Domingo Bañez on Moral and Physical Causality: Christic Merit and Sacramental Realism

ANGELICUM 91 (2014) 105-125

Domingo Bañez on Moral and Physical Causality: Christic Merit and Sacramental Realism

reginalD m. lyncH, o.P. Pontifical college JosePHinum

Abstract

This paper is concerned with the response of Domingo Bañez to specific is-sues that arose in sacramental theology during the sixteenth century. Melchior Cano, who denied that the sacraments were physical causes of grace, argued instead that they were “moral” causes. Because of his strong humanist influ-ences, Cano consistently describes the causal dimension of the sacraments in the language of moral persuasion. Bañez responds by questioning the causal capacity of moral persuasion, effectively reducing “moral causality” to the level of sacramental occasionalism. Beyond this, however, Cano’s reliance on merit in this context raises questions about the nature of Christic merit in re-lation to physical potency. Because Aquinas’ approach to the sacraments as instrumental efficient causes is closely tied to his Christology, Bañez is able to articulate the implications of Aquinas’ doctrine of efficient instrumentality in relation to Christic merit. The Thomist school has consistently defended the intrinsic nature of merit, both in the case of Christ’s own humanity and those in who are members of his body and exercise the theological virtue of charity. The problems that developed within moral theology in the modern period are well known, and many Thomists have gone to great lengths to explain the value of Aquinas’ understanding of virtue and grace, contrasting these concepts with the legalism and extrinsicism of other theories. Bañez himself engaged many of these issues during De Auxiliis, and his approach to moral causality from within the Thomist tradition highlights the importance of sacramental theology for those discussions of grace, potency, and anthropology that have emerged in our own as well.

Introduction

As a Thomist working in sixteenth century Spain, Domingo Bañez (d. 1604) was engaged with many changing currents of intellectual discourse

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106 reginalD m. lyncH, o.P.

within the University of Salamanca, from the secular influence of Re-naissance humanism to the developing threads of modern theology. This study will examine Bañez’s response to moral causality, a theory of sacra-mental efficacy that would eventually become integrated into some of the most popular, non-Thomistic theological systems of the modern period. Although Bañez is perhaps best known for his involvement with the De Auxiliis controversy, prior to this Bañez had already begun to engage some issues surrounding merit and created potency in the context of sacramental causality.

Moral causality was proposed in its most popular form by Melchior Cano (d. 1560), when Bañez was his student at Salamanca.1 According to Cano, the sacraments can be considered as causes, not in the physical or natural sense, but in the moral sense, because they contain the merits of the blood of Jesus Christ.2 In response to this, Bañez articulated the role played by efficient instrumental causality in Aquinas’ understanding of the sacraments themselves, structuring his critique in a way that resembled in some respects the responses of previous Thomists to sacramental occa-

1 As a student at Salamanca, Bañez studied under Melchior Cano and was most likely present for Cano’s Relectio de Sacramentis in Genera in 1547. v. Beltran De HereDia, “Introduccion”, in Domingo Bañez, Comentarios Ineditos a la Tercera Parte de Santo Tomas, vol. 2, De Sacramentis, QQ. 60-90, edited by Vincente Beltran de Heredia. Biblioteca de Teologos Españoles 19, Salamanca, 1953, 6. NCE1 s.v. Báñez and Bañe-zianism. It seems that Bañez taught against moral causality as early as 1572. v. Beltran De HereDia, “Introduccion”, 9, 19. There is some evidence that earlier Spanish theolo-gians such as Francisco de Vitoria may have held this position as well. See a. ciaPPi, De Sacramentis in Communi: Commentarius in Tertiam Partem S. Thomae (qq. LX-LXV). Pontificum Institutum Internationale Angelicum, Torino, R. Berruti & Co., 1957, 71 nota 7.

2 “Sacramenta (…) continere (in quam) non ut causa naturalis continet suum ef-fectum, sed ut causa moralis. Crumena siquidem continere dicitur captivi redemptionem, quoniam pecuniam continet: & Sacramenta, quae continent sanguinem Christi, continere dicuntur gratiam, & remissionem peccatorum: & sicut crumena pecuniam administrans redemptionem confere; ita Sacramentorum virtus, quae adeo multorum ingenia torsit. Virtus enim redemptionis in marsupio est, in quo pretium redemptionis servatur; & virtus Sacramentorum sanguinis Christi est, qui in Sacramentis adhibetur” (sic) (Relect. de Sa-cram., Pars IV, concl. 6, in m. cano, Opera. Kila, MT, Kessinger Publishing, 2011, 489 [Facsimile Reprint of the Hyacinth Serry Edition, Padua, Typis Seminarii, 1734]).

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Domingo Bañez on Moral and Physical Causality: Christic Merit and Sacramental Realism 107

sionalism. For Bañez, moral causality would also reduce to the category of sign. However, because of the role of merit in moral causality, Bañez placed special emphasis on the instrumental character of Christological causality, drawing attention to the connections that existed for Aquinas between sacramental causality, Christology and the anthropology of grace.

Moral Causality

Although different in some respects, moral causality shares some common assumptions with the nominalist approach to sacramental causality, which denied that the sacraments were physical or efficient causes. For Cano, no natural efficient cause could possibly effect grace in any direct sense, even if it were used as a divine instrument. Cano denied that the sacraments could be physical causes of grace, asserting instead a system centered chiefly on the merits of Christ’s passion. Moral causality, as proposed by Melchior Cano, argues that the end of human justification exceeds the causal ca-pacity of any natural tool; Cano therefore objects to the use of physical efficient causality to describe the achievement of such an end. Although Melchior Cano describes moral causality as a species of efficient causality, he distinguishes it from what he terms physical causes. For Cano, physical causes make contact with the end they affect (attingere), while moral caus-es do not.3 He illustrates this by several examples: a moral cause is like a

