he main role of local authorities should beto develop an integrated approach to emergencymanagement as described in the government’s statementof July 1991” and that “councils would be expected tomake contributions to emergency planning from theirown resources” (Civil Protection 1993), a worryingdevelopment for low-profile activities such as emergencyplanning in the current climate of restraint whendepartments in cash-strapped local authorities were andstill are having to bid for scarce resources (Coles andSmith 1997).

The change of government in 1997 from Conservative toLabour and the subsequent Comprehensive SpendingReview resulted in a further review of local authoritycivil protection, the third in less than ten years. Thisreview was gotten underway by the issue in November1997 of a Home Office consultative document onThe Future Role and Funding of Local Civil Protection inEngland and Wales. The document, which was sent to alllocal authorities in England and Wales, asked for viewsregarding the following of issues: the need for astatutory duty for peacetime emergency planning, thecoordination arrangements for emergency planning interms of boundaries, restructuring of financialarrangements, and national performance standards.It is unfortunate that this review resulted in littlevisible change.

Both Parker and Handmer (1992b) and Rocket (1994)have discussed the need for a comprehensivereorganisation of local government civil protection.Parker and Handmer (1992b, p. 267) went as far assuggesting an eight point policy2 for the improvement ofhazard management and emergency planning in theU.K. In the intervening years since the publication ofthese suggested improvements, the political environmentand the “auditing mindset of successive governments”(Hood and Jackson 1992) has conspired to ensure thatno progress on any of these issues has been made.Furthermore, each consultation process has taken noaccount of the call for a separate department to dealwith civil protection, or of developing a research agenda,or for regular audits and inspections of local authorityemergency preparedness, or indeed for adequate trainingand education for emergency planners. Any newarrangements for emergency planning currently beingconsidered should provide structures, funds and

legislation that will cope with the range of events thatincreased dependence on technology, and climatechange can bring. Indeed, Coles (1998) noted that thesafety and protection of the general public that isafforded by good (or even, as Kreps [1992] points out,reasonable) emergency planning is a moral obligationof government.

The current review of emergencyplanning in England and WalesAs noted above, the current review of emergencyplanning was initiated in 2001 by the Deputy PrimeMinister John Prescott following the fuel crisis andextensive flooding in the millennium year 2000 and thesubsequent foot-and-mouth crisis of 2002. The terroristacts of 9/11, while not having a direct influence on thereview, have served to emphasise the ad hoc nature ofarrangements in the U.K. and add impetus to theconsultation.

The consultation period following the review was begunwith the publication, on the eve of 9/11, of The Future ofEmergency Planning in England and Wales: DiscussionDocument in August 2001. The document itself was like‘a breath of fresh air’ as it contained the first indicationthat government had finally accepted that the 1948 CivilDefence Act was an outdated piece of legislation, unableto cope with the modern day demands of civilprotection. It also outlined proposed changes in policy,guidance, and monitoring and the way emergencyplanning is funded by central government, a clarificationof national and regional roles and responsibilities, theintroduction of prevention and mitigation strategies forlocal authorities in the form of hazard identification andrisk assessment, and controversially suggested that localauthorities and not the police take the lead role in thecoordination of local emergencies. The consultationperiod that ended in October 2001 was given addedimpetus by the events of 9/11 and the renewed debatethese events generated among the U.K. public.

However, the wheels of Whitehall turn exceedinglyslowly, and the results of the consultation were notpublished until the spring of 2002 (see Cabinet Office2002a), by which time public interest was alreadybeginning to decline. Respondents to the consultationwere generally in favour of the recommendations madein the document CCS 2002, and it was assumed thataction to implement the proposed changes would bealmost immediate. Again, this was not the case; theconsultation document on the proposed new CivilContingencies Bill has only recently been published(Cabinet Office 2002b), and the bill itself will not begiven parliamentary time until 2003/2004.

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2. The eight points are: a statutory duty to plan for peacetime emergencies; a separate government department to deal with civil protection;policies for dealing with cross-boundary emergencies; adequate financial and human resources; effective arrangements for the free flow ofinformation; regular audit and inspections; development of a research agenda; and adequate arrangements for the education and trainingof emergency planning personnel.

Emergency planning arrangements inEngland and WalesEmergency planning in the U.K. includes structures atlocal, regional, and national levels involved in theresponse to disasters. The organisational framework forthe present system that is operated in London isprovided in Figure 1.

In July 2001, during the consultation period of the mostrecent review, responsibility for emergency planningmoved from the Home Office to the Cabinet Officeunder the auspices of the ‘Civil ContingenciesSecretariat’ (CCS) with the declared aim to “... toimprove the U.K.’s resilience to disruptive challenges atevery level” (Home Office 2001, p. 1). Local authoritiescan seek advice from central government through eitherCCS or a nominated Lead Government Department(LGD) if more appropriate to the type of incident (e.g., a radiation emergency).

Although ‘Government Offices of the Regions’ (GORs)exist at regional level, their role and responsibilitiesduring a disaster appear vague at best. This is clearlyevident when assessing the recent examples involvingtheir activation such as in the ‘fuel crisis’ in 2000 andthe foot-and-mouth outbreak in 2001. In general, theregional level within England and Wales has anundefined emergency planning role, currently in theprocess of being clarified as part of the review.

The Department of Health is almost a separate entity interms of organisational structure; with representation at

the central government level, as well as a regional level

that supports Strategic Health Authorities (StHAs), and

NHS Trusts at local level. An Emergency Planning

Coordination Unit (EPCU) within the Department of

Health has the responsibility for developing policy and

maintaining national guidance in terms of emergency

preparedness and provides national coordination for

health if required in response to a major incident (NHS

Executive 1998, p. 12). The Directorate of Health and

Social Care provides the ‘regional’ coordination arm

(facilitated by the Health Emergency Planning Advisors)

that is tasked with ensuring that plans are compatible

with other responders and comply with national

guidance (ibid.).

The Home Office (1997, p. 4) publication Dealing with

Disaster suggests the “…core of the initial response will

normally be provided by the emergency services and as

necessary by the appropriate local authority or

authorities.” The police, fire, National Health Service

(which includes Strategic Health Authorities, Acute

Hospital Trusts, Primary Care Trusts, and Ambulance

Trusts), and local authorities are considered to be the

main agencies providing or contributing to the local

response to disasters.3 Support for the emergency

services and local authorities is provided by a number

agencies and organisations such as volunteers, industry

and commercial organisations, the Environment Agency,

and assistance from the military.

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Cabinet Office Briefing Room (COBR)

Civil Contingencies Secretariat (CCS)

Lead Government Department (LGD)

Department of Health

Directorate for Health and Social Care

Health Emergency Planning Advisors

StHAPrimary CareTrusts

NHS TrustsAmbulanceTrusts

PoliceFireService

LESLPLFEPALocalAuthority

Local Level

Regional Level

National Level

Figure 1. Emergency planning System in London (Source: Norman 2002, p. 8)

3. Disasters are normally managed using three nationally agreed operational levels of response: Operational (Bronze) Level, Tactical (Silver)Level, and Strategic (Gold) Level. These three levels are recognized by organizations normally involved in a response to a disaster andallow a common framework for all responding organizations. A Strategic Coordinating Group can also be formed to focus on theprovision of resources, prioritization of requests, and forward planning for the successful resolution of the incident and return tonormality (Home Office 1997, p. 16).

Emergency planning arrangements inLondonThe emergency planning situation in London mirrorsthe complex nature of emergency planning in the rest ofthe U.K. London as the capital of the U.K. is one of themost influential financial centres in the world, with apopulation of 13 million (Mitchell 1999, p. 29). It isdivided into thirty-three boroughs (forming the greaterLondon conurbation) that are governed by LocalCouncils (see Figure 2).

It is important to note here that London, unlike anyother major city in the U.K., is in a unique position withregard to arrangements for emergency planning becauseit is also the seat of government. This creates a hierarchyof power in the capital that is firmly rooted in fivehundred plus years of history and rests overwhelminglyin Whitehall. For, although the responsibility for andfunction of emergency planning resides at the local levelwith the thirty-three local authorities that make up theGreater London conurbation in reality should a majorevent of the type and order of 9/11 take place, then thecoordination of arrangements for dealing with it wouldundoubtedly be assumed by central government.

A number of organisations and forums exist in London,some of which were created to promote a pan-Londonresponse to disasters. Other organisations may havesuch a role in the future. The main organisationsinclude: London Emergency Services Liaison Panel

(LESLP), the Mayor of London, Greater LondonAuthority, the Government Office for London, and theLondon Assembly. The LESLP Panel has created theMajor Incident Procedure Manual (also LESLP 1999) todescribe “. . . the agreed procedures and arrangementsfor the effective coordination” (LESLP 2000, p. 7). “TheMayor, London Assembly and the Greater LondonAuthority comprise a new and unique form of strategiccitywide government for London” (GOL 2002). Themayor is responsible for strategic management to dealwith London-wide issues and coordinating action on apan-London basis; however, the mayor does notcurrently have a legislated role within emergencyplanning in a disaster situation. The Association ofLondon Government supports the London Boroughsand Greater London Authority, whereas the GovernmentOffice for London supports the Minister for London anda number a government departments.

London Resilience is another pan-London group housedwithin the CCS; it was established after the attacks onthe World Trade Center (WTC). Initially, LondonResilience was viewed as a temporary subcommitteetasked with assessing the state of ‘resilience’ ofemergency management within the capital. LondonResilience is now a permanent group mainly staffed bysecondees from the organisations represented on thecommittee to ensure London is prepared for a‘catastrophic’ incident (Kowalczyk 2002, p. 16). 103


N

NE

SESW

NW

WalthamForest

RedbridgeHavering

Barking

Greenwich

Bexley

Lewisham

Southwark

LambethWandsworth

Hamm

ersmith

Kensington

Kensington

and Chelsea

and Chelsea

Kensington

and Chelsea

Merton

Richard uponThames

Kingston uponKingston uponThamesThames

Kingston uponThames

Sutton Bromley

NewhamHockney

Tower Hamlets

Haringey

Camden IslingtonIslingtonIslington

Barnet

Enfield

Harrow

Brent

Ealing

Hounslow

Hillington

Figure 2. Map of the London Boroughs (Source: Norman 2002, p. 15)

A ‘catastrophic’ incident could be seen to include anexceptional incident outside the current realm ofexperience. A number of London organisations providedseconded staff to London Resilience to undertake anassessment of emergency management; this assessmentinvolved a questionnaire and interviews with individualpractitioners, departments, and organisations acrossLondon. The results from the assessment were compiledinto a reported produced in March 2002. However, dueto the security-sensitive nature of the report, it wasclassified ‘confidential’ by London Resilience, with onlyparticipating practitioners and organisations privy to thereport; however, aspects of the report may be disclosedin the future (Kowalczyk 2002).

