Divided we fail: Time for the EU to speak with one voice to Belarus

DIVIDED WE FAIL

Anaïs Marin FIIA BRIEFING PAPER 85 • June 2011

85

TIME FOR THE EU TO SPEAK

WITH ONE VOICE TO BELARUS

• Brussels’attemptstodrawBelarusclosertotheEUhaveevidentlyfailed.ActiveengagementwiththeregimedidnotresultindemocratisationnorarapprochementwiththeEUanymorethanthepreviouspolicyofisolationdid.

• ThefailureispartlyduetopersistentdivergenceswithintheEUitself:whendealingwithBelarus,toomanyEUmembersgoitalone.Farfrombeingaprudentdivisionoflabour,thepreferenceforbilateralismleadstofreeriding.

• KeytounderstandingtheEU’sdivisions ishoweachof the27memberstatesperceivesRussia’sroleinthesharedneighbourhood.TheincapacitytoenvisageBelarusoutsidetheframeofrelationswithMoscowisthemaincommondenominatorintheEUcountries’(too)manyforeignpoliciesonBelarus.

• Whateveritsnationalvariations,thisschemepreventstheEUfrombuildingarealisticpartnershipwithBelarus.Thistrendshouldurgentlybereversed,infact,sinceitplaysintothehandsoftheregimeandpushesitbackintothearmsofMoscow.

• Toremedythissituation,theEUshouldnotonlyspeakwithonevoice,butinalanguagethattheauthoritiesunderstand:pragmatism.ProvidedthatMinsksetspoliticalprisonersfree,aroadmapfortheconditionalsupportofeconomicreformsandgradualregimeevolutioncanbenegotiated.

• Acoalitionofthewillingshouldbeformedtocarryoutthetask.Regionalleadershipisneeded,butunderthesupervisionofEUmemberstatesabletobrokerthenewdealwiththeBelarusianelites.

DIVIDED WE FAIL

FIIA Briefing Paper 85

June 2011

TIME FOR THE EU TO SPEAK WITH ONE VOICE TO BELARUS

The EU's Eastern Neighbourhood and Russia research programme

The Finnish Institute of International Affairs

Anaïs Marin

Researcher


THE FINNISH INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 3

The West has come to admit that the Belarusianregime is indifferent to incentives and sanctionsalike.ThecrackdownontheoppositionthathasbeenongoingsinceAlexanderLukashenka’s lastfraudu-lentre-electionshowsthatBelarus isdriftingeverfurtherawayfromdemocraticvaluesandtheEU’s“ring of friends”.Reversing this trend requiresEUmemberstatestoacknowledgethattheybearpartoftheresponsibilityforthefailureoftheengagementpolicylaunchedinOctober2008.

Thepurposeofthispaperisnottostigmatiseanyoftheparties but rather topoint out that theEU-27collectively failed due to internal divisions.Whenspeakingwithonevoicewasmostneeded,theinca-pacity tomaintaina criticalmassof supporters infavourofacomprehensivepolicy,whetherto“hook”ortocoercetheBelarusianregime,ledtoabrouhahathatwassmartlyexploitedbyLukashenkahimself.

ThepreferenceforbilateralisminrelationtoBelarus–andtoRussia,forthatmatter–ledcontradictorynationalpolicies tocancel eachotherout, consist-ently undermining theEU’s geopolitical positionsin the “shared neighbourhood” in the process.Deprivedofacoherentandproactivestrategy,theEU is “losing” Belarus. This should prompt itsmemberstofinallyagreeonarealisticroadmapforapragmaticNewDealwithofficialMinsk.Andtosticktoittogether.

The great divide

Internaldivisionsare a typical featureof theEU’sforeignpolicy-makingmachinery,butevenmoresowhenitcomestoBelarus.Consideringtherangeoftheirrespectiveinterestsintheregion,EUcountriescouldhardlyreachmorethantheminimumconsen-susonBelarus.