3 “Causas esse in duplici differentia, alteras naturales, alteras morales. Morales autem appellamus causas liberas, quae scilicet libere movent: ut qui consulit, qui imperat, ejus rei causa est, quae per ejus aut imperium, aut consilium efficitur. Juxta quam distinc-tionem cum actio peccati duplictiter consideratur, & in ordine effectuum naturalium, & in ordine effectuum moralium, Deus quidem causa naturalis dicitur actionis, quae peccatum est: concurrit siquidem ad brachii motionem, qua hominem interficio, quemadmodum & coelum, motorque angelus simul etiam concurrit. At concursus hic naturalis est: non tamen illius actionis Deus est causa moralis: neque enim aut consulit, aut praecipit, quin potius prohibet. Inter has autem causas discrimen est. Nam naturales suos effectus attin-gunt per vim a natura inditam, ut ignis calefacit per calorem. Morales vero non attingunt actione physica effectus suos, nec influunt, aut producunt qualitates aliquas. Neque enim oportet, ut qui consulit homicidium, actione aliqua physica & naturali quicquam efficiat, quemadmodum natura efficere consuevit” (Relect. de Sacram., cit., Pars IV, concl. 6, in m. cano, Opera, cit., 488).

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man who counsels murder, as opposed to the man who, wielding a stick, commits the murder itself; a moral cause is like a purse of money used to redeem a prisoner from Turkish captivity, the value of which convinces his captors to release him.4 In both of these examples, moral causality is presented as a kind of convincing speech that results in effective action. Cano believes that the concept of moral causality can be particularly useful in the case of the sacraments, because it seems to resolve a question which has presented itself since at least the time of Augustine: how can a finite, created instrument be the cause of supernatural grace? For Cano, the con-cept of moral causality is particularly useful because it allows him to claim that the sacraments themselves are not direct physical causes of grace—an end that he believes to be entirely beyond the reach of their causal power.

Aquinas and Mediaeval Occasionalism5

In the course of his own work, Aquinas himself had faced simi-lar objections to the notion of the sacraments as physical efficient causes. During the Scholastic period, the reception of Aristotle in the West was complicated by a number of speculative and hermeneutical questions, not the least of which was the doctrine of creation—a fundamental claim ne-cessitated by Christian monotheism and only partially addressed by the Arabic commentators through whom much of Aristotle was communicat-ed to the Scholastic world. Because many Scholastics (including the early Aquinas) considered grace to be created ex nihilo,6 there was a reluctance to attribute authentic instrumentality to the sacraments not only because it would mean that supernatural results had somehow been achieved by means of a natural tool, but because it would mean ascribing to a created nature something possible only for God: the act of creation ex nihilo, which by definition is accomplished without any intermediary instrumentality.

4 Ivi, 488-489. 5 For a more detailed treatment of this subject, see r. lyncH, “The Sacraments

as Causes of Sanctification”, in: Nova et Vetera (English) 12 (2014), 791-836. 6 DTC s.v. Sacraments, Causalité, 586.

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The results of Aquinas’ sustained engagement with these and oth-er questions can be seen in his mature doctrine of sacramental causality, which exhibits a developed understanding of the concept of instrumental causality. Already in the Sentences, Aquinas describes God working in relation to the created order as an artist with his tools.7 In the Sentences, Aquinas uses dispositive causality to avoid the problem of creation ex nihi-lo; in the Summa, the concept of divine artistry is expanded to fully include the sacraments as instrumental causes in an unqualified sense, functioning in tandem with the conjoined instrumentality of Christ’s humanity.8

Other scholastics reacted differently to the problem of creation and instrumentality, however. Prior to Aquinas, some had already proposed a deontological solution to these questions. Metaphysical occasionalism, pro-posed by Arabic commentators like Al-Ghazâlî (d. 1111) as a theological response to the seeming naturalism of Aristotelian philosophy,9 reasserted the contingency of the created order in a radical way. A similar position was adopted by William of Auvergne (d. 1249),10 who proposed occasion-alism not only as a general metaphysical stance but also as an explanation

7 Super Sent. lib. 1, dist. 38, q. 1, a. 1 Solutio. 8 Summa Theologiae [herein STh] III, 48, 5, co.; 62, 5, ad 1. For an analysis

of the role of Greek Christology in Aquinas’ thought on this topic, see t. tscHiPke, Die Menschheit Christi als Heilsorgan Der Gottheit: Unter Besonderer Berücksichtigung Der Lehre Des Heiligen Thomas Von Aquin. Freiburger Theologische Studien 55, Freiburg im Breisgau, Herder and Co., 1940.

9 “God is capable of everything, and it is not necessary for the horse to be cre-ated from the sperm nor the tree to be created from the seed—indeed, it is not necessary for either of the two to be created from anything” (al-gHazâlî, Incoherence, 2, d. 17, as found in al-gHazâlî, The Incoherence of the Philosophers, translated by M. Marmura. Provo, UT. Brigham Young University Press, 1997, 174). See m. marmura, “The Meta-physics of Efficient Causality in Avicenna (Ibn Sīnā)”, in m. marmura (ed.), Islamic Theology and Philosophy. Studies in Honor of George F. Hourani. Albany, N.Y., State University of New York Press, 1984, 172-87, 183-187, 183-187.

10 “Indeed, [Auvergne] considers created being so empty and deficient that it cannot exercise true causality. As God is the sole true being, so is he alone truly a cause. It is only by an abuse of the term that a creature is called a cause. In reality it is but a chan-nel or window by which the divine causality is communicated to the world” (a. maurer, Medieval Philosophy, .... 115. See auvergne, De Trinitate, XI, as cited by Maurer).