London Resilience is, however, recommending a numberof general changes to the emergency managementsystem in London. These recommendations include anew and more formal command and control centerstructure with a ‘diamond’ level of command forcatastrophic incidents (Kowalczyk 2002). A new regimefor strategic management in London will also bedeveloped which will include a generic emergency planfor London and clear protocols for the roles oforganisations involved in the response to a ‘catastrophic’incident (ibid.). Furthermore, organisations will receiveindividual recommendations to improve futureperformance of their emergency managementresponsibilities (ibid.). In June 2002, a new group ofsecondees joined the London Resilience Team to furtherdevelop the above initiatives and begin to formulate thepractical implications of implementing these changes.

The current system in London between local-levelresponders and central government appears disjointed.Organisations above the local level appear to formulatetheir own plans and arrangements with little integrationwith other organisations, departments, or levels involvedin emergency management, as admitted by BrigadierAbbott in the Ministry of Defence Select Committee inJanuary 2002. “What we have found since11th September is that the plans for one particulardepartment may well be sound but the problem is theyare not synchronised with the other departments. It isthe ability to synchronise not only central governmentand the elements of central government but also downin the nation at local level, whether it be authorities,boroughs or the police, which is important” (Ministry ofDefence 2002, p. 3). The difficulty comes, not fromeveryday emergencies, but from an incident that doesrequire a multiagency and multilateral response, as seenduring the fuel crisis and flooding during 2000 and thefoot-and-mouth crisis in 2001, which resulted in adisjointed and disorganised response. Brigadier Abbottfrom the CCS admitted in the Ministry of Defence(2002, p. 3) Select Committee that “…we do not learnour lessons” (p. 81).

Research carried out over a number of years since 1998indicates that every facet of the local-level response inLondon, from voluntary organisations to the emergencyservices, are in regular liaison with each other (Normanand Coles 2002). This frequency of liaison, particularlywith the voluntary organisations, is a positive one andreflects local-level involvement in volunteerorganisations interests and activities. However, thepicture is not quite so positive where regional andcentral government are concerned.

Two organisations exist at now ‘regional’ level, theMayor’s Office and the Government Office of London(GOL). Central government level is considered toinclude the Civil Contingencies Secretariat, theDepartment of Health, and other governmentdepartments that may have a role in responding to adisaster.

Research has indicated that less than half of theorganisations questioned were in regular contact withregional level of government (ibid). This may, however,reflect that as a new entity the Mayor’s Office has anunclear role in terms of emergency planning, asparticipants did question whether it was considered a‘regional’ organisation. Also, there is presently nolegislated emergency planning role for the Mayor’sOffice. The role of the GOL is also confusing, with noemergency managers at the regional level (theDepartment of Health is the only central governmentdepartment with its own regional emergency managers)and what would appear to be complete disconnection(both vertically and horizontally) from any otherdepartment or organisation.

With regard to central government, the emerging pictureis overwhelmingly one of confusion. Although theresponsibility for emergency planning moved from theHome Office to the CCS in July 2001, research carriedout by Norman (2002) also identified similar levels ofconfusion when emergency planning was theresponsibility of the Home Office. The results are stark.CCS is the only other level of emergency planning abovethe local response, and communication once every threemonths hardly seems adequate (ibid). It is hoped theyare merely finding their feet in this transition period andnot setting the precedent for the future functioning oftheir department.

When mapping the coordination arrangements forGreater London, some difficulties were encountered.These were not with the complexity of thearrangements, but rather, to echo the Sunday Express(Hall and Palmer 2002) report, with their haphazardnature and the confusion found at all levels thatsurrounds them. The relationship between theorganisations involved in emergency planning and thelines of communication is shown in Figure 2. Thediagram represents the lines of communication and

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liaison in London before and after 9/11 and provides amodel of the current levels of communication betweenthe London boroughs up to central government. Thediagram clearly demonstrates the new lines ofcommunications that have suddenly opened since 9/11.It is our contention that, before effective coordinationcan take place, lines of communication must be wellestablished and operating in a two-way fashion, bothvertically and horizontally. As the model shows, this isclearly not the case.

The evidence gathered in the research is clearlysupported by the work of others. For instance Toulmin,Givans, and Steel (1989, p. 120) have formulated amodel of ‘intergovernmental distance’ which suggeststhat there are constraints in disaster communicationsbetween the various levels of government and agenciesinvolved in undertaking their normal duties andemergency tasks simultaneously. A number of modelsfor coordination have been formulated by such authorsas Drabek (1985, 1986, 2001), Rosenthal, Charles, and‘t Hart (1989), Flin (1996), Sylves and Waugh (1996),Paton, Johnston, and Houghton (1998), and Waugh(2000). What has become evident is a move away fromtraditional and often highly structured systems oforganisation with unity of command, task specialisation,and where communication is often top-down, towards amore ‘structurally fluid’ organisation that does not relyon hierarchy and formal communications systems. Thistype of organisation is referred to by Waugh (1990,

p. 10) as a ‘professional bureaucracy’ and by authorssuch as Drabek (1985, p. 91), Sylves and Waugh (1996,p. 93), and Paton, Johnston, and Houghton (1998, p. 7)have formulated coordination models based on thisconcept of more ‘structurally fluid’ organisations.

It is apparent that the emergency planning systemoperating in London leaves a lot to be desired, and if, aswe suspect, it is a reflection of what is happening in therest of the U.K., then we should indeed be worried.However, it is important to note here that London is theseat of government in the U.K. and considered to be amegacity where responsibility for emergency planningrests at the local level. Should there be a major incidenton the scale of 9/11, it is almost certain that, unlike NewYork City, control will be assumed by centralgovernment. Cabinet minutes to this effect wererecorded in 1982, when the possibility of a major floodin London was discussed. Such a dichotomy creates aduality of tensions that are firmly rooted in the powerbase that has existed in London for over five hundredyears. Coles (1998) noted immediately after the last U.K.review of emergency planning that the system in theU.K. was haphazard at best. Moreover, Parker andHandmer (1992a) pointed out in 1992 the one thingthat characterises the way past governments andindustry have handled disaster has been their inability todisseminate and share information following incidents “… in marked contrast to the ‘right to know’ law of theUnited States.” In four years since 1998, not much has

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Cabinet Office Briefing Room (COBR)

Civil Contingencies Secretariat (CCS)

Lead Government Department (LGD)

Department of Health

Primary CareGroups

NHS TrustsAmbulance PoliceFireService

LESLPLFEPALocalAuthority

HealthAuthoirites

Regional Level(Mayor’s Office or GOL)

NHS Executive(HEPAs)

Two way communications since 11th September

Communications generally fed upwardsTwo way communications when required

Two way communications

Figure 3. Lines of Communication and Liaison in London before and after 9/11 (Source: Norman and Coles 2002)

changed and following the recent review governmentprocrastination will ensure it will not do so until at least2003/2004 (Weatherill 2002).

It is clear from the results of the research carried outbetween 1998 and 2002 that the response at the locallevel within the London boroughs is working despite asmall downturn since 1998. The emergency services,local authorities, and pan-London liaison groupscommunicate regularly, which has helped to build aneffective and coordinated response. The regional levelseems to present a confusing picture where ill-definedroles are the norm. Before September 11, no lines ofcommunication, either vertically or horizontally, wereevident in an emergency planning role. Although it isprobably true to say that the Mayor’s Office and GOLwould like a role within emergency planning, one mustquestion the political motivation rather than practicalexpertise this would afford London. Lines ofcommunication have been established since September2001; however, their role, responsibilities, and authoritywithin emergency planning appear no more transparent.

ConclusionIt is evident from this paper that some of the problemsthat beset emergency planning in England and Wales inthe 1980s and 1990s are still ongoing in 2002. Theimportant issues of legislation, structure,communication, and coordination have still to beaddressed by central government, although the mostrecent review is going some way to doing this, albeitslowly. However, there is to some extent still a veil ofsecrecy surrounding how emergency planning takesplace, a situation that was noted in 1990 by Hodge(1990) and by Beishon (1990). Responsibility for thislack of transparency must be shouldered by Whitehall,which could do much more to raise awareness to theissues of civil protection.

Local authority civil protection in the U.K. is about toexperience a major change. This has been evidenced bythe current review and the ongoing consultation processregarding a proposed new statutory duty. This paper hascritically examined the current status of local authorityemergency planning and found that a comprehensivereorganisation is indeed needed if the government is tomaintain its principal responsibility of the safety andprotection of the public. Since July 2001, theresponsibility for emergency planning at centralgovernment level rests with the CCS. It has beenidentified that there is considerable confusion about therole of CCS which, coupled with the lack of verticalcommunication between borough level and CCS that isevident in Figure 3, demonstrates a serious weakness inthe vertical system. As stated earlier, it is hoped they aremerely finding their feet in this transition period and notsetting a precedent for the future functioning of theirdepartment.

Waugh (2000, p. 154) suggests disasters can createpolicy windows when the “. . . the need to act and toprepare for future events” is heightened and he furthersuggests that these ‘windows’ close very quickly as thememory of the event fades. These opportunities foremergency planning are a rare occurrence. It wouldappear then that the high hopes for the review havealready been dashed as the policy window appears tohave been closed just over six months after the attacksof September 11, 2001; for, as the Sunday Express (Halland Palmer 2002) has stated, the “Cabinet Office hastold local authorities that it will be at least two yearsbefore it can find time for legislation to go throughParliament to set up a proper nationally coordinatedsystem.” So, it appears that the future of emergencyplanning has again been subjected to delaying tacticsand empty promises. The lack of political will on thisissue may result in a complete system failure at a pointin the future when London’s recovery from disaster mayrely on it; at that point emergency planning will becomepart of the disaster.

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Parker, D. and J. Handmer (eds.). 1992a. Hazard Managementand Emergency Planning: Perspectives on Britain. London: Jamesand James Science Publishers, Ltd.

———. 1992b. ‘Improving Hazard Management andEmergency Planning.’ In Hazard Management and EmergencyPlanning: Perspectives on Britain, edited by D. Parker and J.Handmer. London: James and James Science Publishers, Ltd.

Paton, D., D. Johnston, and B. F. Houghton. 1998.‘Organisational Response to a Volcanic Eruption.’ DisasterPrevention and Management: An International Journal 7: 5–13.

Quarantelli, E. L. 1976. Social Aspects of Disasters and theirRelevance to Pre-Disaster Planning. Columbus, OH: PreliminaryPaper No. 30, Disaster Research Center, The Ohio StateUniversity.

———. 1985. The Need for Planning, Training, and Policy onEmergency Preparedness. Newark, DE: Preliminary Paper No.101, Disaster Research Center, University of Delaware.

———. 1988. Local Emergency Management Agencies: ResearchFindings on their Progress and Problems in the Last Two Decades.Newark, DE: Preliminary Paper No. 126, Disaster ResearchCenter, University of Delaware.

———. 1991. Different Types of Disaster and PlanningImplications. Lancaster, England: paper presented at theEmergency Planning Conference, Lancaster University.