Dividing lines distinguish three different groups.Firstly,foramajorityofmemberstates,Belarusisbutaremoteandunknownpost-Sovietcountrynotwor-thyofmuchattention.Secondly,attheoppositeendofthespectrum,amongtheconcernedfewareBela-rus’neighboursandothernewEUmemberswhosenationalinterestsareaffectedbythesituationinandwithBelarus.Thirdly,acoregroupcomprisescoun-trieswhoseambiguouspositionisthemostdamagingfor the coherence of EU policies: those favouringlaissez fairemerelytoavoidoffendingRussia.

InthefirstgrouponefindsSouthernandsmallmem-berstatessuchasGreece,Portugal,Malta,Cyprus,Bulgaria, Ireland,LuxemburgandSlovenia,whichhave limited interactions with Belarus. To someextentSpain,Belgium,DenmarkandEstoniasharetheirlackofinterest.ThisobjectivelyimpliesthatapassivemajoritytendstosupportapolicyonBelarusdependingonfactorsotherthangenuineconcernforthefateofthecountry.PreferencefortheSouthernortheEasternvectoroftheENPisthemainvariablethatdeterminestheiralignmentandquestforpoliti-caldividendswithinEUcoalitions.

Nothingnewhere,butitisofcriticalimportanceinthecaseofBelarussinceBrusselshasnocontractualbasisand thereforeno institutional framework forofficial dialoguewithMinsk. Following Lukashen-ka’s1996“constitutionalcoup”,theEUfrozemulti-lateralrelationswiththehighestrepresentativesoftheBelarusiangovernment.Thisopenedthedoortoindividual free riding, unofficial negotiations andad hoc coalition-building.

A discredited dual leadership

OfalltheEUmembers,PolandandLithuaniarankBelarusthehighestontheirnationalagendas,albeitfor different reasons. Common to both– and alsotoLatvia–isthefactthatneighbourhoodrelationswithBelarusprecededtheEuropeanisationoftheirforeign policy. In otherwords,when bilateralismdoesnotallowthemtoreachtheirgoals,theyturntheissueintoamultilateraloneandlobbyforothermember states to follow their stance. Conversely,when the EU’s common foreign policy threatenstheir national interests, they revert to bilateralframeworks. Illustrative of this strategy of “cus-tomising”theEU isthewayWarsaw(dis)solvesitsminorityissuewithintheEU,turningtheBelarusianregime’sattacksontheUnionofPolesofBelarusintoahumanrightsproblemforthewholeEU.

BelarusisclearlyapriorityofPoland’sEasternpolicy,theaimofwhichistotapintoPoland’sexperienceoftransitiontopromoteandsupervisetheintegrationofEasternneighboursintoEuro-Atlanticstructures.Pursuing this goal in thenameof theEU is awayfor Poland to fulfil its historical regional leader-ship aspirations.The task also implies containingsimilar ambitions ofGermany andRussia, and onoccasionunitingwithoneofthemagainsttheother.


PL18,3

24,0

LT12,3

11,4

IT5,8

2,8

DE30,3

16,9

SE1,5

2,5

FI1,3

1,9EE0,9

4,4

LV2,4

10,9

CZ3,7

2,9SK

1,2

1,9

HU2,3

1,9

RO0,4

2,6

AT3,2

2,0

FI1,3

1,9

Country code

Share of total EU27 exports to Belarus (in %)

Share of total EU27 imports from Belarus (in %)

DK0,7

1,4

NL4,3

2,2

Belarus's main EU trade partners (2010)

MINSK

Source: Eurostat, author's calculations.


The2007Polish-Germanrapprochement,forexam-ple,servedasaplatformforabroaderWarsaw-ledcoalition including Sweden, the Baltic states, theVisegrádcountriesandUkrainetocondemnRussia’sAugust2008interventioninGeorgia.