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of the Christian sacraments.11 Auvergne argued that by divine pact, the sac-raments functioned as occasions for the reception of grace.12 When consid-ered in this way, the sacraments are only occasions on which God choos-es to exercise his causal power univocally, rather than natural instruments through which God works to effect grace. Even in the Sentences Aquinas evidences a nuanced appreciation for these issues. With the growing influ-ence of Averroes (d. 1198), however, more naturalistic approaches to Aris-totle emerged; by the 1260’s, these ideas had begun to entrench themselves within the Parisian Arts faculty.13 Advocates of this approach to Aristotle began to favor the doctrine of an eternal world, opposing this interpretation of Aristotle directly to the Christian doctrine of creation. This Averroistic tendency posed certain dangers for Christian theology: unlike Avicenna (d. 1037), whose Platonized Aristotelianism accounted for the doctrine of cre-ation and the divine governance of created causes, Averroes’ interpretation of Aristotelian anthropology and psychology made it difficult to frame hu-man action in relation to these ultimate ends.14 This impinges directly on the

11 Scholastic proponents of sacramental occasionalism often cited Bernard of Clairvaux in defense of their position. William Courtenay documents the pre-scholastic history of these ideas in monastic theology and highlights the points of continuity and contrast that exist between Clairvaux his scholastic proponents. w. courtenay, “The King and the Leaden Coin: The Economic Background of ‘Sine Qua Non’ Causality”, in: Traditio 28 (1972), 185-209, and “Sacrament, Symbol and Causality in Bernard of Clairvaux”, in Bernard of Clairvaux: Studies Presented to Dom Jean Leclercq. Cistercian Studies Series 23, Washington, D.C., Cistercian Publications, 1973, 111-122. Elsewhere, Courtenay explores other sources that influenced scholastic occasionalism: w. courte-nay, “The Critique of Natural Causality in the Mutakallimun and Nominalism”, in: Har-vard Theological Review 66 (1973), 77-94.

12 auvergne, De Legibus, c. 27. See i. rosier-catacH, “Signes sacramentels et signes magiques; Guillaume d’Auvergne et la théorie du pacte”, in Autour de Guillaume d’Auvergne (1249), edited by N. Bériou and F. Morenzoni. Turnhout, Brepols, 2005, 101-102.

13 f. van steenBergHen, Aristotle in the West: The Origins of Latin Aristote-lianism, translated by L. Johnston. Louvain, E. Nauwelaerts, 1955, 93; J. ratzinger, The Theology of History in St. Bonaventure, translated by Z. Hayes. Chicago, IL, Franciscan Herald Press, 1989, 132.

14 f. van steenBergHen, Thomas Aquinas and Radical Aristotelianism. Wash-ington, D.C., Catholic University of America Press, 1980, 77.

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particular case of the sacraments, where efficient instrumentality depends on the integration of divine and created causality. Further, because grace is the finality towards which sacramental instrumentality is directed, the ques-tion of creation is immediately implied. As theologians continued to wres-tle with the implications of Aristotle’s natural philosophy, some who were initially open to Aristotelian explanations of the sacraments became more inclined towards occasionalism in the case of sacramental efficacy, whether they had strong preexisting metaphysical commitments to occasionalism or not. This tendency is visible in Bonaventure (d. 1274). Although he al-lows for the possibility of the sacraments as dispositive causes, in the end Bonaventure leans towards an occasionalist explanation precisely because it avoids these issues.15 The approach would come to be favored by the later Franciscan school, where the metaphysical tenor of nominalism fit well with an occasionalist approach to the sacraments. The Dominican school, by contrast, embraced Aquinas’ theory of sacramental instrumentality as a consistent outgrowth of his larger metaphysical presuppositions. While Aquinas is able to describe the sacraments as true instrumental causes of grace, functioning as analogical participants in divine power,16 advocates of sacramental occasionalism became hesitant to describe the sacraments as causes at all, in order to avoid compromising divine power and freedom. To this end, Bonaventure claims that the sacraments are referred to as causes only in an equivocal sense.17 In both the Sentences and the Summa, Aquinas argued that this kind of occasionalism was insufficient, effectively erasing the distinction between the sacraments of the Church and the rites of the Mosaic Law by reducing them to the category of sign alone.18

Cano and Occasionalism

Although it stands in continuity with the occasionalist tradition, moral cau-sality does represent a new approach to sacramental causality. Much of

15 Bonaventure, In IV Sent., d. 1, p. 1, q. 4, Respond.16 STh III, 62, 1, co. 17 In IV Sent., d. I, p. I, a. 1, q. 4, Resp. 2.4. 18 STh III, 62, 1, co.

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the difference between sacramental occasionalism and moral causality is hermeneutical: while sacramental occasionalism tended to be inspired by overarching metaphysical concerns, moral causality owed a great deal to the intellectual climate of the early modern period. There are aspects of moral causality that are clearly shaped by the climate of Renaissance hu-manism, which established a dominant presence in northern Europe during the sixteenth century.19 Melchior Cano was influenced by these trends, and in the case of the sacraments this influence shows itself in the role of rhet-oric.20 In the humanist turn, many thinkers rejected the categories of scho-lastic logic and chose instead to emphasize classical rhetoric.21 As a result, Cano’s explanation of the sacraments as a form of convincing speech is more at home within the categories of humanist dialectic than in those of speculative scholastic logic.

Beyond these hermeneutical differences, however, a conscious divi-sion of some kind between moral and occasionalist causality became neces-sary in the sixteenth century because of the teaching of the Council of Trent, which insisted that the sacraments could not be understood as mere signs: grace was contained by the sacraments and conferred through the working of the sacraments themselves (ex opere operato).22 In this much Trent stood

19 c. loHr, “Medieval Latin Aristotle Commentaries, Authors: Rober-tus-Wilgelmus”, in: Traditio 29 (1973), 123-124; The Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy, edited by C. Schmitt and Q. Skinner. New York, Cambridge University Press, 1988, 71, 104, 806.

20 Cano’s major work, De Locis Theologicis, was heavily influenced by human-ists such as Rudolph Agricola. LThK2 s.v. Cano, Melchior. For a discussion of the role of Aristotle’s Topics in De Locis, see B. körner, Melchior Cano: De Locis Theologicis. Ein Beitrag zur Theologischen Erkenntnislehre. Graz, Verlag Ulrich Moser, 1994, 24-29, 142-146.