———. 1995. Disaster Planning, Emergency Management, andCivil Protection: The Historical Development and CurrentCharacteristics of Organized Efforts to Prevent and Respond toDisasters. Newark, DE: Preliminary Paper No. 227, DisasterResearch Center, University of Delaware.

———. (ed.). 1998. What Is a Disaster? Perspectives on theQuestion. London and New York: Routledge.

Rosenthal, Uriel, Michael T. Charles, and Paul ‘t Hart. 1989.Coping with Crises: The Management of Disasters, Riots andTerrorism. Springfield, IL: Charles C. Thomas, Publisher.

Rocket, J. P. 1994. ‘A Constructive Critique of UnitedKingdom Emergency Planning.’ Disaster Prevention andManagement 3: 47–60.

Sibson, M. 1991. ‘Local Authority: A Planned Response toMajor Incidents.’ Pp. 195–202 in Emergency Planning in the90’s, Proceedings of the Second Disaster Prevention andLimitation Conference, University of Bradford, September1990, edited by A. Z. Keller and H. C. Wilson. London:Technical Communications and the British Library.

Sylves, Richard T. and William L. Waugh (eds.). 1996. DisasterManagement in the U.S. and Canada: The Politics, Policymaking,Administration, and Analysis of Emergency Management. SecondEdition. Springfield, IL: Charles C. Thomas, Publisher.

Toulmin, L. M., C. J. Givans, and D. L. Steel. 1989. ‘TheImpact of Intergovernmental Distance on DisasterCommunications.’ International Journal of Mass Emergencies andDisasters 7: 116–132.

Tucker, W. R. 1999. Disasters and Emergencies: Managing theResponse. Leicester, England: The Institution of Fire Engineers.

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AuthorsSarah NormanEve ColesCentre for Disaster ManagementSchool of Science and the EnvironmentCoventry UniversityPriory StreetCoventry CV1 5FBENGLAND(Email: Norman) [email protected](Email: Coles) [email protected]

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Helping the other victims1 of September 11:Gander uses multiple EOCs todeal with 38 diverted flights

1. The idea of calling the diverted passengers the ‘other victims’ was suggested by Henry Quarantelli.

2. Of the 6,600 passengers diverted to Gander, 536 stayed in the Salvation Army and Anglican summer camps, 713 in Lewisporte, 887 inGambo, 155 in Norris Arm, 542 in Glenwood – a total of 2,833 – and the remaining 3,767 stayed in Gander. In addition to 25 Americanflights, Sabena, Aer Lingus, Lufthansa, Air Italia, Malev, Air France, British Airways, and Virgin Air all had flights diverted to Gander.

By T. Joseph Scanlon

On September 11, 2001, after seeing three hijacked

jets turned into missiles and a fourth crash in

Pennsylvania, the United States ordered all U.S.-

registered aircraft to land at the nearest airport and

closed its airspace. When the decision was made,

hundreds of commercial flights were over the Pacific

or Atlantic en route to North America. Some had

sufficient fuel to turn back. Most needed a North

American airport to take them, and that airport had

to be in Canada. The Canadian government, its air

traffic control system, and Canadian airports were

presented with a fait accompli. They had to accept

hundreds of aircraft knowing – given what had

happened – that one or more of them might be

carrying terrorists or be under terrorist control.

Worried about the possibility that some of these jets

might attack major Canadian cities, the federal

government ordered that they land at smaller

communities along Canada’s East Coast.

On the East Coast, two factors affected precisely

where those jets landed – the jet stream and the

weather. The jet stream was far south that day, so

most flights made their North American landfall at

Newfoundland rather than Labrador. That took them

to St. John’s, Gander, or Stephenville, Newfoundland,

rather than Goose Bay, Labrador. Then a light drizzle

and fog hit Newfoundland’s West Coast, dropping

visibility to a mile at Stephenville. Aircraft heading

there had to pull up and land in St. John’s or Gander

or continue to Halifax, Nova Scotia, or Moncton,

New Brunswick. On Canada’s West Coast, there was

little choice: if the planes were going to land in

Canada, for the most part they would have to land

in Vancouver.

As a result of all this, two Canadian cities – Halifax

and Vancouver – received the most diverted flights

on September 11. But when Gander’s population –

10,347 – is considered, its intake was proportionally

far greater. Gander took in 38 flights and 6,600

passengers, a 63 per cent increase in its population,

compared to a two per cent increase in Halifax, less

than a third of a one per cent increase for Vancouver.

Even including nearby towns – Appleton, Gambo,

Glenwood, Lewisporte, and Norris Arm – the Gander

area’s population is 18,882. That is still a 35 per cent

increase.2

This article is about how Gander handled that

situation. As will be shown, the community activated

a number of emergency operations centres (EOCs) –

and each ended up managing one aspect of the

response. Though the airport was the key, the result

was a coordinated system that ran smoothly without

any single agency taking charge. This article

describes how that system came about, why

it worked, and how Gander avoided problems

that often occur with multiple EOCs and

emergent groups.

LiteratureWhen a commercial flight has a seriously ill or unrulypassenger, it notifies its company, and its company callsan airport service company, which makes whateverpreparations are necessary. When the plane lands, theproblem passenger is unloaded, the fuel tanks – ifnecessary – topped up, and the plane is on its way.The service company takes care of and pays for localarrangements, then bills the airline. Even when there isa mechanical failure, the process is much the same. The

service company arranges a secure area – if the stop is ashort one – or transportation and hotels – if the stop islikely to be longer. If necessary, the service companyalerts Customs, Immigration, and other agencies. Onceagain, the service company pays the bills and later billsthe airline. No matter what the cause – even severeweather – diversions are not seen as local, regional, orprovincial emergencies.

Because diversions are routine, there appears to be noacademic literature on the subject.3 There is someliterature on sheltering, but, for the most part, it dealswith cases where those being sheltered are from thecommunity itself or from communities nearby – inshort, sheltering as a result of evacuations (Scanlon1994a). Usually, most persons end up with friends,neighbours, or relatives (Dynes and Quarantelli 1980;Smith, Macauley, and associates 1980, p. 344). When217,000 persons were evacuated from Mississauga,Ontario, after a chemical spill, only about five per centended up in shelters (Scanlon with Padgham 1980).That percentage is virtually identical to Xenia, Ohio,after a devastating tornado (Dynes and Quarantelli1980, p. 344). A University of Toronto study showedthat in Mississauga one-quarter of those evacuatedstayed within five kilometers [ED.: three miles],60 per cent within 10 kilometers [six miles], and95 per cent within 100 kilometers [62 miles] of theirhomes (Burton, Victor, and Whyte 1981, pp. 9–18).The situation in Gander on September 11 was verydifferent. None of the travellers had friends, neighbours,or relatives but came from hundreds if not thousands ofkilometers away.

Two studies about sheltering relate to stranded travellers.The first describes stranded travellers in a rest stopalong the Pennsylvania Turnpike in 1958 during a snowemergency. The second looks at travellers stranded whenflash floods destroyed 25 bridges along the Trans-Canada Highway in Northern British Columbia (B.C.) inNovember 1987. But there were only 800 strandedtravellers in Pennsylvania, 100 in B.C., both far less thanthe thousands stranded on September 11 – and in bothcases the stranded travellers were in the area by choice,not in a location or even a country they had notintended to visit.

On March 19 and 20, 1958, a severe snowstorm forcedapproximately 800 travellers to take shelter at a rest stopalong the Pennsylvania Turnpike for 24 to 36 hours. Thegroup was heterogeneous except for a rather large groupof young, healthy male truck drivers. Even in this briefperiod, some leaders emerged – and were accepted.Leadership came initially from a physician, but twoU.S. Air Force officers and a salesman joined him.

The leaders focused on two things – controlling accessto outside communications and making certain everyoneknew what sustenance was available and that it wasfairly distributed (Disaster Research Group 1958, p. 4;in later references, this study is called the DRGSnowstorm Study). They imposed a few rules. One wasa ban of smoking necessitated by the poor ventilation(ibid., p. 12). Two persons were diabetics, and a numberhad suffered exposure – three physicians, two nurses,and two ambulance drivers, all stranded travellers,handled these (ibid., p. 13). One traveller had diedwhile trying to reach the restaurant in the deep snow.His body was wrapped in blankets and left outside untilremoved by helicopter. Two Roman Catholic Nunsconsoled his spouse.

In 1978, flash floods caused by sudden warm conditionscaused severe damage along the Skeena River. ThoughTerrace was not flooded, water streaming down from themountains created the breaks along the Trans-CanadaHighway and the rail link between Terrace and theinterior of Canada. The floods also broke the gaspipeline that provides natural gas to Terrace, theindustrial centre of Kitimat, and the coastal town ofPrince Rupert. Travellers were stranded all along thehighway. One man had a broken neck: he had drivenonto a bridge unaware the other end had collapsed.Helicopters rescued him and the other strandedtravellers and flew them to Terrace. It would be monthsbefore some were able to return and retrieve their cars.

In one sense, the B.C. travellers were comparable to thetravellers stranded on September 11. Only a handfulhad medical problems, but they had lost theirtransportation. But there was one major difference.No one saw these persons as anything but victims.No one thought that some of them might be terrorists.At first, they were put up in hotels, but later most weremoved to a college dormitory. Since most had intendedto head south to Lower British Columbia by ferry (thereis a ferry at Prince Rupert), they had few resources topay for alternative transportation (Scanlon with Taylorand Jarzab 1978). There is nothing in the study tosuggest any leadership patterns emerged.

Three other items have relevance to September 11 andGander. Two are studies of EOCs – emergencyoperations centres – and one relates to how Ganderdealt with an earlier emergency. An unpublished paperby E. L. Quarantelli notes that, while EOCs areunquestionably of value, they often run into problems,among them overcrowding and the fact that it is notclear who is managing the EOC itself (Quarantelli1972). He also found that, if an EOC becomesovercrowded there is a tendency for key players to go off

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3. A search was made at the Disaster Research Center in Delaware, the Natural Hazards Research and Applications Information CenterInformation in Colorado, and at the library of the Emergency Management Australia Institute in Victoria. Only one article turned up. Itwas written after 9/11, and it was not based on research.

and make decisions outside the EOC. Scanlon identifiedthe same problems in an article reviewing EOCs inCanadian incidents (Scanlon 1994b). Both noted thetendency for a number of agencies to have their ownoperations centre and that this can lead at best to a lackof coordination, at worst to conflict. Scanlon based hisfindings partly from a study of a fatal air crash thatoccurred in Gander in 1985. In that study, CarletonUniversity’s Emergency Communications Research Unit(ECRU) noted that the response was managed by whatamounted to two EOCs, one at the crash site, one ina secure area of the airport (Emergency CommunicationsResearch Unit 1985). Once again, this is in sharpcontrast to Gander, where there was coordination andconsensus and divisions of responsibilities among thevarious EOCs, not conflict.