TheFive-daywartriggeredaradicalpolicychangeintheEU.Fromthenon,Polandadvocatedengage-mentwithLukashenka’sregimeasthelesseroftwoevils,theworstbeingthat“anisolatedBelaruscouldbecome completely ensnared by Russia”, becausethatwould“jeopardizedemocratictransformationand–more importantly inWarsaw’s view–dashhopes that Belarus could become a buffer statebetweenPolandandRussia”.1

Withthisinmind,PolishForeignMinisterRadosławSikorski convincedhisEU homologues to endorsethe idea of resuming the dialogue with Belarus,virtuallywithoutconditions.Hethussetthemonariskycoursewhichhitawallon19December2010:havingpledgeda€3billionEUassistancepackagetoLukashenka shouldhehold freeand fair elections,Radosław Sikorski and Guido Westerwelle wereridiculed6weekslaterwhenLukashenkadupedtheWestonceagain.

Polish opposition leader JarosławKaczyński holdsSikorski personally responsible for this affront tothewholeEU. In an article entitled “Sikorski lostBelarus”2,hedeploredthefactthatPolish“unpro-fessional” diplomacy had neglected to maintaincontacts with the most pro-Western segment oftheBelarusianopposition,notablywithAlexanderMilinkevich,whoranforpresidentin2006butnotin 2010 for lack ofWestern support. In urgingEUcountriestobackVladimirNeklyaevinstead,whomhe(wrongly)assumedwaspro-RussianenoughtosatisfybothMoscowandthoseintheEUwhorefrainfrominterferinginBelarusianaffairsforfearofirri-tatingtheKremlin,Sikorskipickedacandidatewhohad little chanceofuniting theoppositionbehindhimandbeatingLukashenka.

1 Wikileakscabledated12December2008,quotedbyDaneiko,

E.(2010)“EU-Belarus:politicaladventurismorpoliticsastheart

ofthepossible?”,Bell11(21),p.3.

2 “Sikorski przegał Białorus”, Rzeczpospolita, 1 February

2011.SeealsoKaścian,K.“DoesPolandReallyKnowBelarus?”,

TransitionsOnline,4March2011.

Adding to the internal divisions of the Belarusianoppositionitself,theissueofwhichoppositionpartyorleadertosupportisarecurringcausefordisputeamongWesterncountries.Itdividesthetransatlanticcampbetweenhard-liners(theUS,theUKandtheNetherlands) which refuse to engage in dialoguewiththeBelarusianauthoritiesandopenlysupportgrass-rootsoppositionforces,andthedefendersofamorebalanced“dualtrackstrategy”whichadvocatemaintainingchannelsforcriticaldiplomaticdialoguewith official Minsk. Within the latter group, theaccommodatingstanceofLithuaniadrewthemostcriticslately.WalkinginthefootstepsofSilvioBer-lusconi,in2009PresidentDaliaGrybauskaitėstartedopenlycourtingLukashenkaonthegroundsthatheis “the best guarantor of Belarus’s independence”(read: against Russian neo-imperialist appetites).Indeed, formany inVilnius theBelarusianopposi-tionrepresentsathreat.Shouldtheycometopower,BelarusiannationalistswouldsurelychallengesomefoundingmythsofLithuania’sstatehood, ifnot itsterritorialintegrity.

OpportunismthusdictatesLithuania’spositiononBelarus.Thetwocountriesareeconomicallyandcul-turallyinterdependent,asstatisticsontourismandmovementsofpeopleillustrate.In2010,nolessthan3.5millionborder-crossingswereregisteredattheLithuanian-Belarusianborder.MinskandVilniusarelessthan170kmapart,makingtheLithuaniancapi-talashoppingandbusinesscentrefortheBelarusianmiddle-classandMinsk-basedentrepreneurs.Theselinkages, together with Lithuania’s dependenceon Belarusian rawmaterials and transit facilities,explainVilnius’s blocking ofEU sanctions againsttheregime.3

What ensues is a paradoxical situation that putspressureontheLithuanianpolicy-makers.Ontheonehand,Realpolitikdictatesaninterestina“stable,prosperousandsovereign”Belarus.HencearecentdealfortheKlaipedaseaporttohandleVenezuelanoilcargoes,courtesyofwhichLukashenkaintendsto limit Belarus’s energy dependence on Russia.

3 During the lastEUCouncilmeetings,Lithuaniavetoedthe

adoptionofeconomicsanctionsagainstkeyBelarusiancompanies

whicharealsovitalsuppliersfortheLithuanianeconomy.Italso

refusedtofollowthe14OSCEmemberstateswhichon6Aprilac-

tivatedthe“Moscowmechanism”torequestanindependentin-

quiryonpost-electoralviolenceinBelarus.