21 c. scHmitt, Aristotle and the Renaissance. Cambridge, MA, Harvard Univer-sity Press, 1983, 16.

22 “Si quis dixerit, sacramenta novae legis non continere gratiam, quam signifi-cant, aut gratiam ipsam non ponentibus obicam non conferre, quasi signa tantum externa sint acceptae per fidem gratiae vel iustitiae, et notae quaedam christianae professionis, quibus apud homines, discernuntur fideles ab infidelibus: a.s.” (Conc. Trid. Sess. 7 decl. 1 c. 6). “Si quis dixerit, per ipsa novae legis sacramenta ex opere operato non conferri gratiam, sed solam fidem divinae promissionis ad gratiam consequendam sufficere: a.s.” (Conc. Trid. Sess. 7 decl. 1 c. 8).

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in line with the received Augustinian and medieval tradition,23 and ruled out a strict occasionalism in which grace is not contained by the sacraments or communicated through the sacramental action itself. Because of this, Cano is at pains to distinguish moral causality from this kind of occasionalism by claiming that the sacraments contain the price of our redemption and confer it through their operation as moral causes. In this much, Cano deliberately proposes his theory as an interpretation of Tridentine teaching.24

Bañez

Despite Cano’s attempts to conform his theory to Tridentine teaching, Bañez and subsequent Thomists argued that strong similarities existed be-tween Cano’s moral causality and sacramental occasionalism at a structur-al level. For Aquinas, sacramental occasionalism reduced the sacraments to mere signs of grace. In essence, Bañez approaches moral causality along the same lines, arguing that despite appearances to the contrary, moral causality essentially reduces to the level of sign as well.25 Although Bañez

23 The idea of grace passing through the working of sacramental signs is an important dimension of Augustinian sacramentality that was preserved by the Victorines, who argued that grace was contained in the sacraments as medicine in a vial. HugH of st. victor, De Sac. I, 9, 4: PL 176:322A. This approach was communicated to the scholastic period through Peter Lombard, who used the language of causality to describe this doc-trine. “Sacramentum enim proprie dicitur, quod ita signum est gratiae Dei et invisibilis gratiae forma, ut ipsius imaginem gerat et causa exsistat” (emphasis mine; IV Sent., d. 1, c. 4.2. See r. lyncH, The Sacraments as Causes of Sanctification, 793-802).

24 Relect. de Sacram., Pars IV, concl. 6, in m. cano, Opera, 485. See Conc. Trid. Sess. 7 decl. 1 c. 6. Cano’s Relectio de Sacramentis in Genera was given in the summer of 1547, directly after the promulgation of the seventh session of the Council of Trent, which dealt with sacramental efficacy. a. newman, Jus Divinum and the Sac-rament of Penance in Two Tridentine Theologians: Melchior Cano and Ruard Tapper. Doct. diss., The Catholic University of America, 1969, 7. Session 7 of the Council of Trent was promulgated on March 3, 1547. n. tanner (ed.), Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils. Washington, D.C., Georgetown University Press, 1990, II, 684.

25 “At vero epistola v. gr., quam dedid David ad occidendum Uriam, ita dicitur instrumentum morale quod non excedid rationem signi voluntatis regis, ut etiam denarius plumbeus, de quo dicit divus Thomas quod non excedit rationem signi voluntatis regis et ordinationis.” Bañez, in STh III, 62, 1, concl. 5 (D. Bañez, Comentarios Ineditos a la Tercera Parte de Santo Tomas: De Sacramentis, QQ. 60-90, 47).

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sees little structural difference between moral causality and sacramental occasionalism, Bañez’ approach does take account of the hermeneutical difference between the two theories. Aquinas’ critique of occasionalism approached the sign-value of the sacramental elements from an ontolog-ical level: the sacraments, as material elements, signify the end of grace; when taken as mere occasions which do not in themselves cause what they signify—even in an analogical sense—they must be considered as signs of grace alone.26 By contrast, Bañez’ critique of moral causality reflects the changed hermeneutical context of the early modern period: rather than focusing on ontological categories, Bañez engages the rhetorical catego-ries of moral causality. According to Cano, a moral cause functions not as a physical efficient cause, but as a kind of convincing speech, which counsels, or perhaps even demands, a certain response. Cano various-ly describes moral causality using the metaphors of moral counsel, or a monetary price offered to obtain the redemption of a prisoner. For Bañez, however, none of these examples transcends the level of sign. Bañez uses the example of the letter written by King David ordering the death of Uri-ah: although the death of Uriah was ordered by David, the decree itself is a sign of the king’s will, it is not an efficient cause of Uriah’s death. When these metaphors are applied to the case of the sacraments, it is God Himself who must be convinced to act causally for the desired end of our sanctification, and there appears to be little difference between this form of convincing speech and the leaden coin of the nominalist tradition.27

26 “Et ponunt exemplum de illo qui, afferens denarium plumbeum, accipit cen-tum libras ex regis ordinatione, non quod denarius ille aliquid operetur ad habendum praedictae pecuniae quantitatem; sed hoc operatur sola voluntas regis. Unde et Bernardus dicit, in quodam sermone in cena domini, sicut investitur canonicus per librum, abbas per baculum, episcopus per anulum, sic divisiones gratiarum diversae sunt traditae sa-cramentis. Sed si quis recte consideret, iste modus non transcendit rationem signi. Nam denarius plumbeus non est nisi quoddam signum regiae ordinationis de hoc quod pecunia recipiatur ab isto. Similiter liber est quoddam signum quo designatur traditio canonicatus. Secundum hoc igitur sacramenta novae legis nihil plus essent quam signa gratiae” (STh III, 62, 1, co.).