Gander’s experienceThough Gander is a small town in CentralNewfoundland, it is also an airport town – one of themain stopping points for military flights crossing theNorth Atlantic during the Second World War. It is stillan important airport for private jets and visitors to itsinternational transit lounge include persons such asGeorge Bush, Sr., Oprah Winfrey, Tom Cruise, GregNorman, and Tiger Woods. More significant, it is thefirst major airport on its side of the North Atlantic and,therefore, receives aircraft that get into trouble on theGreat Circle Route. It is also the home of the AreaControl Center for air traffic over the Western NorthAtlantic, monitoring flight separation as aircraft leaveNorth America for Europe each evening and as flightsarrive from Europe in the morning hours.

Gander thus sees itself as the aviation crossroads ofNorth America, and its streets are named after aviationpioneers including John Alcock and Lieutenant ArthurWhitten Brown – who made the first nonstop aerialcrossing of the Atlantic in 1919. Their feat isovershadowed by attention given to a man who flew theAtlantic eight years later, when it was not so unusual,Charles Lindbergh. There is a Lindbergh Street inGander and one named after Amelia Earhart. Gander nolonger handles regularly scheduled flights of majorcommercial airlines. It is accustomed to diversions,though not on the scale experienced on September 11.

Gander has had its share of local emergencies:

On September 18, 1946, a Sabena Belgian aircraftcrashed 22 miles southwest of Gander with44 people on board. It was noon the next day beforethe wreckage was sighted and it was confirmed that

there were 18 survivors. Because of the inaccessibilityof the terrain, they did not make it to hospital fortwo more days, though a physician did treat them atthe crash site.

On September 5, 1967, a Czechoslovakian airlinecrashed just past the end of the existing runway.Thirty-four of the 69 passengers survived, thoughmany had to be transported to burn units in Halifaxand Montreal.

On December 12, 1985, a U.S. charter aircraftcrashed almost on takeoff. That took the lives of eightcrew and 248 soldiers from the 101st Airborne.4

There is a monument to those soldiers at the crash site.There is also a show of appreciation from what was thenCzechoslovakia – the Czech pavilion from Expo ‘67 wastaken down and now forms part of the Gander Arts andCulture Centre.

More important, there is also a wealth of experience inGander because many of those involved in the earliercrashes, especially the one in 1985, are still in town. Thetown, in other words, because of its history and itsexperience, has an airport and air crash subculture.5 Theimportance of that history showed as soon as people inGander heard about New York on September 11 – andbecame glued to CNN. Unlike others who watched inhorror, many in Gander realized that their town waslikely to be directly affected. Long before the Americansclosed their air space, many in Gander began to preparefor the impact of such a shutdown – diversions toGander. The EOCs at Canadian Forces Base (CFB)Gander, at the James Paton Hospital, at Gander airport,and at Gander town hall were all partially or completelyactivated prior to the closure of U.S. air space; and theRoyal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) had alreadybeen asked to assist and had responded.

However, the situation that faced those responders onSeptember 11 bore little resemblance to any of thesituations described in the literature. The strandedtravellers were strangers to Gander and toNewfoundland – many had to be shown a map so theyknew where they were – and nothing had happened tothem or their aircraft. They had been forced to seekrefuge because of something that happened elsewhereand because a foreign government had shut down –without consultation – normal operations. Mostimportant, instead of handling one or two diversions –something it was accustomed to – Gander airport founditself handling dozens of diverted flights and scores ofdiverted passengers. To do that, it needed assistancefrom the town, the hospital, the provincial government,

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4. ECRU field researchers visited Gander on that occasion and produced a major study of the response to that crash (EmergencyCommunications Research Unit 1985). The study was also published as an appendix to the crash report by the Canadian Aviation SafetyBoard.

5. Anderson (1965) identified the concept of a disaster subculture in a study of a 1964 flood in Ohio. Perhaps the clearest description of asubculture can be found in the paper by Wenger and Weller (1973); see also Scanlon (1992a).

the private sector, social services, and voluntaryagencies, as well as CFB Gander and the RCMP.

The first response came at CFB Gander, put on alertbecause of the terrorist threat. It opened its commandpost and increased perimeter security, though thoseactions were not connected with the possibility of flightsbeing diverted to Gander. Next came the James Patonhospital: as a result of a call from Emergency HealthServices in St. John’s, it got ready to set up emergencyhospitals.6 Third to activate was the airport. Three staffmembers held a short meeting to discuss the possibilitythat Gander might receive extra flights if U.S. air spacewere to be closed – a decision not yet made. Theydecided that the tower would control part of the airportand direct incoming aircraft to appropriate parking spotsand that one vehicle and one staff member of airportservice staff would be assigned to act as the radio linkbetween the tower and the ground staff. When therewere concerns about widespread computer failures atthe turn of the century, Gander had prepared to receivescores of aircraft and hold them until computers wereagain up and running. They had even prepared aparking plan for such an eventuality. Although no onecould find that plan, the man who drew it up was oneof the three at the meeting, and he recalled it wellenough to use it on September 11. Right after thatmeeting, the airport activated its ECC and notified theRoyal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) and the base.Both sent liaison officers.

After a call from the fire chief – someone at the airportcalled him – the town manager assembled some of thosewho staff its EOC. Soon the town, the base, the hospitaland the airport all had their command posts operating,and they and other agencies – such as the provincialsocial services agency Human Resources andEmployment (HR&E) – began to prepare for a massinvasion. All those EOCs were located and staffedaccording to well-established plans. The airportEmergency Control Center (ECC), for example, was in asecure area. Its members included not just airport staffbut, as planned, representatives from the RCMP andCFB Gander. The town’s EOC was in an upstairscommittee room at town hall. Its members included notjust town staff but also representatives from the JamesPaton Hospital, the Red Cross, NewTel Communications(telephone), and HR&E. The hospital’s EOC was in anarea away from normal patient traffic, the one at CFB ina secure area at the base, and the one at NewTelCommunications in a secure area at its Gander offices.

Eventually, these various operations centres would eachtake on specific responsibilities. With RCMP andmilitary assistance, the airport ECC dealt with theunloading of the flights and – along with Customs,Immigration, and other agencies – screened thepassengers and cleared them for entry to Canada.The Red Cross assisted by Salvation Army volunteersregistered the arrivals. Working with school bus drivers,the fire department looked after transportation. HR&Eidentified shelters, and the town EOC decided whowould go where. The hospital provided health servicesto all the shelters, and the Salvation Army ran a centralfood and supply system. Their owners – church orservice club members or school staff – ran the shelters.The telephone company provided extra telephones andother services as required.

Landing the aircraftThe first hijacked aircraft crashed into the north towerof the World Trade Center at 10:15 a.m. Gander time.(Gander is an hour and a half ahead of New York andhalf an hour ahead of Canada’s Maritime Provinces.7)The second plane hit 18 minutes later at 10:33 a.m.Gander time. The United States Federal AviationAdministration (FAA) shut down U.S. airspace37 minutes after that second crash – at 11:10 a.m.Gander time. Since the Area Control Center in Gandercontrols all traffic along the Western North Atlantic,it immediately began to communicate with U.S. aircraft,ordering the captains to land. It also contactedSt. John’s, Gander, Stephenville, and Goose Bay to seehow many aircraft they could handle. Gander said itwould handle as many as 50 flights. In fact it handled38 and did this so efficiently that all landed on runway22–04 coming straight in, turning off at exit Bravo, andheading to a parking spot.

Once the planes landed and were parked – and thismeant using runway 13–31 and other areas as parkingspots (13–31 was closed) – the pilots were told thateveryone would have to remain on board. For some,that order would last well into the next day. Thealternative would have been to allow 6,600 passengersand crew to flood into the terminal. Since it seemedmore than possible there were terrorists on some flights,that was impractical. (The airport was also receiving‘delay’ orders from the federal government: police andintelligence agencies were frantically reviewingpassenger lists to see if there were suspects on any of thediverted aircraft.) The tension was heightened when thetower was unable to establish contact with five aircraft.Ground crews were instructed to plug his headset into

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6. There are three 200-bed, fully-equipped emergency hospitals in Newfoundland, one in each part of the province. All three were used onSeptember 11.

7. The unusual half-hour time difference means that all network radio and television programs are announced as, for example, ‘10 o’clock,10:30 in Newfoundland.’ It has led to the joke: ‘The world will end tonight at midnight, 12:30 in Newfoundland.’ A look at a globeexplains the time difference. Newfoundland stretches well out from the Canadian mainland. From St. John’s harbor – St. John’s is thecapital and is on the East Coast – the nearest point of land is Ireland.

each aircraft and try to reach the captains. That easedthe tension: all were on the wrong frequency.

It appears that many if not most pilots did not tell theirpassengers exactly why they were being diverted untilafter they landed. One even said there had been acomputer malfunction in the control system in NewYork City. When the first passenger off that aircraft sawCNN, he asked someone what movie it was. Otherswere more forthcoming:

Our captain was as upfront as he could be with usfrom the beginning. After changing course,descending altitude and lowering the landing gear(to expend fuel) he came over the intercom and said:“I have two things to tell you folks, then I have to getback to work. First of all, we have a very healthyairplane. (That was a relief.) And, secondly, there hasbeen an incident in the United States and all U.S.airspace is closed. I have been instructed to land inGander, Newfoundland. Once we are settled on theground, I will let you know more.” Once we landedand taxied to our position, he came back on thesystem and told us about the four planes crashing.Within about 30 minutes of landing (I think) he gotthe Canadian Broadcasting Network, and we listenedto that through the night.8

A passenger on another plane – flying from Rome toPhiladelphia – gave a similar account:

... we were told that the Philadelphia airport hadbeen closed and that we would be diverted toNewfoundland, Canada. Some of us believed it wasdue to bad weather; however, the Captain neverreally expounded on the reason. I had a window seatand as we approached the runway, I became alarmedbecause I could see no runway, only water and trees.I said to my husband, “Where are we going to land?There is no runway!” The descent was quick andquite short. Obviously it was because the runway wasfilled with 37 other planes! Once we landed, thecaptain came on the loudspeaker and told us theUnited States had been struck by terrorists and theTwin Tower Buildings in New York were totallydestroyed and that there had been two other planecrashes, one at the Pentagon, and one inPennsylvania. (This plane was headed toPennsylvania.)

On the groundOn the ground, most of the passengers settled into theirseats and tried to make themselves as comfortable aspossible, but there were some concerns – diabeticproblems and problems with other medication, smokerproblems (Nicorettes were supplied), water problems,stress problems, and – on one aircraft – drinkingproblems. (Two passengers were taken to the police

lockup to sober up.) At first, an ambulance respondedto each medical call, but eventually the EOC at theJames Paton hospital decided to send a team to theairport. Airport staff emptied toilets and provided waterand eventually snacks. Every time a captain madea request, steps had to be moved to that aircraft.