Ontheotherhand, in tryingto“hook”Lukashen-ka’sBelarusasabulwarkagainstRussianencroach-mentintheregion,Vilniusrunstheriskofnotonlyoffending the Kremlin but also Russian businessinterests, known to have percolated through theLithuanianestablishmentovertheyears.

The “Russia first” bias

MostoftheremainingEUcountriesconcernedwiththe fate of Belarus consider that Belarus indisput-ably belongs to Russia’s sphere of interests. Thisstereotypicalconceptionimpliesthatforthesakeofmaintainingthegeopoliticalstatus quo theydismissanyattemptat“unbundling”BelarusfromRussia’sembrace.Asfarastheyareconcerned,EUpoliciesonBelarusshouldacquireMoscow’spriorapprovalorevenbeimplementedthroughRussianmediation.

Originally a German approach, the “Russia first,Russia only” doctrine has spread due to inertiawithin the EU bureaucracy. It traditionally domi-nates in the diplomatic establishment of the BigThree(Germany,FranceandGreatBritain),butalsopartly orientates the Eastern policies of Italy andcountries dependent on Russian energy supplies,suchasSlovakia,AustriaandFinland.TheproblemisnotonlythatthisdoctrinebiasestheirunderstandingofBelarustothepointthatitactuallyplaysintothehandsofRussia– assuming that the latter’s inter-estisindeedtoputanendtoBelarus’ssovereignty.The“Russiafirst”principlealsofavoursfree-ridingtacticswhichthwartjointinitiativesandunderminesolidaritywithintheEUfamily,tothedetrimentofsmalleror“newer”memberstates,asthelaunchingofNordStreamrevealedsomeyearsago.

TheforeignpoliciesofGermanyandFranceprovideampleevidenceofthistrend.BeittosafeguardtheirbusinessinterestsortospareRussia’ssusceptibilities,theirhandlingof the“Belarusdilemma”hasbeenambiguousindeed.InOctober2008forexample,theGermanambassadortoMinskwastheonlyEuropeandiplomatwhoattendedtheinauguralsessionofthenewly-electedBelarusianParliament,despiteapriorconsensuswithhispeerstoboycotttheceremonytodenounceelectoralfraud.

DominantintheFrenchdiplomaticapparatusaswell,the“Russiafirst”tropismhasalsoledParistoturnablindeyetotheBelarusianregime’sauthoritarian

behaviour. Paris failed to criticise the conditionsofLukashenka’s lastre-election: theQuaid’Orsaydid not issue any official statement and the onlydisapprovingwordswereutteredbytheMinistry’sspokespersoninresponsetoaquestionfromajour-nalist during a press conference on 20 December.For the record, that sameweek FrenchdiplomatswerebusynegotiatingwithMoscowoverthesaleofMistral-classwarshipstoRussia.ThefactthatFor-eignMinisterMichèleAlliot-Mariedidnotaddhersignature to thecolumnWilliamHagueandGuidoWesterwelle published on 28 January in the Wall Street Journal to condemn the violent crackdownagainst the opposition obviously reduced the dip-lomaticimpactofthispamphletandwasfavourablyreceivedinMinskaswellasinMoscow.

The extent of the damage

Infailingtoreachaconsensusonacomprehensivestrategyinitsownranks,theEUhasputitselfinabadlight:incoherence,duplicationandthethwart-ingofcommonpoliciesdeprivedBrusselsofmostofits levers against the Belarusian regime, the latteralwaysbeingquicktoidentifyandplayontheEU’sdivisions.Theextentof thedamagecausedbythisbrouhahaiseasytoassessfromtheperspectiveofatleastthreefailedpolicies:strategicthinking,engage-mentandsanctions.