27 “Quando quis sagitta voluntarie occidit hominem, sagitta est instrumentum occisionis, habet tamen propriam actionem. At vero epistola v. gr., quam dedit David ad

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Merit

Although Cano’s use of humanist rhetoric does little to improve upon the limitations of sacramental occasionalism in light of the demands of Trent, his appeal to moral persuasion as an explanation of sacramental efficacy has both Christological and anthropological implications for the doctrine of merit, because of the central importance that Cano places on the re-demptive merit of Christ’s blood in the context of the sacraments them-selves. Responding to the hermeneutical structure of Cano’s argument, Bañez does not confine himself to a comparison between moral causality and occasionalism, but rather engages the question of merit and its rela-tionship to Christology and the sacraments.

Both Cano and Aquinas make reference to Christology in the con-text of sacramental causality. Aquinas’ understanding of Christic instru-mentality is rooted in the instrumentality of the incarnation itself: when considered in reference to human sanctification, the implications of the hypostatic union unfold, displaying the unified instrumental motion of Christ’s humanity and by extension the sacraments, working towards the finality of grace as instrumental causes under the principle agency of di-vine causality. By contrast, Cano makes no direct reference to the hypo-static union in the context of sacramental causality; rather than incorporat-ing a sense of instrumentality drawn from this union into his sacramental doctrine, Cano insists on opposing the merits of Christ to physical cau-sality.28 Although Cano intends to account for the limitations of natural potency with respect to grace, he effectively implies that merit functions in a sphere distinct from efficient causality. This is explicit in the case of the sacraments, and may have implications for Christology as well.

occidendum Uriam, ita dicitur instrumentum morale quod non excedit rationem signi vo-luntatis regis, ut etiam denarius plumbeus, de quo dicit divus Thomas quod non excedit ra-tionem signi voluntatis regis et ordinationis.” Bañez, in STh III, 62, 1, concl. 5 (D. Bañez, Comentarios Ineditos a la Tercera Parte, II, 47). Although Aristotle does allow for the consideration of an advisor as an efficient cause, this is only in relation to physical efficient motion and could not be applied to divine action. Metaphysics, Bk V, c. 2, 1013a24.

28 Although not completely analogous, Cano’s concept of “physical” or “natu-ral” causality is roughly equivalent to Aristotle’s category of efficient causality.

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For Aquinas, the doctrine of instrumental causality allows for a deeper and more seamless integration between natural and divine causality in the case of Christology, the sacraments, and meritorious action in Christ and the just. In the Tertia Pars, Aquinas describes the potency of Christ’s human nature as functioning in an instrumental relationship with his di-vinity because of the hypostatic union. For Aquinas, natural creation itself enjoys a kind of instrumental relationship with its creator, in which God works through the potency of created natures to achieve the goodness and order which He has ordained for creation in wisdom.29 In the enfleshment of the Word, however, natural potency—and in particular the potency of human nature—is caught up in a further instrumentality, this time ordained to a supernatural end by the wisdom of God’s redemptive intent for fallen humanity. Certain features of Aquinas’ mature doctrine of instrumental causality—visible also in his approach to sacramental causality—enable Aquinas to describe the humanity of Christ as a true instrumental cause, avoiding the extremes of univocity and equivocity. Even in the case of natural instrumentality—a saw cutting—an instrumental cause functions not according to the power of its own form, but according to the power of the principle cause. This means that while the instrument is truly in motion, the efficient causality at work is not solely attributable to the form of the instrument. This enables Aquinas to speak of perfective causality in the sacraments and authentic participation in grace without lapsing into Pelagianism or causal univocity. This represents a development from his early work, where Aquinas was more inclined to conflate the natural form

29 “Causalitas autem Dei, qui est primum agens, se extendit usque ad omnia entia, non solum quantum ad principia speciei, sed etiam quantum ad individualia princi-pia, non solum incorruptibilium, sed etiam corruptibilium. Unde necesse est omnia quae habent quocumque modo esse, ordinata esse a Deo in finem, secundum illud apostoli, ad Rom. XIII, quae a Deo sunt, ordinata sunt. Cum ergo nihil aliud sit Dei providentia quam ratio ordinis rerum in finem, ut dictum est, necesse est omnia, inquantum participant esse, intantum subdi divinae providentiae. Similiter etiam supra ostensum est quod Deus om-nia cognoscit, et universalia et particularia. Et cum cognitio eius comparetur ad res sicut cognitio artis ad artificiata, ut supra dictum est, necesse est quod omnia supponantur suo ordini, sicut omnia artificiata subduntur ordini artis” (STh I, 22, 2, co., et al.).

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of the instrument with its natural instrumental end.30 All efficient causal-ity is rendered intelligible by its formal and final cause. In the case of an instrumental cause, however, its own form cannot supply this—reference to the intent of the architect must be made to understand the purpose and teleology of the motion of the instrument. This is not to say, however, that the form of the instrument is meaningless. A tool may retain its own operation—such as the saw cutting by the form of its sharpness—and still be moved by a power and intentionality greater than itself. Further, the operation proper to the form of some natural tools fits them in a particular sense for certain instrumental ends. The sharpness of the saw is selected by a builder who holds the form of the stool in his mind, and directs the motion of the saw towards the achievement of that end. Although the op-eration of the tool is distinct from its power in this sense, there can exist a deep connaturality between the nature of the tool and its instrumental end, and because the power at work is dictated by the form of the principle cause, the formal limitations of the tool’s nature do not make it unsuited to the task to which it is put. Its potency is actuated according to its natural operation, under the impulse of the artists’ power.31 Although the power of the principle cause is responsible for the actuation of the tool’s potency, its motion towards the end still has the quality of an authentic efficient cause, albeit in an instrumental sense.

30 This is noticeable when Aquinas’ teaching on sacramental causality in the Sentences is compared with his mature teaching in the Summa. See Super Sent. lib. 4 dist. 1 q. 1 a. 4 Solutio I and STh III, 62, 1, ad 2. While in the Sentences, Aquinas seems to de-scribe the natural instrumental end of the axe (the stool) as determined to a certain extent by the axe’s natural form, in the Summa Aquinas is more clear, limiting the natural form of the axe to its sharpness, the stool itself being a properly instrumental end determined by the form of the principle agent. See r. lyncH, “Cajetan’s Harp: Sacraments and the Life of Grace in Light of Perfective Instrumentality”, in: The Thomist 78 (2014), 97-99, n. 93.