In most cases, medication could be identified andsupplied, though sometimes prescriptions written inEurope had to be puzzled out. When one passenger’sdescription of his medication could not be understood,airport staff opened the cargo hold and located hisbaggage. Once the prescription was located, themedication was identified. All medication was cleared bya physician and delivered personally to the passenger.Servicing the planes had to be done by persons withclearance to work airside or persons accompanied bythose with passes. That was fine for the volunteerfirefighters – they back up the airport fire department –but not for the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP).There is no RCMP airport detachment, so RCMP had tobe accompanied airside. So did the bus drivers whowere brought in to move passengers from the parkedaircraft to the terminal. The buses also had to besearched and cleared.

While the passengers were waiting, the town wasmaking preparations. Gander has no community socialservices, so HR&E ran the hunt for shelters. It hadpreviously identified possible shelters for up to1,500 evacuees (presumably from nearby towns). Nowit had to find places for four times that number. Its staffbegan contacting churches and schools and otherfacilities not only in Gander but also in nearby towns.It was flooded by calls from scores of local residentswilling to assist.

There was, however, a major problem. Members of theNewfoundland Association of Public Employees (NAPE)were on strike. Not only were schools not being fullyserviced, but also there were pickets at all schools. Theonly local transportation – school buses – was notavailable. The drivers were members of NAPE. Even if away could be found to transport passengers to schools,they would have to cross picket lines. (Looking afterthem once they reached the schools was less of aproblem: teachers were not on strike.) After someinformal contacts – some drivers said they wanted tohelp – the union decided that the situation was anemergency. It announced that the strike would continuebut that strikers would picket only the school boardoffices. More important, the striking drivers wouldassist. The drivers would not end their strike but wouldwork for no pay.

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8. This quote from a passenger, like all other quotes from passengers, was obtained on the understanding that no individual would beidentified. I would, however, like to thank the scores of passengers, including some personal friends, who were kind enough to answermy questions.

Although provincial HR&E was identifying what shelterswere available, the town determined where to sendpeople. It decided that it would start with locations inGander then, if necessary, use smaller communities. Italso decided that it would try to keep the passengersfrom each flight together. That would make it easierwhen they departed. At the request of the airport ECC,the town told hotels to give priority to crew. When somehotels queried this decision – they had already acceptedbookings – the town declared, after consulting theairport again, a local state of local emergency andordered the hotels in writing to cooperate.9 (Passengersfrom two flights were sent to a hotel, though many slepton cots.)

The town asked the local Red Cross to take overRegistration and Inquiry (R&I). By then, a localSalvation Army officer had realized what was happening,met the mayor, and had been invited to join the townEOC. When the Red Cross needed volunteers to assistwith R&I, he passed that request to Army regionalheadquarters. Soon there were scores of Armyvolunteers. The Red Cross had registration forms copiedand held a short training course to show volunteers howto fill them out. They had considered doing R&I intown, then decided to do it at the airport. With the helpof airport staff, tables were set up in the internationallounge, where transit passengers wait while a flight isbeing serviced. No passenger would leave the securearea until he or she was registered and checked against apassport. (The passport check ensured that theregistration records would match the Customs forms.)Even while the Red Cross was arranging R&I, theSalvation Army contacted local suppliers and the airportcaterers and arranged for hot food to be served aspassengers came through the lounge. It also arrangedfor toiletries.

The town took two other steps. It asked the fire chief tomove his department’s mobile command van to theairport to manage transportation. (The chief becameknown humorously as the ‘Minister of Transportation.’)It asked the fire inspector – the town’s emergencyplanner – to be town liaison to the airport ECC. Thetown felt it was crucial to have accurate and up-to-dateinformation about which flights were being unloadedand how many passengers were on those flights. Bythen, the hospital had also established a commandcenter at the airport to take care of the frequent requestsfor medication or medical assistance. While all this washappening, the passengers – on orders from TransportCanada – were still sitting in their aircraft. Concerned

about the possibility that some flights were carryingterrorists, the federal government delayed while itconsidered how the flights should be handled.

Unloading the passengersWhen the airport was ready to start unloadingpassengers, it began with the flights parked closest tothe airport. As passengers came off their planes, theywalked through a cordon of soldiers.10 Once inside, theywalked through a footbath set up by the Canadian FoodInspection Agency because of foot-and-mouth disease.Then at tables staffed by RCMP and military personnel,all hand baggage was searched. Then they reachedCustoms where they were screened and, if necessary,referred to Immigration or Health.

Once they passed this screening – still in the securearea – they were greeted by the tables of hot food andthe volunteers who registered them, using pencil andpaper. The registration was done by aircraft and byfamily, and the files were compiled in alphabetical orderby flight. The forms from each flight were placed in abox. (The boxes were ‘Tim-Bits’ boxes supplied byCanada’s most popular doughnut shop, Tim Horton’s,started by Horton, a former Toronto Maple Leaf hockeyplayer.) Only after the entire flight was checked in werethe passengers taken to a school bus shuttle.

Once the bus’ destination was known, it was noted onthe box for that flight. At that point as well, the firechief called the assigned shelter to say their passengerswere en route. There was one hitch: there were payphones in the lounge. Passengers started to line up tomake calls, delaying the registration process. To stopthis, a telephone company employee got the airport toprepare an ‘Out of Order’ sign and posted in on thephones. That was easier than disconnecting. Becauseofficials were concerned about emotional stress, theairport arranged for clerics to be available in theregistration area. They were cautioned only to respondif passengers approached them. Since uniformedSalvation Army personnel were doing registering, upsetpassengers usually talked to them.

To give the various schools and churches more time toprepare – they were all collecting blankets, mattresses,towels, and other supplies – the town sent the first flightto a Salvation Army summer camp, the second to anAnglican camp. It was just at the end of the campingseason, so the camps were still staffed. Passengers werethen sent to schools, churches, and service clubs inGander, then to Appleton, Glenwood, Norris Arm,

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9. This decision caused some confusion. When Air Canada tried to book rooms for a diverted flight, it was told that no rooms wereavailable. It continued to Halifax and informed Transport Canada Gander airport was full. Transport Canada queried the Area ControlCenter, which queried Gander airport, which assured the ACC that it could still handle more aircraft.

10. CFB Gander provided personnel not only for security escorts but also to assist with baggage searches and baggage handling. The basehad also provided extensive assistance after the 1985 crash. In 2001, CFB Gander also accommodated U.S. Air Force personnel andpassengers from several other flights. Defense cutbacks had left the base with unused accommodations.

Lewisporte, and Gambo.11 The largest facilities were usedfor the biggest flights. In some cases passengers signedin again when they reached a shelter, and in all casesthey were asked to sign out if they moved. That meantfinding a passenger simply involved knowing the nameand flight number and contacting the shelter.(The hospital made certain some medically trainedperson was at every shelter and that pharmacists wereavailable to provide a 24-hour service.)

Although the passengers were allowed to disembarkwith their hand luggage, it was possible that some haddeliberately left objects on the aircraft. RCMP startedsearching some aircraft, then realized they would notknow what to look for. After that, crews were asked tocheck their own planes.

In the sheltersOnce in shelters, passengers had to be accommodatedand fed – many churches and private citizens did thecooking – but supplies were needed, and the SalvationArmy organised a food centre. At first this was in acitadel, but it was moved to the Community Center.The ice was in, and the rink became what residentscalled the world’s largest walk-in cooler. (The town plancalled for the center to be the morgue.) At first,passengers slept on blankets, in sleeping bags, or on airmattresses supplied by another leading Canadian store,Canadian Tire. Then military flights brought inemergency beds and blankets. These were orderedthrough Emergency Health Services in the provincialcapital, St. John’s, and then flown in on Hercules aircraftfrom CFB Trenton. These flights also brought in someextra personnel for Customs and Immigration.

All the shelters had television sets (usually several ofthem), and these were on continuously. At first, thepassengers were glued to the sets, watching the replaysof what had happened while they had been flying:

There were TVs all over the school in which weoccupied… We watched with horror when we firstwere there, but I could not seem to watch the eventsvery much after that, it was too surreal. The TVs wereon constantly and we had access to any staff memberwe wished to speak with. When the TV was on in thecafeteria and the ‘Star Spangled Banner’ played, we allstood, cried, and felt quite emotional, along withAmerican pride. Even though we were in Canada,you felt a sense of patriotism with everyone.

All shelters were given extra phones, and many wereable to arrange for email. (One group ran its office inNew York by email.) There was also a phone bank setup in downtown Gander outside NewTelCommunications. It included email, and there were

arrangements for persons to pay after they had madea call. Because the cellphone towers were beingoverloaded, NewTel brought in an additional cellphonetower and installed it in 14 hours.12 There werededicated lines – already in place – linking the keyEOCs, and there were radio links. To make certain theoutlying towns were in touch, the town arranged for twokey contact persons – the Salvation Army captain inLewisporte and the deputy fire chief in Gambo.Information was relayed through them in bothdirections.

Stores like the Co-op and Wal-Mart stayed open24 hours, but some supplies ran out – there were noflights coming in. In addition, the airport did two crewbriefings – an RAF and a U.S.Air Force pilot discussedthe flight situation – and crews were taken to meet theirpassengers, visits that were appreciated. The most askedquestion, of course, was ‘When do we leave?’ to whichthe answer was that was beyond the airport’s control.

One passenger who had praised the quiet, calm way hercaptain dealt with the initial announcements reported:

This is the same man who would come and see usdaily in Gambo, with many from the crew, to keep usupdated. They were very concerned for us andalways acted in a caring and professional manner.

While leadership emerged among some groups ofpassengers, it did not in others. Passengers apparentlyfelt that their hosts were doing all that could be done.When leaders emerged, they operated much as thestranded travellers did at the time of the snowstorm inPennsylvania – seeking consensus, controlling facilitieswith limited access, asking for needed information:

I’m not sure how our leaders finished up as leaders,it was, it seemed, a perfectly natural way for things todevelop. A Dutch chap called Monty (he got thenickname ‘The General’) became our spokesman…Others, myself… included, just got drafted intodoing the odds and sods of details of daily life,organizing showers, trips, monitoring the phone sono one spent too long on it and everyone got tophone home. Posting emails and phone messages onthe notice board, getting laundry done. Ferryingpeople to houses for showers, meals, etc. We had asinger from Somerset in England who entertained usevery night and was very proud of the fact that hedidn’t sing any song more than once, he sang over100 songs in four nights… Whatever needed doing,someone was found to do it.

I don’t recall any leadership emerging from thecommunity of friends that we established. Theredidn’t seem to be a need to be a leader. We weretaken care of from a physical standpoint; emotionally

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11. Although most passengers stayed with their flight, unescorted children were taken to a home for battered women and looked afterseparately. Only one flight had to be moved: the health inspector ruled that there were too many persons in one of the Gander schools.