Firstly, the EU lacks a joint strategy on BelarusbecauseeffortstodeviseacomprehensiveregionalframeworkfordrawingEasternneighbourscloserto theEUwere stymiedbymembersmakingcon-cessionstoRussiansensitivities.Hencethefateofthe 2003 Polish-Lithuanian “Eastern Dimension”initiative,inwhichcountriesblindedbythe“Russiafirst”goldenruleperceivedaRussophobicidée fixeon thepartofPoland.FiveyearswerewastedonpolicycircumvolutionsbeforetheideaofaSouth/EastdifferentiationoftheENPbecamemainstreamagain.ThankstothebackingofSweden,butalsototheAugust2008Russian-GeorgianconflictwhichpromptedtheCouncil toquicklyadoptaregionalcontainmentpolicy,Poland’s revamped initiativepassedthetestandbecametheEasternPartnership(EaP).Fromtheoutset,theEaPlackedlegitimacy,however, due to the conspicuous absence at thePraguelaunchingsummiton7May2009ofmajorEU leaders apart fromAngelaMerkel andDonaldTusk.


Secondly,restoringthedialoguewiththeBelarusianregimeinOctober2008wasahastyanduncoordi-nated decision. Taken outside of any long-termstrategic frame, this tactical step was decidedlypremature:ofall12conditionssetbytheEU in itsNovember2006non-paper,theauthoritieshadful-filledonlyone(liberatingthreepoliticalprisoners),whilethe28SeptemberparliamentaryelectionshadagainfallenshortofmeetingOSCEstandards.Againstthisbackground,Poland’s insistenceon liftingthevisabanagainsttheregime’scronieswasanunjusti-fiedconcession.FarfromencouragingLukashenkatodemocratise, thisunilateral gestureofgoodwillbolsteredhispopularityathomeandprovidedhimwith undue legitimacy abroad.This accommodat-ingstanceconsistentlyunderminedthecoherenceoftheEU’svalue-basedmessage,obviouslymarredby double standards. It also alienated part of theBelarusianpro-Europeanforces,whichdeploredthefactthattheEUwaslessconcernedwithBelarus’sdemocratisation thanwith its geopoliticalorienta-tions, since from then on theEU's conditionwasmerelythatLukashenkashouldrefrainfromrecog-nisingSouthOssetiaandAbkhazia.4

Thirdly, the current return to coercive diplomacywill certainly prove fruitless as well: nationaldivergences hinder the unanimous making ofstrong enough decisions or compromise their

4 DenisMelyantsov(2010)“Belarus-EU:protractednormaliza-

tion”,BelarusianYearbook2009,Minsk:BISS,p.70.

implementation. The restrictive measures votedinbytheCouncilon31Januaryareobviously“toolittle, too late”. To be effective, severe sanctionsshouldhavebeenintroducedimmediatelyaftertheviolentdispersionofstreetprotestersandthearrestofoppositioncandidates.ThiswasadvocatedbytheEuropeanParliament,whichon20 Januaryunani-mouslyadoptedaresolutioncallingfortheCouncilto follow Washington's example and introducetargetedeconomicsanctionsagainstthecompaniesclosesttotheBelarusianregime.DefendedbyPolish,British,Dutch, Swedish andCzechdiplomats, theideaofanembargo,howeverlimited,wasoriginallyrejectedbyGermany,France,Lithuania,Latvia,Fin-land,SpainandPortugal.

Iftheintentionwasindeedtosuffocatetheregime,the attempt should have been coordinated andtimely,astheEUisnolongerinapositiontonegoti-atenow.Havingde facto expelledBelarusfromtheEaP,itdoesnothavemuchlefttooffer,andreturn-ingtoconditionality,beit“soft”(carrots)or“hard”(sanctions),willonlydiscredititfurther.

United in diversity – can the EU rise to the challenge?

Upuntilnow,theEU’spolicyonBelarushasdevel-oped as a by-product of Russia-Belarus relationsand in response to external factors, such as the2008Russia-Georgiawarorthe2010coolingdownofRussian-Belarusianrelations.Onbothoccasions,Lukashenkausedthe“Russiafirst”tropismofsome

Sergey Lavrov, Bernard Kouchner, Radosław Sikorski and Guido Westerwelle at the Weimar Triangle and Russia meeting

of foreign ministers in Paris, 23 June 2010. Photo: The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland.


member states to outplay theWest and remain inpower.Nowisthetimeforarealisticdiagnosisandastrategicshifttowardsamoreproactivestance.