31 “Ad secundum dicendum, quod instrumentum habet duas actiones: unam in-strumentalem, secundum quam operatur non in virtute propria, sed in virtute principalis agentis; aliam autem habet actionem propriam, quae competit sibi secundum propriam formam; sicut securi competit scindere ratione suae acuitatis, facere autem lectum in-quantum est instrumentum artis. Non autem perficit actionem instrumentalem nisi exer-cendo actionem propriam; scindendo enim facit lectum” (STh III, 62, 1, ad 2).

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Even in the case of ends ordained by divine power, outside the power of created being entirely—such as miracles, the forgiveness of sins, justification and deification in grace—the same principles of instrumental-ity apply, making those natural tools which God employs causes in the full instrumental sense. In the Summa, Aquinas applies these ideas in the case of the sacraments, describing the sacramental elements—the operation of which is already fitted to their purpose in the order of sign—as causes of grace in the instrumental sense.32

In the case of Christology, however, this same understanding of instrumentality is operative. In the unity of the incarnation, the divinity and humanity of Christ both retain the operations proper to their nature. Concerning the humanity of Christ, it retains its operations and the po-tency natural to its form. However, when functioning as an instrumental cause in relation to the divine nature, it is moved, not by its proper form, but according to the power of its principle cause. Aquinas again uses the example of a tool in the hands of an artisan to illustrate this.33

32 “Et similiter sacramenta corporalia per propriam operationem quam exercent circa corpus, quod tangunt, efficiunt operationem instrumentalem ex virtute divina circa animam: sicut aqua baptismi, abluendo corpus secundum propriam virtutem, abluit an-imam inquantum est instrumentum virtutis divinae; nam ex anima et corpore unum fit. Et hoc est quod Augustinus dicit, quod corpus tangit et cor abluit” (STh III, 62, 1, ad 2).

33 “Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, haeretici qui posuerunt in Christo unam voluntatem, posuerunt etiam in ipso unam operationem (…). Quia actio eius quod movetur ab altero, est duplex, una quidem quam habet secundum propriam formam; alia autem quam habet secundum quod movetur ab alio. Sicut securis operatio secundum propriam formam est incisio, secundum autem quod movetur ab artifice, operatio eius est facere scamnum (…). Et ideo, ubicumque movens et motum habent diversas formas seu virtutes operativas, ibi oportet quod sit alia propria operatio moventis, et alia propria ope-ratio moti, licet motum participet operationem moventis, et movens utatur operatione moti, et sic utrumque agit cum communione alterius. Sic igitur in Christo humana natura habet propriam formam et virtutem per quam operatur et similiter divina. Unde et humana na-tura habet propriam operationem distinctam ab operatione divina, et e converso. Et tamen divina natura utitur operatione naturae humanae sicut operatione sui instrumenti, et simi-liter humana natura participat operationem divinae naturae, sicut instrumentum participat operationem principalis agentis” (STh III, 19, 1, co.). Cajetan interprets this Christological passage, which clearly establishes an instrumental relationship between the operations of Christ’s two natures united in one person, with reference to the instrumental end of sancti-fication (caJetan, in STh III, 19, 1, nn. I, II [Leonine ed. 11:241-242]).

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This has particular implications for Aquinas’ doctrine of merit. Does Christ merit in his human nature, and if so, how? Because the hu-manity of Christ functions as an instrumental cause, there is no risk of ascribing the end of salvation to the power of a natural form. And yet the operations of Christ’s humanity are fitted proportionally to the ends of be-atitude and union with divinity—not by their natural power but as a tool to its instrumental end. An instrumental action cannot be distinguished from the action of the principle agent.34 For this reason, Christ’s merit is an in-trinsic principle, which emerges from the operation of his human nature, acting in union with his divinity. Because the motion of these operations is an authentic form of efficient causality, the activity of Christ in his human nature can be meritorious because of its union with the principle efficient causality of Christ’s divine nature. By the operation of his human nature according to its natural form, Christ is able to merit in the same manner as any other man, according to the goodness of nature.35 As head of the Church, however, Christ is united with all of the baptized and is able to merit for them because of this union.36 The operation of Christ’s human nature is a real human act, elevated by divine power. The merits which Christ applies to the baptized united with him in the communion of the Church are not those proportioned only to his human nature, however. As an instrument of the Word, Christ’s human nature is graced by its union with divinity and made capable of the sacrifice of his passion, which as a free offering in charity manifests the priestly identity of Christ that is made possible by the hypostatic union: Christ offers the flesh of his nature and ours to the Father in one single, perfect act of divine worship.37

Because instrumental efficient causality is so essential for Aqui-nas’ understanding of not only the sacraments, but of the humanity of Christ himself, Bañez is quick to criticize Cano for characterizing Christ’s passion as a purely “moral” or meritorious cause. It is true that in Aqui-

34 STh III, 19, 1, ad 2, et al. 35 STh III, 19, 3, co. 36 STh III, 19, 4, co. 37 STh III, 48, 3, co.

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nas’ Christology, a broad causal spectrum is at play: in question 48 of the Tertia Pars, Aquinas argues that the passion of Christ is the cause of our salvation by way of merit and satisfaction, by way of sacrifice, redemption and through efficient causality.38 Although there is a sense in which Chris-tic merit itself is a cause of our salvation, Bañez is quick to point out that when considering the relationship between the instrumental operations of Christ’s humanity (such as the passion itself) and the sacraments as instru-ments, efficient causality plays an essential role. In article 5 of question 62, Aquinas argues that the sacraments have their power from the passion of Christ, by way of merit and the operation of efficient causality, which operates for our salvation through the sacraments functioning as separated instruments. For this reason, Bañez notes that Aquinas’ argument for the causality of the sacraments is not framed in terms of meritorious causality, but efficient instrumental causality under the mode of artistry—as a saw shaping a stool under the directive impulse of the artist himself.39 This in turn focuses our attention on the instrumental character of Christ’s hu-manity, which highlights the role of merit in the context of the hypostatic union. For Aquinas, there is an inherent connection between instrumental causality and Christic merit, such that it is not possible to describe the hy-postatic union, and therefore the meritorious quality of Christ’s passion, without reference to natural potency, considered in its instrumental mode. Because of this, Bañez is able to argue that the sacraments themselves can-not be considered as purely meritorious causes—physical potency must be considered. By extension, however, if Cano were to persist in opposing merit to efficient causality in an absolute sense, his theory would raise questions about the integrity of the hypostatic union itself. Even if his