12. The tower had been intended for Newfoundland’s West Coast. It was simply temporarily diverted.

we were all crippled. We had freedom of movement,speech, etc. There was nothing we really needed,however just to get home. We were frightened andupset as much as any other American was during thattime. As I stated before, we truly were in shock andhaving someone feed you and take care of you was allwe expected at that time.

The town managed to keep both passengers and thosemaking inquiries informed through the town Web site.The airport at first objected when the town posted thetime at which flights were departing, then agreed itcould list flights once they left. The Red Cross advertiseda phone number that persons could call and identifysomeone’s name and flight. Then, using its card filesystem – the convenient Tim-Bits boxes – it searched thealphabetical list and told the caller where the person wasstaying. One woman bypassed that system and calledthe town EOC. Her son had called her from a pub andhad been drinking. The person who answered – theMayor of Gambo – told her he would take care of it.He recognized the pub from the description, went there,found the young man, and told him, “Your mother’sworried about you.”

On the whole, however, passengers accepted their fateand expressed their appreciation for those who assistedthem:

Over the next few days the people of Gambo wereabsolutely magnificent. They did all and everythingfor us. Fed us. Clothed us. Entertained us. Took uson trips. Allowed us into their homes. Theyperformed way above and beyond the call of duty.David’s mother even prepared us ‘hot’ scones(Americans call them biscuits) and home madestrawberry jam and a real pot of tea, when we wentto their home for a shower. When we arrived, manypeople didn’t have basic toiletries, razors, soap,toothbrushes, etc. All these, and then some, appearedas if by magic.

One thing that made things easier was the weather.It can be cold and windy and wet in Newfoundland.Power wires are built to a stronger standard because ofthe high winds. When the flights arrived in mid-September, the weather was superb. EnvironmentCanada records show no precipitation during the fivedays the passengers were stranded. Only on Sunday asthe last planes left did the wind pick up to more than astrong breeze. The daytime temperature was a pleasant17 to a hot 26 degrees Celsius (that’s 62 to84 Fahrenheit), the night time lows never less than10 degrees Celsius. (That’s at least 50 degreesFahrenheit.) Airport staff was able to walk around atnight in T-shirts. The warm temperatures meant thatthe stranded passengers – whose luggage was still ontheir planes – were not uncomfortable withoutoutdoor clothing.

Many passengers simply slept on makeshift beds andwaited for their travels to resume, but a few tried tofind a way out of Gander. Some tried to book taxishome – the drivers did agree to take them to a ferry for$450 – and several bought a car. However, when a travelagent in Lewisporte started booking some flights, theagent was told to stop, and the crew of the airlineconcerned brought in to explain to passengers why thatcould not be done. VIPs – and there were some – kepta low profile. Officials at the airport were surprised tolearn later who had been among their guests.

The flights carried 20 dogs and cats and two pigmychimpanzees en route from Belgium to a zoo inColumbus, Ohio. These were looked after – the dogsand cats got a daily stroll – by staff from Canadian FoodInspection Agency and the Society for Prevention ofCruelty to Animals (SPCA). The chimp’s keeper wasallowed to sleep on a couch in the hangar near hischarges. The animals survived, but the female chimplost her fetus, perhaps because of the stress.

Special attentionInevitably some passengers needed or got specialattention. Twenty-nine of the 6,600 passengers had to betaken to the hospital at some time during their stay, andabout half were admitted. However, all were able toleave the hospital and board their flight when it leftGander. One went directly from the hospital to theaircraft. There was also one serious health concern. Onepassenger developed salmonella poisoning. Until it wasclear where he had gotten it, all those with him had tobe quarantined. They were taken from the GanderAcademy to a Salvation Army Camp. Now, instead ofbeing able to wander around town, they were isolated inthe bush. They all complained until it was establishedthat the passenger had been ill when he boarded hisflight – the food was all right – and that no one else hadbecome ill.

A number of couples were on their honeymoons. WhenSalvation Army personnel found one couple seekingprivacy in a closet, it arranged for them to move toa private home. However, when an Italian honeymooncouple was offered private accommodation, theydeclined. They preferred to stay with the otherpassengers. Although some passengers accepted billetsin private homes immediately after arrival, once a fewhours had passed such offers were refused. Personspreferred to remain with their fellow passengers. Whenthe couple that offered to take the Italian couple showedup to get them, they were refused again, but they endedup with another honeymoon couple.

When a teacher who was helping look after passengersat one school noticed three passengers were not eating,she realized – the man’s dress made that easy – that theywere Orthodox Jews. She called the airport and arrangedfor delivery of kosher food. Later she and her husband

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invited the Rabbi to stay at their home and arranged forthe necessary utensils. When someone called the Rabbi,the teacher’s husband told the caller that he was eating.When the caller said that could not be possible, thehusband said, “Oh, we keep a kosher kitchen – andwe’re Catholics.”

When a Hungarian woman could not leave with herflight because her daughter had an infected ear, Ganderfirefighters arranged a hotel room for her (the roomswere now available) and paid for the tickets when theinfection cleared up. (They had gotten to know thewoman because the Malev flight from Budapest hadbeen billeted at the fire hall.) When firefighters learneda couple had a missing son, a firefighter who had beenat Ground Zero, they sent a young firefighter to talkto them.

Although most passengers declined the offer of privateaccommodation, many did accept the offer to havelaundry done or to visit someone’s home for a shower.One man was astonished when a Salvation Army officertold him to go ahead – the door was open. He could notbelieve there were communities where everyone was sotrusting they could leave their homes unlocked andwelcome strangers into their homes while they werebusy elsewhere. The most common complaint was thatit was difficult to go for a walk: someone would alwaysstop and offer a lift. There was some localentertainment. Some passengers went on a boat trip.Most experimented with Newfoundland food and drink,and some tried the local custom of kissing a codfish:

A few of us actually became honoree Newfies bykissing the codfish, drinking the rum, and saying thewords. Personally, I preferred drinking the rum tokissing the fish.

DepartureGetting the passengers out of Gander proved morecomplicated than handling their arrival. For one thing,the aircraft could only be moved under their ownpower. That presented three problems. First, the U.S.initially opened its air space only to U.S.-registeredaircraft. That meant that these flights were free to leavebut could get out only if non-U.S. planes were out oftheir way.13 Second, some planes refused to start: it wasunusual for so many aircraft to be parked so long withtheir motors off. Third, on one occasion, the pilot wasnot available. When the airport called him to informhim he could get ready to leave, he confessed that hehad not expected to leave so quickly. He had beendrinking. His plane was finally moved when anotherpilot from the same airline agreed to assist. There wasalso a lot of work involved cleaning out the planes:international regulations require all food be removedand incinerated.

After varying instructions, the airport was told that theplanes could leave without checking the luggage,provided that all passengers were on board. If even onepassenger was missing, all baggage had to be taken offand identified. (In some aircraft, baggage for a singlepassenger could be spotted, but in other cases every baghad to be taken out of the hold and each bag inspected.)To avoid this, local authorities launched a frantic lastminute hunt sometimes for one or two passengers.One passenger had to be brought back from a moosehunt. In another case, the RCMP went pub to publooking for a missing passenger. They finally found himat a house party. He was startled when police told himhe was wanted – until they explained he was the lastpassenger on his flight. One pilot asked if he could takeoff if all the baggage was unloaded and left inNewfoundland. He was told yes, and after he checkedwith his company that was done. A few days later, hisairline sent a plane to pick up the baggage.

Under new security rules, airport personnel had tosearch every outgoing passenger and crew member.That process was slow because of limited staff resources.It was slowed as well by the fact that new securitydirectives meant that some items – such as nailscissors – were no longer allowed. Items seized were putin a cardboard box that was then sealed and put into thecargo hold. Gander has only eight women who arelicensed to screen baggage – but the security directivesinsisted that they alone do that. Eventually the directivewas changed so that RCMP could assist. The pressurewas relieved when Air Canada flew in additionallicensed screeners from Toronto. (That was whendomestic flights started moving again.) During theprocess, the passengers also had something new to lookat – an RCMP officer in full dress Red Serge. One of theofficers had received permission to wear dress uniformafter incoming passengers had asked him where the‘Mounties’ were. He replied that he was a Mountie, butthe person insisted, “I mean a Red Mountie.” He felt thepresence of his red uniform would make persons feelmore comfortable, and that appeared to be true. Thesame positive reaction was noticed in Stephenville whenpersons wearing Red Cross vests greeted the passengers.

The biggest problems – and the few major disputes –arose when passengers discovered that their flight wasreturning to Europe. That satisfied a few Europeans whowere anxious to return home. It did not satisfyAmericans on European aircraft. They wanted to gethome. On one flight, the passengers learned that theirplane was going to Milan rather than Newark only afterboarding. Three revolted. It took a lengthy discussionincluding an intervention by a psychologist before allagreed to stay on board. The flight returned to Italy,then turned around and flew back to the U.S. The pilot

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13. The pilots of all aircraft were given a new, confidential code number that would identify them when they entered U.S. airspace.

radioed the Area Control Center to say hello when hepassed over with the same passengers.

There was a more serious revolt when some passengerson an Air France flight decided to charter a bus toPort Aux Basques, to pick up a ferry to North Sydney,Nova Scotia. Airport authorities told them that theywere free to travel on their own but without theirluggage. (Any luggage removed from the aircraft wouldhave to be screened and searched, and the facilities andstaff to do this were limited.) The debate became quiteheated, partly because an airport official tried to pointout that they would probably get to the U.S. faster byflying back to Europe and then back to the U.S. than bytraveling by bus and ferry. (His statement was accuratebut did not seem that way to the exasperated travellers.)The passengers cooled off later when the senior officerfrom CFB Gander reminded them about New York Cityand pointed out that the airport authorities had tofollow security directives. He promised he would havetheir baggage searched by military personnel and madeavailable. Nevertheless, the flight was delayed while allbaggage was identified.

Security problemsThe requirement that baggage be removed whena passenger was not on the aircraft and the new securityrules were only one of the security issues that arose inGander. There were also problems with differentagencies receiving new directives at different times.On occasion, officials would call Gander about a changein security rules only to be told a newer one hadreplaced the directive they were quoting. The problemseemed to be that the directives came originally fromTransport Canada, which sent them to its ownpersonnel, then to other agencies.

At one point, airport authorities agreed to leta passenger change planes. (The passenger had beenflying to the U.S. but had received bad news and nowwanted to go back to England.) The pilot of a London-bound aircraft agreed to take the passenger, and airlinestaff wrote out a new ticket by hand. The passenger wascleared by Canadian authorities, boarded, and headedhome. Her plane was scarcely off the ground when anew security directive insisted no passengers changeflights. Another passenger – for whom similararrangements had been made – had to be taken off heraircraft by the RCMP.

RCMP, with help from the Canadian SecurityIntelligence Service (CSIS), checked out a number ofpassengers. They were able to find them easily becauseof the efficient registration system. There werea few alarums:

• Police received a number of tips from crew andpassengers about persons who, to them, seemed

suspicious. All were meticulously checked out. Noneproved valid.