TheEUshouldtakeresponsibilityforitsoversightsandusewhatlittleisleftofitsleveragetonegotiateastep-by-stepregimetransformationthatwillnotthreatenLukashenkapersonally.Politicalliberalisa-tion,ifnotregimechange,couldfollowsuitbywayofaspill-over.IfEUcountriesstepupeffortstosup-porttheembryonicBelarusiancivilsociety,thewindof changemight even blow fromwithin it soonerthanexpected:forthefirsttimeever,pro-EUviewsprevailinBelarusianpublicopinion,indicatingthatamindsetchangeisalreadyunderway.5

To avoid missing its chance, the EU has to stopbalancing between value-based discourses andpragmatic interests.The latter have long dictateda tacit shift inEU foreignpolicy towardsRealpoli-tik,whereasdemocratic ideals, contradicted fromwithinbyfreeriders,failtoconvince.NotonlyisittimeforEUcountriestospeakwithonevoice,theymustalsospeakLukashenka’slanguage,beasprag-maticashim,andadmit that theremustbe,asheclaims,spheresofsharedinterestsinwhichBrusselsandMinskmayengageinmutuallybeneficialcoop-erationonanequalfooting.

AdvocatingacompromisingattitudetowardsofficialMinskwill,ofcourse,turnBelarusintoyetanotherlitmus test for the ENP’s declared democracy-promotion mission. However, returning to thestatus quo anteofcoercivediplomacywouldmaketheEUpronenotonlytolosingface,butalsotolos-ingBelarusaltogether.Theunwaveringdictatorstillhasatrickortwouphissleeve:ifbothRussiaandtheIMFraisethebiddingtogranthimloans,hemaywellturntoChinainsteadforsupport.

Belarusiscurrentlyfacingadramaticeconomiccri-sis.ThisimpliesthatRussia’spressureonthecountrytoliberaliseandopenitsmarketreadilyconstrainsthe regime to make concessions, at least on theeconomic front.However, structural reforms also

5 AnindependentsurveyrevealedthatinMarch2011over50%

ofrespondentswouldpreferBelarusto jointheEUratherthan

unitewithRussia. This is a 20-point rise compared to the af-

termathofthe2006presidentialelections.Cf.www.iiseps.org/

press15.html.

require foreign investmentsandmoderntechnolo-giesthattheWestisinabetterpositiontoprovide.EnsuringthatEuropeancompaniescanparticipatewhentheprivatisationofBelarusianindustrialassetsgetsunderwayisthemostefficientwayforBrusselsto stay in the race. No doubtEU companieswithbusiness interests in Belaruswill support thepro-ject.ThisactiveeconomicengagementshouldhelpsafeguardBelarus’sstatehoodagainsttheappetitesofcorruptedRussiancapitalismwhilealsopromot-inggoodgovernancestandards,atleastintermsofbusinessculture.

The EU should therefore present the Belarusiangovernment with a concrete offer to deepen eco-nomic cooperation in return for a gradual regimetransformation.Thedealshouldbestraightforwardandplainly stated: liberal reforms in exchange forWestern support for Belarus’s statehood.Theonlynon-negotiableconditionforopeningthedealisthatpoliticalprisonersshouldbeacquittedandreleased.

Time for a New Deal

As a sign of goodwill, the EU shouldmake a uni-lateral move that will surelymeet the Belarusianpopulation’s expectations and leave Lukashenkaabashed:visa liberalisationforbona fide travellers.Thiswouldnotconcernregimecroniesonthevisaban list, but millions of other Belarusians couldbenefit from the measure. Over the past monthsneighbourshavewaivedvisafeesonabilateralbasis,namelyfor“national”(categoryD)visas,whereasapricey€65tariffremainsforSchengenvisas.Andyet,this document is the EU’smost visible “window-pane”,showinghowseriousBrusselsreallyisaboutfacilitatingpeople-to-peoplecontactstoencouragedemocratisationatthegrassroots.