38 “Deinde considerandum est de effectu passionis Christi. Et primo, de modo efficiendi; secundo, de ipso effectu. Circa primum quaeruntur sex. Primo, utrum passio Christi causaverit nostram salutem per modum meriti. Secundo, utrum per modum satis-factionis. Tertio, utrum per modum sacrificii. Quarto, utrum per modum redemptionis. Quinto, utrum esse redemptorem sit proprium Christi. Sexto, utrum causaverit effectum nostrae salutis per modum efficientiae” (STh III, 48, Prooemium).

39 Bañez, in STh III, 62, 1, concl. 5, Comentarios Ineditos a la Tercera Parte, II, 47-48.

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aims are less systematic, his ambiguity on this point is evidence of a lack of integration on the subject of instrumental causality, which could affect the doctrine of merit directly, concerning the potency of Christ’s humanity and ours.

The language of instrumental artistry, applied by Aquinas to both the incarnation and creation, is important for Aquinas because it manifests not only divine power, but also divine goodness and wisdom. These same concepts apply when considering the merits of the baptized, whose actions are meritorious not only because of divine decree, but in accord with di-vine wisdom.40

Previous Thomistic commentators such as Cajetan had raised the issue of anthropology in the context of Christological instrumentality, highlighting the connection between Aquinas’ approach to Christology for the doctrine of merit in the baptized. When describing the possibility of merit for the faithful, Aquinas again employs the categories of instru-mentality: creatures have both a proper motion and operation according to their nature, and an operation by means of divine power, according to a divinely ordained end.41 Grace, as the ontological reality that makes this kind of instrumental operation possible, bears fruit in supernatural char-ity, which animates the soul through the enjoyment of God as goodness Himself.42 Despite the disproportion between our own will and beatitude,

40 J. wawrykow, God’s Grace and Human Action: Merit in the Theology of Thomas Aquinas. Notre Dame, University of Notre Dame Press, 1995, 185-189. See STh I-II, 5, 7, ad 1, et al.

41 “Manifestum est autem quod inter Deum et hominem est maxima inaequa-litas, in infinitum enim distant, et totum quod est hominis bonum, est a Deo. Unde non potest hominis ad Deum esse iustitia secundum absolutam aequalitatem, sed secundum proportionem quandam, inquantum scilicet uterque operatur secundum modum suum. Modus autem et mensura humanae virtutis homini est a Deo. Et ideo meritum hominis apud Deum esse non potest nisi secundum praesuppositionem divinae ordinationis, ita scilicet ut id homo consequatur a Deo per suam operationem quasi mercedem, ad quod Deus ei virtutem operandi deputavit. Sicut etiam res naturales hoc consequuntur per proprios motus et operationes, ad quod a Deo sunt ordinatae. Differenter tamen, quia creatura rationalis seipsam movet ad agendum per liberum arbitrium, unde sua actio habet rationem meriti; quod non est in aliis creaturis” (emphasis mine; STh I-II, 114, 1, co.).

42 STh I-II, 114, 4, co.

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under the influx of the Holy Spirit, charity produces actual condign merit, which is proportioned to eternal life.43 Because of this, the Thomist school argued that the merits of Christ’s humanity were intrinsically efficacious. By extension, concerning this same question Cajetan observed that the lan-guage of instrumental causality enables an authentically intrinsic doctrine of merit. Cajetan contrasted this approach with that of Scotus, who sees no intrinsic merit in this action; God simply decides to accept the actions of those who have previously received grace as meritorious.44 Scotus’ ex-trinsic and univocal approach actually effects the primacy of charity in relation to merit—for Scotus, grace does not fundamentally change the act of natural love, but only raises it by degree.45 For Aquinas, the act of charity is uniquely possible to the state of grace, and meritorious in itself because of the new instrumental relationship established between God and man in divine sonship.46 By contrast, while Scotus establishes an uncom-

43 STh I-II, 114, 3, co. 44 “Scilicet motio Spiritus Sancti et gratia, non sunt duae disperatae causae mer-

iti, sed sunt causae subordinatae: motio quidem Spiritus Sancti ut actio causae primae, et gratia ut causa secunda operis inquantum meritori. Movet enim Spiritus Sanctus homi-nem ad merendum mediante gratia (…). Contra (…) occurrit Scotus, in I Sent., dist. XVII, qu. I, tenens quod actus elicitus a gratia non est meritorious simpliciter vitae aeternae; sed oportet quod, ultra hoc quod sit informatus gratia, sit acceptus Deo, idest ordinatus a Deo ad consequendam vitam aeternam.” caJetan, in STh. I-II, 114, 3, n. III (Leonine ed. 7:348). See scotus, in I Sent., d. XVII, q. 1, a. 1. Concerning the relationship be-tween merit and reward, however, Cajetan differs slightly from de Soto and Bañez. See caJetan, in STh III, 62, 1, n. V (Leonine ed. 12:21). Bañez, in STh III, 62, 1, concl. 5, Comentarios Ineditos a la Tercera Parte, vol. 2:48.