• Some passengers at a shelter passed the word thatsome passengers appeared suspicious and weretalking among themselves in a suspicious way in anArabic language. It turned out those passengers werefrom the Middle East and were worried that the otherpassengers might attack them because of the terroristattacks. They were discussing what they could do.The situation was defused when their concerns wereexplained.

• The Area Control Center reported that four men hadtried to gain entry. It turned out the men were pilotswho had often talked to the ACC as they flewoverheard but had never actually seen it. They haddecided to call in and say hello. They leftimmediately when a security person informed themthey could not enter.

The biggest flap, however, occurred when passengers atthe Roman Catholic parish hall in Gambo wrote thankyou notes on a bristle board. One said, “Yahoo, OsamaBin Laden.” The pilot demanded the RCMP dosomething. A constable brought the board to the RCMPoffices, and police went to the airport to ask who hadwritten that message. A man explained that he had beenso well treated in Gambo that he wanted toacknowledge the man who had made the visit possible –Osama Bin Laden! He had not intended to upsetanyone. When the pilot refused to allow the man onboard, he offered to fly handcuffed. Satisfied no harmwas intended, the RCMP persuaded the pilot to allowthe man on board. If he had not boarded, all thepassengers would have had to identify their luggage.

The RCMP did not have to worry about crime. Therewas not a single incident of robbery, theft, or any othercrime during the entire time the diverted passengerswere in Gander. No visitor or local resident had to bearrested or charged with anything. The nearest incidentinvolved a brawl at a bar. The RCMP found one of thoseinvolved was one of the two passengers removed fromone of the diverted aircraft. However, he not been thecause of the brawl but an effective peacemaker. But hewas inebriated, and his flight was almost ready to leave.The RCMP sobered him up by pouring coffee into him,found him some sunglasses, told him to stay away fromalcohol, and got him on board.

These various delays – one passenger missing, somepassengers refusing to fly, a security problem – meantthat it was difficult to predict how long it would take aflight to depart and, thus, when the next set ofpassengers could leave for the airport. That createdheadaches for the fire chief – who was managingtransportation – and for the town – which was trying toadvise shelters when passengers could start on their way.But the major problems were at the shelters. If a flightwas delayed they sometimes had to schedule an extrameal or even provide an additional night’s

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accommodation. They also had to notify the SalvationArmy that more supplies might be required. Since thedepartures continued around the clock, passengers werenot sure whether it was worth trying to get some sleepor whether they should wait for the call to board thebuses. All of this meant that once again there had to bevery good coordination between the airport EOC –which was deciding the order of departure – the town –which was notifying the various shelters when theirflight was to leave – and the fire chief, who was makingsure the buses were at a shelter when passengers werescheduled to depart. Each time there was an unexpecteddelay, the whole system had to pause until the problemwas resolved.

AftermathJust before the last diverted flight left Gander at6:20 p.m. on Sunday – more than five days after thefirst one arrived – airport staff posed with its crew tocelebrate the end of the road. However, there was stilla lot to do.

All the schools had to be cleaned and made ready forclasses the following day. (Classes were suspended whilethe passengers were in Gander.) This proved no problemin outlying communities that were cleaned on theweekend, but the work ground to a halt in GanderMonday morning (the day after the last flight left) whenNAPE put the picket lines back up. Workers from anumber of unionized plants refused to cross the picketlines. The Salvation Army conducted some delicatenegotiations with the union before volunteers wereallowed across the picket lines so the schools couldbe cleaned.

The litters brought in by CF Hercules aircraft alsoneeded cleaning and no one wanted to pay for that.They were finally returned as they were. There waslinen, much of it donated, to wash – the hospital didthat free of charge. There was food left over: it was givento food banks. There were many donated items notreclaimed. There was overtime to be calculated – exceptfor the school bus drivers. They worked without pay,then went back on the picket lines. The Salvation Armyused its own funds to pay some local merchants whohad provided supplies for the shelters. This was donebecause some small merchants were running intoa serious cash flow problem and would have been infinancial straits in they had not been paid immediately.The Army was reimbursed when it submitted itsaccounts to the municipality, which sent them tothe province.

The postincident debriefings left most officials satisfied,though there were a few concerns. One was that some

persons had worked too many hours. This was, perhaps,inevitable in a small town with limited resources, but itdid lead to short tempers and to some passengerirritation. Another concern was that senior firepersonnel had taken on major jobs – as liaison betweenthe town and the airport, in charge of transportation,and assisting with airport security. (Because thefirefighters as airport backup had clearances, they couldescort others in the secure area of the airport.) Therewould have been serious personnel problems if thefirefighters had had another emergency. In previousstudies, this has been referred to as the ‘two hat’problem, the situation, not uncommon in smallercommunities, when one person has several functions –and all are important in an emergency.14 There werea few information breakdowns. For example, thehospital and the town had not been aware that themilitary flights would simply dump the palletscontaining litters on the tarmac and leave them there.They assumed that local military personnel woulddeliver them to the shelters.

Why system workedThe literature on emergency response shows that it isnot uncommon for existing emergency agencies toestablish their own command posts and for conflict toarise among those posts. It also shows that, whenemergent groups take over specific functions, they tendto come into conflict with the existing agencies,though – as Scanlon’s study of the Canadian ice stormshows – this does not need to happen if the existingorganisations blend in the newcomers and their function(Scanlon 1999). How did it happen that there was solittle conflict in Newfoundland and that the variousoperations centres worked so well together? Thereappear to be a number of reasons.

The first is that the events of September 11 grippedCanadians just as they gripped Americans. As was thecase in the wake of the Kennedy assassination, news ofthe terrorist attacks spread at incredibly high speed –and the reaction was shock, horror, and sympathy. Theresidents of Gander – as in other towns – were anxiousto do anything possible to assist the diverted passengers,the ‘other victims’ of September 11. The residents sawthe diverted passengers as homeless victims, persons notresponsible for their misfortune. They wanted to help.

The second is that Gander is an airport town. Itseconomy is largely dependent on the prosperity of theairport and on the existence of the Area Control Center.Most persons in town are aware of the economicsituation at the airport. They were also aware that theclosing of U.S. airspace would impact Gander. They

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14. In Petawawa, ambulance drivers were also auxiliary police, and professional firefighters from CFB Petawawa were also town volunteers.When ambulance, police, and both fire departments were needed for a train derailment and toxic spill, the so-called ‘two hat’ problemwas identified (Scanlon et al. 1985).

were already preparing their response beforeU.S. airspace was closed.

Third, Gander has significant emergency experience –and that experience is tied to the airport-relatedincidents. Equally important, most local persons whowere involved on September 11 were around for at leastone of the previous incidents. That was true for the staffat the airport, the town, the fire department, and thehospital, though not so true of for the RCMP and nottrue for the base.

Fourth, many of the various players had plans andtheir staff was familiar with those plans. That was true ofthe base, the town, and the hospital, and it wasespecially true of the airport. It activates its ECC – ifonly briefly – each time an incoming aircraft reports anonboard emergency.

Fifth, Newfoundland consists of a number of small,separated communities strong across more than 1,000kilometers [621 miles] of highway. Many in thosecommunities come from even more isolatedcommunities, communities where there is only annualor biannual contact with a supply ship. They are used tocoping on their own.

Sixth, Gander is a small community where virtuallyeveryone knows everyone else. Even those who rotate inoften have roots in the community. The latest RCMPdetachment commander, for example, grew up inGander, and his family stills live there.

Seventh, the airport realized immediately that themagnitude of the event made it impossible for it to behandled as usual. During the response to the 1985crash, the town was not invited to the airport EOC, and,when the deputy mayor became a participant, she wasnot made welcome. This time, the airport welcomed thesupport of the town, and, in turn, the town welcomedthe support of various emergent groups. They wereallowed to work unhindered by direction from anyEOC. In fact, the only time outsiders got involved inshelter management was when the salmonella wasidentified and the Lufthansa passengers were movedfrom Gander Academy.

Eighth, and most important, the various operationscentres were dealing with separate concerns. They eachcarved out an area of responsibility and stuck to it.There was no significant overlapping responsibility. Theairport ECC, for example, made all the decisions aboutunloading and loading and about what flights wouldleave when. The others accepted that and adjusted tothose decisions as required. Similarly, HR&E identifiedwhat places would be used as shelters – and the townstayed out of that – but HR&E did not get involved in

deciding what flights would be sent to what shelters.The various command posts needed to keep in touchwith each other – shared information is crucial to aneffective response – but their decisions could be madeindependently. This cooperative acceptance alsooccurred on a smaller level. For example, whena teacher went to assist setting up the high school, shewas surprised when the computers were unplugged andpack away. However, she made no comment. But whenshe returned to her own school, she saw to it that all thecomputers were made available to the passengers.

If this had not happened and all the players had tried towork from one EOC, there would have been significantovercrowding and a tendency – as noted by Quarantelliand by Scanlon – for key players to leave the EOC andmake decisions independently. Even if one assumes thatthe various shelter managers would not have becomepart of an EOC, there were at least 31 players involvedin the response in Gander: seven federal agencies –Customs, the Canadian Food Inspection Agency,Immigration, Health Canada, the Canadian SecurityIntelligence Service, the Royal Canadian MountedPolice,15 and Canadian Forces Base Gander; eight fromthe private sector – the area control center, the airport,the tower, the service company, the fuel company, thefood service company, NewTel Communications, andthe baggage screeners; three voluntary agencies – theSociety for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (SPCA),Red Cross, and Salvation Army; two provincial agencies– HR&E and Health; six players associated with local orregional government or community services – the town,the hospital, ambulance, the school board, the firedepartment, and the arena; three political leaders – themayors of Gander, Gambo, and Lewisporte; and at leastfour other significant participants – the school busdrivers, the Newfoundland Association of PublicEmployees and the key persons in Gambo andLewisporte, the deputy fire chief of Gambo, and theSalvation Army Captain in Lewisporte. The situationcould have become comparable to that described inScanlon’s study of the Nanticoke tire fire and hissubsequent observations on official convergence(Scanlon 1992b, p. 5; Fritz and Mathewson 1957).

In short, the effectiveness of the response in Gandercame from the fact that it was managed by a number ofEOCs, each of them handling a particular task. Theairport ECC decided what services should be providedto a plane parked on the tarmac and when and how anaircraft should be unloaded. It also controlled departuretimes. The fire department EOC, working from themobile command van at the airport, managedtransportation. The hospital EOC kept track of healthservices and remained linked, through the ambulance

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15. In eight Canadian provinces including Newfoundland, the RCMP wear three hats: they are the local, provincial, and federal police. Theywere wearing all three during the response to 9/11.

radio, to the medical service post at the airport. TheProvince of Newfoundland, through Human ResourcesDevelopment (HR&E), identified shelters that wereavailable and how many persons each shelter couldhandle. The town EOC decided where passengersshould be sent and passed that information along to thefire chief at the airport. The town EOC also handledcommunications between the town and the variousshelters in Gander and – through the Salvation Armycaptain in Lewisporte and the deputy fire chief inGambo – with communications to the shelters in thosecommunities.