NegotiationsonaVisaFacilitationAgreementstartedlastFebruary,buttheprocessisalengthyonethatmaytakeupto twoyears tocomplete.Meanwhile,theEUshouldofferareciprocal50%pricedecreaseforSchengenvisasandacceleratethe implementa-tion of the small cross-border traffic agreementsrecentlysignedwithBelarus’sneighbours.BuildingonthepositiveexperienceoftheSchengenvisacen-treoperatinginChisinau,asimilarcentrecouldbeopenedundertheauspicesoftheEUDelegationinMinsk.


Secondly, theEU should turn itsweakness into astrength by rationalising the existing division oftasks among its members. Guidelines should beagreeduponandfixedinaroadmapassigningclearleadershiptoacoalitionofthewilling.Poland,whichassumes the presidency of the European Councilon1July,willsurelytakethelead.ConsideringthefiascoofSikorski’spreviouspolicy,however,hisEUcounterpartsshouldnotletPolandgoitalone:Ger-manyandSwedenshouldbetheotherpillarsofthisopen coalition,whichmight even include France,shouldtherecenttrendforreactivatingtheWeimarTrianglecooperationbeconfirmed.AsforLithuania,itcanuseitsresourcesoftrustinBelarustorestorethe dialoguewith the authorities. ItsEU partnersshouldensure,however,thatVilniususesitscurrentchairmanshipoftheOSCEforthecommonEuropeangood,whichistofosterelectoralreformsinBelarusaheadofthe2012parliamentaryelections,andnotformoreselfishpurposes.

Toprevent free riding, roles shouldbedistributedbetweenplanners, responsible fordraftinga long-term strategy together with the Commission andthe European External Action Service;promoters,tomaintaindialoguewiththemostreform-mindedsegmentsof theBelarusianbureaucracy6;andbro-kers,abletosellthedealtoMoscow(Slovakiacouldplaysucharole)andtoWashington(thiscouldbethetaskofHungary,whichiscallingforenhancedtransatlanticcooperationonBelarus).Tosupervisethisnewdeal,coordinateEUandnationalpoliciesand embody the EU’s unanimous voice, a specialrepresentativeforBelarusshouldbeappointed.Histaskwouldbetonegotiatewiththerulingelitesineachrelevantsector,withinastandingcommitteeopento thosemembersof theoppositionreadytoresumedialoguewiththeauthorities.

Thirdly, the EU should rethink the value-baseddimension of its neighbourhoodpolicy.The reluc-tance of Belarus to embrace democracy shouldencourageafurtherdifferentiationbetweenEasternPartners in terms of the incentives, rewards andsanctionscontainedintheEU’s“offer”.Nonetheless,the EU should reactivate multilateral democracy-promotioninstrumentsandplatforms(suchastheEaP Civil Society Forum) to encourage regional

6 Jarábik,B.(2011)“Belarusbeyondsanctions”,FRIDEPolicy

Brief72(April).

cooperation, benchmarking and good governance.ImplementingtheEuropeanConsensusonDemoc-racy and reactivating the European InstrumentforDemocracyandHumanRights(EIDHR),whichoffersflexibleandefficientmechanismstosupportcivilsocietyincountrieswhereNGOsarepreventedfrom functioning freely7, is a priority.Here again,steppingupeffortsrequiresandenhancescoordina-tion between sponsors.The Civil Society StabilityforBelarusprojectrecentlylaunchedbytheNordiccountries shows that someregional initiativescanquicklybeturned intodeeds.FollowingupontheSolidaritywithBelarus InternationalDonors’ con-ference organised inWarsaw on 2 February 2011,similar meetings should be arranged to see to itthatdemocracypromotioninBelarusremainshighon the West’s agenda, notwithstanding the shifttowardsincreasedpragmatismadvocatedhere.

7 Řiháčková,V.(2010)“Alongandwindingroad?Thequestfor

‘flexible’EUdemocracyfunding”,PASOSPolicyBrief2.

Anaïs Marin


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Divided we fail: Time for the EU to speak with one voice to Belarus

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