45 scotus, Ord. 1, d. 17, q. 3, nn. 179-82 (Vat., 5.224-26); ibid., Ord. 3, d. 27, q. un., n. 63 (Vat., 10.77); ibid., Lect. 1, d. 17, n. 79-81 (Vat., 17.206-207); ibid., Lect. 3, d. 23, q. un., n. 48 (Vat., 21.115-116). As cited by t. osBorne, Human Action in Thomas Aquinas, John Duns Scotus and William of Ockham. Washington, D.C., The Catholic University of America Press, 2014, 212, n. 81.

46 “For Thomas, grace and charity are necessary for a meritorious act if there is going to be some intrinsic way in which the agent and his acts are proportioned to charity. God could save someone without such an intrinsic proportion, but this proportion itself does not depend on God’s free decision. By their very nature, grace and charity cause merit. In contrast, Scotus does not argue for the necessity of merit by considering any in-trinsic features of grace or charity, such as their ability to raise the agent to a supernatural level, or the way in which charity enables the agent to perform a specifically distinct kind

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fortable proportionality between charity and the natural will, he fails to establish a meaningful proportionality between the infused theological life and beatitude. Therefore while merit is possible for Scotus, his extrincisist anthropology of grace makes it difficult to speak of the divinization of the person in meaningful terms. By contrast, Aquinas is able to argue that the merits of the just are intrinsic because Christ’s merit is intrinsic, therefore building an anthropology of grace around a more robust understanding of the hypostatic union itself. In this we find a definitive hallmark of the Thomistic school, which views merit as essentially analogical, rather than univocal.47 By pointing to the importance of physical causality in the con-text of Christological merit, Bañez speaks from within this tradition and calls our attention to the conceptual connection that unites Christology, sacramentology and grace.48

Since at least the time of De Auxiliis, the Thomist school has placed great importance on the doctrine of grace, insisting on its intrinsic and di-vinizing effects on the person, who is caught up and transfigured in his nat-ural powers by union with divinity. This incarnational analogy animates Thomistic virtue theory, in which the theological life enriches, perfects and elevates the pursuit of happiness according to natural virtue. This vision, most recently championed by the late Servais Pinckaers, O.P., has always been opposed to the extrinsicism and deontological legalism first of nom-

of act. Scotus thinks that the connection between morality, grace, and charity is extrinsic and established by God’s free decree” (T. osBorne, Human Action, 212-213).

47 r. garrigou-lagrange, Reality: A Synthesis of Thomistic Thought, translated by P. Cummins. Ex Fontibus Co., 2007, 265-266.

48 For Bañez, Aquinas’ mature teaching on the sacraments as instrumental caus-es is enabled by the concept of obediential potency. “Gratia creatur a Deo; sed ad crea-tionem solus Deus concurrit et nullo modo creatura neque instrumentaliter quidem: ergo sacramenta non possunt concurrare ad gratiam. Ad hoc respondeo negatur major, quia creatio simpliciter est ex dicatur quod sequitur quod anima rationalis non creatur a Deo quia etiam producitur in materia a Deo, et videtur educi de potentia obedientiali ipsius subjecti: respondetur negando partatem rationis, nam anima rationalis ita producitur a Deo, quod non dependet a subjecto in fieri et conservari. At vero gratia, quae est quaedam qualitas et accidens supernaturalis, ita producitur in subjecto, quod dependet ab illo in fieri et conservari.” Bañez, in STh III, 62, 1, arg. 3, Comentarios Ineditos a la Tercera Parte, II, 50).

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inalism, and by extension Molinism and casuistry.49 For Cano, however, grace is not clearly distinguished from merit; although Trent taught that grace was contained in the sacraments, Cano argues that the sacraments contain the merits of the blood of Christ. The fact that Cano sees this as unproblematic indicates that he does not sufficiently distinguish between grace and merit in the person who receives the sacraments; further, the distinction between the merits of Christ himself and the meritorious acts of the baptized person is also absent. This stark univocity leaves little room for the perfection and divinization of the person in supernatural charity, which the Thomist tradition understood to be an analogical outgrowth of the baptized person’s contact with the sacred humanity of Christ. The im-plications of moral causality for the doctrine of grace were not lost outside of the Thomistic world, however. Although very different from Aquinas’ analogical approach, the extrinsic univocity of Cano’s sacramental the-ology became unfortunately popular in other circles, particularly among those who favored an extrinsic approach to grace. At the time of De Aux-iliis, Vásquez (d. 1604) chose to describe the sacraments as moral causes. Subsequently, Cano’s theory was embraced by later Jesuits sympathetic to Molinism, such as de Lugo (d. 1660) and Franzelin (d. 1886).50 In part because of its association with these thinkers, moral causality remained very popular throughout the modern period. Bañez’ critique, however, highlights an important dimension of the Thomistic synthesis, in which Christology, the sacraments and moral theology are interconnected not only by piety or by common purpose, but speculatively through the con-cept of instrumental efficient causality. Bañez’ challenge to Cano on this point calls attention to a critical juncture of speculative theology that is overlooked when moral theology, sacramentology and Christology are

49 s. Pinckaers, The Sources of Christian Ethics, 3rd edition, translated by M. Thomas Noble. Washington, D.C., The Catholic University of America Press, 1995, 191-298.

50 J. auer – H.m. riley, A General Doctrine of the Sacraments and the Mys-tery of the Eucharist, vol. 6 of Dogmatic Theology, edited by J. Auer and J. Ratzinger, translated by E. Leiva-Merikakis. Washington, D.C., The Catholic University of America Press, 1995, 79.

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viewed independently. When the broader implications of this doctrine are accepted, however, a synthetic integration between grace, the moral life and sacro-Christological participation begins to flourish. For Thomists, the doctrine of instrumental causality not only allows the sacraments to func-tion as true efficient instrumental causes, but also enables the baptized per-son to participate analogically in divine life, as one whose graced human activity has been united to the merit of Christ himself.

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Angelicum 1_2014.indb 126 14/04/15 12.43

Domingo Bañez on Moral and Physical Causality: Christic Merit and Sacramental Realism

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Transcript of Domingo Bañez on Moral and Physical Causality: Christic Merit and Sacramental Realism