There was also an EOC at Canadian Forces Base Ganderthat kept in touch with the National Defence commandsystem and with its liaison personnel in the airport ECC.And there was a command post at NewTelCommunications that, working with the town, kept intouch with the telephone and other services needed atthe airport and in the various shelters. Finally, theSalvation Army had what amounted to a commandpost at its regional headquarters. From there itcoordinated the central food service run out of thecommunity center.

Airport the keyThe airport ECC was still the key. Its decisions aboutwhich flight was unloaded and when a flight wouldleave affected every other response. But the airport wasnot free to act as it chose. For one thing, its decisionswere influenced by security directives flowing in fromNewfoundland’s capital, St. John’s, from various regionalheadquarters, and from the federal capital, Ottawa.For another, sometimes its plans were thwarted by thefact a pilot had been drinking or an aircraft would notstart, or, more likely, some passengers did not show upor did show up and refused to leave. Often, its ability toget a flight off the ground promptly was determinedby whether a shelter or the RCMP could locate a missingpassenger or by the ability of its staff to persuadea passenger that it was best to get or stay on board.It had to be in continual touch with these agencies andthe town to be certain the passengers would arriveas required.

The town EOC was next most important. Based oninformation from the airport ECC, it had to makecertain that transportation was available when a flightwas called and that the shelter knew it was next in line– and that had to be coordinated with the fire commandpost at the airport and, in turn, with the drivers. Thetown also needed to keep the shelters and the SalvationArmy informed about probable schedules so food wason hand if an extra meal was needed and so sheltermanagers knew if they would be open for another night.That affected the volunteers who agreed to assist withcleaning up. Their services could not be used untila shelter was emptied. Finally it affected the hospital.

Its staff was keeping a careful eye on a handful ofpatients, trying to make certain their health would allowthem to join their flight when it was called.

All this meant that it was crucial to have goodcommunications and effective liaison among the variousEOCs and command posts. That is why the town’s earlydecision to send the fire inspector to the airport was soimportant. While communications is important, liaisonis, perhaps, even more important. Because the inspectorwas in on the discussions, he could convey to the townEOC not only the import of what was happening butthe underlying tone. He, for example, could explain whythe airport was becoming frustrated at its inability to getflights off on schedule because one passenger failed toshow or was delayed or because a few passengersdecided at the last minute they did not want to boardtheir aircraft. He could also make sure the airport wasaware of the town’s concerns. Similarly, the HR&Eperson and the NewTel person at the town EOC keptinformation flowing back and forth between theirorganisations and the town.

It is true that some places described as EOCs mightbetter be described as command posts or supportlocations since their function was to assist others. Thiswas certainly true of the fire mobile command post atthe airport that handled transportation requests relayedto it from the airport ECC (when passengers had to beunloaded or loaded) and from the town EOC (whenpassengers had to be moved from the airport to a shelteror from a shelter to the airport). However, it was not sotrue of the EOC at the hospital (which made medicaldecisions on its own) or at NewTel Communications(which serviced the various facilities but also took itsown initiatives.) It was certainly not true of the EOC atCFB Gander, which, though it responded to the needs ofthe airport, also had its own concerns about basesecurity during a period of heightened tension. And itwas clearly not true of either the airport ECC or thetown EOC. Both were full-fledged EOCs handlingmajor problems and coordinating the response of anumber of agencies. Gander’s response to the othervictims of 9/11, therefore, is a model of how dividedresponsibilities can be an affective way of managing anunexpected emergency.

Finally, there was something else at work in Gander: thefact that the victims – having seen the visuals from NewYork City – were grateful to be alive and thankful foranything that was done for them. Most were alsooverwhelmed by the compelling generosity of the localresidents and anxious to do anything to avoid offendingtheir hosts. In fact, it was only some time after thestranded travellers had left that the local residents beganto swap stories about who had been in their midst.Their guests had included senior executives of theRockefeller Foundation (the Foundation donated newcomputers to the Lakewood school), a distinguished

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Dutch artist, and a world-renowned fashion designer,plus one of the senior U.S. military officers involved incounterterrorism. All had quietly accepted their fate.Werner Baldessarini, the chairman of Hugo Boss, hadeven stayed with his fellow passengers after a private jethad been sent to pick him up. After sampling theunderwear in Wal-Mart however, Baldessarini didgratefully accept some underwear brought to himpersonally by a storekeeper in St. John’s who drove allthe way to Gander to look after his distinguished guest.The story is told in Jim Defede’s touching book afterGander and 9/11, The Day the World Came to Town(Defede 2002).

ReferencesAnderson, William A. 1965. Some Observations on a DisasterSubculture: The Organisational Response to the 1964 Flood.Newark, DE: Research Note No. 6, Disaster Research Center,University of Delaware.

Burton, Ian, Peter Victor, and Anne Whyte. 1981. TheMississauga Evacuation Final Report. Toronto: Ministry of theSolicitor General.

Defede, Jim. 2002. The Day the World Came to Town. NewYork: HarperCollins.

Disaster Research Group. 1958. Behavior in an EmergencyShelter: A Field Study of 800 Persons Stranded in a HighwayRestaurant during a Heavy Snowstorm. Washington, DC:National Academy of Sciences-National Research Council.

Dynes, Russell R. and E. L. Quarantelli. 1980. ‘HelpingBehavior in Large-Scale Disasters.’ Pp. 339–354 inParticipation in Social and Political Activities: A ComprehensiveAnalysis of Political Involvement, Expressive Leisure Time, andHelping Behavior, edited by David Horton Smith and JacquelineMacaulay and associates. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass.

Emergency Communications Research Unit. 1985. The GanderAir Crash. Ottawa: Carleton University.

Fritz, Charles E. and J. H. Mathewson. 1957. ConvergenceBehavior in Disasters. Washington, DC: Disaster Study No. 9,National Research Council-National Academy of Sciences.

Quarantelli, E. L. 1972. Initial Observations on the Problems andDifficulties in the Use of Local EOCs in Natural Disasters.Newark, DE: Preliminary Paper No. 6, Disaster ResearchCenter, University of Delaware.

Scanlon, T. Joseph. 1992a. ‘Disaster Subculture.’ DisasterPreparedness: Some Myths and Misconceptions. Easingwold:Emergency Planning College.

______. 1992b. Convergence Revisited: A New Perspective on aLittle Studied Topic. Boulder, CO: The University of Colorado.

______. 1994a. ‘Leaving, Waiting and Coming Back:Evacuation as a Strategy in Emergency Management.’ Pp.27–47 in Problems Associated with Large Scale Evacuations.Easingwold: The Emergency Planning College.

______. 1994b. ‘The Role of EOCs in EmergencyManagement: A Comparison of Canadian and AmericanExperience.’ International Journal of Mass Emergencies andDisasters 12: 51–75.

______. 1999. ‘Emergent Groups in Established Frameworks:Ottawa Carleton’s Response to the 1998 Ice Disaster.’ Journalof Contingencies and Crisis Management 7: 30–37.

Scanlon, T. Joseph with Brian Taylor and Therese Jarzab.1978. The Terrace Floods 1978: Defining a Disaster. Ottawa:Emergency Preparedness Canada.

Scanlon, T. Joseph with Massey Padgham. 1980. The PeelRegional Police Force and the Mississauga Evacuation. Ottawa:Canadian Police College.

Scanlon, Joseph, et al. 1985. The Petawawa Train Derailment.Ottawa: Emergency Preparedness Canada.

Smith, David Horton, Jacqueline Macauley, and associates.1980. Participation in Social and Political Activities: AComprehensive Analysis of Political Involvement, ExpressiveLeisure Time, and Helping Behavior. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

Wenger, Dennis E. and Jack M. Weller. 1973. DisasterSubcultures: The Cultural Residues of Community Disasters.Newark, DE: Preliminary Paper No. 9, Disaster ResearchCenter, University of Delaware.

AuthorT. Joseph ScanlonEmergency Communications Research UnitCarleton UniversityOttawaCANADA

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By Neil Head

EMA was one of a number of

key organisations invited to

Parliament House for the March

announcement by the Prime

Minister of the winning design

for the Australian Emergency

Services Memorial.

In his remarks the Prime Ministerincluded:

“Australia has long needed anational memorial to mark thenation’s respect for the enormoussacrifices that so many people inour emergency services make in theinterests of our own personal safetyand in the interests of our nationalwell-being.

This announcement (of the winningdesign) takes place only a shortperiod of time after the Australiancommunity living in Canberra hasbeen particularly reminded of theferocity of natural events, and hashad the opportunity of seeing on fulland such effective display thecapacity of our emergency services.

We were all greatly touched bywhat they did, we’re all verygrateful to them for what they did.And at a time when people are...

young Australians, youngAustralian men and women havetheir lives on the line in the serviceof the nation around the world weare particularly conscious of peoplewho do things that involve a greatpersonal risk to them for theirfellow Australians.

Today is an opportunity toannounce the winner of thiscompetition and to recommit theGovernment to the construction ofthe Memorial and to look forwardto its opening

The National Emergency ServicesMemorial will honour both careerpersonnel and volunteers. Andwhen we think of Australianmateship, nothing better expresses itthan the way in which people worktogether at a time of adversity. Weall saw it in the Canberracommunity quite magnificently andother communities have seen it overthe years, not only in relation tobushfires and floods but also inrelation to other events andtragedies.

NOTES FROM THE FIELD

Winning design for nationalemergency services memorial

The Prime Minister, Mr John Howard, congratulating the winning designer of theAustralian Emergency Services Memorial at Parliament House

The winning design

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And on every occasion there’s amagnificent willingness on the partof Australians to come together –the community – differences areforgotten, inhibitions fall away andpeople work together.

This Memorial will honourespecially those who’ve died makingAustralia a safer place and helpingtheir fellow Australians. TheMemorial will be located at thewestern edge of Kings Park (at thesite previously dedicated) and isscheduled for completion within thenext 12 months.

I have great pleasure in announcingthe winning design, and the winningdesign fulfils very much therequirements of the design brief tocommemorate the contribution andsacrifice of emergency servicespersonnel in a sensitive, yet verypowerful way. A simple yet movingdesign that allows for visits to theMemorial to be both private andshared. And the winner – the designwas submitted by ASPECTMelbourne Proprietary Limited .”

EMA is represented on the SteeringCommittee for the project throughDGEMA, David Templeman. Davidwas represented at this event byEMA Director Development, NeilHead. Neil will co-ordinate a more amore detailed coverage of theMemorial, and its implications forfuture commemorations andactivities at the site, for the nextedition of AJEM.

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The Prime Minister, Mr John Howard, with emegency services representatives attending the announcement of the winning designer forthe Australian Emergency Services Memorial at Parliament House.

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